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Starlink helped Ukraine pull off Operation Vivaldi. Now Starlink could help Russia take the ground back

22 October 2026 at 15:01

Elon Musk: “Starlink will never turn off for Ukraine”

  • Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi may have begun as early as March
  • The counteroffensive seemingly inflicted more damage on a pair of Russian field armies than previously thought
  • But the gains could be fleeting if a new speed cap on Ukraine's military Starlink terminals stays in place

The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi—its secretive counteroffensive east of Sloviansk in northern Donetsk Oblast—started earlier than first reported, and by the time it ended on 14 October it had cost the Russians more than 8,000 troops, by the 3rd Army Corps' count.

It was a major Ukrainian victory in one of the most important sectors of Russia's 56-month wider war on Ukraine. But it could prove to be a temporary win, one the Russians may be able to partially reverse, if the administration of US President Donald Trump continues to throttle Starshield, the military version of Starlink that Ukraine's drones and commanders rely on.

The Ukrainians' former command and control advantage, largely attributable to once-reliable Starlink and Starshield access, was pivotal as Operation Vivaldi played out in the Donbas region in stages starting in March. That advantage shrank practically overnight on 14 October, when a new speed cap began cutting off Ukraine's Starshield terminals whenever they moved faster than about 160 km/h (100 mph).

The 3rd Army Corps attacked east of Sloviansk and north of Lyman as early as March, analyst and mapper Clément Molin concluded after scrutinizing official videos and interviews the Ukrainian defense ministry recently released. "The operation began much earlier than initially thought," Molin wrote.

We are now 5 months after the start of Ukraine's 🇺🇦 Vivaldi operation and it has now officially ended

A month after the operation was revealed, we know have much more information on the biggest Ukrainian success of the year.

🧵THREAD🧵1/18 ⬇ pic.twitter.com/MgCoSv7Yhr

— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) October 20, 2026

The timing was probably no accident.

In early February, SpaceX, working from a Ukrainian defense ministry whitelist, switched off the thousands of stolen and smuggled Starlink terminals the Russians had been using.

That had the effect of grounding many Russian drones and blinding many Russian commanders. Taking advantage of the Russians' confusion, Ukrainian troops attacked in several key sectors: in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts in the southeast, and east of Sloviansk in northern Donetsk.

The Donetsk attack expanded into a full-blown counteroffensive under conditions of strict secrecy as the 3rd Army Corps probed for weaknesses along the flanks of the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies, then overextended along the axis between the Zherebets River in the east and the outskirts of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban conglomeration in the west.

The Russians had been threatening to lay siege to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the last two big free cities in Donetsk Oblast, from two directions: the north and the south. Operation Vivaldi eliminated the northern threat—and at great cost to the Russian 20th and 25th CAAs.

A Ukrainian Hornet drone about to hit a buhanka, a UAZ van Russian forces use to haul troops and supplies.
A Ukrainian Hornet drone about to hit a buhanka, the UAZ van Russian forces use to haul troops and supplies to the front. Drones like this one have been choking Russian military supply lines. Via WarTranslated.

Drones lead

Aerial drones and unmanned ground vehicles led the attack, taking the Russians by surprise. "For an offensive operation, the Ukrainians sustained relatively few casualties compared to previous engagements," Molin explained. "Conversely, the defending Russian forces suffered significantly higher losses, largely due to the rapid encirclement of at least three regiments, not all of which managed to escape the area."

It's unclear how many casualties the Russians suffered, but they might number in the thousands. The 20th and 25th CAAs were particularly fragile because the 3rd Army Corps and supporting drone units had been bombarding their supply line with so-called "middle strike" drones.

But many middle strike drones rely on civilian-style Starlink satellite terminals or the more rugged, better-performing Starshield. Now that the 3rd Army Corps has wrecked Russia's 144th Motor Rifle Division, which the Institute for the Study of War assessed on 20 October has effectively ceased to exist as an organized fighting force, and pushed the Russian survivors back to the far bank of the Zherebets River, the Ukrainians are probably "consolidating their gains and adopting a defensive posture," according to Molin.

Operation Vivaldi. Map: Euromaidan Press
Operation Vivaldi. Map: Euromaidan Press

But that defensive posture, protecting Sloviansk from a northern attack, depends on reliable communications and responsive drones. On 14 October, a new speed cap hit Ukraine's Starshield terminals, cutting the link on any drone flying faster than about 160 km/h. Who ordered it is disputed. Sources told Reuters the order came from inside the White House, and that Pentagon leaders were told the service needed to be slowed.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Musk himself ordered the slowdown, and that he and Trump discussed it soon after it became public. While Trump has denied ordering the speed limit, it's worth noting that the American president has become more overtly friendly toward Russia as his Republican Party looks likely to lose control of the US Congress in the November mid-term elections.

The speed limit renders many of the faster middle-strike drones unflyable. As a result, "Ukrainian drone strikes have diminished significantly following yesterday's crippling of Ukraine's Starlink/Starshield connections, Russian sources report," the military history account ChrisO_wiki wrote on X on 15 October, the day after the speed limit took Ukrainian operators by surprise.

Map of settlements Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps says it liberated north of Lyman, as of 28 September 2026.
Settlements Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps says it liberated during Operation Vivaldi north of Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, as of 28 September 2026. Map: ISW
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A reduction in middle strikes on Russian supply lines could help Russian field armies recover from recent setbacks, including their retreat back across the Zherebets River. And if the communications confusion resulting from the partial loss of Starlink/Starshield connectivity persists, it could give the Russians the same kind of opportunity the Ukrainians had back in the spring.

An opportunity to go back on the attack—and an Azov communications engineer warned Euromaidan Press in February that the shoe might be on the other foot.

That's the worst-case scenario for the Ukrainians now that Operation Vivaldi has ended. The best case is that they get full Starlink and Starshield access back—or find command and control alternatives—and duplicate, in other sectors, the same success they enjoyed in northern Donetsk.

"Now that the northern flank of Donbas is secured, at least for some time, the focus will concentrate on the southern flank," Molin predicted.

poland bulgaria now lithuania russia’s suspected arson campaign reaches third starlink site serving ukraine · post ukrainian soldier installs open sources images news reports
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Ukraine’s answer to Russia’s jet Shaheds: a jet drone named Bars, built to strike Russia and now turned around to hunt them

21 October 2026 at 19:28

Bars jet-powered drone. Photo: Museum of the Russian-Ukrainian War

  • One of Ukraine's best and fastest interceptor drones is an air-to-air version of the Bars one-way attack drone
  • Bars are some of the best defenses against Russia's fastest Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones
  • But there may be too few small jet engines to rapidly scale up Bars production

Russia's latest jet-propelled Geran-4 and Geran-5 one-way attack drones fly at 500 km/h or more, nearly three times as fast as an older, propeller-driven Geran-2.

That's too fast for many of Ukraine's air defenses. In particular, the inexpensive interceptor drones that Ukrainian forces deploy by the thousand.

Russia launched more than 2,700 jet Gerans at Ukraine in September, and Ukraine is shooting down only about 55% of them, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The speed disparity is a big part of the problem.

Ukrainian forces are scrambling for new defenses against the speedy Gerans. Among the best is actually a Ukrainian take on the Geran-4 and Geran-5: a fast, jet-propelled one-way attack drone that the Ukrainians have modified for air-to-air use.

Against jet drones, the air-to-air Bars have a hit rate of around 30%, Zelensky said during a joint press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Kyiv on 4 October. "The Bars have shown positive results," Zelensky said. "They currently have the highest percentage. Others are also catching up."

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In July, Ukraine and Germany agreed to jointly produce Bars, with Germany financing the first phase. Ukraine has reportedly been launching Bars at targets on the ground since at least the summer of 2025. But it was only recently that clear photos and videos of the drones have circulated.

Over the weekend, Ukraine’s 1021st Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade released footage of one jet drone hunting another. Observers identified the interceptor as a Bars and its target as a Geran-5. After launching from an elevated ramp with help from a rocket booster, the drone's operator—seeing what the drone saw through a front-facing infrared camera—steered the drone toward the Russian drone, possibly destroying it.

Exactly how the operator controlled the Bars—whether by satellite or mesh radio or some other command and control system—is unclear. Equally unclear: what kind of warhead a Bars would employ in the air-to-air role. Many smaller interceptor drones lack warheads. Instead, they simply slam directly into their targets, wrecking them in the collision.

Ukraine’s 1021st Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade has released the first footage of the Ukrainian Bars jet-powered drone in its interceptor configuration engaging a Russian Geran-5 drone. https://t.co/FRBKZQR9lF pic.twitter.com/njPJWXsDwo

— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 17, 2026

Mystery drone

Bars isn't small. It likely packs an explosive warhead. Potentially one that the operator can remotely trigger when the interceptor passes near its target.

Bars is adaptable. Its maker has reworked it from a 22-kg warhead and a 700-km range to a 60-kg warhead and a stated range of more than 1,000 km, and a heavier variant can carry a 105-kg warhead.

In the air-to-air interceptor role, long range is terribly important but speed is everything. There's an obvious way for the Ukrainians to boost the Bars' speed from its reported 700 km/h top speed to potentially even faster. They could shrink the drone's warhead and its fuel load, making it lighter in order to make it faster.

That may explain how a Bars can chase down a Geran-5 even as the Russians, by one Ukrainian analyst's estimate, try to push the Geran-5 toward 700 km/h or more.

A Korkut air defense vehicle.
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Cost is important, too. Russia churns out Gerans for an estimated $100,000 or so per drone. The cheaper the drone, the more copies the Russians can fling at Ukrainian cities. If it takes three or more interceptor drones to take down each of those 2,700 jet Gerans, Ukraine may need to deploy 8,000 to 10,000 interceptors a month.

Ukraine already builds more than 2,000 Bars a month, its maker says, but mostly in strike versions. How many go to air defense, and how much each costs, isn't public.

The supply of small jet engines could be a constraint. “Engines are a key element; we really import them in large quantities,” Zelensky said in an interview with Financial Times. "There are also domestically produced engines, but there are not enough of them.” A Ukrainian-made engine for Bars passed final tests in September.

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