Ankara, 30 oct (Prensa Latina) El presidente de Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, afirmó hoy que la solidaridad entre los Estados túrquicos constituye una necesidad estratégica ante las crisis y conflictos internacionales y la falta de justicia y confianza en el sistema mundial.
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When Turkey’s opposition made big gains in local elections in March 2024, its leaders believed they had finally found a way to defeat long-serving President Tayyip Erdogan.
More than two years later, the opposition’s leading presidential challenger is in prison, its main party has been split by a court ruling and some of the opposition figures who were elected as mayors have defected to Erdogan’s AK Party.
The opposition remains defiant. It says it retains faith in democratic elections and that voters will reject what they see as a politically motivated legal crackdown on government opponents in the next national elections, due in 2028.
The opposition now faces a challenge to harness and sustain people’s anger until then over what they say is government coercion under Erdogan, who has been in power as prime minister and then president for 23 years.
“I do not believe this anger has disappeared,” said Seren Selvin Korkmaz, co-founder and co-director of the IstanPol Institute, an Istanbul-based think tank.
“However, unless this anger is channelled into political energy or organisational energy, it will fade away. It may evolve into disappointment, hopelessness or apathy.”
The government denies the legal cases against its opponents are politically motivated and says the judiciary operates independently.
IZMIR MAYOR’S DEFECTION
Few places capture the opposition’s challenges better than Izmir in western Turkey on the Aegean coast.
The AK Party has never managed to win Izmir, the country’s third-largest city with about 4.5 million residents, at the ballot box, but this month Mayor Cemil Tugay, who was elected on an opposition ticket in 2024, defected to Erdogan’s party.
Tugay’s defection represents a significant symbolic setback in what has long been regarded as the heartland of Turkey’s secular, social democratic opposition.
Tugay says he did so because it was “in the best interests of Izmir” and Erdogan has dismissed as slander opposition allegations that Tugay switched parties under pressure.
But the opposition New Party’s head in Izmir expressed confidence that voters in the city would show their opposition to Tugay’s move and what he depicted as government coercion when they vote in the next national elections.
“The government believes it can steer this process through coercion, but it will realise that it has made a grave miscalculation in the election,” Cagatay Guc, the New Party’s head in Izmir, told Reuters.
The New Party, which is led nationally by politician Ozgur Ozel, staged protests before Tugay’s defection and believes many local voters oppose his change of allegiance.
In interviews with Reuters, many Izmir residents criticised Tugay’s decision.
“It was Tugay who joined the AK Party, not the people of Izmir,” said a 50-year-old man who gave his name only as Koray for fear of recriminations. “The AK Party can never win over the people of Izmir.”
A 67-year-old woman who gave her name only as Halide said: “We have never voted for that side (the AK Party) anyway … and now we’ll vote for Ozgur Ozel.”
Some residents said they agreed with Tugay that Izmir, one of the largest industrial and trade centres of Turkey, might receive more municipal services under a mayor representing the governing party.
“As a resident of Izmir, I want to see more municipal services in our city… With the necessary support from government, this city will be rebuilt, I hope,” said a 46-year-old man, who gave his name only as Isa.
One resident suggested Tugay had “no other choice” than to switch parties.
“He would either end up in Silivri, or carry on by switching parties,” said 53-year-old Alpay, referring to a prison west of Istanbul where many opposition figures are jailed.
LOSING FAITH IN CHANGE?
Inmates at Silivri include Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, who is regarded as Erdogan’s chief rival. In the 2024 local elections, Imamoglu was elected mayor of Istanbul for a second term from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which won 37.8% of the vote and also retained Ankara, Izmir and many other big cities.
Those successes encouraged the opposition to view control of Turkey’s biggest cities as a platform from which to challenge Erdogan nationally.
Dozens of mayors and hundreds of municipal officials are now in jail along with Imamoglu, who is awaiting trial on corruption charges which he denies.
The CHP has been split after a court ruling ousting Ozel as its leader and reinstating former leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu. Ozel, a close ally of Imamoglu, launched the New Party in response, hoping to sustain voter anger over the pressure on the opposition.
“If voters lose faith that change is possible, why would they bother to vote?” said Tanju Tosun, a political science professor at Ege University in Izmir. “Voter turnout in the general election may fall slightly, particularly amongst voters of the opposition parties.”
Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for May 2028 but a presidential adviser said this month that the elections would probably be held slightly earlier than expected. Doing so would allow Erdogan to sidestep constitutional limits and run again for office.
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said that the recently signed maritime deal between Libya’s eastern parliament and Turkey was “blatantly illegal, null and void,” adding that it “completely disregards the geography.”
Mitsotakis, speaking to Reuters as Greece ends its UN Security Council presidency, also called for an urgent “international truce” to protect shipping in the Black Sea after the sinking of a Greek-owned container vessel on Wednesday.
Libya’s eastern parliament last week approved a maritime boundaries deal with Turkey, drawing condemnation from Athens, but also Egypt, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, as a threat to regional security and international legal order.
“It completely disregards the geography, the reality that there are Greek islands — they seem to completely disappear in the thinking of Turkey and Libya,” Mitsotakis said, accusing them of attempting to create a “fait accompli” that ignores the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has said that reactions from the EU and others to the approval of the agreement, originally agreed in 2019, had no legitimate basis, defending Ankara’s policy in the eastern Mediterranean.
Since the 2019 Libya-Turkey deal, Greece has awarded a license to a consortium led by Chevron CVX.N to look for gas off the island of Crete and has sought a separate agreement with Libya on demarcating their maritime zones.
Mitsotakis assured “there’s no risk that these explorations will be in any way challenged.”
Referring to Libya and Greece as “natural neighbors,” Mitsotakis, who first became prime minister in 2019 and is in his second term, urged the African country to negotiate directly with Athens and take the discussions “very, very seriously.”
Mitsotakis, 58, spoke to Reuters after chairing a council debate on maritime security, only hours after a Greek container ship sank after being hit by naval drones off Bulgaria in the latest strike on ships in the western Black Sea this month.
Greek-operated ships are among the world’s largest fleets of tankers and are pivotal for trade across the Black Sea region, whose waters are shared by Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Turkey, as well as warring Russia and Ukraine, which Moscow invaded in February 2022.
“We do need some sort of international truce when it comes to the freedom of navigation,” said Mitsotakis, adding that it was of “utmost priority” to allow for exports of grain from the region into the world through the Black Sea.
“Greek shipowners would be the first to resume trading in the Black Sea, also from Ukraine, assuming a safe passage is guaranteed,” he said, stressing the rising costs of shipping as chartering and insurance expenses have “gone through the roof.”
It was not immediately clear who had carried out the attack, which added to growing concerns about the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine on commercial shipping in the area.
Mitsotakis said that Ukraine was financially dependent on exports of its products: “They had a bumper harvest, but the grain is now sitting in silos, in danger of rotting.”
“Unfortunately, for the moment, Russia doesn’t seem to be interested in engaging in a substantive discussion,” he said.
Mitsotakis also called on the European Union to bolster its naval mission to protect shipping in the Red Sea called Aspides, which was launched in 2024 to protect from attacks by Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis.
Intensifying hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have disrupted oil supplies and heightened the risk of a wider regional conflict, eight months since the US-Israeli strikes on Iran.
“My argument is simple: the European Union has an interest in having a concrete presence with hard assets in this part of the world, and we need more countries to participate in Aspides,” Mitsotakis told Reuters.
He said Greece, Italy and France have deployed “assets” as part of the mission and that was “clearly not enough.” Diplomats told Reuters as of late September there were six warships operating as part of the operation.
The Houthis said this week they had attacked Saudi military aircraft and repelled an advance by Saudi-backed forces near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, an important Red Sea shipping route.
“If we really want to send the message also to the Gulf countries that we take their security seriously, but we also protect the critical arteries and waterways that are absolutely indispensable for European trade, we should be willing to deploy more assets to this part of the world,” Mitsotakis said.
Asked about US President Donald Trump’s move earlier this month to lift sanctions on Russian diesel exports, Mitsotakis reaffirmed Greek support for sanctions on Moscow.
“We believe that we need to put economic pressure and impose more financial pain on Russia to send a very clear signal that as long as they prolong this war, they will suffer very specific economic consequences,” he said.
Hellenic American Leadership Council (HALC) executive director Endy Zemenides said Thursday that Peloton's Halloween-themed "Varosha Ride" trivializes a Cypriot ghost city emptied by Turkey's 1974 invasion, according to a thread he posted on X.
The post Greek American Group on Peloton’s ‘Varosha Ride’: ‘Not a Haunted Amusement Park’ appeared first on Breitbart.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told US President Donald Trump by phone on 28 October that Türkiye is ready to support efforts to revive Ukraine-Russia diplomacy and end the war that way, the Turkish presidency’s Directorate of Communications said. The same day, a White House official said the US will join the next round of talks with Kyiv and Moscow.
Talks between Ukraine, Russia, and the US have been stalled since winter, and the fight now is over timing. On 27 October, Zelenskyy said Kyiv wants that round before a Putin-Trump-Xi summit, which would leave Ukraine out of the room. Putin proposed that summit, The Wall Street Journal reported. Ankara’s statement names neither track, but Ukraine sits at the table only in the first.
The statement named no date or Turkish venue. In July, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in Kyiv that the Türkiye-mediated Istanbul talks should continue in the same format. Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine talks in 2022 and 2025. The 2 June 2025 round in Istanbul ended with a prisoner swap deal but no ceasefire. In March, Zelenskyy named Türkiye among possible venues.
On 28 October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed it was premature to talk about Abu Dhabi: a contact was expected soon and Abu Dhabi had been mentioned as a venue, but Russia was still preparing. Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov claimed the talks would come after 4 November, with the date depending in part on the battlefield. On 27 October, Ukrainian presidential adviser Dmytro Lytvyn told journalists it was too early for announcements. A day later, Zelenskyy told The Sun that the round could come as soon as 10 November.
The White House official told Türkiye Today that the US “looks forward to participating in the next round of trilateral talks, which will take place soon.” The outlet’s question on whether Istanbul was considered had gone unanswered by publication.
Trump told reporters on 28 October that a meeting with Putin and Zelenskyy would be set up soon. The Kremlin keeps its condition. Ushakov claimed on 27 October that such a contact makes the most sense after the negotiation process ends, and repeated that Zelenskyy should come to Moscow.
Another mediator does not decide which meeting comes first. Kyiv and Moscow have both confirmed Abu Dhabi, Zelenskyy said, so it now depends on the US side. Earlier this month, Trump said he waived new sanctions on Russia so as not to drive Moscow from the talks.
Il presidente degli Stati Uniti, Donald Trump, ha promesso di “mettere fine molto rapidamente” alla guerra all’Iran. “Adesso devo solo portare a termine, cosa che farò molto rapidamente, la guerra con l’Iran”, ha promesso parlando in Ohio. “Sono stati duramente sconfitti” ha aggiunto, riferendosi agli iraniani. Ieri intanto il Presidente turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ha avuto un colloquio con Trump, durante il quale i due leader hanno discusso della situazione nello stretto di Hormuz e delle incursioni degli Houthi in Arabia Saudita. In base a quanto reso noto dalla presidenza turca Erdogan ha detto a Trump che la Turchia segue con attenzione gli sviluppi nello Stretto di Hormuz e nello Yemen, e che si stanno compiendo sforzi per risolvere la questione attraverso la diplomazia e sostiene i sauditi nel rispetto del patto siglato alla Mecca lo scorso agosto. Erdogan ha inoltre affermato che la Turchia è pronta a sostenere gli sforzi per rilanciare il processo diplomatico tra Ucraina e Russia e per porre fine alla guerra.
Nella regione, dove già sono dispiegate 20 navi a guerra, è atteso un altro gruppo porta-aerei insieme con un’unità di spedizione dei Marine. Si stima che la guerra, al suo ottavo mese, sia costata 47,1 miliardi di dollari a metà ottobre, un conteggio che non include danni causati alle basi statunitensi nella regione. Circa il 60% del budget – 29 miliardi – è stato impiegato per munizioni come i missili Tomahawk e Patriot. Secondo le fonti del Wsj, il presidente Donald Trump non ha ancora deciso se procedere, ma sarebbe propenso a un grande attacco post-elettorale contro le infrastrutture e i siti nucleari iraniani. L’alternativa sarebbe cercare di nuovo di arrivare a un accordo. Ma nonostante gli sforzi diplomatici dei mediatori regionali continuino, ancora non si vedono passi avanti.
L'articolo Iran, Trump: “Metterò fine rapidamente a questa guerra”. Il doppio piano e la telefonata con Erdogan proviene da Affaritaliani.it.
US President Donald Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke by telephone on Wednesday regarding developments in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine, according to a statement from the Turkish presidency.
The statement said Erdogan told Trump that Turkey, “acting within the framework of the Mecca joint defence pact, is closely following the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and in Yemen”, while seeking “a diplomatic solution”.
On Ukraine, Erdogan said Turkey is “ready to support a revival of the diplomatic process between Russia and Ukraine with the aim of ending the fighting”.
Trump commended Erdogan and the Turks with “a happy national anniversary” marking the founding of the Turkish republic and the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate on October 29.
Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides announced the planned meeting on 16 October during the European Council summit in Brussels, saying discussions would address both the resumption of negotiations over the island’s division and the possibility of improving relations between Ankara and the EU.
The initiative follows diplomatic contacts in New York involving Guterres, European institutional leaders and the Cypriot government. However, renewed differences over the conditions for negotiations have already cast doubt on whether the process can produce substantial progress.
On Sunday, 18 October, Christodoulides accused Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman of imposing preconditions before formal negotiations could resume, particularly concerning arrangements for a rotating presidency in a reunited Cyprus.
The disagreement underlines the difficulties facing an initiative intended to reconnect the UN peace process with the EU’s broader relationship with Turkey.
Christodoulides said the planned meeting between the EU and Turkey would examine how to establish the necessary conditions for negotiations to restart within the previously agreed UN framework.
He indicated that any improvement in EU–Turkey relations would be linked to progress over Cyprus.
The president’s announcement in Brussels follows months of diplomatic consultations involving the Commission, European Council and UN.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa have urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to support the renewed peace initiative.
Turkey’s relationship with the EU encompasses trade, customs cooperation, migration and regional security. Ankara remains an EU candidate country, although accession negotiations have been effectively stalled for years.
Cyprus remains one of the principal obstacles to any substantial improvement in that relationship.
The island has been divided since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974. The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, but EU law remains suspended in areas where its government does not exercise effective control.
The self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey.
The UN has traditionally sought a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
Negotiations collapsed at Crans-Montana in Switzerland in 2017 amid unresolved disputes over security guarantees, political representation, territory and the presence of Turkish troops.
Erhürman, who became Turkish Cypriot leader in 2025, has expressed support for renewed negotiations within a federal framework. However, he wants assurances about political equality and the structure of future talks.
The latest dispute concerns whether the principle of a rotating presidency between the two communities should be accepted before negotiations resume.
Christodoulides rejected that demand on 18 October, arguing that substantive questions should be negotiated together rather than settled in advance.
The Turkish Cypriot leadership regards rotating executive power as an essential element of political equality, while the Greek Cypriot side objects to making agreement on that arrangement a prerequisite for restarting discussions.
The disagreement has emerged despite recent efforts by the United Nations to improve relations between the communities.
In a statement issued on 13 October, the UN confirmed that Christodoulides and Erhürman had met in Nicosia and agreed to continue discussions, including participation in bicommunal initiatives.
The two leaders subsequently attended a joint event in Pyla, although their public differences persisted.
A Cyprus settlement would require agreement not only between the island’s communities but also on Turkey’s military presence and the system of security guarantees established at independence.
Ankara has long maintained that Turkish Cypriots require effective political equality and credible security arrangements.
Greek Cypriot leaders argue that the continuation of foreign intervention rights and Turkish military deployments would be incompatible with a fully sovereign and reunited state.
The EU cannot resolve those differences independently of the UN process, but it can influence the economic and institutional framework within which a settlement might operate.
A comprehensive agreement would affect property ownership, trade, customs arrangements, border administration and the application of European law throughout the island.
The European Commission has sought a greater role in supporting the UN-led peace process, reflecting Brussels’ interest in progress towards a settlement.
The UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, has warned that the opportunity for renewed negotiations may be narrowing.
Disagreements over diplomatic representation, contacts with foreign missions and the status of Turkish Cypriot institutions have complicated relations between the two communities.
Christodoulides has also referred to a series of proposals intended to advance discussions, including the future of the fenced-off area of Varosha. Their full contents have not been publicly disclosed.
The proposed EU–Turkey meeting offers a separate diplomatic channel through which Brussels can assess Ankara’s willingness to support renewed negotiations.
No final date, detailed agenda or list of participants had been publicly confirmed by 18 October.
The immediate test will be whether the parties can agree on the basis for formal talks without attempting to settle disputed constitutional questions before negotiations begin.
The dispute has exposed differences over secularism, religious freedom and Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel, raising questions about the durability of one of the region’s closest strategic alliances.
Azerbaijan is facing an unusual wave of protests after new school dress regulations led to girls wearing Islamic headscarves being excluded from classrooms and teachers reportedly being ordered to remove their hijabs. The controversy has escalated into a diplomatic dispute with Turkey, whose governing party has been accused by President Ilham Aliyev’s administration of interfering in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs.
The confrontation intensified on 13 October when Azerbaijan’s ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) publicly condemned senior figures in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). The dispute has since widened to encompass Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel, exposing political differences between two countries accustomed to describing themselves as “one nation, two states”.
The controversy began on 21 September, when Azerbaijan’s government adopted Resolution No. 309, amending the regulations governing uniforms in state schools. The changes prohibit clothing that conflicts with prescribed uniforms or the secular character of public education.
Although the new regulations do not explicitly mention Islamic headscarves, some schools have interpreted them as prohibiting the hijab. A further decision on 6 October introduced similar requirements for teachers. Women in Baku and Sumgayit subsequently reported being instructed to remove their headscarves or risk losing their positions.
The enforcement of these regulations prompted demonstrations outside schools, with girls carrying placards demanding access to education. Male pupils also joined protests in support of their classmates. Such demonstrations are unusual in Azerbaijan, where public assemblies face extensive restrictions.
On 12 October, the Interior Ministry reported that 37 people had been detained in Baku, alleging disruption of public order, damage to property and obstruction of school activities. Activists claimed that more than 200 people had been detained, although that higher figure has not been independently confirmed.
In a statement issued on 16 October, Amnesty International criticised the exclusion of pupils and called for the release of peaceful demonstrators. The organisation also raised concerns over the reported detention of a mother protesting her daughter’s exclusion and the disappearance of an activist who had organised educational assistance for affected children.
Access to TikTok and Instagram was disrupted as the protests spread online. Internet monitoring organisations documented restrictions, although Azerbaijani authorities have not publicly explained their cause.
The dispute acquired an international dimension when Oktay Saral, a senior adviser to Erdoğan, condemned the exclusion of girls wearing headscarves.
In a public statement on 12 October, Saral questioned how preventing a girl from attending school because of her religious clothing could be reconciled with justice. He demanded that Azerbaijan reverse the restrictions. Several AKP parliamentarians subsequently joined the criticism.
The response from Baku was unusually confrontational. In its official statement, the New Azerbaijan Party accused Turkish political figures and media organisations of conducting a systematic campaign against Azerbaijan.
The party argued that religious solidarity did not entitle one Muslim-majority country to dictate another’s domestic policies. It described the Turkish politicians’ interventions as irresponsible and warned against attempts to interfere with Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.
The disagreement reflects contrasting approaches to secularism. Azerbaijan, a predominantly Shia Muslim country, has maintained strict state control over religious institutions since independence from the Soviet Union. Turkey, by contrast, has progressively removed restrictions on Islamic headscarves under Erdoğan’s government, reversing policies previously associated with its secular establishment.
The dispute has also reopened disagreements concerning Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel.
Baku maintains substantial security and defence cooperation with Israel, including military technology and equipment supplied during its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey supported Azerbaijan during that conflict but has adopted an increasingly confrontational position towards Israel.
As EU Today has previously examined, the relationships between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Israel reveal competing strategic interests beneath Ankara and Baku’s declared solidarity.
In its October statement, the New Azerbaijan Party specifically rejected criticism of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, insisting that its dealings with Israel were legitimate bilateral arrangements. The inclusion of Israel in a response ostensibly concerning school uniforms indicates that the disagreement extends beyond religious clothing.
A further escalation emerged on 16 October when Azerbaijani prosecutors announced charges against Turkish journalist Celal Çiftçi, accusing him of advocating the violent overthrow of the Azerbaijani government in social media posts connected to the controversy. An arrest warrant was reportedly issued in his absence. Prosecutors did not publish the posts, and Çiftçi’s response was not available.
Despite the increasingly hostile exchanges, there is little evidence of an imminent diplomatic rupture.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan travelled to Baku on 15 October and met President Aliyev. The meeting addressed recent developments in bilateral relations, while Fidan publicly emphasised the enduring strategic partnership between the countries.
He acknowledged that differences could arise but argued that they should be resolved through direct dialogue rather than political confrontations on social media. Senior AKP figures have also sought to reduce tensions, stressing respect for Azerbaijan’s sovereign decisions.
The relationship extends far beyond shared language and cultural identity. Turkish military cooperation has been central to Azerbaijan’s regional security policy, while energy infrastructure and transport corridors connect the countries economically. Ankara also remains an important actor in the changing strategic balance of the South Caucasus.
For the European Union, the confrontation is relevant because Azerbaijan remains an important energy supplier and trading partner, while Turkey occupies a central position in regional transport and security arrangements.
The immediate question is whether Baku will reconsider the application of its school regulations. The wider political dispute concerns the extent to which Turkey can criticise Azerbaijan’s domestic policies without jeopardising a partnership that both governments have consistently presented as a cornerstone of their foreign policy.
The public confrontation has exposed differences that had previously been managed within the bilateral relationship. However, Fidan’s intervention and the continued diplomatic engagement suggest that both governments are seeking to contain the dispute rather than dismantle their alliance.
Erdogan said the participants agreed on several issues, including establishing and activating the alliance’s secretariat.
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