The United States is increasingly using its financial power to target political organisations beyond its borders, with consequences extending far into Europe. Under the banner of counterterrorism, US sanctions can effectively cut activists and organisations off from banking services, digital infrastructure, and the financial resources needed to operate, even when European authorities have not designated them as terrorist groups.

The case of Autistici/Inventati (A/I), an Italian digital network providing services to antifascist and anticapitalist organisations, illustrates how this works.

On 26 August 2026, the Trump administration sanctioned A/I alongside the British activist group Palestine Action and the transnational Palestinian organisation Masar Badil. Washington accused them of supporting terrorism, as part of a broader campaign against what it describes as violent far-left extremism.

A/I was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US Treasury, which accused it of providing digital infrastructure and services to violent extremist organisations. The collective rejected the accusations, insisting that its work consisted of providing secure communications and digital services to political movements.

Yet the US decision's consequences were felt almost immediately in Italy.

A/I's bank, Banca Etica, suspended operations on its account because of the potential risks associated with US sanctions. The collective also reported disruptions to its website and payment services, eventually announcing that it would dissolve and wind down its activities.

The episode raises a troubling question: how can a decision taken in Washington effectively undermine the operations of organisations based in Europe, without any equivalent decision by European authorities?

Instruments of political pressure

For the European Legal Support Centre (ELSC), an organisation providing legal assistance to individuals and groups mobilising for Palestine, A/I's experience represents a dangerous precedent "that puts the very notion of Europe at risk.”

The case's significance extends beyond A/I itself. It exposes how international financial networks, banking compliance requirements and the threat of US penalties can become instruments of political pressure across national borders.

The US government argues that its sanctions target organisations providing support for terrorism, including violent attacks and damage to property. But the expanding use of counterterrorism measures against activist networks also raises questions about where political dissent ends, and terrorism begins, and who has the power to decide.

The very label of “terrorist” carries a long history of political use - which dates back to the British Empire - and appears to be applied selectively. The legal distinctions matter. A US sanctions designation is not a criminal conviction, nor does it automatically make an organisation illegal under European law. Nevertheless, the practical consequences can be devastating.

For banks and financial institutions that depend on access to USA financial networks, the risk of maintaining relations with a sanctioned organisation may simply be considered too great. This creates a system in which European organisations can face financial and social exclusion because of decisions made by a foreign government, even without direct legal orders from their own authorities.

The case of Mohammad Hannoun, a Palestinian activist based in Italy, demonstrates another dimension of this pressure. Hannoun faced restrictions on his banking activities before the US government sanctioned him in October 2024 over allegations relating to Hamas financing. Italian authorities subsequently detained him amid criminal proceedings alleging he funded the group.

Hannoun's case involves separate criminal allegations and judicial proceedings, which should not be confused with the sanctions themselves. Nevertheless, it illustrates how financial restrictions, political accusations and legal proceedings can intersect.

These developments reflect a wider system in which state authorities, banks, media organisations, universities, cultural venues, and lawfare groups can collectively contribute to isolating individuals, groups, and networks accused of supporting terrorism.

The impact on solidarity efforts

The implications are particularly concerning for activists and organisations supporting Palestine, whose activities have faced increasing scrutiny and restrictions in several European countries. In Britain, Palestine Action was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in July 2025 following its direct-action campaign against companies connected to Israel's defence industry. The group has challenged the ban in court, with the UK Supreme Court due to hear an appeal in November 2026.

The subsequent US designation of Palestine Action illustrates how one government's measures can be reinforced by another, potentially multiplying their impact on the organisations concerned.

But the A/I case points to something further: extending such measures to organisations that provide services and infrastructure used by political movements.

The question is whether European institutions have either the tools or the political willingness to challenge this expanding extraterritorial reach.

The European Union does possess a legal mechanism intended to protect European individuals and businesses against certain foreign sanctions: the Blocking Statute, introduced under Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96. Originally adopted in 1996, the statute was designed to counter the effects of US sanctions on European economic operators. It was subsequently updated in 2018 in response to the reimposition of US sanctions against Iran.

The legislation can prohibit compliance with specified foreign sanctions and provide legal remedies to affected European operators. However, it applies only to the foreign legislation covered by its annex, which currently includes certain US measures concerning Cuba and Iran. It does not automatically protect organisations targeted under the US counterterrorism sanctions regime.

Extending or adapting such protections would require further action by European institutions, and would not necessarily eliminate the financial risks facing European banks.

Nevertheless, this legal mechanism shows that the EU has previously recognised the problem posed by the extraterritorial application of US sanctions.

As the ELSC pointed out: "We have this European law, but it has never been used on the scale required to counter the US sanctions."

The consequences of inaction are not merely financial. When an organisation loses access to its bank accounts, online services or funding channels, its ability to operate can rapidly disappear. The threat of sanctions can also discourage other organisations, financial institutions, and individuals from associating with it, even before any formal restrictions are imposed.

"The aim of the US sanctions is to isolate and fragment the European political movement for Palestine," the ELSC argued. "A sanctioned person will be concerned about how to recover funds instead of doing their work."

These chilling effects are difficult to measure, but they are central to understanding the wider implications of the sanctions regime. In the A/I case, the collective's decision to dissolve shows how legal uncertainty, financial pressure, and risk to associated individuals can make the situation unsustainable.

The European Union frequently presents itself as a defender of civil liberties, the rule of law and political freedoms. Yet these commitments face a practical test when European organisations are subjected to financial restrictions originating outside their own legal system.

The question is not whether organisations accused of terrorism should be exempt from scrutiny. Rather, the question is whether European institutions should allow foreign sanctions decisions, and the financial pressure they generate, to determine whether organisations operating within Europe can survive.

If the consequences of a US designation can effectively shut down a European organisation without an equivalent decision under European law, the boundary between US financial power and European political sovereignty becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish.

For European civil society, that boundary may be far more important than it first appears.

Matteo Chiani is a freelance journalist based in Italy who specialises in environmental reporting and investigative journalism. His academic background includes postcolonial and media studies, Mediterranean culture, and the history of Arab countries.

Follow Matteo on Instagram: @mattechiani

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

It has become almost customary for Palestinians, whenever we speak about Palestine, to begin by telling the story of our suffering. We are expected to explain how we became refugees, how our parents and grandparents were displaced, and which members of our families were killed, imprisoned or disappeared under Israeli occupation.

We are expected to expose our deepest wounds, relive generations of trauma, and to offer our grief as evidence that our demands for justice deserve to be heard.

This is nothing but emotional labour.

And today, I refuse to audition for anyone’s sympathy.

I refuse to bare my wounds for the world to see, simply to validate the decisions and actions we take on the path towards our liberation.

Palestinian rights are not conditional upon our ability to move an audience to tears.

This is why when Green Party members voted to adopt the historic motion declaring Zionism to be racism and calling for a free Palestine from the river to the sea, it felt like a historic movement in UK solidarity efforts.

As a Palestinian and a Green Party member who co-authored and helped develop and advance this motion, I saw this as more than a political victory. It was also an affirmation that Palestinian voices could shape the policies of a major British political party without having to surrender their own understanding of their oppression or dilute their demands to be palatable.

Yet what should have been a moment of collective reflection and celebration quickly became overshadowed by opposition from several Green Party MPs and figures within the party leadership.

A democratic victory that some refuse to accept

The motion did not emerge overnight. Outsiders did not impose it, nor was it the product of some mysterious group of extremists, as some have suggested. 

It was drafted and championed by ordinary Green Party members, including Palestinians and anti-Zionist Jews, who spent months organising workshops, seminars, discussions and fringe events to engage fellow members.

Even after the motion was denied a hearing following procedural delays and filibustering during the party’s spring conference, we continued organising, discussing and engaging.

We believed in the Green Party’s commitment to grassroots democracy, even when its procedures appeared to work against us.

Nevertheless, once the motion finally passed, some elected representatives responded not by acknowledging the democratic outcome, but by questioning the motivations of those who brought the motion forward, portraying our organisation and determination as something threatening.

MP Ellie Chowns called for protecting the party from extremists and entryists.

Ironically, only months earlier, party leadership was enthusiastically celebrating a remarkable surge in membership.

Apparently, welcoming new members is something to celebrate until those members organise, exercise their democratic rights and successfully influence party policy.

Even my own MP, Sian Berry, whom I personally contacted to engage with the motion and its arguments, did not respond. Yet, once the media attacks started, Berry weighed in by publicly distancing herself from the motion, describing it as seriously flawed and accusing its Palestinian proposers of being unwilling to compromise.

She has even called on the party to revisit a decision reached through its own democratic processes.

MP Adrian Ramsay, the party's former co-leader, has publicly encouraged Green council groups to distance themselves from the democratically adopted policy. In a recent public statement

Ramsay praised council groups that rejected the motion, described the conference decision as a distraction from their work, and said it did not reflect the views of most party members.

It is deeply disappointing to see a former party leader effectively encouraging a division between elected council groups and the democratic decisions of the party’s own membership.

Selective silencing

Whilst disagreement is a legitimate part of political life, actively encouraging local representatives to distance themselves from a policy adopted through the party’s highest democratic forum raises serious questions about whose voices are ultimately respected.

What message does this send to party members who invest their time, energy and conviction in the democratic process, only to see its outcome publicly undermined by those elected to represent them?

What makes this particularly painful is that these Green MPs are now among the most vocal opponents of a motion written by Palestinians, for Palestinians, and supported through the party’s democratic process.

Not long ago, Palestinians within the Green Party extended a gesture of solidarity and goodwill to those very MPs. After Israeli authorities imposed entry bans on them, we sent a letter replacing that exclusion with an invitation to visit a Free Palestine, to stand alongside us and to hear directly from Palestinians about our aspirations for freedom, dignity and self-determination.

It was an invitation to listen, to engage and to recognise that Palestinians are not merely subjects of political debate, but people with voices, histories and a right to determine their own future. Judging by some of the responses to the motion, it feels like the invitation was buried under a pile of political calculations and selective solidarity.

Palestinians are also not the only ones who’ve been silenced by opposing MPs and the subsequent media storm.

A leading accusation against the motion is that it threatens the safety of Jewish members of the Green Party. But Jewish safety is not at risk from a motion that defines and confronts Zionism as a settler colonial ideology, examining its historical and contemporary manifestations, and reaffirming the Palestinian struggle for liberation, including ending occupation and confronting the structures of displacement and dispossession.    

Not only is this argument, which conflates Zionist views with Jewish identity, antisemitic in itself, but it also completely ignores anti-Zionist Jewish members. Many of those members participated in drafting the motion and organising discussions and public meetings in support of it, but opponents have shown they’re not interested in this part of the story.

No one’s safety should ever come at the expense of another people’s freedom, dignity or right to self-determination.

Amro Tabari is a British Palestinian renewable energy engineer, activist and writer. Born a refugee in Syria and raised in Jordan, his family originates from Tiberias, Palestine. He has lived in the UK since 2014 and is actively involved in grassroots campaigns for Palestinian liberation, social justice and environmental sustainability. A member of the Green Party and Greens for Palestine, he was recognised as one of The Big Issue’s 100 Changemakers in 2026 for his work in politics and activism.

Follow Amro on Instagram: @amro_tabari 

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

During Metallica’s residency at the Sphere in Las Vegas earlier this month, frontman James Hetfield told concertgoers: “Metallica is not here, like some other entertainers, to influence you with their bullshit, OK?” He then declared: “We’re here to forget about all the outside shit, OK? Metallica’s agenda is love, energy and heavy music, baby!”

The remarks arrived less than a month after rapper Macklemore was removed from Ed Sheeran’s US tour following his onstage call for a free Palestine. Many interpreted Hetfield’s words as a swipe at Macklemore; NME raised that exact question.

Indeed, the timing matters. Musicians are facing professional consequences for speaking out about Palestine, and one of rock’s most influential frontmen was ridiculing the practice of addressing audiences about political causes.

Whether it was directed at Macklemore or not, Hetfield’s comments were particularly rich coming from a member of Metallica because for decades, the band has sold millions of records filled with condemnations of militarism, political repression, and institutional corruption.

For Palestine solidarity activists, this highlighted the contradiction between the band’s professed ideals of justice and their behaviour when it comes to Palestinian oppression.

A history of mixing politics and music

Metallica did not become famous by pretending the world beyond the concert hall did not exist. On their album Master of Puppets (1986), their track Disposable Heroes critiques young soldiers as expendable instruments of military command. Blackened imagines the planet's destruction, and the song … And Justice for All attacks a legal order distorted by money and power. The band’s own anniversary retrospective described the latter as music that confronts broken systems and serves as a “battle cry for change”. Its power lay precisely in making listeners face the world around them – not hide from it.

The politics are even less ambiguous in the track One, which tells the story of a soldier catastrophically wounded in war and trapped inside his own body. In an interview republished on Metallica’s official website in September 2026, Hetfield called it “the anti-war song.”

Discussing The Shortest Straw, which references McCarthyism and restrictions on artistic freedom, he said it was “more political than any of the other songs”.

Not only does this history make Hetfield’s attack on other entertainers hollow, but the fact that so many of their anti-war tracks were then performed on the night that their fans were urged to forget the outside world makes it all the more so.

There is no difference between condemning war through song lyrics and speaking out against it on stage.

Several band members have also openly expressed political opinions. For example, guitarist Kirk Hammett urged people to defend American democracy and reject Donald Trump’s rhetoric of “American carnage” in 2017. He used his considerable platform to criticise the new administration and called on his followers to respond.

Drummer Lars Ulrich also publicly opposed Trump’s proposed wall on the US-Mexico border, and invoked Metallica’s ability to bring people across national and cultural divisions.

And during a period of rising racial tension in 2017, Hetfield made his opposition to division and intolerance clear during a performance in Edmonton.

As has been the case with many artists over the past three years of the attacks on Gaza, Metallica's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has also highlighted much hypocrisy. Through the ‘All Within My Hands foundation’, Metallica gave an initial $100,000 and then a further $500,000 to World Central Kitchen’s relief effort for Ukrainians displaced by the war. The foundation even turned the campaign into a mobilisation of Metallica’s fanbase, using merchandise, auctions, fan-club activity and matching donations to raise more money.

By June, the band announced that the drive had met its $1 million target.

Apparently, it’s not “bullshit” when artists use their influence to rally support for Ukraine…

Palestine

Palestine was hardly a new political question for Metallica. Already, in 2009, the Palestine solidarity movement urged the band to cancel its scheduled concert in Tel Aviv, warning that performing would help normalise Israel’s system of occupation, apartheid, and dispossession of the Palestinian people.

Activists published an open letter which started with a passage from “...And Justice for All”, deliberately confronting Metallica with its own denunciation of corrupted justice.

Despite the mobilisation, Metallica went ahead with the show, choosing to disregard calls for a cultural boycott from Palestinian civil society. Its official concert archive confirms that the band played at Ramat Gan Stadium in Tel Aviv on 22 May 2010, which was their third time performing in Israel.

Little has changed, clearly.

In reality, Hetfiled's tone-deaf comments earlier this month only fuel hostility towards those who dare to speak out during a time of political repression, in Donald Trump’s America – which the band was once all too willing to publicly oppose – and around the world. And given that their fellow artists have been targeted and censored for speaking in support of Palestinian liberation and calling for an end to the killing, their message puts them on the wrong side of history.

As Antonio Gramsci argued, ruling groups maintain power partly by making their ideas seem like common sense. This helps explain the political significance of Metallica’s call for disengagement at a time when Israel’s genocide in Palestine demands urgent international attention. Hetfield’s vague agenda of “love, energy and heavy music” ultimately amounts to a refusal to stand for anything meaningful. And that refusal is itself deeply political.

Shan Karemani is an independent researcher focusing on Islamophobia and nationalism. He holds a master’s degree in Russian and East European Studies from Indiana University and is the director of the documentary film Stories of the Kosovo War.

Follow Shan on Instagram: @GenghisShan

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

As military operations between the United States and Iran seem to subside, a war of competing narratives is emerging, and opposing claims over the Strait of Hormuz are creating potentially misleading and profound consequences.

On the one hand, Iran declares that the Strait is shut down, while allowing a limited number of ships and vessels to gain safe, yet reportedly paid, passage through its territorial waters. The United States, meanwhile, continues to insist that the Strait is open and that free, unobstructed navigation is guaranteed. President Trump has gone further, declaring the Strait of Hormuz to be US territory.

Beyond these competing claims, however, lies a compelling reality. Satellite imagery and marine tracking applications undeniably show that traffic across this Strait is very limited, with navigation now operating at only a fraction of its normal level before 28 February 2026. Contrary to US claims, the severely restricted passage of commercial ships across the Strait has clearly affected the global energy market, driving a surge in oil prices.

As this narrow passage becomes congested with military fleets, tankers, and other vessels, and as international interest grows, new realities are unfolding. Reported bilateral discussions between the two coastal states bordering the Strait, Oman and Iran, have reached a critical stage, defining new routes for vessels into and out of the strait. The bilateral discussions, meticulously followed by the US and the mediators, Pakistan and Qatar, is said to introduce new realities which did not exist before the US-Israeli attacks on Iran last February.

The Maritime Security Group's open-source analysis indicates that Iran seeks a role in overseeing inbound, and possibly outbound, maritime traffic through the Strait. Tehran is reportedly demanding new arrangements concerning vessels carrying military articles that could be used in military operations against Iran. If these reports prove accurate, they would mark the beginning of a fundamental shift in how access, navigation, and security are managed in the Strait of Hormuz.

Yet, even a successful conclusion of bilateral discussions with Oman would not guarantee the reopening of the Strait. Iranian officials have stressed that reopening the Strait of Hormuz is not contingent on the successful conclusion of these talks. Rather, Tehran views US adherence to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) bilaterally signed with Iran as a precondition for a sustainable resumption of navigation across Hormuz. In particular, Iran is calling for swift implementation of the MOU provisions on the cessation of hostilities, the lifting of the blockade, and the easing of sanctions. This distinction is critical.

The Oman-Iran discussions may address the mechanics of navigation through the Strait, but Tehran appears to be linking the sustainability of that navigation to a much broader political and security framework.

Those familiar with Iran’s nuclear negotiations will realise the magnitude and the level of concession Tehran has made on the nuclear front. A closer look at the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding reveals that Iran has committed itself to halting uranium enrichment, down-blending its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and imposing a moratorium on nuclear fuel cycle activities.

Amid growing speculation of a rift with Iran’s leadership, these concessions may have prompted hard-line elements, already dissatisfied with the MOU's terms, to seek to renegotiate Article 5, which addresses the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. This is consistent to a great extent with repeated statements by Iranian officials that the “Hormuz card” is more valuable than possessing nuclear weapons; To the Iranian mindset, the strategic leverage offered by the Strait is the perfect compensation to Iran’s concession in the nuclear file.

All this suggests that the Strait of Hormuz may not return soon to pre-war conditions. For Iran, Hormuz is not simply a waterway; it is now the “guarantor”, a part of its broader strategic equation involving sovereignty, deterrence and gaining lasting leverage.

For Oman, known for its balanced relations and tradition of diplomatic mediation, this Gulf state finds itself in a peculiar yet potentially advantageous position at the forefront of emerging regional arrangements.

Other GCC states may be the greatest losers from these evolving dynamics and arrangements. Obviously, GCC states have to face the new reality that Iran is not simply a neighbour, but a “gatekeeper for Hormuz”. Given GCC economies’ heavy dependence on maritime trade and energy exports, we may soon see GCC plans for alternative routes to export/import oil and commodities. This contingency planning would profoundly affect oil prices and markets.

For the United States, a key player facing an equally difficult calculation in the region, there is a fundamental interest in keeping international navigation open across Hormuz, alongside a recognition that military pressure would backfire.

Russia, meanwhile, remains in a comfortable position, benefiting from US exemption from oil sanctions, which allows it to sell its oil to international markets. The longer the crisis in Hormuz, the greater the benefit for Russian energy exports.

For China, the calculation is different. As one of the world's largest energy consumers, Beijing has a strong interest in restoring predictable navigation through Hormuz while exploring mechanisms to evade sanctions.

Regardless of these positions, the critical question is not simply whether the Strait becomes open. It is whether regional actors can build a mechanism that keeps Hormuz open, rather than using it as an instrument of pressure.

Ayman Khalil is a Senior Researcher at the Arab Institute for Security Studies. A physicist by training and holds a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Reading University (UK).  He is the coordinator of the "Missile Capabilities Platform" and “Nuclear Forum”, the only specialized forum in the Arab world that promotes policy and public dialogue in CBRN and delivery vehicles.

Fadel Kaseb is a Senior Researcher and Lecturer at the Arab Institute for Security Studies. He possess strong academic qualification with a Diploma focused in  policy and strategy from U.S Naval War college and a diploma from UK's joint staff college. He has vast experience  in Defence and security studies, with a Master degree from the University of London/King's College. Brigadier retired Kaseb has specific interest in joint military operations, future and strategic foresight. Fadel Kaseb and Ayman Khalil are both coordinators of the Maritime Security Group, a Norwegian sponsored initiative.

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.