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Amid global demand for Patriot interceptors, Lockheed Martin recently unveiled its most advanced interceptor, the PAC-3 Edge, which could offer improved performance against ballistic missiles and hypersonic threats.

EurAsian Times takes a deep dive into the evolution of Patriot Air Defense Systems, but before that, let’s start with the news.

PAC-3 EDGE

The new interceptor missile builds on the combat-proven PAC-3 MSE technology, which has proven its worth in multiple conflicts, including Ukraine and the Middle East.

The new PAC-3 Edge incorporates a new seeker, an upgraded control system, and a more advanced solid rocket motor developed with Northrop Grumman.

These new features will improve the missile interceptor’s range, altitude, speed, and precision.

It is part of the US Army’s Future Interceptor program, which is currently in competition.

“The Army’s decision to progress Lockheed Martin into the next stage of development affirms its confidence in Lockheed Martin’s proven Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) experience and the company’s ability to deliver an advanced, layered defense,” the company said in a statement.

Lockheed Martin will advance development and begin testing PAC-3 Edge in 2027 to prepare for rapid deployment by 2031, it added.

“Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 Edge interceptor leverages the combat-proven PAC-3 MSE, delivering even greater maneuverability, power and velocity to ensure the Army’s layered defensive architecture remains the most advanced in the world,” said Tim Cahill, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control president.

PAC-3 interceptors come in three variants: the lower-cost PAC-3 ACE, legacy PAC-3 CRI, and the prestigious PAC-3 MSE.

The company said it invested US$250 million in the Strigo Product Center to fund new, industry-leading seeker technology that increases precision and maneuverability against evolving threats.

PAC-3 Edge is designed to be integrated with existing and future Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities, including the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), the M903 launcher, containerized launchers, and HIMARS Flex.

The US Army’s selection of Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 Edge program highlights the service’s efforts to improve its existing layered air defense systems to address evolving aerial threats.

While the company did not provide technical details of the new seeker technology, analysts believe that it could be a dual-mode or multimode configuration that integrates multiple sensors to better detect, track, and intercept evolving threats such as hypersonic cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), maneuvering ballistic missiles, and the ability to distinguish real threats from decoys.

In the war in Ukraine, while the PAC-3 MSE interceptors have proved highly effective in countering ballistic missiles and aircraft, they have struggled to intercept Russia’s hypersonic missiles, such as Oreshnik, Zircon, and Kinzhal.

Furthermore, while PAC-3 MSE interceptors were highly effective against ballistic threats in the initial phase, their performance gradually declined as Russia adapted its missiles to perform increasingly complex terminal maneuvers.

According to a Financial Times report based on Ukrainian Air Force data compiled by the Center for Information Resilience, Patriot interceptors’ ballistic interception rate reached 37% in August 2025 but fell to a low of 6% in September.

This decline was linked to Russian tactical improvements, such as missiles changing trajectory and missiles capable of performing terminal maneuvers.

However, despite this drop in interception rates, Patriot batteries remain Ukraine’s only defense against Russian ballistic threats.

The new PAC-3 Edge interceptors will provide increased protection against such maneuvering missile threats and hypersonic missiles.

Notably, the unveiling of new PAC-3 Edge interceptors comes as global demand for PAC-3 interceptors has increased, and Lockheed Martin is establishing new facilities to raise its interceptor production rate.

Lockheed produced nearly 620 interceptors in 2025; however, it plans to triple Patriot interceptor production to 2000 by 2030.

Patriot PAC-3 interceptors are also included in the Pentagon’s Munitions Acceleration Council (MAC), which is targeting 12 legacy and two “emerging” munitions as part of its ambitious plan to ramp up production and ink a series of agreements with key vendors to ensure cost efficiency while maintaining production stability, according to fiscal 2027 budget documents.

Rising global demand for PAC-3 interceptors, requests from multiple countries to establish Patriot interceptor production facilities, and the unveiling of the advanced PAC-3 Edge interceptors underscore the Patriot air and missile defense system’s continued relevance more than four decades after it first became operational.

The Evolution Of Patriot Air Defense Systems

The MIM-104 Patriot is the US Army’s primary air-and-missile defense system.

Although it was initially designed as an anti-aircraft system, newer Patriot variants can engage ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, loitering munitions, and aircraft.

A typical Patriot battery includes a radar set, an engagement control station, power generation, other support vehicles, and several launch stations.

The US Army Missile Command first developed the Patriot concept in 1961 as the Army Air Defense System for the 1970s (AADS-70s).

The AD system was meant to be mobile and replace the static HAWK and Nike Hercules emplacements.

In 1964, the US Army renamed it Surface-to-Air Missile, Development (SAM-D).

Three years later, in 1967, the Department of Defense selected Raytheon as the prime contractor. SAM-D’s first flight test took place in November 1969.

Although Raytheon won the prime SAM-D contract in 1967, it did not build everything alone. Martin Marietta joined early as a major subcontractor to handle missile assembly, launcher vehicles, and canister production.

In 1974, the Department of Defense reoriented the SAM-D program to support a Track-Via-Missile (TVM) guidance system and a simplified concept of operations.

The revised and re-engineered system was renamed PATRIOT (Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept On Target) in 1976.

Patriot entered full-rate production in September 1980, and the US Army activated its first Patriot missile battalion in May 1982.

The Army added significant upgrades to the Patriot system throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

In 1985, the Department of Defense (DoD) started efforts to add a ballistic missile defense capability to the system.

In 1986, the Army upgraded Patriot to the Patriot Advanced Capability-1 (PAC-1) standard, which included software changes that allowed it to engage tactical ballistic missiles.

The PAC-1 was deployed by 1988.

Soon, the US Army began efforts towards the PAC-2 standard, which involved modifications to the missile fuze, warhead, and guidance to engage more capable ballistic missiles like the Soviet OTR-23.

The Patriot system first saw combat service during the 1991 Gulf War, defending critical assets in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. The PAC-2 missiles were used to intercept Iraq’s Scud missiles.

Martin Marietta built the PAC-2 interceptors.

In 1993, the US Army added remote launch capability to Patriot systems, allowing missile launchers to be deployed over 10 km from the radar. This also more than tripled the system’s defended area.

Later, the US Army also developed the PAC-3 standard.

The most significant PAC-3 upgrade was a new interceptor with hit-to-kill technology, developed by Lockheed, which defeats targets by striking them directly rather than using a blast-fragmentation warhead.

Lockheed achieved the first-ever hit-to-kill intercept in 1984 with the Homing Overlay Experiment, using impact force alone to destroy a mock warhead outside Earth’s atmosphere. Further development and testing produced today’s PAC-3 missile, which won a 1993 competition to become the US government’s first hit-to-kill interceptor.

In 1995, Lockheed Corp merged with Martin Marietta to create one of the US’s largest defense aerospace companies, combining two key components of the Patriot program: Martin Marietta’s established Patriot infrastructure and production facilities and Lockheed’s cutting-edge hit-to-kill technology.

This newly formed mega-contractor rolled out the PAC-3 missile interceptor.

The PAC-3 standard itself included three distinct configurations, Configuration 1, 2, and 3, which improved its radar, seeker, and range.

The US declared PAC-3 Configuration 3 combat-ready in August 2002.

PAC-3 Configuration 3 had its first combat test in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In 2010, the US Army successfully tested an upgraded PAC-3 interceptor, the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE).

According to CSIS’s Missile Threat, the PAC-3 MSE features an enlarged motor and other enhancements to nearly double the PAC-3’s range. It achieved initial operational capability in late 2016.

The PAC-3 also features an active Ka-band radar seeker for endgame guidance. With its lighter weight and newer propulsion system, the PAC-3 can reportedly defend an area seven times greater than the PAC-2.

Patriot currently employs a single AN/MPQ-53, AN/MPQ-65, or AN/MPQ-65A radar set to detect and engage targets. Unlike other air defense systems, the Patriot radar combines surveillance, tracking, and engagement in a single unit.

The AN/MPQ-53 was the world’s first phased-array air defense radar and was employed with legacy PAC-2 systems.

The AN/MPQ-65A is the most advanced Patriot radar; however, the US Army is currently transitioning to use the new Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) radar, which offers 360-degree coverage and significantly greater detection range.

Furthermore, while the AN/MPQ-53 and -65-series radars are passively scanned arrays, LTAMDS is an active electronically scanned array (AESA) that uses gallium nitride (GaN) power amplifiers, offering greater jamming resistance, beam agility, and power efficiency than previous systems.

360-degree coverage is essential to counter Russia’s evolving “wolf-pack tactics,” which involve launching dozens of aerial targets simultaneously, including drones and ballistic and cruise missiles, that approach from different directions and strike at once.

Only the US and Poland are procuring the LTAMDS at present. In September, the US awarded a US$1.7 billion contract to produce nine radars for the two users.

Currently, 18 countries operate the Patriot AD system. These include the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Taiwan, Greece, Spain, South Korea, the UAE, Ukraine, Qatar, Romania, Sweden, Poland, and Bahrain.

In 2023, the US allowed countries to transfer Patriot batteries to Ukraine, where they have repeatedly intercepted Russian ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

For instance, on May 16, 2023, the Ukrainian Air Force claimed it used Patriot to intercept a salvo of six Kinzhal missiles over Kyiv.

However, rising global demand for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and Russia’s adaptive missile technology, which involves terminal-phase maneuvers, have necessitated a two-pronged strategy: boosting PAC-3 interceptor production and developing more advanced interceptors.

The PAC-3 Edge will keep the Patriot AD system relevant amid evolving aerial threats.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post New U.S. Missile Aims To Outmaneuver Russia’s Maneuvering Missiles: Here’s Patriot’s Evolution to PAC-3 Edge appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

There is now a growing debate over what constitutes war and whether it should include strikes on data centers. They represent a new front in warfare, in which facilities powering the technology behind many critical industries have become targets.

As it is, the definition of a military attack seems to be changing over time.

Conventionally, it was understood to occur when tanks or fighter planes crossed a border. Then it was expanded to include the use of missiles that were fired without crossing the border but hitting a city and causing physical destruction of “vital infrastructure and death”.

Such attacks justified a country retaliating under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which legitimizes a war under “Right to Self Defense” if an “armed attack occurs.”

Now there is a growing school of thought that “vital infrastructure” must include any disruptive attack on data centers, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, amounting to significant loss of function. It should be treated as a use of force and trigger the affected country’s right to self-defense under Article 51, the argument goes.

Apparently, vulnerabilities in modern digital infrastructure have turned data centers into primary targets in contemporary warfare. As society becomes deeply integrated with cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and automated logistics, data centers have evolved into the nervous system of modern statecraft.

Attacks on digital infrastructure are no longer limited to cyberattacks (non-kinetic) that cause banking collapses and disrupt vital systems like power grids and hospitals by cutting off Internet access; they now include kinetic strikes on data hubs that affect nations’ military capabilities and expose financial vulnerabilities.

After all, modern defense systems rely heavily on cloud-based logistics. Data centers process satellite imagery, coordinate drone operations, run predictive maintenance algorithms for fighter jets, and host classified communication networks. Thus, taking down these nodes effectively blinds an adversary’s command structure.

This has been noticed in the recent conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. For instance, on September 23, Russian Geran-5 jet drones hit the Inkom Business Center in Kyiv,  housing Datagroup’s data center. Four people died, and internet service for 100,000 households was down for hours.

On September 27, Kyivstar — Ukraine’s central mobile operator — and Vodafone Ukraine’s data centers were hit. Russia’s Defense Ministry  justified this by saying that “Data centers were being used for the benefit of the Ukrainian military.”

Two weeks later, Ukraine returned the favor. It launched highly targeted long-range drone strikes hitting major data hubs across Russia, inflicting significant disruption on the country’s digital economy.

Between October 8 and October 14, 2026, Ukrainian forces carried out a series of “symmetrical responses” to counter earlier Russian attacks on Ukrainian internet and telecommunications assets. The strikes specifically crippled infrastructure belonging to Yandex (often called “Russia’s Google”) and Sberbank, Russia’s largest banking and technology conglomerate.

Similarly, in February-March 2026, during US-Israeli strikes on Iran, the latter hit back not only at oil but at data centers — Google, Microsoft, and Oracle cloud infrastructure in the Gulf, particularly those located in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

Apparently, when Amazon Web Services’ Bahrain facility suffered “physical damage to cooling infrastructure from debris”, it became the first known case of an AWS data center damaged in an interstate war.

Iranian missiles near Al Udeid Air Base damaged an Oracle Cloud data center in Doha. Microsoft also confirmed “connectivity issues” in the Qatar Central region.

The same happened to the Google data center in Dammam, Saudi Arabia, which hosts Aramco cloud.

G42 [UAE AI company backed by Microsoft] data center in Abu Dhabi was also affected, forcing it into blackout mode.

In other words, from Kyiv to Bahrain, a pattern is clearly apparent  — belligerents no longer distinguish between cloud and command. Data centers that host banks and brigades are treated as brigades. They have officially transitioned from commercial tech infrastructures to critical national security assets.

As Omar Sultan Al Olama, the UAE’s Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, Digital Economy, and Remote Work Applications, said the other day,  “Unfortunately, they’re more important than bridges. They’re more important than roads. They’re more important than tunnels because our whole lives are on these devices that we’re using”.

Incidentally, the UAE is revising plans for a 5-gigawatt AI data center project following the Iranian strikes. The original plan envisioned a 10-square-mile campus in Abu Dhabi, to be built in partnership with American tech companies like Oracle, Nvidia, and Cisco. Now the data centers will likely be spread out across the UAE. Sultan Al Olama said, “ The UAE will change its data centre rules and stop promoting where they are”.

According to Kirk Cameron, founding director of the Institute for Advanced Computing at Virginia Tech, “Data centers are now on the critical path for modern digital infrastructure. The loss of key data centers could collapse economies, disrupt public and private transportation with loss of GPS, and affect government essential services for health, emergency dispatch, and power grids.”

Many agree with him when he argues that  “Data centers are competitive advantages in warfare. Knocking out capabilities means potentially crippling combat operations for an adversary. It’s also a form of economic warfare and could lead to longer-term competitive challenges for the target.”

All this brings the question of whether bombing a data center constitutes an act of war.  Does the definition of war need to change?

The main challenge to this question lies in what is called the “Gray Zone” of conflict, particularly in non-kinetic attacks. Unlike a missile launch, which leaves clear radar signatures and identifiable points of origin, cyber operations offer plausible deniability.

Under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, attacking a dual-use target is governed by the principles of distinction and proportionality.  Here, attacking a dual-use target is legal only if the military advantage gained outweighs the civilian collateral damage.

If an attack on a data center shuts down military communications but also disables the life-support monitoring systems of dozens of regional hospitals, the strike violates proportionality. Such an operation can be classified as a war crime, reinforcing the argument that major cyber infrastructure operations carry the same legal weight and consequences as traditional warfare.

But any clear distinction in such cases is neither easy nor free from contention. For instance, when Russia attacked data centers in Ukraine, it claimed that these were being used by Ukrainian intelligence and military. However, Ukraine denied the charge.

As  Kasia Klonowska, an authority on international law, says, “Due to a lack of a definition of the treaty- terms weapons, means or methods of warfare, it is unclear whether non-weaponized AI decision-support systems should be subjected to a legal review prescribed by Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I. It remains a challenge to determine exactly what should be subjected to review beyond weapons.

“You have very limited situations in which they would actually qualify as lawful targets when they’re used by the military, and even then, it’s very difficult for the attacker to know whether that’s happening or not. If they are purely processing military data, they could be legitimate targets. But many, if not most, are dual-use.”

To address the legal ambiguity surrounding digital warfare, Prof. Ben Hines has proposed what he calls a “Substantive Necessity” framework, reinterpreting international law under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Under this framework, a non-kinetic cyber attack amounts to an armed attack when the victim state, based on clear and convincing evidence, apprehends a hostile act that has fundamentally compromised, or is imminently poised to compromise, the functioning or security of infrastructure crucial to the state’s ability to function.

The framework argues that traditional international legal thresholds for “force” and “gravity” do not inherently require physical destruction or kinetic weaponry. Under this test, taking down a country’s primary data center cluster that hosts banking, health, emergency dispatch, GPS — even without an explosion — is an armed attack. Because effects equal or exceed kinetic.

Viewed thus, it is not surprising that Western nations like the US, the Netherlands, and France are clearly asserting that a disruptive attack on data centers that causes significant loss of function will be treated as a use of force and may trigger the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In sum, as the line between the physical and digital worlds disappears, international law is adapting to treat high-consequence infrastructure attacks as equivalent to an armed attack.

Data centers are now firmly on the front lines of global conflict, where a single breach can serve as the definitive catalyst for war. The lines between civilian infrastructure and military assets are dangerously blurring.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Iran Hit Amazon. Russia Struck Kyiv’s Data Centers. Ukraine Hit Yandex. Can Such Attacks Trigger Article 51? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

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OPED by Imran Khurshid, PhD

China’s Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, has once again published a propaganda editorial against India titled “India’s ‘Victory Narrative’ Will Only Hit a Wall on China-India Border.” The article was published on October 14, 2026.

One notable characteristic of Chinese commentaries and diplomats is that they use polite language in their statements but then, within the same text, suddenly shift to intimidating language and issue warnings.

They act like a “big brother,” offering suggestions, dictating terms, and adopting a dominant attitude toward other countries, which stems from their “Middle Kingdom syndrome”—a mindset rooted in a historical Sinocentric worldview that exhibits king-subject thinking and demands homage and subservience.

This pattern is also reflected in what is commonly described as “wolf warrior diplomacy,” in which Chinese diplomats adopt a more confrontational tone when their country’s interests or positions are challenged.

Similarly, Chinese diplomats may appear cool and calm at first, then abruptly use fierce language to assert dominance and make strong statements.

Beijing’s Revisionist Map Games

This article targets India because New Delhi has recently stepped up its “counter-cartography” policy, formally assigning standardized names to key locations along the India-China border.

This includes the Home Ministry’s October 2026 announcement standardizing 28 strategic features in Ladakh—specifically covering crucial Line of Actual Control (LAC) friction points like Gogra and Hot Springs, alongside peaks, passes, and glaciers.

It also follows India’s August 2026 mapping of 27 critical sites in Arunachal Pradesh, including historic flashpoints like Longju and Thag La. The Global Times article claims that by assigning these names, India “creates the self-delusion that its border claims have been settled.”

The text further asserts that “first comes an administrative announcement, followed by the names being entered on official maps, and then repeated amplification through the media.” It thus criticizes India’s approach; however, China does exactly the same through its own lawfare.

Beijing has repeatedly used map manipulation as a geopolitical tool to assert its claims—such as by releasing multiple rounds of standardized Mandarin names for locations in Arunachal Pradesh (which it calls Zangnan).

This is a typical Chinese way of doing things; China historically used these exact cartographic and administrative assertions before annexing Tibet in 1950, and it continues to use maps as an aggressive tool to project its territorial claims today.

It says that “India is playing games,” but this is exactly what China does in its dealings with India by failing to honor its agreements, including those reached in 1993 (Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility), 1996 (Confidence-Building Measures), and 2003/2005 (Political Parameters and Modalities).

If peace and tranquility have prevailed along the India-China border or LAC for an extended period, it is because India has unilaterally honored and abided by these agreements.

For instance, before 1962, China signed the Panchsheel Agreement (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), under which Beijing promoted the narrative of mutual interests, mutual benefits, and peaceful relations through the slogan “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai,” but then suddenly attacked India.

Similarly, in 2020, sensing India’s vulnerability when the country was battling one of its worst COVID-19 crises, China tried to grab more Indian land and attacked Indian soldiers in Galwan through deception, killing 20 Indian soldiers.

Cartographic Fraud

Then it says that, in 2019, “India unilaterally amended its domestic laws, revoked relevant constitutional provisions, and announced the creation of the so-called ‘Union Territory of Ladakh,’ deliberately incorporating Chinese territory in the western sector of the China-India border into its own administrative jurisdiction.”

However, when India revoked Article 370 of its Constitution and reorganized Jammu and Kashmir, it was an internal decision of India’s sovereignty, over which no foreign country has any say. India has historical claims to this region, and it has been an integral part of India for centuries.

China cannot dictate to India when it changes names, reorganizes its territories, or makes administrative changes. China has actually occupied Aksai Chin since the 1950s, consolidating its control during the 1962 war. It has also occupied the Shaksgam Valley, which it continues to hold illegally.

It then says the China-India border has historically belonged to China and that “China possesses sovereignty over the relevant areas, including the Aksai Chin region in Northwest China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and has ample historical and legal grounds for its claims.” How can China claim historical ownership when it has no historical claim to these territories? This is a complete distortion of history.

In reality, China’s administrative footprint never historically extended south of the Kunlun Mountains, and its own official records contradict its claims.

For instance, the Postal Atlas of China—officially published by the Chinese government between 1917 and 1933—as well as the 1925 Peking University Atlas, explicitly marked the international boundary along the Kunlun range, placing the entire Aksai Chin plateau completely outside of China and within India.

Furthermore, India’s legitimate administrative and historical rights were formally established under the 1842 Treaty of Chushul, signed between the Dogra Kingdom of Jammu & Kashmir and Tibet/the Qing Empire, which solidified Ladakh’s traditional frontiers.

The 1865 Johnson Line precisely mapped this boundary, and the Maharaja of Kashmir even built a military fort at Shahidulla (Xaidulla) to safeguard trade routes.

China established a presence in Aksai Chin only in the 1950s by covertly building the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway (G219) across Indian territory while New Delhi focused on peaceful diplomacy, and it eventually occupied it by force during the 1962 war.

Using Multilateral Forums as Geopolitical Tools

It then says that when Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Xi Jinping, they discussed improving ties. It then gives a warning to India, a typical Chinese way of behaving: first bullying and then giving advice.

It says that “India should exercise greater restraint on border issues of this kind rather than provoke tensions.” It further says that “some Indian politicians are now keen to stage political shows over the border issue to divert attention from domestic problems and pander to nationalist sentiment.”

It thus links India’s renaming of places with an attempt to divert attention from domestic issues. However, this description fits China’s all-weather ally, Pakistan, which always seeks to externalize its internal threats toward its neighbors, particularly India and Afghanistan.

In stark contrast, India has robust political stability under a strong parliamentary mandate, a functioning electoral democracy, and the title of the world’s fastest-growing major economy, with resilient GDP growth of around 6.5% to 7% despite global slowdowns. It faces no major internal crisis that would force it to externalize its problems.

It then says that “China and India are important neighbors, major developing countries,” and that their relationship extends beyond bilateral ties to global forums, where they must cooperate through platforms such as BRICS and the United Nations to address global challenges and uphold international fairness and justice.

It says this as if India is the irritant preventing China from cooperating with it. However, China uses these forums to its advantage and sometimes directly against India. In these global forums, Beijing consistently blocks India’s rightful interests and actively seeks to constrain India’s rise.

For instance, at the UNSC, China repeatedly uses its veto to block India’s permanent seat and places technical holds to shield Pakistan-based terrorists from global sanctions. Furthermore, Beijing single-handedly blocks India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) while using BRICS to push its own geoeconomic agendas that violate Indian sovereignty.

Then, in typical Chinese style, it concludes with another warning: “We urge India to act in the broader interests of bilateral relations, exercise prudence in both words and actions on the boundary issue, and follow the important understandings reached by the two countries’ leaders.”

Ultimately, this Global Times article stands as a textbook example of Chinese doublespeak and strategic hypocrisy. It attempts to lecture India on restraint and respect for agreements while China itself has a long, documented history of violating bilateral treaties, executing covert land-grabs, and aggressively weaponizing cartography against its neighbors.

By trying to portray India’s sovereign, internal administrative decisions as “political shows” or “provocations,” Beijing is merely projecting its own anxieties onto New Delhi. India’s robust economy, stable democracy, and firm counter-cartography policy prove that it will no longer remain passive in the face of China’s “salami-slicing” tactics and lawfare.

If China truly wants “peace and tranquility” on the border, it must shed its outdated Middle Kingdom syndrome, look at India as an equal, and stop using global forums and state media to launch malicious propaganda against Indian sovereignty,

• THIS IS AN OPINION ARTICLE. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
• Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Center for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
• Connect with the author at: khurshidimran (at) gmail.com

The post China Accuses India of Map Games and a “Victory Narrative.” But Beijing’s Old Maps Betray the Claim: Opinion appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

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The global defense industry appears to be entering a period of structural transformation, driven by rising military spending, technological change, and increasing private-capital involvement.

The “Aerospace & Defense M&A Report 2026: Deal Activity, Market Trends and Outlook,” published by Ropes & Gray LLP  on October 7, 2026, says that Aerospace and Defense Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), Private Equity (PE), and Venture Capital (VC) funding are likely to expand further, showing that 2026 is on track to be one of “the strongest deal-making years” on record.

The report highlights that Defense Tech/Services is the fastest-growing segment at a 22% Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), followed by Aerospace at 16% CAGR; Aircraft Manufacturers, Parts & Components at 14% CAGR; and Air, Land, & Sea Defense at 9% CAGR.

The report argues that the growth is not simply a temporary response to international conflicts. Governments are rebuilding industrial capacity, replenishing weapons inventories, strengthening supply chains, and accelerating the development of advanced military technologies.

In the United States, the largest market, proposed increases in defense resources, procurement reforms, longer-term contracts, and financial support for defense technology companies aim to attract private capital and expand manufacturing capacity.

In Europe, the EU’s Security Action for Europe initiative aims to mobilize about €800 billion in defense-related investment through national fiscal flexibility, loans, and related financing support.

Germany’s increased spending and procurement reforms can accelerate equipment acquisition and industrial expansion. Collectively, these policies are reshaping the geography of defense investment in Europe.

In fact, the report says that  Europe has emerged as a major driver of new activity. “Europe has become a primary engine of deal flow, not a secondary market. Rising national budgets and new EU-wide financing mechanisms are reshaping where capital is being deployed as well as dictating deployment speed”, it says. NATO’s higher spending ambitions, European rearmament and new financing arrangements are encouraging companies to expand, consolidate and acquire specialist capabilities.

Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific is undergoing a rapid, structural alignment driven by what regional planners call a “contested era.”

China is consolidating its domestic defense industry, though restrictions on cross-border investment limit Western investors’ access. Japan is rapidly reshaping its defense posture and adapting to an environment where the traditional binary definitions of “peacetime” and “wartime” have effectively blurred.

In this era of continuous competition, the report says Japan has elevated allied burden-sharing to its foundational organizing principle.

This shift is most visible in the digital domain. With the operationalization of Japan’s Active Cyber Defense Oversight Commission, Tokyo has adopted a proactive cyber defense strategy. By implementing legal public-private threat reporting and neutralized-access protocols, Japan is signaling a willingness to legally counter and neutralize state-sponsored infrastructure targeting before cyber assaults can cripple critical domestic networks.

One of the report’s most important observations is that defense investment is increasingly a private-equity story. Private-equity firms are acquiring established manufacturers, selling businesses to strategic buyers and building larger companies through additional acquisitions. Venture capital is also financing newer businesses developing military technologies.

Among the ten largest transactions listed for 2026 up to September 30 was GE Aerospace’s $11.8 billion acquisition of Consolidated Precision Products. Other major deals involved aerospace leasing, maritime defense, aircraft components, and specialist detection technologies.

Dubai Aerospace Enterprise bought Macquarie Airfinance for $9.0 billion in what was a leasing consolidation. In a move that signals European rearmament, land-defense scaling, and main-battle tank production, KfW Group (German State Bank) is backing KNDS [Franco-German tank maker Krauss-Maffei Wegmann + Nexter] with $7.8 billion.

In other words, private investors are no longer confined to peripheral suppliers. They are becoming key participants in the industrial ecosystem that supports national defense.

Significantly, the traditional reliance on a handful of legacy prime contractors is giving way to an ecosystem heavily backed by private equity and venture capital.

The private sector is now driving global defense deal-making as it pivots toward software-defined defense, autonomy, and next-generation platforms.

The report shows how defense technology is changing the industry’s center of gravity. Although aerospace and defense remains one of the most active and strategically complex sectors for private capital deployment, software-defined defense, autonomy, and next-generation platforms are pulling ahead as the fastest-growing corner of the market.

Investors are particularly interested in artificial intelligence and software-defined defense systems; autonomous platforms, including unmanned aircraft and maritime systems; counter-drone and missile-defense capabilities; space infrastructure and surveillance; and specialist electronics, communications, and mission-critical components.

However, while these technologies can drive rapid growth, they also carry risks due to restrictive policies in the US and Europe. The report notes that regulatory compliance is becoming a structural hurdle rather than an afterthought.

In the United States, the largest market by transaction value, more national security vetting—including CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) and FOCI (Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence) mitigation—is becoming foundational to ensuring a clean exit.

In other words, the global defense landscape seems to be marked by a distinct paradox.

On the one hand, geopolitical threat vectors are accelerating at breakneck speed. On the other hand, the financial and regulatory machinery needed to field next-generation capabilities faces structural friction.

As a result, companies may depend heavily on a single government customer, handle classified information, or face restrictions on intellectual property developed under government contracts. Cybersecurity compliance and access to sensitive facilities can also complicate acquisitions.

In the United States, the CFIUS can scrutinize foreign investment for national-security risks. FOCI can also affect access to classified work and sensitive facilities.

Similarly, European foreign-investment screening is marked with many complexities. Even businesses that are not conventional arms manufacturers may face scrutiny if they supply strategically important electronics, software, communications or other dual-use technologies.

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Commercial risks matter too. Fixed-price government contracts can leave manufacturers exposed when costs rise unexpectedly. Buyers must therefore examine contract liabilities, working capital, supply-chain resilience, workforce retention and the restrictions that could affect a future sale, the report advises.

The report’s overall conclusion, therefore, is that while defense investment opportunities are expanding,  success increasingly depends on technological relevance, reliable industrial execution, regulatory compliance and the ability to navigate national-security restrictions throughout the ownership cycle.

What lessons could India draw from the trends above?

For India, the report is particularly relevant because it highlights a shift in how advanced military capabilities are developed and financed. The implications extend beyond aircraft, missiles, and ships to defense electronics, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, space technology, supply chains, and foreign investment.

India’s first opportunity is to integrate more deeply into international aerospace and defense supply chains. As Western manufacturers expand production and diversify their suppliers, Indian companies could become more important producers of precision components, avionics, electronics, aerospace structures, and maintenance services.

The most instructive lesson may come from GE Aerospace’s September 8, 2026 acquisition of Consolidated Precision Products (CPP). Experts say that it was a paradigm shift in aerospace and heavy industrial manufacturing. For decades, aerospace primes aggressively outsourced manufacturing to optimize their balance sheets, shifting capital-expenditure risks onto multi-tiered supply chains.

But years of systemic, compounding engine delays—magnified by the Pratt & Whitney GTF powder metal crisis and Boeing’s structural manufacturing gridlock — exposed a fatal flaw: primes (like GE) outsourced execution, but they could never outsource the risk.

Therefore, GE Aerospace decided to buy the absolute bottleneck of jet engine production: structural castings and complex airfoils. Its deal with private equity firms Warburg Pincus and Berkshire Partners is meant to address persistent, industry-wide shortages of critical engine parts and airfoils. In other words, GE bought the supply chain to control the delivery.

For India, this implies that beyond focusing on “Make in India” as screwdriver assembly, it should also consider “Own the Supply Chain.”

Second, as defense technology gains primacy, expanding AI-enabled systems, autonomous platforms, counter-drone technology, advanced sensors, and space infrastructure could be more relevant for India than producing isolated components.

Some experts argue that because European primes are cash-rich and seeking low-cost engineering, they would prefer a JV with India to meet capacity needs.

Lastly, as the Ropes & Gray LLP  report illustrates, private equity and venture capital can help consolidate fragmented industries, finance expansion, and support specialized technology businesses. India could adapt this approach to build stronger domestic defense suppliers.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Europe Is Rearming — and U.S. Wall Street is Writing the Checks, Including GE’s Nearly $12 Billion Deal appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Professor Roger Watson reviews The Trials of Maurice Brophy, the new novel by Marcus Bland about a Cambridge academic whose life spirals after he finds himself summarily cancelled over his research on Wagner.

The post An Ode to Cancel Culture appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

The United States is one of the few developed Western democracies that still carries out the death penalty, with dozens of executions every year.

However, even by American standards, the execution planned for December is unusually severe.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has said that Major Nidal Malik Hasan, sentenced to death in 2013 by a general court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), will be executed by firing squad at Fort Hood, Texas, and that the execution will be public.

The Pentagon has since said it will livestream the execution.

It was here in Fort Hood, Texas, that Major Hasan opened fire inside a crowded medical readiness center at Fort Hood, killing 13 people and injuring 32 others in 2009.

Before opening fire on unarmed soldiers, Hasan shouted “Allahu Akbar.” He also shot at the backs of soldiers fleeing toward the parking lot.

Hasan later said it was an effort to stop them from going to Afghanistan and killing his fellow Muslims.

This will mark the first U.S. military execution in over 60 years, the first military execution by firing squad since World War II, and the world’s first-ever officially livestreamed execution.

The last time the U.S. military carried out an execution was in 1961, when Army Pvt. John Bennett was executed by hanging.

The last time the U.S. military carried out a death sentence by firing squad was in 1945.

The best-known case is Private Eddie Slovik, shot by a 12-man firing squad in France in January 1945 for desertion, the only U.S. soldier executed for desertion during the Second World War and since the Civil War.

Nearly 10 months later, Dan J. Lee was executed by the U.S. military’s firing squad in the Philippines in November 1945 for murder and/or rape.

Hasan, therefore, could become the first U.S. servicemember to be executed by a firing squad in over eight decades.

His execution could also become the world’s first officially live-streamed death penalty.

Public executions were common in the medieval period.

In “Discipline and Punish,” French philosopher Michel Foucault writes that the death penalty was a “spectacle.”

“Public torture and execution of criminals provided one of the most popular spectacles of eighteenth-century France,” Foucault wrote in his book.

However, gradually, most countries outlawed public executions.

The UK abolished public executions in 1868 with the passing of the Capital Punishment Amendment Act 1868, which moved all executions behind prison walls.

France followed suit in 1939. In the U.S., the last public execution was carried out in 1936.

Amnesty International said in its report on executions in 2025 that it knew of at least 17 public executions – 11 in Iran and 6 in Afghanistan.

The U.S., therefore, joins a handful of countries like Iran and Afghanistan where public executions are still carried out.

Notably, the U.S. is currently at war with Iran and fought a 20-year-long war with Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021.

The question, then, is what precisely Washington hopes to achieve by joining the league of its adversaries?

Live Streaming of Death Penalty By Firing Squad

It is noteworthy that the general court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) only awarded the death sentence to Hasan in 2013.

Military appeals later affirmed that sentence. The Supreme Court declined review in 2025.

In October 2026, Defense Secretary Hegseth recommended death by firing squad, and President Trump approved the recommendation.

Hegseth later said that the execution will be public, with the Pentagon clarifying that it will be live-streamed.

Hegseth explained part of the reason himself.

“Execution by firing squad. Army major betrays his country. Radical Islamist kills a bunch of Americans at Fort Hood. Of course, we’re going to do it at Fort Hood and do it on a Thursday. We’re going to do it at 1 o’clock, which is when he did it, and it’s going to be soldiers with rifles executing the firing squad,” Hegseth said in an interview with Jack Posobiec on Real America’s Voice.

“It was a radical Islamist attack in uniform inside the ranks, and so he’s going to get a firing squad of soldiers, as it should be. And we’ll make sure that people can watch it, that it’s public, because people need to understand that there are serious consequences for these types of things.”

“Army firing squad for convicted terrorist Nidal Malik Hasan, the jihadist who opened fire on unarmed American soldiers at Fort Hood in 2009. He killed 13 people and wounded 32 others while shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the attack,” Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said.

The remarks make it clear that the Pentagon wants to send a strong message against internal threats and reassert the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s (UCMJ) ultimate authority.

It is notable that while, in theory, the UCMJ has the power to award the death penalty for criminal behavior in the armed forces, in practice, the awarding of the death penalty by the UCMJ, and its actual implementation, has had a chequered history.

The UCMJ and Death Penalty

UCMJ is the federal criminal code and procedural system that governs the U.S. armed forces.

The UCMJ was enacted in 1950 and took effect in 1951.

The code creates one uniform system of military justice for all branches. Its rules apply to active-duty members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Space Force; certain reservists on duty; and others such as prisoners of war or retired members.

Its stated objective is to promote justice, maintain good order and discipline, support efficiency and effectiveness in the armed forces, and thereby strengthen national security. It balances the military’s need for discipline and readiness with procedural protections for the accused.

It contains punitive articles that define both uniquely military offenses, such as desertion, absence without leave, insubordination, and disrespect, and ordinary crimes, like murder, larceny, and sexual offenses.

The general courts-martial under the UCMJ have the authority to impose the death penalty.

From its founding in 1951 till 1961, the U.S. Army carried out 10 executions awarded by the UCMJ, all by hanging.

The last military execution in the U.S. was carried out in 1961, after President Eisenhower approved it.

However, in 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment in the Furman v. Georgia case, effectively placed a temporary moratorium on the death penalty across the United States.

In 1984, President Ronald Reagan signed an order that set detailed rules for military death-penalty trials.

It established that the court-martial could not sentence someone to death just because the crime was serious. The prosecutors must also establish one more “aggravating” factor, such as the killing of more than one person, or killing someone during robbery.

Furthermore, the panel could impose the death sentence only if all members agreed on guilt and the sentence. Under these rules, the UCMJ authorized capital punishment again.

From 1984 till mid-2000s, the military sought the death sentence against the accused in 47 cases.

The panel, however, awarded the death penalty in only 15 out of those 47 cases. Even in these 15 cases, many were later reduced to life imprisonment on appeal or commuted.

For instance, former President Barack Obama commuted Dwight Loving’s 1989 sentence to life in 2017.

Currently, four men remain under a UCMJ death sentence: Ronald Gray (1988), Hasan Akbar (2005), Timothy Hennis (2010), and Nidal Hasan (2013).

Notably, former President George Bush approved Gray’s death sentence in 2008, becoming the first U.S. President since Eisenhower, after a gap of 47 years, to approve a death sentence awarded by the UCMJ.

However, a federal judge stayed that execution so Gray could challenge the sentence in court. His execution has still not been carried out.

Now Trump has become only the second President to approve the death sentence awarded by the UCMJ in 65 years.

Hasan’s death sentence is set for December 3.

Notably, President Trump has not only approved Hasan’s death sentence, but also approved his execution by a firing squad and its live-streaming.

Hasan’s execution, therefore, could mark the return of military executions in the U.S. after over six decades.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Fort Hood Live Execution: How Nidal Hasan’s Livestreamed Firing Squad Could Strengthen UCMJ’s Authority appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

American philosopher Susan Neiman's new book Call it Evil: Understanding the Trump Era has no shame as it brands Trump wicked for liking free-market capitalism while ruing the end of communism in Europe, says Chris Milton.

The post Susan Neiman’s Deranged Anti-Trump Screed Only Shows She Has No Idea What “Evil” Is appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

The Conservative Party Conference was slick and professional, says Ellie Hodges, but Reform's conference, while more chaotic, had the kind of passion that you don't get from a fancy lanyard.

The post You Can’t Put Passion on a Fancy Lanyard appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

OPED by Rear Admiral Girish Kumar Garg, VSM (Retd)

The difficulty in ending the Iran war is not identifying the ingredients of peace. The nuclear issue, missiles, sanctions, regional armed groups, freedom of navigation, and Israel’s security concerns are all well known. The harder question is: how adversaries who deeply distrust each other can take the first step without believing that they are making themselves more vulnerable.

Military action can change the battlefield, but it cannot by itself create a durable political settlement. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the danger that military calculations become disconnected from the strategic objective.

The answer may not lie in one grand bargain, but in a sequence of reciprocal bargains, each limited in scope, independently verifiable and linked to the next. The objective should not be to create trust between Iran, Israel and the United States. That is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

The objective should be to create a system that can function despite the absence of trust.

The broad issues are already clear. Iran wants recognition of its sovereignty, sanctions relief, and protection from military attack.

Israel wants assurance that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iranian-supported groups cannot threaten its population. The United States wants to prevent nuclear proliferation, protect regional stability and avoid another open-ended war.

These objectives are not necessarily irreconcilable. The difficulty lies in sequencing them.

Iran fears that surrendering strategic capabilities before receiving meaningful concessions will leave it exposed. Israel fears that sanctions relief before Iranian capabilities are constrained will simply give Tehran resources to rebuild. Washington fears that concessions without Iranian compliance could be interpreted as weakness.

This is the classic security dilemma: each side sees its own actions as defensive while viewing the other’s actions as a threat that must be countered.

A successful peace process must therefore address not only what is negotiated, but how concessions are exchanged.

Replace the Grand Bargain with Reciprocal Bargains

The first step could be a time-bound Strategic Pause, perhaps lasting 30 days. During this period, the parties would freeze specified offensive operations, avoid attacks on civilian infrastructure and commercial shipping, and suspend actions that materially escalate the confrontation.

Compliance would need independent monitoring. More importantly, neither side should have to make a leap of faith. Each concession should trigger a corresponding concession by the other side.

A verified Iranian reduction in a specified category of nuclear activity could trigger suspension of particular sanctions. A verified reduction in attacks by regional armed groups could trigger defined relaxation of maritime or economic pressure. A verified violation would automatically suspend the corresponding benefit.

The settlement would therefore be built incrementally, with each step creating the conditions for the next.

Address Israel’s Security Dilemma

No settlement can succeed if it ignores Israel’s fundamental security concerns. From Israel’s perspective, Iran’s nuclear program is only one part of the threat. Iranian support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis has created a network of armed actors capable of imposing military pressure on Israel and disrupting regional security.

The practical approach would be to negotiate capabilities and behavior rather than political allegiance.

Iran could progressively restrict the transfer of specified advanced weapons, particularly long-range missiles, precision-strike systems and sophisticated drones, and commit to preventing attacks that deliberately target civilians or expand the conflict beyond agreed limits. In return, Iran would receive progressively stronger security assurances against direct attack.

The exchange is straightforward in principle: Iran reduces the forward military pressure it generates through its regional partners, while its security becomes less dependent on maintaining that forward deterrence.

For Israel, the benefit would be reduced military pressure on its territory. For Iran, the benefit would be a reduced perceived need to maintain an extensive regional deterrence architecture.

Hezbollah, Hamas & Houthis Need Different Solutions

These three groups should not be treated as one problem.

For Hezbollah, the central issue is Lebanon’s sovereignty and the presence of a heavily armed non-state actor on Israel’s northern frontier. A settlement should strengthen the Lebanese state’s authority and provide for a phased reduction or relocation of heavy weapons from sensitive areas. The immediate objective need not be the disappearance of Hezbollah as a political organization, but preventing any non-state actor from initiating a major interstate conflict without the Lebanese state’s consent.

Hamas presents a different challenge because it is inseparable from the unresolved Palestinian question. Requiring Hamas simply to disappear is unlikely to be realistic. A more viable pathway would involve Hamas relinquishing governance in Gaza, progressively reducing heavy weapons and transferring administration and security responsibilities to a legitimate Palestinian structure supported by the international community.

That process would need reconstruction and a credible political horizon for Palestinians. Otherwise, disarmament could simply create a vacuum for another armed movement.

The Houthis should be addressed through a separate Red Sea security arrangement. Iran could restrict the transfer of specified missile, drone, and maritime-strike capabilities, while a Yemeni political process provides the Houthis with a legitimate political future.

The objective would be to separate Yemen’s internal conflict from the wider Iran-Israel confrontation and restore freedom of commercial navigation.

Turn sanctions into an instrument for peace

Sanctions relief should also be redesigned. Iran is unlikely to make major concessions today in exchange for benefits that may arrive years later.

A Peace Escrow Mechanism could address this problem. Sanctions would be suspended in stages rather than simply lifted. Oil revenues, access to frozen funds, and selected financial channels could be released automatically when independent monitors verify specified Iranian actions.

The same principle would operate in reverse. If commitments are violated, the corresponding benefits would automatically pause.

Iran would therefore not have to trust that sanctions relief will eventually materialize; the economic benefit would be directly linked to verified compliance. At the same time, the United States and its partners would retain leverage until Iran demonstrated its commitments.

Sanctions would cease to be merely punishment or bargaining leverage and become an instrument for implementing the settlement.

Make Hormuz The First Test

The Strait of Hormuz offers an immediate opportunity for confidence-building because its security affects the entire international community.

Iran could provide a verifiable commitment to the safe passage of commercial shipping, while the United States and its partners could suspend specified maritime pressure measures during the Strategic Pause. An independent mechanism could investigate incidents and determine responsibility.

If commercial vessels can move safely while military forces exercise restraint, it would demonstrate that reciprocal commitments can work even when the parties remain deeply hostile.

That lesson could then be applied to the nuclear program, missiles and regional armed groups.

Peace Through Managed Distrust

The central mistake would be to expect trust to precede the agreement. Trust is more likely to result from repeated compliance.

The settlement should therefore rest on four principles: reciprocity, verification, gradualism and automaticity. Every concession should have a corresponding benefit; important commitments should be independently verifiable; major concessions should be broken into manageable stages; and agreed rewards or penalties should operate automatically rather than depend on renewed political bargaining.

This approach also gives each government a politically defensible narrative. Iran can present the process as an exchange of specific military concessions for tangible economic and security benefits rather than capitulation. Israel can demonstrate that its security concerns are being addressed through enforceable restrictions rather than political assurances. The United States can retain leverage while reducing the risk of another prolonged regional war.

Most importantly, the framework recognizes a basic reality of international politics: peace does not always begin with trust. Sometimes it begins with managing distrust.

The parties do not have to agree on history, ideology or regional ambitions. They need only agree that certain actions are too dangerous to continue and that restraint can produce tangible benefits.

A durable peace is therefore unlikely to emerge from one dramatic handshake or a single comprehensive treaty. It is more likely to emerge from a chain of smaller agreements in which each side discovers, step by step, that restraint produces greater security than escalation.

The real diplomatic breakthrough would not be an agreement that ends all disagreements. It would be an agreement that makes continued disagreement less dangerous, more predictable and progressively less dependent on the use of force.

The ultimate test of diplomacy will not be whether Iran, Israel and the United States learn to trust one another. It will be whether they can construct a system in which they do not need to trust one another to stop fighting.

• OPED By Admiral (R) Girish Kumar Garg
• This is an Opinion Article. Views Personal of the Author
• The writer is a retired Rear Admiral and was the Naval Officer-in-Charge (A&N Islands)

The post Hezbollah, Hamas & Houthis Cannot Be Disarmed With a Single Deal: U.S. & Israel Need New Mechanism: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

After hesitating for weeks amid a deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye (Turkey) have finally agreed to activate “deterrence measures” under the mutual security agreement, the Makkah (Mecca) Pact.’

Under the agreement, Pakistan and Türkiye have agreed to “rapidly deploy forces” in Saudi Arabia to counter the attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

This is the first time that the ‘Mecca Pact,’ signed in August, has been invoked.

“The committee agreed to activate collective deterrence measures, within the framework of the Alliance, in response to the attacks and all those responsible for them,” Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, said.

The ‘Mecca Pact’ has a mutual defense clause, similar to NATO’s Article 5, that an armed attack against one country would be considered an attack on all three.

Under the agreement, Ankara could deploy its soldiers in the southern Arabian peninsula for the first time in over a century.

The last time Turkish soldiers served in Yemen was in 1919 under Ottoman rule. After the Ottomans’ defeat in the First World War, Ankara agreed to surrender garrisons outside Anatolia under the Armistice of Mudros.

After the Armistice, signed between the Ottomans and Allied nations in 1918, Ottoman garrisons in Yemen surrendered to the British forces one by one.

Therefore, activating the Mecca Pact could see Turkish forces return to the southern Arabian Peninsula after more than a century.

In fact, while the Mecca Pact was signed only in 2026, Turkey has been waiting for an opportunity to return to Yemen for over a decade.

In 2015, when Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Yemen against the Houthi rebels for the first time, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that “Depending on the course of events, we may consider providing logistical support.”

However, Ankara should not celebrate too soon, as history holds a sobering lesson for the Turks.

The mighty Ottoman Empire once ruled across the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe; controlled three of Islam’s holiest sites, including Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem; and controlled a huge territory in the European lands of the Balkans and southern Europe.

Ottomans, however, could never fully subjugate the Zaidi tribesmen of Yemen, the historical ancestors of today’s Houthi rebels.

Yemen, in fact, was frequently called the “graveyard of Anatolia” or the “graveyard of Ottoman soldiers”.

Yemen – The Graveyard of Turks (Ottomans)

Victoria Clark, in Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (2010), writes that by the 1890s Yemen was already “renowned as the ‘graveyard of the Turks'” during Ahmed Feyzi Pasha’s campaigns.

She also quoted an Ottoman official: “Yemen has become now the graveyard of Muslims and money.”

Turkish journalist and author Mustafa Balbay titled his book ‘Türkler Mezarlığı Yemen,’ which means “Cemetery of the Turks”.

In fact, describing Yemen as a “graveyard of Turkish soldiers” is a recurring theme in Ottoman (Turkish) historical memory.

Yemen Türküsü is a famous Turkish folk song that serves as a tragic lament for Ottoman soldiers who marched off to fight in Yemen during World War I and never returned.

Another Turkish folk song remembers the difficulties faced by Ottoman soldiers in Yemen and pays homage to Turks who went to Yemen but never returned.

“There are no clouds in the sky, what is this smoke?
There is no death in the neighborhood, what is this commotion?
These lands of Yemen are so treacherous
Oh, Yemen, its rose is a meadow
Why do those who leave not return?”

Ayşe Hür, in her article “The largest Ottoman cemetery: Yemen,” recounts that the Ottoman rule in Yemen was fiercely opposed by Zaydis, the ancestors of Houthi rebels.

According to the Zaydis, the Ottomans were ‘turbaned infidels’.

In his work titled “My Lament,” Ahmet İzzet (Furgaç) Pasha, who was sent to Yemen in early 20th century to supress a Zaydi revolt against the Ottomans described the period of Ottoman struggle in Yemen (1635-1840) in following words: “After a century of conflict in Jabal, with internal revolts and constant wars against the Zaydi imams, which continued until the year 1045 AH (1635), the entire Yemen region fell under the rule of the Zaydi imams due to the siege and pressure exerted on Haydar Pasha, who was forgotten and left in Jabal by the central government.”

Ottoman sources do not specify how many people died in the wars with the Zaydis during these 100 years, merely stating that “thousands of people died.”

“Going to Yemen and not returning” has been the fate of Ottoman soldiers since the 16th century, Ayşe Hür wrote in her article.

In the article titled “The Situation in Yemen” in the 15th issue of the Ottoman Newspaper dated 1316 (1900), it was stated: “As a result of Ahmet Fevzi Pasha’s wrong policies, approximately 4,000 soldiers died every year.”

Ayşe Hür also quoted an Ottoman official in her article who said that 1,30,000 Ottoman soldiers were buried in the Hijaz and Yemen between 1871 and 1894.

Marshal Galip, who served as a captain in Yemen in the 19th century, wrote: “Since I worked under the General Staff, all the general staff records passed through my hands. In these records, I noticed a wide and terrible gap between the new soldiers joining the army and those who were replaced or disabled… Yemen was a permanent war zone at that time.

“I compared the number of those who joined their factions or were mobilized en masse and sent away due to rebellions with the number of those who survived and returned to their homeland. The conclusion I reached was this: In the 22 years that had passed, a total of 130,000 Anatolian youths had been buried in the deserts of Hejaz and Yemen.”

In 2011, then-Turkish President Abdullah Gül renovated and inaugurated a Turkish Memorial Cemetery (Yemen-Türk Şehitliği) in Sanaa to commemorate the Ottoman soldiers who died in Yemeni campaigns.

Just one year later, in 2012, Houthi rebels demolished part of the memorial.

For centuries, the memorial has symbolized the Ottoman presence in Yemen. The deliberate attack on this memorial serves as a reminder of how the Houthis recall Ottoman campaigns in Yemen.

It was also a clear message to Ankara that they would not accept any Turkish involvement in Yemen.

Writing in Politics Today, Ahd Yaseen Al-Tamimi said: “History textbooks, which were adopted after 1962, presented a positive view of the Ottoman Empire and its rule over Yemen. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Zaydi supporters from maintaining their strict and extremist position on the Ottoman Empire.”

Of course, Turkey is a strong military power, and its influence extends in Yemen as well.

It has achieved remarkable military success in Syria, Libya, and in combating Kurdish insurgents in Iraq. Its military support to Azerbaijan was perhaps the deciding factor in its war against Armenia.

However, Yemen is a different ballgame altogether.

And if history is anything to go by, then Yemen, often described as a “graveyard of the Ottomans,” could once again become a quagmire for Turkey.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Why Yemen Could be a Graveyard for Turkish & Mecca Pact Soldiers: History Has The Answers: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Recently, during the 5^th Halla Bolle Conclave held at the Radisson Collection in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, the same separatist discourse once again found space.

The conclave brought together mainstream political leaders and a former separatist figure, with discussions focusing on issues such as restoring statehood, Article 370, autonomy, political rights, governance, youth aspirations, reconciliation, and India-Pakistan relations.

Many of the questions asked and answers given reflected narratives that have long been nurtured in the Valley and closely resemble Pakistan’s longstanding propaganda on Kashmir.

The participation of mainstream political leaders alongside former separatist figures also showed how some of these old narratives still find space in Kashmir’s contemporary political discourse.

Selective Politics of Kashmir’s Mainstream Leaders

Aga Syed Ruhullah Mehdi, the National Conference Member of Parliament (MP) representing the Srinagar Lok Sabha constituency, who behaves like some philosopher-king, is systematically promoting Pakistan’s propaganda and narratives.

He tries his best to hurt India whenever he gets the chance.

For instance, when asked to state his position on the situation in Muzaffarabad and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), he said that he would not talk about it until people in the Valley were ‘empowered’, deflecting by declaring, ‘Return our dignity & we will talk about Muzaffarabad’. He then went on to claim that Kashmiris face the status of ‘second-class citizens’ in the Valley, asserting that ‘our reality is that we are disenfranchised as second-class citizens.’

This is exactly the problem. He avoids questions concerning PoJK but remains extremely vocal when criticizing India.

He is actually misusing his constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression and using Indian democracy as a shield while promoting narratives that are completely in line with Pakistan’s interests. He actually doesn’t want to hurt his masters sitting in Rawalpindi.

He also claims that there is no freedom of speech, frequently protesting that, “as a Kashmiri Muslim voice, I was denied the opportunity to speak.” Yet his actions contradict this narrative. He himself makes the most noise, using every available platform to speak publicly, give interviews, address gatherings, speak in Parliament, and criticize India regularly.

If he is supposedly not allowed to speak, then how is he able to constantly and systematically spread venom and engage in anti-India propaganda repeatedly?

There is a clear difference between legitimate democratic criticism of a government and repeatedly using the democratic space available in India to promote narratives that portray India itself as the source of Kashmir’s problems while giving Pakistan a free pass for its sponsorship of cross-border terrorism and the killing of innocent civilians in J&K and the rest of the country.

Then, an audience member asked National Conference president Farooq Abdullah why Kashmir had aligned with ‘Hindu-majority India’ in 1947. The very framing of the phrase ‘Hindu-majority India’ exposes the toxic ideology behind the question.

However, those who push such narratives desperately need to look at what actually happened to the regions that joined Pakistan in 1947, as well as those parts of the subcontinent that were forcibly taken by Pakistan, and the misery their people endure today.

Look at Balochistan. Look at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Look at the political and institutional failures that ultimately led to the secession of Bangladesh, demonstrating that a shared religious identity alone could not keep Pakistan united. Most importantly, look at the disaster that is Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) today.

For years, the people of PoJK have taken to the streets to protest Islamabad over basic political, economic, and social rights. The recent protests have faced deadly crackdowns, reportedly leaving more than 150 people killed, while the brutal authorities have even gone so far as to restrict the supply of essential goods, including food, flour, medicines, and fuel, during periods of unrest.

When Pakistan’s Failures Are Blamed on India

Yet Pakistan’s propaganda machinery has repeatedly played its cards well in Kashmir. Its influence remains deeply entrenched in the Valley, allowing narratives about Pakistan and India to persist regardless of what happens inside Pakistan.

Pakistan can have Imran Khan in jail, political repression, a deeply constrained democratic system, and an army that continues to exercise enormous influence over the country’s politics, elections, government formation, policymaking, and even the broader political system, yet people in Kashmir are repeatedly told that Pakistan’s problems are somehow the result of an Indian conspiracy.

Even when Pakistan itself is burning, its failures are deflected towards India rather than examined as the consequences of its own political and institutional failures.

This should force Indian authorities to rethink their approach and ask why such narratives continue to resonate in the Valley. Simply dismissing them as propaganda will not be enough. There needs to be a serious effort to understand the channels through which they spread, the political actors who amplify them, and the reasons they continue to influence public discourse.

Certain mainstream political parties and leaders in Jammu and Kashmir have also played a major role in keeping this discourse alive. They have repeatedly used the blood and suffering of Kashmiris for their own political objectives. Rather than challenging narratives promoted by Pakistan, they have often sustained and magnified them.

Take PDP chief Mehbooba Mufti, for example. She has advocated opening the Line of Control in Kashmir so that trade can take place with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and other regions, invoking the old Silk Route and China’s connectivity. One has to ask: what world is she living in?

Does she not understand the region’s geopolitics? Does she not understand the cross-border terrorism and terrorist infrastructure operating from Pakistan-occupied territory? Does she not understand the India-Pakistan dispute over PoJK? Does she not understand China’s illegal territorial claims against India in Jammu and Kashmir, the Shaksgam Valley territory ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, the recent Galwan clashes, and China’s broader geostrategic interests in the region?

It is not simply a matter of opening India’s borders and assuming that will solve everything. Other players have their own interests and nefarious designs, and they too have agency. Besides, extra-regional powers have their own interests. The region is not operating in a geopolitical vacuum.

The problem with Kashmir’s political leadership is that they rarely talk about the issues that actually matter to the people, for which they were elected, and instead think that by playing separatist politics, they can secure their votes and political future.

They rarely talk about how to improve the living standards of common people, eliminate corruption, generate employment, improve infrastructure, attract investment, or make governance more accountable and responsive.

Instead, they have often tried to frame the relationship between the people of Kashmir and the central government in colonial terms, as a master-slave relationship. They repeatedly use words such as “Delhi,” while saying that Kashmiris have to “fight Delhi.” They rarely speak about constructive engagement with the central government.

They now say that Kashmiris have been “disempowered” after the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019. But what happened before 2019? Were Kashmiris not being described as “alienated” and “disempowered” before 2019 as well? Were these same political leaders not making exactly the same arguments then?

If they were making the same arguments before 2019, then what exactly did they do for the people of Kashmir when they had the political power they now claim to have lost?

This is something that needs to be asked.

Need to Move Beyond the Politics of Alienation and Victimhood

Moreover, the words “alienation” and “disempowerment” are not being used accidentally. They carry a specific political meaning and fit into a particular narrative. The problem is that these leaders have never really looked at the relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and the central government in the same way that political leaders in other parts of India look at their relationship with the Center.

The current noise over statehood also needs to be understood in this context. They present the demand for statehood as though it is entirely about the interests of the common people. But is it?

Of course, statehood is important, and people can legitimately demand its restoration. But it also involves political interests. These political parties want more political power and greater control over the administration.

After losing statehood, they feel they lost a significant part of their political authority. They also want statehood because it would give them greater political control and a shield from the scrutiny and accountability they currently face from different agencies and institutions. In this sense, the demand for statehood is also about restoring their own political power and reducing accountability.

But the common people have other priorities. They want good governance. They want corruption to be eliminated. They want development, employment, better infrastructure, better public services, and an improved standard of living.

The question is: when there was statehood before 2019, what did they do to improve the lives of common people?

If the mainstream political parties in Jammu and Kashmir had pursued positive, constructive, forward-looking, and pragmatic politics instead of sustaining and magnifying narratives that have served Pakistan’s interests, the Valley could have been very different.

Political parties have every right to criticize the government. They have every right to demand statehood, greater powers, development, and political representation. But when criticism of India becomes constant while questions concerning Pakistan are systematically avoided, and when every issue is presented through the prism of alienation and disempowerment, it becomes necessary to ask whose interests this politics is ultimately serving.

The mainstream political leadership in Jammu and Kashmir needs to understand that the people of Kashmir cannot be kept permanently trapped in the politics of grievance, alienation, and victimhood. The people deserve politics that focuses on their future, not politics that continuously recycles past narratives.

• Views Personal of the Author
• The author is a prominent journalist from Jammu & Kashmir and wishes to keep his identity concealed for security reasons.
• For any feedback on the story, email us at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

The post Kashmir’s ‘Halla Bolle’ Conclave: Old Script, New Venue. Venom Against India But Mum on Pakistan: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

During his interaction with the press ahead of Air Force Day on October 8, 2026, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) stated that, in the near future, the Indian Air Force would have a “healthy mix” of LCA Tejas Mk 1A, LCA Mk 2, the French Rafale and the indigenous fifth-generation AMCA.

On the face of it, there is little to quarrel with what the CAS stated.

These aircraft will undoubtedly constitute important elements of the IAF’s future fighter fleet. However, the projection has some infirmities that are difficult to overlook.

The first question is what the CAS meant by the “near future”.

If the statement is intended to describe the fighter fleet that the IAF will field over the next decade or so, the mix is understandable. But if it projects the force structure into the 2040s—and beyond—it raises a more fundamental question.

How far into the future was the CAS extrapolating current procurement plans to arrive at the projected “healthy mix”?

Based on the past record of Indian fighter aircraft development projects, I would think at least 15 years from now, well into the 2040s.

By then, Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2, Rafale and AMCA could indeed form the backbone of the IAF’s manned combat-aircraft fleet. But describing that combination alone as a “healthy mix” ignores a major transformation already underway in air warfare.

The manned fighter is no longer the whole equation

There is little doubt that the IAF will continue to depend predominantly on the 4th-generation fighters named by the CAS, quite possibly for the next 20 to 30 years. Fighter aircraft have long service lives, and India’s continuing dependence on legacy and contemporary 4th-generation platforms is therefore likely to persist well into the 2040s and perhaps beyond.

But the fighter force of the 2040s cannot be assessed merely by counting manned fighters across different generations.

The changing character of air warfare will demand a mix of manned and unmanned platforms, with different levels of survivability, autonomy and weapons heft.

This matters because the most dangerous missions in a future conflict will likely involve penetrating increasingly dense and sophisticated air-defense networks. A manned 4th-generation fighter, however capable, is not necessarily the most appropriate platform for every such mission.

The Unmanned Component

The IAF’s future force structure will therefore need an increasing proportion of unmanned combat aircraft.

At one end of the spectrum would be relatively inexpensive unmanned systems able to perform reconnaissance, electronic warfare, decoy and weapons-truck functions. At the other end would be sophisticated unmanned combat aircraft capable of operating alongside manned fighters as loyal wingmen.

The latter could substantially increase the effectiveness of a manned fighter formation. An unmanned aircraft could carry additional weapons, extend the formation’s sensor coverage, perform electronic attack or act as a decoy, while exposing no pilot to the risk of a mission in heavily defended airspace.

There is also an important economic dimension. An unmanned platform does not necessarily have to replicate the capabilities, complexity, or cost of a manned fighter. A future air force could therefore field far more expendable or attritable unmanned combat aircraft than it could afford to field manned fighters.

This would fundamentally alter the arithmetic of air combat.

Why describe only the present procurement mix?

The “healthy mix” the CAS referred to was therefore, in my view, probably intended primarily for mainstream media consumption.

That is not necessarily a criticism of the CAS.

Mainstream reporting tends to operate at shallow depths and gravitates towards readily understood narratives. In India’s case, the Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) narrative is particularly attractive.

Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2 and AMCA fit neatly into that narrative, while Rafale provides the foreign component of the mix.

But the full spectrum of capabilities that the IAF will require in the 2040s is considerably more complicated.

It would include manned 4th-generation fighters, 4.5-generation fighters, 5th-generation VLO aircraft and an expanding family of unmanned combat aircraft ranging from relatively inexpensive attritable systems to sophisticated loyal wingmen.

The Uncomfortable Technological Reality

I suspect that the IAF leadership understands this reality.

India’s indigenous technological capability in unmanned combat aircraft is still far short of what it would take to develop and field the full range of systems a future air force will need.

The problem is not simply the airframe. Autonomous operation, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, secure communications, distributed sensing, electronic warfare and the ability to operate in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment all present formidable challenges.

MoD bureaucrats are unlikely to be unaware of these limitations either.

Under the circumstances, articulating the full range of what a truly “healthy mix” would entail would perhaps serve little purpose in a public interaction with the media.

But that does not make the issue any less important.

The Real Challenge

The real challenge is not recognizing that India needs a mix of manned and unmanned combat aircraft. It is developing the technologies and industrial ecosystem needed to field them in meaningful numbers.

The IAF of the 2040s will almost certainly still contain large numbers of 4th-generation fighters. There is nothing inherently wrong with that. The question is what surrounds them.

If the future force consists predominantly of today’s manned fighter concepts, supplemented by a relatively small number of AMCA aircraft, it may represent a healthy mix of India’s current procurement programs.

It may not, however, be a healthy mix for the wars India could have to fight in the 2040s and beyond.

The distinction is important. A force structure should not be called “healthy” merely because it contains a balanced selection of aircraft India can build or procure today.

It should be judged against the operational environment in which that force will actually have to fight.

• Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
• Views Personal of the Author
• Follow the author @vkthakur

The post Rafale, Tejas & AMCA: IAF’s “Healthy Mix” of Fighter Jets Leaves Out The Aircraft That May Matter The Most appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

OPED by Mahendra Ved  

Indian High Commissioner Dinesh Trivedi has conveyed a few home truths to his host country, Bangladesh.

They seem to have been forgotten while demanding that ousted former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina be returned: on August 5, 2024, she was “not brought by the Indian Air Force or the Indian Army.”

India had “hardly any choice” and was “unprepared” when she arrived.

Now a diplomat, the politician avoided stating the obvious: she was brought from Dhaka to India on a Bangladesh Air Force aircraft.

Another reminder: “At that point in time, Hasina was still the prime minister of Bangladesh.”

He said that legal procedures were ‘underway’ for her extradition, and that they take time.

Of course, he didn’t mention Hasina’s repeated announcement in December that she would return of her own discretion.

How times have changed! Once considered the ‘friendliest’ in South Asia, India’s relations with Bangladesh have become complex, even delicate.

Sheikh Hasina’s exile in India and her proposed return have added another layer of complexity to an already extraordinarily complicated relationship.

Addressing the media and her Awami League cadres through audio calls, she has repeated that she will return home, despite knowing that arrest and prosecution await her.

Seeking international support from lawmakers and human rights organizations, she has addressed seminars in London and Geneva via audio.

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s government expressed ‘outrage’ at her audio address in Delhi and has banned domestic media from reporting it. It did not respond to India’s twin invitations, one bilateral and the other for the BRICS summit in New Delhi.

A brief update is essential.

Following Hasina’s ouster, an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus sustained itself on anti-Hasina and, since she was in India, anti-India sentiment.

Since this year’s February elections, a party with a history of problematic relations with India has been in power. The elections also brought to power an opposition force of Jamaat-e-Islami and students who worked to oust Hasina and see India as an adversary.

As India tries to rebuild bilateral ties under totally changed circumstances, hosting Hasina has complicated them. Rahman’s possible visit in November has been discussed at different levels, but exploring dates and announcing final dates are different.

To anyone unversed in India-Bangladesh ties, the two issues—Hasina’s return and Tarique’s visit—may appear separate. In reality, they are closely intertwined.

The government in Dhaka wants Hasina back, convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to death. Since it involves a bilateral extradition treaty, India cannot simply hand her over.

As Rahman faces pressure, especially from the opposition, he must weigh in on Hasina’s presence while visiting India. His government’s grievance, also used as leverage, affects ties with Delhi.

Delhi, meanwhile, has a larger strategic interest: building a workable relationship with the government in Dhaka, whoever leads it. Bangladesh is too important to India to let the relationship remain permanently hostage to a former prime minister’s fate.

That is why the proposed Tarique visit matters. But it is also why it is difficult. There is a certain diplomatic stalemate.

Dhaka cannot easily separate Hasina’s presence in India from its own domestic politics. It wants Delhi to accept the new political reality. Yet the Hasina question remains the most emotionally and politically charged issue between them.

Both neighbors want a relationship based on mutual interests and reciprocity. But neither wants to be seen conceding on Hasina to facilitate Rahman’s visit. Any ‘understanding’ with India on this would expose Rahman at home to the charge of having surrendered.

This explains why Rahman’s visit in November is possible, but not certain.

Because after November comes December.

Assuming Hasina returns, another question becomes unavoidable: what happens to her safety?

If the Rahman government arrests and prosecutes her, it is also duty-bound to protect her.

It may regard her as responsible for grave political and human-rights abuses. It may even seek to establish her responsibility through courts. But it cannot allow her fate to be decided by an assassin, a mob or an extremist organization.

With several past attempts on her life, Hasina herself has acknowledged that she could face death if she returns. The Bangladesh government has responded by saying that she would receive full security and legal protection.

The world witnessed the assassination of another former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, in 2007. It reminds us that government protection does not make an extremist threat disappear. A politically prominent person can remain a target even when the state has formally undertaken to protect her.

One would not like to push the Benazir angle too far. Nothing so far suggests a conspiracy or that Hasina is destined to meet the same fate. But religious extremism has deep roots in Bangladesh. It also witnessed killings of people in jail in 1975. Hence, the threat to Hasina’s life cannot be dismissed.

That creates a paradox for Rahman’s government. It is not just a political gesture to an adversary; Hasina’s protection is a state obligation.

Indeed, this matters because Hasina is not merely another former prime minister. She is the daughter of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and has been at the center of Bangladesh’s political life for decades. To her supporters, she represents a political tradition that is now under assault. To her opponents, she represents a period of authoritarian rule for which she must answer.

If she returns and faces trial, Bangladesh will certainly be under an international microscope. If the proceedings are conducted peacefully and in accordance with the law, the government can argue that the country has chosen the judicial route.

If she is imprisoned, the government will have to show that imprisonment is not an excuse for political revenge.

And if, despite state protection, she were killed by extremists, the political consequences could be enormous—even if the government itself had nothing to do with the assassination.

Hasina could become a martyr. The now-banned Awami League could acquire a powerful new symbol. The new government’s credibility could be damaged. And Bangladesh’s already polarised politics could become even more dangerous.

Both must consider the wider strategic considerations.

India cannot build its Bangladesh policy entirely around Hasina.

Her nearly 16-year rule created a close relationship between New Delhi and Dhaka, particularly on security and connectivity. But governments change. India has to deal with the Bangladesh that exists, not simply the Bangladesh it would prefer to see.

That means engaging Tarique Rahman’s government. It means rebuilding political contacts and restoring economic and commercial links. It means addressing border security, connectivity, water, the Northeast, and China’s growing influence. It means recognizing that the new Bangladesh will have its own political priorities.

But normalization does not require India to forget Hasina. Nor does it require Bangladesh to abandon its demand for justice.

Perhaps the two countries can eventually learn to separate these questions.

Tarique Rahman can visit India.

• OPED by Mahendra Ved
• President (2016-2022), Commonwealth Journalists Association (CJA)

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