As the US targets a 60% stealth force by 2035, the F-16 Fighting Falcon, the US Air Force’s combat-proven workhorse, is quietly seeing a revival.

Lockheed Martin, the F-16’s manufacturer, has hundreds of export orders in its backlog for the upgraded F-16 Viper variant; it is pitching a new variant, the F-16G, to the USAF and could arm it with hypersonic missiles.

Notably, the single-engine F-16 first flew in the 1970s. Lockheed Martin’s recent “F-16 Fast Facts” states that roughly 2,800 F-16s are operating in 29 countries.

Even as the USAF moves toward an overwhelming stealth force, the F-16 is refusing to quietly fade into oblivion, and Lockheed Martin expects the fighter jet to bring the company hundreds of new orders and another round of growth.

Hypersonic Missiles

When it comes to air-launched hypersonic missiles, Russia may have established a lead.

In the war in Ukraine, Russia demonstrated that it can launch hypersonic missiles, primarily the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal from the MiG-31 and R-37M from the Su-35 and Su-57.

However, many Western analysts question whether both missiles, the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal and R-37M, qualify as hypersonic missiles.

According to CSIS’s The Missile Threat, the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal is a nuclear-capable, Russian air-launched ballistic missile, likely derived from Russia’s ground-launched 9K720 Iskander-M. The missile follows a ballistic or quasi-ballistic flight path rather than operating as a scramjet cruise missile or a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.

However, because the missile can reach speeds up to Mach 10, it may qualify as a hypersonic missile. Due to its limited maneuverability, Ukraine’s Patriot AD systems have intercepted the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal on multiple occasions.

The US was trailing in the hypersonic race, but is currently testing four air-launched hypersonic missiles: the ARRW (Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon), HACM (Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile), Mako, and Blackbeard, with multiple aircraft, including the F-15EX, F/A-18 Super Hornet, F-35 & F-22.

The Blackbeard hypersonic missile, a low-cost, air-launched hypersonic weapon developed by American defense contractor Castelion for the US Navy and Air Force, has already been tested with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and can also be launched from ground-based HIMARS.

However, Castelion is now also trying to pair the hypersonic missile with the F-16.

Hypersonic Missiles for F-16s?

On October 26, Castelion announced it has received a contract modification under its existing work with the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to begin integrating its Blackbeard hypersonic weapon onto the F-16 Fighting Falcon.

Notably, Castelion has so far been a Navy and Army story in the US, working to integrate the missile into the US Navy’s carrier-capable F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and the US Army’s HIMARS.

If the F-16 integration succeeds, it will bring the Blackbeard hypersonic missile to the USAF fleet as well.

Castelion has not disclosed the contract’s financial terms with AFRL or when the F-16 might first carry or fire the weapon.

According to US Navy plans for the Blackbeard program, a single F/A-18E/F is designed to carry up to four of these long-range hypersonic weapons. Since the F-16 and F/A-18E/F have broadly similar payload capacity, a single F-16 is expected to carry four Blackbeard hypersonic missiles.

Blackbeard is designed to fly above Mach 5 while maneuvering, making it far harder to intercept than a weapon on a predictable ballistic path.

Additionally, because Blackbeard is designed as a relatively low-cost, mass-produced hypersonic weapon, integrating it with the USAF’s workhorse F-16 is a very different proposition from pairing the far more expensive ARRW or HACM missiles with the F-15EX, F-35, and F-22.

Procurement plans for fiscal years 2028–2031 call for acquiring more than 4,000 Blackbeard missiles.

Meanwhile, earlier this month, the USAF submitted its 2035 force structure plan to Congress, noting that the F-16 will remain an important component of the USAF over the next decade.

F-16’s  Role in the USAF During the Next Decade

Under the plan, the USAF will field 1,509 manned, combat-coded fighter aircraft by 2035, roughly 60 percent of which will be stealth platforms. The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35As and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s. The remaining 40% of the fleet will be split evenly between the F-15EX and F-16 jets.

This means that by 2035, the USAF could still maintain nearly 300 F-16 fighters. The actual number of F-16 aircraft would be even higher if you also count the trainers and test aircraft.

The report, titled “Long-Term USAF Fighter Force Structure,” also mentions that the USAF is open to acquiring an entirely new fighter to reach its goal of 1,509 fighters by 2035.

“Accordingly, the USAF is also evaluating additional recapitalization options, including a new capacity fighter, increased reliance on CCAs, and developing air-to-air capabilities on bombers,” the report said.

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Days after Canada received the first two of the 16 F-35A fighters from Lockheed Martin, Swedish defense and aerospace firm Saab has stepped up its “Gripen for Canada” campaign by selecting top Canadian aerospace firms to build the Gripen-E jets.

On March 28, 2022, Lockheed Martin edged out Saab to win a CAD $27.7 billion contract for 88 F-35A Lightning II stealth fighters, with an initial commitment of 16 jets.

Saab attributed the loss to unfair play. “The process was not transparent. The requirements were tailored to exclude competition. We delivered the best value—Canada chose politics over merit,” said the Saab Canada President, Simon Carroll.

After Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced in March 2025 that it would review the purchase of F-35 stealth fighters amid rising tensions with the Trump administration, Saab revived its Gripen-E campaign last year.

Saab has offered a deal that may prove difficult to ignore. At the heart of this offer are local manufacturing, full technology transfer (ToT), access to source code for mission systems, sovereign control of data, and full independence in upgrades and maintenance for the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).

Saab announced on October 27 that it plans to work with several of Canada’s leading aerospace companies as a first step toward creating a large national ecosystem to develop, deliver, and support the Gripen E fighters if the Canadian government decides to move forward with the acquisition.

If the RCAF chooses Saab, the company and its Canadian partners will provide an all-encompassing domestic capability for manufacturing, final assembly, maintenance, and advancing airpower capabilities, the company said in a statement. The partnership would also provide long-term sustainability, training, and in-service support (ISS). 

SAAB’s Tempting Offer

The Canadian government has been vocal about the industrial and regional benefits, jobs, technology transfer, and sovereign sustainment of major defense procurements.

“We think that we can use military procurement to get more,” Canada’s Industry Minister Mélanie Joly told reporters in November 2025 on the question of fighter programs creating jobs. “That is why we’re looking, indeed, at the Gripen.” “We’ll see how that is concrete,” Joly said. “And at the same time, we’re looking at what Lockheed Martin can do.”

Saab’s official partnership with Canadian companies is meant to appeal to this sentiment, especially since Canadian public and political opinion has grown more cautious about relying exclusively on the US amid ongoing trade and diplomatic tensions.

Saab has repeatedly promised to create around 10,000 jobs for Canadian, with some estimates rising higher when GlobalEye surveillance aircraft are included.

As noted in its official release, Saab has built teaming arrangements with Canadian firms CAE of Montreal, Quebec; IMP of Halifax, Nova Scotia; and Magellan Aerospace of Mississauga, Ontario. “Canada’s fighter capability is a long-term national investment. Together with CAE, IMP and Magellan Aerospace, we are prepared to establish a strong Canadian industrial ecosystem around Gripen that delivers operational effect, national sovereignty and lasting industrial and technological benefits,” said the Saab CEO.

The companies selected by Saab will be in charge of the following:

IMP Aerospace & Defense will establish and run a new final assembly line for the Gripen fighter in Canada, produce electrical assemblies, and provide in-service support (ISS) for Canada’s Gripen fleet. 

IMP is a vertically integrated Canadian aerospace company that specializes in In-Service Support (ISS) / Fleet Management (Full lifecycle support for military aircraft fleets), Maintenance, Repair & Overhaul (MRO), Aircraft Missionization and Modernization (aircraft upgrades and modernization), Engineering Solutions (Design, structural analysis, systems integration, avionics work, and airworthiness certification), and Manufacturing.

Magellan Aerospace will manufacture advanced aerostructures, composite structures, and structural assemblies in Canada.

Magellan mainly produces aeroengines and aerostructures (complex structural components and major aircraft assemblies), offers MRO, and also produces solid rocket motors, satellite buses, space hardware, and related systems for space-based applications. 

CAE will deliver advanced fighter pilot and technician training, handle mission systems engineering, and provide support and sustainment capabilities in Canada.

CAE  is a Canadian global leader in training and simulation technologies.

Its main segments include civil aviation, defense, and security. It delivers military training and simulation solutions for air, land, sea, and other domains, supplies mission simulators, live-virtual-constructive (LVC) training systems, and platform-independent training programs, and supports force readiness for defense forces, OEMs, and government agencies.

Saab formalizing partnerships with these companies is a major move in its campaign, turning “we will build in Canada” language into named, ready-to-execute industrial relationships.

It demonstrates that Saab has done the groundwork with capable domestic players who already have relevant expertise. In fact, it likely aims to show that the industrial package the company repeatedly offers is not just marketing.

These partnerships promise significant new high-tech jobs and skills development in advanced manufacturing, composite structures, electrical systems, model-based systems engineering, training, and much-needed long-term sustainment.

At the same time, Saab’s selection of these companies means work will be distributed across key regions, appealing to local governments and lawmakers.

Saab has stressed that “These partnerships are designed to strengthen Canada’s sovereign defense capability while contributing to the development of advanced aerospace and defense expertise across the country.”

Canada’s F-35 Review Still Ongoing

Political sensitivity around the F-35 deal has grown amid trade tensions with the US.

In August 2026, the head of the Defense Investment Agency said the Canadian public would not welcome sole-source military contracts awarded to American companies under the current conditions. “That’s just me reading the room,” Stephen Fuhr, secretary of state for defense procurement, said in an interview. “I think that would be a very difficult thing to do, especially after this last week. I think that people would not be happy about that.”

Fuhr stressed that Canada has recognized the risks of “putting all our eggs in one basket” and that Ottawa needs to form new strategic alliances or become more independent in military manufacturing, adding that he still sees the US as a crucial defense ally. 

Saab, for its part, appears hopeful.

In Saab’s Gripen final-assembly hall in Linköping, flags of its eight customer nations hang above the line—plus a ninth white banner marked “RESERVED,” the Globe and Mail had reported. However, ambiguity persists as Canadian leadership sits on the review, more than a year after Carney ordered it.

Canada may not abandon the F-35 purchase entirely, as it is currently the only fifth-generation stealth fighter available in the market that offers deep interoperability with NORAD forces.

Moreover, top RCAF leadership continues to view the F-35 as the most credible counter to peer adversaries such as China and Russia, both of which field advanced stealth fighters and sophisticated air defenses.

Beyond proponents of the F-35 and Gripen-E/F, a third school of thought advocates a mixed fleet. Earlier this year, a report in Canadian media said the country could buy 72 F-35s and 72 Gripen-E/F jets, bringing its fighter-jet purchases to more than 88 and suggesting Ottawa was unlikely to abandon the US stealth fighter.

A mixed fleet, however, would add high costs and complexity in training, logistics, weapons integration, and infrastructure. Defense planners have long cited these factors as potential long-term drawbacks for the RCAF.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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British shipbuilder Babcock is pitching one of its well-known frigates to the US Navy, which recently changed policy to welcome foreign warships from allies as part of its push to rebuild the “arsenal of freedom” at pace. 

Babcock is offering its Arrowhead 140 design, which is the parent of the Royal Navy’s Type 31 Inspiration-class frigate, to the US Navy.

The company has already held initial talks with Pentagon officials about the offer and, according to British media reports, is poised to file an expression of interest (EoI) by the end of October. 

“Of course we’re interested. We have a world-class frigate, close links to the U.S. and U.S. industry. It would be insane for us not to respond,” Sir Nick Hine, head of Babcock’s marine business and a former Second Sea Lord,  was quoted as saying by The Telegraph earlier.

According to reports, the largest military shipbuilder in America, Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), will be part of this plan. The two companies are reportedly exploring a deal that may allow the US to manufacture the Arrowhead 140 under license.

The offer is imminent, as US President Donald Trump issued a national security memo in August 2026 that allowed the Navy to acquire foreign ship designs and build some warships overseas amid delays, cost overruns, and limited shipyard capacity in the US.

Under the new model, foreign shipbuilders must invest in or take a majority stake in a US shipyard and build subsequent ships in the US after the first two overseas-built vessels.

This means that if Babcock wins a contract, the US will build most of its ships in its own shipyards, with the British company providing design and engineering technology.

This comes as the US Navy seeks to expedite the acquisition of smaller surface combatants after canceling the troubled Constellation-class in November 2025.

The US Navy currently has no dedicated frigates in service.

Following Trump’s waiver, the US Navy is reportedly considering frigate designs, including Japan’s FFM Mogami-class guided-missile frigate, South Korea’s Chungnam-class guided-missile frigate, and Turkey’s Istanbul-class guided-missile frigate. This means that if Babcock files an official pitch, the US would have four designs to choose from.

Notably, Babcock and the US submarine industrial base already have a solid working relationship. For example, Babcock’s facilities have been producing tactical missile tube assemblies for General Dynamics Electric Boats since at least 2014 as part of the “Common Missile Compartment” shared by the US Navy’s Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines and the Royal Navy’s Dreadnought-class.

At the same time, Babcock’s partnership with HII has grown stronger through industrial collaboration.

While the prospect of the US Navy selecting a British ship design looks promising for ties between the age-old allies, the UK has little precedent for offering its own ships to the United States, long regarded as the world’s most advanced maritime power. In fact, a major historical naval transfer between the two countries went the other way in the 1940s.

On September 2, 1940, the-then US President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the destroyers-for-bases deal with Great Britain.

Under the deal, the US transferred 50 of its aging destroyers to the United Kingdom. In return, Britain leased eight bases in the Western Hemisphere to the United States for 99 years. At the time, the United Kingdom was fighting to survive the Battle of Britain and repel a potential German invasion, while the United States remained at peace.

The deal followed British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s request to the US for a loan of 50 destroyers to defend the English Channel against German invasion.

Under the deal, the US transferred 50 aging Caldwell, Wickes, and Clemson-class destroyers to the UK after extensive correspondence.

This agreement marked the beginning of the Anglo-American alliance during the war.

Following the deal, Churchill declared in the British Parliament that “these two great organizations of the English-speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general advantage”.

Against this background, the imminent offer to the US Navy from a British firm represents a significant departure in historical approaches.

What Do We Know About Arrowhead?

Arrowhead 140, for one, has already been marketed to Poland and Indonesia, and is now being pitched to Chile. The Arrowhead 140 has a baseline length of around 455 feet, a beam of 65 feet, and a displacement of about 5,700 tons.

The ship can reach more than 28 knots and has a baseline endurance of about one to two months. It has a large flight deck and hangar, and multiple large, dedicated boat bays for rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and other craft. 

The ship’s open architecture and generous internal volume allow different weapon, sensor, and mission-system fits without major structural changes.

The ship is a general-purpose warship capable of surface warfare, escort, and maritime security operations. It can be outfitted with a medium-caliber gun up to 127 mm, secondary guns of 40 mm caliber, a vertical Launch System with provision for up to 32 cells, anti-ship missiles, close-in weapon systems, a combat management system, 3D air or surface search radar, electro-optical sensors, hull-mounted sonar, and also offers options for towed-array or variable-depth sonar. However, it is highly configurable, and the armament can be modified to meet the customer’s requirements.

Despite these attributes, the British offer carries a significant caveat: the Royal Navy’s Type 31 program, which is based on Arrowhead 140, remains unproven in operational service.

The Type 31 was envisioned as a vessel intended to provide the Royal Navy with five relatively affordable general-purpose frigates to replace older Type 23s in lower-threat presence roles. Designed for modularity, long endurance, and a range of missions, from maritime security to escort duties, the class remains mired in delays and cost overruns, with Babcock and the British Defense Ministry facing skepticism from critics.

The class’s lead ship, HMS Venturer, was launched in 2025 and is currently being fitted out, while the second ship, HMS Active, has been rolled out. The keel of the third, HMS Formidable, was laid in December 2025, and steel has been cut on the fourth. The program still has momentum on paper, but timelines have slipped, and delays continue. For example, the first two ships still need a Capability Insertion Period after initial delivery, including installing Mk 41 vertical launch systems, further delaying operational capability.

The British Ministry of Defense (MoD) has grown increasingly vague about in-service dates, and cost pressures continue to cloud the outlook for the later ships of the class.

Babcock declared a £140 million charge against the program in May 2026 because rework on HMS Venturer and HMS Active was higher than anticipated due to design modifications and out-of-sequence build activity early in the project. Needless to say, late outfitting corrections are more difficult and costly than those made in the build hall.

More recently, the MoD confirmed ongoing inflationary pressures, particularly on labor and the wider supply chain. The British Defense Minister Luke Pollard went so far as to say that the program’s affordability “remains under review,” and any budget changes will follow standard processes.

Observers are also questioning whether the baseline Type 31 will be sufficiently capable for the roles expected of a modern general-purpose frigate, as well as cost and schedule. The design is intended to be affordable, modular, and to perform presence tasks, but key systems such as the Mk 41 vertical launch cells are planned to be inserted later rather than as a day-one fit, and the initial anti-submarine warfare sensors have been described as limited compared with specialized peers or some earlier Type 23 general-purpose frigates.

The ships have faced familiar British procurement challenges, including inflation, supply-chain strain, and changing requirements, and critics warn they risk entering service as among the more lightly armed frigates of their generation.

Therefore, Babcock is now offering the world’s most advanced navy a capability that has yet to prove itself within the Royal Navy.

At the same time, however, a deal with the US would be the much-needed endorsement for the Arrowhead 140 and the Type 31 program. This success would let Babcock and the Ministry of Defense argue that the design is mature and flexible enough to meet the US Navy’s exacting standards, providing a powerful counter to domestic critics who question the ship’s capability and the program’s delivery track record.

However, if the US chooses another design on offer, given strong interest in designs from allies like Tokyo and Seoul, it may make things much harder for Type 31 proponents at home.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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Israelis have voted but, it seems, have not chosen a clear winner.

Exit polls suggest that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc and his principal rival and erstwhile cabinet colleague, Gadi Eisenkot, who once headed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), are neck and neck in the race to cobble together the 61 seats required for a majority in the 120-member Knesset.

However, whoever wins is unlikely to fundamentally change Israel’s strategic outlook.

A change in the leadership, that is, if Eisenkot becomes the Prime Minister, is unlikely to see any radical departure from Israel’s policies towards the Palestinian issue, Lebanon, Iran, the United States, and even India.

Held on 27 October 2026, it was the country’s first national election since the 7 October 2023 attacks and served as a critical referendum on Netanyahu’s long-standing rule amid protracted regional conflicts. Driven by massive mobilization in liberal bastions and Arab communities, voter turnout surged to 77.7%, marking the highest participation rate in Israel in nearly 30 years.

Arab-majority parties, meanwhile, appear to have made significant gains, potentially emerging as kingmakers in the negotiations that follow in a hung Knesset, though neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot would like them to play that role, as yet.

For a clear picture to emerge, it will take weeks of complex coalition jockeying. The President of Israel will consult all factions before tasking a Knesset member with forming a government.

If neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot can assemble a 61-seat majority through floor-crossing defections or a broad unity agreement, Israel will remain in political limbo, potentially triggering yet another national election in 2027.

Netanyahu’s Likud party seems to be emerging as the largest party, but that does not guarantee success in leading the next government; yet in his post-election address a few hours ago, he was confident he could form “a strong new right-wing government”.

However, the more consequential point is not simply whether Netanyahu survives. The more consequential question is whether his departure, should it happen, will fundamentally reorient Israel’s strategic vision. Because, though many considered yesterday’s election a referendum on Netanyahu,  it was not necessarily on Netanyahu’s worldview.

Eisenkot and Netanyahu may differ sharply over leadership, accountability and the handling of the 7 October 2023  Hamas attack. They nevertheless share important assumptions about Israel’s security, the threat posed by Iran and the need to maintain overwhelming military superiority.

After all, Eisenkot is not a dove who opposed Netanyahu. He is a hawk who served under him, joined his war cabinet after the attack, and left in June 2024, citing the lack of a post-war strategy. His difference is not ideology, but statecraft.

Now he blames Netanyahu for the unprecedented security failure of October 7.

He has made accountability for that failure central to his challenge- the adequacy of intelligence and preparedness. He also questions Netanyahu’s subsequent conduct of the war and the absence of a convincing political endgame.

When, in September 2025,  Eisenkot founded his “centrist”  Yashar Party, his slogan was “Israel Must Win”,  alongside concepts inspired by former hostages regarding “ a straight, direct path”.

He authored what is called “the  Dahiya Doctrine”,  which relies on disproportionate, heavy force directed at civilian and dual-use infrastructure in areas used by hostile forces to establish long-term deterrence.

He also strongly favors continuous, low-signature military and intelligence operations to degrade adversaries below the threshold of an all-out war. He explained this military philosophy as his advancement of MABAM (Hebrew acronym for Ma’aracha Bein HaMamilchamot or “Campaign Between the Wars”).

Eisenkot supports aggressive military objectives against Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah, but sharply criticizes Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over endgame strategy and domestic political motives. He accuses Netanyahu of prolonging conflicts for political reasons – to serve his own political survival rather than national security.

On Palestine, Eisenkot does not believe in the “two-state” formula. He has said Israel must heavily control the area between the Jordan River and the sea. He opposes a Palestinian state, though he would consider the Palestinian Authority preferable to continued Hamas rule if forced to choose.

He favors legal settlements in occupied territories “that serve national interest”, but opposes the present trend of Netanyahu encouraging “settlement blocks”  and suggests outpost violence needs military policing, not civilian control.

On Gaza, his plan is blunt – destroying  Hamas’s military wing and dismantling its leadership within 18 months through US President Donald Trump’s ceasefire plan or “creative” military means, while retaining an Israeli security corridor and allowing incremental reconstruction.

In other words, Eisenkot’s Palestine policy is essentially the same as Netanyahu’s in substance; it is a change of tone, not of map.

In Lebanon, Eisenkot supports a security zone while seeking stronger American and French involvement against Hezbollah. This is classic IDF establishment thinking — buffer, not occupation.

Netanyahu’s Lebanon war degraded Hezbollah significantly, and Eisenkot, as author of Dahiyeh, would not hesitate to use overwhelming force again. But he is more likely to couple it with a US-led diplomatic arrangement, giving Washington what analysts called “more room to pursue regional diplomacy, including Saudi-Israeli normalization”.

On Iran, Eisenkot has the same goal as that of Netanyahu – Iran must not get a nuclear weapon and deserves attacks. He has told supporters that the conflict is not finished, since Iran retains 440kg of highly enriched uranium,  and that the war must end in destruction in case Trump-guided diplomacy of  US-enforced restrictions around enriched sites and their eventual dismantlement fails.

In other words, while Netanyahu seeks military decisions to manage Iran, Eisenkot seeks military pressure to compel a diplomatic closure. But for Tehran, the threat remains the same, though Eisenkot may be more predictable for Washington and less prone to unilateral fait accompli.

In fact, though Trump endorsed Netanyahu, he has no institutional reason to miss him if the latter fails to save his Prime Ministerial post. Trump’s loss will be strictly personal since he considers Netanyahu a close friend.

American support for Israel rests on intelligence cooperation, military technology, defense assistance and shared regional interests. These foundations are unlikely to disappear with Netanyahu.

An Eisenkot government is likely to value a more structured relationship with Washington, with closer coordination on military operations and a clearer understanding of the political objectives behind them. An Israeli government that consults Washington more closely could reduce the risk of strategic miscalculation in the Middle East.

Similarly, it may be argued that though Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, like Trump, will feel sorry for not seeing Netanyahu remain the head of the Israeli government, Indo-Israeli relations on defense, water, agri-tech, and the I2U2 (India, Israel, United Arab Emirates and the United States) framework will continue, as the partnership is now bipartisan in both capitals.

Eisenkot has said nothing that would downgrade India. As the champion of MABAM, he would equally appreciate India’s need for calibrated kinetic options without full war.

An Eisenkot government may actually be smoother for New Delhi. Netanyahu’s far-right partners frequently embarrassed India with statements on Gaza that forced New Delhi’s official balancing, particularly when India’s principal opposition Congress party is a big votary of the Palestinian cause.

A centrist security government of Eisenkot, focused on Iran and Hamas, not on Temple Mount provocations, allows Delhi to maintain its “friend to both” — strong with Israel, credible with Palestine. This also makes it easy for Modi to maintain his pragmatic, open-ended image in the Gulf countries, which he has built solidly over the last 14 years.

However, for China, an Israel led by Eisenkot may not be exactly good news.

Under Netanyahu, Israel maintained a transactional relationship with Beijing. This was visible in major infrastructure projects like the Haifa port, Chinese tech investments, and a deliberate refusal to fully align with US technology bans. This strategy gave Jerusalem some diplomatic and economic autonomy from Washington.

By contrast, a government led by Eisenkot, a former Chief of Staff deeply integrated into CENTCOM interoperability, would likely prefer to restore institutional trust with the US.

He would not like his administration to risk being perceived by Washington as a backdoor for Chinese influence. While basic trade continuity will likely remain with China, screening on dual-use technology, critical infrastructure, and artificial intelligence could become significantly tighter.

In that sense, for China, an Israel led by Eisenkot becomes a less viable strategic hedge against American influence.

Viewed thus, a hung parliament has given Israel a choice between a familiar Prime Minister and a familiar General. It is unlikely that the overall strategic approach will change substantially, though the style could differ if the General becomes Prime Minister.

Eisenkot’s style is likely to be more institutional, more American-aligned, and more predictable.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

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With India-China border tensions back in the news over border skirmishes, the Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief said the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) “has a larger overall inventory” but that “its operations against India are constrained by the geography of the Tibetan Plateau.”

Explaining China’s vulnerability, Air Chief Marshal Singh said that the Tibetan Plateau’s “high-altitude airfields reduce payload, range and turnaround times.”

However, he said the IAF does not face these constraints. “The IAF, by contrast, operates from lower-altitude, all-weather forward air bases with full payload and shorter response times.”

Turnaround time is the time fighter jets take to refuel and rearm; response time refers to scramble, the urgent, high-speed mobilization and takeoff of fighter jets in response to an immediate air-defense threat.

In the 1962 India-China War, the Tibetan Plateau’s geography favored Beijing.

Tibet’s flat, arid terrain aided road construction, army mobilization, and logistics, and gave Beijing a high-altitude advantage, while the steep, rugged mountains and dense forests on the Indian side made road construction and troop movement challenging.

However, any future conflict between the two countries is likely to involve the Air Force, and both countries are ramping up their air bases near the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border between India and China.

The same altitude that gave Beijing an advantage during the 1962 land war could limit its aerial operations.

Indian vs Chinese Forward Air Bases Near the LAC

Air Chief Marshal Singh said the IAF operates from “lower-altitude, all-weather forward air bases,” which offer several advantages compared with Tibet’s high-altitude air bases.

The reality, however, is more nuanced, as some of India’s forward air bases in Ladakh sit at altitudes comparable to, or even higher than, China’s main Tibetan plateau bases.

India also operates the world’s highest airstrip at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), at an elevation of 5,064 meters. DBO, however, is not an air base but only an unpaved, gravel-and-sand-earth advanced landing ground (ALG), suitable only for certain kinds of aircraft, such as heavy-lift C-130J Super Hercules aircraft and rotary-wing helicopters.

For reference, USAF’s Hill Air Force Base in Utah sits at 1,460 meters, making it one of the highest major US Air Force bases.

Similarly, Chushul ALG sits at an elevation of 4,267 meters.

The Nyoma Air Base, a newly upgraded frontline military airfield in eastern Ladakh commissioned last November, sits at an elevation of 4,175 meters. The Nyoma Air Base is just 23 to 35 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.

The IAF also operates the Fukche Advanced Landing Ground (ALG), another critical high-altitude tactical military airfield. Located in the Demchok sector of eastern Ladakh, it sits just 2.5 kilometers from the LAC with China, at an altitude of approximately 4,176 meters above sea level.

The Leh airfield, IAF’s main logistics base in Ladakh, sits at 3,256 meters.

These forward airstrips, ALGs, and airfields are comparable in altitude to some of China’s forward air bases in Tibet, such as Ngari Gunsa (4,274 meters), Shigatse Tingri (4,317 meters), Qamdo Bamda (4,334 meters), and Shigatse Peace (3,782 meters).

India’s advantage comes from its low-altitude bases, such as Ambala, Bhatinda, Sirsa, Hasimara, and Chabua. These bases are near sea level and within 500 kilometers of the LAC; however, given the vast expanse of the Tibetan plateau, the PLAAF’s rear air bases in the plains are much farther away and have limited utility when operating near the LAC.

For instance, Hasimara Air Base in West Bengal, home to the IAF’s Rafale Falcons Squadron, is about 150 kilometers from the LAC and sits at an elevation of just 104 meters. In comparison, China’s Shigatse Peace Air Base, nearly 100 kilometers from the LAC, sits at an elevation of 3,782 meters.

Similarly, Chabua Air Base in Assam is about 100 kilometers from the LAC and sits at an elevation of 112 meters above sea level. In contrast, the Qamdo Bamda air base in Tibet is equidistant from the LAC but sits at an elevation of over 4,000 meters.

The Ambala Air Base in Haryana, home to the IAF’s second Golden Arrows Rafale squadron, is about 500 kilometers from the LAC and sits at an elevation of 275 meters. However, the Lhasa Gonggar air base in Tibet is about 200 kilometers from the LAC but sits at an elevation of 4,275 meters.

The IAF’s Bathinda and Sirsa air bases are also about 500 kilometers from the LAC and sit at around 100 meters above sea level.

This means IAF warplanes can operate at full capacity with maximum payload and have shorter response and turnaround times, unlike the Chinese PLAAF.

The thinner air in Tibet nearly cripples PLAAF jets as they cannot operate with their full weapons payload.

Additionally, IAF bases in the plains remain operational year-round, whereas Chinese air bases in Tibet face limited operability during the harsh winter season.

Who Holds the Edge?

However, given the widening gap between the IAF and the PLAAF’s inventory, one could argue that Beijing has already neutralized the IAF’s geographic advantage.

The IAF is currently at a historic low in maintaining fighter squadrons. India currently has around 29 fighter squadrons, compared with a sanctioned strength of 42.5. Meanwhile, China’s PLAAF already has more than 1,800 combat aircraft, including nearly 300-500 fifth-generation stealth J-20 fighters.

Air Chief Marshal Singh’s remarks are no revelation and have circulated in Indian policy circles for over six decades.

In fact, during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s decision not to use air power against Chinese forces remains one of the most enduring criticisms of his leadership.

Critics argue that had India used its Air Force, New Delhi could have turned the tide in its favor.

During the war, the IAF deployed only helicopters and transport crews to serve forward pickets in the then North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh.

The IAF’s use in offensive operations was considered but rejected for fear of escalation.

Many analysts argue that in 1962, the IAF had both qualitative and quantitative superiority over the PLA Air Force.

At that time, the IAF had nearly 22 combat squadrons and over 500 aircraft. The IAF’s mainstays included the Hunter Mk-56 fighter-bomber, Gnat interceptor, French-built ground-attack aircraft such as the Mystere and Toofani, Canberra bomber-reconnaissance jets, and the Vampire ground-attack jet.

Meanwhile, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) operated the MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, and medium-range IL-28 bombers.

India’s intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), cautioned that if India deployed the IAF for offensive operations, then in return, the PLAAF could bomb Indian cities, such as Kolkata (then Calcutta).

However, it did not account for the fact that PLAAF aircraft could reach targets in India only if they operated from airfields in Tibet, where high altitudes severely restricted their weapon-carrying capacity.

In contrast, IAF fighters could have carried full weapon loads from airfields in the plains of Assam and Punjab.

General B.M. Kaul, the commander of IV Corps in NEFA, alleged in his memoirs – The Untold Story (1967) – that the IAF was not used in close support of the Army.

Neville Maxwell, correspondent of The Times (London) in 1962, in his book India’s China War, says: “The government had decided that tactical air support with bombers on ground attack must be ruled out for fear of Chinese retaliation against Indian cities, especially Calcutta. Considering the terrain in NEFA and the limitations of the IAF, it is doubtful whether its intervention in a tactical role could have had much effect.”

However, many people still believe Nehru committed a blunder by overestimating the PLAAF’s capabilities and not paying attention to the geographic limitations the Tibetan Plateau imposed on Chinese aircraft operations.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post 1,800 Jets, Nearly 500 Stealth Fighters — Why China’s Air Force May Still Struggle to Dominate the IAF? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The US Defense Intelligence Agency said in a new assessment that China could deploy space-based directed-energy weapons by the late 2020s, adding to an existing suite of ground-based systems already capable of affecting satellites.

Titled “Challenges to Security in Space,” and published on October 26, the assessment is the third in a series of reports examining the military space programs of China and Russia, as well as emerging capabilities in Iran and North Korea.

Although China already fields an array of ground-based lasers capable of disrupting, degrading, or damaging satellites in low Earth orbit, the DIA report said it could deploy these directed-energy weapons in space and field more powerful ground-based systems that could threaten American satellites by the end of the 2020s.

These DEWs will be part of a broader Chinese counterspace arsenal that includes electronic warfare, cyber tools, kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, and co-orbital platforms.

The assessment follows US Space Force Gen. Stephen Whiting’s August 2026 public assertion that China has ASAT missiles, ground-based lasers, jammers, and maneuverable, dual-use satellites.

“These developments intend to degrade our current space superiority and would potentially give China a maneuver and logistics advantage in space – something we would not accept on the land, at sea, or in the air,” he emphasized at the time.

Directed-energy weapons, for one, transmit concentrated electromagnetic energy, including high-power lasers or high-power microwaves, toward a target to damage, disable, disrupt, or destroy it, rather than relying primarily on conventional fires, shells, or missiles.

DEWs are significantly cheaper than conventional weapons.

Chinese state-owned media dismissed the reports as “hype,” accusing the United States of raising alarms about purported space threats even as it presses ahead with its own orbital military buildup, deploys weapons in space, and advances the aspirational space-based Golden Dome missile defense initiative.

US Already Has Weapons in Space 

While the above is typical of a Chinese response to such accusations, the United States has indeed placed weapons in space whilst cautioning about the domain’s militarization.

USAF Secretary Troy Meink said in September 2026 that the country now possesses “on-orbit space control weapons” capable of defending US and allied forces, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

Although he did not say which weapons the US has deployed, US Space Force doctrine emphasizes “space control,” the ability to contest and control the space domain using kinetic and/or non-kinetic means to disrupt, degrade, or destroy adversary capabilities. Thus, the deployed weapons can serve either offensive or defensive purposes.

Meink linked the deployment to threats from China and Russia, asking rhetorically whether anyone doubted those countries’ development of similar weapons. “It is critically important that we maintain our dominance not only in the air but in space, and so we’ve had to take steps to make sure that when we’re threatened, we can take care of that,” he asserted.

At the time, the Chinese foreign ministry responded to the U.S. announcement by accusing Washington of “preparing for war in outer space” and warning against turning space into a battlefield or triggering an arms race, the same things it often campaigns against.

When asked whether the admission of placing weapons in space amounts to militarization of space by the US and if it could trigger an arms race, Group Captain Pandey (retd) told the EurAsian Times, “By design, the Pentagon wants potential adversaries to know that an operational defensive and offensive counterspace shield exists in orbit, without revealing how it functions. Disclosing exact specifications (such as frequencies, physical yield, or tracking systems) would allow rivals to develop countermeasures.” 

“Meink’s emphasis on innovating faster than competitors highlights the rapid technological race between the US, China, and Russia. Because space capabilities can be upgraded or deployed faster than ground infrastructure, staying ahead depends on continuous deployment, autonomous software, and rapid launch iterations,” he added.

Whether US systems include directed-energy weapons remains unknown and is the subject of speculation. However, non-kinetic options such as electronic warfare or jamming payloads are currently believed to be among the more plausible options for early on-orbit deployments, as they avoid generating debris.

From Ground-Based To Space-Based DEWs 

China already fields a host of directed-energy systems, including counter-drone laser weapons and military-grade dazzlers used to intercept other fighter jets in international airspace, as the EurAsian Times has noted in the past.

However, US officials have repeatedly noted that China also has an inventory of ground-based laser weapons that could threaten satellites.

“Aside from missiles, the PLA has fielded multiple ground-based laser weapons able to disrupt, degrade, or damage satellite sensors. By the mid-to-late 2020s, we expect them to deploy systems high enough in power that they can physically damage satellite structures,” Gen. Chance Saltzman, Chief of US  Space Operations, warned in a strongly worded statement last year.

China allegedly operates lasers capable of reversible effects, such as temporarily blinding satellites’ optical sensors in low Earth orbit, although more powerful configurations could permanently damage satellite sensors and other onboard components.

These systems, however, face operational limits from atmospheric distortion, line-of-sight constraints, weather, and the time required to slew and track targets. 

Thus, putting lasers or microwaves in space would virtually remove these restrictions and provide unbridled access to potential targets. A satellite-based DEW could maintain longer dwell times on targets, engage satellites in higher orbits that are currently harder to reach from the ground, and potentially hold multiple targets at risk across successive orbits. 

China currently has multiple anti-satellite weapons in space that could endanger US satellites providing critical communications and situational awareness to its troops on Earth during a conflict. However, deploying DEWs in space would let Beijing attack designated targets without the lasting orbital debris generated by kinetic anti-satellite missiles.

Notably, kinetic interceptors create debris that threatens everyone’s satellites for decades, while directed energy weapons are expected to leave the orbital environment largely intact. Therefore, these non-kinetic options offer clearer escalation control and reduced risk of self-inflicted damage, while allowing military planning to operate in a contested space domain and preserve access.

This could be bad news for the United States because a conflict with China is never off the table, especially in the event of a Taiwan invasion.

Currently, the US military operations depend heavily on space for navigation, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), missile warning, and communications.

A capable orbital DEW capability would give China additional options to blind or degrade US or allied sensors and communications during a confrontation, especially in a Taiwan invasion scenario.

More importantly, it would give Beijing the option to conduct lower-escalation or deniable attacks targeting both LEO proliferated constellations (such as Starlink) and higher-orbit assets simultaneously. This would, in turn, complicate US  space domain awareness, attribution, and response timelines.

At the same time, however, directed energy weapons could be employed defensively—to protect one’s own satellites from interference or attack—and to support space domain awareness and integrated defense architectures.

Legally, China is allowed to place DEWs or other conventional weapons in space because the 1967 Outer Space Treaty only prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

However, just because it can does not mean China can deploy or sustain directed energy weapons in space. This is because factors such as power generation, thermal management, beam control, and delivering militarily useful energy levels from a satellite remain substantial engineering challenges to fielding DEWs in space.

Whether China has overcome these obstacles sufficiently to field operational systems by the late 2020s remains to be seen.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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The United States Air Force (USAF) just ordered the AGM-183 Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), officially reviving its first hypersonic missile program three years after it was unceremoniously shelved.

USAF said in a statement on October 26, 2026, that the  Department of the Air Force awarded Lockheed Martin a $694 million contract to produce and field the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) on September 29, 2026. The Department of War executed the contract under its Enterprise-Wide Agile Acquisition Contract.

The US Air Force has described the AGM-183A as a long-range hypersonic boost-glide standoff weapon and “a lethal capability against high-value time-sensitive targets.”

It is intended to improve the service’s ability to strike heavily defended targets, such as enemy military bases and surface warships, from outside the range of many air-defense systems.

With the latest contract, the program officially moves from flight testing and prototyping into production. However, no information is currently available on how many missiles the contract will produce or when the Air Force will start receiving them. 

“This is a turning point in our advanced weapons roadmap,” Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink was quoted as saying in the statement. “By moving ARRW from test to production, we’re providing our combatant commanders with a credible, high-speed strike weapon capable of penetrating the most advanced anti-access and area-denial systems.”

The order is noteworthy because the ARRW program, once expected to be the USAF’s first operational hypersonic weapon, was shelved in 2023.

ARRW is Back

The ARRW’s demise began after a failed test on March 13, when the missile was fired from a B-52H Stratofortress off the coast of California. The former Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall later told a Congressional hearing on March 28 that the “tests were not successful (and we) did not receive data from the tests that we needed.”

In late March 2023, the Air Force announced it would not pursue follow-on procurement of the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) once the prototyping program  was over, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

At the time, USAF leadership said it intended to divert all resources and attention previously devoted to the ARRW to another USAF hypersonic program, the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), which Raytheon and Northrop Grumman are developing. The HACM remains under development and has reportedly entered flight tests.

Despite funding cuts, the USAF urged that the program not be completely abandoned. In written testimony, then-Air Force acquisition chief Andrew Hunter recommended completing All-Up Round (AUR) test flights…to garner the learning and test data that will help inform future hypersonic programs and potential leave-behind capability.

In fact, the USAF published photos of a live AGM-183 Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) affixed under the wing of a B-52H bomber at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam in February 2024. The last test of the hypersonic weapon reportedly took place on March 17, 2024, when it was launched from a B-52H flying out of Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, toward the Reagan Test Site.

However, the USAF overturned its decision in June 2025 when former USAF Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin told lawmakers in a hearing that the service wanted to include both ARRW and the HACM in the fiscal 2026 budget proposal.

“We are looking, and have in the budget submission — assuming it’s what we had put forward — two different [hypersonic] programs,” he said. “One is a larger form factor that is more strategic and long-range that we have already tested several times. It’s called ARRW, and the other one is HACM.”

More recently, plans “to begin [ARRW] INC 2 [Increment 2] technology efforts such as but not limited to integrating pre-planned product improvements, design, trade studies, hardware upgrades, facilitization, affordability initiatives, and testing” were disclosed in the service’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request, which was published earlier this year.

The revival has been seen as an epic story, especially since the ARRW went from an abandoned program to the first USAF missile to enter production.

Notably, this comes as the US is grappling with a major problem: It has yet to operationally field a hypersonic weapon; its competitors, like China, Russia, and countries like Iran and North Korea, have purportedly fielded hypersonic weapons. 

The US’s primary adversary, China, has amassed a variety of weapons that travel at five times or more the speed of sound and are hard to intercept because of unpredictable trajectories, including the DF-17, the YJ-21 anti-ship missile, and the long-range DF-27, to name a few.

Russia, on the other hand, has Kinzhal, Zircon, Avangard, and Oreshnik, though doubts have been raised about whether Kinzhal and Zircon are truly hypersonic. 

Why is ARRW Back

To understand why the Air Force revived ARRW, it is important to know how the weapon works.

The AGM-183A is a boost-glide hypersonic missile: a rocket booster accelerates it to hypersonic speed and high altitude, then separates, releasing an unpowered glide vehicle that maneuvers toward the target.

Then, the ARRW’s nose cone separates, releasing a wedge-shaped, unpowered boost-glide vehicle that was hidden inside.

After that, the vehicle travels at hypersonic speed through the Earth’s atmosphere over a short flight path to reach its destination, likely maneuvering along the way on an unpredictable trajectory.

This combination of speed, flight path, and maneuverability makes interception of this missile extremely difficult.

The USAF has historically positioned both its hypersonic programs, the ARRW and HACM, as critical to success against near-peer adversaries, especially in the Indo-Pacific conflict with China’s People’s Liberation Army forces.

The service likely revived the ARRW program to diversify capabilities, possibly after concluding that relying on a single type of hypersonic weapon left significant gaps in its ability to hold targets at risk in heavily defended environments, such as those near China.

Both ARRW and HACM are air-launched weapons, but they differ significantly. 

ARRW is a larger boost-glide hypersonic weapon system, which makes it suitable for long-range strategic strikes launched from bombers such as the B-52 and B-1.

Meanwhile, HACM is a smaller air-breathing scramjet cruise missile. After an initial rocket boost, a scramjet engine provides continuous powered flight at lower altitudes, allowing greater sustained maneuverability. Its smaller size means tactical fighters such as the F-15E and F-15EX, as well as long-range bombers, could carry it.

Succinctly put, fielding both types forces an adversary to defend against two distinct flight regimes—one high-altitude, extremely fast, and quasi-ballistic, and the other lower-flying, continuously powered, and highly maneuverable.

For the US Commanders, using both missile types in a conflict would make it much harder for the adversary to defend itself, as it would require broader radar coverage, more varied interceptor capabilities, and more complex command-and-control systems. This would, in turn, multiply the defender’s costs and spread limited air-defense resources thinner, forcing the adversary to look in multiple directions at once.

Additionally, having both missiles would also give the USAF valuable operational flexibility: ARRW could strike a deep, heavily defended target from a bomber, while HACM could handle a more tactical engagement.

China, for instance, fields both types of weapons. Therefore, developing ARRW would help close the capability gap.

Moreover, awarding an ARRW contract may reduce risk, especially since hypersonic weapons are prone to delays, as Washington’s experience shows. For example, a July report from the US Congress watchdog, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), noted that the HACM risks delays, as the EurAsian Times explained in detail at the time.

The Air Force initially structured the HACM program around a compressed five-year rapid-prototyping phase, planning to transition to production if testing proved successful. It initially scheduled 13 flight tests between October 2024 and March 2027.

It later tightened the test plan and shrank the testing to seven flights as design delays pushed the program behind schedule. However, the plan revised again in 2025 as reports indicated the USAF was considering reducing the campaign from seven end-to-end demonstrations to five because of delays in finalizing the weapon’s hardware design. The missile’s first flight occurred only earlier this month.

The ARRW is not expected to be a panacea for the US military’s existing hypersonic woes, but moving ARRW into production gives commanders a concrete, high-speed standoff option while the Air Force continues to mature a complementary air-breathing system.

As the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Ken Wilsbach said, “Fielding ARRW enhances our ability to hold targets at risk anywhere around the world. This hypersonic weapon provides the Joint Force a flexible and rapid response option for highly contested environments.”

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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Just a few months after an Iranian Yak-130 was shot down by an Israeli Air Force F-35, Russia has armed its upgraded Yak-130M with the President-S130 onboard defensive suite to improve the aircraft’s survivability.

Russia’s state-owned arms conglomerate Rostec announced that the Yak-130M — the modernized version of the Yak-130 trainer/light combat aircraft–of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) has been equipped with an active defense system that uses heat decoys and electronic jamming signals to fend off anti-aircraft missiles.

“The third Yak-130M prototype aircraft of our United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) has recently successfully completed its maiden flight. Its integration will accelerate testing of the new aircraft. The first deliveries to customers are planned as early as 2028. The aircraft is equipped with the President-S130 onboard system,” the company said in a statement, as reported by the state TASS news agency.

President-S130 is an onboard aircraft self-protection airborne defense complex, a specialized adaptation of the broader President-S family of optoelectronic and electronic warfare protection systems.

It is primarily designed to protect fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft from infrared- and radar-guided missiles, particularly man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), as well as a range of air-to-air and surface-to-air threats.

The base President-S system has been in service since around 2014 and has been tested and fitted on various Russian helicopters and aircraft. It typically includes radar, laser, or missile-approach warners, control units, jammers, and countermeasures dispensers.

The President-S130 system operates automatically in stages.

First, sensors detect an incoming missile launch/threat; second, the system generates radioelectronic jamming to disrupt enemy detection and guidance systems; and third, it dispenses decoys, flares, chaff, and other countermeasures to neutralize infrared and radar seekers.

“It automatically detects an enemy missile launch, then instantly applies electronic interference to its detection and guidance systems, and then deploys special traps to neutralize infrared and radar homing heads,” the Russian-language RIA Novosti stated.

Interestingly, the recent disclosure about equipping the Yak-130M comes months after the baseline version of the aircraft—a Yak-130 belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)—was downed in combat. However, integrating the President-S130 was not a direct consequence of that event; it was planned in advance. 

“An Israeli Air Force Adir (F-35I) jet shot down an Iranian combat aircraft (YAK-130) over Tehran skies a short time ago,” the military said in a statement at the time. “This is the world’s first shootdown of a manned fighter jet by an F-35,” it added.

The stealthy F-35 used its advanced radar and networked situational awareness to detect and engage the Yak-130 before the slower, less capable aircraft could mount an effective response.

Against that backdrop, the President-S130 could make the Yak-130M more survivable in permissive or lightly defended environments against ground-based air defenses and other threats, but it is unlikely to dramatically bolster the jet’s survivability if a cutting-edge stealth fighter, such as the F-35, is hounding it.

Russia’s Yak-130 Aircraft

Developed by Russia’s Yakovlev design bureau, the YAK-130 is an advanced trainer aircraft adapted for light combat roles and is reportedly armed with the Soviet-origin R-73 air-to-air missile. The Yak-130 also has a secondary light-attack capability, allowing it to strike enemy ground formations and serve as a force multiplier.

The aircraft can also train for close air support missions and carry several tons of ammunition, including various wing- and fuselage-mounted weapons. The Yak-130 can typically carry KAB-500 guided bombs, Kh-29 guided missiles, 80-mm, 122-mm, and 330-mm rockets, and 250- and 500-kilogram bombs.

The Yak-130’s fly-by-wire controls and computerized cockpit mimic the flight characteristics of modern advanced fighter planes. Furthermore, the aircraft’s ability to sustain steady, controllable flight at angles of attack up to 35 degrees puts it on par with the MiG-29 and Su-30.

The Yak-130 can take off and land from a variety of runways, making it a versatile platform.

Thanks to its remarkable thrust-to-weight ratio, the aircraft can withstand high g-forces and deliver remarkable climb and takeoff performance. It has a maximum combat payload of 3,000 kg, a top speed of 1,060 km/h, a range of about 1,600 km (internal fuel), and a service ceiling of 12,500 m (41,020 feet). Maximum takeoff weight is approximately 10,290 kg.

It features a three-hour endurance (with two drop tanks) and a detachable in-flight refueling probe. Some reports say it can also carry extra fuel tanks and two electronic warfare pods on the wingtips to extend its operating range.

Russia reportedly completed the first upgraded Yak-130M jet in October 2025. The Yak-130M keeps essentially the same two-seat airframe and engines but adds radar, targeting, self-protection, communications, and expanded guided-weapons capability, turning the jet from an advanced trainer/light-attack aircraft into a more capable light combat aircraft.

This variant adds a significantly updated mission system architecture while keeping the original airframe and AI-222-25 engines.

Notably, the latest disclosure comes months after reports noted that the Yak-130M advanced began flight testing with a new avionics package that included an updated self-protection complex, an electro-optical targeting system, and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar.

Reports say the most significant upgrade in the Yak-130M is the BRLS-130R radar. The original Yak-130 can carry weapons, but the M version can independently find and track targets, guide precision munitions, and potentially engage drones or aircraft beyond visual range, capabilities the baseline aircraft lacks.

In addition to the BRLS-130R AESA radar, the Yak-130M adds the SOLT-130K electro-optical/laser targeting system, the KSS-130 communications link, and the President-S130, enabling more autonomous target detection, precision weapon delivery, networking, and self-protection.

President-S130 turns the Yak-130M from a light attack aircraft into one with an integrated, automated survivability layer against surface- and air-launched missiles. Its value lies in letting the aircraft operate closer to contested airspace and in the low-altitude counter-drone or counter-insurgency roles Moscow is positioning the Yak-130M for.

With the President-S130, the aircraft can conduct low-altitude strike or armed-reconnaissance missions and automatically respond to a sudden missile launch, rather than relying solely on crew vigilance and flare dispensing. Moreover, in permissive-to-contested environments, the Yak-130M’s sensors and weapons can address risks from adverse UAVs and even neutralize light ground targets. 

Combined with KSS-130—the onboard communications link and radio unit developed as part of the Yak-130M avionics suite—the aircraft can receive cueing from ground stations or other aircraft, then use its own sensors to classify and engage a target, while the President-S130 protects it during approach and egress.

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The United States will deploy USS Colorado as the first US nuclear-powered attack submarine to join a rotating force based in western Australia, under the AUKUS pact. 

US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense Richard Marles, and UK Secretary of State for Defense Wes Streeting said they were pleased to announce the designation of the USS Colorado (SSN 788) as the first US Navy Virginia-class fast-attack submarine assigned to Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) beginning in late 2027.

This announcement comes ahead of the upcoming United States Submarine Maintenance Period, which begins later this week and will further demonstrate Australia’s growing ability to sustain US and UK nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines. 

The deployment is a “significant milestone” in building joint U.S.-Australia-UK deterrence in the Pacific under their AUKUS defense pact, the allies said in a joint statement. The selection of the USS Colorado “marks a significant milestone for AUKUS Pillar I and is a decisive step in strengthening collective deterrence in the Pacific,” the statement added.

The rotating force of nuclear-powered submarines—known as Submarine Rotational Force-West—is to be hosted at a naval base in Western Australia, HMAS Stirling.

The base is projected to host up to five fast-attack submarines—four from the United States and one from the UK—on a rotational basis. The force will operate under existing arrangements, including the US-Australia Force Posture Agreement, and will not constitute a permanent foreign base.

The three countries said it will help Australia prepare to operate and maintain its own nuclear-powered submarines while supporting its allies’ deployments and maintenance. Australian sailors will gain at-sea experience on American and British submarines, while local maintenance personnel will support the vessels ashore.

Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, director-general of the Australian Submarine Agency, called the designation “a clear demonstration of the trust and confidence the United States has in Australia’s people, workforce and infrastructure.”

He added that the Colorado’s presence “will help accelerate the development of the skills, experience and knowledge transfer that are fundamental to delivering Australia’s future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability.”

Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Matt Buckley described the move as “a significant milestone for Australia, our Navy and the AUKUS partnership,” noting that sailors would work alongside “the world’s most experienced nuclear-powered submarine operators.”

USAF Revives “Shelved” AGM-183 ARRW Hypersonic Missile Program With $694M Lockheed Contract

Overall, AUKUS is part of a broader effort to build Australian “undersea power” in the Indo-Pacific region. Nuclear-powered submarines offer speed, endurance, and stealth that conventional submarines lack, and they serve as a cutting-edge deterrent rather than preparation for war against China.

The USS Colorado, commissioned in 2018, is one of the US Navy’s most advanced attack submarines. It is the first of up to four US Virginia-class submarines expected to rotate through the base, alongside a Royal Navy Astute-class submarine.

The Trump administration launched a review of the 2021 AUKUS pact, signed under the Biden administration, on June 11.

AUKUS

Earlier, on July 29, the US said it would review the AUKUS pact with the UK and Australia.

The US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Elbridge Colby’s office, said in a post on X that the review will be an “empirical and clear-eyed assessment” of the deal.

The AUKUS pact, signed in September 2021, is a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States aimed at promoting a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”

The deal has two central pillars.

Pillar 1 is about the supply and delivery of nuclear-powered attack submarines.

Under the pact, Australia will buy three second-hand nuclear-powered but conventionally armed (SSNs) Virginia-class submarines from the US, with options to purchase two more. These SSNs were expected to be delivered to Australia beginning in the 2030s.

After that, the plan is to design and build an entirely new nuclear-powered submarine model for the UK and Australian navies.

The United States and the UK will also deploy their own nuclear-powered submarines in the region as part of “Submarine Rotational Force-West.”

Pillar 2 focuses on allies collaborating on “advanced capabilities,” including sharing military expertise in critical areas such as long-range hypersonic missiles, undersea robotics, quantum technology, and AI.

The deal will tremendously boost Australia’s undersea capabilities. Nuclear-powered submarines offer many advantages over non-nuclear submarines, including extended range, endurance, and stealth, and they don’t have to surface as often, which could give away their position.

The deal will make Australia, alongside the UK, the only countries with which Washington would share nuclear-propulsion technology.

Furthermore, the US and UK commitment to deploy their own nuclear-powered submarines in the region will reinforce Australia’s position in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, Australia will gain access to sensitive technologies, substantially boosting its naval prowess.

AUKUS is Australia’s biggest-ever defense project, with a commitment of A$368 billion (US$240 billion) over three decades.

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Why Trump Wanted To Review AUKUS?

Questions have been raised over the deal’s relevance to Washington and whether it fits ‘America First’ policy.

Colby’s office said the AUKUS review would “be an empirical and clear-eyed assessment of the initiative’s alignment with President Trump’s America First approach.”

Notably, Colby has long been skeptical of AUKUS.

He has previously questioned the benefits of the pact’s submarine-sales element, arguing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee in March that the United States wasn’t producing enough submarines to meet its own Indo-Pacific requirements.

When the Senate’s Armed Services Committee asked Colby about the AUKUS deal, Colby replied: “I have expressed concerns, as I understand, shared by many on this Committee, regarding US attack submarine force structure and production rates. I believe we must increase US attack submarine production to meet US military requirements in the Indo-Pacific region.”

However, during that hearing, Colby also expressed his commitment to AUKUS, saying, “I also agree with Secretary Hegseth that AUKUS is a model for how we should engage with our closest allies and partners when it comes to technology cooperation, scaling production, and integrating our industrial bases.”

If media reports are to be believed, the US wants to impose additional conditions on the deal, including a commitment by Australia to spend 3.5% of its GDP on defense and a promise by Canberra to deploy its submarines to support the US in a potential conflict with China.

Speaking before the US Senate Armed Services Committee in March, Colby suggested the US should press Australia to increase defense spending.

“The main concern the United States should press with Australia, consistent with the President’s approach, is higher defense spending. Australia is currently well below the 3% level advocated for NATO by NATO Secretary General Rutte, and Canberra faces a far more
powerful challenge in China,” Colby had said.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese rejected that Washington was using AUKUS review as “leverage.”

“We expected a review from an incoming government, just like the Keir Starmer government did (in the UK). We expect that those things take longer than just 30 days,” Albanese added.

Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

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The US Air Force (USAF) is evaluating its bombers, including the next-generation B-21 Raider, for potential air-to-air combat roles, and they could also operate alongside Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones.

So far, the USAF has used its bombers, including the B-52 Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2 Spirit, for a variety of missions, including conventional ground strikes, nuclear deterrence, maritime anti-ship operations, and close air support roles.

However, adding air-to-air missiles to bombers and pairing them with CCAs would also enable them to perform air-superiority missions in a contested environment.

The plans are part of the USAF’s latest fighter force structure report, submitted to the US Congress for approval earlier this month.

The report, titled “Long-Term USAF Fighter Force Structure,” also envisions a combat-coded fleet of 1,509 fighters by 2035, along with at least 500 CCAs.

The plan calls for adding hundreds of new fighters as the USAF increases its current fighter fleet from 1,288 aircraft, while also accounting for hundreds of F-16s, older F-15s, and F-22 Raptors due for retirement in the coming years.

The 2035 plan envisions a 60% stealth force, including 40% F-35A Joint Strike Fighters, 20% F-47s and F-22 Raptors, and 40% upgraded fourth-generation fighters, with an even mix of F-16s and F-15EXs.

The USAF will build the new fleet by procuring Lockheed Martin’s F-35s and Boeing’s F-47 and F-15EX fighters.

However, the report acknowledges that meeting its ambitious fighter procurement targets may not be achievable because of “fiscal realities and industrial production limitations.”

To meet the 2035 target, the USAF will need to add more than 70 fighters to its fleet each year for the next ten years.

The report therefore discusses other recapitalization options for the USAF, including acquiring an entirely new fighter, relying more on semi-autonomous drone fighters known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft, and giving bombers air-to-air roles and capabilities, Air & Space Force Magazine said after reviewing the report, which has not been released in the media.

“Accordingly, the USAF is also evaluating additional recapitalization options, including a new capacity fighter, increased reliance on CCAs, and developing air-to-air capabilities on bombers.”

As EurAsian Times reported last week, the new fighter could be Lockheed Martin’s upgraded F-16, termed F-16G, or Boeing’s already-in-production F-15EX variant. Lockheed Martin is also discussing adding new sixth-generation capabilities to the F-35 fighter.

However, the report’s most unusual suggestion is to add new air-combat munitions to the USAF’s bomber fleet, including the under-development B-21 Raider stealth bomber.

Air-To-Air Missiles For Bombers

The USAF’s fighters have long carried air-to-ground munitions, such as precision-guided JDAMs, laser-guided bombs, and Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs).

Bombers, however, have traditionally not carried air-to-air missiles, severely limiting their ability to conduct air-to-air missions.

For instance, during the recent Operation Epic Fury, the USAF employed B-2 Spirit, B-1B Lancer, and B-52H Stratofortress Bombers, but used them exclusively for long-range standoff ground strikes, penetrating stealth strikes, or stand-in ground strikes once Iranian air defenses were sufficiently suppressed.

These bombers therefore mostly flew in strike packages with F-35s and F-22s, as well as F-15s and F-16s, tackling aerial threats and conducting air superiority and SEAD/DEAD missions.

Adding air-to-air capability will allow USAF bombers to support air superiority missions.

Additionally, pairing them with CCAs will let the bombers serve as airborne nerve centers and communication nodes for a networked strike package, with a bomber aircraft at the center controlling multiple combat and reconnaissance drones.

The USAF plans to have at least 500 CCA drones in service by 2032.

The bombers, including the B-21 Raider, could therefore be programmed to launch air-to-air missiles and drones. Some of these drones could launch air-to-air missiles themselves, thereby greatly extending bombers’ combat range.

Given bombers’ size, payload capacity, and range, a single bomber could carry multiple air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, as well as drones, a capability that could be crucial over the long distances of the Pacific theatre.

For instance, a B-2 Spirit bomber could carry over 27,000 kg of weapons payload, more than three times the F-35’s maximum payload capacity (8,200 kg).

Similarly, the B-2 Spirit’s unrefueled range of 6,000 nautical miles is nearly five times that of the F-35 (1,200 nautical miles).

Adding long-range air-to-air missiles and pairing combat drones with bombers will further extend their combat range.

Notably, the US is already developing several very long-range air-to-air missiles.

The US Navy has already fielded the AIM-174B air-launched version of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6).

While the exact range of the AIM-174B is classified, widely cited estimates put it at 130 to 250 miles.

Separately, the US is also developing another very long-range AAM missile, the AIM-424 Malice, expected to reach over 250 miles.

In June, the USAF issued a call for a new anti-air missile with a range of at least 1,000 nautical miles.

Integrating such very long-range AAMs with bombers could redefine air warfare.

In addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on the LongShot program to test the feasibility of an air-launched drone that can launch air-to-air missiles.

The air-to-air capability of the bombers could also include self-protection systems, such as carrying air-launched anti-missile interceptors. In fact, Northrop Grumman, the B-21’s prime contractor, has already patented an anti-missile defense system for stealthy aircraft that fires hard-kill interceptors.

Notably, this is not the first time the USAF has explored adding air-to-air munitions to its bomber fleet.

Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin signaled in October 2024 that the B-21 Raider stealth bomber could play a greater role in the service’s air-dominance plans.

At the time, the USAF was reviewing its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter program, which Boeing eventually won in 2025 and named the F-47.

When asked whether the air superiority review could give the B-21 a more prominent role, Allvin said, “We have not taken that off the table.”

However, the USAF force structure report has not detailed what the bomber fleet’s potential air-to-air role would entail. Nor has it specified which USAF Bombers will be programmed for air-to-air combat roles.

However, because the B-21 Raider is still in early production, the bomber is best suited to be paired with AAM and CCA drones.

While the USAF initially planned to buy 100 B-21 Raiders, later reports suggested the force could increase that number to 140.

Besides, the USAF also has about 76 B-52 Stratofortresses, 44 B-1B Lancers, and nearly 19 B-2 Spirits.

The 2035 Force Structure Report suggests that the USAF is hedging on multiple options to maintain its dominance and fighter numbers, including buying a new aircraft (possibly F-16G), “increased reliance on CCAs,” and considering new air-to-air roles for bombers.

All these plans will compete for US funding. The US Congress will only know which programs are approved and funded when it approves the Force Structure Report.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post What If the B-21 Raider Could Shoot Down Enemy Fighter Jets? The U.S. Air Force Just Put the Idea on Table appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

After nearly a decade of struggling to win new orders, Swedish defense manufacturer SAAB reported “better than anticipated” third-quarter earnings, driven by a steady surge in orders for the JAS-39 Gripen fighter jets and the GlobalEye early-warning aircraft.

This coincides with the 71st anniversary of the first flight of one of Saab’s most distinctive earlier designs, the J-35 Draken.

Saab recently announced at a quarterly earnings call that new order intake more than tripled year on year. “It is a very strong quarter,” Saab CEO Micael Johansson said in an interaction with Reuters. “Very good order intake, quite a few large orders, strong sales growth — over 30% organic — as well as increased profitability and strong cash flow,” he added, signaling that the company would meet its financial targets.

The new orders reportedly exceeded FactSet projections of 56.4 billion kronor ($5.68 billion), coming in at 65.8 billion Swedish kronor ($6.6 billion), up from 20.9 billion kronor ($2.10 billion) a year ago. Meanwhile, the third-quarter sales exceeded FactSet’s forecast of 20 billion kronor ($2.01 billion), coming in at 20.6 billion kronor ($2.07 billion), while EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) exceeded projections of 1.9 billion kronor ($191.3 million), coming in at 1.95 billion kronor ($196.4 million).

Saab’s operating profit rose to 1.95 billion kronor ($196.4 million) from 1.37 billion kronor ($138 million) the previous year, exceeding the mean estimate of 1.91 billion kronor ($192 million) in an LSEG analyst survey.

The largest single contributor was the SEK 24.6 billion ($2.54 billion) contract for 16 Gripen E fighters for Ukraine, signed on 30 June 2026 and booked in the third quarter. “The growing customer demand is reflected in major contract awards, including Gripen for Ukraine, GlobalEye, and an order related to Germany’s new frigates,” CEO Johansson said.

The latest sales, including the order from Ukraine, highlight a major turnaround for a company that struggled to sell its aircraft—particularly the Gripen-E/F—to exporters who kept choosing the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter or the Dassault Rafale.

The most advanced Gripen variant made an official comeback last year, with Thailand ordering 4 of these jets and Colombia ordering 17. SAAB is now pushing the aircraft for export to countries including Canada.

If the export campaigns result in a contract, the company would see another significant surge in orders and earnings. The company has also reportedly offered the aircraft to countries like the Philippines and Peru.

“From a purely logical standpoint, I believe it would be a very good solution for Canada, and it would make for a very good partnership between Canada and Sweden,” the SAAB top boss told Reuters when asked about a potential deal with Ottawa, which placed its F-35 purchase on review last year and has been seeking a replacement ever since.

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Separately, Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson said earlier this year that the Swedish Air Force was considering purchasing the two-seat Gripen-F variant to expand training capacity, which would further boost the 4.5th-generation combat aircraft.

In addition to the Gripen-E, the GlobalEye early warning aircraft also drove profits this quarter. SAAB received a SEK 10.1 billion ($1.02 billion) order in July for two GlobalEye aircraft from a Middle Eastern country, as the EurAsian Times reported earlier.

The GlobalEye is also sweeping orders as Europe modernizes and strengthens NATO’s overall combat posture amid sustained security threats from Russia. Earlier this month, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that the alliance would begin formal negotiations with the company for up to 10 GlobalEye aircraft to replace its fleet of 14 Boeing E-3A Sentry AWACS aircraft, whereas Canada picked the aircraft in May 2026.

However, neither NATO nor Canada has placed a firm production order yet, so further sales growth from these programs remains prospective.

Further, a contract with German shipbuilder TKMS drove Saab’s profits. In July 2026, the company signed a SEK 8.7 billion ($876 million) contract with German naval defense company TKMS to deliver and integrate combat systems, composite structures, and sensors onto four of the German Navy’s new MEKO A-200 DEU-class frigates.

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While Saab’s recent growth has been driven primarily by the Gripen E/F and related systems, the timing of the results invites a look back at another landmark Swedish design that first flew exactly 71 years ago.

The SAAB Draken 35 Flew More Than 7 Decades Ago

About 71 years ago, on October 25, 1955, the iconic Saab 35 Draken—whose name means “the Kite” or “the Dragon” in Swedish—made its maiden flight, marking the start of the most daring and transformative chapter in Swedish military aviation history. 

Sweden developed the Saab 35 Draken during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States-led Western bloc, amid concerns that the Cold War might spill over its borders and threaten its sovereignty because of its proximity to Russia.

So, the country wanted an aircraft that could combat Soviet fighters and intercept its bombers at high altitudes, which ultimately led to the development of the Saab 35 Draken.

The Swedish Air Force demanded that the new combat aircraft could operate from reinforced public highways that would serve as wartime airbases. It wanted the aircraft to operate from its unique airbase system, Bas 60, which emphasized distributing Swedish air power across several air bases to increase survival chances in the event of conflict.

More importantly, however, the requirements emphasized supersonic speed, all-weather capability, quick turnaround by conscripts, and single-pilot operation, among other things.

Led by designer Erik Bratt, the team adopted a radical double-delta wing: a sharply swept inner section of approximately 80 degrees optimized for high-speed flight, combined with a more moderately swept outer section of about 60 degrees for improved low-speed handling.

The configuration blended the wing and fuselage so thoroughly that the aircraft dispensed with a conventional horizontal stabilizer, producing a distinctive stingray-like silhouette often described as resembling a kite.

Needless to say, the Draken-35 was distinguished as the most aesthetically pleasing combat aircraft. The aircraft had a service ceiling of 66,000 feet and a maximum speed of 2,450 kilometers per hour.

To validate the concept, Saab first built a half-scale testbed, the Saab 210 “Lilldraken,” propelled by the Armstrong Siddeley Adder jet engine, which flew in 1952.

The first full-scale Draken prototype, fitted with a license-built Rolls-Royce Avon Mk 21 engine, took off on 25 October 1955 and soon achieved supersonic speed in level flight.

The second prototype, equipped with an afterburner, unintentionally exceeded the sound barrier during its first climb.

The Saab 35 Draken was a revolutionary aircraft that set multiple records. It was the first Western European combat aircraft that could fly at true supersonic speeds. Later variants reached top speeds of Mach 2.0 to 2.3 (around 2,125–2,450 kilometers/hour) at altitude, with a service ceiling of about 18,000–20,000 meters and a very high rate of climb. 

It was a single-engine aircraft that could carry the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile among other weaponry. The Swedish aircraft could also carry a payload of nearly 6,400 pounds, including internal rockets and bombs.

Most versions of this supersonic combat aircraft carried one or two 30 mm ADEN cannons, with later Swedish models often retaining only a single gun to make room for additional avionics.

Because the Draken’s fuselage was designed to split into front and rear sections, early versions of the aircraft had issues, including a tendency toward “superstall” at high angles of attack.

At times, it became uncontrollable regardless of pilot input, making ejection the only plausible option. Unfortunately, this caused several tragic accidents.

Swedish pilots developed recovery techniques, including the “kort parad” (short parry) maneuver—widely regarded as a precursor to the later “Cobra”—that allowed them to manage and even exploit the behavior.

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The main Swedish Draken variants progressed from the initial J 35A to the improved J 35B with better radar and integration into Sweden’s air-defense network, and onto the two-seat Sk 35C trainer, the more powerful J 35D, the S 35E reconnaissance variant, and the definitive J 35F interceptor equipped with advanced radar and missiles.

Additionally, the aircraft was built in four export variants for Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Austria.

All Drakens were interceptors with limited air-to-ground capability except for the Danish Drakens, which served as strike aircraft and carried AGM-12 Bullpup air-to-ground missiles, electronic countermeasures, and enhanced internal and external fuel storage.

Despite early technical challenges, the Draken earned a strong reputation for performance and reliability, as shown by its about fifty-year service life. In fact, Austria (the last operator of the type) used it until 2005. 

Sweden introduced the Draken into front-line service in 1960 and retired the last examples in the late 1990s,  by which time the Saab 37 Viggen had largely replaced them and the Draken was bridging the gap until the JAS 39 Gripen arrived.

Nonetheless, a handful of aircraft have continued flying in civilian and historic roles, including with the Swedish Air Force Historic Flight and the US National Test Pilot School, according to reports.

Although the Draken never saw real combat, its striking double-delta shape, long service life, and design ingenuity secured its place as one of the most recognizable European fighters of the Cold War era.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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The US Navy recently awarded Boeing a $16.7 million contract to support the shutdown of production lines for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler.

The Department of War said: “The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri, is awarded a $16,667,607 firm-fixed-price order (N0001926F1139) against a previously awarded basic ordering agreement (N0001926G1002).

This order provides planning, analysis, engineering, and program management support for the shutdown of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler production lines.

This effort includes inventorying and assessing government-owned production equipment and tooling; developing retention, storage, and disposition recommendations; and delivering a master property inventory and disposition plan. Work will be performed in St. Louis, Missouri (60%); El Segundo, California (37%); and Bethpage, New York (3%), and is expected to be completed in November 2030.

Fiscal 2024 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $16,667,607 will be obligated at the time of award. This order was not competitively procured. Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.”

Super Hornets Fail to Attract Customers

Boeing announced in 2023 that it would halt Super Hornet production by late 2025. The deadline was pushed back when the US Navy awarded Boeing a $1.3 billion contract to acquire 17 Block III Super Hornets and deliver a technical data package essential to the aircraft’s maintenance.

Boeing later said that it will shutter its production lines once it completes delivery of its last order, projected for 2027.

Despite production coming to a full halt, Boeing will continue upgrading the aircraft. Earlier, it received a new $930.77 million contract from the US Navy to continue work on the Super Hornet Service Life Modification (SLM) program.

The program will increase the service life of up to 60 F/A-18E/F aircraft from 6,000 to 10,000 flying hours, keeping them operational well into the future. Additionally, the US Navy has contracted Boeing to upgrade all the older Super Hornets to the latest Block III standard.

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Boeing’s official said on February 23, 2023: As we invest in and develop the next era of capability, we are applying the same innovation and expertise that made the F/A-18 a workhorse for the US Navy and air forces around the world for nearly 40 years.”

Boeing spokeswoman Deborah VanNierop confirmed then that the remaining congressionally added US jets would be “the last American Super Hornets ever built” (absent an Indian Navy win, which did not materialize).

Indian Snub

Despite its best efforts to promote the Super Hornets to customers such as Canada, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Switzerland, Boeing failed to secure any new contracts. The last snub came from India, which was looking to replace its Russian-supplied MiG-29 K jets.

Boeing said it would extend the deadline by 2 years to 2027 if the Indian Navy selected the F/A-18 Super Hornet Block III over the French Rafale-M.

Boeing pitched the Super Hornets to India in 2022 and announced a roadmap to greatly increase its investments, in line with the “Make in India” initiative.

It also promised technology transfer (ToT) to the Indian industry if Delhi selected the Super Hornets. However, after a series of trials, India selected Rafale-M jets over the Super Hornets. You can read a full analysis of why the Super Hornets lost to the Rafale-M jets here.

Why India Rejected F/A-18 Super Hornets Despite Its Navy Loaded With American Military Platforms?

“We ran several international campaigns or competitions that we were unsuccessful in previous years,” Mark Sears, Boeing vice president for fighters, said in a 2024 interview. “That kind of played out, and there are no active discussions with the Navy about additional F-18s beyond these.”

He added that Boeing was focused on delivering the remaining jets on schedule “because we know how badly the Navy needs this capability,” while pivoting the St. Louis workforce to other programs (F-15EX, T-7A, MQ-25).

Super Hornets

The Super Hornet was developed to close a critical capability gap in US naval aviation during a period of major service restructuring.

The A-6 Intruder fleet was aging, the F-14 Tomcats were becoming difficult & expensive to maintain, and the baseline F/A-18 Hornets lacked the range and payload for deep-strike operations, creating a capability gap for the US Navy in the 1980s.

Because building a new jet from scratch would require a significant investment in an austerity-dominated era, McDonnell Douglas proposed developing a 70% larger, extensively redesigned F/A-18 Hornet.

McDonnell Douglas established the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet production line in the mid-1990s, and Boeing acquired the company in 1997. The aircraft made its maiden flight on November 29, 1995, and Boeing began full-rate production in September 1997.

The first production Super Hornet flew in November 1998, with deliveries to the US Navy beginning in January 1999.

It replaced the F-14 Tomcat in fleet defense, assumed the A-6 Intruder’s strike role, and eventually became the model for the EA-18G Growler. This dedicated Electronic Warfare combat aircraft entered service with the US Navy in 2009.

“The Super Hornet is the second major model upgrade since the inception of the F/A-18 aircraft program, highly capable across the full mission spectrum: air superiority, fighter escort, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, close air support, air defense suppression and day/night precision strike,” as per information on the official website of NAVAIR (Naval Air Systems Command).

The production line, primarily at Boeing’s St. Louis, Missouri, facilities, has continued to churn out these cutting-edge jets since then.

The aircraft was upgraded to Block II standard in 2002, adding Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, improved sensors and avionics, increased range, and the ability to employ a precision-weapons arsenal.

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This aircraft then became the workhorse of the US Navy’s carrier operations and recently received its most advanced Block III upgrade.

The US Navy is the largest operator of the Super Hornets.

The aircraft has seen extensive combat, including the current conflict in the Middle East, since it made its debut with a strike against hostile targets in Iraq’s no-fly zone in November 2002.

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On October 22, India’s Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) chief, Shatrujeet Singh Kapoor, stated while addressing ITBP personnel in Alwar, Rajasthan, that the threat from China continues to persist. He said there had been face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops at several locations in Arunachal Pradesh in the preceding days, and that these were continuing. 

Kapoor stressed that conventional military methods alone would not suffice against China, given the People’s Liberation Army’s extensive modernization. He called for stronger drone and anti-drone capabilities.

The ITBP chief’s call for stronger drone and anti-drone capabilities needs to be viewed in the correct perspective. Media coverage of military threats tends to focus on an adversary’s high-value weapon systems—ballistic and cruise missiles, fighter aircraft, bombers, warships and tanks. These systems are conspicuous, expensive and relatively easy to identify, quantify and assess in terms of their capabilities and the threats they pose.

The threat from drones, however, is fundamentally different and often underappreciated. Their low cost, small signatures, ease of deployment, and the difficulty of reliably detecting, identifying, and tracking them make the threat particularly hard to assess.

Drone Evolution

Drone warfare has evolved rapidly since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022.

Initially, small drones were widely deployed for short-range reconnaissance and attack, including as loitering munitions. Their range was often limited by their dependence on line-of-sight communications and control.

Ukraine and Russia also fielded medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drones, which provided reconnaissance and strike capabilities broadly analogous to those of close air support aircraft.

However, their effectiveness depends inversely on the strength of the adversary’s air defenses. As a result, both sides have increasingly relied on these drones for reconnaissance and target acquisition, rather than operating them freely in heavily defended airspace.

Drone warfare capabilities have improved significantly since the start of the war through advances in propulsion, navigation, communications and machine vision. The evolution from short-range reconnaissance and attack drones to low-cost, long-range precision-strike systems has created a capability that, in some missions, can compete with that of cruise missiles.

Propulsion

Initially, many drones relied on internal combustion engines, which could be noisy, while smaller electric drones offered quieter operation but generally had more limited range and endurance.

Advances in battery technology have improved electric propulsion, although energy storage remains a constraint.

The development and wider availability of relatively low-cost jet engines have enabled some drones to fly at high speeds and altitudes over long distances, potentially complicating ground-based detection and interception.

Communication

Line-of-sight communications remain important, particularly for smaller drones. Their limitations can be mitigated through relay systems and mesh networking, while satellite links can extend communications beyond the radio horizon.

Geostationary satellite links generally have higher latency than low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite links, which can provide lower-latency communications. Together with improved networking, these technologies have expanded the scope for remote piloting and long-range operations. However, communications remain vulnerable to jamming and disruption.

Navigation and Precision Attack

Drones have traditionally relied on satellite navigation (SatNav) and other navigation methods to reach their targets. SatNav is vulnerable to jamming and can become unreliable in contested environments. A significant advance has been the development of AI-enabled terrain matching and machine vision, which allow drones to navigate using terrain features and visual cues rather than relying solely on satellite signals.

Machine vision has also improved precision-strike capabilities through target identification. Meanwhile, advances in counter-drone technologies have helped shape the evolution of strike drones, driving the development of systems designed to overcome increasingly sophisticated defenses.

Drone Development Cycle

Drone development and operational fielding cycles are considerably shorter than those of manned aircraft and helicopters.

Lower development costs and shorter timelines allow drone warfare to evolve rapidly in response to battlefield conditions. Drone designs and capabilities can be tailored to the specific challenges of a battlefield and the objectives of a particular campaign.

The design and capabilities of attack drones depend on the targets they are intended to engage. Attacking bridges, troop concentrations, moving road vehicles, or logistical storage facilities presents different operational requirements and calls for different drone capabilities. These requirements must also account for the counter-UAS systems deployed by the adversary.

The same principle applies to drone interceptors: their capabilities must match the threats they are designed to counter. For instance, countering high-speed, jet-powered attack drones may require equally fast, jet-powered interceptors, although other interception methods may also be effective.

Both the targets to be attacked and the capabilities of the adversary vary from one conflict to another. Consequently, drone development is driven by the specific operational requirements of each battlefield and the continuing interaction between attack drones and the defenses designed to defeat them.

Drone Warfare Enabling Technologies

A formidable drone warfare capability cannot be built merely by developing drones with impressive specifications. It requires drones whose capabilities are tailored to specific targets and tactical scenarios. For example, interdicting road supply lines requires drones that can identify and engage moving supply trucks while distinguishing them from other vehicles. Such drones may be unsuitable for attacking bridges.

The key is to master the enabling technologies that allow drones to perform specific tasks.

These broadly encompass five areas:

Propulsion: Low-cost, efficient engines for the required combination of speed, range, and endurance.

Communication: Resilient, low-latency communications, including LEO satellite links, for responsive remote piloting and target engagement.

Navigation: AI-enabled machine vision and terrain matching for navigation that does not depend solely on satellite navigation (SatNav).

Precision attack: Machine vision and target recognition for accurate engagement of intended targets.

Warheads: Payloads tailored to the intended targets and desired effects.

A nation cannot become a leader in drone warfare simply by developing drones. It must master these enabling technologies and continuously improve them to meet evolving battlefield requirements.

India’s mastery of drone-warfare enabling technologies remains limited in several critical areas, particularly when compared with China’s industrial scale and technological capabilities.

The Chinese Threat

China has substantial capabilities in many of the enabling technologies discussed above. More importantly, it has a formidable drone-component manufacturing ecosystem spanning electric motors, flight controllers, sensors, machine vision, navigation and communications modules, as well as drone propulsion.

Its experience with mesh networking can support low-latency drone control and coordination. China is also developing large-scale LEO satellite constellations, although their specific contribution to military drone operations should not be assumed without further evidence.

China could potentially develop and field drones tailored to exploit specific vulnerabilities in Indian Army capabilities or tactics within relatively short periods. It could also adapt its systems to counter tactical innovations introduced by Indian forces.

Along the border, China’s industrial capacity could enable it to manufacture and field drones in large numbers, threatening Indian troop movements by day and night. Supply lines, radars, tanks and artillery could all face persistent drone attacks.

Without comparable capabilities, the Indian Army would risk losing operational ground.

Long-range precision strikes by Chinese drones could also threaten IAF airbases, radars, air-defense units and logistics bases, potentially degrading India’s ability and willingness to sustain a prolonged conflict.

If this scenario seems overstated, consider how Russia, despite possessing a formidable layered air-defense network, has struggled to prevent Ukraine’s sustained drone attacks.

Ukrainian long-range strikes have benefited from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support, including Western assistance. Satellite communications, including Starlink, have also played a role in some Ukrainian drone operations.

China possesses substantial ISR and communications capabilities of its own, although their effectiveness in a conflict along the Indian border would depend on operational conditions and the resilience of the systems involved.

Given India’s resource constraints and technological gaps, it could struggle to withstand a sustained, large-scale Chinese drone campaign unless it develops comparable capabilities in drone production, deployment, and counter-drone warfare.

• Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
• Views Personal of the Author
• Follow the author @vkthakur

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As Germany seeks a new partner to develop its next-generation fighter after the collapse of FCAS, it now faces two choices: join the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) or forge a new partnership with Sweden and Spain.

If the proposal materializes, Europe could have three sixth-generation fighter programs: GCAP and the French initiative.

In June 2026, the Friedrich Merz administration pulled the plug on the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) that it was pursuing with France and Spain, over irreconcilable differences between industry partners Airbus (representing Germany and Spain) and France’s Dassault Aviation.

Berlin has been seeking a partnership to develop a sixth-generation aircraft ever since.

Earlier this month, reports indicated it held “exploratory talks” about joining the GCAP led by the UK, Japan, and Italy, and British Prime Minister Andy Burnham officially raised Germany’s involvement in GCAP.

However, Airbus had also earlier hinted it could potentially partner with Swedish defense manufacturer Saab to develop its sixth-generation fighter.

German defense officials have reportedly encouraged Berlin to seek a new fighter-aircraft collaboration with Sweden and Spain rather than join an existing deal involving the United Kingdom.

The internal ministry assessment notes that forming a new German-Swedish-Spanish partnership is “the more advantageous and promising” than joining the current GCAP. The evaluation does not, however, indicate that Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has approved the recommendation or that it represents a final government decision.

A New Partnership

Airbus had been exploring alternatives even before formally exiting the FCAS manned fighter program.

In May 2026, shortly before the collapse, Michael Schoellhorn, head of Airbus Defense and Space, told the Swedish newspaper Dagens Industri that he was looking forward to working with Sweden and Saab on a new next-generation fighter.

He emphasized Saab’s deep expertise in combat aircraft design and production and noted that discussions with the Swedish and German governments were already underway.

After the FCAS collapse, Schoellhorn said the company remained open to joining forces with Britain, Italy, and Japan for the GCAP, provided Germany secured a significant share of the work and meaningful leadership.

“What we’re ready to do is to join something or to build something where we have a significant portion of the work and the leadership. That’s currently being explored,” he said.

Days after Germany pulled out of FCAS, a group of companies led by Airbus, operating under the banner “Team Gen 6,” also submitted a position paper to the German government outlining a sixth-generation fighter concept, underscoring industry’s push for influence over the path forward.

Airbus has since invested heavily in the new path.

With a decision still pending and talks ongoing with both sides, Germany can swing either way. However, the German Defense Ministry’s inclination toward a new partnership with Sweden and Spain reflects the complexities of joining GCAP, now at an advanced stage.

Unlike the FCAS, GCAP Stays on Track

Edgewing, GCAP’s industrial joint venture to design and develop the next-generation fighter, is led by Leonardo (Italy), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan), and BAE Systems (the UK), and is advancing toward the aspirational milestone of flying its first demonstrator by 2027 and fielding the aircraft by 2035.

For Germany, joining the GCAP program at this stage could be thorny. Although the UK and Italy have openly expressed willingness to welcome more partners into the GCAP, Japan has been reluctant, concerned that renegotiating everything with a new partner would delay the program.

In fact, Tokyo—which needs to replace its F-2 combat jet with a sixth-generation fighter amid tensions with China—had earlier blocked cash-rich Saudi Arabia’s entry for similar reasons.

Even if Japan conceded, reopening delicate talks on industrial participation, production shares, and intellectual property could cause friction.

In that scenario, Germany may be offered a junior role, with limited say over design, architecture, and key decisions, which could be unacceptable to both Airbus and Berlin. British industry representative in the program, BAE Systems, is already believed to dominate it and has reportedly been unwilling to share technology with other partners, as Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto alleged earlier in April 2025.

This could limit the German industry partner’s room to maneuver within the program.

Moreover, the German Defense Ministry’s assessment specifically targets BAE Systems, citing bad experiences during the Eurofighter program (pursued jointly by the UK, Germany, Spain, and Italy).

The Ministry has reportedly accused BAE of prioritizing exports over German and Italian development interests and warns that British dominance would be incompatible with a partnership of equals.

Another disadvantage for Germany in joining the GCAP is a clear mismatch between operational requirements and the aircraft’s design philosophy.

The GCAP is reportedly being built around a maritime scenario, whereas Berlin would want an aircraft suited to its own geography and continental use, much like the Eurofighter or the F-35A Lightning II it is acquiring from the US.

Beyond these overarching issues, the existing GCAP members already have different priorities. Japan wants to replace the F-2 with a new fighter by the mid-2030s, while the UK and Italy reportedly want GCAP to create a state-of-the-art “system of systems,” a fighter that can operate with a swarm of drones, on a less strict timeline.

Admitting a new partner could further complicate the program’s internal workings.

Germany with Saab

In contrast, Germany’s collaboration with Sweden and Saab appears much more promising, at least in theory.

For one, if Germany forges a new partnership with Sweden and Spain, it would gain industrial influence and an equal partnership from the start, better alignment with continental European operational needs, and a more balanced industrial starting position.

For example, FCAS got off to a decent start in 2017, with all partners onboard and a division of work, but it eventually stalled over disagreements on work-share arrangements, with French contractor Dassault refusing to cede space to Airbus in developing the Next-Generation Fighter (NGF), the program’s centerpiece.

In its next partnership, Germany would want more influence and a greater workshare that actually benefits its industry.

The three countries could establish an Airbus–Saab joint venture, potentially using Saab’s Gripen E as a technological stepping stone or baseline while developing a new aircraft.

Both sides bring vast experience developing combat aircraft, which would come in handy for the new program. Moreover, bringing Spain into this partnership would give Airbus continuity and likely stronger bargaining power within the grouping.

That said, building a new partnership from the ground up also carries significant risks. The partners would need to establish governance structures, align requirements, agree funding shares, define intellectual property rules, and negotiate work-share from scratch.

This would push fielding past 2035, potentially into the late 2030s or beyond. Moreover, the exact problems that killed the FCAS manned fighter—work-share, leadership, and IP control—could easily reappear between Airbus and Saab, two strong design houses with distinct cultures.

Despite these risks, a pure continental European next-generation fighter partnership would preserve greater decision-making autonomy and manufacturing work for German, Spanish, and Swedish industry. More importantly, it would support long-term European defense-industrial capacity without the complications of late entry into an existing program with set architecture and priorities.

Saab is already conducting independent studies on sixth-generation technologies and has publicly stated it remains open to collaborations, including on fighter aircraft. “Saab remains open to a variety of collaborations and partnerships across a wide range of defense-related areas, including fighter aircraft.

Large-scale cooperation projects of this kind are typically addressed at the political level, with participation decisions made by the governments concerned,” a Saab spokesperson was quoted as saying in the POLITICO report. “Consequently, any questions about possible Swedish involvement should be directed to the Swedish government.

As always, Saab stands ready to support Sweden’s future fighter requirements,” it added. Meanwhile, Airbus boss Michael Schöllhorn shed some light on the company’s relationship with Saab in an interview with Handelsblatt earlier this week, emphasizing that they had “always worked well” together.

For now, it remains to be seen which way Chancellor Merz’s government will swing. The choice is between accepting a subordinate but potentially faster role within a mature program, or insisting on industrial leadership and requirements fit, at the cost of delays and the risk of repeating past mistakes and failures.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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Russia is using fighter jets from both ends of its inventory, its most advanced fifth-generation Su-57s and the rare MiG-35s, to counter Ukraine’s long-range drones, though for sharply different operational reasons.

While reports of Su-57s deployment for Moscow’s air defense and shooting down Ukrainian drones have appeared frequently, a Telegram channel belonging to the specialized community Soniashnyk and connected to Ukrainian aviation reported on October 21 that Russia deployed a MiG-35 to shoot down Ukrainian drones.

The Telegram channel also published an image of a russian pilot in the cockpit of a MiG-35 allegedly involved in intercepting Ukrainian drones.

What makes MiG-35s alleged involvement in anti-drone operations unusual is the fact that these jets are still in the experimental stage and have rarely been used in the war in Ukraine.

In fact, while the war in Ukraine is already in its fifth year, there have only been three known instances where MiG-35s were involved in combat operations, and every time they were used for anti-drone operations.

The first reports of MiG-35 involvement in anti-drone operations emerged nearly three years ago, in November 2023; however, at the time, the story was based entirely on claims from Russian industry, with no supporting images or videos.

Sergei Korotkov, Chief Designer at the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), told RIA Novosti that the MiG-35 was already participating in operations related to the conflict in Ukraine.

He said the aircraft “is already participating in all ongoing operations” amid the current events in Ukraine, and that the Ministry of Defense still needs to decide on serial procurement before further test flights.

Then nearly one-and-a-half years later, in May 2025, Russian sources claimed the MiG-35 was used for the first time since the start of the special military operation to intercept Ukrainian UAVs.

Now, nearly 17 months later, and for the first time, a Telegram channel associated with Ukrainian aviation has reported the use of the MiG-35 to counter Ukrainian drones. This time, it also published an image of the MiG-35 pilot.

Clearly, Russia has scarcely used MiG-35s in the war in Ukraine, and only for anti-drone operations.

So why is Russia using the latest, most advanced fighter jet from the legendary Mikoyan factory, which Moscow markets as a 4+++ generation fighter, so sparingly and strictly only for anti-drone operations?

Why is the MiG-35 Missing From Action?

Part of the reason is the numbers themselves.

So far, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) have received only six MiG-35s (four single-seat MiG-35S and two two-seat MiG-35UB variants).

All six fighters belong to an experimental/pre-production batch that took five years to produce, from 2018 to 2023. Two of these fighters (both two-seat MiG-35UB variants) are trainers.

The Mig-35 aircraft has not entered serial production yet.

The extremely limited numbers and experimental status mean that neither enough jets are available for combat nor have they matured enough to serve in frontline combat roles.

In fact, while Russia placed its first order for the MiG-35 eight years ago in 2018, and the fighter entered operational service in 2019, Moscow has placed no subsequent orders.

Russia initially planned to order 37 MiG-35s; later, it reduced that number to 24. However, in the end, Russia ordered only six aircraft.

Russia backed multiple Sukhoi models, including the Su-34, Su-35, and fifth-generation Su-57, over the cheaper MiG-35.

Similarly, although Russia presented the MiG-35 to international customers at the 2017 Moscow air show and entered it in numerous export contests, including the massive Indian MMRA contest for 114 fighter jets, it won no export orders.

Other export customers, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Iran, and Egypt, also overlooked the MiG-35.

The lack of substantial domestic orders and zero export orders clearly points to the fighter’s below-par performance.

In fact, analysts have consistently pointed out that while the MiG-35 was promised as a 4++ generation aircraft, it offers only marginal improvements over the 1980s MiG-29 in range, engine performance, and payload capacity, rather than a transformative leap.

They point out that the MiG-35 airframe is essentially a rebranded late-model Fulcrum airframe with slight modifications, such as more internal fuel and a larger wing area.

It currently has a PESA radar, not the promised AESA radar. The serial-production aircraft lacks thrust-vectoring control, as previously planned.

Its RD-33 derivative engines have underperformed, delivering no real gains in thrust, fuel economy, or reliability.

Analysts also point out that with air combat changing dramatically, the MiG-35 increasingly looks like an outdated combat aircraft.

It is not a stealth platform and lacks long-range weapons, sensor fusion, potent electronic warfare capabilities, and network-centric warfare.

No wonder neither Russia nor export customers are ordering MiG-35s.

Countries that want high-capability, high-performance fighters pick Rafale, F-35, F-15 Eagles, and F-16V.

Countries seeking cheaper alternatives gravitate toward the Chinese JF-17 and JF-10 and the Swedish Gripen.

Until MiG-35s receive new capabilities such as AESA radar, thrust vectoring, long-range weapons, and sensor fusion, the aircraft is ill-suited for modern warfare.

However, Ukrainian swarm drone attacks and the falling number of Russian combat aircraft due to wartime losses mean that Moscow is deploying every airborne asset that it can mobilize to counter Ukrainian drones.

Further, the limited deployment of MiG-35s in the Ukraine conflict serves two other purposes for Russia: it can give Moscow valuable real-world data to improve the aircraft and signal to international customers that the fighter has been combat-tested.

In fact, there is a case for resurrecting the flop MiG-35; it is substantially cheaper than Sukhois like the Su-34 and Su-35. Its operating costs are also much lower than the heavier Sukhoi fighters.

Once the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will need a cheaper alternative to expensive, heavy Sukhoi fighters to quickly rebuild the VKS fleet with more numbers to account for heavy wartime losses.

In fact, last year Breaking Defense reported that Yuri Slyusar, shortly before leaving his post as head of the United Aircraft-Building Corporation (OAK), confirmed that the MiG-35, now designated a “4+++ generation fighter,” would begin large-scale production.

Russia may be deploying the MiG-35 in limited counter-drone operations to test its performance in real-world conditions and use the data to improve the serial-production variant once the war ends.

Russia, however, is deploying the fifth-generation Su-57 for very different reasons.

Why is Russia Deploying Su-57 to Hunt Drones?

Another Russian fighter that has seen only a limited role in the war in Ukraine is the fifth-generation Su-57.

During a Ukrainian swarm drone attack on Russia’s largest Omsk oil refinery in July, online footage from locals showed the silhouette of the elusive Su-57 shrieking overhead.

Earlier, pictures emerged showing a Su-57 fitted with R-73 air-to-air missiles on its wing pylons rather than in its internal weapons bay. Another set of pictures has shown the Su-57 carrying short-range R-73/R-74 (AA-11 Archer) series air-to-air missiles.

Carrying the missiles beneath the wing pylons would compromise the Su-57’s stealth; however, if the jet is deployed primarily for anti-drone operations, stealth is unnecessary. Similarly, short-range AAMs are effective only against drones.

These pictures provide conclusive evidence that Russia used the Su-57 for counter-drone operations.

Critics argue that Moscow is deliberately limiting the Su-57’s exposure to protect its export potential. Any confirmed losses to Ukrainian forces, they say, would severely damage the jet’s credibility in the international export market.

Russia is therefore using the Su-57 for low-risk counter-drone operations.

The war of attrition in Ukraine, which is already in its fifth year, the high aircraft loss ratio for both sides, and the intensity of Ukrainian swarm drone attacks have created a peculiar situation for Russia, where it is deploying its most advanced fighter, the Su-57, and perhaps the least promising, the MiG-35, mostly for low-risk counter-drone operations.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Su-57 and MiG-35: How Russia is Using Its Best and Worst Fighter Jets To Fight Ukraine’s Drones appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Is Turkey now globally recognized as a major military-industrial power?

The question assumes significance as, in a span of 48 hours, Turkey has signed two significant agreements that enhance its military-industrial power projection.

In Doha on October 21, it signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan, Qatar, and Indonesia for joint defense production, integrated manufacturing chains, and technology sharing.

In Ankara on October 22, it signed a Strategic Partnership with Canada, including a formal Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership, alongside deals on energy and air transport.

Four senior ministers signed the Badr Memorandum (BMU): Pakistan’s defense minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Turkey’s defense minister Yasar Guler, Qatar’s Deputy PM Sheikh Saud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Yusuf Jauhari.

Prof. Dr. Haluk Görgün, President (Secretary) of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) in Turkey and regarded as the “architect” of the BMU, was present at the signing ceremony.

Incidentally, Badr refers to the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers defeated their opponents in one of Islam’s earliest battles in the Arabian Peninsula.

Turkey’s defense ministry explained the name “Badr” as “full moon”. It said that “the four participating nations complement one another through this pact, which holds significant military and economic importance”.

In a statement, it added that “by leveraging the capabilities of each country in the field of military production, cooperation and integration will be achieved, defense industry capacities will be developed, and the needs of allied and friendly nations can thus be met.”

Similarly, the statement made by the Qatari Defense Ministry said the “Badr” Memorandum of Understanding “aims to foster cooperation in the field of defense manufacturing, enhance defense capabilities among the four countries, and promote collaboration in technical defense training, as well as in research and development areas, thereby contributing to the creation of solutions and industries worthy of the evolution of modern defenses”.

According to Arda Mevlutoglu, managing director of Ankara-based Mergen Analytical Strategies, the BMU’s implications could extend well beyond the four participants. “We may be witnessing the emergence of an interconnected network of defense and security arrangements extending from the Gulf to South and Southeast Asia, rather than a single formal alliance”.

Under the agreement, each country will bring its own resources and skills to the table.

“Turkey contributes technological expertise, systems integration and a mature defense industry; Pakistan and Indonesia offer manufacturing capacity, skilled workforces and sizable domestic markets; and Qatar provides investment potential and demand. Together, the four nations could establish integrated supply chains, allowing these countries to jointly develop, manufacture and sustain defence systems”, Mevlutoglu told Al Jazeera.

This means each member brings a complementary, not equal, asset. Turkey provides the industrial core, with establishments like Baykar (drones), TAI (aerospace), Aselsan (defense electronics), Roketsan (Missiles and munitions), STM (naval systems), and proven export models like the TB2 and Akıncı unmanned air-combat vehicles.

But Turkey seeks scale, co-production markets, and capital. Qatar can provide the finance. Pakistan and Indonesia can serve as markets.

Reportedly, Pakistan wants to diversify its military imports and not rely solely on China. It wants technology transfer and self-reliance through collaborations.

Indonesia is an emerging market and production base. Jakarta has bought Turkish weapons before — Kaplan tanks, MILGEM-derived frigates — and wants to build its own defense industry under Prabowo’s doctrine, with access to NATO-standard tech without full Western political conditions. The doctrine is championed by President Prabowo Subianto, who is aggressively executing a multifaceted supplier-diversification and co-production strategy.

However, the BMU is not the Mecca Pact of August 2026 that Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia signed in Riyadh and reportedly contains a collective defense clause—an attack on one is an attack on all.  It is an industrial MoU.

But one could argue that the initiative reflects Gulf countries increasingly looking toward the Global South and fellow Muslim countries, as recent Middle East conflicts have exposed vulnerabilities tied to dependence on foreign suppliers, technology restrictions, and supply chain disruptions.

By anchoring a defense-industrial coalition with Qatar, Pakistan, and Indonesia, Ankara seems to have signaled that it could be the technological and industrial nucleus of the Global South. And the global validation of its strategy has come through “the three-year action plan” with Ottawa.

Reports describe the optics of Prime Minister Mark Carney being received at the Presidential Complex in Ankara with full honors by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as historic. Carney is the first Canadian Prime Minister to make a dedicated bilateral visit to Turkey, although he traveled to Ankara in July to attend the NATO summit.

The visit resulted in the signing of three agreements: a Defense Industry Partnership between SSB Chairman Haluk Gorgun and Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand; an Air Transport Agreement; and a Joint Declaration on Energy Cooperation.

Remarkably, a few years ago, the two countries’ defense relations had virtually collapsed.

In October 2019, Canada imposed an arms embargo on Turkey after “Operation Peace Spring” in northeastern Syria. It was a military offensive launched by the Turkish Armed Forces and the allied Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

In October 2020, Canada suspended and later canceled export permits for L3Harris Wescam camera and targeting systems after confirming they were used on Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones supporting Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In fact, Canada adopted a presumptive-denial policy for military exports to Turkey. The Turkish defense industry saw Canada as a technology chokepoint.

However, over the last two years, Canada and Turkey have rebuilt their defense relationship. In January 2024, Ottawa quietly lifted arms-export restrictions and returned to a case-by-case assessment. In July 2026, at the NATO Summit in Ankara, the two defense ministers signed a “Statement of Intent”  on military dialogue.

“In an increasingly complex global security environment, rising geopolitical uncertainties, and evolving humanitarian challenges, a strong and resilient Canada-Turkiye partnership is essential, providing a foundation to mitigate shared threats and capitalize on new opportunities,” said a joint statement by Carney and Erdogan on Thursday.

Canary’s own statement was more emphatic: “Today’s new Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership will connect Canadian and Turkish companies to work together, creating good jobs at home, export opportunities abroad, greater security for our citizens, and contributing to a stronger NATO alliance”.

The partnership’s three-year action plan rests on four pillars: trade and investment; defense and security; energy; and ties between people.

On trade, investment and innovation, the two leaders agreed to “work toward the successful conclusion of a Canada-Turkey Free Trade Agreement”. They will also expand bilateral trade and investments in priority sectors, including energy supply, defense production, aerospace, and artificial intelligence (AI).

On defense and security, Carney and Erdogan “underlined their intent to deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation”. They also agreed to “strengthen cooperation in support of peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, including Ukraine, South Caucasus, and the Middle East, in particular Gaza”.

The three-year action plan calls for exploring co-development in aerospace, defense production, AI, critical minerals, LNG, and nuclear energy.

Of course, what Canada has agreed is not about Turkey alone. Carney is in the middle of a full-scale trade war with Washington. President Donald Trump’s tariffs and rhetoric questioning Canadian sovereignty have forced Ottawa to pursue a deliberate diversification strategy.

Carney has already reset ties with Saudi Arabia, India and China — all strained under his predecessor Justin Trudeau. Turkey, with 87 million people, NATO’s second-largest army, and a growing industrial base, fits perfectly into his “reliable partners” and “collective resilience” narrative.

For Turkey, the gain is more strategic than commercial. A G7 member and a Five Eyes country, which once embargoed it, Canada now legitimizes its defense industry as a partner. No wonder Erdogan was quick to link Thursday’s agreement to his pet project — “the Defense, Security and Resilience Bank” , announced by nine countries at the NATO summit in July 2026 to finance defense production.

Few will contest that Turkey’s defense industry has grown steadily. From an import-dependent country with 20% local production in 2002 to over 80% today, with $7.1 billion in exports in 2024, it is now a top-15 arms exporter. The fact that both Canada, which embargoed it, and Indonesia, which has options from South Korea and France, want co-production with Turkey is the recognition of Turkey’s defense ecosystem.

Apparently, the narrative has shifted from “Turkey buys” to “Turkey builds with.” Both the Badr agreement and the deal with Canada use the language of “joint production and technology sharing”, not a “buyer-seller” arrangement.

Secondly, Turkey is building a parallel architecture. A formal NATO ally, it is also becoming the leader of a non-Western defense network.

Thirdly, it is showing “Sanctions Resilience”. Western restrictions for its intervention in Syria and the controversy over its buying the S-400  from Russia seem to have taught Turkey to indigenize. Now that indigenization is proving to be its selling point.

However, some reality checks are needed. Turkey’s achievements need not be projected as triumphalism.

After all, both the Agreements made at Doha and Ankara are  MoUs and framework agreements. No specific defense program has been identified that would allow assessment of impact on regional military balance. “Badr” has no factory, no joint venture company yet. In defense deals, MOUs are one thing, but their eventual shape is a different matter.

Second, there is the technology ceiling. Turkey still depends on Western subsystems — engines for Kaan and Altay, critical minerals processing, and high-end semiconductors. Canada can help with the latter, but Ottawa’s case-by-case export control means strategic tech will still be gated.

Engaging pragmatically with strategically vital G20 and NATO allies without requiring complete alignment on all domestic values, Canada is meeting this moment with what it calls “values-based realism”.

It is “pragmatically” dealing with other countries, but it will not cross a line when its commitment to the fundamental values of freedom, human rights, sustainability, and solidarity is challenged.

So, it remains to be seen how long Canada will remain silent on the widely reported sweeping and unprecedented nationwide crackdown by the Turkish government on dissent and civil society, heavily focusing on the systematic dismantling of LGBTQ+ and HIV-advocacy organizations.

However, all this does not detract from the fact that Turkey is emerging as a second-tier military-industrial power like South Korea and Israel. Its products are innovative and export-driven. But it has miles to go before reaching the status of the US, France, and Russia, which set global standards.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Canada Deal Cements Turkey’s Position as a Military-Industrial Power. Comes After Makkah & Badr Pacts appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

For the first time, a Royal Air Force (RAF) Eurofighter Typhoon flew alongside the French nuclear-capable Rafale during a simulated nuclear-strike mission, showcasing rare coordination between Europe’s two most advanced fighter jets. 

The UK deployed a small contingent of Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4s to France’s Saint-Dizier air base—a key facility in northeastern France that hosts Rafale squadrons of the deterrence force—for Exercise Rummy held over two days on October 20 and 21, 2026.

The exercise took place over France and the Mediterranean, with the Typhoons serving as a defensive counter-air (DCA) escort for the mock nuclear-armed Rafales during a simulated long-range nuclear strike sortie. The A330 MRTT refueling tankers supported the package.

“Taking off from the nuclear-capable air base at Saint-Dizier, the French and British crews demonstrated a very high level of interoperability and an ability to coordinate. The French and British nuclear forces remain independent,” the French Chief of the Defense Staff, General Fabien Mandon, said in a post on X.

Notably, the exercise did not involve any real nuclear warheads, although images published by French officials and Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin show French Rafales armed with ASMP (an air-launched land-attack cruise missile that can carry a nuclear payload) and Mica air-to-air missiles. Meanwhile, the Eurofighters were seen equipped with the short-range ASRAAM air-to-air missiles and fuel tanks.

“Conducted under robust safety and security arrangements, the exercise did not involve nuclear weapons. The exercise focused on improving how our forces work together, ensuring that if the UK faces a serious threat, our military can respond quickly and effectively alongside our closest European ally,” the UK Ministry of Defense said in an official statement on October 23, 2026.

Under the Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations (CSNO) concept, which is an established approach of NATO, the conventionally armed Eurofighter Typhoons could provide conventional escort and protection for the nuclear-capable Rafales without carrying, controlling, or deciding on the use of nuclear weapons.

As the nuclear-armed aircraft’s main air defense, the Typhoons would have unrestricted movement around the Rafales’ perimeter to identify and, if required, neutralize any radar contacts.

Optimized for high-altitude, high-speed air superiority and carrying weapons for both short- and long-range combat, the Eurofighter Typhoons can detect, intercept, and engage enemy fighters that threaten the strike package during a nuclear mission.

In a real mission, the Typhoon’s high-altitude intercept capability and the Rafale’s low-observable, terrain-following performance would lower overall mission risk and improve the chances of the strike aircraft reaching the launch point.

Nuclear Cooperation Without Sharing Nukes

Both the UK and France are nuclear powers, although Britain stopped using air-launched nuclear weapons in 1998 following the Strategic Defense Review (SDR), and currently only possesses the Trident submarine-launched missiles for nuclear weapons. France, by contrast, has both sea- and air-based nuclear launch capability.

France, in turn, retains exclusive political and operational control over its nuclear forces. Therefore, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force; it shows only that two independent deterrents can practice the tactical and procedural interface of a nuclear mission, including communications, escort, tanker support, and deconfliction, without combining their weapons, targeting, or the final decision to fire.

That said, France and Britain signed the Northwood Declaration to strengthen cooperation on their respective nuclear arsenals during French President Emmanuel Macron’s three-day visit to Britain in July 2025. 

“This morning, we signed the Northwood Declaration, confirming for the first time that we are coordinating our independent nuclear deterrence,” the former British PM Keir Starmer said at the time. ”From today, our adversaries will know that any extreme threat to this continent would prompt a response from our two nations. There is no greater demonstration of the importance of this relationship.”

Later that year, the newly formed Nuclear Steering Group met for the first time in Paris, and British officials observed Exercise Poker, a regular nuclear deterrence exercise conducted by French Air and Space Forces, marking the first time foreign officials had been given that access. Notably, the UK went from mere observer to participant, providing conventional support in a nuclear deterrence drill, in 10 months.

“Having independent nuclear forces doesn’t exclude coordination. By coordinating, our nuclear forces demonstrate that they can contribute even more significantly to the overall security of the alliance and the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic zone,” French Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin stated.

Meanwhile, British Defense Secretary Wes Streeting said, “As Europe’s nuclear powers, we have a shared responsibility to contribute to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. This exercise demonstrates the depth of our partnership, the credibility of our deterrents and our determination to stand together in the face of emerging threats.”

France has been collaborating with several European partners on the idea of “forward deterrence” amid uncertainties about US security guarantees for Europe and escalating security threats from Russia. Earlier this year, German Eurofighter Typhoons flew alongside French nuclear-capable Rafales in a joint “forward deterrence” exercise earlier this year.

In July 2026, two Luftwaffe Eurofighter Typhoons from Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 31 “Boelcke” at Nörvenich and two French Air and Space Force Dassault Rafale Bs from the Forces Aériennes Stratégiques at Saint-Dizier conducted their first joint air activity.

In March this year, French President Macron announced some changes in the country’s nuclear policy, including increasing the size of the country’s nuclear arsenal and extending the deterrent to cover other European countries.

“The next 50 years will be an era of nuclear weapons,” he exclaimed. The President noted that the UK, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark had all agreed to participate in the new “advanced deterrence” plan. He emphasized that the eight European nations could host air bases where France’s nuclear bombers could be based as well as participate in exercises of France’s air-launched nuclear capability. 

This would allow France’s Strategic Air Forces (FAS) to “spread out across the depth of the European continent… and thus complicate the calculations of our adversaries”, the president said at the time. This hinted that the country was eager to spearhead the continent’s nuclear posture amid rising security threats from Russia and a strained transatlantic relationship that has heightened insecurity among European states.

That said, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force, nor does it amount to a French nuclear umbrella in the classic extended-deterrence sense. Instead, it shows France systematically testing how far it can bring conventional partners–including Europe’s only other nuclear power–into the operational orbit of its airborne nuclear forces while retaining full control over the nukes in line with the larger “forward deterrence.”

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post Rafale Jets Lead Nuclear Strike Package, Eurofighter Typhoons Provide Air Cover in 1st UK-France Nuke Drills appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Four of China’s new KJ-3000 airborne early warning aircraft have been spotted at the Xi’an Aircraft Company complex, suggesting the type may have entered low-rate or serial production just 22 months after its first flight. 

Satellite images captured around October 4, 2026, by Vantor and posted to social media show four KJ-3000 early warning aircraft at the Xi’an Aircraft Company (XAC) complex in Yanliang. Three were spotted near the Y-20 production facilities, and the fourth was seen at the adjacent China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE).

Senior Fellow J. Michael Dahm of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies analyzed all available images in depth and assessed that the presence of four aircraft at Xi’an’s Y-20 production facility indicates the KJ-3000 has entered serial production. 

However, Chinese military aviation specialist Andreas Rupprecht seemed to agree with Dahm’s assessment, though he noted that the images could instead signal that the aircraft have entered low-rate production.

“Consequently, this could indeed be a sign that production or LRIP has begun; however, it could also be that all 4 previously known prototypes are in place. What we therefore need are clear photographs of the aircraft, their serial numbers, and, at best, showing them in PLAAF grey,” he argued, adding just the amount of caution required vis-à-vis Chinese platforms.

The KJ-3000, expected to be China’s most advanced early warning aircraft, first broke cover in December 2024, right after the sixth-generation prototypes, the J-36 and the J-50, were seen flying for the first time.

A pixelated image of the KJ-3000 in flight was posted to social media, as the EurAsian Times had reported at the time. Another highly pixelated image of a primer-painted aircraft bearing serial number 7821 surfaced in May 2025.

Notably, AEW&C aircraft serve as “eyes in the sky,” providing real-time surveillance and command and control over large areas. They are crucial force multipliers that coordinate air operations, guide fighters, and integrate data from multiple sources, including satellites, other aircraft, and ground-based sensors, serving as airborne command centers. Thus, playing a vital role in complex, dynamic battlefields where rapid decision-making is key.

Although details about the KJ-3000 are scarce, it is based on the Y-20B transport aircraft and powered by a WS-20 high-bypass turbofan engine.

The aircraft has a noticeable set of antennae on the forward fuselage and a large circular radome positioned over the rear fuselage. It also features a prominent intake at the base of the tailfin, likely to supply cooling air for its numerous onboard electronics. Additionally, it has an aerial refueling probe above the cockpit.

The aircraft is expected to have a detection range of 360 to 500 kilometers, although some estimates put it at 600 to 1,000 kilometers. These conjectures couldn’t be verified.

The massive early warning radar aircraft is likely intended to replace the KJ-2000, China’s only large jet-powered AEW&C platform to date. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) had a limited fleet of about four KJ-2000 aircraft, converted from Russian Ilyushin Il-76MD transports in the early 2000s, as the program stalled due to limited access to suitable Il-76 airframes and reliance on Russian engines and spares.

The KJ-3000 is believed to be a massive improvement over the KJ-2000. It can reportedly carry up to 66 tons of payload (16 tons more than the KJ-2000), and the WS-20 engines provide more thrust (about 31,000 pounds) and fuel efficiency, enabling longer flights.

The KJ-3000 would serve as a high-end airborne command, control, and surveillance node, significantly enhancing China’s ability to detect, track, and coordinate forces across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific in a potential conflict with the United States.

Its large AESA radar—mounted on a high-flying, long-endurance Y-20B platform—provides a much greater radar horizon than ground-based radars or existing smaller Chinese AEW&C aircraft.

Operating at higher altitudes and with aerial refueling will allow the KJ-3000 to provide persistent coverage over key maritime approaches, the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine Sea, or the South China Sea.

The aircraft could detect aircraft, ships, and potentially low-observable or low-flying threats (such as drones and bombers) farther away, giving Chinese forces earlier warning and more time to decide on a fast-moving battlefield.

The KJ-3000 is designed as a “sky command center.” It can track multiple targets at once and direct Chinese fighters, such as the J-20 stealth aircraft, as well as long-range air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and drones.

Furthermore, the KJ-3000 detects and tracks carrier strike groups, airborne tankers, AWACS, and strike packages at longer ranges, feeding targeting data to ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, and helping Beijing’s painstakingly built Anti-Access/Area-Denial structure.

A Mismatch Between Chinese & US Capability

Interestingly, China’s expanding early warning capabilities contrast sharply with those of the United States Air Force, which continues to grapple with the transition of its own heavy advanced early warning from the E-3 to the more advanced E-7 Wedgetail.

The E-3 Sentry fleet is aging, and its airframe and radar limitations are becoming more acute with every passing day. The planned replacement, the Boeing 737-based E-7 Wedgetail, already in service with allies such as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, and soon the United Kingdom, was originally planned for the USAF at 26 aircraft. However, budget uncertainty and shifting priorities have repeatedly delayed procurement.

Last year, for instance, the previous US Air Force plan to acquire 26 Boeing E-7 Wedgetail aircraft remained under review during the fiscal 2026 budget process under the current Trump administration, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

However, Congress pushed back against potential cuts and cancellation of the program.

In March 2026, the USAF changed strategy and awarded contract modifications to continue development and procure additional engineering-and-manufacturing-development (EMD) aircraft, bringing the contracted total to about seven. Later, in May 2026, the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated the department’s “mindset” had changed and that the E-7 “has a future” and a place on the battlefield.

Finally, reports in June 2026 noted that the Pentagon was seeking diversion of money from the US Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye and classified Air Force accounts to fund a $1.55 billion spending plan for its revived E-7 Wedgetail program in fiscal 2027. However, it has not yet committed to the large production run of the originally planned 26 aircraft.

The continued delay has raised concerns about a potential gap in airborne battle management amid rising security threats, especially since the E-3 is becoming outdated and the US has only about 15 of these aircraft (after one loss in the Iran war). 

By contrast, China is not only improving its early warning capabilities but also expanding its AEW&CS fleet—something that could trouble the US and its allies in an Indo-Pacific conflict.

China is Amassing Early Warning Aircraft

Early warning platforms are among an air force’s most strategic assets, especially since a single high-end platform can cover hundreds of thousands of square kilometers and track multiple targets during combat. However, no air force can rely on a handful of expensive, slow-moving, vulnerable early-warning aircraft alone.

So, China appears to have created somewhat of a layered AEW&C force structure.

Under this strategy, instead of fielding one type of aircraft, Beijing is working on deploying complementary tiers of platforms optimized for different roles, ranges, basing options, and threat environments. This is intended to create persistent, resilient, multi-domain surveillance that adversaries find harder to suppress.

China has developed newer early-warning aircraft based on existing designs, including the KJ-500, which forms the backbone of the PLAAF’s early-warning capability and is based on the Shaanxi Y-9 turboprop, and the KJ-200, a legacy aircraft based on the older Y-8.

The KJ-200 and KJ-500 are smaller than the high-end KJ-3000. They are considered ideal for regional operations, including in volatile areas like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and would play a major role in a potential contingency in these flashpoint areas.

The KJ-200s, for one, provide supplementary coverage and experience while the PLAAF expands and simultaneously upgrades its KJ-500 fleet.

China has also developed the KJ-700, a next-generation Y-9-derived design intended as a more capable complement to the KJ-500. It features improved sensors and enhanced networking and is designed to handle denser, more complex threat environments, including low-observable aircraft and large numbers of drones. It is likely designed for missions anticipated in a future conflict with the United States.

China has also developed the KJ-600 for carrier-based operations, giving the PLA Navy massive reach and the ability to detect incoming threats from farther away, allowing it to project power far from its coast. With a twin-turboprop design, folding wings, and a large AESA rotodome, the KJ-600 entered operational service on the CATOBAR carrier Fujian in 2025 and has been observed on the ski-jump carrier Shandong.

The KJ-200 could be classified as a low-tier legacy aircraft, while the KJ-500 and KJ-700 could be clubbed as medium-tier and advanced medium-tier aircraft, respectively.

Meanwhile, the KJ-600 is a specialized carrier aircraft. The larger, more capable KJ-3000 falls into the high-tier category, and its serial production would let China field multiple aircraft for continuous coverage, attrition resilience, or simultaneous operations.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post In Just 22 Months — China’s Four KJ-3000 AEW&C Aircraft Spotted at Xi’an. Experts Hint at Serial Production appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.

Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.

The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.

The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.

It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft. However, the agreement’s execution still depends on Congressional authorization and appropriations.

The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.

The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.

The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.

“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.

“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”

The Pentagon believes multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to invest upfront in expanding production facilities.

Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.

Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.

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The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.

If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.

In addition, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants.

The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.

To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.

Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.

“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”

Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.

The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.

Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.

According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.

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While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.

Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).

Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.

Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will let Lockheed Martin enter long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.

It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.

Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.

It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.

Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.

Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.

If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.

“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24^th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

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Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.

Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.

If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.

Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.

Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.

A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.

The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post F-35 Stealth Fighter: Why Pentagon is Locking Production For a Decade—and Lockheed’s $7B Counter-Bet to Make It Work appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.

Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.

The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.

The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.

It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft.

However, the agreement’s execution remains subject to Congressional authorization and appropriations.

The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.

The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.

The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.

“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.

“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”

The Pentagon believes that multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to make upfront investments in expanding production facilities.

Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.

Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.

The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.

If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.

Besides, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants of the fighter.

The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.

To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.

Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.

“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”

Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.

The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.

Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.

According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.

While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.

Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).

Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.

Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will allow Lockheed Martin to enter into long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, thereby stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.

It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.

Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.

It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.

Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.

Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.

If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.

“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24^th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.

Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.

If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.

Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.

Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.

A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.

The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post The $7 Billion Bet Inside Lockheed’s F-35 Framework: Why Pentagon Wants to Lock Production for a Decade appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.