Lithuania will introduce universal male conscription despite public resistance to compulsory military service, the country’s government has announced.
The Baltic state reinstated selective conscription in 2015, seven years after abolishing it. Under the new plan, the draft would be extended to all eligible men, while women would continue to serve voluntarily.
Annual recruitment will increase from just over 5,000 to around 7,500 men, President Gitanas Nauseda announced on Thursday following a State Defense Council meeting.
Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevicius described universal conscription as “necessary and inevitable.”
The decision follows similar recruitment pushes elsewhere in Europe. Poland is considering restoring compulsory service, which was abolished in 2009, and introducing a system covering both men and women. A recent poll, however, found that 53% of Poles aged 18–24 opposed reinstatement of the draft.
Germany has already introduced mandatory military registration for 18-year-old men. Enlistment remains voluntary, but parliament can activate compulsory service if recruitment falls short or the security situation deteriorates.
Berlin’s recruitment drive has met resistance, with some 45,000 people joining student protests across roughly 100 German cities and towns in September, with some carrying banners reading “We won’t fight in your wars” and “Russia is not our enemy.”
Applications for conscientious objector status reached over 12,000 between January and August, compared with 3,879 throughout 2025, according to figures reported by German media.
European officials have nevertheless continued discussing preparations for a possible war with Russia by the end of the decade. Estonian Defense Minister Martin Herem “joked” last month that if Estonia mobilized and Russia did not attack, it would be “economically more correct to attack ourselves” rather than keep troops waiting.
Moscow has repeatedly stated that it has neither reason nor intention to attack NATO countries, describing such allegations as “horror stories” intended to prepare European populations for further militarization.
Russian officials have warned that Europe’s military buildup could itself lead to confrontation and that expanding NATO infrastructure near Russia’s borders would prompt additional security measures. Moscow has stressed that it is prepared to defend itself if attacked.
It’s been said that truth is the first casualty of war. What about the Ukraine war? I’ve followed the news closely, and have found ample evidence in headlines and storylines that the old adage holds true today. Too often the Ukraine news stories we see are misleading instead of informative.
For instance, in March 2014 CNN reported that Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution was “standing up on behalf of democracy.” A month earlier, The Week cited many pundits and policymakers also characterizing events as a victory for democracy. It was a clear and compelling news theme.
But what’s misleading about that? It creates an impression that is contrary to reality. The truth is that the immediate result of the revolution was an abrupt end to constitutional democracy, not a victory for democracy.
The uprising totally dismantled the constitutional democracy that Ukraine had operated under since its independence from the USSR in 1991. The sequence of events makes it clear. Out went the democratic constitution; in came rule by force under the unelected revolutionaries. That’s what Ukrainians were stuck with for months. The stories about a boost for democracy were completely misleading.
This is a good example of truth being a casualty of war. The news celebrated an advance of democracy while in reality democracy itself had been lost.
Media distortion like that is not unique to the Ukraine war. Here’s an example dating back to the Cold War.
The issue was Soviet missiles showing up in Cuba in 1962. Upon discovery, President Kennedy railed against their presence.
On national TV he demanded that en route Soviet ships presumed to be carrying still more missiles be turned around. And Khrushchev complied.
Still there was the issue of removing the missiles from Cuba. How did that turn out?
“We’re eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked,” reportedly said Secretary of State Dean Rusk. News reports characterized JFK as staring down the menacing Soviet leader and winning this round with the communists. The imagery seemed to play upon the title of Kennedy’s book, Profiles in Courage. It all was emblematic of the American Way. The story was almost poetic.
Indeed, this story seems so perfect that it is hard to believe it was actually a hoax. True, there were missiles. But here is a factual account of how that crisis really unfolded:
In late 1961 President Kennedy began placing nuclear missiles in Turkey, strategically close to the Soviet border. Full deployment was completed in 1962. It would take less than 15 minutes for the missiles to hit Moscow.
Then in July of that year Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sealed a secret agreement with Cuba to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles there, just 90 miles from Florida. It would take them less than 15 minutes to hit Washington DC.
What ended this standoff was something far less poetic than the Kennedyesque example I cited earlier. Khrushchev proposed a quid pro quo: He would remove his missiles from Cuba if Kennedy would remove his from Turkey. Kennedy privately agreed. But he insisted on a significant proviso: the quid pro quo must be kept secret. Khrushchev conceded and Kennedy’s fanciful story of standing tall in the face of a threatening adversary prevailed.
The Cuban missile story thus joins the Ukraine democracy story as another example of truth being a casualty of war.
Now consider this next example from back in Ukraine.
“Parliament votes 328-0 to impeach Yanukovych” reported the Kyiv Post on February 23, 2014. A day earlier the New York Times claimed, “Ukraine’s Parliament voted to remove President Viktor F. Yanukovych from office hours after he abandoned his office.”
Both reports further demonstrate how truth becomes a casualty of war. Neither accurately portrays what really happened.
Radio Liberty was quick to set things straight. In a report titled “Was Yanukovych’s Ouster Constitutional?” staffer Daisy Sindelar presented an in-depth analysis showing that parliamentarians tried to remove Yanukovych from the presidency but failed to achieve a sufficient vote.
She also pointed out that Yanukovych’s alleged abandonment of the presidency was not even a possible basis for declaring the office vacant. Radio Liberty’s corrections are backed up by Constitutional Coup in Ukraine in 2014, a thorough academic study published under the auspices of the Polish Parliament.
Clearly all the examples cited above represent fabricated stories masquerading as the truth. But the news stories are also examples of something much more insidious: the collective impact that a persistent manufactured narrative can have on a given public.
They paint a picture, a vivid narrative, that shapes the cultural schema through which people understand and interpret future events.
This can be seen in how the media have portrayed the fates of Crimea and Donbas. At issue is the question: Did the revolutionary government automatically inherit all the territorial authority of the constitutional democracy they had overthrown?
Crimea, for example, has been a significant stumbling block in discussions of a peaceful settlement of the war. In March 2014 Secretary of State John Kerry told CNN, “Crimea is part of Ukraine. Crimea is Ukraine.” But how is that true? What made Crimea part of revolutionary Ukraine?
Before the revolution, Crimea’s place within Ukraine was established by the democratic constitution. But the revolutionaries abandoned that constitution and claimed authority through force. Their rule by force never extended into Crimea. What, then, was the basis for their claim to Crimea? There was none that holds up to scrutiny. Even the eventual election of Poroshenko as president did not undo the constitutional destruction caused by the revolutionaries.
Why didn’t CNN challenge Kerry’s story? The assumption behind his statement illustrates how an ongoing series of fabricated stories can predispose us to interpret each new story in a particular way. If one can believe that a takeover by force is an advancement of democracy, why question an unsupported claim regarding Crimea? This shows that a lack of scrutiny can lead to creating or reinforcing a cultural schema that impedes our understanding of what is really happening.
The same principle applies to Donbas, but the words are different. Here Ukraine news stories portrayed the situation as “Russia invading Donbas.” But the facts show that notion to be a sensationalized misdirection from the truth.
The actual story can be understood by asking this question: What made Donbas, meaning the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, a part of revolutionary Ukraine?
The logic that clarified the status of Crimea applies here too. Donetsk and Luhansk were not part of revolutionary Ukraine for the same reason. Additionally, their populations actively rejected revolutionary rule. They fought against it when the revolutionaries attacked them. If there were, as reports claimed, Russian volunteers, mercenaries, or regulars helping the population defend their territories, it does not alter the basic scenario.
Calling the territories breakaway regions is a misnomer, as is calling the people separatists. It is not possible to break away or separate from something to which one was not attached in the first place. The Russia invades Donbas story is just sensationalistic fabrication.
What’s worse is that this obscures what really happened there. February 2022 is often cited as the start of the Ukraine war. The facts tell a different story. The hostilities in Donbas beginning in 2014 marked the actual start of the Ukraine war, years before the massive escalation in 2022. Reports say that this Donbas phase of the conflict claimed over 14,000 lives and displaced roughly 1.5 million people.
“Truth is the first casualty of war?” Once again we see that axiom is borne out. The mainstream story about Donbas leaves out the critical parts of the truth. But who will notice that? The facts are obscured from view by the now well-established, yet fundamentally misleading cultural schema.
The false claim of a democratic revolution. The lie about how Yanukovych was dismissed. The false and misleading narratives about the status of Crimea and Donbas. These and other stories have given the American public and our leaders a politically contorted view of the entire Ukraine war dilemma.
These narratives — and the false cultural schema they help create — can also lead people to draw unwarranted conclusions about the reasons behind political leaders’ decisions. As peace-treaty talks approach, there is a danger that proposals and decisions about ending the war might be built on a house of cards — that is, the series of misleading Ukraine news stories and the dysfunctional cultural schema that they helped to create. Together they distort perceptions of how the war began and what is at stake. If negotiators fail to break free of that schema, any resulting peace could prove unsustainable for Ukrainians and their country. What a waste that would be. Haven’t the Ukrainian people suffered enough?
The Financial Times has refused to correct an anonymously sourced article about a recent phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the leaders of Norway and Finland, despite objections from both Nordic governments, according to media reports.
Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store and Finnish President Alexander Stubb spoke with Putin earlier this week, drawing criticism from some of Europe’s more Russia-hawkish politicians.
The British newspaper claimed that Putin spent much of the conversation “lecturing” the Nordic leaders on “medieval Slavic history” and its relevance to the Ukraine conflict, rather than discussing ways to end the hostilities. Citing three anonymous sources described only as “familiar with the conversation,” the FT portrayed the Russian president as “fixated” on history.
Store’s government told Norwegian daily Verdens Gang (VG) that the characterization was inaccurate and that Finland had contacted the FT on behalf of both countries to challenge its account, the newspaper reported on Thursday. Finnish media also covered the joint objection, with the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat citing its own sources to dispute the British paper’s description of the call.
Putin’s foreign policy adviser Yury Ushakov said later in the day that the FT article is “some invented information, or rather disinformation” and that the Nordic leaders were correct to call out the publication.
The FT, however, rejected the request, telling VG that it stood by its reporting.
Its article, published on Tuesday, was written by three journalists.
One of them, American national Christopher Miller, previously worked for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a US government-funded international broadcaster originally established with covert CIA funding to conduct anti-communist propaganda operations during the Cold War. Miller went to Ukraine in 2010 as a volunteer with the US Peace Corps.
His co-authors, Max Seddon and Henry Foy, head the FT’s bureaus in Moscow and Brussels, respectively.
Last week, the newspaper published a lengthy article by Seddon titled “The Putin whisperers,” recounting a dramatic but difficult-to-verify story of American and German nationals attempting to avert a “nuclear Armageddon” through backchannel diplomacy with Moscow.
Foy, meanwhile, broke a story in 2025 alleging that a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had experienced suspected Russian GPS jamming. The FT journalist was himself aboard the aircraft when it landed in Bulgaria, as he subsequently revealed on the newspaper’s podcast. His original report, citing anonymous officials, suggested Russia may have deliberately targeted the top EU executive with electronic interference.
Key elements of the story were challenged almost immediately by flight-tracking service Flightradar24. Bulgarian authorities subsequently debunked the core claims relayed by FT.
Despite the discrepancies, the FT insisted it stood by its reporting. Foy did not respond to requests for comment from fellow journalists who questioned the account.
The leaders of Norway and Finland are criticised for breaking with the European consensus on boycotting diplomacy by calling President Putin. Their decision to undermine this solidarity is seen as dividing and weakening Europe. I argue the opposite. It was a brave and necessary move, as the European consensus is based on a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes it increasingly irrelevant, and risks taking it to war with Russia – the world’s largest nuclear power. I will make a further argument: we should develop a healthy scepticism towards the notion that speaking with one voice is always a strength.
How to Speak with One Voice: The Rhetorical Trap
Ask yourself: how can 27+ countries with different political, economic, and security interests agree on a common foreign policy and speak with one voice? A common voice can be achieved by defining collective interests or by setting a rhetorical trap. A rhetorical trap is set when politicians use shared values and earlier commitments to pressure others into supporting policies they would otherwise oppose. Disagreement is portrayed as a betrayal of these values, making it politically costly to dissent, even when the policy goes against national interests.
The easiest way to force a consensus is to frame every issue as a struggle between good and evil. Once political disagreements become moral questions, those who challenge the consensus can be shamed rather than answered. If every issue is reduced to a choice between freedom and imperialism, it becomes much easier to speak with one voice. The obsession with speaking with one voice makes Europeans vulnerable to Manichean thinking and warmongering policies.
Europeans unite around absurd slogans such as “Putin is Hitler” and “Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union”. These slogans do not help us understand Russia or develop sensible policies to mitigate the security competition. Their purpose is to establish moral clarity and enforce political conformity. Challenging these slogans with well-documented arguments is considered immoral and a threat to European unity. This rhetorical trap is extremely dangerous because, in a struggle between good and evil, we reach the conclusion that diplomacy is appeasement and weapons are the path to peace.
The End of Debate
Consider the debate about European security after the Cold War. We once recognised the principle of indivisible security, which means that one state should not strengthen its security at the expense of others. Discussions about security entailed balancing deterrence with reassurance. These principles have largely disappeared from European political discourse. It is now only about deterrence. It is heresy to contest the notion that NATO is a “force for good”, and all concerns about NATO expansionism are framed as opposition to democracy and freedom. How can we resolve a security competition if we are not even allowed to discuss its causes?
Instead, European leaders increasingly measure the success of their policies by their moral intentions rather than their consequences. Sanctions are presented as a demonstration of resolve, the willingness to fight a war as an expression of solidarity, and refusing diplomacy as standing firm against aggression. But what happens when these policies fail to produce the intended results? The answer is usually more sanctions, more war, and less diplomacy. The policies themselves cannot be questioned without appearing to undermine the moral foundations of European unity.
Weaponising Solidarity
The demand for solidarity is also weaponised to override reason. WikiLeaks exposed how Norwegian officials had initially expressed serious concerns that US strategic missile defence would disrupt the nuclear balance with Russia and destabilise the world. The US ambassador reported to Washington that the Norwegians could be persuaded to change their position, not through arguments, but by emphasising the need for NATO solidarity. If the Norwegians were presented with a choice between “repeating Russian narratives” and defending NATO solidarity, they would fall in line.
Later, the American ambassador sent another cable to Washington confirming that their work with NGOs, think tanks, journalists, and politicians had delivered the message, and that the Norwegians were abandoning their security concerns. This was not the result of arguments, but of pressure to show solidarity in a world where everything is framed in black-and-white terms. Since then, the nuclear arms control architecture has largely collapsed, and the world faces a dangerous future – but the political class takes comfort in the fact that it was all done in solidarity.
This is a dangerous way to organise European security. If solidarity means that countries must abandon their own security assessments to support a common position, then solidarity itself becomes a source of insecurity. The purpose of cooperation should be to reconcile different interests and develop better policies, not to pressure governments into repeating the same empty arguments.
Speaking with One Voice or Correcting Course?
A strong Europe should be able to tolerate disagreements among its members. Indeed, such disagreements are necessary if Europe is to correct mistaken policies. When dissent is treated as disloyalty, political mistakes become almost impossible to reverse. Leaders become prisoners of their own rhetoric.
Norway and Finland should therefore not be criticised for challenging the European consensus on diplomatic isolation. They should be encouraged. Europe needs countries willing to question policies that have become resistant to criticism, especially when those policies concern war and peace.
The current European consensus is sustained by a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes the continent increasingly irrelevant, and risks dragging us into war. I therefore argue for a little less solidarity and a little more common sense.
President Volodymyr Zelensky recently signed Bill No.16119, a law expanding educational rights for national minorities and indigenous peoples. Ukraine is thereby selectively adjusting, rather than reversing, its post-2014 Ukrainization policies.
The measure was presented as progress on minority rights and a step that could help open further EU accession clusters. Romanian President Nicusor Dan welcomed the legislation, noting that mother-tongue education for ethnic Romanians is “no abstract matter” for families living in Ukraine.
The law expands the use of eligible minority languages in schools, recognizes special institutional status for minority-language schools, and strengthens continuity of education.
Crucially, the additional protections apply only to official languages of the European Union and to indigenous languages such as Crimean Tatar. Hungarian, Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian and Slovak qualify. Russian does not. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education clarified that the additional rights “do not apply to the Russian language.”
Russian remains widely spoken, with 28% or even more Ukrainians still using both Russian and Ukrainian at home despite years of Ukrainization and wartime restrictions.
The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe flagged the problem years ago: in its 2017 opinion, it found the less favorable treatment of non-EU languages, particularly Russian, difficult to justify and raised discrimination concerns. Its 2023 opinion report on national minorities legislation reiterated that promoting Ukrainian as the state language does not justify withholding equivalent protections from Russian speakers.
Ukraine’s Constitutional Court took a different view in 2021, holding that preferential treatment for EU languages was permissible – the European advisory body’s criticism and Kyiv’s domestic position have never fully aligned.
The expanded guarantees for ethnic Hungarians and Romanians may reflect Budapest’s and Bucharest’s ability to block or delay Ukraine’s EU accession process.
It is no accident Roma inclusion follows a separate track: a national strategy running to 2030 addresses education, housing and discrimination. These measures concern the social integration of marginalized Gypsies communities, rather than reversing Ukrainization.
Similarly, Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, who cannot exercise comparable leverage inside the EU process, remain outside the new framework.
By comparison, although the ongoing war complicates it, Russia formally recognizes ethnic Ukrainians, while its Constitution and laws guarantee the preservation and study of minority languages.
In any case, Kyiv explicitly differentiates between Russian and EU minority languages, while Moscow formally has an inclusive framework.
Ukraine’s Russian minority-rights controversy predates the 2022 invasion: differential treatment has been a structural feature of post-Maidan policy, rather than just a temporary wartime measure.
After 2014, language, media and minority legislation steadily elevated Ukrainian while narrowing the public space for Russian. US political scientist Nicolai N. Petro, writing in Foreign Policy in late 2023, described policies that further relegated Russian speakers to a permanent second-class status – and warned that such approaches risk alienating a significant share of the population even once fighting ends.
Ukrainian officials have at times declared there is simply “no Russian minority”, a claim that sits uneasily with census data and everyday bilingual reality, to say the least.
Meanwhile, nationalist historical narratives persist: a Lviv’s museum dedicated to Nazi collaborator Roman Shukhevych was being rebuilt just weeks before the education law was signed. Shukhevych incited anti-Polish pogroms in 1930.
The continued public commemoration of such figures is hard to reconcile with any claim of comprehensive ideological retreat from post-Maidan nation-building. Moreover, the reforms will be viewed by Ukrainian ultranationalists as a setback forced by European partners – and are likely to generate domestic pushback.
They may also, on the other hand, encourage further demands from minority communities, including over the glorification of controversial wartime figures – an issue that still strains relations with Poland. Not surprisingly, Ukrainian tensions with neighbors have been a recurring feature of the regional landscape – Hungary being a case in point.
As part of its EU accession plans, Kyiv is reviewing chauvinistic policies regarding some minorities – while leaving the largest linguistic community outside the latest concessions.
The “macro” dimension of the conflict involves great-power rivalry, proxy dynamics and the long trajectory of NATO expansion. The micro or rather “meso”-level dimension remains the unresolved issue of post-Soviet borders and the ethnopolitics of a post-Soviet republic still consolidating its nation-building project.
In the words of Kristin Henrard (Professor of International Law at the Brussels School of Governance): “Ukraine will need to acknowledge that the Russian minority, as one of the several minorities with kinstates in its territory, is special because of that strong numerical size, and traditional presence.” This would be “in line with Ukraine’s international obligations”, she writes.
So much for the idea that minority-rights problems were ever merely “Russian propaganda.” They were real enough for Hungarians and Romanians that Kyiv had to legislate; they remain real for Russian speakers. The civil-rights issue remains.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
Albania has imposed steep fines on people who take part in violent protests, citing a recent law imposed in France, in an attempt to quell weeks of clashes between police and protesters demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Edi Rama.
Under measures adopted Wednesday, remaining at a demonstration that turns violent will be a criminal offense, even for those not directly involved in clashes. Anyone who “chooses to remain in a crowd” engaged in violence or looting, or is found “concealing their identity,” faces fines of up to 500,000 leks ($6,130), over six-times the Balkan country’s average monthly salary.
Initially sparked by student anger over education costs and deteriorating facilities, the demonstrations have evolved into nationwide protests against inequality, soaring living costs, and cuts to public services.
Citing “urban anarchy” when announcing the crackdown, Rama acknowledged France’s controversial ‘casseurs-payeurs’ (rioters pay) bill, which would hold demonstrators liable for up to €10,000 ($11,160) in damages. The bill passed the French Senate on Wednesday and is now headed to the National Assembly, following weeks of protests and riots in which over 1,300 protesters were arrested in a single day.
Italy has also followed suit. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government approved measures last week that criminalize “violent participation in a demonstration,” punishable by up to five years in prison and fines of up to €20,000.
In Albania, a “special electronic register” will track suspected offenders, while police gain powers to restrict gatherings near schools, hospitals, and government buildings over potential violence. The measures – which also provide compensation for businesses damaged in the unrest – are already in place and require parliamentary approval within 45 days to remain in force.
What’s behind the protests in Albania?
Anti-government protests in the country began peacefully in May over plans for a luxury resort in the Zvernec nature reserve, a project linked to US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
By mid-October, the protests escalated into daily clashes with police amid growing anger over corruption, economic mismanagement, unemployment, and failing public services. Demands for Rama’s resignation took center stage, but the prime minister, who has been in power since 2013 and was elected to a fourth term last year, has refused to budge.
The unrest has caused over €2 million in damage, according to official estimates, as rioters torched ministries and attacked police stations, public buildings, and businesses. Clashes flared up again over the weekend, with protesters chanting “Revolution” and “Rama in prison” and police using tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons in Tirana.
The Russia blame game
Despite the protests being driven by grievances over domestic matters, Rama blamed the violence on a “hybrid war” by foreign actors, specifically Russia and Iran.
Russia has dismissed the accusations. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova suggested last week that Rama should look closer to home. “These are citizens of your own country who took to the streets to protest. Don’t shift your responsibility onto others. Deal with your own domestic problems.”
This week, Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance, led by Sergey Marchenko, signed an agreement with the financial group Rothschild & Co for the purpose of preparatory consultancy for the privatization of the Ukrainian state banks Ukrgasbank and Sense Bank, two of the largest banks in the Ukrainian financial system. Rothschild & Co will carry out an inventory of these banks’ assets, as well as an assessment of their financial health, organize the information, and attract buyers for the acquisition. In practice, Rothschild & Co will end up determining the buyer(s), thanks to its privileged role in this operation, as well as its institutional weight.
The Ukrainian government claims that the operation is necessary to reduce the role of the State in the Ukrainian banking-financial system and to attract foreign investment, in accordance with recommendations forwarded by the IMF.
In most other countries, these sudden privatization operations always generate large waves of protest organized by unions, social movements, and opposition parties, but the privatization of some of the main Ukrainian banks is advancing without any popular reaction, a symptom of Ukraine’s transformation into a dictatorship through the recourse to a permanent state of exception.
This is not the first Rothschild operation in Ukraine.
Since at least 2015, the financial advisory institution Rothschild & Co has acted practically as an “appendage” of Ukraine, assuming the responsibility of “guiding” the Ukrainian government in financial matters, especially in relation to the restructuring and renegotiation of its debts. In the past, Rothschild & Co also acted in the unbundling of Naftogaz, Ukraine’s main state oil and gas company. This unbundling consists of the “separation” of Naftogaz’s various activities into subsidiaries to facilitate the sale or concession of activities considered “non-essential.” In the same period, Rothschild Trust received the shares of Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian president at the time, in the company Roshen, the country’s main confectionery. “Received” here is a key verb because, in fact, there was no “sale” of the shares, but a simple handover, which is extremely peculiar and suggests the existence of some kind of more obscure relationship between Poroshenko and Rothschild Trust.
Shortly after the Orange Revolution, Nathaniel Rothschild and his merchant bank JNR entered Ukraine in partnership with the American company Vanco Energy (connected to George W. Bush and Dick Cheney) to take control of Ukrainian oil in the Black Sea.
This is the same Nathaniel Rothschild who in April 2022 said that Vladimir Putin was the most dangerous man since Hitler, and that “Ukraine is an essential piece that we cannot lose on the geopolitical chessboard.” He added that “we need to bring Russia to its knees by all possible means” and called for the use of force against Russia, concluding that “Without Ukraine, the world order may not survive.”
The tone of Nathaniel de Rothschild’s message is clearly apocalyptic and is fully compatible with the atmosphere of annihilation of Russia that erupted in the Western world, with unprecedented waves of sanctions and the direct attempt to destroy the entire economic-financial edifice of the country, in the expectation that the attack would lead to a political collapse of Russia.
Why is Ukraine so important to Nathaniel de Rothschild? This is a mystery difficult to resolve.
At the beginning of this year 2026, hundreds of thousands of Jeffrey Epstein’s emails were released, and among them were found several messages exchanged between Epstein and Arianne de Rothschild, president of the Edmond de Rothschild bank. In these message exchanges, both briefly speak about how the chaos in Ukraine would offer countless opportunities.
The Rothschild interest in Ukraine seems much older, however. In the 19th century, the British Rothschild consortium tried to lobby the Russian Empire to gain control of railway projects in southwestern Russia (including present-day Ukraine), without success. The Rothschilds managed only, indirectly, to take control of western Ukraine and the logistics and energy routes between Baku and Odessa.
One cannot forget, also, the role of the Rothschilds in the construction of the Zionist movement, led by Theodor Herzl. Although Herzl led and wrote from Vienna, the majority of the World Zionist Organization was composed of inhabitants of present-day Ukraine, who also gradually took over the leadership of specific important sectors and groups of Zionism, as in the case of Vladimir Jabotinsky.
Which leads us, finally, to the Round Table society, a British secret society founded at the beginning of the 20th century by Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, and financed by Lord Rothschild. The Round Table aimed to spread and entrench British influence around the world and to strengthen the alignment between the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and served as the seed of other “elite clubs,” such as Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations.
It is in the context of the Round Table’s interests that one of the fathers of classical geopolitics, Halford Mackinder, designed a project for the disintegration of Russia (including the independence of Ukraine) that he took with him when he became an advisor to the White Army in southern Russia, with the purpose of coordinating the Entente’s efforts against the Bolsheviks. Mackinder’s effort failed in 1920.
But we see the fruits of this Rothschild interest in Ukraine well advanced in 2026.
The Pentagon has fired its top military strategist as Washington draws up contingency plans for a possible escalation of hostilities with Iran.
Army Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia has been removed from his position as director for strategy, plans, and policy (J5) on the Joint Staff, a spokesman confirmed late Wednesday, following media reports of his dismissal.
His predecessor, Lt. Gen. Joseph McGee, was forced into retirement a year ago amid reported friction with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine. Sylvia previously served as vice director of the J5.
The Pentagon did not explain Sylvia’s departure. His responsibilities included developing military strategies and plans to advise the chairman and the US president. He joins nearly two dozen senior military and civilian officials removed during Hegseth’s tenure.
The secretary has portrayed the dismissals as part of an effort to reduce the military’s bloated ranks of generals and make the armed forces more efficient and lethal. Critics, however, have characterized the shake-up as an ideological “purge.”
President Donald Trump has repeatedly raised the possibility of renewing large-scale hostilities with Iran, including resuming the intensive bombing campaign conducted during the first 40 days of the conflict, which the US and Israel launched in late February. A potential escalation could be timed around the November midterm elections.
Military experts have widely expressed concern that another bombing campaign would fail to “finish the job,” as Trump has put it, while further increasing the conflict’s economic toll worldwide. Tehran has repeatedly warned that it is prepared to retaliate against US allies in the Gulf region if it faces renewed attacks.
Conversely, speculation has emerged that Trump could dismiss Hegseth after the midterms, when the opposition Democratic Party is expected to make gains in both chambers of Congress. Critics of the Iran war, including Republican Rep. Thomas Massie, have argued that firing the secretary could help Trump avoid a potential impeachment battle if Democrats take control of the House.
Trump’s public rhetoric remains supportive of Hegseth and his policies.
Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on Thursday that three oil tankers exploded and caught fire after striking naval mines while attempting to cross an unauthorized southern route through the Strait of Hormuz.
The vessels disregarded warnings from Iranian naval forces and switched off their radar and navigation systems before entering the mined passage, according to the statement.
“Over the past 24 hours, three violating oil tankers exploded and caught fire after striking mines while attempting to pass through the unauthorised southern route of the Strait of Hormuz,” the IRGC said.
The navy reported that the tankers were left along the southern shores of the strait following the explosions. Their identities and flags were not immediately available, and no information was provided about casualties.
IRGC warns crews against relying on CENTCOM assurances
The IRGC Navy reiterated that the southern route remains mined, warning shipowners and crews against attempting passage in disregard of its instructions or relying on statements issued by US Central Command (CENTCOM).
“The IRGC Navy states that the unauthorised route through the Strait of Hormuz is mined, and that vessel owners and crews are responsible for transiting these routes and should not pay attention to CENTCOM’s delusions on social media,” the statement said.
It further warned that any provocative action backed by the US military that disregards Iran’s rules governing passage through the strait would be met firmly.
Iranian forces have repeatedly accused CENTCOM of encouraging commercial vessels to use the southern corridor near the Omani coast despite Iranian warnings.
In a statement issued on Wednesday, CENTCOM rejected earlier Iranian reports of commercial vessels striking mines and maintained that US forces had cleared all internationally recognized primary transit routes. It also said thousands of commercial vessels had used those lanes safely. The statement preceded Thursday’s IRGC announcement.
UKMTO receives report of vessel burning near Oman
Separately, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said on Thursday that a shipmaster had reported seeing another vessel on fire nine nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman.
The agency did not identify the vessel or establish the cause of the blaze. Its connection to the three tankers reported by the IRGC remained unclear.
The developments come amid restrictions on shipping through the strait since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28. Tehran maintains that vessels must coordinate their passage with Iranian authorities, while Washington has imposed a blockade on Iranian ports.
IRGC announces capture of US reconnaissance drone
In a separate statement, the IRGC Navy announced that its electronic warfare unit had captured a US drone in the western Strait of Hormuz and brought it down intact.
The navy identified the aircraft as an MQM-170 reconnaissance and decoy drone, saying it had been tasked with detecting Iranian air-defense systems along the Gulf coastline and the strait.
“The IRGC Navy announced that its electronic warfare unit had successfully captured a US MQM-170 drone during an offensive operation in the western Strait of Hormuz,” the statement said.
The War on Iran, and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, forced energy buyers to source crude oil and refined products from the United States. But US exports of crude to Asia have since collapsed, and are plumbing multiyear lows. Oil transport costs have skyrocketed, making American oil shipments to Asia non-competitive. Industry insiders strongly suspect that the increased oil flows through the Persian Gulf are a result of oil suppliers quietly paying Iran for safe passage through the Hormuz. Middle East suppliers are also selling oil on a “delivered basis” to buyers in China and India, thereby assuming all the transport costs and insurance risks.
Ship captains and crews transiting the Strait of Hormuz make so much danger pay that they’re ‘almost being viewed as mercenaries’ https://fortune.com/2026/10/10/ship-c…
The presence of Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani officials in Tehran on 26 October reflected a growing recognition that Iran cannot be excluded from any serious regional security arrangement. Despite the US–Israeli war against Iran, Tehran remains central to the region’s military and political balance.
For Riyadh and its partners, the meeting also exposed the limits of the Mecca defense pact, particularly as Saudi Arabia faces renewed confrontation with the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).
Much of the speculation surrounding the four-country meeting centered on what Iran might be expected to surrender, particularly its relationship with Sanaa. Such expectations rested on the assumption that Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan had established a regional security order into which Iran was now seeking admission, with Tehran potentially offering concessions over Yemen in return.
Yet the political and military circumstances that brought the participants to Tehran suggest a different calculation. Iran has withstood sustained American and Israeli attacks, while Saudi Arabia and its partners have struggled to contain the YAF’s military operations. Any agreement that disregards these realities risks reproducing the confrontations it seeks to resolve.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry had identified Israel’s expansionist policies, Lebanon, and the US war against Iran among the subjects for discussion. Yemen was absent from the announced agenda and the subsequent press statement.
Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the gathering also served to congratulate Mohsen Rezaei, the council’s newly appointed secretary, and discuss regional security, including opposition to foreign interference, particularly by Washington. According to information obtained by The Cradle, Yemen was not discussed during the meeting.
On the morning of 27 October, a day after the talks, Rezaei met Yemen’s ambassador, Ibrahim Mohammad al-Dailami, in Tehran. Rezaei praised Yemen’s defense of Gaza and its confrontation with Israel, while the ambassador thanked him and the Iranian government for their positions.
The encounter came amid speculation that Tehran’s diplomatic engagement with Riyadh might come at the expense of its relationship with Sanaa. By publicly reaffirming those ties immediately after the summit, Iran signaled its intention to pursue regional diplomacy while maintaining its existing alliances.
Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s conservative daily Kayhan, wrote in a 27 October editorial that “Yemen’s revolutionaries are allies of Islamic Iran.” He warned that the visiting delegations might seek to create the impression that Tehran was distancing itself from Sanaa, offering Washington and its allies “breathing room, however brief” by encouraging expectations of an imminent settlement.
The Mecca pact’s limits
Iran has good reason to approach the Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani framework, commonly known as the Mecca pact, with caution. The agreement brings together three states with substantial military capabilities and extensive relations with Washington, raising questions about whether their security cooperation could eventually be directed against the Axis of Resistance.
For Riyadh, Yemen remains a central concern. Years of confrontation with the YAF have demonstrated Sanaa’s ability to impose high military and economic costs beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia’s renewed campaign has again brought its energy infrastructure and military installations within range of Yemeni retaliation, exposing the limits of the kingdom’s reliance on foreign military protection.
In Tehran, closer military coordination among the pact’s members could be seen as an attempt to contain the Axis of Resistance at a time when American security guarantees are becoming increasingly uncertain.
Iran’s participation in talks with the pact’s members carries no commitment to join their alliance. Tehran has made no such announcement, while Rezaei’s explanation of the summit emphasized the establishment of security through regional cooperation, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and an end to outside interference.
These objectives leave considerable differences between the participants. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan maintain security relationships with Washington, while Iran regards the American military presence as a principal source of regional instability. Their respective positions on armed resistance movements, Israeli aggression, and the obligations of any collective defense arrangement also remain unresolved.
The meeting produced a brief press statement confirming the participants’ intention to continue their dialogue, without setting out binding commitments. Rezaei indicated that further meetings would follow, suggesting that the four governments were exploring the foundations of a wider regional accommodation.
The initiative itself emerged from Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran the previous week, according to information obtained by The Cradle. Iranian officials also confirmed Pakistan’s proposal, describing the gathering as an opportunity to advance regional security arrangements based on shared interests and mutual trust.
Riyadh’s security dilemma
The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani alliance combines considerable military resources, diplomatic influence, and strategic relationships. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of its members to confront threats that may carry very different consequences for each country.
The limited assistance Pakistan and Turkiye have provided during the renewed confrontation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia illustrates these constraints. Although both countries have pledged support for Riyadh, their involvement has fallen short of the decisive intervention that might alter the military balance with the YAF.
Saudi Arabia’s own account of the visit was more restrained. In a statement following the meeting, Riyadh said the talks formed part of efforts to de-escalate tensions, encourage diplomatic solutions, and support mediation by Qatar and Pakistan. It also reaffirmed the Mecca pact’s role in promoting regional security and stability.
Islamabad and Ankara have also sought to limit their military involvement. Turkish officials have ruled out offensive operations against Yemen, while Pakistan has denied reports that its aircraft carried out strikes on Yemeni forces. These restrictions expose the distance between the pact’s collective defense commitments and its members’ willingness to enter a wider war.
The continuing Yemeni operations against Saudi targets have consequently strengthened the argument for direct engagement with Tehran. Riyadh must weigh the costs of further confrontation against the possibility of reaching an understanding with Iran, whose regional relationships and military capabilities remain central to the wider balance of power.
Despite the damage inflicted during the war, Tehran has retained the ability to influence the course and costs of regional confrontation. Its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and its capacity to retaliate against military infrastructure have complicated Washington’s efforts to impose a settlement on its own terms.
These developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, although translating military endurance into a durable security arrangement will require more than the recognition of its regional weight. Tehran must also demonstrate that cooperation with its neighbors can reduce the likelihood of renewed war without undermining the relationships that have helped it withstand external pressure.
For Saudi Arabia, the lesson is equally significant. Its security cannot be guaranteed indefinitely through military partnerships that exclude one of the region’s principal powers, particularly when those partnerships have struggled to prevent attacks on Saudi territory.
Yemen cannot be traded
The suggestion that Tehran might trade its relationship with Ansarallah for concessions from Riyadh overlooks the movement’s independent political interests and roots in Yemen. Ansarallah’s resistance to Saudi intervention grew out of a prolonged struggle over the country’s political future, during which its ties with Iran deepened.
The two sides share important strategic interests, but Yemen’s military and political decisions cannot be reduced to directives from Tehran. The YAF’s intervention in support of Gaza, its confrontation with Israel, and its continuing war with Saudi Arabia reflect calculations shaped by Yemen’s own circumstances.
Iran’s regional relationships have also evolved through years of confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv. The Islamic Republic’s resistance to American and Israeli pressure has become inseparable from its wider regional security calculations, particularly as the war has intensified the threats facing its allies.
Sanaa has paid a substantial price for its military and political positions, enduring years of bombardment, blockade, and attempts to dismantle its authority. Ansarallah’s survival has given it considerable influence over Yemen’s future, making any settlement negotiated without its participation unlikely to produce lasting results.
The assumption that Tehran could simply secure Yemeni compliance also underestimates the political consequences of such an arrangement. The Sanaa government would have little reason to accept an agreement that disregards its security interests or leaves Saudi military pressure intact.
Rezaei’s meeting with the Yemeni ambassador therefore served an important political purpose. As Tehran opened discussions with the Mecca pact’s members, it reaffirmed a relationship whose continuity remains important to the wider Resistance Axis.
Israel’s declining leverage
The summit’s joint statement made no reference to Israel, but Rezaei’s subsequent account of the talks placed Israeli military operations among the issues discussed. He said the participants had emphasized ending Israeli attacks and securing Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.
Before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Saudi–Israeli normalization was a serious diplomatic prospect. Washington sought to advance Israel’s integration into a regional security and economic framework that would strengthen its position while isolating Iran and its allies.
The wars that followed have disrupted those calculations. Israel’s military campaigns across West Asia, alongside the American war against Iran, have exposed the risks associated with a regional order built around Israeli military superiority and US security guarantees.
Rezaei’s public emphasis on Israeli aggression reflects the changing circumstances in which the talks took place. Riyadh has not formally adopted his characterization in the joint statement and maintains its longstanding relationship with Washington, but Saudi security concerns have increasingly brought it into direct contact with Tehran despite years of hostility.
The contrast with 2017 is especially revealing. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) then threatened to take the confrontation inside Iran, reflecting Riyadh’s confidence in its ability to challenge Tehran through regional pressure and military alliances.
Nearly a decade later, Saudi officials are in Tehran discussing regional security with the same government Riyadh once threatened to attack. Years of confrontation have failed to break Iran’s regional influence, while Washington’s ability to shield its allies from another war is increasingly in doubt.
Yemen’s ability to remain a consequential military actor despite years of Saudi-led operations has also shaped this reassessment. Its continued resistance has demonstrated the limits of attempts to impose regional arrangements through military force.
Tehran’s next move
The summit’s lasting significance will depend on whether the participating governments can translate their discussions into practical security arrangements. Iran has an opportunity to advance its longstanding position that West Asia’s security must be determined by the countries of the region, without dependence on foreign military intervention.
Such an arrangement would require Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan to recognize Iran’s security concerns and its existing alliances. Tehran would also have to address its neighbors’ security concerns without compromising those relationships.
The presence of all four countries in Tehran suggests that these questions are now receiving serious attention. Rezaei’s subsequent meeting with Yemen’s ambassador also indicated the basis on which Iran intends to participate: regional cooperation alongside continued support for its established allies.
Any regional agreement must also account for Yemen and the other members of the Axis of Resistance. Their military and political weight cannot be ignored, nor can their futures be decided through negotiations between Tehran and its neighbors.
Iran has emerged from the war with its regional alliances intact and greater room to negotiate. The question now is whether Riyadh and its partners are prepared to reach an understanding with Tehran that recognizes those alliances rather than seeking to dismantle them.
Donald Trump and his coalition have rocked the Republican party more than any other right-wing movement this century.
So much so that some Republicans now long for the party as it was before MAGA, the ostensibly “traditional” pre-Trump GOP.
Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) is one of them. The senator, who decided not to run for re-election this year, is promoting a new book that presents himself as, if not a Never Trumper, then at any rate a dissident from MAGA. “What [Trump’s] done is he’s created a coalition that, in my opinion, will not stay with Republicans once we go back to traditional Republican platform priorities,” Tillis said of the GOP’s future in an interview last week. “I think a lot of the elements of the populism that Trump created to expand a base that made him successful running for president, I don’t think that stays with the party long term.”
On X, The Blaze’s Auron MacIntyre shared a clip of Tillis saying this and added, “They’re admitting out loud that they’re running out the clock on Trump so they can return the GOP to factory neocon settings.”
MacIntyre is not wrong.
Another figure who longs for the GOP before Trump is Rahm Emanuel, the former chief of staff to President Obama who is currently making a bid for the 2028 Democratic nomination. He wants Democrats to embrace what he calls “McCain-Romney Republicans” who now vote Democrat.
“The top story from the 2026 cycle will be the electoral opening Democrats seized—and will have to maintain,” Emanuel wrote for the Wall Street Journal last Wednesday. “Most important, the McCain-Romney Republicans, who are politically homeless, need to be welcomed into Democrats’ governing and electoral coalition.”
Emanuel urged his fellow Democrats to make common cause with these kinds of centrist Republicans, and to avoid embracing the hard-left socialist Democratic candidates who are faring well at the moment.
“Millions of McCain-Romney voters are redefining their political identities, and they will be most responsible for Democratic gains in November,” Emanuel explained. “These voters don’t want to be associated with MAGA, and they see themselves as free agents.”
It’s true that many Republican voters who might go for Democrats this election don’t want to be associated with MAGA. But they might not want to revert to the supposed good ol’ days of John McCain, Mitt Romney and George W. Bush either.
President Ronald Reagan’s former Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman shared Emanuel’s op-ed and added, “McCain-Romney neocon warmongering GOP campaign loot collectors from the MIC (military-industrial complex)? You are barking up the wrong tree, Rahm.”
Stockman is on point.
Tillis and Emanuel are both right that voters, and especially Republicans, are mad at Trump and his party, and most predict this anger will be on full display in the upcoming election.
But both are wrong to dismiss populism. The establishmentarian politics that Tillis and Emanuel represent within their respective parties is what so many voters were rejecting when they embraced the current “Drain the Swamp” president.
Populism is not only not the problem, it’s not likely to be going anywhere. The upcoming midterm elections won’t mark some return to party-elite form, but another populist revolt against the apparently insincere populism Americans voted for two years ago.
This isn’t rocket science: Trump’s coalition is mad because the erstwhile “no new wars” president who promised to put America first and keep prices low instead started a brand new war at the behest of Israel and the expense of working-class Americans. The Republican establishment was also on board with the war—until recently, when even a few historically hawkish candidates in tight races have started saying it should end.
On the Iran War, the issue that seems to be defining Trump’s second term the most, this president has delivered what the neocon favorite Mitt Romney seemed to promise as the 2012 Republican presidential nominee, and what the 2008 GOP nominee and neocon favorite John McCain campaigned on. Trump is now compared to that most “traditional” of 21st century Republicans, George W. Bush. The former president’s brother, Jeb Bush, has praised Trump for starting a war with Iran. Marc Thiessen, an alumnus of the George W. Bush White House, is a big fan of Trump and his war. And the neoconservative pundits Mark Levin and Ben Shapiro now praise Trump for having a foreign policy that looks a lot like what was on offer from McCain and Romney.
On the other side of the aisle, many of the Democrats challenging Republicans in seats once thought safe are finding success with populist campaigns that focus on combatting rising prices, opposing the overwhelmingly unpopular war, and, perhaps most amusingly, putting America First. Abdul el-Sayed, the Democrat who is running against “traditional” Republican Mike Rogers for Senate in Michigan, has regularly appeared on Fox News and constantly pitches to (former?) MAGA voters.
It’s worth noting that there was a Republican party before Trump, under whose banners Tillis was first elected to the Senate in 2014. This is how POLITICOreported Tillis’s victory in the GOP primary for that seat: “Tillis Beats Tea Party in N.C.: The GOP establishment scored a victory Tuesday when its preferred candidate soundly defeated a pair of grass-roots insurgents in a North Carolina primary.” One of those insurgents was Greg Brannon, who had the endorsement of the Tea Party Republican and war skeptic Rand Paul. (Paul, of course, won his own Senate seat in 2010 by running against the pre-Trump, pro-war neoconservative-marinated Republican brass.)
There was a Republican uprising against the party’s establishment well before Trump burst on the scene, and Tillis was definitely not part of it.
In fact, there was much dissent and intra-party challenging of Republican elites in those post-Bush years. Obama’s 2008 victory was largely a rejection of the old GOP and its wars, which McCain fully embraced, and Romney’s 2012 loss was due in no small part to Americans not wanting another extension of Bush-Cheney.
The “traditional” McCain-Romney Republicans haven’t been popular enough to win a presidential election since Bush in 2004, and the first Republican to do so won by calling Dubya a liar and his war in Iraq a “big, fat mistake.”
Now Trump is making his own mistake in Iran, and many of his 2024 voters appear eager to correct their mistake this year. Not because they yearn for a return to the Republican party as it was before him, but because Donald Trump promised to beat that party and dispose of it—and has failed.
Jack Hunter is the former political editor of Rare.us. Jack has written regularly for the Washington Examiner, The Daily Caller, Spectator USA, Responsible Statecraft and has appeared in Politico Magazine and The Daily Beast. Hunter is the co-author of the The Tea Party Goes to Washington by Sen. Rand Paul.
A group of former US government officials who resigned because of Washington’s policy in the Gaza Strip has urged candidates seeking the 2028 presidential nomination to pledge not to appoint officials they said enabled Israel’s genocide in the enclave, Anadolu reports.
“Senior Biden Administration officials who were architects of the Gaza policy are now actively white-washing their own roles in enabling genocide,” Gaza Resignees said in a statement signed by 12 former officials.
“They violated U.S. and international law by providing U.S. weapons while Israel indiscriminately and disproportionately attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure, and as Israel arbitrarily blocked humanitarian assistance to Gaza,” it said.
The signatories include former State Department officials Josh Paul, Annelle Sheline and Stacy Gilbert, former diplomats Hala Rharrit and Mike Casey, former White House official Anna Del Castillo and former USAID senior adviser Alexander Smith. Also among them are former Army officer and Defense Intelligence Agency official Harrison Mann, former Air Force Maj. Riley Livermore, former Navy Lt. Cmdr. Hani Z. Nofal and former political appointees Tariq Habash of the Education Department and Lily Greenberg Call of the Interior Department.
“Not even two years since the end of their disastrous time in office, many of these same officials appear to be pursuing a path back into the halls of power,” they said.
“The most basic level of accountability, the most minimal level of consequences, is to ensure that those who have wreaked so much harm from within the highest levels of our Government cannot return to it,” according to the statement.
The group said that “Gaza has become a litmus test for the credibility of American politicians and the viability, in particular, of Democratic candidates.”
The pledge asks candidates to acknowledge US “complicity” in Israel’s genocide in Gaza. It also asks them to exclude any past or present political appointee who was “an architect, leader, defender, or key enabler” of the policy.
In a video released with the statement, the former officials took turns reading the call over images of former Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who now sits on the board of directors of the Center for American Progress, a Washington think tank.
“We have watched as elite institutions have welcomed these officials,” said Mann, as the video showed former White House Middle East coordinator Brett McGurk, who is now with venture capital firm Lux Capital and a CNN commentator. It also showed former National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and former USAID Administrator Samantha Power, who both joined Harvard Kennedy School after leaving office.
“We have watched as these officials have tried to launder their bloody reputations,” Paul said, with Rharrit adding, “and prepare to re-enter the halls of power.”
“And we say, enough,” the former officials said in the video. “Enough with the culture of impunity in Washington. Enough with policies that break our laws and defy our values.”
“They have blood on their hands,” they added.
Top Biden administration officials at that time acknowledged civilian suffering in Gaza but defended Israel’s right to defend itself following the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack.
US-made weapons were photographed several times in Israeli strikes in Gaza, although US authorities have declined to confirm this.
Since October 2023, Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza has killed more than 74,000 Palestinians, mostly women and children, and wounded over 175,000, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry. It has also caused widespread destruction affecting around 90% of the territory’s civilian infrastructure.
More than 1,500 Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip since an October 2025 ceasefire went into effect.
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