The Financial Times has published details of back-channel talks between U.S. leaders and Vladimir Putin in 2022 and early 2023. The effort began with Richard Conn, an American lawyer who had worked in Russia for many years and, after the war began, grew concerned that Putin might use nuclear weapons, with unpredictable consequences. In the fall of 2022, Conn worked through several Russian and American intermediaries to deliver a “conciliatory” message from Joe Biden’s administration to Putin. He later received a response to subsequent peace proposals. But by early 2023, official negotiators Yuri Ushakov and Eric Green had effectively brought Conn’s channel to an end, even before the Biden administration left office. The many subsequent U.S. attempts to negotiate a peaceful end to the war have involved other people and have yet to succeed.

Who is Richard Conn, and how did he get involved in talks between Russia and the U.S.?

Richard Conn is an American corporate lawyer and investor who began working in Russia in 1992, when he founded the Russian office of the law firm Latham & Watkins. The back channel originated in early March 2022, when Conn received a call from an unnamed Russian businessman who feared that the failure to capture Kyiv was pushing Vladimir Putin toward using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Conn decided he could use his longstanding contacts among American investors in Russia to establish direct contact between Washington and the Kremlin, bypassing Russia’s Foreign Ministry and other officials.

To reach Putin, Conn contacted Bob Foresman, an American investor specializing in Russia. Foresman had held senior positions at several banks and investment firms with ties to Russia, including ING Barings, Renaissance Capital, Barclays, UBS, and Dresdner Bank. Through his work at Dresdner, Foresman knew Matthias Warnig, a longtime friend of Vladimir Putin. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Warnig was an economist and an officer in the Stasi. He began doing business in Russia in the early 1990s and eventually became head of the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 projects. People who spoke to the FT said Warnig was one of the few people with direct access to Putin, thanks to their longstanding relationship.

On the U.S. side, Conn enlisted Eric Green, an acquaintance who oversaw Russia policy at the U.S. National Security Council. They had discussed the idea of a back channel as early as 2021, shortly after Green took on that role.

How events unfolded

• Immediately after speaking with the unnamed Russian businessman, Conn contacted Eric Green and proposed establishing direct contact with Putin to deliver a message from Joe Biden’s administration. This would bypass officials who, Conn suspected, might be shielding the Russian president from outside information to serve their own interests.
• Green agreed, but Conn did not manage to reach Putin until September 2022, after official talks in Istanbul had failed and Russian troops had withdrawn from the outskirts of Kyiv. The threat of tactical nuclear weapons being used had not disappeared entirely, but by then it had become clear that the threat had not materialized in the war’s first six months.
• On October 4, 2022, Conn and Foresman met with Warnig in Zurich. Afterward, Conn received a White House message from Green and passed it to Warnig at a separate meeting in Germany. The FT quoted it verbatim: “The US is not pursuing regime change. We’re not trying to destroy Russia. There is no existential threat. We’re trying to support international order and the UN. We want peace.”
• On October 26, at Frankfurt Airport, Warnig relayed Putin’s response, which he had written down in a notebook, to Conn and Foresman. The FT also presented this as a quotation, though it is not entirely clear whether these were Putin’s words or Warnig’s understanding of them: “I have no choice but to conduct military operations, but I am entirely open to negotiations. I want to discuss ways to resolve the problem. I want peace for Ukraine. We need to resolve this problem. I want a solution that will last 100 years. If there is no other choice, I will press ahead, knowing it will be painful. But I cannot turn back, and I am ready to fight.”
• The next day, speaking at a plenary session of the Valdai Discussion Club, Putin took a much more conciliatory tone on nuclear escalation. Discussing the possibility of Ukraine using a “dirty bomb,” he stressed that using nuclear weapons made “no political or military sense” for Russia. Conn and Foresman took this as a sign that their efforts had succeeded and the nuclear threat had diminished. The FT noted, however, that confidential talks on the subject were also taking place through official channels at around the same time, between Joe Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, and Yuri Ushakov.
• Encouraged by this apparent success, Conn and Foresman decided to go beyond delivering a U.S. message to Putin and act as unofficial mediators between Russia and Ukraine. To do so, Conn needed businessman Michael Calvey to put him in touch with Ukrainian producer Alexander Rodnyansky, who knew Volodymyr Zelensky.
• At Conn and Foresman’s initiative, Warnig and Rodnyansky delivered peace proposals to the leaders of Ukraine and Russia. Under the proposals, Russia would withdraw its troops from most of the regions Putin had just annexed, with the border following the boundaries of Crimea and the parts of Donbas occupied before 2022. Ukraine would recognize Russian control over Crimea and grant Russia free passage along the “land bridge” to the peninsula. To ensure compliance with the ceasefire, Ukraine would receive protection from NATO countries, while Russia would begin discussions with the U.S. on a separate agreement on security guarantees.
• The FT reported that Warnig delivered these proposals to Putin on February 1, 2023, and that Putin had “gone through the document line by line, circling passages and scribbling comments.” Putin ruled out Ukraine joining NATO but allowed for EU membership, with some other military security guarantee as an alternative to the alliance, “like the one discussed at the Istanbul talks.”
• Meanwhile, Rodnyansky had great difficulty persuading Zelensky and Andriy Yermak even to hear the proposals developed at Conn’s initiative, the FT reported. In early 2023, the Ukrainian military was riding high after liberating large parts of the Kherson and Kharkiv regions and was actively preparing for its 2023 counteroffensive. Zelensky and his chief of staff refused to make any of the concessions in Conn’s proposals.
• The parallel talks effectively ended on February 18, 2023, when Conn and Foresman met with Warnig again in Zurich. Warnig said Putin had told Ushakov and several other senior Russian officials about the back channel. Putin also demanded that Ushakov confirm with Jake Sullivan that the American businessmen really did represent U.S. interests. According to Warnig’s account of what Putin told him, Sullivan did not confirm that Conn’s channel was authorized and said official contacts between the U.S. and Russia were sufficient to discuss these issues.
• The success attributed to the negotiators Conn brought together thus rests solely on the timing: “nuclear de-escalation,” if it happened at all in October 2022, followed shortly after Matthias Warnig delivered a direct message to Vladimir Putin.

The FT article includes one personal detail with no direct bearing on the talks or their outcome. It recounts a private meeting between Warnig and Putin after Warnig came under European sanctions and encountered many difficulties in his daily life in Germany. Even the approximate date of the meeting is unclear, except that it definitely took place after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

At the meeting, Warnig and Putin sat at opposite ends of the famous 33-foot table in the Kremlin that the Russian president used to keep his distance from others during the COVID-19 pandemic. Putin was sympathetic to Warnig’s difficulties under sanctions and suggested that he move his family to Russia, but Warnig declined. Warnig, for his part, said Putin’s strength had always been his personal touch, but prolonged isolation had robbed him of it. “Power is a drug,” Putin said in response.

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On October 23, 1956, hundreds of thousands of Budapest residents took to the streets to demand political reforms, free elections, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Peaceful demonstrations quickly turned into an armed uprising. Within days, Hungary was on the verge of leaving the Soviet bloc. The Soviet leadership initially agreed to make concessions and withdraw troops from the capital, but then reversed course. On November 4, the Soviet army launched a large-scale military operation that crushed the uprising. Thousands of people died, and about 200,000 Hungarians left the country. Western governments condemned Moscow’s actions but stopped short of intervening. Why did Hungarians rise up against the communist regime? What made Khrushchev abandon compromise? Could the United States and Europe have helped the insurgents? And why, 70 years later, do the events of 1956 still provoke political disputes in Hungary? Historian Alexey Uvarov answers these and other questions about the uprising.

What was happening in the world in the fall of 1956?

By the mid-1950s, the Cold War had been underway for almost 10 years. After World War II, Europe split into two camps. The United States played the leading role in Western Europe, while communist regimes under Soviet control took power in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany. In 1949, the United States and its allies formed NATO; in 1955, the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries established the Warsaw Pact.

The confrontation extended beyond Europe. From 1950 to 1953, the United States and its allies fought in the Korean War against North Korea, which had Soviet and Chinese backing. By then, both superpowers had nuclear weapons and understood that a direct conflict between them could have catastrophic consequences.

Tensions began to ease after Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953. The Korean War ended, and in 1955, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Austria, which became a neutral state. That same year, the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France met in Geneva for the first time in 10 years. Their rivalry continued, but both sides sought to avoid a direct confrontation.

Soviet policy was changing, too. Stalin’s death set off a power struggle in Moscow that Nikita Khrushchev won. In February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, he delivered a secret speech condemning Stalin’s cult of personality and mass repression. At the same time, the Soviet leadership began talking about the possibility of national paths to socialism. Across Eastern Europe, this prompted public debate about possible reforms and loosening Moscow’s political control.

Dwight Eisenhower had been president of the United States since January 1953. His administration publicly advocated the “liberation” of Eastern Europe from communist rule, while the Washington-funded broadcaster Radio Free Europe encouraged anti-Soviet sentiment. In practice, however, White House policy was far more cautious. In June 1953, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Germany, and the United States had not intervened. American leaders decided that attempting to liberate Eastern Europe by force could lead to nuclear war. They therefore sought to weaken Soviet influence primarily through peaceful means.

The Suez Crisis erupted as events unfolded in Hungary. In late October 1956, Israel, Britain, and France launched a military operation against Egypt, whose president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had nationalized the Suez Canal. The United States opposed its own allies’ actions, dividing the Western powers.

The fall of 1956 was a time of contradictions. The Cold War continued, yet the superpowers were seeking to avoid confrontation and had resumed contacts broken off under Stalin. Changes underway in the Soviet Union were raising hopes for reform in Eastern Europe. But no one knew what the limits of those reforms might be or how far Soviet leaders were prepared to go in supporting them.

What was Hungary like in the first half of the 20th century?

Until 1918, Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where it enjoyed considerable autonomy. The Kingdom of Hungary covered a much larger territory than modern Hungary, encompassing present-day Slovakia, Transylvania, and Croatia. After its defeat in World War I in 1918, Austria-Hungary disintegrated. Hungary became independent, and a republic was proclaimed in Budapest, but the new government could not hold on to power. In the spring of 1919, communists led by Béla Kun seized power. They proclaimed the Hungarian Soviet Republic, which lasted a few months. Communist rule brought political terror and ended in defeat by the Romanian army.

After the communists fell, Miklós Horthy, a former admiral in the Austro-Hungarian navy, came to power. In 1920, Hungary became a kingdom again, but without a king. Horthy became regent and effectively ruled the country until 1944. His regime was conservative and authoritarian, though parliament and some political parties continued to exist. The country’s most pressing problem was the aftermath of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon: Hungary lost about two-thirds of its territory, and roughly a third of ethnic Hungarians found themselves outside its new borders.

The desire to recover those territories largely shaped Horthy’s foreign policy. Hungary gradually drew closer to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, whose support helped it regain some of the lost lands from 1938 to 1941. The price, however, was participation in World War II on Germany’s side. In 1941, Hungary entered the war against the Soviet Union, and in 1943 its army suffered catastrophic losses on the Eastern Front.

In March 1944, Germany occupied Hungary, fearing that it would pull out of the war. With the active participation of the Hungarian authorities, more than 400,000 Jews were deported to Auschwitz within a few months. That fall, Horthy tried to negotiate an armistice with Germany’s enemies but was removed from power. The Nazis replaced him with Hungarian far-right politicians from the Arrow Cross Party.

In February 1945, after a siege lasting almost two months, the Red Army took Budapest. The city had suffered extensive destruction, and Hungary was once again on the losing side of a world war. Its political future now depended largely on the Soviet Union, whose troops were stationed in the country.

What happened in Hungary between 1945 and 1956? Did it become a copy of the Soviet Union?

Hungary was treated as a defeated ally of Nazi Germany, so its reconstruction and political future depended on the victorious powers. Formally, the Allied Control Commission monitored compliance with the armistice, but Soviet representatives led by Marshal Kliment Voroshilov dominated the commission. Hungary also had to pay reparations, a substantial share of which was to go to the Soviet Union.

Initially, the country retained a multiparty system. Free parliamentary elections were held in November 1945. The Smallholders’ Party won about 57% of the vote, while the communists received just 17%. With Moscow’s support, however, the communists kept their places in the coalition government and retained control of key security agencies. Their leader, Mátyás Rákosi, gradually eliminated political opponents using what he himself called “salami tactics”: Opposition parties were weakened piece by piece as their leaders were accused of conspiring and engaging in activities against the state.

By the end of the 1940s, the communists had established complete control. In 1947, Soviet security services arrested Béla Kovács, a leader of the Smallholders’ Party, and Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy was forced to resign. In 1948, the communists absorbed the Social Democratic Party, and in 1949 a Soviet-style constitution was adopted. Hungary became a people’s republic, with one party holding a virtual monopoly on power.

A harsh dictatorship took shape in the years that followed. Rákosi, who called himself Stalin’s best pupil, established a system of mass repression. Opposition figures, clergy, intellectuals, and even members of the Communist Party itself were arrested. In 1949, former Interior Minister László Rajk was executed on fabricated espionage charges. Cardinal József Mindszenty, the head of Hungary’s Catholic Church, was sentenced to life in prison. Tens of thousands of people were sent to prisons and camps, and many families were forcibly expelled from cities.

At the same time, the authorities tried to restructure the economy along Soviet lines. Industry was nationalized, peasants were forced to join agricultural cooperatives, and resources went primarily toward the rapid expansion of heavy industry. The aim was to turn Hungary into an industrial hub for the Soviet bloc despite its limited raw material reserves. These policies led to falling living standards, shortages of consumer goods, and growing public discontent.

By the early 1950s, Hungary’s political and economic system largely replicated that of the Soviet Union under Stalin. The communist regime lacked broad public support and survived mainly because of the Soviet military presence. After Stalin’s death, the discontent that had built up began to surface more forcefully.

What happened in Hungary between Stalin’s death and the start of the uprising?

In March 1953, Soviet leaders began reassessing their policies in Eastern Europe. Moscow understood that repression and economic hardship were fueling public discontent and decided to move away from Stalin’s approach to foreign policy. In June, Hungary’s leaders were summoned to the Kremlin, where Mátyás Rákosi faced sharp criticism. He was accused of mass repression, excessive industrialization, and ruining agriculture. Moscow demanded that Rákosi hand the prime minister’s post to Imre Nagy while remaining leader of the Communist Party.

Nagy was a longtime party member who had spent many years in the Soviet Union. After World War II, he served as agriculture minister and oversaw a land reform that distributed large estates among peasants. On becoming prime minister in the summer of 1953, Nagy announced a “new course.” The authorities slowed industrialization, eased pressure on peasants, began releasing political prisoners, and gave greater priority to producing consumer goods. There was no talk yet of abandoning socialism or introducing a multiparty system, but the changes were substantial compared with previous policies. The reforms quickly made Nagy popular with the public.

But Rákosi remained party leader and opposed these policies. The outcome of his struggle with Nagy depended largely on who prevailed in Moscow. In early 1955, Khrushchev strengthened his position, while Georgy Malenkov, who supported Nagy, lost his post as head of the Soviet government. This enabled Rákosi to oust his rival from power. In April 1955, Nagy was removed as prime minister and later expelled from the party. Socialist Hungary’s leaders tried to return to their previous policies, but it was too late: Reform-minded writers, journalists, and party officials continued to push for change.

These movements gained momentum after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, where Khrushchev condemned repression. Rákosi, who regarded himself as a follower of Stalin, became even more vulnerable. Public debate intensified in Budapest, particularly in the Petőfi Circle, a discussion group named after the poet Sándor Petőfi, which drew thousands of participants. In the summer of 1956, the Politburo decided to remove Rákosi but installed his closest associate, Ernő Gerő, as party leader. Most critics of the regime saw this as merely a symbolic concession that fell well short of what was needed.

Tensions continued to mount. On October 6, the authorities allowed a ceremonial reburial of László Rajk, the party official executed in 1949 on fabricated charges. Tens of thousands attended, turning the ceremony into a mass demonstration against the Stalinist past. On October 13, Nagy was readmitted to the party. The leadership, however, still hesitated to undertake serious reforms.

The situation in Hungary was full of contradictions. Moscow had first supported reforms, then allowed them to be rolled back, and then once again advocated change and began de-Stalinization. Yet the people responsible for repression and harsh policies remained in power in Hungary. Hungarians increasingly doubted that the communists could carry out the necessary reforms, and soon they decided to take to the streets.

How and why did the uprising begin?

Events in neighboring Poland provided the spark. In October 1956, Polish communists decided to restore Władysław Gomułka to the party leadership. He had been removed from power and imprisoned under Stalin. Moscow tried to prevent his return: On October 19, Khrushchev and other leaders hurried to Warsaw, and Soviet troops began advancing toward the city. After negotiations, however, the Kremlin accepted the appointment of Gomułka, who promised to preserve the alliance with the Soviet Union. In Hungary, these events raised hopes that similar changes could be achieved at home.

On October 22, students at Budapest’s Polytechnic Institute drew up 16 demands for the authorities. They called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Nagy’s return as prime minister, free elections, an end to censorship, and accountability for the country’s former leader, Rákosi. The students decided to hold a demonstration the following day in support of Poland’s reforms.

The October 23 demonstration began peacefully but quickly grew into a mass protest. Workers and other Budapest residents joined the students; by evening, hundreds of thousands of people were in the streets. Some demonstrators gathered outside parliament, demanding Nagy’s return, while others toppled an enormous statue of Stalin. Gerő, the Communist Party’s first secretary, went on the radio and accused the protesters of nationalism and hostile actions against the socialist system. His speech only fueled the anger.

Meanwhile, thousands of people gathered outside the state radio building. They demanded that the students be allowed on air to read their 16 demands. The building was guarded by political police, and the demonstrators’ representatives, who had been allowed inside for talks, had still not come back hours later. Rumors spread through the crowd that they had been arrested or even killed. Tensions rose as demonstrators demanded the delegation’s release and tried to enter the building. State security officers used tear gas and then opened fire on the crowd, which included unarmed demonstrators. Some people were killed, and others were wounded.

The authorities then lost control of the situation entirely. Protesters began arming themselves. Hungarian soldiers and police officers who refused to disperse the demonstration gave them some weapons; the protesters obtained others from warehouses and factories. Street fighting broke out around the radio building and continued through the night. Within hours, a peaceful demonstration had become an armed uprising.

How did the Soviet leadership respond? Did Moscow immediately decide to crush the uprising by force?

On the evening of October 23, as protests escalated into armed clashes, the Hungarian authorities asked Moscow for military assistance. Soviet leaders convened an emergency meeting at the Kremlin that night. Most supported sending in troops. Only Anastas Mikoyan opposed the move, believing that force would only deepen the crisis. The other Politburo members did not support him, however, and Soviet tanks entered Budapest on the morning of October 24. At the same time, Nagy was reappointed prime minister of Hungary in the hope that this would calm the protesters.

But sending in troops had the opposite effect: A local protest against the communist leadership became a national uprising against Soviet domination. Street fighting continued, and some Hungarian troops joined the insurgents. On October 25, demonstrators outside parliament came under fire on an even larger scale, and dozens of people were killed. The authorities were rapidly losing control of the country: Revolutionary committees sprang up in cities, and workers’ councils formed in factories.

Soviet leaders again tried to find a political solution to the crisis. On October 28, Hungary’s new prime minister, Nagy, announced a ceasefire, recognized the uprising as a national democratic movement, and promised to disband the political police. Moscow, in turn, agreed to begin withdrawing troops from Budapest.

Records of Soviet leadership meetings from October 28 to 31, 1956, reveal considerable hesitation. On October 28, for example, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin called a full-scale military operation a “reckless venture,” a view supported by Politburo member Lazar Kaganovich. That same day, Khrushchev himself advocated a political solution, saying, “All we’re doing is shooting.” On October 30, Foreign Minister Dmitry Shepilov even suggested that Moscow stop dictating terms to Eastern European countries.

Soviet leaders changed course on October 31. They concluded that concessions had failed to halt the revolution: Communist Party rule in Hungary was rapidly crumbling, and Nagy’s government could no longer guarantee that the country would remain in the Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, the start of the British-French operation against Egypt reinforced Khrushchev’s fear that withdrawing from Budapest would be seen as a sign of weakness. Fear of criticism from the Soviet Communist Party’s conservative wing also played a role, as did confidence that the United States would stop short of military intervention. Khrushchev gave this explanation:

If we leave Hungary, it will encourage the American, British, and French imperialists. They will see it as weakness on our part and press forward. We would be exposing the weakness of our position. Our party would not understand us. We would then be giving them Hungary on top of Egypt. We have no other choice.

Moscow therefore abandoned compromise and decided to restore control over Hungary by force.

How was the uprising crushed? How many people died? And what kind of regime emerged in Hungary?

After deciding to intervene militarily on October 31, the Soviet Union began moving additional troops into Hungary. Dubbed Operation Whirlwind, the operation was led by Marshal Ivan Konev. About 60,000 Soviet troops took part in total. The plan called for seizing Budapest and other major cities simultaneously, disarming the Hungarian army, and taking control of key government institutions.

Meanwhile, Soviet leaders continued to pretend they were willing to negotiate a peaceful settlement. On November 3, Hungarian and Soviet representatives discussed a troop withdrawal. That evening, however, the Hungarian delegation, led by Defense Minister Pál Maléter, was invited to a Soviet military base, where KGB officers arrested its members. At dawn on November 4, the Red Army launched its offensive. Prime Minister Nagy managed to broadcast a radio message announcing the invasion before taking refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. Moscow announced the formation of a new Hungarian government led by János Kádár.

The Hungarian army was unable to mount organized resistance. Soviet troops quickly disarmed most of its units, leaving volunteer groups — mainly young workers and students — to do most of the fighting. Despite the Soviet Union’s overwhelming military superiority, street battles in Budapest continued for several days. The last major pockets of resistance were crushed by mid-November.

About 2,500 to 2,700 Hungarians died in the fighting, and roughly 20,000 more were wounded. A total of 669 Soviet soldiers were killed in action or died of their wounds. Another 51 servicemen were missing, and about 1,500 were wounded. Resistance continued even after the fighting ended: Workers’ councils organized strikes, demanding the restoration of the country’s independence. With Soviet support, Kádár’s new government gradually suppressed these protests.

Military defeat was followed by mass repression. Tens of thousands of people were convicted of taking part in the uprising, and about 230 were executed. More than 200,000 Hungarians left the country. Nagy, who had been promised safe passage from the Yugoslav embassy, was detained and taken to Romania. He was later returned to Hungary, where he was sentenced to death in a trial closed to the public. On June 16, 1958, Nagy was executed along with several associates.

Kádár remained in power for more than 30 years. The early years of his rule brought brutal repression, but the regime gradually softened. A broad amnesty was announced in 1963, and in later years Hungarians gained more economic freedom and greater freedom in their private lives than people in many other Soviet-bloc countries. This system later became known as “goulash communism.” Political power, however, remained in the party’s hands, Soviet troops stayed in the country, and the events of 1956 were officially regarded as a “counterrevolution.”

How did Western countries respond to the uprising? And why didn’t they help the Hungarians?

The uprising caught the United States and its European allies off guard. American intelligence services had not expected a mass armed revolt against the communist regime, even though the Eisenhower administration advocated the “liberation” of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. The American-funded broadcaster Radio Free Europe also encouraged anti-communist sentiment and called for resistance. Some Hungarians therefore expected the West to come to their aid if they rose up.

But as events in East Germany in 1953 had already shown, the United States had no intention of liberating Soviet-bloc countries by military force. Washington understood that such a confrontation could escalate into nuclear war. When the Hungarian uprising began on October 23, 1956, the White House therefore ruled out direct intervention almost immediately.

Instead, the Americans tried to find a diplomatic solution. Washington hoped that Hungary could become an independent, neutral state, following Austria’s example. Hungary would no longer be under Soviet control but would not join NATO either. On October 27, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles publicly said that Washington did not regard Eastern European states as potential military allies. American leaders hoped this would persuade Moscow to refrain from another military intervention.

The Suez Crisis complicated matters. As the uprising unfolded, Britain and France joined Israel in launching a military operation against Egypt, which the United States sharply condemned. Serious divisions emerged among the Western allies. The main reason Western governments refused to intervene militarily, however, was not the Suez Crisis but their unwillingness to risk a direct war with the Soviet Union.

American policy thus proved contradictory: Washington publicly supported the liberation of Eastern European countries but had no intention of going to war for them. As a result, some Hungarian insurgents waited for Western help that never came.

What form did Western support take, then?

Although Western countries ruled out military intervention, they publicly supported the uprising and condemned Soviet actions. British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd told Parliament that the British government was following the Hungarians’ struggle for freedom with admiration. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet rejected Soviet accusations that fascists had organized the uprising. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer called the Hungarian resistance an example of extraordinary heroism. Mass demonstrations in solidarity with Hungarians took place in European capitals.

The U.N. Security Council began considering the situation in Hungary as early as October 28, and after the renewed Soviet invasion on November 4, Western countries demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Moscow, however, used its veto to block a resolution to that effect. The issue was referred to the U.N. General Assembly, which voted on November 4 to condemn the Soviet intervention and demand a troop withdrawal. In January 1957, a special U.N. committee was established to investigate the events. Its report confirmed that the uprising had been a mass movement against Soviet domination, rather than a Western-organized coup. But General Assembly resolutions were not binding, and the United Nations could not compel Moscow to change its policy.

The largest practical contribution was taking in refugees. After the uprising was crushed, more than 200,000 people — about 2% of the population — left Hungary. As many as 185,000 fled to neighboring neutral Austria, and about 20,000 more to Yugoslavia. Many crossed the border on foot without assistance. This was relatively easy because some of the border barriers between Hungary and Austria had been dismantled in the summer of 1956.

The Austrian authorities set up temporary camps and provided refugees with food, shelter, and medical care. With support from the United Nations, the Red Cross, and other international organizations, refugees began resettling in other countries. The United States, Canada, Britain, West Germany, and other countries took in tens of thousands of Hungarians. In total, about 180,000 refugees later moved from Austria and Yugoslavia to countries around the world.

How were the events of 1956 remembered in Hungary — and how are they remembered today?

After the uprising was crushed, the communist authorities led by Kádár officially called it a “counterrevolution” organized by enemies of socialism. Participants were persecuted, and public discussion of the events was tightly controlled. Over time, the authorities preferred to keep silent about the subject, since memories of the Soviet invasion called the legitimacy of the Moscow-backed regime into question. Nevertheless, the memory of the uprising lived on among emigrants and opposition circles, particularly through the circulation of samizdat — publications distributed outside state censorship — in the 1970s and 1980s.

The situation began to change in the second half of the 1980s, influenced by perestroika in the Soviet Union and reforms in Hungary itself. In 1988, Kádár was removed as party leader. In January 1989, Imre Pozsgay, a leader of Hungary’s Communist Party, publicly called the events of 1956 a popular uprising. A turning point came with the ceremonial reburial of Nagy and his associates on June 16, 1989, which drew about 250,000 people. A young opposition politician, Viktor Orbán, spoke at the ceremony, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops and free elections. On October 23, 1989, the anniversary of the uprising’s start, Hungary officially ceased to be a socialist republic.

After the communist regime fell, the 1956 revolution became one of the symbols of Hungary’s new democracy. In 1990, October 23 was declared a national holiday. Gradually, however, political groups developed different interpretations of the uprising’s legacy. Liberal politicians more often emphasized the struggle for democracy and political freedoms, while national conservatives stressed resistance to foreign domination and the defense of national independence. Nagy himself also became a subject of dispute: He had led the revolutionary government and been executed, but he had also risen through the communist movement and initially advocated reforming socialism rather than abolishing it.

Under Orbán, who headed the government from 2010 to 2026, the government’s official commemoration of 1956 increasingly emphasized national independence. Orbán repeatedly compared the Hungarians’ struggle against Moscow in 1956 to Budapest’s contemporary disputes with the European Union. In late 2018, a monument to Nagy was removed from a square near parliament and later installed elsewhere. The decision drew criticism from the opposition.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the memory of the uprising became the subject of fresh disputes: Orbán’s opponents pointed to the contradiction between his reverence for those who fought the Soviet invasion and his warm relations with Putin’s Russia. In September 2024, an adviser to Orbán said that if Russia invaded, Hungary should not follow Ukraine’s example of armed resistance, because the 1956 uprising had ended in tragedy. The remark prompted another wave of criticism. Orbán was forced to distance himself publicly from his adviser’s words, calling them a mistake.

The Hungarian uprising was one of the Cold War’s most dramatic events. It showed how sweeping the demands for change inspired by de-Stalinization could become, and how little change Soviet leaders were willing to allow. When Hungary’s place in the Soviet bloc came under threat, Moscow chose military intervention over political compromise. Despite their public support for the Hungarians, Western countries stopped short of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, limiting their response to diplomatic protests and aid for refugees.

The uprising was crushed, but its memory survived and, three decades later, played an important role in the fall of the communist regime. Yet the history of 1956 has not become a national symbol everyone agrees on: Politicians still interpret the uprising’s goals and lessons differently. Hungarians continue to debate what freedom, independence, and resistance to outside pressure mean today.

Read more

• How a 1965 Moscow protest demanding that the Soviet government obey its own laws helped launch the USSR’s dissident movement

At Meduza, we are committed to transparency about our use of artificial intelligence in the newsroom. The story you’re reading was written by one of our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an AI model configured to follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is the result of extensive testing and refinements to ensure our English-language coverage is timely and accurate. A Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.

If you find any errors in this translation, please contact us at reports@meduza.io.

To read Meduza’s exclusive content in English, please subscribe to our newsletter.

Alexey Uvarov

The best books from Meduza’s publishing house, according to the people who work here

In the three years since Meduza launched its publishing house, we’ve published more than 30 books in Russian. Now, when people ask which we recommend, we have to ask a few questions: Fiction or nonfiction? Or perhaps diaries or autofiction? And on what subject? War, history, politics, film, music, parenting? Yes, we have all of that, and we’re very proud of it. Choosing just one is getting harder. But we gave it a try — and asked our colleagues to write a few sentences about their favorite book from Meduza’s publishing house. Save the list or buy the books as gifts for people you love. Every recommendation here comes straight from the heart.

Galina Timchenko, publisher

Anton Dolin, “Plokhiye russkiye” (“Bad Russians”)

Reading books because it’s all “work — deadlines — got to get it done…” really isn’t as much fun as choosing a book yourself. There’s a story we tell in the newsroom about “Bad Russians”: After the first edit, the manuscript grew by 300,000 characters. And yes, it’s an enormous book, but I found “Bad Russians” as gripping as a detective novel. I even rewatched some of the films I thought I remembered down to the last frame. It was a rare weekend when nothing could get me off the couch. Anton’s extraordinary gift for storytelling is matched by his expertise. I think this is his best book, though he’d surely pick a different one (he’s published 15 already).

Ivan Kolpakov, Meduza’s editor-in-chief

Sergei Lebedev, “Belaya dama” (“The Lady of the Mine”)

Meduza’s publishing house has been around for three years now, and this is still one of my favorite books we’ve published — definitely my favorite work of fiction. The blurb opens with “July 2014, Donbas,” so you might immediately form all kinds of ideas about this book. But unless you already know something about it, I’m sure you won’t guess what it’s like. Anyway, I want to declare my love for this book and its author. Thank you, dear Sergei Lebedev. And to anyone who somehow hasn’t heard of it, I recommend buying it right away.

A. Z., publishing editor

Lana Estemirova, “Pozhaluysta, zhivi” (“Please Live”)

“It mattered to me that this book could be read by a housewife in Ohio, a girl in Germany interested in strong women, and people in Russia who know nothing about Chechnya,” Lana Estemirova says of “Please Live.” For me, the way this book speaks to everyone is perhaps its greatest strength. It brings together hazy childhood memories and wartime chronicles; family stories about how her grandfather survived deportation in 1944 and human rights reports on war crimes in the 1990s; and teenage experiences captured in emails and diaries alongside newspaper articles about the rise of authoritarianism in Chechnya in the 2000s.

The book isn’t detailed enough to be called a biography, isn’t objective enough to claim to be a historical study of Chechnya, and is too painfully true to count as autofiction. But somehow, magically, it weaves together the best of all three genres — more than three, really. A documentary account becomes a sweeping novel about growing up, loss, working through grief, and an immense, incredibly powerful maternal love that even death cannot defeat.

Without false modesty, and with enormous gratitude to the translator who worked under a pseudonym, I’ll say that “Please Live” is equally good in English and Russian.

Dmitry Ivanov, publishing editor

Konstantin Gaaze, “Kuda dreyfuyut diktatury?” (“Where Do Dictatorships Drift?”)

Over these three years, I’ve read quite a few books (and even edited some) devoted to the same question: How did we end up here? Why did Russia attack Ukraine, disregarding the views of its own people, the judgment of the international community, and, finally, historical memory? Different authors offered different answers, but perhaps no one has examined the problem as deeply and systematically as Konstantin Gaaze in “Where Do Dictatorships Drift?” His account doesn’t start in the era of Peter the Great or with Ukraine’s Maidan protests. He aims to show that the current outbreak of Russian aggression was neither predetermined by some historical trajectory nor solely a response to the other side’s actions, as Vladimir Putin’s favorite refrain — “we were left with no choice” — would have it.

Konstantin reconstructs the basic logic of autocracy from Herodotus to the present to show that the Kremlin’s stance toward the West developed along the fairly common “besieged fortress” model. Ukraine became the target of the attack through a whole series of steps taken by Vladimir Putin and his inner circle beginning in 2008. Those steps pulled in different directions and were sometimes independent of one another. Readers will learn how an autocrat’s fears prompt his inner circle to peddle threats, where the “Putin majority” came from and what sustains it, why liberal economists and administrators lost their strategic struggle with officials from the security services and law enforcement, and, finally, how the 2008–09 global financial crisis relates to Putin’s conviction that America could no longer tell him what to do. Where do dictatorships drift? Konstantin Gaaze’s answer: often toward a major war, though with whom and on what terms depends on the particular historical circumstances.

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Hi, I’m Vladislav Gorin.

I’m the host of Meduza’s daily Russian-language news podcast. This summer, the Russian authorities opened a criminal case against me — not for committing a crime, but for telling the truth about Russia and its war against Ukraine.

Because the Kremlin has branded me a criminal, I can’t go home. I also can’t safely travel to countries like Turkey — even though it’s a NATO member — because I could be arrested and extradited to Russia. I can’t even renew my passport at the consulate anymore. 

None of this is going to stop me. I know there are hundreds of thousands of people in Russia who don’t want this war and who still believe in freedom and democracy, and they deserve access to independent journalism. Please support Meduza so I can keep reaching them.

---

Sonya, publishing manager

Konstantin Zarubin, “Nashe serdtse byotsya za vsekh” (“Our Heart Beats for Everyone”)

Some books create worlds that, for some inexplicable reason, lodge in your head for good. You’ll be standing in the checkout line at the supermarket, lost in thought, and suddenly find yourself somewhere far, far away without even noticing. Konstantin Zarubin’s novel is one of the books I “jump” into like that. A Selecta cappuccino from a coffee machine in the gray corridors of Iceland’s immigration office, a commuter train car baked by the summer sun on the Riga–Saulkrasti line, the summer cottage community of Medvedkovo, and an awkward portrait drawn in crayon from a VKontakte photo — I remember every house, every street, and every name in “Our Heart.”

I’m mesmerized by this broken, complicated world, so indifferent to the people who live in it. Absolutely anything can happen there — bad or good. I think it’s this unpredictability (sometimes quite cruel), with all its “chance” coincidences and encounters, that puts our humanity to the test and makes life what it is.

Quoting a review, Zarubin calls his novel “a decent light read.” I think that’s an understatement. “Our Heart” is certainly written with a light touch and plenty of wit, and it’s a pleasure to read. But I don’t think just “a light read” (even a decent one) can get so deep inside your head.

Natasha, manager of Meduza’s Magaz shop

Zhenya Berezhnaya, ”(Ne) o voyne” (”(Not) About War”)

”(Not) About War” is a book about the very first days of the full-scale war and being forced to leave. At first, you tense up with anxiety as you read the especially difficult passages. Then, page by page, you begin to relax. By the end, the heaviness gives way to hope: Everything will be all right.

And yet the war never goes away. It’s there the whole time, but even in a world like this, there’s still room for a miracle. I think that’s what the book is about.

The writing helps, too. Before the war, Zhenya Berezhnaya wrote fairy tales, and you can hear echoes of that in the novel: It’s a painful autobiographical story told in wonderfully warm, inviting language.

The book’s design deserves a mention of its own: Yellow symbols are scattered across a green background — they could be spiky anti-tank obstacles or little flowers with petals. Just like the book itself, where a miracle grows alongside the war.

I’m not the only one who liked it: The novel was shortlisted for the Dar literary prize.

Olya V., publishing staff member

Maria Alyokhina, “Politicheskaya. Kak vyzhit v iz Rossii” (“Political Girl: Life and Fate in Russia”)

I didn’t think I’d like Maria Alyokhina’s “Political Girl: Life and Fate in Russia.” But I was wrong. This book is a candid, dramatic diary that never slips into melodrama. Alyokhina feels injustice acutely, and even in the most difficult situations, she doesn’t let hurt and fear get the better of her.

“We don’t choose where we’re born. We don’t choose the color or the lettering on our passports. But we do choose how we live,” Maria writes. The book is her account of that choice. Perhaps “A Political Prisoner” will give you hope and strength — so many people are short of both in these dark days.

And — most importantly — Punkʼs not dead!

Alexander Polivanov, deputy editor-in-chief

Ilya Barabanov and Denis Korotkov, “Nash biznes — smert” (“Our Business Is Death”)

I read Ilya Barabanov and Denis Korotkov’s book about the Wagner private military company roughly two years after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny and his death. I thought I’d give up halfway through — I mean, what could it tell me about Prigozhin that journalists (including Barabanov and Korotkov themselves) hadn’t already reported?

But “Our Business Is Death” is a book you race through; some of the events feel as if you’re learning about them for the first time. Partly because as soon as something drops out of the news, you forget the details, the things that made it distinctive fade, and all that’s left is a few lines on Wikipedia. From where we stand in 2025–26, Prigozhin’s mutiny seems unimaginable, while his methods of managing people and waging war have, sadly, become commonplace.

A. F., news editor

Sergei Lebedev, “The White Lady” (and more!)

Much of today’s Russian-language publishing abroad focuses on political and social commentary and nonfiction, and that makes sense. It’s really great that Meduza’s publishing house also pays such close attention to contemporary fiction and discovers talented Russian-language authors. Konstantin Zarubin and his novel “Our Heart Beats for Everyone” deserve special mention — it’s a gripping cyberpunk utopia that is, horrifyingly, coming true almost to the letter. Or there’s Natalia Krupenina’s moving young adult book “Ya umeyu padat” (“I Know How to Fall”), a healing balm and a lifeline for teenagers (and adults, too!) in difficult times.

But for now, my top pick is “The Lady of the Mine.”

One setting: a mining settlement in the Donbas. Four characters: Zhanna, Valet, the general, and the engineer. Just five chapters: five days in the summer of 2014. Sergei Lebedev’s novel is compact and full of substance, fewer than 200 pages, but its seemingly simple, self-contained plot quickly expands into a tragedy of universal proportions. The author builds his narrative around the real history of this ill-fated Ukrainian region, closely intertwining events from the current war and a past one: Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, shot down by pro-Kremlin separatists, and a mine pit that the Nazi occupiers used for executions. The historical parallels really are chilling. It takes your breath away, as great literature does.

P.S. If you do prefer commentary and want more facts about this story, I recommend pairing Lebedev’s novel with “Dom na linii ognya” (“A House in the Line of Fire”), journalist Dmitry Durnev’s true account of the contemporary Donbas.

Katya Abramova, head of communications

Sergei Lebedev, “The Lady of the Mine”

Of course I knew about Sergei’s book: We’d discussed it at work meetings, planned the release, promotional materials, and so on. But I wasn’t in a hurry to read it — I just didn’t have the strength to read any more about war and the Holocaust. Then things didn’t go as planned: My colleagues at the publishing house asked me to help sell books at Sergei’s book event at Berlin’s Panda platforma. I agreed, though without much enthusiasm — it was a Saturday evening. And then… I was spellbound! It was an amazing, fascinating, nuanced discussion that gave me strength without leaving me feeling crushed at all. Despite the difficult subject. I went home and had finished the book by Monday. Now I recommend it to everyone.

From Meduza’s archives

• Russia is in an age of sweeping book censorship. Meanwhile at Meduza: time to publish books the Kremlin hates.
• ‘The number of words you can say keeps shrinking’ Meduza investigates how wartime censorship has (and hasn’t) reshaped Russia’s book industry

At Meduza, we are committed to transparency about our use of artificial intelligence in the newsroom. The story you’re reading was written by one of our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an AI model configured to follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is the result of extensive testing and refinements to ensure our English-language coverage is timely and accurate. A Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.

If you find any errors in this translation, please contact us at reports@meduza.io.

To read Meduza’s exclusive content in English, please subscribe to our newsletter.

Just over a month ago, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić addressed the nation on television. He lamented the difficult circumstances but said that, despite everything, the country had “managed to preserve stability.” To ensure that Serbia could continue “to develop and maintain its internal unity in the face of external threats,” Vučić announced that he would dissolve parliament and call early elections for October 25, 2026. He resigned shortly afterward. Vučić needs the election to stay in power: His presidential term would have expired soon. But he may not succeed. His main rival is the “Student List — Students Win” movement, which formally emerged a month ago but became known around the world during mass protests across Serbia in 2024. We explain why Vučić called the election now, what the main parties are campaigning on, and who is most likely to win.

Why Serbia’s election matters

Aleksandar Vučić joined the Serbian Radical Party as a young man and became known as an ardent Serbian nationalist. He became prime minister in 2014 and was elected president three years later. With the backing of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), Vučić built a regime that political scientists abroad describe as authoritarian.

As early as 2019, the U.S. nonprofit Freedom House downgraded Serbia’s status from free to partly free. That same year, the European Parliament said Vučić and the SNS were blocking parliamentary debate on bills they opposed, accusing their critics of betraying the country, and suppressing independent media.

Five years later, Freedom House said the ruling party was undermining political rights and civil liberties and putting pressure on independent media and civil society organizations. In 2024, V-Dem, an independent Swedish research institute that studies democracy worldwide, called Serbia an “electoral autocracy.” This year, the German think tank Bertelsmann Stiftung classified it as a moderate autocracy, citing the concentration of power in Vučić’s hands.

Other indicators also show the problems facing Serbian democracy. Between 2014 and 2026, the country fell from 54th to 104th place in the annual press freedom index compiled by the international organization Reporters Without Borders.

Transparency International ranked Serbia 78th in its Corruption Perceptions Index in 2014 and 116th in 2025. A survey conducted last year by Transparency Serbia found that 22% of respondents considered corruption the country’s biggest problem — the highest share in a quarter century.

All this makes the coming election especially consequential. It will determine whether Serbia continues on the authoritarian course it has followed over the past decade and a half under Vučić and the SNS, or gets a chance to democratize if the Student List, the main opposition group, wins.

How the electoral system works

Serbia is a parliamentary republic. Parliament, officially known as the National Assembly, elects the government and holds it accountable.

The constitution limits the president’s powers: He commands the armed forces, signs laws, and nominates a prime minister for parliament’s approval. He can also dissolve the Assembly — for example, if it fails to approve a government within 90 days. But the president cannot dismiss the government or hold other positions while in office. Vučić disregarded the latter rule: From his first election as president until May 2023, he also led the ruling party.

The Assembly has a single chamber with 250 members. Under the constitution, elections are held every four years, but early elections have effectively become the norm since 2000. Only the 2012 and 2020 elections took place on schedule.

Voters cast ballots for party lists; there are no single-member districts. Parties must clear a 3% threshold to enter parliament, but this requirement does not apply to ethnic minority parties. The current Assembly includes parties representing Hungarians, Bosniaks, Croats, Albanians, and even Russians. If the ruling party or coalition needs a few more votes to secure a parliamentary majority, ethnic minority lawmakers can wield disproportionate influence.

The previous parliamentary election, held on December 17, 2023, was marred by serious irregularities, including the so-called Bulgarian train ballot-swapping scheme, busing in voters from Republika Srpska, and vote-buying. These practices helped the SNS win nearly 47% of the vote and a parliamentary majority, while the opposition Serbia Against Violence coalition had to settle for 23.7% and 65 seats.

The vote-rigging triggered mass protests, but they had petered out by the end of December 2023. New grievances soon emerged. In July 2024, thousands took to the streets against a project to extract lithium at the Jadar mine in western Serbia. Events in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second-largest city, prompted a far larger response.

On November 1, 2024, a canopy at the city’s railway station collapsed, killing 16 people, including children. The irony was that renovations at the station had been completed just four months before the disaster. Two Chinese state-owned companies had carried out the work under a contract awarded by the Serbian authorities without competitive bidding.

Officials initially denied any responsibility. Pro-government media and Goran Vesić, the construction, transport, and infrastructure minister, repeatedly said that the station canopy had not been part of the renovation. The Transport Ministry refused journalists’ requests for financial documents relating to the work.

All this raised suspicions of corruption and sparked large protests in Novi Sad and other cities. Many students joined and became the protests’ main driving force. The largest demonstration, on March 15, 2025, drew up to 325,000 people — an enormous number in a country with a population of just over 6.5 million. In addition to calling for the release of documents relating to the station’s renovation and for increased spending on higher education, protesters demanded the government’s resignation and early elections.

The government could hardly ignore the protests. Vesić resigned in November 2024 and was behind bars a few weeks later. He and 12 other officials faced charges, but these were later dropped for lack of evidence. Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned in January 2025.

Vučić, meanwhile, suggested that unnamed foreign powers were instigating the protests. Pro-government media accused protesters of betraying their country and committing crimes and called for their arrest and lengthy prison sentences.

Police treated demonstrators harshly. Participants in a mass demonstration in Belgrade in March 2025 said a sound cannon had been used against them. During protests in Valjevo in August, police beat 25 demonstrators with batons. In Belgrade, police arrested, beat, and humiliated 15 protesters and threatened women with sexual violence.

Why did Vučić call the election now?

Protesters have been demanding new elections for the past two years, but Vučić did not dissolve parliament to accommodate them. He has his own reasons. His second presidential term was due to expire in May 2027, and Serbia’s constitution bars him from running again. But Vučić does not want to relinquish power.

He is well positioned to hold on to it. He has the backing of the SNS, which has come to dominate Serbian politics over the past decade and a half. The party enjoys substantial political advantages through its access to state institutions and directly or indirectly controls all the country’s major television channels. These advantages helped it secure a decisive victory in the 2023 election. On October 25, it hopes to repeat that success and preserve the current regime.

Under these circumstances, Vučić’s calculation is clear: He wants to move from the presidency to the prime minister’s office. That post would give him considerable powers. Under the constitution, the prime minister determines domestic and foreign policy, can introduce bills in parliament, oversees the state administration, appoints and dismisses ministers, and can even initiate the dissolution of parliament.

The election date is no accident. First, Vučić has sought to deny the students time to build a stronger political organization. Their movement is not even a party, and it has yet to establish an extensive network of local branches to mobilize voters. Second, the election was scheduled for the earliest date legally possible after parliament’s dissolution: 46 days later. That gives the students as little time as possible to campaign, while Vučić and the SNS have been promoting themselves for months.

Serbia will elect a new president in December, and Vučić will try to install a loyalist. One possibility is Ana Brnabić, the Assembly’s speaker and now acting president. She has already proved her loyalty to Vučić: During her years as prime minister, she effectively ceded all real authority to the president. Another candidate is Miloš Vučević, the SNS leader and a close Vučić ally, who ranks second on the party’s electoral list.

The main contenders and their platforms

A total of 18 parties and coalitions, including those representing ethnic minorities, will contest the October 25 election. But the main battle will be between the Aleksandar Vučić — United Serbia coalition and the opposition Student List.

The pro-government camp

The dominant party on the government side is the Serbian Progressive Party, founded in 2008 after a split in the Radical Party. The SNS espouses nationalist, conservative, and populist views, while its economic positions lean toward neoliberalism. With around 800,000 members in 2020 — 13% of Serbia’s population — it is Europe’s largest party by membership. It is running as part of the Aleksandar Vučić — United Serbia coalition, but its partners carry little weight.

The SNS platform rests on several key tenets. These include defending Serbia’s territorial integrity — meaning refusing to recognize Kosovo’s independence — and supporting Serbs living abroad; steady economic development and efforts to combat corruption; social justice; and joining the EU while cooperating with Russia, the United States, and China. There is one problem with the platform published on the party’s official website, however: It dates from 2011 and has not been updated since.

In the current campaign, the ruling party and Vučić are focusing primarily on recent economic successes. Serbia’s GDP has indeed grown steadily in recent years. According to the World Bank, it rose by 3.9% in 2024 and 2% in 2025, while the International Monetary Fund forecasts growth of 3.3% this year. Serbia has also been actively attracting foreign investment, which reached 5.2 billion euros in 2024 and nearly 3.5 billion in 2025. This September, Vučić proudly said Serbia accounted for 62% of all foreign direct investment in the Western Balkans.

To sustain growth, the authorities are banking on large projects that can double as publicity opportunities. Work has recently picked up, for example, on the Belgrade metro, a project first launched in the 1990s. Chinese companies are now involved, and Vučić said with great fanfare that two enormous tunnel-boring machines were due to arrive in the capital in October — just in time for the election. For now, however, the spectacle of their arrival has had to be postponed: Technical problems have left the machines stuck in the Romanian port of Constanța.

But nothing is stopping the ruling party from constantly talking about Expo 2027, the world’s fair that Belgrade will host. Vučić frequently visits the construction site and says the “historic” exhibition is moving the capital and the country as a whole “forward.” The exhibition was also one of the official reasons given for calling the early election: Vučić said the vote needed to be timed so that afterward the country could focus on preparing for Expo.

The authorities also emphasize the need for stability. Serbia went through a turbulent period in the 1990s, and the authorities now use fears of a return to that era to argue that people should vote for the SNS. In their view, the main threat to stability comes, naturally, from the protesting students, who they say receive foreign funding and want to organize a “color revolution” in Serbia.

SNS lawmaker Biljana Pantić said the choice in this election was clear: On one side are the SNS and Vučić, who put “care for citizens, stability, and Serbia’s continued development” first; on the other are those “who have no concrete platform or results and have reduced their politics to hatred, violence, and attacks on everything Aleksandar Vučić does or says.”

The opposition

The students, who form the backbone of the protests, hold a wide range of views, and their ranks include both nationalists and liberals. Nevertheless, they have managed to stay united by avoiding contentious issues such as European integration, relations with Russia, and Kosovo’s independence.

On September 9, 2026, the day parliament was dissolved, they announced the formation of their own political movement, Student List — Students Win. In just a few days, the students collected the required number of voter signatures to run in the election and submitted their candidate list to the Electoral Commission, which unanimously approved their inclusion on the ballot on September 15.

The list contains 250 parliamentary candidates. None are students; instead, they include scholars, university professors, experts, and athletes. At the top is cardiologist Ilija Srdanović, a professor at the University of Novi Sad, although the students stress that they are not looking for “a new leader around whom another personality cult could form.”

The movement’s election platform is called the ”Student Plan” and consists of 11 points grouped into three sections. The first, “Serbia or the Mafia,” calls for stronger efforts to fight corruption, barring from public office officials who have broken the law and have ties to the mafia, and guaranteeing media freedom.

The second section, titled “Knowledge Is Power,” calls for adapting the education system to modern needs, introducing competitive selection for teaching positions, and subsidizing startups and innovation.

The third section, “Serbia Grows With Us,” addresses social and economic issues. Among other things, it proposes providing housing for young families and essential workers, and improving health care by standardizing medication prices nationwide and modernizing hospitals, particularly in rural areas.

The other parties

Among the other contenders, two coalitions — Stability Factor and European Serbia — have a chance of clearing the 3% threshold, according to a poll conducted by Serbian market research agency Factor Plus and published on September 21.

Stability Factor, led by Ivica Dačić, brings together the Socialist Party and partners such as the Social Democrats and the Greens. The coalition presents itself as an alliance of the patriotic left and intends to work with the SNS and Vučić. It is going through a difficult period, however, facing criticism for cooperating with the regime. On August 31, the Socialist Party expelled its vice president, Branko Ružić, for supporting the protesting students. Two members of its main council and several regional party leaders then left in protest.

European Serbia, meanwhile, consists of pro-European parties and has a detailed plan to dismantle the regime built by the SNS within 100 days and begin building a “European Serbia.” The coalition did not join forces with the students but is willing to cooperate with them after the election.

How the campaign unfolded

Although the official campaign began on September 9, Vučić and the SNS effectively started much earlier. The SNS put its own spin on the student movement’s main slogan, “Students Win!” For several months, enormous billboards reading “Serbia Wins!” could be seen across the country.

Government-controlled TV channels heavily promote Vučić. An analysis by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation found that he appeared on various channels 129 times in August — an average of four times a day. He appeared in his capacity as head of state, meaning he did not pay for the airtime.

Vučić has used other methods as well. In September 2026, the government set aside money for one-time payments of 160 to 300 euros to pensioners. Vučić also promised to raise public-sector salaries by 8% and social workers’ salaries by 12% — but only starting in December, after the election.

The students have no such resources, so they have to rely on social media and direct campaigning. They have set up booths in various Serbian cities where people can talk to candidates and learn about their platform. The students are also going door to door, trying to persuade voters to support the Student List.

Meanwhile, opposition supporters face direct pressure and restrictions from the authorities. Universities are firing professors sympathetic to the protesters, while television gives the opposition half as much airtime as pro-government parties and portrays it negatively. CRTA, an independent Serbian election-monitoring organization, says opposition candidates, observers, and activists face surveillance, insults, intimidation, and even physical attacks.

Who will win?

It is difficult to gauge support ahead of the election: Opinion polls vary widely. According to Factor Plus, 48.7% of voters are prepared to vote for the SNS and its coalition partners, and 37.1% for the Student List. European Serbia, at 3.6%, and the Socialist Party-led coalition, at 4.9%, also cleared the 3% threshold in the poll. But opposition politicians accuse the agency of bias and of working for the SNS, whose support it consistently overstates.

On September 30, Đorđe Vukadinović, editor in chief of the independent political science journal Nova srpska politička misao (New Serbian Political Thought), put support for the students at 44.4% and for the pro-government coalition at 41.7%. He did not explain the basis for those estimates. On October 15, political analyst Mirko Dautović suggested that support for the students had risen above 50% over the preceding month, but he too cited no specific poll.

Serbia faces a fierce electoral contest, but observers say tensions could persist afterward. First, there is no guarantee that Vučić would willingly step back if he lost — he could declare the results invalid. But that would risk a repeat of Slobodan Milošević’s fate: In the fall of 2000, he too refused to acknowledge defeat, only to be forced to give in after 10 days of mass protests.

Second, the students are determined and make no secret of the bleak future awaiting Vučić if they win: He will be put on trial. In September, a student-made video appeared online showing Vučić in various settings, followed by a figure mopping a prison floor. The video achieved its aim — it infuriated the Serbian authorities.

Even setting Vučić’s fate aside, a student victory would leave the movement facing the question of what to do next. Once their common opponent is gone, their disagreements over Kosovo, European integration, and relations with Russia and China — which they have set aside for now — will surface. Maintaining a consensus will be very difficult. And winning an election alone will not be enough to eradicate corruption. As the example of 2000 shows, democrats coming to power does not necessarily mean a victory for democracy.

What the election means for Russians living in Serbia

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Serbia declined to impose sanctions on Russia while also taking in tens of thousands of Russians. By December 2024, the Serbian authorities had issued 67,000 temporary residence permits.

Estimates put the number of Russians in Serbia at 55,000 to 62,000 at the end of 2025, with more than 80% living in Belgrade. Most are young: People ages 24 to 39 account for 55%. And 66% of the Russians who have relocated to Serbia have a university education.

Temporary residence does not, of course, give Russians the right to vote, but Serbian politics is of little interest to them. A survey by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy found that 72.8% of Russians who had moved to Serbia did not want to take part in political or civic activities. They were far more concerned about their personal safety and economic well-being.

The government’s approach to Russians who have relocated appears unlikely to change if the pro-government coalition wins. The Serbian authorities, for example, have repeatedly said they have no plans to revise the existing visa-free travel agreement with Russia.

If the Student List wins, its policy toward Russian emigrants is impossible to predict at this point: The students have carefully avoided commenting on Russia or on Russians who have moved to Serbia.

More on Serbia’s election

• Aleksandar Vučić resigns as Serbia’s president eight months early to run for prime minister instead

At Meduza, we are committed to transparency about our use of artificial intelligence in the newsroom. The story you’re reading was written by one of our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an AI model configured to follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is the result of extensive testing and refinements to ensure our English-language coverage is timely and accurate. A Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.

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Alexander Dunaev

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said speed restrictions on Starlink satellite communications terminals and their military version, Starshield, remain in place in Ukraine. He spoke in a video address to the Hudson Institute in Washington, Interfax-Ukraine reported.

“The speed limits on Starlink and Starshield are still there. The speed has not been restored. And the delivery of interceptors to protect us against Russian ballistic missiles is still delayed. We’re waiting for interceptors that were already agreed on. But they are still not coming. Hope that everything is on the way. And this is a real problem for us, because the Russians attack us almost every day. Russia attacks us massively. So that’s where things stand today,” Zelensky said.

He added that this was happening as Ukraine continues its “quite successful operations on the front,” and said the Starlink and Starshield restrictions had complicated the situation.

“But our front line is still holding, and we are doing our best to keep our logistics working, and we continue defending ourselves,” he said.

On October 14, Ukrainian military personnel reported encountering restrictions on Starlink satellite communications terminals — specifically, their military version, Starshield. The connection cut out when drones exceeded 160 kilometers per hour (about 100 miles per hour). This came amid a sharp deterioration in relations between Zelensky and U.S. President Donald Trump.

Two days later, Trump said he had not ordered Starshield service in Ukraine to be restricted and did not know who could have done so. However, The Telegraph, citing four sources, reported that Musk had approached Trump with a proposal to restrict Starlink speeds in Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal later reported that Musk had ordered Starshield service in Ukraine to be restricted.

The Wall Street Journal also reported that Trump called Musk and asked him to lift the restrictions on the military version of Starlink in Ukraine. Trump later said Musk had lifted the restrictions.

Ukraine’s military Starlink service

• How Ukraine’s military uses Starlink — and what would happen if the Trump administration cut off its satellite communications entirely
• Ukrainian troops lost Starlink access for a day. Elon Musk and the Trump White House both deny responsibility.

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Moscow’s Tagansky District Court has ruled partly in Oleg Deripaska’s favor in his defamation lawsuit against Anti-Corruption Foundation investigators Maria Pevchikh and Sergey Yezhov, former Popular Politics host Irina Alleman, and human rights activist Olga Romanova, the businessman’s lawyer, Alexey Melnikov, told Interfax.

Melnikov said the court found that the information the defendants had circulated was false and defamatory. The court also ordered the defendants to pay 40 million rubles in compensation.

Deripaska had sought 1 billion rubles from Pevchikh, Yezhov, Alleman, and Romanova.

In his lawsuit, Deripaska alleged that for several years, “the defendants have been waging a large-scale campaign against him to tarnish his honor and good name.”

The lawsuit stemmed from a video titled “Organized Crime, Officials, Girls: The Criminal Biography of Oleg Deripaska” on the Navalny Live YouTube channel. The video’s description calls Deripaska “an oligarch for whom crime has always been the norm.”

Oleg Deripaska has repeatedly sued the Anti-Corruption Foundation. In August 2022, he filed a lawsuit against Alexey Navalny, Maria Pevchikh, Georgy Alburov, and The Insider over an investigation into Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. In October 2022, Moscow’s Zelenogradsky District Court ruled in Deripaska’s favor. He had previously sued over an investigation by Navalny’s team into his yacht vacation with Sergey Prikhodko, then a Russian deputy prime minister, and escort agency employee Nastya Rybka. In December 2024, Deripaska sued Pevchikh and Google over her statement in a Popular Politics video that the billionaire “chips in to fund a private military company.”

From Meduza’s archives

• ‘Working trips’ Team Navalny looks into Sergey Lavrov’s ‘female companion’ identified by investigative journalists
• ‘The main risk is that they’ll kill us all’ How Navalny’s team worked while he was in prison — and what changed after his death

At Meduza, we are committed to transparency about our use of artificial intelligence in the newsroom. The story you’re reading was written by one of our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an AI model configured to follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is the result of extensive testing and refinements to ensure our English-language coverage is timely and accurate. A Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.

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Moscow’s Basmanny District Court has ordered Oleg Mikhailov, a former State Duma deputy and former head of the Communist Party’s Komi branch, held in pretrial detention. He is charged with justifying terrorism over a post supporting imprisoned political scientist Boris Kagarlitsky and faces up to seven years in prison. Mikhailov built one of the Communist Party’s strongest regional branches, brought together people with different political views, took part in environmental protests, and challenged the republic’s authorities. During his State Duma election campaign, he was also one of the few Communist candidates to campaign for peace. Yet after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Mikhailov repeatedly voted for repressive laws.

Warning: This article contains profanity.

Meduza previously reported that the presidential administration was urging the Communist Party’s leadership not to nominate strong regional candidates who had defeated United Russia candidates in single-member districts in the previous election. Among them was Mikhailov, a Communist from the Komi Republic.

The Communist Party partly complied, but its Komi branch leader ran anyway, both in his district and on the federal party list. His original position on the list offered him no prospect of winning a seat.

A Communist Party source told Meduza that the party leadership provided almost no funding for Mikhailov’s district campaign. After his nomination, the source said, Mikhailov and the party began receiving “hints” from the Kremlin: If he did not withdraw, he would face a criminal investigation. Meduza has learned, however, that the authorities planned to launch an investigation regardless, and that the Federal Security Service (FSB) began examining Mikhailov’s social media accounts as early as 2024.

“I told him: Go on vacation after the election, to whatever country you can, and maybe stay a little longer. He agreed to take a vacation, but he ruled out emigrating. He wanted to stay in Russia,” an acquaintance of the former deputy told Meduza, requesting anonymity.

Mikhailov failed to win reelection to the State Duma in September 2026. On October 21, he was detained at Moscow’s Domodedovo Airport as he returned from vacation.

Mikhailov was born in 1987 in Pechora, a district seat in Komi. After studying biology at Syktyvkar State University, he went to graduate school, earned a doctorate, and worked at Komi’s Institute of Biology. He joined the Communist Party in 2007 while still a student and became an activist. At the time, the party’s Komi branch attracted little attention compared with branches in other regions that had prominent local politicians.

“You could’ve called the Komi regional party committee a retirees’ club. They were an opposition group — not very active, but honest,” Pavel Andreyev, founder of the Revolt Center and an acquaintance of Mikhailov’s, told Meduza. “At first, he came across as pretty off-putting — this guy with no sense of fashion, like he’d stepped out of Soviet times. But the older crowd liked that.”

An acquaintance of Mikhailov’s who spoke to Meduza anonymously said he “steadily worked his way up through the party”:

He’d help [the branch leadership] with one thing, lend a hand with another. They promoted him for obvious reasons: He did the things [the branch leadership] didn’t have enough people to do, and [the party leaders] also felt it was time to retire.

And before he knew it, Oleg had become a Syktyvkar city council member, then head of the regional party committee and a member of the regional legislature.

As head of the committee, Mikhailov actively supported protests against the construction of a landfill at Shiyes railway station. The station is in the Arkhangelsk region, practically on the Komi border, and much closer to Syktyvkar than to Arkhangelsk. Mikhailov laid out his position on Shiyes in 2019:

There’s no middle ground on Shiyes: You’re either for it or against it. If you’re for it, you’re an accomplice to the garbage occupiers; if you’re against it, you’re a normal person. There’s no third option.

Another deputy once said to me, “Maybe you should go work in the Arkhangelsk region? It’s their problem, after all.” That tells you something about a deputy who doesn’t understand that administrative and national borders are drawn by people, while nature has no borders. It’s all one ecosystem: Pollution will flow into the Vychegda and Northern Dvina [rivers], then into the White and Barents seas, and we’ll pollute half of Europe.

Speaking to Meduza that same year, Mikhailov called the landfill’s construction “a political issue, rather than an environmental one.” He spoke with considerable emotion in that interview:

The federal government treats Russia’s regions and the people who live in them unfairly. What are we, second-class citizens? Is that why you’re building a dump here? How about we put a dump in your backyard? We’re a region that sends out huge amounts of resources — 151 billion rubles in taxes last year. We send you money, resources, and even our talent. The best of everything goes to Moscow! And we get Moscow’s garbage.

At the time, Mikhailov organized Syktyvkar’s largest protest in several years: The Communists said at least 1,800 people attended. The republic’s authorities authorized the rally at the local “Hyde Park,” a designated protest area, but it turned into a march and continued in the city’s main square.

During the Shiyes protests, the Communist Party’s Komi branch built ties with environmental activists and the Komi national movement. Mikhailov told Meduza that he was half Komi himself and supported compulsory Komi-language instruction in the republic’s schools. It had become voluntary shortly before, in January 2018.

“In places like Vorkuta or Inta, nonindigenous residents openly say, ‘What do we need this language for?’ But if you live here, if you’re staying rather than waiting to move away, then respect the traditions of the local people. If I move to any European country and want to live there, I have to learn the language,” Mikhailov told Meduza indignantly.

In 2019, the Communist Party’s Komi branch actively supported Komi national activists in elections to the interregional civic organization Komi Voityr. For the Communists, that campaign was something of a warm-up for the 2020 elections for the republic’s leader and its State Council. By then, residents saw the Communist Party as the main force for political protest.

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An acquaintance of Mikhailov’s said he had “an ability to build electoral alliances with people of different views.” Previous secretaries of the Communist Party’s regional committee had focused solely on the party and its voters, the acquaintance told Meduza, while Mikhailov worked with “the whole range of civic activists — environmentalists, housing activists, human rights advocates, liberals, and patriots.”

“This guy, who basically never picked fights, hoovered up opposition-minded people and pulled them into his orbit. But the activists didn’t roll over for him. They just understood that Oleg was a reasonable person they could work things out with,” Mikhailov’s acquaintance said.

Opposition to the Kremlin’s appointee, Komi leader Sergey Gaplikov, and his team of “outsiders” was central to the Communists’ 2020 State Council campaign. Gaplikov had had no connection to Komi before his appointment. Mikhailov spoke about him to Meduza in 2019:

Before Gaplikov, the leaders had at least built their careers here. He’s a complete outsider. The State Council meets seven to nine times a year, and the republic’s head shows up exactly once a year, to deliver his report. [During rallies,] people stand on the steps of the republic’s government building, shouting, “Gaplikov must go!” — and he couldn’t care less. The main thing is that everyone who’s more or less politically active understands that these people are just passing through, here for a stint. They’ll leave anyway.

The Communists did well in the republic’s State Council election, winning 14.8% of the vote — nearly twice their share in the previous election, in 2015. Four Communist Party candidates won seats in Komi’s parliament: three through the party list and one in a single-member district. United Russia received 28% of the vote.

Shortly before the election, the republic did get a new leader: Another “outsider,” Vladimir Uiba, replaced Gaplikov. Mikhailov was barred from running for Komi’s top job after the republic’s election commission ruled that he had failed to collect the required endorsements from municipal officials.

Uiba proved a poor choice for the job. The new leader clashed with local residents and with Mikhailov himself. At a State Council meeting in April 2021, Mikhailov told the republic’s head that Uiba had “even run his campaign like a complete coward, picking outright spoiler candidates as his opponents.” Uiba responded by calling Mikhailov a “horse” and threatening to “beat the shit out of” him.

This confrontation only cemented Mikhailov’s position as Komi’s leading opposition politician — and possibly its most popular politician overall. He regularly traveled around the region and met with residents. In the 2021 State Duma election, he won his single-member district, while the Communist Party received 26.9% of the vote in Komi, according to official figures. United Russia had one of its lowest vote shares nationwide in Komi that year: 29.4%, compared with 49% across Russia.

After Mikhailov moved to the federal parliament, libertarian Viktor Vorobyov took over his State Council seat and his position as the party’s caucus leader there.

In the State Duma, Mikhailov did not vote for the 2022 laws recognizing the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics, or for the law imposing penalties for “discrediting the army.” Nevertheless, the European Union, the United States, and Canada sanctioned him for allegedly supporting the latter law.

Mikhailov did support other measures, including the November 2022 ban on “LGBT propaganda,” the November 2024 ban on adoptions by people in countries that allow “sex changes,” and the July 2025 law allowing the FSB to establish its own pretrial detention centers.

Meanwhile, the Communist Party’s Komi branch continued to oppose Uiba, who remained in office until November 2024 despite his unpopularity. He was replaced by Rostislav Goldstein, the former head of the Jewish Autonomous Region. Goldstein had close ties to Komi: He had run businesses in the republic, served in its State Council, and then represented the region in the federal parliament.

An acquaintance of Mikhailov’s said that, unlike Uiba, Goldstein and his team initially “tried to reach an understanding” with the Communists. “At least an agreement not to fight dirty with each other,” the acquaintance told Meduza. Gradually, however, relations between the republic’s authorities and the Communist Party branch began to deteriorate, he said.

“Goldstein is a pretty tough guy. He also wanted to show the federal leadership that he’d brought everyone to heel in a region known for protest and dealt with the Communist Party problem,” a source close to the presidential administration’s domestic politics team told Meduza.

The confrontation between Goldstein and the republic’s Communists culminated in Mikhailov being barred from the 2025 election for regional leader. As before, the official reason was his alleged failure to collect the required endorsements from municipal officials.

Ahead of the 2026 parliamentary election, Komi’s authorities deliberately worked to keep the “troublesome deputy” out of the State Duma, a political consultant who works with the presidential administration’s domestic politics team told Meduza. To that end, the consultant said, they fielded Stanislav Kochev, who had fought in the war against Ukraine, in the single-member district. “A veteran can’t lose — anything goes to make sure he wins,” the consultant said.

Mikhailov, meanwhile, campaigned on the slogan “For peace,” a rarity among Communist Party candidates. Officially, he lost the State Duma election, but the vote tallies from in-person polling stations where observers were present indicate otherwise. In electronic voting, the United Russia candidate received 2.5 times as many votes as Mikhailov.

An acquaintance of Mikhailov’s said the politician’s arrest could make it harder for the Communist Party’s Komi branch to function and would probably turn it into a typical, largely inactive party branch. “Yeah, he probably could’ve done more. But he could’ve done jack shit, like most politicians,” the acquaintance said of Mikhailov’s work.

The acquaintance still considers Mikhailov one of Komi’s most popular political figures: “His [Telegram] channel is called ‘Voice of the Republic.’ I think that’s how residents see him — as the voice of the people.”

Russia’s State Duma election

• Gerrymandering à la russe: To preserve United Russia’s supermajority, the Kremlin is pressuring Communists to sideline their strongest candidates in September’s elections
• Russia’s State Duma election delivered record turnout and a landslide for United Russia. Kremlin insiders say the results were achieved ‘through very dirty means.’

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Andrey Pertsev

Russia’s Justice Ministry has added journalist Maxim Kurnikov, editor-in-chief of the news outlet Ekho, to its register of “foreign agents.”

Also added to the list were:

• Yelena Shuvalova, a former Moscow City Duma member who heads the Novosibirsk branch of the Rassvet party
• The project “BEYOND PROPAGANDA”
• The project Prostranstvo Politika. Novosibirsk
• The International Union of German Culture, an association of nonprofit organizations
• Mavi Grupp LLC

Ekho was founded abroad by former journalists from the radio station Ekho Moskvy. The outlet was designated a “foreign agent” in July 2026.

From Meduza’s archives

• ‘Our readership is smarter than the Kremlin thinks’ Meduza talks to the chief editors of blacklisted Russian media outlets about their plans for the future
• ‘You can always expect retaliatory measures from Moscow’ Deputy Duma Speaker Pyotr Tolstoy explains Russia’s new legislation against ‘foreign agents’ in the news media
• ‘I don’t want to become a political prisoner’ Three ‘foreign agent’ journalists describe life after designation by Russia’s Justice Ministry

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Russia’s Justice Ministry has published a registry of people subject to “temporary restrictive measures” on its website.

The list contains 12 names, with Mikhail Khodorkovsky first. It also includes political scientist Yekaterina Schulmann, businessman Yevgeny Chichvarkin, philanthropist Boris Zimin, and several others.

1. Mikhail Khodorkovsky

2. Alexey Nesterenko

3. Anastasia Shevchenko

4. Yekaterina Schulmann

5. Leonid Gozman

6. Yevgeny Chichvarkin

7. Michael Nacke

8. Yelena Kotyonochkina

9. Boris Zimin

10. Vladimir Milov

11. Mark Zakharov

12. Anastasia Burakova

Clicking on a name in the registry opens an entry with personal information — date and place of birth, taxpayer identification number, and pension insurance number — along with the grounds for the restrictions.

Deputy Justice Minister Oleg Sviridenko discussed the registry’s creation in an interview with TASS the previous day. He said the law establishing it — dubbed the “civil death” law on social media — was “neither excessive nor a violation of constitutional rights, but a justified effort to restore the rule of law and justice.”

“I can’t rule out that, as the law is applied, it may need fine-tuning and targeted adjustments to ensure it is fully consistent with the broader legal framework for protecting national sovereignty,” Sviridenko said.

In late July 2026, the State Duma passed a law in both its second and third readings introducing “temporary restrictive measures” against people outside Russia who have been found guilty of an offense in the country and are “evading” an administrative or criminal penalty. Among other provisions, the law called for a registry — effectively a list of “enemies of the people.” The registry began operating in test mode in late August.

Placement on the registry effectively amounts to “civil death.” Restrictions include freezing funds in Russian banks, barring access to online banking, prohibiting sales of real estate and vehicles, banning all transactions conducted under a power of attorney, and denying access to consular services.

Measures affecting Russians abroad

• Russia begins widespread freezing of bank accounts belonging to exiled cultural figures
• How new ‘transnational repression’ measures could affect the lives of Russians in Europe

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Austria will expel four Russian diplomats suspected of spying. Three worked at the Russian Embassy in Vienna and the fourth at Russia’s mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Austria’s Foreign Ministry said the diplomats “have engaged in activities incompatible with their diplomatic status” and had therefore been declared personae non gratae.

Austrian authorities have long known about all four diplomats and have kept them on internal lists of suspects for some time, Profil magazine reported. An inquiry began in mid-August after the news outlet Proekt reported on ties between Russian diplomats in Europe and three Russian intelligence agencies: military intelligence (the GRU), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Federal Security Service (FSB).

Austria previously expelled three Russian Embassy employees in May on suspicion of maintaining spying equipment. Profil reported that satellite dishes Russia could use to intercept communications traffic had been found on the embassy’s roof.

From Meduza’s archives

• ‘A path towards destroying relations’ Czech Republic to limit Russian Embassy staff in Prague amid escalating diplomatic tensions
• What is the GRU? Who gets recruited to be a spy? Why are they exposed so often? Here are the most important things you should know about Russia’s intelligence community

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Police in Cyprus have launched an investigation into reports that Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich may have evaded taxes with help from the accounting firm Deloitte. A Cypriot Justice Ministry official told a parliamentary committee meeting on combating money laundering that the investigation was underway, the BBC reported.

The police financial crime unit is conducting the investigation.

“We will look at any company or person who may be involved. We will see if there has been fraud or if some documents have been manipulated,” Cypriot police spokesman Andreas Anastasiades told the BBC.

The BBC, The Guardian, and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) previously published investigations reporting that Deloitte, one of the world’s largest consulting and accounting firms, helped falsify documents to conceal Abramovich’s wealth and help him evade taxes. According to the journalists, Deloitte’s Cyprus division helped him conceal $672 million in assets, including mansions, yachts, and private jets.

Abramovich’s lawyers denied any wrongdoing. Deloitte Cyprus said it had always complied with local laws.

Russian billionaires and Cyprus companies

• Investigations implicate Deloitte, one of the world’s largest accounting firms, in alleged tax-evasion schemes involving Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich’s Cyprus companies
• Moscow money in the Mediterranean Leaked documents show Cyprus firms linked to Russian billionaires played key role in the Kremlin’s backdoor dealings

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Israel will hold parliamentary elections on October 27. Recent opinion polls show Likud, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, trailing Yashar, the party led by former Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. Neither party has a decisive lead, however.

A few days before the election, Netanyahu posted a recording of a conversation with musician Andrey Makarevich, who has lived in Israel for the past several years. Makarevich, who holds both Israeli and Russian citizenship, expressed support for Netanyahu during the conversation.

Many people in Israel and beyond were unhappy with Makarevich’s support for Netanyahu, who divides opinion among Israelis. Some Israelis are dissatisfied with the prime minister’s domestic policies, as well as his government’s actions before, during, and after the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023.

“Wow, what a storm this has stirred up! A typhoon! A tsunami!” Makarevich wrote on social media.

Critics noted that the musician had supported Vladimir Putin in the early 2000s and that in 2008, his band, Mashina Vremeni, had taken part in the “Forward, Russia!” rally and concert on Moscow’s Vasilyevsky Spusk to celebrate Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential election victory. Makarevich later publicly criticized the Russian authorities on many occasions. In 2022, the musician, who spoke out against the war with Ukraine, was designated a “foreign agent” in Russia.

“God, what an absolute disgrace,” blogger Rustem Adagamov wrote, pointing out that the International Criminal Court had issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu and that the prime minister faces corruption charges in Israel.

Adagamov stressed that Makarevich had “spent years condemning the crimes of Putin’s regime, Russian aggression, and the killing of civilians,” but was now “having a friendly chat with a politician accused of extremely serious international crimes,” helping him “build a favorable public image.” “This isn’t about principles anymore — it’s hypocrisy and double standards,” the blogger wrote.

Some users on Facebook, where Makarevich’s conversation with Netanyahu has drawn the most discussion, supported the musician, saying that “everyone has the right to freedom of speech and freedom of choice.”

Makarevich responded to the comments:

Once again, my opponents have proved that their emotions run about a hundred times stronger than their brains — assuming they have any — and that they can outdo even the worst Kremlin trolls when it comes to being obnoxious. Pretty much what I expected. Building politics in our country around those attitudes is a bad idea. Take my word for it. I reserve the right to think what I think and say what I say. Enjoy the elections.

Israelis and the October 7 attack

• Three years since October 7: Israelis tell Meduza how the worst terrorist attack in their country’s history changed them and the world around them
• ‘Something like this has never happened before’ Meduza readers in Israel share their experiences of the October 7 Hamas attack

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Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian military’s General Staff, said Russian forces would cease fire on the Kherson front starting at 4 a.m. on October 27 for a humanitarian operation in Oleshky (Alyoshki in Russian).

“To ensure people’s safety and deliver essential supplies, arrangements will be made to conduct engineering reconnaissance and provide safe passage for a humanitarian convoy into Alyoshki in the Kherson region,” Gerasimov said.

On the afternoon of October 23, the White House said Russia and Ukraine would temporarily halt hostilities in Oleshky, in the Russian-occupied part of the Kherson region, so residents could leave the city safely. U.S. first lady Melania Trump was involved in reaching the agreement. The ceasefire was scheduled to begin on October 29, the White House said.

Oleshky was occupied at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. By the fall of 2026, conditions there had become dire — residents had no food, electricity, or adequate medical care. Civilians cannot leave the city safely. Pope Leo XIV also appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the situation in Oleshky, calling in a phone call for a ceasefire to allow humanitarian aid deliveries and the safe, voluntary evacuation of residents.

The humanitarian crisis in Oleshky

• ‘The smell of death is everywhere’: Inside the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Russian-occupied Oleshky, where hundreds are trapped without food, electricity, or medicine
• A humanitarian crisis is gripping Russian-occupied Oleshky as food deliveries stop and safe evacuation becomes nearly impossible

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The Comoros-flagged cargo ship Khoryv sank in the Black Sea off Romania’s coast after a drone attack, Reuters reported. The ship had 13 sailors from Ukraine and Azerbaijan aboard. One crew member was killed, nine were rescued, and three remain missing.

“It is part of Russia’s escalation process in its war in Ukraine,” Romanian President Nicusor Dan said. He told reporters that the ship had sunk after being hit by a drone.

Romania’s naval authority said the Khoryv sent a distress signal 24 kilometers (about 15 miles) from the port of Constanta, just outside Romania’s territorial waters.

At least seven cargo ships have been attacked off the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria in the past two weeks, Reuters reported. About 30 sailors have been killed or gone missing.

Most of the ships attacked were near the Sulina Channel, which connects the Danube to the Black Sea. After strikes on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, the channel became the main export route for Ukrainian grain and vegetable oil, Reuters reported.

Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria have called on NATO to do more to protect commercial ships in the Black Sea.

Black Sea shipping

• Greenpeace reports another huge oil slick in the Black Sea following an attack on a tanker off Sochi’s coastline. Russia denies any pollution but has declared a h alert.
• ‘The agreement won’t last long’ What the Black Sea grain deal means for Ukraine, Russia, and the wider world

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The retail chain Metro, whose Russian assets were placed under temporary management less than a month ago, said it had donated 1 billion rubles to the “People’s Front: Everything for Victory!” fund.

The money will go toward “purchasing equipment needed by the military on the front lines,” the company said in a press release.

The fund said the money would help meet “urgent needs” for vehicles, communications and reconnaissance systems, equipment to counter drones, and “other things needed by troops in the “special military operation.”

“As part of Russia’s economic system, we believe it is important to take part in the state’s strategic initiatives,” said Johannes Tholey, Metro’s chief executive in Russia.

Update: Germany’s Metro said it had not approved the transfer of 1 billion rubles to the Russian military. In a statement to Deutsche Welle, Metro AG said it “distances itself from any support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.” “Financing or supporting military operations runs counter to both our position and our business principles,” the company said.

In late September, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree placing the assets of the German retail chain Metro under temporary management. The company had remained in Russia after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The appointed manager was JSC UK Torg Rus, a company registered three weeks earlier. Its listed owner was Johannes Tholey, who has headed Metro Cash & Carry since 2023.

Le Monde later reported that Metro itself had proposed that the Russian authorities place it under temporary management, deciding to “act preemptively” to avoid the worst-case scenario.

From Meduza’s archives

• Here’s what we know about Putin’s decree empowering the Russian state to take control of companies that fail to stop Ukrainian drones
• A new wave of nationalization How the Russian authorities are seizing private assets, one court ruling at a time
• Putin says he won’t nationalize markets, but here are three tactics federal prosecutors are using to seize Russians’ assets

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Ukraine’s armed forces have evacuated a wounded soldier from the front line by drone for the first time, Reuters reported. The news agency recounted the rescue of 49-year-old Kostiantyn Vlasenko in the Kharkiv region, based on his account.

Vlasenko had been on the front line since May 2025, holding a position in a trench with a fellow soldier whose call sign was Basky. They received food and supplies by drone. There was no other way to deliver them — the sheer number of drones made any movement near the front line potentially deadly, Reuters reported.

They were due to rotate out in the fall of 2025, but the two soldiers sent to relieve them were killed on the way to their position. Two more soldiers sent to retrieve their bodies were then killed. Vlasenko said that was when he realized that “no one would get out anymore.”

In mid-February, after 10 months in the trench, Vlasenko and Basky were forced to abandon their position because it had flooded. They moved into a partially destroyed school building. One day, when they went out to collect a package of food and clothing dropped by their fellow soldiers, a Russian reconnaissance drone spotted them. Another drone then struck their position. Basky, who turned 50 that day, was killed.

The blast shattered Vlasenko’s left foot and left his right leg broken and twisted. He managed to crawl into shelter — a pit measuring about 80 by 60 centimeters beneath a metal boiler used to heat the school.

Vlasenko said his left foot gradually “rotted away,” while a bone protruded from his injured right shin. He decided to cut off his right foot as well. “I had to amputate it because it was just dragging along behind me. The leg was dragging so much that the bone was sticking out further and further,” he said.

As Vlasenko “started losing hope,” Reuters reported, his commanders began looking for ways to evacuate him. Using an armored vehicle was impossible because of the drones, so they initially planned to rescue him with unmanned ground vehicles. But drones destroyed two of those vehicles as they tried to reach him.

The commanders then decided to try a new heavy-lift drone capable of carrying a 90-kilogram load for up to 25 kilometers. That was enough: The officers estimated that Vlasenko weighed about 70 kilograms after a year on the front line, and a safe location behind the lines was 15 kilometers away.

Vlasenko was evacuated in early October after spending months alone awaiting rescue. The day before, a supply drop brought him a harness to put on and attach to a cable, along with a phone containing instructional videos.

During the evacuation, the drone carrying Vlasenko climbed to an altitude of 70 meters. Three other small drones escorted it to distract Russian drones. Before and during the evacuation, four FPV drone crews, fixed-wing drones, and artillery struck nearby positions identified as those of Russian drone operators.

The flight lasted 15 minutes. “I wasn’t afraid of falling, say somewhere into the forest, I wasn’t afraid of that. But I was afraid of falling into the water, because I can’t swim,” Vlasenko said. He is now undergoing rehabilitation at a hospital in Kharkiv.

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In December 2025, Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, head of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff’s Operational Training Directorate, was killed in a car bombing in Moscow. A Russian man who left the country in 2022 and now coordinates a network of volunteers tracking Russian military personnel says he helped prepare the killing. His role is detailed in the BBC documentary ”Traitors, Patriots, Spies: Shadowmen Helping Ukraine Inside Russia.”

The film introduces the man as Foma. His face is hidden — viewers see only his silhouette and hear his voice. The filmmakers say that in early 2022, Foma warned Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, the HUR, about Russia’s planned invasion. He then fled Russia, and the Ukrainians helped him settle in Warsaw. He now lives in Poland.

Foma says he coordinates a network of about 30 people operating in Russia, Ukraine, and several European countries. He says he also maintains ties with sources in Russia’s intelligence services. According to the film, years of working among Russia’s elite gave him a unique network of contacts and a steady flow of inside information.

Foma says his network gathers intelligence on where storage depots and headquarters are located, where units are stationed, where generals live, where officers working at those headquarters live, where strategic bomber pilots who attack Ukraine live, and who gives the orders.

The HUR confirmed that it had worked with Foma, the investigative outlet iStories reported.

One scene shows Foma training volunteers to conduct surveillance in Moscow. He tells them not to bring a phone. He also warns that if they are caught, they face terrorism charges and 25 years in prison.

In the film, Foma says he wants Russian soldiers and officers who order the shooting of prisoners and the rape and murder of civilians to think long and hard before giving such orders, to be scared, and to stop. Those who turn into animals and those who kill people, he says, need to be punished.

The next segment covers the December 2024 killing of General Igor Kirillov, head of Russia’s Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Troops. Foma told the BBC that he was not involved in that killing but confirmed that his network passes information about Russian military personnel to Ukraine. He insists the people his volunteers follow are war criminals.

Sarvarov was killed a year after Kirillov. When the BBC filmmaker asked Foma about Sarvarov’s killing, he said: “Keeping track of him took quite an effort. He lived alternately with his mistress and his colleague. Covered his tracks and constantly changed his schedule.” Foma stresses, however, that his group does not take part in the killings themselves.

A man using the same pseudonym has appeared as a military expert on The Breakfast Show’s morning broadcasts since mid-September. On September 19, after regular military expert Yuri Fyodorov left the channel, The Breakfast Show founder Alexander Plyushchev wrote that the morning show would have a new military commentator: Foma, co-founder of the Telegram channel Volya, who appears on camera with his face hidden.

The BBC film does not explicitly link Foma to Volya. But Agentstvo journalists noticed that several shots show him sitting in front of a computer monitor displaying Volya’s donation page on Patreon.

Plyushchev told Agentstvo that he contacted Foma while looking for a replacement for Fyodorov. “All I knew about Foma was that he did analysis on Georgian political scientist Gela Vasadze’s show and ran the Telegram channel Volya… We understood the risks of having an anonymous commentator, but we decided to try it, since he was providing commentary rather than serving as a source. Foma is now one of four military commentators who regularly work with The Breakfast Show,” Plyushchev said. Agentstvo received no response from Foma, who had been sent an editor’s contact information.

Russian military personnel and attacks

• At least six assassination attempts have targeted Russian generals away from the front line over the past two years — three of them fatal
• ‘A war criminal and a legitimate target’ Russian general assassinated in Moscow accused Kyiv and the West of secret biolabs, drone-delivered mosquitoes, and engineered pandemics
• A spy inside Russia’s army. The Wall Street Journal tells the story of the lieutenant who helped Ukraine kill hundreds of his fellow soldiers.

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Ukrainian forces launched a missile attack on Russia’s Oryol region. Preliminary reports from Ukrainian monitoring channels suggest the target was the Proton factory, which produces optoelectronic equipment and components for military use.

A missile alert was issued across the Oryol region at about 5 p.m. local time. Local Telegram channels reported at least four explosions in the city of Oryol. Afterward, residents reported seeing thick smoke and hearing emergency vehicles.

Storm Shadow cruise missiles were used in the attack on Oryol, according to preliminary reports from Ukrainian monitoring channels.

The Telegram channel Exile+ reported that the factory’s products are used to manufacture S-71 “Kover” air-launched cruise missiles, 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and Pantsir-S1 air defense missile and gun systems.

Oryol Governor Andrey Klychkov said Ukrainian forces had launched a missile attack on a civilian facility — a business in Oryol’s Sovetsky district. Details on casualties and the extent of the damage remain unclear.

Ukraine’s missile strikes on Russian factories

• Photos and videos from Voronezh, where Ukraine attacked a factory that supplies electronics for Russia’s cruise missiles
• What we know about Ukraine’s missile attack on a microchip plant in southwestern Russia
• A Ukrainian attack on a Russian missile plant killed at least seven civilians. Locals say they had nowhere to hide.

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Russia has mounted an online campaign to discredit candidates for the U.S. Congress ahead of the November 3 midterm elections, Senator Mark Warner and Representative Jim Himes told Politico. Both are Democrats who sit on their chambers’ intelligence committees.

The lawmakers said their conclusions about Russian interference come from a classified U.S. intelligence report they received earlier in the week. The report says Moscow is using AI tools to spread disinformation and undermine trust in individual candidates and in the elections as a whole.

The lawmakers believe Russia could target both Democrats and Republicans who support Ukraine. The intelligence agencies have found no proven attempts by Russia to hack the election system or campaign networks.

Reports of attempts to interfere in the congressional elections first surfaced in early September. The Bot Blocker project, which tracks pro-Russian bot activity on social media, warned about AI-generated videos featuring deepfakes of celebrities such as Robert De Niro, Julia Roberts, and Cher urging viewers not to vote for Democrats.

According to the project, a Russian bot network called “Matryoshka” is spreading the videos. The clips were posted on X under the logos of real news outlets and contained false accusations against American politicians.

Posts from Russian bots on X rack up tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of views, but those figures are artificially inflated through fake engagement, Bloomberg reported. The clips can reach up to 200,000 views in the first hour, after which the view counts stop moving entirely. Moreover, the posts draw almost no likes or reposts.

Researchers from Graphika, Alethea, and Clemson University identified another Russian bot network spreading deepfake videos that targeted American politicians, NBC News reported. On October 20, videos appeared on X baselessly accusing Texas Democrat James Talarico of sexual assault, and one post garnered more than 1.3 million views.

The researchers said the network behind it is a Russian disinformation operation called “Storm-1516” that has been linked to Russian military intelligence. “Storm-1516” has previously been accused of interfering in elections in the United States, Germany, Hungary, and France.

At Meduza, we are committed to transparency about our use of artificial intelligence in the newsroom. The story you’re reading was written by one of our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an AI model configured to follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is the result of extensive testing and refinements to ensure our English-language coverage is timely and accurate. A Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.

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Russia and Ukraine will temporarily pause fighting to allow residents of Oleshky, a city in the occupied part of Ukraine’s Kherson region, to evacuate safely.

The White House said U.S. first lady Melania Trump helped broker the agreement.

The ceasefire will begin October 29.

“Residents who wish to evacuate will receive coordinated support and transportation to their preferred destination. I anticipate some will want to go to Russia, and some to Ukraine,” Melania Trump said.

Russian forces occupied Oleshky at the start of the full-scale war in 2022. By the fall of 2026, conditions in the city had grown dire: residents had no food, electricity, adequate medical care, or any safe way to leave.

European Parliament Vice President Pina Picierno declared a hunger strike to “draw international attention” to the situation in Oleshky. Pope Leo XIV spoke by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin and urged him to halt the fighting so humanitarian aid could reach residents and allow them to evacuate.

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