Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. A central problem in US nuclear thinking is that it is fragmented. Washington is laser-focused on the “three-body problem”: It considers the US-Russia-China triangle fundamental, and when it does not ignore the China-India-Pakistan triangle, it treats it as a mere “Southern Asia” issue. Washington, […]
Imran Khan’s son says his father had previously warned that he could suffer a similar fate to former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi, who died during a court hearing in 2019
With India-China border tensions back in the news over border skirmishes, the Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief said the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) “has a larger overall inventory” but that “its operations against India are constrained by the geography of the Tibetan Plateau.”
Explaining China’s vulnerability, Air Chief Marshal Singh said that the Tibetan Plateau’s “high-altitude airfields reduce payload, range and turnaround times.”
However, he said the IAF does not face these constraints. “The IAF, by contrast, operates from lower-altitude, all-weather forward air bases with full payload and shorter response times.”
Turnaround time is the time fighter jets take to refuel and rearm; response time refers to scramble, the urgent, high-speed mobilization and takeoff of fighter jets in response to an immediate air-defense threat.
In the 1962 India-China War, the Tibetan Plateau’s geography favored Beijing.
Tibet’s flat, arid terrain aided road construction, army mobilization, and logistics, and gave Beijing a high-altitude advantage, while the steep, rugged mountains and dense forests on the Indian side made road construction and troop movement challenging.
However, any future conflict between the two countries is likely to involve the Air Force, and both countries are ramping up their air bases near the contested Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border between India and China.
The same altitude that gave Beijing an advantage during the 1962 land war could limit its aerial operations.
Indian vs Chinese Forward Air Bases Near the LAC
Air Chief Marshal Singh said the IAF operates from “lower-altitude, all-weather forward air bases,” which offer several advantages compared with Tibet’s high-altitude air bases.
The reality, however, is more nuanced, as some of India’s forward air bases in Ladakh sit at altitudes comparable to, or even higher than, China’s main Tibetan plateau bases.
India also operates the world’s highest airstrip at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), at an elevation of 5,064 meters. DBO, however, is not an air base but only an unpaved, gravel-and-sand-earth advanced landing ground (ALG), suitable only for certain kinds of aircraft, such as heavy-lift C-130J Super Hercules aircraft and rotary-wing helicopters.
For reference, USAF’s Hill Air Force Base in Utah sits at 1,460 meters, making it one of the highest major US Air Force bases.
A file photo of an IAF C-130J Super Hercules landing at Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), the highest airstrip in the world. (IAF photo)
Similarly, Chushul ALG sits at an elevation of 4,267 meters.
The Nyoma Air Base, a newly upgraded frontline military airfield in eastern Ladakh commissioned last November, sits at an elevation of 4,175 meters. The Nyoma Air Base is just 23 to 35 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.
The IAF also operates the Fukche Advanced Landing Ground (ALG), another critical high-altitude tactical military airfield. Located in the Demchok sector of eastern Ladakh, it sits just 2.5 kilometers from the LAC with China, at an altitude of approximately 4,176 meters above sea level.
The Leh airfield, IAF’s main logistics base in Ladakh, sits at 3,256 meters.
These forward airstrips, ALGs, and airfields are comparable in altitude to some of China’s forward air bases in Tibet, such as Ngari Gunsa (4,274 meters), Shigatse Tingri (4,317 meters), Qamdo Bamda (4,334 meters), and Shigatse Peace (3,782 meters).
India’s advantage comes from its low-altitude bases, such as Ambala, Bhatinda, Sirsa, Hasimara, and Chabua. These bases are near sea level and within 500 kilometers of the LAC; however, given the vast expanse of the Tibetan plateau, the PLAAF’s rear air bases in the plains are much farther away and have limited utility when operating near the LAC.
For instance, Hasimara Air Base in West Bengal, home to the IAF’s Rafale Falcons Squadron, is about 150 kilometers from the LAC and sits at an elevation of just 104 meters. In comparison, China’s Shigatse Peace Air Base, nearly 100 kilometers from the LAC, sits at an elevation of 3,782 meters.
Similarly, Chabua Air Base in Assam is about 100 kilometers from the LAC and sits at an elevation of 112 meters above sea level. In contrast, the Qamdo Bamda air base in Tibet is equidistant from the LAC but sits at an elevation of over 4,000 meters.
The Ambala Air Base in Haryana, home to the IAF’s second Golden Arrows Rafale squadron, is about 500 kilometers from the LAC and sits at an elevation of 275 meters. However, the Lhasa Gonggar air base in Tibet is about 200 kilometers from the LAC but sits at an elevation of 4,275 meters.
The IAF’s Bathinda and Sirsa air bases are also about 500 kilometers from the LAC and sit at around 100 meters above sea level.
This means IAF warplanes can operate at full capacity with maximum payload and have shorter response and turnaround times, unlike the Chinese PLAAF.
The thinner air in Tibet nearly cripples PLAAF jets as they cannot operate with their full weapons payload.
Additionally, IAF bases in the plains remain operational year-round, whereas Chinese air bases in Tibet face limited operability during the harsh winter season.
PLAAF
Who Holds the Edge?
However, given the widening gap between the IAF and the PLAAF’s inventory, one could argue that Beijing has already neutralized the IAF’s geographic advantage.
The IAF is currently at a historic low in maintaining fighter squadrons. India currently has around 29 fighter squadrons, compared with a sanctioned strength of 42.5. Meanwhile, China’s PLAAF already has more than 1,800 combat aircraft, including nearly 300-500 fifth-generation stealth J-20 fighters.
Air Chief Marshal Singh’s remarks are no revelation and have circulated in Indian policy circles for over six decades.
In fact, during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s decision not to use air power against Chinese forces remains one of the most enduring criticisms of his leadership.
Critics argue that had India used its Air Force, New Delhi could have turned the tide in its favor.
During the war, the IAF deployed only helicopters and transport crews to serve forward pickets in the then North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh.
The IAF’s use in offensive operations was considered but rejected for fear of escalation.
Many analysts argue that in 1962, the IAF had both qualitative and quantitative superiority over the PLA Air Force.
At that time, the IAF had nearly 22 combat squadrons and over 500 aircraft. The IAF’s mainstays included the Hunter Mk-56 fighter-bomber, Gnat interceptor, French-built ground-attack aircraft such as the Mystere and Toofani, Canberra bomber-reconnaissance jets, and the Vampire ground-attack jet.
Meanwhile, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) operated the MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19, and medium-range IL-28 bombers.
India’s intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), cautioned that if India deployed the IAF for offensive operations, then in return, the PLAAF could bomb Indian cities, such as Kolkata (then Calcutta).
However, it did not account for the fact that PLAAF aircraft could reach targets in India only if they operated from airfields in Tibet, where high altitudes severely restricted their weapon-carrying capacity.
In contrast, IAF fighters could have carried full weapon loads from airfields in the plains of Assam and Punjab.
General B.M. Kaul, the commander of IV Corps in NEFA, alleged in his memoirs – The Untold Story (1967) – that the IAF was not used in close support of the Army.
Neville Maxwell, correspondent of The Times (London) in 1962, in his book India’s China War, says: “The government had decided that tactical air support with bombers on ground attack must be ruled out for fear of Chinese retaliation against Indian cities, especially Calcutta. Considering the terrain in NEFA and the limitations of the IAF, it is doubtful whether its intervention in a tactical role could have had much effect.”
However, many people still believe Nehru committed a blunder by overestimating the PLAAF’s capabilities and not paying attention to the geographic limitations the Tibetan Plateau imposed on Chinese aircraft operations.
Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
On October 22, India’s Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) chief, Shatrujeet Singh Kapoor, stated while addressing ITBP personnel in Alwar, Rajasthan, that the threat from China continues to persist. He said there had been face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops at several locations in Arunachal Pradesh in the preceding days, and that these were continuing.
Kapoor stressed that conventional military methods alone would not suffice against China, given the People’s Liberation Army’s extensive modernization. He called for stronger drone and anti-drone capabilities.
The ITBP chief’s call for stronger drone and anti-drone capabilities needs to be viewed in the correct perspective. Media coverage of military threats tends to focus on an adversary’s high-value weapon systems—ballistic and cruise missiles, fighter aircraft, bombers, warships and tanks. These systems are conspicuous, expensive and relatively easy to identify, quantify and assess in terms of their capabilities and the threats they pose.
The threat from drones, however, is fundamentally different and often underappreciated. Their low cost, small signatures, ease of deployment, and the difficulty of reliably detecting, identifying, and tracking them make the threat particularly hard to assess.
Drone Evolution
Drone warfare has evolved rapidly since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022.
Initially, small drones were widely deployed for short-range reconnaissance and attack, including as loitering munitions. Their range was often limited by their dependence on line-of-sight communications and control.
Ukraine and Russia also fielded medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drones, which provided reconnaissance and strike capabilities broadly analogous to those of close air support aircraft.
However, their effectiveness depends inversely on the strength of the adversary’s air defenses. As a result, both sides have increasingly relied on these drones for reconnaissance and target acquisition, rather than operating them freely in heavily defended airspace.
Drone warfare capabilities have improved significantly since the start of the war through advances in propulsion, navigation, communications and machine vision. The evolution from short-range reconnaissance and attack drones to low-cost, long-range precision-strike systems has created a capability that, in some missions, can compete with that of cruise missiles.
Propulsion
Initially, many drones relied on internal combustion engines, which could be noisy, while smaller electric drones offered quieter operation but generally had more limited range and endurance.
Advances in battery technology have improved electric propulsion, although energy storage remains a constraint.
The development and wider availability of relatively low-cost jet engines have enabled some drones to fly at high speeds and altitudes over long distances, potentially complicating ground-based detection and interception.
Communication
Line-of-sight communications remain important, particularly for smaller drones. Their limitations can be mitigated through relay systems and mesh networking, while satellite links can extend communications beyond the radio horizon.
Geostationary satellite links generally have higher latency than low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite links, which can provide lower-latency communications. Together with improved networking, these technologies have expanded the scope for remote piloting and long-range operations. However, communications remain vulnerable to jamming and disruption.
Navigation and Precision Attack
Drones have traditionally relied on satellite navigation (SatNav) and other navigation methods to reach their targets. SatNav is vulnerable to jamming and can become unreliable in contested environments. A significant advance has been the development of AI-enabled terrain matching and machine vision, which allow drones to navigate using terrain features and visual cues rather than relying solely on satellite signals.
Machine vision has also improved precision-strike capabilities through target identification. Meanwhile, advances in counter-drone technologies have helped shape the evolution of strike drones, driving the development of systems designed to overcome increasingly sophisticated defenses.
Drone Development Cycle
Drone development and operational fielding cycles are considerably shorter than those of manned aircraft and helicopters.
Lower development costs and shorter timelines allow drone warfare to evolve rapidly in response to battlefield conditions. Drone designs and capabilities can be tailored to the specific challenges of a battlefield and the objectives of a particular campaign.
The design and capabilities of attack drones depend on the targets they are intended to engage. Attacking bridges, troop concentrations, moving road vehicles, or logistical storage facilities presents different operational requirements and calls for different drone capabilities. These requirements must also account for the counter-UAS systems deployed by the adversary.
The same principle applies to drone interceptors: their capabilities must match the threats they are designed to counter. For instance, countering high-speed, jet-powered attack drones may require equally fast, jet-powered interceptors, although other interception methods may also be effective.
Both the targets to be attacked and the capabilities of the adversary vary from one conflict to another. Consequently, drone development is driven by the specific operational requirements of each battlefield and the continuing interaction between attack drones and the defenses designed to defeat them.
Indian and Chinese army troops greeted each other along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) near the Karakoram Pass in Ladakh on October 31, 2024, on the occasion of Diwali. Chinese troops greeted Indian soldiers and exchanged sweets on October 31 at two points along their contested border to mark a major Indian festival, army sources said, a week after leaders of the Asian rivals held their first bilateral meeting in five years. (Photo by Indian Army / AFP) / XGTY / RESTRICTED TO EDITORIAL USE – MANDATORY CREDIT “AFP PHOTO/INDIAN ARMY” – NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS – DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS
Drone Warfare Enabling Technologies
A formidable drone warfare capability cannot be built merely by developing drones with impressive specifications. It requires drones whose capabilities are tailored to specific targets and tactical scenarios. For example, interdicting road supply lines requires drones that can identify and engage moving supply trucks while distinguishing them from other vehicles. Such drones may be unsuitable for attacking bridges.
The key is to master the enabling technologies that allow drones to perform specific tasks.
These broadly encompass five areas:
Propulsion: Low-cost, efficient engines for the required combination of speed, range, and endurance.
Communication: Resilient, low-latency communications, including LEO satellite links, for responsive remote piloting and target engagement.
Navigation: AI-enabled machine vision and terrain matching for navigation that does not depend solely on satellite navigation (SatNav).
Precision attack: Machine vision and target recognition for accurate engagement of intended targets.
Warheads: Payloads tailored to the intended targets and desired effects.
A nation cannot become a leader in drone warfare simply by developing drones. It must master these enabling technologies and continuously improve them to meet evolving battlefield requirements.
India’s mastery of drone-warfare enabling technologies remains limited in several critical areas, particularly when compared with China’s industrial scale and technological capabilities.
The Chinese Threat
China has substantial capabilities in many of the enabling technologies discussed above. More importantly, it has a formidable drone-component manufacturing ecosystem spanning electric motors, flight controllers, sensors, machine vision, navigation and communications modules, as well as drone propulsion.
Its experience with mesh networking can support low-latency drone control and coordination. China is also developing large-scale LEO satellite constellations, although their specific contribution to military drone operations should not be assumed without further evidence.
China could potentially develop and field drones tailored to exploit specific vulnerabilities in Indian Army capabilities or tactics within relatively short periods. It could also adapt its systems to counter tactical innovations introduced by Indian forces.
Along the border, China’s industrial capacity could enable it to manufacture and field drones in large numbers, threatening Indian troop movements by day and night. Supply lines, radars, tanks and artillery could all face persistent drone attacks.
Without comparable capabilities, the Indian Army would risk losing operational ground.
Long-range precision strikes by Chinese drones could also threaten IAF airbases, radars, air-defense units and logistics bases, potentially degrading India’s ability and willingness to sustain a prolonged conflict.
If this scenario seems overstated, consider how Russia, despite possessing a formidable layered air-defense network, has struggled to prevent Ukraine’s sustained drone attacks.
Ukrainian long-range strikes have benefited from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support, including Western assistance. Satellite communications, including Starlink, have also played a role in some Ukrainian drone operations.
China possesses substantial ISR and communications capabilities of its own, although their effectiveness in a conflict along the Indian border would depend on operational conditions and the resilience of the systems involved.
Given India’s resource constraints and technological gaps, it could struggle to withstand a sustained, large-scale Chinese drone campaign unless it develops comparable capabilities in drone production, deployment, and counter-drone warfare.
Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
The Indian Navy is conducting trials of the French Dassault Rafale-M, the naval aircraft that edged out the American F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in a tight contest.
Interestingly, the Indian Navy already operates a substantial number of American platforms. Against that backdrop, Boeing had expected to secure yet another major Indian contract.
Why did the French Rafale-M ultimately edge out the Super Hornets?
In April 2025, India ordered 26 Rafale Marines to replace the Russian-origin MiG-29K, which currently operates from Indian aircraft carriers– INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant.
More than a year after signing the contract, the Indian Navy is running Rafale-M trials at the Shore-Based Test Facility (SBTF) at INS Hansa in Goa and is reportedly considering some minor modifications to its aircraft carriers to accommodate the French aircraft.
According to the reports, the service is considering these small modifications because the Rafale-M fighters were originally designed to operate from CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) carriers—such as the French carrier Charles de Gaulle—whereas Indian carriers use a Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) system.
Additionally, the Rafale-M has a wingspan of almost 10.9 meters, and unlike the MiG-29K, it is not designed to fold its wings to take up less space on the deck. This creates a larger deck or hangar footprint. So, the Navy is purportedly examining minor procedural workarounds, such as temporarily detaching the wingtip missile launch rails to reduce the effective span to roughly 9.6 meters, along with handling and stowage adjustments.
Rafale-M deliveries are expected to begin in 2028 and likely conclude by 2030, marking the first time in a decade that the Indian Navy will operate a non-Russian or Western fighter. Its last Western carrier fighter was the British Sea Harrier aircraft, which it retired in 2016 after more than three decades of service.
Notably, the Indian Navy has operated French equipment before, though never on this scale.
Earlier, it acquired 12 Breguet Alizé carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft that participated in the 1961 Goa operations and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and served the Navy until 1991. The service has also operated the HAL Chetak, a French-designed light utility helicopter produced in India for decades, though it is now being phased out in favor of more advanced indigenous aircraft.
By contrast, the Indian Navy operates a range of US-origin equipment, from helicopters to spy aircraft, making the choice of a French carrier-based jet particularly interesting.
File Image: Rafale-M
Indian Navy: Full of US-Origin Weapon Systems
Despite the push for indigenization, the Indian Navy has steadily acquired American platforms and weapons over the past few decades.
One of the most important items on this list is the P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft. India first ordered eight P-8I aircraft in January 2009, becoming the type’s first international customer.
It signed a follow-on order for four additional aircraft in 2016, significantly enhancing its maritime surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and ISR capabilities and positioning it as a critical asset in the Indian Ocean Region.In February 2026, the Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) officially cleared an additional P-8I purchase.
In addition to the Poseidon, the Indian Navy ordered 24 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-mission naval helicopters in February 2020. It has since received 21, and the rest are expected to arrive in 2027. These helicopters can conduct anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, shipborne multi-role operations, and networked operations, arming the Navy with the capability to detect and neutralize underwater and surface threats in the Indian Ocean.
The Navy has also leased two MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones from US-based General Atomics since 2020. It is supplementing these by leasing two more as per a contract signed in August 2026. These drones have supported maritime surveillance and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in the Indian Ocean Region, complementing the Navy’s P-8I and helping maintain vigilance.
India also signed a $3.3 billion deal with the US in October 2024 to acquire 31 MQ-9B High-Altitude Long-Endurance UAVs. Of the 31 Sea Guardians the MoD purchased, the Indian Navy will receive 15 drones, while the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force will each receive 8 to strengthen surveillance along the northern and western borders.
The Indian Navy operates one US-acquired INS Jalashwa (the former USS Trenton), an Austin-class amphibious transport dock with a sealift capability for over 3,500 troops and a squadron of armored vehicles.
Furthermore, the service has also acquired several lethal US munitions over the years, including the AGM-84 Harpoon Block II anti-ship missile, Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes, and the AGM-114 Hellfire, to name just a few.
Despite these rather high-value acquisitions, the Indian Navy has never purchased or operated an American fighter jet. When it finally got the chance to buy a US aircraft, i.e., the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the service chose the Rafale-M instead.
Why did India Opt For Rafales over Super Hornets?
When India opened the contest for a carrier-based fighter to replace the MiG-29K jets, Boeing offered its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Block III.
In 2022, Boeing India marketed the F/A-18 Super Hornet Block III as a carrier-based fighter designed for high-load, high-stress operations, and stressed that the multi-role naval fighter would be fully compatible with Indian Navy carriers.
Boeing pitched the Super Hornet as a jet that required minimal support equipment and had a remarkably low cost per flight hour while maintaining high mission readiness. It tried to woo the Indian Navy by emphasizing that the aircraft would become a force multiplier because it could interface with the P-8I and other US-origin systems the service operates.
To sweeten the deal, Boeing also announced a roadmap to significantly increase its investments in line with the “Make in India” initiative and pledged to transfer cutting-edge technologies to Indian industry if the Super Hornet was selected.
However, the Super Hornet had to dogfight with the French Rafale, a cutting-edge fighter for India’s carrier-borne aircraft tender.
In a tightly fought contest, both jets underwent extensive testing at a shore-based facility, including take-off trials from both ski-jump and catapult launchers. Both aircraft reportedly met the Indian Navy’s requirements, but the Rafale-M ultimately won.
Speaking to the EurAsian Times earlier, an ex-Indian Navy pilot who had flown both the Super Hornet and Rafale said both aircraft were extremely capable and on a level playing field. “The only issue I can think of is that the F-18 is a heavier aircraft, and the Rafale M is lighter. So, when it comes to arrested landing on the aircraft carrier, Rafale has more flexibility,” the naval aviator said at the time, requesting anonymity.
In this image released by the US Department of Defense, an F/A-18F Super Hornet launches from the flight deck of the world’s largest aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, October 11, 2023. (Photo by Triniti Lersch / US Department of Defense / AFP) /
The Rafale-M shared a very high degree of commonality with the 36 Rafale jets operated by the Indian Air Force (IAF). This meant several parts, tools, and test equipment could be interchanged, and India could share ground-support systems, simulators, and diagnostic software.
Additionally, India had already established maintenance infrastructure, trained technicians, and supply chains for the IAF Rafales, which could support the Rafale-Ms.
The Navy would have assessed that Rafale-Ms would reduce costs by creating an inventory of maintenance facilities, spare parts, logistics, and potential future overhauls. Meanwhile, introducing the Super Hornet would require building an entirely separate support ecosystem.
In this scenario, the air force can familiarize itself with the Marine aircraft, while naval pilots can transition to the IAF’s twin-seat Rafales.
The IAF is now poised to acquire 114 Rafale multi-role fighters, most of which will be manufactured locally. Therefore, one could argue that the decision to choose French jets for the Indian Navy may have been driven by the need for uniformity and interoperability, which are crucial in fast-paced conflict zones.
A secondary factor could have been the Infrared Search and Track (IRST) system, which provides a stealthy advantage in detecting and engaging threats, including potential low-observable aircraft. The Rafale-M came with an integrated IRST, whereas the Super Hornet Block III lacked one, although Boeing offered a podded solution.
Moreover, the Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile on the Rafale also offered superior standoff capability compared to the Super Hornet’s AIM-120 AMRAAM.
More importantly, however, strong defense ties between India and France, smoother government-to-government negotiations even in past deals, the potential for indigenous weapons integration, and the presence of French fighter jets in the IAF played a crucial role in the decision.
India has never acquired US fighter jets for several reasons, including export controls and restrictions on their use.
Despite its best efforts to market the Block III jet to potential customers such as Canada, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Switzerland, Boeing failed to secure any new contracts and kept losing out to rivals such as Saab Gripen, Dassault Rafale, and the Lockheed Martin F-35.
Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
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China’s Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, has once again published a propaganda editorial against India titled “India’s ‘Victory Narrative’ Will Only Hit a Wall on China-India Border.” The article was published on October 14, 2026.
One notable characteristic of Chinese commentaries and diplomats is that they use polite language in their statements but then, within the same text, suddenly shift to intimidating language and issue warnings.
They act like a “big brother,” offering suggestions, dictating terms, and adopting a dominant attitude toward other countries, which stems from their “Middle Kingdom syndrome”—a mindset rooted in a historical Sinocentric worldview that exhibits king-subject thinking and demands homage and subservience.
This pattern is also reflected in what is commonly described as “wolf warrior diplomacy,” in which Chinese diplomats adopt a more confrontational tone when their country’s interests or positions are challenged.
Similarly, Chinese diplomats may appear cool and calm at first, then abruptly use fierce language to assert dominance and make strong statements.
Beijing’s Revisionist Map Games
This article targets India because New Delhi has recently stepped up its “counter-cartography” policy, formally assigning standardized names to key locations along the India-China border.
This includes the Home Ministry’s October 2026 announcement standardizing 28 strategic features in Ladakh—specifically covering crucial Line of Actual Control (LAC) friction points like Gogra and Hot Springs, alongside peaks, passes, and glaciers.
It also follows India’s August 2026 mapping of 27 critical sites in Arunachal Pradesh, including historic flashpoints like Longju and Thag La. The Global Times article claims that by assigning these names, India “creates the self-delusion that its border claims have been settled.”
The text further asserts that “first comes an administrative announcement, followed by the names being entered on official maps, and then repeated amplification through the media.” It thus criticizes India’s approach; however, China does exactly the same through its own lawfare.
Beijing has repeatedly used map manipulation as a geopolitical tool to assert its claims—such as by releasing multiple rounds of standardized Mandarin names for locations in Arunachal Pradesh (which it calls Zangnan).
This is a typical Chinese way of doing things; China historically used these exact cartographic and administrative assertions before annexing Tibet in 1950, and it continues to use maps as an aggressive tool to project its territorial claims today.
It says that “India is playing games,” but this is exactly what China does in its dealings with India by failing to honor its agreements, including those reached in 1993 (Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility), 1996 (Confidence-Building Measures), and 2003/2005 (Political Parameters and Modalities).
If peace and tranquility have prevailed along the India-China border or LAC for an extended period, it is because India has unilaterally honored and abided by these agreements.
For instance, before 1962, China signed the Panchsheel Agreement (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), under which Beijing promoted the narrative of mutual interests, mutual benefits, and peaceful relations through the slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai,” but then suddenly attacked India.
Similarly, in 2020, sensing India’s vulnerability when the country was battling one of its worst COVID-19 crises, China tried to grab more Indian land and attacked Indian soldiers in Galwan through deception, killing 20 Indian soldiers.
Indian and Chinese army greet each other along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) near Karakoram pass in Ladakh on October 31, 2024, on the occasion of Diwali. Chinese troops greeted Indian soldiers and exchanged sweets on October 31 at two points along their contested border to mark a major Indian festival, army sources said, a week after leaders of the Asian rivals held their first bilateral meeting in five years. (Photo by Indian Army / AFP)
Cartographic Fraud
Then it says that, in 2019, “India unilaterally amended its domestic laws, revoked relevant constitutional provisions, and announced the creation of the so-called ‘Union Territory of Ladakh,’ deliberately incorporating Chinese territory in the western sector of the China-India border into its own administrative jurisdiction.”
However, when India revoked Article 370 of its Constitution and reorganized Jammu and Kashmir, it was an internal decision of India’s sovereignty, over which no foreign country has any say. India has historical claims to this region, and it has been an integral part of India for centuries.
China cannot dictate to India when it changes names, reorganizes its territories, or makes administrative changes. China has actually occupied Aksai Chin since the 1950s, consolidating its control during the 1962 war. It has also occupied the Shaksgam Valley, which it continues to hold illegally.
It then says the China-India border has historically belonged to China and that “China possesses sovereignty over the relevant areas, including the Aksai Chin region in Northwest China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and has ample historical and legal grounds for its claims.” How can China claim historical ownership when it has no historical claim to these territories? This is a complete distortion of history.
In reality, China’s administrative footprint never historically extended south of the Kunlun Mountains, and its own official records contradict its claims.
For instance, the Postal Atlas of China—officially published by the Chinese government between 1917 and 1933—as well as the 1925 Peking University Atlas, explicitly marked the international boundary along the Kunlun range, placing the entire Aksai Chin plateau completely outside of China and within India.
Furthermore, India’s legitimate administrative and historical rights were formally established under the 1842 Treaty of Chushul, signed between the Dogra Kingdom of Jammu & Kashmir and Tibet/the Qing Empire, which solidified Ladakh’s traditional frontiers.
The 1865 Johnson Line precisely mapped this boundary, and the Maharaja of Kashmir even built a military fort at Shahidulla (Xaidulla) to safeguard trade routes.
China established a presence in Aksai Chin only in the 1950s by covertly building the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway (G219) across Indian territory while New Delhi focused on peaceful diplomacy, and it eventually occupied it by force during the 1962 war.
Using Multilateral Forums as Geopolitical Tools
It then says that when Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Xi Jinping, they discussed improving ties. It then gives a warning to India, a typical Chinese way of behaving: first bullying and then giving advice.
It says that “India should exercise greater restraint on border issues of this kind rather than provoke tensions.” It further says that “some Indian politicians are now keen to stage political shows over the border issue to divert attention from domestic problems and pander to nationalist sentiment.”
It thus links India’s renaming of places with an attempt to divert attention from domestic issues. However, this description fits China’s all-weather ally, Pakistan, which always seeks to externalize its internal threats toward its neighbors, particularly India and Afghanistan.
In stark contrast, India has robust political stability under a strong parliamentary mandate, a functioning electoral democracy, and the title of the world’s fastest-growing major economy, with resilient GDP growth of around 6.5% to 7% despite global slowdowns. It faces no major internal crisis that would force it to externalize its problems.
It then says that “China and India are important neighbors, major developing countries,” and that their relationship extends beyond bilateral ties to global forums, where they must cooperate through platforms such as BRICS and the United Nations to address global challenges and uphold international fairness and justice.
It says this as if India is the irritant preventing China from cooperating with it. However, China uses these forums to its advantage and sometimes directly against India. In these global forums, Beijing consistently blocks India’s rightful interests and actively seeks to constrain India’s rise.
For instance, at the UNSC, China repeatedly uses its veto to block India’s permanent seat and places technical holds to shield Pakistan-based terrorists from global sanctions. Furthermore, Beijing single-handedly blocks India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) while using BRICS to push its own geoeconomic agendas that violate Indian sovereignty.
Then, in typical Chinese style, it concludes with another warning: “We urge India to act in the broader interests of bilateral relations, exercise prudence in both words and actions on the boundary issue, and follow the important understandings reached by the two countries’ leaders.”
Ultimately, this Global Times article stands as a textbook example of Chinese doublespeak and strategic hypocrisy. It attempts to lecture India on restraint and respect for agreements while China itself has a long, documented history of violating bilateral treaties, executing covert land-grabs, and aggressively weaponizing cartography against its neighbors.
By trying to portray India’s sovereign, internal administrative decisions as “political shows” or “provocations,” Beijing is merely projecting its own anxieties onto New Delhi. India’s robust economy, stable democracy, and firm counter-cartography policy prove that it will no longer remain passive in the face of China’s “salami-slicing” tactics and lawfare.
If China truly wants “peace and tranquility” on the border, it must shed its outdated Middle Kingdom syndrome, look at India as an equal, and stop using global forums and state media to launch malicious propaganda against Indian sovereignty,
THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Center for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
Connect with the author at: khurshidimran (at) gmail.com
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Malaysia expects to receive its Korean-made FA-50M light combat aircraft on schedule, Defense Minister Khaled Nordin said, with the first jets due this month or next.
“According to the schedule, the aircraft will arrive this month or next month – I will announce the arrival date later. So far, I have not received any information regarding a delay in the delivery of the aircraft,” Khaled told reporters after the launch of the Warriors’ Fund Campaign 2026/2027.
In May 2023, Malaysia signed a nearly $920 million contract with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) for 18 FA-50 Block 20 light combat aircraft, designated FA-50M, for the Royal Malaysian Air Force.
Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, India’s LCA Tejas was also competing for a Malaysian fighter-jet contract.
Malaysia, which has long needed to modernize its fast jet fleet, commenced the FLIT-LCA requirement in June 2021.
The country launched the tender to acquire a Lead-In Trainer-Light Combat Aircraft as part of the air force’s Capability 55 plan, released in 2018 and outlining the air force’s objective to achieve an ideal force structure by 2055.
The tender quickly gained traction from several countries, including India. Other contenders included the Turkish Hurjet, China-Pakistan’s JF-17, Russia’s MiG-35, and the Korean FA-50.
The FA-50 and Tejas were the two final shortlisted candidates, with the South Korean aircraft ultimately prevailing. Malaysia selected the FA-50 aircraft over India’s Tejas, with officials citing the Korean jet’s proven service record and combat record as key factors.
Korea Aerospace Industries confirmed in February 2023 that it had secured the Malaysian deal.
Then-Defence Minister Mohamad Hasan said the jet’s service record was the primary consideration. “We cannot take the risk and acquire assets that are still at the prototype stage. Our personnel will use this jet, so safety is in our criteria,” he told a press conference in May 2023, echoing comments made in parliament the previous month.
A Korea Aerospace Industries representative later told Channel News Asia that the Royal Malaysian Air Force viewed the Tejas as lacking an export record, while the FA-50 was already proven in combat.
The Philippine Air Force has used the FA-50, including during the 2017 Marawi campaign, and several regional air forces, including Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, operate it.
Sources at India’s HAL acknowledged the outcome. “We were short-listed for the Malaysian LCA contract. We were hopeful as we were very competitive on several criteria, but unfortunately this has not gone our way,” one source said.
HAL Chairman C.B. Ananthakrishnan reportedly said the company was optimistic after being shortlisted from multiple bidders but had received indications that the order was going to the Korean contender, though it had not yet received formal notification.
KAI and Lockheed Martin jointly developed the supersonic T-50 advanced jet trainer, with the TA-50 as the Lead-in fighter trainer and the FA-50 as a light combat aircraft variant.
The T-50 partly resembles the F-16 Fighting Falcon and is 80% of its size. Development began in the 1990s, funded 70% by the South Korean government, 17% by KAI, and 13% by Lockheed Martin.
The aircraft made its first flight in August 2002 and entered service by February 2005.
KAI and Lockheed Martin pursued a joint international marketing program for the T-50.
The T-50/FA-50 family is operated (or on order) by the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Iraq, Poland, and Malaysia. Total firm orders across the family exceed ~290 airframes, with roughly 220–230 already built or delivered as of late 2026 (around 70 still in production or pending delivery).
FA-50
The T-50 is equipped with a GE F404 engine built under license by Samsung Techwin. GE provides engine kits to Samsung Techwin, which also produces some parts and performs final engine assembly and testing.
The fighter/attack variants are equipped with the Elta EL/M-2032 fire-control radar, the same as the initial LCA MK1. The TA-50 can operate as a full-fledged combat platform with PGMs, air-to-ground weapons, and air-to-air missiles.
The TA-50 can carry pods for reconnaissance, targeting assistance, and electronic warfare. Reconnaissance and electronic warfare variants are also being developed, designated RA-50 and EA-50, respectively.
The TA-50 has an internally mounted three-barrel M61 Vulcan cannon. Wingtip rails can accommodate the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile, and underwing hardpoints can carry a variety of additional weapons.
South Korea is considering arming the FA-50 with a smaller version of the Taurus KEPD 350 missile to give it a 400 km stand-off engagement capability. The aircraft has an internal fuel capacity of 2,655 liters. It can carry 1,710 liters in the three external fuel tanks.
The aircraft has a max take-off weight of 12,300 kg. Its ferry range is 1,851 km, and its thrust-to-weight ratio is 0.96. The seven hardpoints can carry up to 5,400 kg of payload.
The FA-50 can carry more internal fuel, and the engine could be either the Eurojet EJ200 or the General Electric F414, providing up to 25% more thrust. Other AESA radars, such as Raytheon’s AN/APG-79 and Northrop Grumman’s AN/APG-83, are options for future production.
In January 2019, KAI began developing an improved FA-50 known as the Block 10 and Block 20 upgrades. The Block 20 adds munitions such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM. Raytheon PhantomStrike and Northrop Grumman AN/APG-83 were being considered as the future AESA radars.
MBDA has offered to integrate the Meteor and ASRAAM medium- and short-range air-to-air missiles on FA-50 and future KF-X fighter jets.
The T-50/FA-50 lost several competitions or was blocked from sales. The UK arms embargo on British components, such as the ejection seat, thwarted Argentina’s interest. Israel and Singapore instead chose the Italian M-346. Taiwan developed its own T-5 Brave Eagle based on its F-CK-1 fighter. The US chose Boeing’s T-7 and also blocked a proposed sale to Uzbekistan, citing concerns that the technology could reach Russia.
Unlike the F-35, India has received a formal offer from Russia for the Sukhoi Su-57 fifth-generation fighter but has not yet decided whether to evaluate it, the head of the Indian Air Force said.
Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh told reporters on the sidelines of the Exercise Tarang Shakti in Jodhpur that the Indian Air Force was aware of Moscow’s proposal.
“As far as the Su-57 is concerned, we have received information that an offer has been made, but no decision has been taken on whether to evaluate it,” he said.
“Once a decision is made, we will assess how well it meets our requirements.”
Russia has repeatedly pitched the Su-57 to India.
Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, Russian President Vladimir Putin personally renewed the Su-57 offer to India.
Speaking on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Putin reaffirmed Russia’s readiness to cooperate with India on the Su-57, including exporting and jointly producing the aircraft.
“It’s fifth-generation technology — I think it’s the best in the world as of now,” the Russian President said at the forum.
President Putin recalled Indo-Russian 5th-gen aircraft collaboration and said: “As far as the Su-57 goes, at one point we proposed to our Indian friends to work together on this technology. “But back then, our Indian friends said: ‘Go ahead on your own, and then we will see – maybe we’ll join’…The aircraft could have been our joint project. We built it independently, but we are ready to work with India in this field – to supply this aircraft and to keep developing it,” the Russian President told the reporters. “We don’t have any issues with it or any limitations. The same goes for air defense systems,” he added.
The Su-57 is a supersonic, twin-engine fifth-generation aircraft designed to destroy air, ground, and naval targets. Developed to compete with the F-22 and F-35, the ‘Felon’ jet features enhanced stealth through composite materials and can cruise supersonically.
It is a multi-role fighter jet capable of air superiority missions, ground attacks, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. Russia is integrating a range of lethal weapon systems on the Su-57 platform, including the long-range R-37M missile and hypersonic missiles, as reported by the EurAsian Times.
Additionally, the aircraft is being integrated with Artificial Intelligence (AI) to enhance threat detection, decision-making, and pilot support. However, these features have failed to attract buyers, especially India.
If India proceeds with the Su-57 deal and Moscow meets all Indian prerequisites, including technology transfer, it could inject billions into Russia’s sanctions-hit economy. India would also get an interim fifth-gen fighter till the indigenous AMCA arrives.
Russia’s defense exports have historically benefited through high-profile deals with India. An excellent example is the Su-30MKI, India’s customized variant of the Su-30.
India’s acquisition of the Su-30MKI in the early 2000s influenced other nations, such as Malaysia, which modeled its Su-30MKM on the Indian version. Its versatility—including thrust-vectoring engines, canards, and integrated avionics from multiple countries—made it a flagship for Russian technology.
Another bigger success story is the BrahMos supersonic missile.
India’s DRDO and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya launched the joint venture in 1998 to develop and produce the BrahMos, one of the world’s fastest supersonic cruise missiles.
The Philippines was the first customer of the BrahMos, signing a contract worth approximately $375 million with BrahMos Aerospace in January 2022 for three shore-based anti-ship missile batteries.
The package, intended for the Philippine Marine Corps, includes mobile launchers, missiles, operator and maintainer training, and integrated logistics support. Deliveries began in April 2024 with the first battery and continued through 2025 and into 2026, with the third and final battery nearing completion.
Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has indicated interest in further adapting or expanding the capability to suit the country’s geography and operational needs.
Another Southeast Asian country, Indonesia, became its second customer.
An agreement for “cooperation on the BrahMos System” was struck during the visit, Indian foreign ministry spokesman Randhir Jaiswal said in a post on X.
The two countries also reached an agreement on air-to-air missile cooperation that “enhances technology collaboration and defense capabilities”, he said.
Indian PM Modi hailed the “growing trust” between Jakarta and New Delhi after meeting Prabowo, which he said underpinned cooperation in “defense, security and maritime affairs”.
“Today, we reached an agreement to enhance defense exchanges, disaster management, and industrial cooperation,” Modi told reporters.
A man waves India’s national flag in front of a replica of the Indian Army’s BrahMos missile system during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s roadshow in Ahmedabad on May 26, 2025. (Photo by Sam PANTHAKY / AFP)
Earlier, Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) spokesperson, Rico Ricardo Sirait, told Reuters on March 9 that Jakarta has agreed to buy the BrahMos missile system from India.
The Indian Navy inducted its first BrahMos system in 2005 aboard INS Rajput. The Indian Army followed in 2007 with its own regiments, and the Air Force later introduced an air-launched version from the Su-30MKI in 2019.
The BrahMos missile saw combat use during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, when Indian forces employed air-launched variants from the Su-30MKI. IAF reportedly fired 15-19 BrahMos missiles.
The Indo-Russian missile could have more export customers.
India sketched a list of “friendly nations” it deemed potential buyers, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and South Africa. The list has since changed, with several countries dropping interest and others queuing up to assess the combat-tested missile system.
India reportedly started talks with Vietnam to sell off the supersonic cruise missile in 2023. An official with BrahMos Aerospace Ltd told the EurAsian Times at the time: “Vietnam had shown interest in the system. But the negotiations have just started.”
Further evidence of BrahMos’s widespread appeal in Southeast Asia is Malaysia’s sustained interest in the missile system, particularly the air-launched variant, which could be integrated with the Royal Malaysian Air Force’s Su-30MKM fighter jets.
By 2025, Malaysia appeared in lists of countries “queuing up” or actively negotiating for BrahMos. In fact, in August that year, reports suggested Malaysia had begun preliminary negotiations with Russia and India for the missile, aiming to revolutionize its Indo-Pacific airpower projection.
Besides Southeast Asia, the Middle East could be a potential market for the BrahMos missile.
Alexander Maksichev, Co-Director of BrahMos Aerospace, explicitly emphasized the UAE as a potential customer. Additionally, India has repeatedly listed the UAE among “friendly nations” eligible for BrahMos exports.
Other countries that have reportedly shown interest in the missile include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and Egypt. BrahMos has also gained traction in South America, with countries such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela showing interest.
The Indo-Russian BrahMos is a major export success, and Putin may want to replicate that success with the Su-57, using Russian tech and Indian co-production and marketing.
Whether India will bite the bullet remains to be seen.
Taiwan recently received its first two F-16V (Viper) fighter jets from the US under an $8 billion deal for 66 F-16Vs, approved during US President Donald Trump’s first term.
The F-16 Vipers landed at Taiwan’s ChihhangairAir Force Base in Taitung. President Lai Ching-te called it “a major milestone in elevating Taiwan’s air defense capabilities” and thanked the US for its “long-standing support.”
When Lockheed Martin delivers the 66 new jets by 2028, the Taiwanese Air Force will have more than 200 F-16 Viper fighter jets, making it the largest Viper-standard fleet in the Indo-Pacific region.
Meanwhile, another Asian country, wary of China’s military, plans to acquire 114 Rafale jets from France.
IAF (Indian Air Force) already operates 36 Rafales and has ordered 26 Rafale-M (Marine) fighter jets for its Navy. If and when the IAF acquires all 114 Rafale jets, it will become the largest operator of Dassault jets outside France.
A newly purchased F-16V Block 70 fighter jet lands at Chihhang Air Base in Taitung on October 2, 2026. Taiwan received its first two US-made F-16V fighter jets, as the island democracy upgrades its military capabilities to deter a potential Chinese attack. The warplanes are part of an $8 billion deal for 66 F-16Vs approved during US President Donald Trump’s first term and scheduled for delivery this year. (Photo by CHENG Yu-chen / AFP)
Rafale vs F-16V
Both Rafale and F-16V are powerful fighter jets, but one massive advantage makes the US Vipers “superior” to the French Rafales, at least theoretically.
On paper, the twin-engine, nuclear-capable Dassault Rafale looks far more lethal than Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Viper, a single-engine lightweight fighter that first flew in 1974, more than five decades ago.
However, in modern times, fighter-jet battles are rarely one-on-one platform contests.
As heroic dogfights between fighter jets became a relic of the past and gave way to beyond-visual-range (BVR) contests, the battle for aerial supremacy became a system-of-systems contest rather than a straightforward one-on-one contest.
In this system-of-systems contest, a much less capable fighter aircraft can trounce a much superior aircraft if it integrates ground-, air-, and space-based sensors, capable radars, sensor fusion, an integrated battlespace display, and precision targeting.
In short, a networked fighter jet, even if less capable, is more lethal than a stand-alone aircraft.
Additionally, fighter jet deals are rarely purely military decisions; they are as much geopolitical as they are military.
It’s no surprise that a capable, cost-effective combat aircraft like the Saab JAS-39 Gripen struggled to find an export customer for over a decade. Again, after signing a deal with Brazil for the Gripen E/F variant in 2014, the aircraft failed to win other export customers for more than a decade.
While Gripen is a cutting-edge aircraft with state-of-the-art weapons, its biggest weakness was the lack of a powerful, influential backer on the global stage like the US or France.
Sweden, where Saab is based, is not really a global powerhouse, has a modest military, is not part of the nuclear club, and is not a member of the UN Security Council, unlike the US, Russia, France, the UK, and China, all of which are permanent members of the UNSC and enjoy veto power that could offer myriad advantages in geopolitical contests.
Brazil’s military transport aircraft, the Embraer C-390 Millennium, faces a similar challenge. Though capable and boasting an enviable safety record, it sells far fewer units than the American C-130J Super Hercules.
In other words, countries not only buy fighter jets; they also prefer to buy from countries with strong military and geopolitical clout.
This is where the US has an unmatched lead over competitors, including France, Russia, and China.
Consider, for example, Ukraine.
It not only received used F-16 fighter jets, but it also received Starlink support and US intelligence inputs, which allowed it to target military targets deep inside Russian territory.
Ukrainian F-16 Fighter Jet.
Without this satellite and intelligence support, the F-16s would be only half as effective.
Similarly, consider Israel in the Middle East.
It has not only received advanced US fighter jets such as the F-15 and the F-35, but Jerusalem also gets full US intelligence support, pinpoint information on adversary military targets, and their military movements.
Similarly, Jerusalem gets early warning whenever Iran launches ballistic missiles towards it.
The US has nearly 20 military bases in the region and maintains advanced surface-to-air missile batteries, such as Patriot and THAAD, sea-based missile defense platforms, and AN/FPS-132 missile early-warning radar in the Middle East.
This diversified radar network ensures that not only does Israel receive early warning of every Iranian attack, but Iranian missiles and drones have to pass through a layered missile defense infrastructure spread over the whole of the Middle East before their projectiles can reach Israel.
It is these incremental weapons, missiles, radar and sensors, intelligence, and satellite support that ensure that Jerusalem comes out on top in every regional military conflict.
In the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel’s adversaries, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, had advanced Soviet fighters, and yet Jerusalem was able to trounce their combined military might, thanks to the intelligence support it received.
Export of military platforms is perhaps the US’s most successful export commodity since the two World Wars.
According to SIPRI, between 2021 and 2025, the US was the world’s top military exporter, accounting for as much as 42% of global military exports.
France was a distant second with just a 9.8% share of global military exports.
However, this uncontested leadership depends on the superior performance of its military platforms in conflict.
So, basically, the US has a vested interest in ensuring the victory of militaries that field US military platforms.
On the other hand, countries that do not field US military platforms often struggle with poor intelligence support.
India, for instance, repeatedly requested Washington to provide satellite reconnaissance pictures to target Pakistani military positions on mountains during the Kargil War in 1999. But Washington declined India’s requests.
Had India bought US military planes, Washington would have, most probably, provided New Delhi with satellite imagery to target Pakistani military positions, so that India could hit these targets and Washington could market the efficiency of its jets.
In a potential conflict between China and Taiwan, Washington would provide Taipei with every possible intelligence and satellite support so that its fighter jets and other military platforms are not trounced against Chinese weapon systems.
As we have seen in the Ukraine War, no other country currently has a satellite network comparable to Starlink. In a potential conflict with China, this US support could be decisive.
With this US support, the F-16 Vipers could be far more lethal than they actually are.
Rafale is a very capable platform. It has an AESA radar, a SPECTRA electronic warfare suite, long-range air-to-air missiles such as Meteor, precision-strike munitions such as Hammer guided bombs, a long-range SCALP EG cruise missile, twin engines, and nuclear capability, which make it a lethal fighter.
However, despite its status as a major military power, France lacks the heft of the United States.
Despite the current “frosty” US-India ties, New Delhi must find a way to work with the US while preserving its strategic autonomy and boosting its Make-in-India initiative.
This is an Opinion Article
Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
India’s air force chief said on Saturday that the U.S. has made no formal offer to sell India F-35 stealth fighters, and added that American personnel have not even allowed Indian officers near the stealth aircraft.
Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh made the comments at a press conference marking the end of the multinational Exercise Tarang Shakti-2026 in Jodhpur, while seated alongside U.S. Pacific Air Forces commander Gen. Kevin Schneider.
“Your people don’t even let us go near the aircraft, and you are talking about selling it to us,” Singh said.
Six U.S. Air Force F-35As, accompanied by more than 200 personnel, participated in Tarang Shakti. This was the first time the American stealth fighters had drilled against Indian jets on Indian soil.
Singh also said the Indian government has not yet decided whether the air force should evaluate Russia’s offer of the Su-57.
“Once the decision is conveyed to us (by the government), we will evaluate how well it meets our requirements,” he said.
Earlier in 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump said, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington, that the United States would pave the way for India to acquire the F-35.
Later, Vice President J.D. Vance reiterated the offer during his visit to India in April 2025, saying, “We, of course, want to collaborate more. We want to work together more. And we want your nation to buy more of our military equipment, which we believe is best-in-class. American fifth-generation F-35s, for example, would give the Indian Air Force the ability to defend your airspace and protect your people like never before.”
Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet discussed selling the F-35 to India and raised the prospect of selling the F-21, a highly sophisticated F-16 derivative.
“I think the F-16 also has strong legs, if you will, and more and increasing interest as we go forward from several countries that aren’t quite ready for F-35,” Taiclet said. There are “some countries that could see F-21 or F-16, for India, for example, as a stepping stone to F-35.”
The sale of the F-35 is subject to rigorous U.S. export controls under the Arms Export Control Act, which requires approval from the State Department, the Pentagon, and often Congress. The White House maintains strict policies on technology transfers, regional stability, and the internal politics of the potential recipient state to safeguard its sensitive technology.
The U.S. hesitation is straightforward: sharing it with other countries could put sensitive technology in the hands of enemies, especially if the recipient country has ties to countries like China or Russia, which would try to exploit or reverse-engineer it.
Earlier, writing for EurAsian Times, Air Marshal Anil Chopra (retired) said: The F-35 soft pitch faced almost immediate limitations due to subsequent tariff frictions and India’s core push for technology transfer for domestic manufacturing of its AMCA fifth-gen warplanes and aero-engines.
GE Aerospace has faced immense delays on its 2021 contract to supply 99 F404-IN20 engines to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for the Tejas Mk1A fighter program. Only six out of the promised engines have been delivered instead of the targeted 12-plus a year, prompting HAL to invoke contractual penalty clauses.
Tariffs on “friend” India and delayed engines for AMCA have badly weakened Indo-US ties.
India also operates Russian-supplied S-400 systems, a factor that previously caused friction between the U.S. and Turkey.
India already operates the Russian-origin S-400 AD System. The U.S. fears these networks could compromise classified F-35 stealth data. The jet relies on the U.S.-controlled Operational Data Integrated Network for software and logistics.
The U.S. may already be accessing such data through many other American platforms on Indian soil.
Meanwhile, introducing a complex new Western platform adds severe maintenance challenges to an already diverse military fleet. Even in the U.S., very few airbases can service stealth coatings.
Buying foreign fifth-generation jets risks diverting funds from India’s indigenous AMCA project. Putting too many military aviation eggs in the unreliable U.S. basket is also a risk. Americans can be “very unreliable” when it comes to imposing sanctions and freezing spares and maintenance support.
Operationally, the F-35 could offer major strategic advantages for the IAF, but any deal involves deep geopolitical, logistical, and financial complexities. Acquisition costs range from $80 to $110 million per jet, plus very high hourly operating expenses, creating budgetary challenges for New Delhi.
F-35: Image via U.S. Embassy, New Delhi
After two decades of stable ties, the last two years have seen distrust between the world’s largest and oldest democracies.
While many hope this is a transitory phase, it is becoming clear that the U.S. is not interested in India’s rise as a global power. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau stated at the last Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi that Washington will not repeat its past approach (read: mistake) with China by granting India unfettered market and tech access that could lead to strong commercial competition.
The U.S. wants India strong enough only to serve as a bulwark against China, not to become an independent power center or a technology and economic power.
The U.S. seems keen only to supply platforms to India through large contracts. Even for aero-structures and smaller components, it prefers make-in-India “Build to Print” over significant technology sharing.
Even the proposed India-USA deal to co-produce GE Aerospace F414 engines with HAL faces major hurdles. The main complications include a nearly threefold cost surge, intense disputes over sensitive hot-end technology transfer, and the risk of delays to India’s Tejas Mk2 and AMCA programs.
Many Indians wonder whether we have invested too much in a partner with a high trust deficit and a vacillating foreign policy. U.S. is known to have “dumped” friends and allies for immediate national interests. The Trump administration’s recent public threats and admonishments to its NATO allies further strengthen Indian concerns.
The U.S. has already deepened its ties with India’s airborne platforms, supplying transport aircraft (C-17, C-130), maritime patrol aircraft (P-8I), UAVs (MQ-9), and helicopters (Chinook, AH-64 Apache, and MH-60R).
For a long time, the U.S. was trying to sell the F-16 ‘Viper’ (renamed F-21) and the F-18 Super Hornet as part of India’s Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) proposal. Later, it offered the F-15EX. The U.S. never officially offered the F-35.
Despite being the oldest democracy, the U.S. finds it easier to deal with dependent military Generals, and West Asian Sheikhs, rather than growing democracies. The U.S. has a poor opinion of India’s “Non-Alignment” and “Strategic Autonomy.”
Washington continues to prefer Pakistan, which helps it connect with China, the West, and Central Asia, and is willing to toe the American line for a few bucks. This Pakistan connection further erodes India’s trust.
Most analysts feel that letting the USA into India’s fighter-aircraft ecosystem is not a great idea. Any F-35 deal, like other aircraft deals, will be only a supply-and-support contract. There will be no technology transfer and no “Make-in-India” element.
While India pushes its own AMCA program, the Su-57 may still be the better choice for an interim fighter.
China is increasingly trying to diversify its connections to the region as Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan create new security and strategic problems for Beijing. The opening of a road through the Wakhan Corridor is an important step in that effort. Afghanistan has formally inaugurated a 121-kilometer road through the corridor, running from Broghil to the […]
Pakistan has outrighty rejected a New York Times (NYT) report that claimed PAF fighter jets were involved in strikes against Houthis, calling the claim “fake and fabricated.”
“The claim in the above-referenced NYT report that Pakistan Air Force aircraft are being used against the Houthis is fake and fabricated,” Pakistan’s Information Ministry said.
In an X post, Pakistan’s Ministry of Information & Broadcasting wrote: Fact Check | Ministry of Information & Broadcasting NYT above referred story attributing employment of PAF aircraft against Houthis is fake and fabricated. International Media houses are again asked to avoid speculative reporting with regards to employment of Pakistan’s Military Forces under Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. Details of any employment, if necessary will be given by concerned authorities. Truth Prevails over Falsehood.
The report came days after Pakistan and Turkey agreed to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.
File Image: JF-17 Jets
Earlier, a senior Pakistani military official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told NYT that Pakistan Air Force jets were being used in strikes against the Houthis.
Another Pakistani official said Islamabad’s role was aimed at degrading Houthi drone and missile threats through air support rather than a ground offensive in Yemen, the NYT claimed.
Col. David O. Smith, a former U.S. Army attaché in Pakistan and former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, said he had no classified figures, but that the analyst consensus was about 8,000 Pakistani troops deployed in Saudi Arabia. He said the force included a Pakistan Air Force contingent and Army air-defense units, that they would likely help secure oil infrastructure, and that Pakistani soldiers were unlikely to fight the Houthis directly because Islamabad is trying to preserve its relationship with Iran.
Pakistan’s military spokesman, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, confirmed to CNN that Pakistani troops are already in Saudi Arabia and described any role as defensive, without saying whether they would operate across the border in Yemen.
Interestingly, Pakistan earlier furiously denied a social media buzz that claimed Pakistan had lost three JF-17 fighter jets due to a Houthi missile attack that targeted King Abdulaziz Air Base in Saudi Arabia.
“This is absolutely fake. No credible or official source has also reported any sort of damage to PAF JF-17s,” the Ministry of Information reportedly said in its statement. The “deliberate fabrication of damage to PAF aircraft and their alleged evacuation is only blatant Indian propaganda, part of Hindutva deceit and a deceptive mindset,” the Ministry said.
The Pakistani Air Force jets and support aircraft, including JF-17 jets, arrived in April 2026 under the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed in September 2025.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s foreign minister has rejected sending troops to Yemen, despite the “Mecca pact” with Saudi Arabia.
“This is a defense agreement,” said Hakan Fidan, adding: “If one of the countries is attacked, you support its defense. This is not an offensive agreement.” Turkey “will not send its troops to another country’s territory to launch an attack”, he emphasized.
Fidan said Turkish and Saudi military delegations would work together to assess what defensive measures might be needed, without giving details.
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