Six people were killed in a Russian strike in the settlement of Nova Vodolaha in Kharkiv Oblast, including girls aged 1 and 11. Another 15 people were injured, including seven children, Kharkiv Oblast Governor Oleh Syniehubov said on 20 October. Russian forces struck a park with a drone while families with children were there, Ukraine’s Minister of Internal Affairs Ivan Vyhivskyi said.

Russian forces continue to attack Ukrainian cities, killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office has opened a war-crime investigation into the strike. The strike was aimed at people, Yurii Yurchenko, head of a police department in Kharkiv Oblast, said in a comment to Suspilne.

The 14-month-old girl was named Anhelina

The Russian drone circled the park several times before crashing, Yurchenko said. He said the drone struck a tree near a café, and the blast wave and shrapnel hit people at the establishment. The attack came at around 16:30, the prosecutor’s office said, adding that Russian forces had preliminarily used a Geran-3 drone.

The Russian strike killed three women, aged 28, 34 and 36, a man around 40 years old, and two girls, aged 14 months and 11 years, Syniehubov said in his statement.

The youngest girl, named Anhelina, was born in August 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. Her mother, Inna, died in the hospital, he added.

Zelenskyy shows US senators photos of the aftermath the same day

Zelenskyy met with US Senators Richard Blumenthal and Thom Tillis, along with their colleagues from both parties and both chambers of Congress, according to a 19 October post on his social media accounts. During the meeting, he discussed the Russian attack in Kharkiv Oblast and showed lawmakers photographs from the scene, including one of the infant who was killed in a stroller.

“This is how Russia responds to the lifting of sanctions and the easing of pressure,” he said in the post.

Zelenskyy said Ukraine needs air defense and that no one should think about making money with Russia while it continues its war. He asked that sanctions on Russia stay in place until the killing stops, urged the US to “be strong” and apply Lindsey Graham’s law, and called on Europe to keep supporting Ukraine.

Donald Trump has presented his agreement with Vladimir Putin as a means of reducing American fuel prices. Yet the Treasury authorisation extends far beyond the announced diesel shipments, opening opportunities for international trade in Russian petroleum products as American investors negotiate the acquisition of Lukoil’s overseas assets.

President Donald Trump’s decision to reopen trade in Russian diesel has implications extending well beyond American fuel prices. The agreement, announced ahead of November’s congressional elections, coincides with negotiations over Russian energy assets and mounting American pressure on Ukraine to suspend attacks against Moscow’s oil infrastructure.

The US Treasury’s General Licence 135, issued on 9 October, authorises transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027. Unlike Trump’s public announcement, which referred to specific quantities destined for the American market, the licence establishes no corresponding volume ceiling or restriction confining authorised trade to the United States.

Its provisions permit American businesses to participate in eligible international transactions involving Russian diesel, including associated financial and commercial services. Existing sanctions remain formally in force, but an important category of Russian petroleum trade has been reopened.

The arrangement potentially benefits not only Russian producers but also American commodity traders, financial institutions and intermediaries capable of purchasing Russian fuel and distributing it internationally.

Sanctions relief without removing sanctions

The legal mechanism offers Washington considerable flexibility. Rather than formally abandoning restrictions imposed over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the administration can authorise selected transactions while maintaining the broader sanctions framework.

Congress’s Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 strengthened the legislative basis for economic pressure on Moscow but also provided presidential waiver powers.

General Licence 135 was issued under existing Treasury sanctions authorities, rather than necessarily through those waiver provisions. Nevertheless, the combined framework leaves the administration substantial discretion over the practical application of economic restrictions.

Washington can consequently maintain its declared sanctions policy while selectively restoring commercial relations with Russia. European governments, which have maintained extensive restrictions on Russian energy, have little influence over such unilateral American exemptions.

The Lukoil connection

The timing becomes more revealing when considered alongside negotiations over Lukoil’s international assets.

American investors have been exploring the acquisition of the Russian company’s overseas operations, including oilfields, refineries, storage facilities and retail distribution networks. The portfolio has been valued at approximately $20–22 billion.

Among the prospective investors is billionaire Todd Boehly, while discussions concerning Russian-American economic cooperation have involved Trump’s representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

An American-controlled acquisition of Lukoil’s international network could complement the commercial opportunities created by the diesel authorisation.

Russian petroleum products could potentially be purchased and marketed through American-controlled businesses, allowing Russian suppliers to retain export revenues while intermediaries earn profits from financing, distribution and resale.

No evidence establishes that General Licence 135 was specifically designed for the prospective Lukoil purchasers, or that Trump personally holds an interest in the proposed transactions. Nevertheless, the parallel negotiations suggest the possibility of an emerging commercial arrangement under which American intermediaries assume a greater role in Russian energy exports.

Ukraine and the conflict of interests

The consequences for Ukraine could be considerable.

Kyiv has expanded attacks against Russian refineries, fuel depots and petroleum infrastructure, seeking to reduce Moscow’s export earnings and disrupt supplies supporting its armed forces.

Trump has repeatedly criticised these strikes, linking them to higher international fuel prices. His administration now has an additional commercial reason to seek their suspension.

On 11 October, Trump announced an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, although President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated that Kyiv had not agreed to such an arrangement.

Ukraine has maintained that any suspension of attacks against Russian energy facilities must be matched by an end to Moscow’s strikes on Ukrainian power infrastructure.

An agreement protecting Russian refineries without equivalent Russian concessions would preserve an important source of Kremlin revenue while depriving Kyiv of military and economic leverage.

A separate accommodation with Moscow?

The immediate political advantage for Trump is apparent. Rising diesel prices have become a concern ahead of the 3 November midterm elections, particularly among farmers and transport businesses. Additional Russian supplies offer the administration an opportunity to demonstrate action on domestic fuel costs.

Yet the six-month Treasury authorisation extends considerably beyond the election, suggesting commercial objectives that cannot be explained exclusively by short-term electoral considerations.

The emerging pattern is one of bilateral economic engagement with Moscow proceeding independently of a settlement in Ukraine. Russian energy trade is being selectively reopened, American investors are pursuing Russian-owned assets, and Washington is seeking restrictions on Ukrainian operations against the infrastructure underpinning those commercial interests.

For European governments, this threatens the cohesion of the sanctions regime. Brussels may continue restricting Russian energy revenues while Washington authorises transactions that restore access to international markets.

The larger prospect is a system in which Russia retains export earnings, American intermediaries acquire profitable commercial positions, and sanctions become instruments of bilateral negotiation rather than coordinated Western pressure.

Trump’s diesel agreement may therefore represent the opening stage of a wider economic accommodation with Putin, negotiated while Russia continues its war against Ukraine and without any corresponding Russian commitment to withdraw from occupied territory.