Is Turkey now globally recognized as a major military-industrial power?

The question assumes significance as, in a span of 48 hours, Turkey has signed two significant agreements that enhance its military-industrial power projection.

In Doha on October 21, it signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan, Qatar, and Indonesia for joint defense production, integrated manufacturing chains, and technology sharing.

In Ankara on October 22, it signed a Strategic Partnership with Canada, including a formal Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership, alongside deals on energy and air transport.

Four senior ministers signed the Badr Memorandum (BMU): Pakistan’s defense minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Turkey’s defense minister Yasar Guler, Qatar’s Deputy PM Sheikh Saud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Yusuf Jauhari.

Prof. Dr. Haluk Görgün, President (Secretary) of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) in Turkey and regarded as the “architect” of the BMU, was present at the signing ceremony.

Incidentally, Badr refers to the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers defeated their opponents in one of Islam’s earliest battles in the Arabian Peninsula.

Turkey’s defense ministry explained the name “Badr” as “full moon”. It said that “the four participating nations complement one another through this pact, which holds significant military and economic importance”.

In a statement, it added that “by leveraging the capabilities of each country in the field of military production, cooperation and integration will be achieved, defense industry capacities will be developed, and the needs of allied and friendly nations can thus be met.”

Similarly, the statement made by the Qatari Defense Ministry said the “Badr” Memorandum of Understanding “aims to foster cooperation in the field of defense manufacturing, enhance defense capabilities among the four countries, and promote collaboration in technical defense training, as well as in research and development areas, thereby contributing to the creation of solutions and industries worthy of the evolution of modern defenses”.

According to Arda Mevlutoglu, managing director of Ankara-based Mergen Analytical Strategies, the BMU’s implications could extend well beyond the four participants. “We may be witnessing the emergence of an interconnected network of defense and security arrangements extending from the Gulf to South and Southeast Asia, rather than a single formal alliance”.

Under the agreement, each country will bring its own resources and skills to the table.

“Turkey contributes technological expertise, systems integration and a mature defense industry; Pakistan and Indonesia offer manufacturing capacity, skilled workforces and sizable domestic markets; and Qatar provides investment potential and demand. Together, the four nations could establish integrated supply chains, allowing these countries to jointly develop, manufacture and sustain defence systems”, Mevlutoglu told Al Jazeera.

This means each member brings a complementary, not equal, asset. Turkey provides the industrial core, with establishments like Baykar (drones), TAI (aerospace), Aselsan (defense electronics), Roketsan (Missiles and munitions), STM (naval systems), and proven export models like the TB2 and Akıncı unmanned air-combat vehicles.

But Turkey seeks scale, co-production markets, and capital. Qatar can provide the finance. Pakistan and Indonesia can serve as markets.

Reportedly, Pakistan wants to diversify its military imports and not rely solely on China. It wants technology transfer and self-reliance through collaborations.

Indonesia is an emerging market and production base. Jakarta has bought Turkish weapons before — Kaplan tanks, MILGEM-derived frigates — and wants to build its own defense industry under Prabowo’s doctrine, with access to NATO-standard tech without full Western political conditions. The doctrine is championed by President Prabowo Subianto, who is aggressively executing a multifaceted supplier-diversification and co-production strategy.

However, the BMU is not the Mecca Pact of August 2026 that Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia signed in Riyadh and reportedly contains a collective defense clause—an attack on one is an attack on all.  It is an industrial MoU.

But one could argue that the initiative reflects Gulf countries increasingly looking toward the Global South and fellow Muslim countries, as recent Middle East conflicts have exposed vulnerabilities tied to dependence on foreign suppliers, technology restrictions, and supply chain disruptions.

By anchoring a defense-industrial coalition with Qatar, Pakistan, and Indonesia, Ankara seems to have signaled that it could be the technological and industrial nucleus of the Global South. And the global validation of its strategy has come through “the three-year action plan” with Ottawa.

Reports describe the optics of Prime Minister Mark Carney being received at the Presidential Complex in Ankara with full honors by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as historic. Carney is the first Canadian Prime Minister to make a dedicated bilateral visit to Turkey, although he traveled to Ankara in July to attend the NATO summit.

The visit resulted in the signing of three agreements: a Defense Industry Partnership between SSB Chairman Haluk Gorgun and Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand; an Air Transport Agreement; and a Joint Declaration on Energy Cooperation.

Remarkably, a few years ago, the two countries’ defense relations had virtually collapsed.

In October 2019, Canada imposed an arms embargo on Turkey after “Operation Peace Spring” in northeastern Syria. It was a military offensive launched by the Turkish Armed Forces and the allied Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

In October 2020, Canada suspended and later canceled export permits for L3Harris Wescam camera and targeting systems after confirming they were used on Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones supporting Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In fact, Canada adopted a presumptive-denial policy for military exports to Turkey. The Turkish defense industry saw Canada as a technology chokepoint.

However, over the last two years, Canada and Turkey have rebuilt their defense relationship. In January 2024, Ottawa quietly lifted arms-export restrictions and returned to a case-by-case assessment. In July 2026, at the NATO Summit in Ankara, the two defense ministers signed a “Statement of Intent”  on military dialogue.

“In an increasingly complex global security environment, rising geopolitical uncertainties, and evolving humanitarian challenges, a strong and resilient Canada-Turkiye partnership is essential, providing a foundation to mitigate shared threats and capitalize on new opportunities,” said a joint statement by Carney and Erdogan on Thursday.

Canary’s own statement was more emphatic: “Today’s new Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership will connect Canadian and Turkish companies to work together, creating good jobs at home, export opportunities abroad, greater security for our citizens, and contributing to a stronger NATO alliance”.

The partnership’s three-year action plan rests on four pillars: trade and investment; defense and security; energy; and ties between people.

On trade, investment and innovation, the two leaders agreed to “work toward the successful conclusion of a Canada-Turkey Free Trade Agreement”. They will also expand bilateral trade and investments in priority sectors, including energy supply, defense production, aerospace, and artificial intelligence (AI).

On defense and security, Carney and Erdogan “underlined their intent to deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation”. They also agreed to “strengthen cooperation in support of peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, including Ukraine, South Caucasus, and the Middle East, in particular Gaza”.

The three-year action plan calls for exploring co-development in aerospace, defense production, AI, critical minerals, LNG, and nuclear energy.

Of course, what Canada has agreed is not about Turkey alone. Carney is in the middle of a full-scale trade war with Washington. President Donald Trump’s tariffs and rhetoric questioning Canadian sovereignty have forced Ottawa to pursue a deliberate diversification strategy.

Carney has already reset ties with Saudi Arabia, India and China — all strained under his predecessor Justin Trudeau. Turkey, with 87 million people, NATO’s second-largest army, and a growing industrial base, fits perfectly into his “reliable partners” and “collective resilience” narrative.

For Turkey, the gain is more strategic than commercial. A G7 member and a Five Eyes country, which once embargoed it, Canada now legitimizes its defense industry as a partner. No wonder Erdogan was quick to link Thursday’s agreement to his pet project — “the Defense, Security and Resilience Bank” , announced by nine countries at the NATO summit in July 2026 to finance defense production.

Few will contest that Turkey’s defense industry has grown steadily. From an import-dependent country with 20% local production in 2002 to over 80% today, with $7.1 billion in exports in 2024, it is now a top-15 arms exporter. The fact that both Canada, which embargoed it, and Indonesia, which has options from South Korea and France, want co-production with Turkey is the recognition of Turkey’s defense ecosystem.

Apparently, the narrative has shifted from “Turkey buys” to “Turkey builds with.” Both the Badr agreement and the deal with Canada use the language of “joint production and technology sharing”, not a “buyer-seller” arrangement.

Secondly, Turkey is building a parallel architecture. A formal NATO ally, it is also becoming the leader of a non-Western defense network.

Thirdly, it is showing “Sanctions Resilience”. Western restrictions for its intervention in Syria and the controversy over its buying the S-400  from Russia seem to have taught Turkey to indigenize. Now that indigenization is proving to be its selling point.

However, some reality checks are needed. Turkey’s achievements need not be projected as triumphalism.

After all, both the Agreements made at Doha and Ankara are  MoUs and framework agreements. No specific defense program has been identified that would allow assessment of impact on regional military balance. “Badr” has no factory, no joint venture company yet. In defense deals, MOUs are one thing, but their eventual shape is a different matter.

Second, there is the technology ceiling. Turkey still depends on Western subsystems — engines for Kaan and Altay, critical minerals processing, and high-end semiconductors. Canada can help with the latter, but Ottawa’s case-by-case export control means strategic tech will still be gated.

Engaging pragmatically with strategically vital G20 and NATO allies without requiring complete alignment on all domestic values, Canada is meeting this moment with what it calls “values-based realism”.

It is “pragmatically” dealing with other countries, but it will not cross a line when its commitment to the fundamental values of freedom, human rights, sustainability, and solidarity is challenged.

So, it remains to be seen how long Canada will remain silent on the widely reported sweeping and unprecedented nationwide crackdown by the Turkish government on dissent and civil society, heavily focusing on the systematic dismantling of LGBTQ+ and HIV-advocacy organizations.

However, all this does not detract from the fact that Turkey is emerging as a second-tier military-industrial power like South Korea and Israel. Its products are innovative and export-driven. But it has miles to go before reaching the status of the US, France, and Russia, which set global standards.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Canada Deal Cements Turkey’s Position as a Military-Industrial Power. Comes After Makkah & Badr Pacts appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

For the first time, a Royal Air Force (RAF) Eurofighter Typhoon flew alongside the French nuclear-capable Rafale during a simulated nuclear-strike mission, showcasing rare coordination between Europe’s two most advanced fighter jets. 

The UK deployed a small contingent of Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4s to France’s Saint-Dizier air base—a key facility in northeastern France that hosts Rafale squadrons of the deterrence force—for Exercise Rummy held over two days on October 20 and 21, 2026.

The exercise took place over France and the Mediterranean, with the Typhoons serving as a defensive counter-air (DCA) escort for the mock nuclear-armed Rafales during a simulated long-range nuclear strike sortie. The A330 MRTT refueling tankers supported the package.

“Taking off from the nuclear-capable air base at Saint-Dizier, the French and British crews demonstrated a very high level of interoperability and an ability to coordinate. The French and British nuclear forces remain independent,” the French Chief of the Defense Staff, General Fabien Mandon, said in a post on X.

Notably, the exercise did not involve any real nuclear warheads, although images published by French officials and Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin show French Rafales armed with ASMP (an air-launched land-attack cruise missile that can carry a nuclear payload) and Mica air-to-air missiles. Meanwhile, the Eurofighters were seen equipped with the short-range ASRAAM air-to-air missiles and fuel tanks.

“Conducted under robust safety and security arrangements, the exercise did not involve nuclear weapons. The exercise focused on improving how our forces work together, ensuring that if the UK faces a serious threat, our military can respond quickly and effectively alongside our closest European ally,” the UK Ministry of Defense said in an official statement on October 23, 2026.

Under the Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations (CSNO) concept, which is an established approach of NATO, the conventionally armed Eurofighter Typhoons could provide conventional escort and protection for the nuclear-capable Rafales without carrying, controlling, or deciding on the use of nuclear weapons.

As the nuclear-armed aircraft’s main air defense, the Typhoons would have unrestricted movement around the Rafales’ perimeter to identify and, if required, neutralize any radar contacts.

Optimized for high-altitude, high-speed air superiority and carrying weapons for both short- and long-range combat, the Eurofighter Typhoons can detect, intercept, and engage enemy fighters that threaten the strike package during a nuclear mission.

In a real mission, the Typhoon’s high-altitude intercept capability and the Rafale’s low-observable, terrain-following performance would lower overall mission risk and improve the chances of the strike aircraft reaching the launch point.

Nuclear Cooperation Without Sharing Nukes

Both the UK and France are nuclear powers, although Britain stopped using air-launched nuclear weapons in 1998 following the Strategic Defense Review (SDR), and currently only possesses the Trident submarine-launched missiles for nuclear weapons. France, by contrast, has both sea- and air-based nuclear launch capability.

France, in turn, retains exclusive political and operational control over its nuclear forces. Therefore, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force; it shows only that two independent deterrents can practice the tactical and procedural interface of a nuclear mission, including communications, escort, tanker support, and deconfliction, without combining their weapons, targeting, or the final decision to fire.

That said, France and Britain signed the Northwood Declaration to strengthen cooperation on their respective nuclear arsenals during French President Emmanuel Macron’s three-day visit to Britain in July 2025. 

“This morning, we signed the Northwood Declaration, confirming for the first time that we are coordinating our independent nuclear deterrence,” the former British PM Keir Starmer said at the time. ”From today, our adversaries will know that any extreme threat to this continent would prompt a response from our two nations. There is no greater demonstration of the importance of this relationship.”

Later that year, the newly formed Nuclear Steering Group met for the first time in Paris, and British officials observed Exercise Poker, a regular nuclear deterrence exercise conducted by French Air and Space Forces, marking the first time foreign officials had been given that access. Notably, the UK went from mere observer to participant, providing conventional support in a nuclear deterrence drill, in 10 months.

“Having independent nuclear forces doesn’t exclude coordination. By coordinating, our nuclear forces demonstrate that they can contribute even more significantly to the overall security of the alliance and the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic zone,” French Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin stated.

Meanwhile, British Defense Secretary Wes Streeting said, “As Europe’s nuclear powers, we have a shared responsibility to contribute to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. This exercise demonstrates the depth of our partnership, the credibility of our deterrents and our determination to stand together in the face of emerging threats.”

France has been collaborating with several European partners on the idea of “forward deterrence” amid uncertainties about US security guarantees for Europe and escalating security threats from Russia. Earlier this year, German Eurofighter Typhoons flew alongside French nuclear-capable Rafales in a joint “forward deterrence” exercise earlier this year.

In July 2026, two Luftwaffe Eurofighter Typhoons from Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 31 “Boelcke” at Nörvenich and two French Air and Space Force Dassault Rafale Bs from the Forces Aériennes Stratégiques at Saint-Dizier conducted their first joint air activity.

In March this year, French President Macron announced some changes in the country’s nuclear policy, including increasing the size of the country’s nuclear arsenal and extending the deterrent to cover other European countries.

“The next 50 years will be an era of nuclear weapons,” he exclaimed. The President noted that the UK, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark had all agreed to participate in the new “advanced deterrence” plan. He emphasized that the eight European nations could host air bases where France’s nuclear bombers could be based as well as participate in exercises of France’s air-launched nuclear capability. 

This would allow France’s Strategic Air Forces (FAS) to “spread out across the depth of the European continent… and thus complicate the calculations of our adversaries”, the president said at the time. This hinted that the country was eager to spearhead the continent’s nuclear posture amid rising security threats from Russia and a strained transatlantic relationship that has heightened insecurity among European states.

That said, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force, nor does it amount to a French nuclear umbrella in the classic extended-deterrence sense. Instead, it shows France systematically testing how far it can bring conventional partners–including Europe’s only other nuclear power–into the operational orbit of its airborne nuclear forces while retaining full control over the nukes in line with the larger “forward deterrence.”

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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Four of China’s new KJ-3000 airborne early warning aircraft have been spotted at the Xi’an Aircraft Company complex, suggesting the type may have entered low-rate or serial production just 22 months after its first flight. 

Satellite images captured around October 4, 2026, by Vantor and posted to social media show four KJ-3000 early warning aircraft at the Xi’an Aircraft Company (XAC) complex in Yanliang. Three were spotted near the Y-20 production facilities, and the fourth was seen at the adjacent China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE).

Senior Fellow J. Michael Dahm of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies analyzed all available images in depth and assessed that the presence of four aircraft at Xi’an’s Y-20 production facility indicates the KJ-3000 has entered serial production. 

However, Chinese military aviation specialist Andreas Rupprecht seemed to agree with Dahm’s assessment, though he noted that the images could instead signal that the aircraft have entered low-rate production.

“Consequently, this could indeed be a sign that production or LRIP has begun; however, it could also be that all 4 previously known prototypes are in place. What we therefore need are clear photographs of the aircraft, their serial numbers, and, at best, showing them in PLAAF grey,” he argued, adding just the amount of caution required vis-à-vis Chinese platforms.

The KJ-3000, expected to be China’s most advanced early warning aircraft, first broke cover in December 2024, right after the sixth-generation prototypes, the J-36 and the J-50, were seen flying for the first time.

A pixelated image of the KJ-3000 in flight was posted to social media, as the EurAsian Times had reported at the time. Another highly pixelated image of a primer-painted aircraft bearing serial number 7821 surfaced in May 2025.

Notably, AEW&C aircraft serve as “eyes in the sky,” providing real-time surveillance and command and control over large areas. They are crucial force multipliers that coordinate air operations, guide fighters, and integrate data from multiple sources, including satellites, other aircraft, and ground-based sensors, serving as airborne command centers. Thus, playing a vital role in complex, dynamic battlefields where rapid decision-making is key.

Although details about the KJ-3000 are scarce, it is based on the Y-20B transport aircraft and powered by a WS-20 high-bypass turbofan engine.

The aircraft has a noticeable set of antennae on the forward fuselage and a large circular radome positioned over the rear fuselage. It also features a prominent intake at the base of the tailfin, likely to supply cooling air for its numerous onboard electronics. Additionally, it has an aerial refueling probe above the cockpit.

The aircraft is expected to have a detection range of 360 to 500 kilometers, although some estimates put it at 600 to 1,000 kilometers. These conjectures couldn’t be verified.

The massive early warning radar aircraft is likely intended to replace the KJ-2000, China’s only large jet-powered AEW&C platform to date. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) had a limited fleet of about four KJ-2000 aircraft, converted from Russian Ilyushin Il-76MD transports in the early 2000s, as the program stalled due to limited access to suitable Il-76 airframes and reliance on Russian engines and spares.

The KJ-3000 is believed to be a massive improvement over the KJ-2000. It can reportedly carry up to 66 tons of payload (16 tons more than the KJ-2000), and the WS-20 engines provide more thrust (about 31,000 pounds) and fuel efficiency, enabling longer flights.

The KJ-3000 would serve as a high-end airborne command, control, and surveillance node, significantly enhancing China’s ability to detect, track, and coordinate forces across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific in a potential conflict with the United States.

Its large AESA radar—mounted on a high-flying, long-endurance Y-20B platform—provides a much greater radar horizon than ground-based radars or existing smaller Chinese AEW&C aircraft.

Operating at higher altitudes and with aerial refueling will allow the KJ-3000 to provide persistent coverage over key maritime approaches, the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine Sea, or the South China Sea.

The aircraft could detect aircraft, ships, and potentially low-observable or low-flying threats (such as drones and bombers) farther away, giving Chinese forces earlier warning and more time to decide on a fast-moving battlefield.

The KJ-3000 is designed as a “sky command center.” It can track multiple targets at once and direct Chinese fighters, such as the J-20 stealth aircraft, as well as long-range air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and drones.

Furthermore, the KJ-3000 detects and tracks carrier strike groups, airborne tankers, AWACS, and strike packages at longer ranges, feeding targeting data to ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, and helping Beijing’s painstakingly built Anti-Access/Area-Denial structure.

A Mismatch Between Chinese & US Capability

Interestingly, China’s expanding early warning capabilities contrast sharply with those of the United States Air Force, which continues to grapple with the transition of its own heavy advanced early warning from the E-3 to the more advanced E-7 Wedgetail.

The E-3 Sentry fleet is aging, and its airframe and radar limitations are becoming more acute with every passing day. The planned replacement, the Boeing 737-based E-7 Wedgetail, already in service with allies such as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, and soon the United Kingdom, was originally planned for the USAF at 26 aircraft. However, budget uncertainty and shifting priorities have repeatedly delayed procurement.

Last year, for instance, the previous US Air Force plan to acquire 26 Boeing E-7 Wedgetail aircraft remained under review during the fiscal 2026 budget process under the current Trump administration, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

However, Congress pushed back against potential cuts and cancellation of the program.

In March 2026, the USAF changed strategy and awarded contract modifications to continue development and procure additional engineering-and-manufacturing-development (EMD) aircraft, bringing the contracted total to about seven. Later, in May 2026, the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated the department’s “mindset” had changed and that the E-7 “has a future” and a place on the battlefield.

Finally, reports in June 2026 noted that the Pentagon was seeking diversion of money from the US Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye and classified Air Force accounts to fund a $1.55 billion spending plan for its revived E-7 Wedgetail program in fiscal 2027. However, it has not yet committed to the large production run of the originally planned 26 aircraft.

The continued delay has raised concerns about a potential gap in airborne battle management amid rising security threats, especially since the E-3 is becoming outdated and the US has only about 15 of these aircraft (after one loss in the Iran war). 

By contrast, China is not only improving its early warning capabilities but also expanding its AEW&CS fleet—something that could trouble the US and its allies in an Indo-Pacific conflict.

China is Amassing Early Warning Aircraft

Early warning platforms are among an air force’s most strategic assets, especially since a single high-end platform can cover hundreds of thousands of square kilometers and track multiple targets during combat. However, no air force can rely on a handful of expensive, slow-moving, vulnerable early-warning aircraft alone.

So, China appears to have created somewhat of a layered AEW&C force structure.

Under this strategy, instead of fielding one type of aircraft, Beijing is working on deploying complementary tiers of platforms optimized for different roles, ranges, basing options, and threat environments. This is intended to create persistent, resilient, multi-domain surveillance that adversaries find harder to suppress.

China has developed newer early-warning aircraft based on existing designs, including the KJ-500, which forms the backbone of the PLAAF’s early-warning capability and is based on the Shaanxi Y-9 turboprop, and the KJ-200, a legacy aircraft based on the older Y-8.

The KJ-200 and KJ-500 are smaller than the high-end KJ-3000. They are considered ideal for regional operations, including in volatile areas like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and would play a major role in a potential contingency in these flashpoint areas.

The KJ-200s, for one, provide supplementary coverage and experience while the PLAAF expands and simultaneously upgrades its KJ-500 fleet.

China has also developed the KJ-700, a next-generation Y-9-derived design intended as a more capable complement to the KJ-500. It features improved sensors and enhanced networking and is designed to handle denser, more complex threat environments, including low-observable aircraft and large numbers of drones. It is likely designed for missions anticipated in a future conflict with the United States.

China has also developed the KJ-600 for carrier-based operations, giving the PLA Navy massive reach and the ability to detect incoming threats from farther away, allowing it to project power far from its coast. With a twin-turboprop design, folding wings, and a large AESA rotodome, the KJ-600 entered operational service on the CATOBAR carrier Fujian in 2025 and has been observed on the ski-jump carrier Shandong.

The KJ-200 could be classified as a low-tier legacy aircraft, while the KJ-500 and KJ-700 could be clubbed as medium-tier and advanced medium-tier aircraft, respectively.

Meanwhile, the KJ-600 is a specialized carrier aircraft. The larger, more capable KJ-3000 falls into the high-tier category, and its serial production would let China field multiple aircraft for continuous coverage, attrition resilience, or simultaneous operations.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.

Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.

The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.

The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.

It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft. However, the agreement’s execution still depends on Congressional authorization and appropriations.

The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.

The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.

The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.

“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.

“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”

The Pentagon believes multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to invest upfront in expanding production facilities.

Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.

Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.

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The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.

If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.

In addition, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants.

The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.

To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.

Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.

“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”

Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.

The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.

Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.

According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.

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While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.

Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).

Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.

Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will let Lockheed Martin enter long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.

It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.

Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.

It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.

Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.

Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.

If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.

“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24^th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

Three Decades After Subic Bay Withdrawal, U.S. Military Returns to the Philippines With a New Model to Check China

Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.

Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.

If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.

Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.

Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.

A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.

The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post F-35 Stealth Fighter: Why Pentagon is Locking Production For a Decade—and Lockheed’s $7B Counter-Bet to Make It Work appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.

Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.

The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.

The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.

It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft.

However, the agreement’s execution remains subject to Congressional authorization and appropriations.

The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.

The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.

The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.

“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.

“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”

The Pentagon believes that multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to make upfront investments in expanding production facilities.

Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.

Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.

The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.

If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.

Besides, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants of the fighter.

The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.

To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.

Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.

“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”

Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.

The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.

Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.

According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.

While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.

Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).

Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.

Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will allow Lockheed Martin to enter into long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, thereby stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.

It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.

Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.

It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.

Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.

Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.

If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.

“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24^th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.

Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.

If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.

Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.

Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.

A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.

The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post The $7 Billion Bet Inside Lockheed’s F-35 Framework: Why Pentagon Wants to Lock Production for a Decade appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The Indian Navy is conducting trials of the French Dassault Rafale-M, the naval aircraft that edged out the American F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in a tight contest. 

Interestingly, the Indian Navy already operates a substantial number of American platforms. Against that backdrop, Boeing had expected to secure yet another major Indian contract.

Why did the French Rafale-M ultimately edge out the Super Hornets?

In April 2025, India ordered 26 Rafale Marines to replace the Russian-origin MiG-29K, which currently operates from Indian aircraft carriers– INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant.

More than a year after signing the contract, the Indian Navy is running Rafale-M trials at the Shore-Based Test Facility (SBTF) at INS Hansa in Goa and is reportedly considering some minor modifications to its aircraft carriers to accommodate the French aircraft.

According to the reports, the service is considering these small modifications because the Rafale-M fighters were originally designed to operate from CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) carriers—such as the French carrier Charles de Gaulle—whereas Indian carriers use a Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) system.

Additionally, the Rafale-M has a wingspan of almost 10.9 meters, and unlike the MiG-29K, it is not designed to fold its wings to take up less space on the deck. This creates a larger deck or hangar footprint. So, the Navy is purportedly examining minor procedural workarounds, such as temporarily detaching the wingtip missile launch rails to reduce the effective span to roughly 9.6 meters, along with handling and stowage adjustments.

Rafale-M deliveries are expected to begin in 2028 and likely conclude by 2030, marking the first time in a decade that the Indian Navy will operate a non-Russian or Western fighter. Its last Western carrier fighter was the British Sea Harrier aircraft, which it retired in 2016 after more than three decades of service.

Notably, the Indian Navy has operated French equipment before, though never on this scale.

Earlier, it acquired 12 Breguet Alizé carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft that participated in the 1961 Goa operations and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and served the Navy until 1991. The service has also operated the HAL Chetak, a French-designed light utility helicopter produced in India for decades, though it is now being phased out in favor of more advanced indigenous aircraft. 

By contrast, the Indian Navy operates a range of US-origin equipment, from helicopters to spy aircraft, making the choice of a French carrier-based jet particularly interesting.

Indian Navy: Full of US-Origin Weapon Systems

Despite the push for indigenization, the Indian Navy has steadily acquired American platforms and weapons over the past few decades.

One of the most important items on this list is the P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft. India first ordered eight P-8I aircraft in January 2009, becoming the type’s first international customer.

It signed a follow-on order for four additional aircraft in 2016, significantly enhancing its maritime surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and ISR capabilities and positioning it as a critical asset in the Indian Ocean Region. In February 2026, the Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) officially cleared an additional P-8I purchase.

In addition to the Poseidon, the Indian Navy ordered 24 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-mission naval helicopters in February 2020. It has since received 21, and the rest are expected to arrive in 2027. These helicopters can conduct anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, shipborne multi-role operations, and networked operations, arming the Navy with the capability to detect and neutralize underwater and surface threats in the Indian Ocean.

The Navy has also leased two MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones from US-based General Atomics since 2020. It is supplementing these by leasing two more as per a contract signed in August 2026. These drones have supported maritime surveillance and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in the Indian Ocean Region, complementing the Navy’s P-8I and helping maintain vigilance.

India also signed a $3.3 billion deal with the US in October 2024 to acquire 31 MQ-9B High-Altitude Long-Endurance UAVs. Of the 31 Sea Guardians the MoD purchased, the Indian Navy will receive 15 drones, while the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force will each receive 8 to strengthen surveillance along the northern and western borders.

The Indian Navy operates one US-acquired INS Jalashwa (the former USS Trenton), an Austin-class amphibious transport dock with a sealift capability for over 3,500 troops and a squadron of armored vehicles.

Furthermore, the service has also acquired several lethal US munitions over the years, including the AGM-84 Harpoon Block II anti-ship missile, Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes, and the AGM-114 Hellfire, to name just a few. 

Despite these rather high-value acquisitions, the Indian Navy has never purchased or operated an American fighter jet. When it finally got the chance to buy a US aircraft, i.e., the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the service chose the Rafale-M instead.

Why did India Opt For Rafales over Super Hornets?

When India opened the contest for a carrier-based fighter to replace the MiG-29K jets, Boeing offered its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Block III.

In 2022, Boeing India marketed the F/A-18 Super Hornet Block III as a carrier-based fighter designed for high-load, high-stress operations, and stressed that the multi-role naval fighter would be fully compatible with Indian Navy carriers.

Boeing pitched the Super Hornet as a jet that required minimal support equipment and had a remarkably low cost per flight hour while maintaining high mission readiness. It tried to woo the Indian Navy by emphasizing that the aircraft would become a force multiplier because it could interface with the P-8I and other US-origin systems the service operates.

To sweeten the deal, Boeing also announced a roadmap to significantly increase its investments in line with the “Make in India” initiative and pledged to transfer cutting-edge technologies to Indian industry if the Super Hornet was selected. 

However, the Super Hornet had to dogfight with the French Rafale, a cutting-edge fighter for India’s carrier-borne aircraft tender.

In a tightly fought contest, both jets underwent extensive testing at a shore-based facility, including take-off trials from both ski-jump and catapult launchers. Both aircraft reportedly met the Indian Navy’s requirements, but the Rafale-M ultimately won.

Speaking to the EurAsian Times earlier, an ex-Indian Navy pilot who had flown both the Super Hornet and Rafale said both aircraft were extremely capable and on a level playing field. “The only issue I can think of is that the F-18 is a heavier aircraft, and the Rafale M is lighter. So, when it comes to arrested landing on the aircraft carrier, Rafale has more flexibility,” the naval aviator said at the time, requesting anonymity.

The Rafale-M shared a very high degree of commonality with the 36 Rafale jets operated by the Indian Air Force (IAF). This meant several parts, tools, and test equipment could be interchanged, and India could share ground-support systems, simulators, and diagnostic software.

Additionally, India had already established maintenance infrastructure, trained technicians, and supply chains for the IAF Rafales, which could support the Rafale-Ms.

The Navy would have assessed that Rafale-Ms would reduce costs by creating an inventory of maintenance facilities, spare parts, logistics, and potential future overhauls. Meanwhile, introducing the Super Hornet would require building an entirely separate support ecosystem.

In this scenario, the air force can familiarize itself with the Marine aircraft, while naval pilots can transition to the IAF’s twin-seat Rafales.

The  IAF is now poised to acquire 114 Rafale multi-role fighters, most of which will be manufactured locally. Therefore, one could argue that the decision to choose French jets for the Indian Navy may have been driven by the need for uniformity and interoperability, which are crucial in fast-paced conflict zones.

A secondary factor could have been the Infrared Search and Track (IRST) system, which provides a stealthy advantage in detecting and engaging threats, including potential low-observable aircraft. The Rafale-M came with an integrated IRST, whereas the Super Hornet Block III lacked one, although Boeing offered a podded solution.

Moreover, the Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile on the Rafale also offered superior standoff capability compared to the Super Hornet’s AIM-120 AMRAAM.

More importantly, however, strong defense ties between India and France, smoother government-to-government negotiations even in past deals, the potential for indigenous weapons integration, and the presence of French fighter jets in the IAF played a crucial role in the decision.

India has never acquired US fighter jets for several reasons, including export controls and restrictions on their use.

Despite its best efforts to market the Block III jet to potential customers such as Canada, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Switzerland, Boeing failed to secure any new contracts and kept losing out to rivals such as Saab Gripen, Dassault Rafale, and the Lockheed Martin F-35.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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Last year, Turkey signed a deal for 20 new Eurofighter Typhoons after a long and grueling campaign to bolster its aging Air Force. Now, it is looking to strike another deal—this time with Qatar to buy its surplus Typhoon jets.

In its weekly media briefing on October 22, Rear Adm. Zeki Aktürk, the chief spokesperson of the Turkish Ministry of Defense (MoD), said Turkey is keen to finalize an agreement with Qatar to purchase its used Eurofighter combat aircraft. 

“Efforts are ongoing to procure Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Qatar to meet the operational needs of our [Turkish] Air Force Command,” he stated. “Within this framework, inter-delegation meetings held in August and September addressed the scope of aircraft and ammunition to be procured, the training of pilots and maintenance personnel, and technical and logistical support for the maintenance and operation of the aircraft.”

Although Qatar has not officially confirmed whether it was looking to sign a deal, the Turkish Defense Ministry said, “It is expected for Qatar to prepare the draft training program and the sales contract to be sent to our country.”

Turkey signed a deal in October 2025 to buy 20 Eurofighter Typhoon combat jets from the United Kingdom, a major step in its bid to modernize its air force.

After the deal was announced, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said he was exploring purchasing surplus Eurofighters from both Qatar and Oman. The UK deal allowed Turkey to buy Eurofighters from other operators, but through a separate contract.

Currently, Erdogan seems particularly focused on Qatari Eurofighters because they are reportedly more advanced than Oman’s.

It is currently not clear how many Eurofighters Turkey is seeking from Doha. However, previous reports hinted that Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler and Air Force Commander General Ziya Cemal Kadıoğlu visited Doha in October last year to negotiate a deal for 12-24 Tranche 3A Eurofighters.

Qatar currently operates 24 Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3A aircraft and has ordered an additional 12 Tranche 4s for the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF).

Theoretically, Qatar could transfer 12 of these existing jets to Turkey, giving it a ready-made batch that would equip a squadron. Besides Eurofighters, Qatar also operates about 48 F-15QAs and about 36 Rafales.

Turkey and Qatar have strong bilateral defense ties that have deepened significantly since the early 2010s. In fact, military ties are the backbone of the relationship, with Qatar hosting 3,000 Turkish soldiers at a military base in Tarqiya, Qatar.

Turkey To Close Capability Gap With Eurofighter

Turkey has been eager to secure surplus QEAF Eurofighter Typhoons to bolster its Air Force, which currently relies on an aging F-16 fleet.

The Turkish Air Force has come under immense pressure in recent years, especially after Ankara was expelled from the F-35 consortium in 2019 and sanctioned under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) for buying the Russian S-400 air defense.

The sanctions also made upgrading and sustaining the F-16C/D fleet harder, more expensive, and more complicated.

At the same time, Turkey’s arch-nemesis, Greece, has acquired 24 Rafale and signed a contract for 20 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters amid rising regional tensions with Ankara, particularly over the Aegean Sea. This power vacuum has put Ankara in a tough spot.

Turkey is now upgrading its F-16 fleet to counter Greek F-16s, pushing to purchase F-35s to counter Greek F-35s, and acquiring the Eurofighter Typhoon to rival the Greek Rafale.

Ankara has also advanced work on its own fifth-generation aircraft, the KAAN.

However, developing a fifth-generation fighter requires years of testing, software development, weapons integration, and pilot training. Moreover, the Turkish Air Force would receive the first jet only in 2028, and it would take much longer to reach operational maturity and even longer to field a substantial number of these jets.

Meanwhile, the Turkish administration is lobbying the United States to authorize an F-35 sale to Ankara and is actively pursuing a strategy to divest itself of its Russian-made S-400.

Last month, President Erdogan said Ankara could regain access to the stealth fighter, adding that he expects Washington to take “concrete” steps toward Turkey’s return. “US President Donald Trump expressed a positive willingness regarding Turkey’s return to the F-35 program,” the Turkish President stated at the time.

While both KAAN and F-35 will change the region’s security landscape by adding teeth to Turkish air power, their arrival is not imminent.

This makes buying second-hand Eurofighter Typhoons more significant for Ankara. 

Eurofighter Typhoon is a twin-engine, 4.5th-generation multirole aircraft. It is extremely agile, making it a very powerful dogfighter. The aircraft has a reduced radar cross-section, AESA radar, sensor fusion, advanced avionics, and supercruise capability.

“The Eurofighter Typhoon is the world’s most advanced swing-role combat aircraft,” the Airbus website states. “No other fighter has integrated such a large number of European and US weapons, making it combat-ready for any mission.”

The aircraft is designed for high-performance aerial combat, combining powerful engines, advanced sensors, and a high rate of climb with the ability to carry modern air-to-air missiles, such as the Meteor.

Acquiring the Typhoons from Qatar could help bridge the capability gap until new-build Eurofighters arrive.

Furthermore, Qatar’s aircraft could also give Turkey valuable experience with the Eurofighter platform before more aircraft arrive. Turkish pilots and maintenance crews would need training, while engineers would have to establish procedures for servicing the aircraft and supporting their weapons.

The Eurofighter would give Turkey another modern multirole fighter capable of conducting air-superiority missions, intercepting hostile aircraft, and carrying out precision strikes against ground targets.

It could be particularly useful for air patrols and missions over the Aegean, the eastern Mediterranean, and other areas where Turkey needs to maintain a strong air presence, even as it bolsters its air force with other cutting-edge fighters.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

 

The post As Rival Gets F-35 & Rafale Jets — Turkey Turns to Qatar for Eurofighter Typhoons to Boost its Air Force appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

China produced more than twice the ship tonnage of the United States in 2024–25, a new report says, indicating Beijing is closing the naval gap with Washington. 

The World Defense Shipbuilding report, compiled by Flottes de Combat and the French maritime industry association Gican and released ahead of the Euronaval defense show, states that China built about 636,208 tons of combat ships over two years through December 2025, while the United States built about 270,509 tons in the same period. 

China accounted for more than a third of the global naval tonnage built in 2024-25, the report states, presenting the magnitude of China’s shipbuilding capability.

“We are seeing a fairly substantial expansion of naval forces, and consequently of shipbuilding,” Philippe Missoffe, Gican’s general director, said in a press briefing on October 20. “We’re seeing an increase in power capabilities, particularly nuclear-powered attack submarines, for example,” he added.

In the two-year period, China’s combat-vessel building was valued at $43.5 billion, while US construction totaled $26.8 billion, according to the report. It also notes that  China’s shipyards produced 202,520 tons in 2022–2023, while the US produced 245,703 tons in the previous two-year period, indicating a clear year-on-year surge for China.

The US Navy still leads China in the overall fleet tonnage.

As of January 1, 2026, US warships weighing more than 200 tons totaled 3.11 million tons, compared with China’s 1.44 million tons, says the report. However, just two years ago, the figures were 3.22 million tons for the US and 1.3 million tons for China, showing how Beijing is closing the displacement gap.

China has already surpassed the US Navy in ship count. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has more than 370 battle-force ships, whereas the US Navy has over 290.

This gap is expected to further increase. US-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) predicted in its 2025 report titled “Ship Wars – Confronting China’s Dual-Use Shipbuilding Empires” that China would have a 425-ship-strong fleet by 2030, compared to the US Navy’s 300 vessels.

That said, adding more tonnage is different from simply churning out ships faster, which a navy can do by producing many small or medium-sized ones. Meanwhile, tonnage measures the total displacement of those ships. One large destroyer or amphibious ship can displace as much as several smaller frigates, and higher tonnage means more overall mass in the fleet, more weapons, sensors, fuel, aviation facilities, troops, and endurance.

Currently, China appears to be doing both, expanding the fleet by accelerating production of smaller combatants while also adding displacement to bigger, more sophisticated vessels. The strategy is meant to make the PLAN combat-ready in the future. 

Notably, the latest Euronaval report findings are significant but hardly surprising, given that American senators and congressional researchers have repeatedly warned that the US may not be able to keep up with Beijing’s growing naval fleet because of China’s ever-expanding shipbuilding capacity, and the delays and bottlenecks in US naval production.

As of now, the US Navy has many qualitative advantages over the PLAN, including 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, a large and capable submarine force, greater overall tonnage, higher missile capacity per ship in many classes, and extensive combat experience. However, these could erode if China sustains high output of modern ships.

For now, China producing more naval tonnage than the US reflects a sustained advantage in Chinese industrial capacity. However, Beijing did not build twice the tonnage of the United States from a purely military-industrial base.

Its ability to expand naval tonnage production compared with the US stems from its enormous dual-use shipbuilding industry and economies of scale the US no longer has.

Civilian-Military Fusion Is Driving Construction

China’s maritime development has accelerated as the lines between military and commercial shipbuilding have blurred, as in other strategic areas.

The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)—the world’s largest shipbuilder—is the poster child for China’s seamless fusion of civil and military shipbuilding capabilities.

The CSSC operates several shipyards, factories, and research institutes under the oversight of China’s top political and military leadership. It has built warships for the Chinese Navy, including the Type 003 Fujian aircraft carrier, the Type 055 destroyers, and the Type 075 amphibious assault ships, among other popular combat ships.

At the same time, it is acing civilian shipbuilding. The CSSC built more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 than the entire US shipbuilding industry had since WWII, as the EurAsian Times reported earlier. Chinese shipbuilders produced 53.69 million deadweight tons (DWT) of commercial vessels in 2025, or about 56.1% of the world’s output. They also scored 107.82 million DWT in new orders, and closed the year with an orderbook of 274.42 million DWT, or 66.8% of the global outstanding work.

Order volume from foreign customers suggests the world is rapidly becoming dependent on Chinese shipyards to meet demand for commercial trading vessels, allowing the CSSC to redirect commercial revenue toward naval warship construction.

The expansion of China’s commercial shipbuilding industry directly supports higher naval tonnage production, primarily through shared physical infrastructure, including the same large dry docks, slipways, heavy-lift cranes, and fabrication halls used to build container ships, tankers, and bulk carriers, to build warships. In fact, several major CSSC shipyards routinely build commercial vessels and naval ships side by side, meaning that China does not need a completely separate, underutilized set of military-only yards.

Open-source analysis and satellite imagery have documented this physical integration of civil and military ships on multiple occassions. For instance, gray-hulled battleships and commercial hulls were previously seen being built concurrently at the huge Changxing Island complex in Shanghai. It is not much different at other shipyards in Dalian, Hudong-Zhonghua, and the Longxue Island complex near Guangzhou.

Not every Chinese yard is dual-use in the same way, and some high-end naval facilities have become more specialized as the PLA Navy moves toward larger, more complex platforms. In fact, a 2024 RAND working paper noted that certain yards producing the newest surface combatants and carriers had reduced their commercial output.

Nonetheless, wherever civil-military fusion is widespread, commercial work keeps tens or hundreds of thousands of skilled welders, fitters, engineers, and managers employed year-round. This basically gives it an experienced labor pool it can direct toward naval projects.

Moreover, sustained commercial volume accelerates learning and process improvements that transfer to warship building.

China’s astounding rise in commercial shipbuilding has given it access to dual-use technologies such as specialized engines and propellers, navigation and control systems, integrated electronics, and radar modules.

Another advantage of this civil-military fusion is that the high-volume commercial production creates robust domestic supply chains for steel, engines, electrical systems, coatings, and other components. China uses these suppliers to support naval ships.

Additionally, high supply volumes drive down unit costs through economies of scale.

The machinery keeps running smoothly, with revenue flowing in from expanding commercial orders. These profitable commercial contracts, many from foreign buyers, generate cash flow that Beijing uses to fund yard expansion, integrate new equipment, and upgrade technology.

However, China’s rise as a shipbuilder did not happen overnight. It resulted from a long-term strategy that combined government support, investment in industrial infrastructure, a large workforce, and an extensive domestic supply chain. China developed the capacity to manufacture ships at an enormous scale while ensuring that many of the materials, components, and industrial facilities needed for production were available domestically. This helped Chinese shipyards become highly competitive in cost, capacity, and output.

“China has risen because, in 2015, they declared that seas are the future of prosperity and trade. Therefore, China needed to build robust maritime infrastructure and a strong PLAN to protect its interests.

These are two factors that made them realize that shipbuilding infrastructure should serve a twin purpose, so the facility can be used to its full potential since this infrastructure is expensive to build,” Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, a retired Indian Navy officer, earlier told the EurAsian Times.

By contrast, the US lacks this industrial base and has struggled to expand shipbuilding capacity to counter Beijing.

It is now deliberately drawing on the advanced commercial and naval shipbuilding expertise of its closest Indo-Pacific partners, including South Korea and Japan, to bolster shipbuilding and prevent delivery delays and cost increases that have become common for US Navy programs.

However, the latest figure suggests Washington may have to do more, and faster. 

China’s sustained high output of modern ships, underwritten by dual-use commercial strength, continues to narrow the quantitative gap. The United States retains qualitative and experiential advantages for now, but those edges are not permanent.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post China Outbuilt the U.S. by Over 2X in Naval Tonnage in 2024–25. How Did Beijing Outpace America? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

When both Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base were closed as active American military facilities in the early 1990s, the Philippines was said to be the sick man of US alliances. The same Philippines now seems to have emerged as America’s pivot in the Indo-Pacific.

General Ronald Clark, Commander of US Army Pacific, made it clear in an October 18 interview with the Financial Times that the Philippines, alongside Japan and South Korea, is central to US deterrence against hostile forces (implying China) in the Indo-Pacific.

The commander of US Army Pacific, a component of Indo-Pacific Command, said he wanted to demonstrate more “exquisite” military capabilities to help “show the adversary some things that they should be concerned about.”

As part of that push, US Army Pacific has expanded its role, including by temporarily deploying weapons in the Philippines, Japan, and other parts of the region that would play a critical role in a war with China, including over Taiwan, according to General Clark.

He revealed how Typhon, a mobile missile launch system that fires SM-6 missiles at ships, and Tomahawks that could strike parts of coastal China from the Philippines, have been used in recent joint exercises with the Philippines.

The US Army has also been using the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) in ways designed to send a clear message to China about the joint military capabilities of America and its allies, Clark said.

Mentioning an exercise earlier this year in which the army moved long-range precision weapons from the US to the Philippines and brought ammunition from South Korea for a live-fire mission, Gen. Clark stressed that it was important for deterrence.

“It causes them to go: ‘Hey, this is something that we have to think about,’” he said,  adding, “You can see it operate and we can do it at scale at a time and place of our choosing. So, you reveal capability in order to give your adversary pause.”

Incidentally, in an earlier conversation with the Wall Street Journal, Gen. Clark, who commands 107,000 soldiers, talked about the “tyranny of distance” that made it impossible to fight China with just air and naval power.

He argued that China’s vast geographic expanse and its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities make it impossible or too risky to rely solely on air and naval power.

Here, Gen. Clark argues that the Philippines’ geography is a major advantage. The country’s 7,641 islands sit near vital maritime routes, the South China Sea, and the Luzon Strait/Taiwan Strait, making it an irreplaceable staging ground for US surveillance, logistics, and coastal defense.

From Batanes in northern Luzon—100 miles from Taiwan—to Palawan facing the Spratlys in the south, the archipelago locks the two hottest flashpoints: the north controls the Taiwan Strait, and the south controls the South China Sea.

For the US  military, it is the only territory that can monitor both the Taiwan Strait and the West Philippine Sea simultaneously. The archipelago can thus complicate the movement of Chinese naval forces from their coastal waters into the wider Pacific.

Incidentally, America is rebuilding its military presence in the Philippines after its 1992 withdrawal.

China Outbuilt the U.S. by Over 2X in Naval Tonnage in 2024–25. How Did Beijing Outpace America?

The return to Subic Bay and the expansion of US military cooperation across the Philippines mark a major strategic reversal. Washington is once again developing access to facilities that can support its operations in the western Pacific.

The US has access to nine Philippine military sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and is investing more than $300 million to upgrade infrastructure.

However, all 9 (nine) bases are owned by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), but the US has been granted rotational access. The first 5 (five) were agreed in 2014, with 4 (four being added later in 2023 by President Marcos Jr. to deal with threats from the South China Sea.

The nine sites are being turned into A2/AD nodes that complicate any Chinese movement through the First Island Chain.

Notably, rather than building massive permanent bases, the US and the Philippines are building a flexible, distributed network that complicates targeting by China and raises the costs of a potential conflict (“deterrence by denial”).

Viewed thus, it is understandable why the US has introduced, as seen in Gen. Clark’s  FT interview,  advanced mobile-strike and missile systems such as the Typhon mid-range missile system into the Philippines, capable of reaching targets in the South China Sea and southern China.

One could further argue that Gen. Clark’s interview was not about the Philippines alone. It was about a new American way of fighting a war in the Indo-Pacific that is distributed, land-based, visible, and anchored on three democracies of  Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. That is why he put the Philippines in the same sentence as Japan and Korea.

One can thus surmise that, in a future contingency arising from Chinese actions, Japan will provide airfields, South Korea ammunition, and the Philippines firing positions.

This aligns with the US 2026 National Defense Strategy that EurAsian Times explained earlier. The idea is to build “a strong denial defense” along the First Island Chain.

In this scheme of things, Japan is the northern anchor — with long-range missiles, US-Japan command integration, and bases. South Korea is the arsenal and logistics hub — Clark himself cited a live-fire exercise in the Philippines using ammunition brought from South Korea, showing how Korean stockpiles now sustain Philippine operations.

The Philippines is the southern anchor and now a vital Indo-Pacific center for the US. The 12th Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, held in Manila on February 16, 2026, officially reaffirmed both allies’ commitment to maintaining a vigilant posture, strengthening deterrence across the First Island Chain, and keeping critical sea lanes open.

Apparently, Washington is not only institutionalizing this triangle, the US, Japan, and the Philippines, but also widening its scope by involving Australia and forming the “Squad.”

The Squad’s core focus is to counter maritime pressure and escalation in the South China Sea and East China Sea and reinforce freedom of navigation.

Accordingly, defense officials and defense chiefs from the four nations have increasingly aligned through mini-lateral dialogues, joint exercises (such as Balikatan), and security assistance packages (including transfers of Japanese warships and patrol aircraft to the Philippine Navy).

The developments above make it clear that the Philippines has become the centerpiece of Washington’s strategy to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. As Elbridge Colby, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said this year, Manila is Washington’s “model ally”.

In his words, “When our partners are strong, deterrence is strong. And that is exactly what we have here in Manila, under the leadership of President Marcos, Secretary of National Defense Teodoro, and other key leaders. We see and respect a resolute and proud nation that is determined to strengthen its own capabilities to better defend itself and its interests. A model ally.”

The Philippines now strengthens America’s network of strategic positions running from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Both are developing capabilities intended to make Chinese military operations more difficult, costly, and uncertain.

But as explained above, that is in a manner that affords more operational flexibility for America through access to ports, airfields, and other facilities that can help US forces disperse, sustain operations, and respond more quickly during a crisis, without depending on a small number of major bases.

In other words, thirty-four years after losing its sovereign bases in the Philippines in 1992, the US military has returned with comparable power, but by shifting its status from a base owner to a rotational guest.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Three Decades After Subic Bay Withdrawal, U.S. Military Returns to the Philippines With a New Model to Check China appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Amid stiff competition from Silicon Valley-based, AI-focused defense companies, Northrop Grumman, part of the US defense market’s ‘Big Five,’ has posted better-than-expected sales and a record order backlog of US$ 109.6 billion.

Notably, at nearly $110 billion, the company’s order backlog is nearly 1.4 times its US$78 billion market cap and equals about two and a half years of sales.

Northrop Grumman’s record backlog suggests that traditional prime contractors in the US defense-industrial complex continue to win substantial new orders even as their leadership faces increasing pressure from AI-focused defense firms such as Palantir and Anduril.

For instance, Anduril, founded in 2017, is already worth US$ 90 billion, more than Northrop Grumman’s and General Dynamics’ market caps.

Meanwhile, Palantir, founded in 2003, is already worth nearly US$480 billion, more than any of the Big Five.

Northrop Grumman’s steady sales and record US$109.6 billion backlog should reassure investors that traditional defense primes can continue to thrive alongside the rapid growth of AI-focused defense companies.

The Virginia-based defense contractor reported third-quarter revenue of US$11.12 billion, up 7% from US$10.42 billion a year earlier.

Net income rose to US$1.12 billion from US$1.10 billion a year earlier.

However, the biggest surprise came in the company’s backlog order book. The company received US$16.4 billion in net contract awards during the third quarter (Q3) of 2026, pushing its net outstanding backlog to US$109.6 billion.

A year ago, at the end of Q3 2025, the company’s backlog stood at US$91.4 billion. Since then, it has received new contracts worth US$18.2 billion.

“In a complex world with the growing need for solutions that scale and perform, our customers continue to turn to Northrop Grumman,” Chair, Chief Executive and President Kathy Warden said in the earnings announcement.

According to company filings, the company’s third-quarter contracts totaled US$16.4 billion, which included US$4.6 billion for classified programs, US$2 billion for the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program, and US$1.4 billion for Virginia-class submarines.

The company also received US$1.3 billion in awards related to the F-35 fighter jet and US$1 billion for the E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft.

The Q3 contracts show strong demand for the company’s products in fighter jets, AWACS, missiles, submarines, and space programs.

Overall, Defense Systems accounted for the largest portion of the company’s backlog at US$36.5 billion, followed by Aeronautics Systems at US$26.8 billion and Space Systems at US$26.3 billion.

U.S. Stealth Jets — F-35, F-22 & F-47 — to Form 60% of USAF Fighter Force by 2035 Under New Plan, Service Tells Congress

Strong Demand for Northrop Grumman’s Aeronautics Systems

In Q3, Northrop Grumman reported aeronautics systems revenue of US$3.58 billion, up 14% year-on-year, and won new contracts worth over US$3 billion.

Strong aeronautics systems performance is driven by demand for the F-35 fighter jet, progress on the B-21 Raider program, maintenance work on the B-2 Spirit bomber, and work on Army helicopters such as the AH-64 Apache, CH-47 Chinook, UH-60 Black Hawk, and others.

Northrop Grumman is a principal contractor on the F-35 Lightning II program, with Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor. The company contributes roughly 25% of the aircraft and produces or supports several major structural and mission systems for all three variants – F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C.

Northrop Grumman designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

It also leads mission systems development, pilot and maintenance training courseware, and low-observable technology support to ensure readiness and modernization across all three F-35 variants.

The company also received new contracts worth US$1.3 billion for F-35 fighter jets.

It also won contracts worth US$1 billion for the E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft.

Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), and sole designer, developer, and manufacturer of the E-2 Hawkeye family, including the current E-2D Advanced Hawkeye.

Northrop Grumman is also the prime contractor for both the B-2 Spirit and the B-21 Raider.

In 2024, Northrop won a US$7 billion award for the B-2 Spirit modernization and sustainment program, including programmed depot maintenance of the fleet, sustaining engineering, software maintenance, support equipment, logistics elements, and interim contractor support.

This B-2 Spirit modernization and sustainment work continues at Palmdale, California; Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri; Tinker AFB, Oklahoma; Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; Edwards AFB, California; and Hill AFB, Utah, and is expected to be completed by May 2029.

In 2015, Northrop Grumman won the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) program, also known as the B-21 Raider.

However, the US Air Force has deliberately withheld detailed pricing for the program.

Earlier this year, the USAF and Northrop agreed to expand B-21 Raider production capacity by about 25% with roughly US$4.5 billion in government funding.

A 2021 Pentagon Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) study estimated that developing, procuring, and operating a fleet of 100 B-21 Raider aircraft could cost about US$203 billion over the next 30 years.

In September, Northrop Grumman also won a US$4.84 billion Army contract for CIRCM (Common Infrared Countermeasure) laser-based missile defense systems to protect Army helicopters, such as the AH-64 Apache, CH-47 Chinook, UH-60 Black Hawk, and others, from infrared-guided missiles. The program will run through 2035.

The Bombers U.S. Paid to Scrap Weakened Ukraine, Helped Russia. Why Did Kyiv Clip Its Own Wings?

Another critical program is Northrop’s role in the Sentinel missile program, a key part of the US Nuclear triad.

In the third quarter, the company won a US$2 billion contract for the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program.

Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor for the LGM-35A Sentinel program, also known as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD).

Under the program, Northrop will design and produce a new three-stage solid-propellant ICBM with improved range, accuracy, reliability, and modularity compared with Minuteman III.

It will also construct hundreds of new or heavily modernized hardened launch silos and related facilities across multiple states, and new nuclear command-and-control networks. Sentinel will provide the US with on-alert nuclear deterrence through 2075.

Northrop Grumman is also a major supplier and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for key components on Virginia-class submarines. It won a US$1.4 billion contract in Q3 for the Virginia-class submarines.

Northrop also plays an important role in the Patriot missile defense system. It supplies the solid rocket motors, ignition safety devices, and related propulsion elements for PAC-3 MSE missiles.

Patriot interceptors are in global demand due to the two ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

In August, the Department of War (DoW) signed framework agreements worth US$3 billion for expanding Patriot interceptor missile production.

The contract allocates nearly US$2 billion for solid rocket motors and ignition safety devices, in which Northrop will play a key role.

Northrop is also the prime contractor for the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), which integrates Patriot with other air- and missile-defense assets.

The company is also executing many of the USAF’s classified space-segment programs.

Many of these contracts, such as the B-21 Raider, F-35, Sentinel, and Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, will run for decades, providing Northrop with a steady source of income. However, execution risk remains.

Demand for many of the company’s products, such as aircraft, missiles, and space systems, remains strong; however, investors’ key question is whether Northrop can turn its record US$109.6 billion backlog order book into improved margins and earnings.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Northrop Wins Fresh F-35, B-21, Sentinel & Virginia-Class Work as Backlog Hits Record $110 Billion appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Australia and East Timor (Timor-Leste), ASEAN’s eleventh member state, have signed a defense framework to boost cyber and maritime security as Canberra attempts to keep China away from its island neighbors.

Richard Marles, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, said: “Australia and Timor-Leste are close neighbors, trusted partners and longstanding friends. Signing the Defense Cooperation Framework with Timor-Leste marks an important milestone in our defense relationship and provides a modern foundation for deeper cooperation in the years ahead.

Australia is proud to be Timor-Leste’s largest defense and security partner, and we remain committed to supporting Timor-Leste’s defense capability.

Together, we are strengthening our ability to work together to respond to shared security challenges, support humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, and promote a peaceful, stable and resilient region.”

He added: “Australia and Timor-Leste share a history of deep security cooperation, underpinned by decades of security cooperation and strong people-to-people ties. This package reflects the trust and friendship between our countries. As Timor-Leste takes on a greater role in our region as ASEAN’s newest member, Australia is proud to stand alongside our close neighbor and work together in support of a peaceful, stable and prosperous region.”

Foreign Minister Penny Wong said: “The Partnership Joint Declaration is driving a new era of cooperation between Australia and Timor-Leste, and these initiatives are a demonstration of our close partnership and friendship. As close neighbors and partners, Australia and Timor-Leste are working together to address shared challenges and ensure the peace, stability and prosperity of our region.”

East Timor is around 700 kilometers northwest of Australia and gained independence from Indonesia in 2002. It joined ASEAN in October 2025.

Earlier in August, China said its Defense Minister, Dong Jun, met with East Timor’s leaders in Dili and offered to “take military-to-military relations to a new level”. The visit was the first by a Chinese defense minister and coincided with commemorations for the FALINTIL-Defence Forces.

Dong met President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao.

Marles and Gusmao signed the pact under which Australia will provide $62 million (US$43.56 million) over five years for cyber security, maritime security, infrastructure, disaster relief, and training.

More than $19 million of that is earmarked for a cyber-security uplift, including specialist advisers and protection of critical systems. Australia will also give East Timor new police vessels for maritime patrols, search and rescue, and countering transnational crime.

PM Gusmao told reporters the agreement will help East Timor fight organized crime and illegal fishing. The package expands the long-running Timor-Leste Police Development Program and supports the country’s role as ASEAN’s newest member.

East Timor’s upgraded ties with Beijing have caused regional security concerns.

Earlier in September 2023, President Jose Ramos-Horta had assured Australia and Indonesia that the country had not forged any military base arrangements with Beijing.

“We don’t have a Chinese military base of any sort. We never discuss that with China, even. The Chinese never approach us on that,” Ramos-Horta had said. He highlighted that Timor-Leste maintains normal relations with all partners while prioritizing expanded defense and maritime security cooperation with Australia.

“Indonesia and Australia…we can include Singapore and Malaysia…they are the countries closest to us…can always sleep at peace. Timor Leste will not be a nuisance, a concern in terms of security,” Ramos-Horta has confirmed to Reuters.

Western critics frequently caution against Beijing’s attempts to establish military outposts by taking over infrastructure from nations that default on loan repayments, a practice often labeled “debt trap diplomacy.”

In Sri Lanka, China took over Hambantota port after the country defaulted on loan repayments.

Canberra has grown concerned about China’s efforts to forge security ties with nearby developing nations.

In 2022, China signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, raising concerns that it could eventually lead to a Chinese naval presence.

Although it assured it will not host a base, Canberra remains apprehensive.

Since then, Australia has pursued agreements across the Pacific, including with Vanuatu, to reinforce its role as the primary security partner and constrain third-party arrangements with an eye on China.

Damien Kingsbury, Emeritus Professor, Deakin University, believes that “Small countries such as East Timor risk having large investors and donors such as China swamp their local economy and thus lose the capacity to make independent economic decisions.

China could end up having an outsized influence in policymaking.”

“When China looks at investing in another developing country, they do so with one eye, certainly on a viable business, but with the other eye, very much on a longer-term strategic interest.”

Kingsbury has also noted Timor-Leste’s economic pressures, including the expected depletion of its petroleum fund, as a driver of closer ties, while highlighting past caution by Dili (e.g., rejecting a Chinese radar proposal whose range exceeded Timorese waters).

Australia’s Key Role in East Timor

Australia played a prominent role in restoring order in East Timor after violence erupted following its 1999 independence vote. It led the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), a multinational mission that paved the way for the territory’s formal independence in 2002.

Indonesia ruled East Timor from 1975 to 1999. In August 1999, the United Nations organized a referendum. More than three-quarters of voters chose independence.

The result triggered widespread violence by pro-Indonesian militias. Homes were burned, people were killed or forced from their homes, and hundreds of thousands were displaced. Pro-Indonesian militias destroyed much of the territory’s infrastructure.

In response, the UN Security Council authorized INTERFET on 15 September 1999. Australia agreed to lead the force. Troops began arriving in Dili on 20 September under Major General Peter Cosgrove’s command.

Australia provided the largest contingent, about 5,500 personnel from the army, navy, air force and police. This was Australia’s largest military deployment since the Vietnam War. 22 countries took part, including New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States, among others. At its peak, the force numbered around 11,000.

INTERFET was tasked with restoring peace and security, protecting UN staff, and helping deliver humanitarian aid. The force quickly brought the situation under control. Indonesian troops withdrew, militia activity largely stopped, and by early 2000, the immediate crisis had eased.

In February 2000, INTERFET handed over to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which governed the territory while it prepared for independence.

On 20 May 2002, East Timor became fully independent—the first new country of the 21st century. Australia continued to support the new nation through the follow-on UN mission (UNMISET) and by helping to train and equip the fledgling East Timorese defense force. Australian personnel remained involved in security and capacity-building for several more years.

On 13 September 2024, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, marking the 25th anniversary of INTERFET’s arrival, in Dili had said: “The arrival of INTERFET was a beacon of hope. The relief and joy our people felt when INTERFET arrived was immeasurable. INTERFET’s contribution to helping put an end to the violence in Timor-Leste is remembered with deep gratitude by all Timorese.”

“Our regional neighbors, including Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, played leading roles in this mission, which marked a turning point in our fight for freedom.”

• By: ET Online Desk
• Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

The post China’s “Military-to-Military” Proposal Fizzles as Australia & Timor-Leste Sign Defense Cooperation Framework appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The U.S. Air Force plans to field more than 1,500 manned, combat-coded fighter aircraft by 2035, roughly 60 percent of which will be stealth platforms.

The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35As and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s. The sixth-generation Boeing F-47s are gradually expected to replace the aging Raptors.

If the plans materialize, then by 2035, every three out of five U.S. Air Force fighters will be stealth platforms, and every two out of five fighters will be F-35s.

The new plans are part of an updated fighter force structure report the USAF submitted to Congress last week, and Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, revealed them at a media briefing in the Pentagon on October 20.

About 40 percent of the fleet could be F-35s, Tabor said.

Another 20 percent would be a mix of F-22 Raptors and F-47s as the sixth-generation fighter replaces the Raptor, Tabor said, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

The USAF built 186 F-22 Raptors and plans to replace them with an equivalent number of sixth-generation F-47s.

Tabor did not provide a breakdown of the remaining 40% of the force structure; however, he said the remaining fleet would likely split evenly between F-15 Eagle variants and F-16 Fighting Falcons.

Notably, the F-35A Lightning IIs currently make up about 30 percent of the USAF fighter fleet, with the F-22 Raptors contributing another 10 percent.

The stealth platforms currently make up about 40% of the USAF fighter fleet.

The Air Force plans to increase the share of stealth platforms from 40% to 60% over the next nine years, with the F-35A share increasing from 30% to 40%, and the F-22 Raptors and F-47s contributing the remaining 20%.

He did not provide the breakdown of how many F-22s and F-47s the USAF plans to operate in 2035.

In March 2025, Boeing won the contract to design and develop the F-47 fighter under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) effort. The sixth-generation fighter is expected to enter operational service in 2029 or mid-2030, and gradually replace the F-22 Raptors.

The F-15 Eagles’ share is expected to rise from 15% to roughly 20%, while the F-16 Fighting Falcons’ share is expected to fall sharply from 45% to 20%.

By then, the USAF will phase out all A-10 Thunderbolts.

The USAF had about 162 A-10C Thunderbolt IIs at the beginning of 2026. The U.S. Congress blocked the Air Force’s request to retire them all in FY2026 and required the USAF to keep at least 103 aircraft until October.

The USAF now plans to retire them all by September 2030. Notably, the current breakdown of the USAF fighter fleet does not include the A-10C Thunderbolts: 45% F-16s, 30% F-35s, 15% F-15s, and 10% F-22s.

USAF Needs To Add Over 70 Fighters Annually For The Next Decade 

The USAF aims to increase its fighter fleet from the current 1,271 fighters (including 103 A-10C Thunderbolts) to 1,509 combat-coded aircraft by 2035.

Notably, last year’s report set a 2030 target of 1,369 combat-coded fighters.

The USAF will therefore need to add another 238 aircraft over the next nine years. When accounting for the 103 A-10C Thunderbolts set to retire by 2030, the USAF will need to add 341 fighters.

However, the USAF will need to add many more fighters, as nearly 200 F-16s, at least 60 F-15Es, and some F-22 Raptors will also retire during this time.

The USAF will therefore need to add nearly 700 fighters over the next nine years to reach its target of 1,509 manned, combat-coded fighters, while also accounting for fighters that will retire during this time.

The USAF officials have consistently maintained that the service needs to buy 72 new fighters each year to replace its older, retiring jets and modernize the fleet.

The U.S. has not reached that target yet; in 2027, the budget request proposed adding 62 new fighters, including 38 new F-35s and 24 F-15EXs.

Tabor said those purchases can “ramp over time” to hit the numbers the Air Force needs.

“The question is, can industry produce at those levels?” Tabor said. “They’ve assured us that they can, and we believe them, but we also actually need to see it manifest.”

The Continued Relevance Of Fourth-Gen Fighters

On an aside, the USAF report submitted to the U.S. Congress makes it clear that even in 2035, the force intends to have a substantial fleet of fourth-generation fighters, nearly 40 percent, split evenly between upgraded F-15EXs and newer F-16s.

Put differently, even in 2035, two out of every five USAF fighters will be non-stealth platforms, underscoring the force’s belief that these upgraded fourth-generation fighters will remain relevant over the next decade.

The USAF has already tested this doctrine of flying a mix of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters in the Iran War.

In June 2025, during Operation Midnight Hammer, the USAF employed a mixed force of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters against Iranian targets. The F-35As reportedly led the penetration of Iranian airspace, conducting SEAD/DEAD missions against air-defense systems and escorting B-2 bombers to their targets; F-22s provided air superiority, while F-15Es and F-16s also participated in the broader strike package.

This operation provided a real-world test of using fifth-generation aircraft to suppress defenses and enable follow-on strikes by fourth-generation fighters.

The USAF followed the same strategy during Operation Epic Fury.

The USAF, therefore, continues to invest in upgraded fourth-generation platforms, such as F-15EXs.

According to the 2027 budget documents, the USAF plans to procure up to 268 new F-15EX aircraft over the next 10 years, potentially costing U.S. taxpayers over US$ 37 billion.

Meanwhile, the USAF is also considering an upgraded F-16 variant called the F-16G.

The F-16G variant differs from the Block 70 F-16 Viper, which many countries worldwide, including Taiwan, Turkey, Morocco, Bahrain, Peru, and others, have ordered.

Buoyed by the F-15EX’s success, Lockheed Martin is aggressively pushing the F-16G variant to the USAF.

Tabor clarified that while the USAF is considering the F-16G variant, it does not have to decide “immediately.”

“We’re not in a position where that decision has to be made immediately.”

He said the decision likely won’t be made in the 2028 budgeting process, but perhaps in the years that follow.

“There is a spectrum of capability that we might want to replace the F-16s with,” he said.

“It’s not urgent, frankly. What we don’t want to get to is a point where it is urgent, and we haven’t done the homework and decided ‘hey, this is really the right place to be.’ We do have time to churn through that and make sure that we have a good option going forward.”

One advantage to buying more F-16s is that “it’s practically a ready-made aircraft,” Tabor said.

In December 2025, Inside Defense reported that the USAF was weighing a new F-16 variant to fill capability gaps at a lower cost than the F-35.

Ordering upgraded F-16s also offers the USAF other advantages.

The U.S. already has an established F-16 production line in Greenville, South Carolina. So, ordering new F-16s wouldn’t require establishing a new production line or reviving a dormant one.

However, it remains to be seen whether the F-16G achieves the same success as the F-15EX.

Tabor stressed that pushing multi-year procurement packages, as the USAF is currently exploring for the F-35 and F-15EX, will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in expanding their production facilities, which will help meet the USAF’s ambitious target of adding 72 fighters every year.

Tabor also clarified that the USAF will continue investing in crewed fighter jets, even as it adds hundreds of autonomous drone fighters, known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), to its fleet.

The USAF aims to field 500 CCAs by 2032.

“CCA is very much a reality,” Tabor said.

“It is going to be a part of our future, and there is absolutely a world in which the incorporation of CCAs into the force will mitigate the requirement for the number of fighters. That’s not the CCA that we have right now, but it is advancing very, very rapidly. We’re confident that it will play a major role in future versions of the fighter force structure report.”

For the foreseeable future, the USAF is seeking to balance crewed fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-generation platforms with autonomous drone fighters.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post U.S. Stealth Jets — F-35, F-22 & F-47 — to Form 60% of USAF Fighter Force by 2035 Under New Plan, Service Tells Congress appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

In a major milestone, the U.S. Navy’s Nimitz-class aircraft carrier remotely controlled an MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial refueller from more than 2,100 miles away, a capability that could eventually boost F/A-18 Super Hornets.

“In a historic U.S. naval aviation event, an aircraft carrier connected to and controlled an unmanned aerial refueler, the MQ-25A Stingray, more than 2,100 miles away,” the US Navy said in an official release.

The MQ-25 Stingray is designed primarily as an unmanned aerial tanker, though it could also be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.

During what the Navy described as a preliminary sea trial, the ship’s Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC), used by Air Vehicle Pilots (AVPs) for controlling future MQ-25 Stingray airborne operations, employed its MD-5C Ground Control Station to establish a Beyond Line-of-Sight connection with an MQ-25A test aircraft through a Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) satellite network, the service stated.

While the carrier was in the Pacific Ocean, Boeing kept the MQ-25 at its Illinois facility for the trial.

To provide command and control of the MQ-25A, the MD-5C GCS combined Lockheed Martin’s MDCX hardware and software with other government-made equipment and the Navy’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) network. The Navy also noted that this system will command and control the Navy’s future unmanned carrier aircraft and the Air Wing of the Future. 

“This first-ever underway connection between a carrier-based UAWC and an MQ-25A aircraft proves that the Carrier Air Wing of tomorrow is a reality today,” said Capt. Daniel Fucito, program manager for the Navy’s Unmanned Carrier Aviation Program Office.

This marks a momentous step toward integrating unmanned systems into carrier air wings and preparing the Navy’s first carrier-based unmanned tanker for operational use. The trial was part of a series of build-up exercises intended to verify protocols, networks, and interfaces.

Before this, the MQ-25 Integrated Test Team, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and the US Navy, conducted pier-side and at-sea tests with the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Program Office’s (PMA-268) Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System team.

Although the test showed remote connectivity and control over a significant distance, the Navy did not record an autonomous flight, aerial refueling operation, or carrier landing.

F-35, F-22 & F-47 to Form 60% of USAF Fighter Force by 2035 Under New Plan, Service Tells Congress

Nonetheless, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Hung Cao, said, “The MQ-25A Stingray’s carrier-based refueling capabilities enable F/A-18 Super Hornets to fly farther and longer. The integration of this unmanned aerial refueler demonstrates the transformational change our manned and unmanned asset integration provides the Fleet.”

Why Does This Long-Range Trial Matter?

This latest demonstration matters because it validated critical enabling technologies for unmanned carrier operations.

Notably, the earth’s curvature and the vast operating areas of carrier strike groups, such as the Pacific Ocean, limit traditional radio links. Routing commands and data through a resilient satellite constellation removes that constraint.

Against that backdrop, the latest trial confirms that the Navy’s MD-5C Ground Control Station architecture can operate in a realistic operational environment, not just in controlled shore-based or pier-side tests.

Furthermore, the successful use of a proliferated LEO satellite constellation from a moving warship proves that reliable beyond-line-of-sight command and control is achievable in a realistic at-sea environment.

Three U.S. Navy aircraft carriers feature Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC) infrastructure using Lockheed Martin Skunk Works-powered MD-5 ground-control systems. The USS George H.W. Bush served as the fleet’s initial developmental testbed, while the USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Ronald Reagan are officially designated as the Navy’s first and second fully operational, deployable drone-capable carriers.

Demonstrating that a carrier can continuously control an unmanned aircraft over intercontinental distances from its own Unmanned Air Warfare Center proves the viability of the shipboard control infrastructure already installed on these carriers.

This infrastructure is purportedly intended to support tankers and future uncrewed platforms performing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, or other roles, enabling deeper manned-unmanned teaming between crewed and uncrewed platforms.

This capability counts because the MQ-25A is designed to serve as the Navy’s carrier-based unmanned tanker, taking over aerial-refueling duties that currently take time away from the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.

By validating long-range control from the carrier, the Navy has shown that operators aboard the aircraft carrier can direct the Stingray to deliver fuel to fighters hundreds of miles from the deck.

Stingray refueling will extend the carrier air wing’s combat radius and time on station while keeping more Super Hornets available for strike, air superiority, or other primary missions instead of diverting them into “buddy” tanker roles during crucial deployments. 

This would be a critical enhancement to the carrier wing’s capability in theatres like the volatile Indo-Pacific region, where distances are long and adversaries like China field sophisticated anti-access/area-denial systems.

Europe “Blind in Space”: Why Only U.S. Can See Russian Missiles as Ukraine Begs For American Help?

In a potential conflict with China, American carriers may need to operate farther from contested shorelines to reduce vulnerability to long-range missiles and other threats. In that scenario, a reliably controllable unmanned tanker that can be controlled from the ship will allow the air wing to project power over long distances without staying close to the carrier or relying on land-based or allied tanker support that may be hard to obtain.

That said, a proliferated satellite network also adds resilience, particularly because such constellations are harder to disrupt completely than single high-value satellites or line-of-sight links. This will improve the survivability of the command-and-control chain under contested conditions, and in a conflict with a near-peer adversary like Beijing.

Operationally, this will also help the Navy achieve its manned-unmanned teaming objective. The MQ-25 Stingray, for one, has been positioned as a trailblazer for the “Air Wing of the Future,” and is expected to help establish procedures, networks, and infrastructure that will support not only tankers but also future uncrewed systems for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and potentially even strike roles.

Earlier this month, for instance, Boeing announced a successful trial of the Stingray’s Link 16 datalink-based Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) command-and-control software during the Emerald Flag exercise at Eglin AFB, Florida.

The software was installed on a Beechcraft 1900D and a King Air E90 to demonstrate command and control between the two aircraft. This capability will eventually move into the MQ-25A and Super Hornet.

The latest trial is an important step before Stingray starts operating from carrier decks. The Boeing MQ-25 T1 test asset previously refueled three carrier-based aircraft—an F/A-18 Super Hornet, E-2D Hawkeye, and F-35C Lightning II —but it has yet to fly from a carrier.  The first production-representative MQ-25 flew for the first time in April 2026, and the service plans its first carrier launch next year.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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Since Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Starlink, and later Starshield, have become vital for Ukraine’s defense and even offensive capabilities.

Amid ongoing tussle over Starshield restrictions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on October 20, 2026, that he had positive talks with the United States to resolve the issues.

“I spoke with Marco Rubio, and it was a substantive conversation – focused on the issues that matter. I am grateful for his readiness to help and his clear position. First, ballistic missile interceptors, which are needed to protect lives. Second, early warning of Russian ballistic missile attacks, which is vital.

Third, we need to restore the Starlink/Starshield situation. Of course, all of this comes against the backdrop of our diplomatic efforts to end this horrific war and the constant killing of people. We agreed to get in touch again soon for an update.

Thank you, Marco, for the constructive discussion! Thank you to everyone in America who supports fair approaches!” Zelenskyy said in a post on X.

However, the restrictions have highlighted Ukraine’s heavy military dependence on US-linked satellite systems amid political friction with the  Trump administration, including mounting pressure over Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure and related disputes over intelligence sharing and sanctions policy, even as Moscow intensifies attacks.

Why is Starshield?

To understand Starshield and its utility for Ukraine, one must understand Starlink.

Starlink is a satellite internet service developed and operated by SpaceX. It operates a constellation of thousands of smaller satellites at around 550 kilometers above Earth.

Notably, traditional terrestrial and satellite communication (SATCOM) networks cannot match Starlink’s bandwidth. Most conventional SATCOM systems also rely on geostationary (geostationary orbit) satellites, which introduce higher latency and limit the effectiveness of real-time applications such as remote piloting of UAVs, as the EurAsian Times explained earlier.

However, Starlink’s low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite architecture makes it more resilient to jamming and provides a more secure communication channel.

Starshield is SpaceX’s satellite program focused on government and national security. While Starlink is built for consumers, businesses, and general connectivity, delivering high-speed internet via a massive constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites, Starshield is purpose-built for government customers—primarily the US Department of Defense, intelligence agencies, the US Space Force, and allied countries and their military, like Ukraine.

Ukraine has used both: commercial Starlink terminals widely for communications and logistics, and Starshield for higher-security military needs where available.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, it systematically targeted fiber-optic cables, cell towers, and power grids, destroying all traditional internet and jamming military radios. This is when Starlink stepped in.

Ukraine wanted Starlink terminals because they don’t rely on ground infrastructure and operate in blacked-out or contested areas. Starlink and Starshield provide connectivity even when the enemy damages or destroys traditional telecommunications infrastructure.

Ukrainian troops currently rely on Starshield for long-distance video transmission for military operations, information gathering, and communication. It serves as the backbone for encrypted voice, messaging, and data links between units, headquarters, and isolated positions. This includes real-time situational awareness systems.

Satellite internet connectivity is especially important for drone operations, which are central to Ukraine’s offensive and defensive strategies. These unmanned Ukrainian systems rely on satellite connectivity because current operations frequently require constant contact between controllers and aircraft.

Starshield enables long-range control and live video feeds from reconnaissance and attack drones far beyond the reach of normal radio links. It also supports interceptor drones that pursue fast Russian jet-powered drones, including the notorious Shahed class.

Ukrainian officials recently alleged that Starshield receptors stopped working in Ukraine when mounted on fast-moving objects, impairing drones that depend on them for onboard guidance over Ukrainian territory.

In fact, a Ukrainian Defense Ministry official said the sensors worked when moving, but only up to 100 miles per hour (160 kph), meaning drones had to slow down significantly. Some units reported disruptions at even lower speeds.

When connectivity is sketchy or slows, missions slow, lose accuracy, and sometimes become impossible. In fact, military officers quoted in media reports alleged that connections were lost during operations and missions were canceled when connectivity failed. These constraints may have been especially painful because Ukraine increasingly uses drones for long-range strikes, as well as air defense and interception.

Ukraine also uses Starshield to launch strikes from ground-based systems. It allows targeting data to flow quickly from sensors and drones to guns and HIMARS, closing the sensor-to-shooter loop and improving precision.

Additionally, Starlink/Starshield are crucial to Ukrainian forces receiving intelligence from allies. Western partners provide Ukraine with surveillance data regarding Russian air strikes, missile launches, troop movements, anti-aircraft positions, and escape routes.

Put succinctly, Ukrainian forces rely heavily on Starlink for battlefield management, Secure communications, Drone operations, artillery coordination and precision strikes, cybersecurity and intelligence sharing, and logistics and command networks.

At the same time, Starlink has significant civilian applications. It has also been crucial for hospitals, emergency services, local administrations, journalists, and ordinary citizens in frontline or occupied areas, who use it to stay connected when conventional networks fail.

By 2025, roughly 50,000 Starlink/Starshield terminals were operating in Ukraine, according to analysis from the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. As of now, Ukraine has no equivalent resilient, high-bandwidth LEO alternative available at comparable scale and speed of deployment.

What is The Ongoing Issue?

Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukraine’s former Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, asked SpaceX owner Elon Musk on X to activate SpaceX’s Starlink satellites.

Musk complied almost immediately and shipped user terminals to Ukraine.

SpaceX’s satellite internet service has since provided resilient communications when ground networks were jammed or destroyed, supported drone operations, logistics, and reconnaissance, and helped maintain connectivity for civilians and the military. In fact, it has become the cornerstone of Ukraine’s offensive and defensive operations throughout the grinding war.

Earlier this month, Ukrainian forces were jolted by connectivity problems with Starshield terminals. The Ukrainian government alleged that the Trump administration and SpaceX had unilaterally restricted its access.

Serhiy Beskrestnov, a presidential adviser on defense technologies and well-known military blogger, stated: “Our armed forces did not receive a warning about these restrictions, and this led to the failure of a number of missions… It’s clear that this action cannot be a coincidence and is connected to the current political situation.”

President Zelenskyy said Russian forces appeared to exploit the disruption, noting that interceptor drones hunting jet-powered Shahed-type munitions depend on the connection.

“It is clear that the Russians are trying to take advantage of the problems with Starlink in Ukraine, as our interceptor drones depend on this connection among other things,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy posted to X.

Responding to the claims, Musk wrote on X that the US government owns and controls the Starshield systems, and that the US military and president control any limits on its speed or use. Starlink “cannot be used for offensive military action, as doing so would be inappropriate for a commercial company,” Musk highlighted in his post.

Citing sources, Reuters reported that the White House had ordered the Department of Defense to slow down Starshield services for Ukraine.

This sparked speculation that the crucial communications system was briefly restricted to add more pressure on Ukraine to stop its strikes on Russian refineries, which US President Donald Trump has repeatedly blamed for skyrocketing fuel costs that are hurting his Republican Party’s chances in the upcoming November midterm elections.

The Trump administration did not confirm these allegations.

However, the sudden Starshield outage coincided with massive Russian ballistic missile attacks for which Ukraine did not receive any warning from the US, just days after the Trump administration warned Kyiv to stop its attacks on Russian refineries or face suspension of intelligence sharing.

Another twist in this grueling tale came when The Telegraph reported that Musk approached Trump about slowing down Starshield in Ukraine.

However, Trump later said he did not believe that either he or Musk was responsible for Ukraine losing access to Starshield.

Over the weekend, Marco Rubio went on record saying Starshield is currently unavailable to Ukraine, adding that a request from Kyiv to use the system for attacks deep inside Russia was “under discussion.”

“Starlink is a commercial product, okay? And so it’s regulated and handled as a commercial product. Starshield is a defense product, a military product,” said Rubio in comments published by the Pentagon. “They’ve asked for access to it in order to conduct deep strikes inside of Russia. They don’t have access to it at the moment. That’s under discussion,” he added.

Ukrainian officials say the restrictions affected Starshield terminals they use for military operations. Secretary Rubio has stated that Starshield itself is not currently available to Ukraine and that Ukraine’s drone operations have relied on commercial Starlink. The two sides do not agree on which system was restricted.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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China’s J-20 stealth fighter fleet is estimated to have reached 500 aircraft, according to open-source assessments by analysts tracking serial numbers and unit deployments. However, its ambitious H-20 stealth bomber, touted as a challenge to the US B-21 Raider, remains conspicuously absent.

The J-20 Mighty Dragon first flew in 2011 and entered service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in 2017. China has rapidly increased its inventory; Chengdu Aircraft Corporation facilities produce about 100-120 airframes a year.

China unveiled the tandem-seat J-20S at the 2025 Victory Day Parade as the EurAsian Times reported at the time. If production continues at pace, reports suggest the total number of J-20 aircraft, including the two-seat variant, could reach or exceed 1,000 by 2030.

Alongside the J-20, China is scaling production of the J-35 family, its second fifth-generation aircraft. Some estimates suggest China could have 200 to 300 J-35s operational by 2030.

This makes China the only nation besides the US to field two fifth-generation aircraft.

Beijing has also begun flight testing two different sixth-generation prototypes: the larger, three-engine Chengdu J-36 and the smaller twin-engine Shenyang J-50. They are seen as a counter to the Boeing F-47 6th-gen aircraft.

Where is China’s H-20 Bomber?

China has hinted about the debut of the H-20 stealth bomber for several years.

China first publicly acknowledged a next-generation stealth bomber, later identified as the H-20, around 2016. At the time, officials described it as a flying-wing design intended to provide true intercontinental penetrating strike capability.

In January 2021, a clip from the PLAAF’s recruitment video showed off the supposed flying-wing design to the public.

The following year, images of a metallic wind-tunnel test model of a bomber linked to the final H-20 prototype surfaced on Chinese social media (subsequently posted to X), sparking speculation that the bomber technology may be maturing at pace, as the EurAsian Times noted in a detailed report at the time. 

In March 2024, then-PLAAF deputy commander Wang Wei told reporters the H-20’s development had no “technological bottlenecks” and hinted that the bomber’s public unveiling was imminent. He assured reporters that manufacturing and commissioning would follow the aircraft’s test flights and take place shortly after its official public debut.

Later that year, Beijing was widely expected to showcase the H-20 at the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2024. However, that did not happen at China’s biggest air show.

Meanwhile, the US B-21 ‘Raider’ next-generation bomber has moved at breakneck speed, going from the official public unveiling in December 2022 to the maiden flight in record time in November 2023. The program is currently in low-rate initial production, meaning Northrop Grumman is building a small number of aircraft to test and refine the production process before full-rate production begins. 

By contrast, the Chinese H-20 has had no confirmed test flight, no publicly verified prototype imagery of a finished airframe, and no visible production line as of October 2026.

Europe “Blind in Space”: Why Only U.S. Can See Russian Missiles as Ukraine Begs For American Help?

In fact, United States officials and intelligence assessments have grown increasingly cautious and skeptical in recent years about an impending unveiling.

The Pentagon’s December 2024 assessment of China’s military stated the H-20 is unlikely to appear before the end of the decade.

“The PLAAF is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets. PLAAF leaders publicly announced the program in 2016; however, it may take more than a decade to develop this type of advanced bomber,” the report emphasized.

The Pentagon’s 2025 China report did not mention the H-20 at all, directly or indirectly. However, the head of US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) was quoted saying: “I can certainly understand their [the Chinese] desire to have a long-range strike capability like the United States, and I know that they’re pursuing it aggressively.”

“What I can tell you is they’re just not there yet. I think our adversaries look at our long-range strike capabilities, and … want to mimic them, but they can’t,” he continued. “There’s no other country in the world [besides the United States] that can take and deliver a long-range strike platform pretty much on any day, at any time and place that they’re choosing, right?” AFGSC commander Gen. Stephen Davis added.

Notably, China’s only operational bombers are variants of the Xi’an H-6 family, the Chinese-built version of the 1950s Soviet Tupolev Tu-16. China currently operates the H-6K, its primary modern conventional bomber; the H-6N, a nuclear-capable variant; and the H-6J, the naval maritime-strike version optimized for anti-ship missiles. 

Unlike the United States, which fields the formidable B-2 Spirit, China does not yet have a dedicated long-range stealth bomber.

Currently, widespread speculation suggests China may have faced technical hurdles in developing the next-generation stealth bomber. 

China does not yet have a ready, purpose-built, fuel-efficient jet engine designed specifically for a large, long-range flying-wing bomber. Engines currently used on its transport planes (like the Y-20) or fighters (such as the WS-15) are not well-suited for the efficiency, range, and low heat signature needed. In addition, creating a smooth, seamless stealth surface on a large aircraft is much harder than on smaller fighter jets.

Another challenge China may face is building large composite structures, precision tooling, and manufacturing. Typically, building a smooth, tailless flying wing requires specialized production tooling and controlled environments that China has been developing.

Tailless designs are also inherently unstable and require advanced fly-by-wire systems, thermal management, and overall system integration.

Starshield vs. Starlink: The Satellite Fight Complicating the Ukraine-Russia War and Kyiv’s Ties with the U.S.

Interestingly, the US intelligence and military leaders have described the program as facing “significant engineering design challenges” and being “nowhere near as good as US low-observable platforms.”

Even if prototypes exist or limited testing has occurred, China may have strong reasons to withhold a public unveiling. For one, strategic bombers are part of the nuclear triad and long-range conventional strike, and premature disclosure could reveal design details of a highly classified program, something Beijing officials have been outspoken about.

H-20 Do?

The aircraft would add a flying leg to China’s nuclear triad. The Pentagon’s 2018 and 2019 “China Military Power Report” predicted that China’s new H-20 long-range stealth bomber would have an operational range of 8,500 kilometers. It will be a “flying-wing” design with a payload capacity of around 10 tons.

The H-20 could project power beyond the first chain of islands, threatening infrastructure, ships, and bases from farther away.  Furthermore, China would be able to threaten regional rivals like Japan and India and attack extremely critical peripheral places, such as the US island territories of Guam and Hawaii, with an increased long-range strike aviation force.

Analysts predict the aircraft would have serrated air intakes, cranked-kite wings, and foldable twin-tail surfaces that can switch between horizontal tailplanes and V-tails.

The H-20 is likely to feature internal armament bays that can accommodate conventional weapons, long-range cruise missiles, and maybe nuclear weapons, much like previous stealth systems. However, the  H-20 is probably not intended for carpet bombing or deep-penetration missions, but rather for stand-off and limited penetration.

While China’s next fighter jets are gaining momentum, the H-20 seems far from reality.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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The Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, is bitterly complaining that the country cannot intercept Russian ballistic missiles because Kyiv has not been receiving advance launch warnings from its partners for over a week.

On October 19, Zelenskyy wrote on platform X: “Another Russian ballistic missile attack came in several waves overnight, and once again, there was no early warning from our partners.”

Earlier, explaining the criticality of early missile warning, Zelenskyy said on October 13, “A Russian ballistic missile attack on Kyiv. Once again, no early warning from our partners… Our systems detected these missiles only when they were already virtually on approach to Kyiv. … And this is absolutely unjust: when they are destroying our energy infrastructure, and Ukraine is not even receiving early warnings about ballistic missile launches.”

Along with Patriot missile interceptors, Zelenskyy has described ‘missile early warning’ as absolutely vital to intercept Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.

“I spoke with Marco Rubio… First, ballistic missile interceptors, which are needed to protect lives. Second, early warning of Russian ballistic missile attacks, which is vital,” he said on October 20.

Zelenskyy has so far avoided blaming the US for failure to provide advance early warning of missiles; rather, he is blaming Ukrainian “partners” as a whole for this failure.

However, Ukraine’s European partners have absolutely no role in this, as they themselves are entirely dependent on the US for the space-based early missile-warning system.

Along with Starlink and Starshield, a space-based early missile-warning system is another critical area where Europe currently has no comparable system, and if Washington withdraws its support to Kyiv, Europe will be simply incapable of filling the gap.

While Europe has invested in ground-based radars and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, long-range radars that can track a missile in its mid- and terminal phases, Europe has no space-based early missile-warning system that can detect a missile launch in its boost phase and provide warnings to ground and airborne radars for tracking and intercepting the missiles.

This is critical for successfully intercepting ballistic and cruise missiles, as it gives ground-based and airborne radars more time to track and intercept them.

Space-Based Missile Early Warning System: How Does It Work?

The US has a series of space-based satellites fitted with sensors that can detect, track, and identify missile launches from anywhere in the world, a Cold-War-era system that has been perfected and upgraded over the decades.

The US currently has six Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) around Earth to provide 24/7 global strategic missile-warning capability.

Launched between 2011 and 2022, these satellites are known as SBIRS (Space-Based Infrared System). The satellites carry high-power infrared sensors that monitor Earth’s surface nonstop to detect heat signatures from missile launches.

SBIRS satellites can scan large swaths of territory to detect missile activity and also focus on areas of interest for smaller-scale activities, including tactical ballistic missile launches.

These sensors are independently tasked, meaning the satellite can scan a wide territory while also focusing on a specific area of concern.

For instance, currently, the US SBIRS satellites would naturally scan Iran and Russia more than any other region.

During the missile’s initial boost phase, its exhaust plume releases intense heat. These intense heat signatures stand out in infrared sensors against the cooler Earth background.

Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) sensors on satellites spot this signature within seconds of ignition, even through clouds or darkness, and provide ground-based stations and radars with the first warning of a missile launch.

These powerful sensors can detect any missile launch within seconds, from small, unsophisticated missiles such as the Iraqi Scuds, which were detected, tracked, and intercepted during the First Gulf War, to Russia’s large intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and everything in between, such as the short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and even cruise and hypersonic missiles.

These sensors can not only detect missile launches, but also identify them. Missile rocket motors produce exhaust gases at different temperatures based on their fuel, chemical composition, and other design features, helping these sensors identify distinct missile signatures.

However, infrared sensors on the six GEO satellites are not the US’s only space-based assets that help it detect missile launches in their boost phases.

The space segment of the SBIRS program also includes Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) sensors riding on host satellites and legacy Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites.

HEO sensors improve coverage of high-latitude and polar regions that are harder to monitor effectively from GEO alone.

The DSP program was launched in the 1970s, after the experimental Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) of the 1960s proved the concept of detecting ICBM launches from space.

Under the DSP program, the US launched over 20 satellites with spinning IR sensors into geosynchronous orbit between 1970 and 2007.

DSP provided continuous strategic warning during the Cold War. It was this system that detected Iraqi Scud missiles during the First Gulf War.

The SBIRS program succeeded DSP, with significantly higher sensitivity, dual sensors, multi-spectral capability, better resolution, and improved ground processing.

Together, GEO, HEO, and DSP satellites provide 24/7 monitoring of Earth’s surface and can detect a missile launch from anywhere on Earth.

These satellites downlink data to ground stations (Air Force Space Command in Colorado), which analyze it to characterize the event, launch time and location, missile type, possible trajectory, and likely point of impact, then relay the information to NORAD, US Strategic Command, combatant commands, and missile defense systems.

This early missile warning is crucial to successful missile interception because it gives ground-based and airborne radars more time to track and intercept the missile, and Europe currently lacks a corresponding system.

Why Europe Is Dependent On The US For Early Missile Warning

SBIRS collects data and processes it at ground stations, then shares it with European allies through NATO’s Shared Early Warning System (SEWS).

This data is complemented by Europe’s ground-based and airborne radars, as well as by the US AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar at RAF Fylingdales in the UK.

However, Europe has no comparable space-based early missile-warning system. It has some space situational awareness, but nothing equivalent to a persistent space-based infrared constellation for detecting missile launches.

Therefore, not only Ukraine but Europe itself depends on the US for early warning of ballistic or hypersonic missile threats.

Europe therefore cannot fill the gap if Washington decides not to share these missile-launch warnings with Kyiv.

Europe has pursued this capability for years; however, its programs have not progressed beyond the technology-demonstrator stage.

For instance, in 2009, France launched SPIRALE, a spaceborne early warning demonstrator program. It successfully collected infrared data on missile launches; however, the program ended in 2011 and France is yet to launch a full-scale follow-up program.

European countries also launched another technology demonstrator program, TWISTER, in 2019.

In October last year, France and Germany signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) to launch two complementary, interoperable geostationary (GEO) satellites with infrared sensors, under the JEWEL (Joint Early Warning for a European Lookout) program.

However, Europe currently has no sovereign, operational, space-based missile early-warning system.

Europe recognizes its vulnerability and has demonstrated its technological capability, but building a space-based, IR-sensor-equipped satellite constellation that provides nonstop coverage of every part of Earth’s surface would take at least a decade more.

Meanwhile, both Ukraine and Europe remain critically dependent on the US.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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UK will deploy its Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets to Saudi Arabia to help defend the embattled country against increasing attacks from the Houthis.

This would not be the first time the RAF would use its Typhoon jets against the Houthis.

For instance, in January 2024, as part of joint US-UK operations to protect shipping lanes in the Red Sea, RAF Typhoons operating from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus struck Houthi military targets in Yemen with Paveway IV precision-guided bombs.

On the night of 11–12 January, the jets targeted a drone-related facility at Bani in northwestern Yemen and an airfield at Abbs used to launch cruise missiles and drones. Later, follow-up strikes hit targets near the Sanaa airfield.

No Offensive Strikes: UK

Meanwhile, the British Ministry of Defense said the deployment was part of “additional defensive military support” to Riyadh.

“The UK will fly defensive counter-air missions to support the protection of Saudi cities and critical national infrastructure against aerial attack, using RAF Typhoon fighter jets,” the Ministry of Defense said. “These aircraft will operate in a defensive role and will not conduct offensive strikes against the Houthis.”

The UK will also deploy a military transport aircraft “to support the movement of defense material within Saudi Arabia alongside UK military advisers to support Saudi staff officers”, the statement added.

“The continuing attacks from the Houthis on our ally Saudi Arabia are absolutely despicable,” said defense secretary Wes Streeting.

“The targeting of the airport in Riyadh in particular shows the lengths the Houthis are going to (to) escalate the situation in the region,” Streeting added.

A surge in Houthi attacks has led Saudi Arabia to postpone a major investment conference, undermining its efforts to draw greater foreign investment and reduce reliance on oil.

While the UK has asserted that the Typhoons will strictly be in a defensive role, the RAF has previously used its jets to attack Houthis in Yemen on several occasions.

In the defensive role, the RAF Typhoons are expected to intercept incoming Houthi aerial threats—essentially drones and cruise missiles—before they reach Saudi cities, airports, or other critical infrastructure.

The RAF is likely to employ the Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4, the most advanced version in its fleet and one of the most sophisticated Typhoon variants.

Equipped with the CAPTOR radar and PIRATE infrared search-and-track system, the jet can detect and track low-flying, small-signature targets such as drones and cruise missiles at reasonable ranges. Its Praetorian Defensive Aids Subsystem further improves survivability against enemy air defenses or electronic threats.

For these intercepts, the Typhoons are armed with beyond-visual-range Meteor missiles, with a large, approximately 60 km No Escape Zone.

Then there is the Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM), which offers a high-agility option for close-range engagements against drones or missiles that penetrate closer to protected areas. It also has an internal 27-mm Mauser cannon that can serve as a last-resort weapon against very close threats, though missile intercepts are the main method.

The Typhoon FGR4 can also carry air-to-ground weapons such as Enhanced Paveway II and Paveway IV bombs, Storm Shadow cruise missiles, and Brimstone, but these are not relevant to this deployment’s purely defensive role.

In earlier operations, the RAF used Paveway IV laser/GPS-guided bombs against Houthi targets in Yemen; those strikes, however, were offensive while the UK describes the current mission as defensive.

Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4 

The Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4 is a multi-role variant used by the Royal Air Force.

The FGR4 designation applies to the RAF’s single-seat Typhoons upgraded to Block 5 or later capabilities across Tranches 1, 2, and 3. This single-seat fighter is optimized for air-to-air combat, precision air-to-ground missions, reconnaissance, and swing-role operations.

In May 2026, the RAF began using Eurofighter Typhoons equipped with the AGR-20A APKWS (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System) for air-defense missions in the Middle East.

“Now in operational use by 9 Squadron, the APKWS enhances Typhoon’s versatility and enables the aircraft to respond more flexibly to evolving threats. The system strengthens the RAF’s ability to maintain persistent air defense while managing costs and resources more effectively,” the RAF said in an official statement.

• By ET Online Desk with AFP Inputs
• Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

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Russia’s Tupolev Tu-160M, the world’s largest, heaviest, and fastest strategic bomber, has become even more formidable.

Its manufacturer, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), says it has modernized roughly 80% of the aircraft’s onboard systems and equipment, keeping the nuclear-capable bomber relevant amid rapidly evolving battlefield demands.

The upgraded onboard systems include modern avionics, navigation technology, weapons-control systems, and a complete renewal of onboard radio-electronic equipment and upgrades to the aircraft-control system.

The company has also changed the strategic bomber’s propulsion system, introducing the new NK-32-02 engines, also described as the NK-32 Series 02.

The upgrades provide Russia with a modernized long-range strike platform, capable of delivering nuclear warheads as well as conventional military missions.

The Tu-160M ‘White Swan’ is also a key part of Russia’s nuclear triad, alongside land-based and submarine-launched missiles.

However, although the company has modernized and upgraded 80% of the onboard systems and equipment, it has not tinkered with the aircraft’s airframe, which remains unchanged. This means that the Tu-160M, known by its NATO reporting name Blackjack, retains the distinctive variable-sweep wings and overall appearance of the original Tu-160.

The Tu-160M’s variable-sweep wings can adjust from about 20° fully forward to 65° fully swept back for high-speed flight.

The forward-swept wings maximize lift and wingspan, allowing the massive aircraft to take off with its heavy payload, while the fully swept wings sharply reduce drag, enabling the Tu-160M to reach about Mach 2.05 and making it the fastest operational strategic bomber.

In short, variable-sweep wings let a large strategic bomber combine heavy-lift capability, long endurance, and genuine supersonic performance, a combination fixed-wing designs struggle to match.

More importantly, Russia has rebuilt the engineering and industrial capacity to produce a strategic, nuclear-capable, long-range bomber nearly three decades after Moscow lost this crucial capability.

Tupolev head Yuri Abrosimov discussed the Tu-160M’s modernization efforts in an article published by the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which includes Tupolev.

Highlighting the Tu-160’s unique characteristics, Abrosimov said, “The Tu-160 strategic missile carrier is still the best supersonic aircraft in the world, surpassing in its characteristics a similar aircraft complex available in the United States.”

“46 official world records have been set on the Tu-160, including the record for flight duration and range. The resumption of mass production of the legendary ‘White Swan’ is the development of unique competencies and industrial and technological sovereignty of our country,” he added.

Abrosimov underlined that, in addition to modernizing 80% of the onboard systems, including a new powerplant, the company has refurbished several assembly lines from scratch using modern technologies.

The company has also upgraded workshop equipment and its flight-test facilities, and introduced electron-beam welding and vacuum annealing systems for titanium assemblies.

Tupolev has also rebuilt supply lines for producing the upgraded Tu-160M bombers.

“One of the main difficulties we are facing is the restoration of production cooperation, starting with suppliers of materials and semi-finished products. We have actually rebuilt the technological chains for a number of units, taking into account the use of modern technologies,” Abrosimov said.

He also highlighted the difficulties Russia faced in restarting Tu-160M production, and the use of modern digital technologies in the process.

“The implementation of the Tu-160 reproduction program required the creation of a fundamentally new unified digital environment for working on the project. The design bureaus of Sukhoi, Mikoyan, and Ilyushin participated in the preparation of digital documentation.”

He further said that the upgradation of onboard systems was done in a way that newer systems can be integrated without requiring modernization of the entire complex.

“When upgrading on-board systems, modern approaches have been applied, which make it possible, if necessary, to further increase the functionality of the systems and the aircraft as a whole, as an aviation complex, without significant improvements.”

“The approaches used in building the architecture of the avionics complex will allow installing new systems to replace those that become obsolete over time, without modernizing the entire complex. This makes it possible to constantly provide a response to the emerging demands of time,” he said.

Notably, Russia has localized the upgrade of the Tu-160M bomber and refurbished its assembly units while under crippling Western sanctions that specifically target the Russian military-industrial and aerospace complex, including the UAC, Rostec, Tupolev, and the Kazan manufacturing plant that produces the Tu-160.

Earlier, the UAC disclosed that it digitized the complete design documentation for the Tu-160M and modernized over 40% of equipment at the Kazan Aviation Plant to restart bomber production.

In the 1980s, during the Soviet era, the Kazan Aircraft Production Plant produced the Tu-160.

Production continued until 1992, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered an end to serial production after the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991.

During this time, the Kazan plant built nearly 35 Tu-160M bombers.

Notably, when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, 19 of the nearly 35 Tu-160M bombers were in Ukraine, which announced their integration into the Ukrainian Air Force.

However, in the following years, Ukraine transferred eight Tu-160 bombers to Russia under a debt-relief program and dismantled the remaining bombers under a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program with the US.

Russia decided to restart Tu-160M production in 2016 and again chose the same plant, the Kazan Aviation Plant (KAZ), for the job.

The facility required substantial modernization, including new equipment, rebuilding workshops, and restoring titanium-welding capability.

However, sanctions slowed the program. The first round of sanctions was imposed on Russia in 2014, following the occupation of Crimea.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, much stronger sanctions were imposed on Russia, especially on its military-industrial complex.

In June 2024, UAC announced it had completed modernization at three workshops for producing new Tu-160 bombers. Overall, from 2016 to 2024, Russia modernized about 10 production facilities for the strategic bomber.

Despite crippling sanctions, Russia restarted production of the Tu-160M bomber and even achieved 80% modernization of its onboard systems, no small feat.

However, the 80% figure comes from internal company claims and has not been independently verified.

Russia has signed a contract to produce 10 Tu-160M bombers.

The first newly built Tu-160M2 made its maiden flight in Kazan on January 12, 2022, becoming the first new Tu-160 built since 1992.

However, the program has missed repeated deadlines.

Russia was supposed to receive four Tu-160M bombers by 2023: two newly built Tu-160M2 and two upgraded Tu-160Ms.

The deadline was then extended first to 2024, and then to 2025.

By the end of 2025, Russia had received only two Tu-160M strategic bombers. It remains unclear whether the two are new or upgraded.

Still, restarting Tu-160 production, digitizing its engineering design documentation, and upgrading 80% of its onboard systems, including a new engine, despite crippling Western sanctions, remain major achievements for Russian military aviation.

The Tu-160M is not only a nuclear delivery platform but also a strategic conventional military platform, and it has been used in both the Syrian War and the Ukraine War.

It remains the largest combat aircraft in the world; it could carry 45,000 kg of ordnance across its two internal bays, or up to twelve nuclear-armed cruise missiles, and fly 14,000 km without refueling. Its supersonic speed of 2,300 km/h and variable-sweep wings made it a standout in aviation history.

Russia is slowly restarting production and upgrading its Tu-160M bomber, while the US and China are already working on next-generation strategic bombers, the B-21 Raider and H-20.

The Northrop Grumman B-21 stealth bomber remains on track to enter operational service in 2027, and China’s Xi’an H-20 is also in production, though its current status is unknown.

While the Tu-160 is unmatched in payload capacity and can exceed Mach 2, it isn’t stealthy, unlike the B-2 Spirit or the under-development B-21 Raider, which can penetrate contested airspace.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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As EurAsian Times recently reported, France hinted it would prefer more F4 Rafale fighter jets rather than waiting for the new, advanced F5 variant.

The Chief of Staff of the French Air and Space Force, General Jérôme Bellanger, told senators that the military needs more Rafales well before the fighter’s next standard, the F5, becomes available.

Bellanger’s comments made sense as the Rafale F5 variant is far from ready and even faced a setback when the UAE pulled out of the co-development of the “Super Rafale.”

After the Emirati setback, France has decided to go solo with F5 development.

As per reports in the French newspaper La Tribune, the UAE was set to contribute up to €3.5 billion ($3.9 billion) toward the remaining development cost of the Rafale F5, estimated at around €5 billion ($5.6 billion).

However, negotiations between Paris and Abu Dhabi collapsed in December 2025 during President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to the UAE, where he met President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed.

The Emiratis were reportedly unhappy with the limited technology transfer France offered. They wanted a bigger role in the program and gain access to key technologies, including advanced optronics, which France refused to share, the reports said.

According to French La Tribune: “After several months of deadlock in 2025 regarding the financing of the Rafale F5 fighter jet, Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Abu Dhabi was intended to clarify the two countries’ expectations for the development of this cutting-edge technology-enhanced program. This was a point of great interest to the Emiratis, who are avid adopters of new technologies.”

According to reports, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed was “furious” about the French proposals and the meeting “went very badly.”

Abu Dhabi wanted to be “as closely involved as possible” in the development in return for its financing, but France was not prepared to share the program’s secrets, “notably in the optronics.”

Macron was reportedly irritated by the outcome and directed his frustration at the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) and the French Chief of Staff.

A source from EDGE Group told EurAsian Times on the condition of anonymity: “EDGE Group, which is owned directly by the Government of Abu Dhabi, is emerging as a highly ambitious, American-style corporate firm. Unlike many other UAE state-owned companies, EDGE operates under tremendous pressure and aggressive targets. The UAE hoped for technology transfer that would give EDGE a genuine edge in the defense sector. But I think they probably demanded more than what they could chew”.

Advanced Optronics

Advanced optronics systems have become important on modern fighter jets. They help pilots find, track, and attack targets without depending only on radar. Unlike radar, which sends out signals that can be detected, optronics systems are mostly passive.

They detect heat and light from aircraft engines, the airframe, missiles, or targets on the ground. Because they don’t emit signals, they are useful when a jet needs to stay quiet or when facing stealthy aircraft that are hard to see on radar but still give off heat.

France’s Rafale fighter uses the Thales Front Sector Optronics (FSO) system. It combines a long-range infrared sensor, a high-resolution camera, and a laser rangefinder. The jet can also carry the TALIOS targeting pod, which is being upgraded with artificial intelligence to help automatically detect and identify targets and reduce the pilot’s workload.

Jet makers and pilots focus on combining different sensors. Optronics systems combine heat and light data with radar, electronic warfare sensors, and information from other sources. This gives the pilot one clear, combined picture of what’s happening. Artificial intelligence increasingly spots targets automatically, decides which ones matter most, and keeps tracking them.

This helps pilots handle a lot of information at once in dangerous situations. Steady camera mounts, better heat-detecting materials, and faster computers also help. They let the systems see farther and produce clearer images, even while the jet is turning and moving hard.

Denied access, the UAE pulled out, and France had to absorb the full cost through its updated military programming law.

Dassault Aviation Chairman and CEO Eric Trappier later confirmed the approach, stating in August that “there is no co-development with foreign countries today” on the F5 and that the aircraft would be offered for export from 2035.

Meanwhile, Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin described the UAE as a “major customer” of the future F5 standard, hinting that although the UAE is not a development partner, the country could acquire the much more advanced Rafale F5 jets.

In 2021, the UAE ordered 80 Rafale F4 jets and 12 military helicopters in a deal worth nearly $19 billion ($21 billion), making it the largest-ever export order for Dassault Rafale jets. The deliveries are slated to begin at the end of 2026.

Rafale F5 

France’s Rafale F5 is expected to carry ASN4G hypersonic nuclear missiles and could be powered by a high-thrust T-REX engine.

France’s defense procurement agency, the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA), notified MBDA on June 2, 2026, of a framework agreement to implement and develop the ASN4G (Air-Sol Nucléaire de 4ème Génération), the country’s nuclear-armed hypersonic cruise missile.

The DGA has set a 2035 deadline for the missile’s induction, and it will arm both Air Force and Naval (Rafale-M) jets.

Standard M88 engines power the current Rafale jets. The Rafale F5 is expected to carry the Safran-developed M88 T-REX, an advanced, higher-thrust military turbofan engine that was unveiled at the Paris Air Show in June 2025.

In early 2019, the French Ministry of Defense announced it had signed the development contract for the new Rafale F4 standard. According to Dassault Aviation, it is part of an ongoing process to enhance the aircraft to meet operational requirements continuously, and engineers are now working on the F5 variant, which will further boost Rafale’s operational capabilities.

Over the next decade, powerful artificial intelligence algorithms will further help Rafale pilots control the collaborative combat sphere on increasingly complex missions, amid ever more elusive threats. As a result, Dassault says the future Rafale F5 will have robust offensive and defensive capabilities beyond 2060.

The Rafale F5 will also be optimized to work with the UCAS that Dassault Aviation is developing. This UCAS will complement the Rafale and be suited to collaborative combat. It will incorporate stealth technologies, autonomous control, internal payload capacity, and more. It will be highly versatile and designed to evolve in line with future threats.

The UCAS is meant to act as an extension of the Rafale—a remote sensor and effector that can fly ahead of the crewed fighter.

Typical missions include reconnaissance and forward sensing, contributing to a shared targeting picture, electronic warfare, strike, and suppression/destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD).

By absorbing higher risk in contested airspace, it lets the Rafale stay back and focus on command and control. French officials have described it as a “cornerstone” for dealing with advanced air-defense networks.

The new loyal wingman will likely build on the nEUROn program, which demonstrated Europe’s first stealth UCAV, but Trappier said it will likely be more than twice as large.

“We will go to more than double that to carry weapons and get a certain range. It’s going to be a big one,” Trappier had said last year.

Earlier, the French Ministry of Armed Forces said that the combat drone “will allow it to act with discretion as an extension of the Rafale F5 to produce decisive network effects” and that “with these characteristics,” this device “should be a cornerstone of processing modern medium and long-range anti-aircraft systems.”

• Mail EurAsian Times at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

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As Ukraine battles near-daily Russian bombardment, Kyiv must be rueing the fateful decisions made by its leadership in the 1990s, which agreed to voluntarily degrade its military and nuclear capabilities.

Ironically, it was none other than the US and Russia that encouraged Kyiv to transfer/destroy its nuclear bombs, and other critical military assets like ballistic and surface-to-air missiles, and strategic bombers.

As fate would have it, some of the same nuclear-capable bombers that Kyiv transferred to Russia are believed to have been used by Moscow to attack Ukraine.

As the US pressures Ukraine to accept a ceasefire on Russia’s terms, including crippling limits on Ukrainian military size and power, Kyiv would think a million times before any commitment, which could degrade its military.

Ukraine’s Inheritance From The Soviet Union

On December 8, 1991, Boris Yeltsin – President of the Russian Federation in the Soviet Union, Leonid Kravchuk – President of Ukraine, and Stanislav Shushkevich – Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus, met at a hunting lodge in Belarus and signed an agreement declaring that the Soviet Union “as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality” had ceased to exist and created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in its place.

Nearly two weeks later, on December 25, the Kremlin lowered the Soviet Sickle and Hammer flag for the last time, and the Soviet Union became history, fragmenting into 15 new independent states.

At that time, the Soviet Union (USSR) was one of the world’s two superpowers.

It had the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear bombs, thousands of nuclear delivery platforms, including launchers and strategic bombers, and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

The 15 independent states did not divide these military assets orderly, and the country hosting the nuclear warheads and delivery platforms often became their de facto owner.

Ukraine, the second-most populous and economically powerful republic in the Soviet Union, inherited approximately 1900 strategic nuclear warheads, between 2,650 and 4,200 Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, 176 ICBMs (130 SS-19 and 46 SS-24) and associated launchers, nearly 600 nuclear-capable KH-55 cruise missiles, and approximately 102 strategic bombers: 23 Tu-95MS, 19 Tu-160, and more than 60 Tu-22M3.

This large nuclear arsenal would have made Ukraine the world’s third-largest nuclear power, after Russia and the US. Worryingly, Ukraine inherited not only nuclear warheads, but also delivery platforms, such as nuclear-capable missiles, launchers, and nuclear-capable strategic bombers.

The situation was a non-proliferation nightmare for the world, and the US and Russia, the long-time Cold War adversaries, soon found a common cause to come together and take away these new countries’ nuclear assets, in the process robbing them of their deterrence against external aggression.

However, the disarmament process forced Ukraine to transfer not only its nuclear assets but also its conventional military platforms, such as ICBMs, cruise missiles, and strategic bombers, assets that could have been crucial for Kyiv in defending its territory from Russian aggression.

On December 5, 1994, leaders of the US, the UK, and the Russian Federation met in Budapest, Hungary, and signed the Budapest Memorandum, under which the three countries gave security assurances to Ukraine in return for its accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapons state.

Under the agreement, Ukraine agreed to transfer its nuclear warheads to Russia.

Further, under the 1992 Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the US-funded Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (1993), Ukraine committed to dismantling all strategic nuclear delivery systems by December 5, 2001. This deadline was later extended to 2006.

The Degradation of the Ukrainian Air Force

Ever since the war in Ukraine started in February 2022, Russia has routinely used its strategic bombers to launch missiles at Ukraine.

In 1991, Ukraine inherited approximately 102 strategic bombers: 25 Tu-95MS, 19 Tu-160, and more than 60 Tu-22M3.

According to the Eurasian security think tank Jamestown Foundation, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine hosted two of its most important strategic air bases.

At Uzin, 70 kilometers south of Kyiv, the Soviets stationed 25 Tu-95MS turboprop nuclear missile carriers. At Pryluky, 130 kilometers east of the capital, the Soviet Union stationed its only operational unit of 19 new, supersonic Tu-160 Blackjack bombers.

In February 1992, the unit at Uzin declared allegiance to Ukraine. In May 1992, just one week after Russia announced it was forming its own national armed forces, Ukraine announced it was taking command of all long-range aviation units on its territory. This included the Tu-160 base at Pryluky.

The Tu-160s were particularly lethal. It was designed to match the American B-1B bomber, but was significantly larger and faster.

It remains the largest combat aircraft in the world; it could carry 45,000 kg of ordnance across its two internal bays, or up to twelve nuclear-armed cruise missiles, and fly 14,000 km without refueling. Its supersonic speed of 2,300 km/h and variable-sweep wings made it a standout in aviation history.

However, under the START-1 treaty and CTR agreement, Ukraine agreed to dismantle all of these strategic bombers.

Thus began the consensual elimination of Ukraine’s strategic aviation.

Under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the United States funded the destruction of some strategic bombers and missiles, including the extraction of valuable metals.

However, some bombers were not destroyed.

At the time, the newly independent Ukraine was struggling with debt. For decades, as part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine got access to heavily subsidized fuel and gas. When the Soviet Union dissolved abruptly in 1991, Moscow suddenly cut off this subsidized gas.

Struggling with mounting debt, Ukraine agreed to transfer eight Tu-160 and three Tu-95MS bombers to Moscow in exchange for US$285 million in debt relief. This decision remains controversial, as the estimated value of a single Tu-160 was between US$250 and US$300 million.

Between 1999 and 2000, Kyiv transferred Tu-95s and Tu-160s as partial payments on natural-gas debts, along with 575 Kh-55 missiles.

This fateful decision not only degraded Ukraine’s air power and deterrence, but it also multiplied Russia’s air power, creating a military imbalance that Moscow is exploiting in the current war.

In 2024, an investigation by Ukrainian investigative news site Skhemy found that six of the eight Tu-160 bombers transferred to Russia were still active in military operations against Ukraine.

The remaining strategic bombers in Ukraine were dismantled, often with technical and financial assistance from the US.

In March 2007, the US State Department reported that Ukraine had dismantled 57 Tu-22 bombers, 27 Tu-95s, six Tu-142s, 11 Tu-160s, for bomber trainers, 346 Kh-22 ASMs, and 483 Kh-ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles).

While these platforms were nuclear-capable and theoretically could have been used to launch nukes, they also had conventional military capabilities.

By dismantling and transferring these military assets to Russia, Kyiv delivered a double blow to itself – degrading its own capabilities while multiplying its adversary’s.

In the annals of military history, few decisions have proven as fateful – or as irreversible.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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