When both Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base were closed as active American military facilities in the early 1990s, the Philippines was said to be the sick man of US alliances. The same Philippines now seems to have emerged as America’s pivot in the Indo-Pacific.

General Ronald Clark, Commander of US Army Pacific, made it clear in an October 18 interview with the Financial Times that the Philippines, alongside Japan and South Korea, is central to US deterrence against hostile forces (implying China) in the Indo-Pacific.

The commander of US Army Pacific, a component of Indo-Pacific Command, said he wanted to demonstrate more “exquisite” military capabilities to help “show the adversary some things that they should be concerned about.”

As part of that push, US Army Pacific has expanded its role, including by temporarily deploying weapons in the Philippines, Japan, and other parts of the region that would play a critical role in a war with China, including over Taiwan, according to General Clark.

He revealed how Typhon, a mobile missile launch system that fires SM-6 missiles at ships, and Tomahawks that could strike parts of coastal China from the Philippines, have been used in recent joint exercises with the Philippines.

The US Army has also been using the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) in ways designed to send a clear message to China about the joint military capabilities of America and its allies, Clark said.

Mentioning an exercise earlier this year in which the army moved long-range precision weapons from the US to the Philippines and brought ammunition from South Korea for a live-fire mission, Gen. Clark stressed that it was important for deterrence.

“It causes them to go: ‘Hey, this is something that we have to think about,’” he said,  adding, “You can see it operate and we can do it at scale at a time and place of our choosing. So, you reveal capability in order to give your adversary pause.”

Incidentally, in an earlier conversation with the Wall Street Journal, Gen. Clark, who commands 107,000 soldiers, talked about the “tyranny of distance” that made it impossible to fight China with just air and naval power.

He argued that China’s vast geographic expanse and its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities make it impossible or too risky to rely solely on air and naval power.

Here, Gen. Clark argues that the Philippines’ geography is a major advantage. The country’s 7,641 islands sit near vital maritime routes, the South China Sea, and the Luzon Strait/Taiwan Strait, making it an irreplaceable staging ground for US surveillance, logistics, and coastal defense.

From Batanes in northern Luzon—100 miles from Taiwan—to Palawan facing the Spratlys in the south, the archipelago locks the two hottest flashpoints: the north controls the Taiwan Strait, and the south controls the South China Sea.

For the US  military, it is the only territory that can monitor both the Taiwan Strait and the West Philippine Sea simultaneously. The archipelago can thus complicate the movement of Chinese naval forces from their coastal waters into the wider Pacific.

Incidentally, America is rebuilding its military presence in the Philippines after its 1992 withdrawal.

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The return to Subic Bay and the expansion of US military cooperation across the Philippines mark a major strategic reversal. Washington is once again developing access to facilities that can support its operations in the western Pacific.

The US has access to nine Philippine military sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and is investing more than $300 million to upgrade infrastructure.

However, all 9 (nine) bases are owned by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), but the US has been granted rotational access. The first 5 (five) were agreed in 2014, with 4 (four being added later in 2023 by President Marcos Jr. to deal with threats from the South China Sea.

The nine sites are being turned into A2/AD nodes that complicate any Chinese movement through the First Island Chain.

Notably, rather than building massive permanent bases, the US and the Philippines are building a flexible, distributed network that complicates targeting by China and raises the costs of a potential conflict (“deterrence by denial”).

Viewed thus, it is understandable why the US has introduced, as seen in Gen. Clark’s  FT interview,  advanced mobile-strike and missile systems such as the Typhon mid-range missile system into the Philippines, capable of reaching targets in the South China Sea and southern China.

One could further argue that Gen. Clark’s interview was not about the Philippines alone. It was about a new American way of fighting a war in the Indo-Pacific that is distributed, land-based, visible, and anchored on three democracies of  Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. That is why he put the Philippines in the same sentence as Japan and Korea.

One can thus surmise that, in a future contingency arising from Chinese actions, Japan will provide airfields, South Korea ammunition, and the Philippines firing positions.

This aligns with the US 2026 National Defense Strategy that EurAsian Times explained earlier. The idea is to build “a strong denial defense” along the First Island Chain.

In this scheme of things, Japan is the northern anchor — with long-range missiles, US-Japan command integration, and bases. South Korea is the arsenal and logistics hub — Clark himself cited a live-fire exercise in the Philippines using ammunition brought from South Korea, showing how Korean stockpiles now sustain Philippine operations.

The Philippines is the southern anchor and now a vital Indo-Pacific center for the US. The 12th Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, held in Manila on February 16, 2026, officially reaffirmed both allies’ commitment to maintaining a vigilant posture, strengthening deterrence across the First Island Chain, and keeping critical sea lanes open.

Apparently, Washington is not only institutionalizing this triangle, the US, Japan, and the Philippines, but also widening its scope by involving Australia and forming the “Squad.”

The Squad’s core focus is to counter maritime pressure and escalation in the South China Sea and East China Sea and reinforce freedom of navigation.

Accordingly, defense officials and defense chiefs from the four nations have increasingly aligned through mini-lateral dialogues, joint exercises (such as Balikatan), and security assistance packages (including transfers of Japanese warships and patrol aircraft to the Philippine Navy).

The developments above make it clear that the Philippines has become the centerpiece of Washington’s strategy to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. As Elbridge Colby, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said this year, Manila is Washington’s “model ally”.

In his words, “When our partners are strong, deterrence is strong. And that is exactly what we have here in Manila, under the leadership of President Marcos, Secretary of National Defense Teodoro, and other key leaders. We see and respect a resolute and proud nation that is determined to strengthen its own capabilities to better defend itself and its interests. A model ally.”

The Philippines now strengthens America’s network of strategic positions running from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Both are developing capabilities intended to make Chinese military operations more difficult, costly, and uncertain.

But as explained above, that is in a manner that affords more operational flexibility for America through access to ports, airfields, and other facilities that can help US forces disperse, sustain operations, and respond more quickly during a crisis, without depending on a small number of major bases.

In other words, thirty-four years after losing its sovereign bases in the Philippines in 1992, the US military has returned with comparable power, but by shifting its status from a base owner to a rotational guest.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

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Australia and East Timor (Timor-Leste), ASEAN’s eleventh member state, have signed a defense framework to boost cyber and maritime security as Canberra attempts to keep China away from its island neighbors.

Richard Marles, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, said: “Australia and Timor-Leste are close neighbors, trusted partners and longstanding friends. Signing the Defense Cooperation Framework with Timor-Leste marks an important milestone in our defense relationship and provides a modern foundation for deeper cooperation in the years ahead.

Australia is proud to be Timor-Leste’s largest defense and security partner, and we remain committed to supporting Timor-Leste’s defense capability.

Together, we are strengthening our ability to work together to respond to shared security challenges, support humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, and promote a peaceful, stable and resilient region.”

He added: “Australia and Timor-Leste share a history of deep security cooperation, underpinned by decades of security cooperation and strong people-to-people ties. This package reflects the trust and friendship between our countries. As Timor-Leste takes on a greater role in our region as ASEAN’s newest member, Australia is proud to stand alongside our close neighbor and work together in support of a peaceful, stable and prosperous region.”

Foreign Minister Penny Wong said: “The Partnership Joint Declaration is driving a new era of cooperation between Australia and Timor-Leste, and these initiatives are a demonstration of our close partnership and friendship. As close neighbors and partners, Australia and Timor-Leste are working together to address shared challenges and ensure the peace, stability and prosperity of our region.”

East Timor is around 700 kilometers northwest of Australia and gained independence from Indonesia in 2002. It joined ASEAN in October 2025.

Earlier in August, China said its Defense Minister, Dong Jun, met with East Timor’s leaders in Dili and offered to “take military-to-military relations to a new level”. The visit was the first by a Chinese defense minister and coincided with commemorations for the FALINTIL-Defence Forces.

Dong met President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao.

Marles and Gusmao signed the pact under which Australia will provide $62 million (US$43.56 million) over five years for cyber security, maritime security, infrastructure, disaster relief, and training.

More than $19 million of that is earmarked for a cyber-security uplift, including specialist advisers and protection of critical systems. Australia will also give East Timor new police vessels for maritime patrols, search and rescue, and countering transnational crime.

PM Gusmao told reporters the agreement will help East Timor fight organized crime and illegal fishing. The package expands the long-running Timor-Leste Police Development Program and supports the country’s role as ASEAN’s newest member.

East Timor’s upgraded ties with Beijing have caused regional security concerns.

Earlier in September 2023, President Jose Ramos-Horta had assured Australia and Indonesia that the country had not forged any military base arrangements with Beijing.

“We don’t have a Chinese military base of any sort. We never discuss that with China, even. The Chinese never approach us on that,” Ramos-Horta had said. He highlighted that Timor-Leste maintains normal relations with all partners while prioritizing expanded defense and maritime security cooperation with Australia.

“Indonesia and Australia…we can include Singapore and Malaysia…they are the countries closest to us…can always sleep at peace. Timor Leste will not be a nuisance, a concern in terms of security,” Ramos-Horta has confirmed to Reuters.

Western critics frequently caution against Beijing’s attempts to establish military outposts by taking over infrastructure from nations that default on loan repayments, a practice often labeled “debt trap diplomacy.”

In Sri Lanka, China took over Hambantota port after the country defaulted on loan repayments.

Canberra has grown concerned about China’s efforts to forge security ties with nearby developing nations.

In 2022, China signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, raising concerns that it could eventually lead to a Chinese naval presence.

Although it assured it will not host a base, Canberra remains apprehensive.

Since then, Australia has pursued agreements across the Pacific, including with Vanuatu, to reinforce its role as the primary security partner and constrain third-party arrangements with an eye on China.

Damien Kingsbury, Emeritus Professor, Deakin University, believes that “Small countries such as East Timor risk having large investors and donors such as China swamp their local economy and thus lose the capacity to make independent economic decisions.

China could end up having an outsized influence in policymaking.”

“When China looks at investing in another developing country, they do so with one eye, certainly on a viable business, but with the other eye, very much on a longer-term strategic interest.”

Kingsbury has also noted Timor-Leste’s economic pressures, including the expected depletion of its petroleum fund, as a driver of closer ties, while highlighting past caution by Dili (e.g., rejecting a Chinese radar proposal whose range exceeded Timorese waters).

Australia’s Key Role in East Timor

Australia played a prominent role in restoring order in East Timor after violence erupted following its 1999 independence vote. It led the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), a multinational mission that paved the way for the territory’s formal independence in 2002.

Indonesia ruled East Timor from 1975 to 1999. In August 1999, the United Nations organized a referendum. More than three-quarters of voters chose independence.

The result triggered widespread violence by pro-Indonesian militias. Homes were burned, people were killed or forced from their homes, and hundreds of thousands were displaced. Pro-Indonesian militias destroyed much of the territory’s infrastructure.

In response, the UN Security Council authorized INTERFET on 15 September 1999. Australia agreed to lead the force. Troops began arriving in Dili on 20 September under Major General Peter Cosgrove’s command.

Australia provided the largest contingent, about 5,500 personnel from the army, navy, air force and police. This was Australia’s largest military deployment since the Vietnam War. 22 countries took part, including New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States, among others. At its peak, the force numbered around 11,000.

INTERFET was tasked with restoring peace and security, protecting UN staff, and helping deliver humanitarian aid. The force quickly brought the situation under control. Indonesian troops withdrew, militia activity largely stopped, and by early 2000, the immediate crisis had eased.

In February 2000, INTERFET handed over to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which governed the territory while it prepared for independence.

On 20 May 2002, East Timor became fully independent—the first new country of the 21st century. Australia continued to support the new nation through the follow-on UN mission (UNMISET) and by helping to train and equip the fledgling East Timorese defense force. Australian personnel remained involved in security and capacity-building for several more years.

On 13 September 2024, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, marking the 25th anniversary of INTERFET’s arrival, in Dili had said: “The arrival of INTERFET was a beacon of hope. The relief and joy our people felt when INTERFET arrived was immeasurable. INTERFET’s contribution to helping put an end to the violence in Timor-Leste is remembered with deep gratitude by all Timorese.”

“Our regional neighbors, including Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, played leading roles in this mission, which marked a turning point in our fight for freedom.”

• By: ET Online Desk
• Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

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South Korea’s ICT authority pledged to support mobile operators and transit providers to ensure 5G-based Wi-Fi would be available on underground railway networks across the country, following a deployment on two lines in Incheon.

In a statement issued at an event showcasing the newly-installed technology on Incheon Metro Lines 1 and 2, second vice minister at the country’s Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) Ryu Je-myung highlighted the “quality improvements achieved”.

He added the government agency would “continue to cooperate with the three mobile operators and regional transit corporations and provide policy support so that 5G-based subway Wi-Fi can be expanded nationwide.”

The project saw LTE replaced by 5G to supply connectivity to the Wi-Fi system, with all three of the country’s mobile operators supporting the service.

To assess the quality of the connection on a section of one of the lines, politicians and other officials were joined by representatives from the operators, Incheon Transit Corporation and a handful of members of the public at the event.

The showcase involved participants streaming video, browsing the internet and using social network services. MSIT noted users were able to experience faster response times than before the upgrade.

“Even when many users were connected simultaneously, high-definition videos could be viewed without interruption, enabling smooth use of data-intensive services,” it added.

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Jio Platforms’ $3.2 billion IPO was reportedly fully subscribed within around 100 minutes of opening on Wednesday (21 October), as investors rushed to take part in India’s largest share sale.

Sources told Reuters institutional investors covered their allocated portion within 10 minutes of bidding opening, although demand from retail investors was slower. Around a third of the shares are reserved for retail buyers.

“It’s the fastest in the history of India,” a source said.

Reliance Industries’ telecoms unit is offering 270 million shares priced at between INR1,065 ($11.28) and INR1,119 apiece, with the offer closing on Friday (23 October). The IPO values the business at up to $108.3 billion and marks the first public offering from billionaire Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance conglomerate in two decades.

The company plans to use most of the IPO proceeds to repay or prepay borrowings at Reliance Jio Infocomm, its telecoms subsidiary, with the remainder earmarked for general corporate purposes, including capital expenditure.

Jio Platforms reported a profit of around $3.2 billion on revenue of $15.5 billion in the year to March.

The offering also comes despite a weak domestic equity market, after the country’s Nifty 50 benchmark index of 50 leading Indian companies slumped this year.

However, Indian wealth management firm SMIFS Limited noted “the long-term outlook for Jio Platforms Limited remains highly favourable, driven by sustained growth in India’s digital economy”.

According to the company, Jio Platforms will “benefit from rising 5G adoption, increasing smartphone penetration, accelerating broadband penetration, growing enterprise digitalisation and expanding demand for cloud and AI-enabled services”.

Jio’s telecoms business has more than 500 million subscribers, making it the world’s second largest telecoms operator in a single country after China Mobile. It disrupted India’s telecoms market after launching in 2016 with low-cost data plans, putting pressure on rivals Bharti Airtel and Vodafone Idea.

However, the company continues to face regulatory uncertainty and growing competition in satellite connectivity, as billionaire Elon Musk’s Starlink prepares to enter India’s market.

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China’s J-20 stealth fighter fleet is estimated to have reached 500 aircraft, according to open-source assessments by analysts tracking serial numbers and unit deployments. However, its ambitious H-20 stealth bomber, touted as a challenge to the US B-21 Raider, remains conspicuously absent.

The J-20 Mighty Dragon first flew in 2011 and entered service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in 2017. China has rapidly increased its inventory; Chengdu Aircraft Corporation facilities produce about 100-120 airframes a year.

China unveiled the tandem-seat J-20S at the 2025 Victory Day Parade as the EurAsian Times reported at the time. If production continues at pace, reports suggest the total number of J-20 aircraft, including the two-seat variant, could reach or exceed 1,000 by 2030.

Alongside the J-20, China is scaling production of the J-35 family, its second fifth-generation aircraft. Some estimates suggest China could have 200 to 300 J-35s operational by 2030.

This makes China the only nation besides the US to field two fifth-generation aircraft.

Beijing has also begun flight testing two different sixth-generation prototypes: the larger, three-engine Chengdu J-36 and the smaller twin-engine Shenyang J-50. They are seen as a counter to the Boeing F-47 6th-gen aircraft.

Where is China’s H-20 Bomber?

China has hinted about the debut of the H-20 stealth bomber for several years.

China first publicly acknowledged a next-generation stealth bomber, later identified as the H-20, around 2016. At the time, officials described it as a flying-wing design intended to provide true intercontinental penetrating strike capability.

In January 2021, a clip from the PLAAF’s recruitment video showed off the supposed flying-wing design to the public.

The following year, images of a metallic wind-tunnel test model of a bomber linked to the final H-20 prototype surfaced on Chinese social media (subsequently posted to X), sparking speculation that the bomber technology may be maturing at pace, as the EurAsian Times noted in a detailed report at the time. 

In March 2024, then-PLAAF deputy commander Wang Wei told reporters the H-20’s development had no “technological bottlenecks” and hinted that the bomber’s public unveiling was imminent. He assured reporters that manufacturing and commissioning would follow the aircraft’s test flights and take place shortly after its official public debut.

Later that year, Beijing was widely expected to showcase the H-20 at the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2024. However, that did not happen at China’s biggest air show.

Meanwhile, the US B-21 ‘Raider’ next-generation bomber has moved at breakneck speed, going from the official public unveiling in December 2022 to the maiden flight in record time in November 2023. The program is currently in low-rate initial production, meaning Northrop Grumman is building a small number of aircraft to test and refine the production process before full-rate production begins. 

By contrast, the Chinese H-20 has had no confirmed test flight, no publicly verified prototype imagery of a finished airframe, and no visible production line as of October 2026.

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In fact, United States officials and intelligence assessments have grown increasingly cautious and skeptical in recent years about an impending unveiling.

The Pentagon’s December 2024 assessment of China’s military stated the H-20 is unlikely to appear before the end of the decade.

“The PLAAF is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets. PLAAF leaders publicly announced the program in 2016; however, it may take more than a decade to develop this type of advanced bomber,” the report emphasized.

The Pentagon’s 2025 China report did not mention the H-20 at all, directly or indirectly. However, the head of US Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) was quoted saying: “I can certainly understand their [the Chinese] desire to have a long-range strike capability like the United States, and I know that they’re pursuing it aggressively.”

“What I can tell you is they’re just not there yet. I think our adversaries look at our long-range strike capabilities, and … want to mimic them, but they can’t,” he continued. “There’s no other country in the world [besides the United States] that can take and deliver a long-range strike platform pretty much on any day, at any time and place that they’re choosing, right?” AFGSC commander Gen. Stephen Davis added.

Notably, China’s only operational bombers are variants of the Xi’an H-6 family, the Chinese-built version of the 1950s Soviet Tupolev Tu-16. China currently operates the H-6K, its primary modern conventional bomber; the H-6N, a nuclear-capable variant; and the H-6J, the naval maritime-strike version optimized for anti-ship missiles. 

Unlike the United States, which fields the formidable B-2 Spirit, China does not yet have a dedicated long-range stealth bomber.

Currently, widespread speculation suggests China may have faced technical hurdles in developing the next-generation stealth bomber. 

China does not yet have a ready, purpose-built, fuel-efficient jet engine designed specifically for a large, long-range flying-wing bomber. Engines currently used on its transport planes (like the Y-20) or fighters (such as the WS-15) are not well-suited for the efficiency, range, and low heat signature needed. In addition, creating a smooth, seamless stealth surface on a large aircraft is much harder than on smaller fighter jets.

Another challenge China may face is building large composite structures, precision tooling, and manufacturing. Typically, building a smooth, tailless flying wing requires specialized production tooling and controlled environments that China has been developing.

Tailless designs are also inherently unstable and require advanced fly-by-wire systems, thermal management, and overall system integration.

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Interestingly, the US intelligence and military leaders have described the program as facing “significant engineering design challenges” and being “nowhere near as good as US low-observable platforms.”

Even if prototypes exist or limited testing has occurred, China may have strong reasons to withhold a public unveiling. For one, strategic bombers are part of the nuclear triad and long-range conventional strike, and premature disclosure could reveal design details of a highly classified program, something Beijing officials have been outspoken about.

H-20 Do?

The aircraft would add a flying leg to China’s nuclear triad. The Pentagon’s 2018 and 2019 “China Military Power Report” predicted that China’s new H-20 long-range stealth bomber would have an operational range of 8,500 kilometers. It will be a “flying-wing” design with a payload capacity of around 10 tons.

The H-20 could project power beyond the first chain of islands, threatening infrastructure, ships, and bases from farther away.  Furthermore, China would be able to threaten regional rivals like Japan and India and attack extremely critical peripheral places, such as the US island territories of Guam and Hawaii, with an increased long-range strike aviation force.

Analysts predict the aircraft would have serrated air intakes, cranked-kite wings, and foldable twin-tail surfaces that can switch between horizontal tailplanes and V-tails.

The H-20 is likely to feature internal armament bays that can accommodate conventional weapons, long-range cruise missiles, and maybe nuclear weapons, much like previous stealth systems. However, the  H-20 is probably not intended for carpet bombing or deep-penetration missions, but rather for stand-off and limited penetration.

While China’s next fighter jets are gaining momentum, the H-20 seems far from reality.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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For much of the last two decades, the digital divide has been viewed primarily as an infrastructure problem. The assumption was if networks were built, people would connect.

Across the developing Asia Pacific (APAC) region, the assumption no longer holds. A new study by GSMA Intelligence and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) reveals this stark reality.

Developing APAC is home to 4.3 billion people, more than half of the world’s population, and 71% of people use mobile internet, equivalent to 3.1 billion individuals.

However, 1.1 billion people live within reach of 4G networks but do not use them. By comparison, 100 million people remain outside mobile broadband coverage altogether.

The region’s connectivity gap is therefore no longer primarily about coverage. It is increasingly about enabling people to access and use mobile internet meaningfully, in a way which improves their lives.

The shift from coverage to usage is important because mobile connectivity has become far more than a communications service. As countries accelerate their digital transformation agendas, connectivity provides the foundation for digital public infrastructure, digital services, data-driven innovation and the adoption of AI across economies.

Countries seeking to become digital nations cannot do so if large segments of their populations remain disconnected from the internet economy.

What stops people from connecting?
The study shows the primary barriers to mobile internet adoption are device affordability, and digital skills and literacy.

For example, the average cost of an entry-level internet-enabled device in the region is more than 60% of the monthly income for the poorest 40% of the population, more than three-times higher than what is considered affordable.

Survey evidence also shows safety and security, particularly scams and fraud, are becoming increasingly significant concerns. This highlights the importance of trust as a broader enabler of digital adoption. As digital services become increasingly AI-enabled, it is also becoming more important to ensure these are accessible and relevant in local languages.

The barriers to adoption remain unevenly distributed. Women across developing APAC remain 12% less likely than men to use mobile internet, while rural populations are 25% less likely than urban populations to do so. These disparities are even wider in certain regions such as the Pacific Islands and South Asia.

These gaps are as much economic issues as they are social. Every individual left offline has limited access to services or opportunities for economic participation. Closing the mobile connectivity gap by 2030 is expected to add $230 billion to the developing APAC economy. And GDP is only part of the story. Universal connectivity would also accelerate progress on poverty reduction, education, healthcare access, financial inclusion, disaster response and environmental sustainability. For many people, particularly in remote regions, connectivity increasingly determines whether essential services and economic opportunities are within reach.

What needs to be done?
The study demonstrates there is a strong economic case for closing the digital divide, but doing so requires coordinated policy reform, investment and implementation.

Countries in developing APAC have made substantial progress to bring more than half a billion people online in the past five years. By 2030, it is expected more than three quarters of adults will be using 4G or 5G mobile internet. To connect the remaining offline populations will require a total investment of $316 billion. The private sector is expected to generate $132 billion of investment, which means there is an investment gap of $184 billion.

At first glance the figure appears daunting. However, the composition of the gap tells a more encouraging story.

More than half of the investment gap relates to improving device affordability and digital skills. In other words, the largest barriers are not engineering challenges but rather policy, financing and development challenges. This calls for holistic multi-stakeholder strategies which look beyond network rollout and address the conditions enabling people to adopt and meaningfully use digital services.

Historically, connectivity strategies and universal service funds have often focused on infrastructure expansion. While infrastructure remains important, particularly in underserved rural areas, a more balanced approach is needed to address affordability and adoption barriers directly. Supporting device financing schemes, reducing sector-specific taxes, reforming universal service funds and investing in digital literacy programmes will generate far greater returns than traditional approaches alone. Importantly, these policies also help crowd in private investment rather than replace it.

From connected to digital nations
Over the next decade, governments across developing Asia Pacific are increasingly expected to focus on AI, digital public infrastructure and national digital transformation strategies. These ambitions are well founded, but they all rest on a common foundation: affordable, safe, meaningful and inclusive connectivity.

Without universal access and adoption, the benefits of AI and digital transformation risk being concentrated among those already connected, further widening existing inequalities.

The good news is developing APAC has already solved much of the challenge. With 98% 4G network coverage, the region has built an extraordinary platform for digital inclusion. The task now is to ensure everyone can actually use it. The next phase of digital inclusion will, therefore, not be defined by network coverage alone. It will be shaped by affordability, skills, trust, accessibility and relevance. Closing these gaps may prove to be one of the most important development challenges and opportunities of the next decade.

The editorial views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and will not necessarily reflect the views of the GSMA, its Members or Associate Members.

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Veon agreed a deal to acquire Uzbekistan mobile operator Perfectum for around $207 million, in a move designed to boost its spectrum holdings and accelerate 5G deployment in the country.

The group stated it had reached an agreement to buy 100% of Rubicon Wireless, which operates under the Perfectum brand. The deal includes around $93 million in existing Perfectum debt. Completion is expected by the end of the month, with regulatory approvals already secured.

The acquisition brings fresh spectrum and network infrastructure into Veon’s regional telecoms business, Beeline Uzbekistan. Perfectum holds 115MHz of spectrum across the 850MHz and 3,800MHz bands, alongside network equipment and a standalone 5G network deployed using Nokia technology.

Veon said the acquisition would increase Beeline Uzbekistan’s spectrum holdings by around 50%, giving the operator additional resources to expand network capacity and support future 5G and fixed wireless access services.

The companies also anticipate expenditure savings and improved “efficiency of future network investment” from integrating Perfectum’s network with Beeline Uzbekistan’s existing infrastructure.

The deal adds to Veon’s investments in Uzbekistan, a market of nearly 40 million people where demand for connectivity and digital services is apparently booming. The group said the combined assets would enable broader access to broadband to support mounting demand for financial services, digital applications and sovereign AI across the country.

“Uzbekistan is one of Veon’s core growth markets, and this acquisition reflects our confidence in its digital future,” noted Veon group CEO Kaan Terzioglu, adding the company aims to turn the deal into “stronger customer experiences, more efficient network investment and sustainable growth”.

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Nokia agreed a deal with SoftBank Corp to conduct an AI-RAN field trial in commercial traffic conditions in 2027, progressing efforts to validate the technology.

The Finnish vendor stated the trial in Japan would be an important step in SoftBank’s AI-RAN ambitions by assessing the approach in a live network environment.

For Nokia, the trial also advances its AI-RAN commercialisation roadmap by shifting the technology from laboratory development to real-world deployment.

Nokia explained it will combine its AI-native anyRAN cloud RAN software on SoftBank’s core AI-RAN platform AITRAS, along with Nvidia’s ARC platform.

Through a combination of the platforms, Nokia stated AI-RAN would bring radio and AI workloads on to a common platform, helping operators “improve infrastructure utilisation, acceleration innovation and unlock new revenue opportunities”.

Nokia and SoftBank already have an AI-RAN deal in place, backed by an Nvidia accelerated computing node.

SoftBank SVP and CTO Ryuji Wakikawa said the trial is a significant milestone in the transition of AI-RAN from concept to execution.

“We are excited to begin this next phase of validation with Nokia, paving the way for a new era of networks that can deliver both connectivity and AI services.”

Pallavi Mahajan, chief technology and AI officer at Nokia, pointed to the potential for AI-RAN to “unlock new levels of spectral efficiency while providing the distributed intelligence needed to support physical AI”.

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In a bizarre incident, Japan’s Meteorological Agency (JMA) issued a warning about what could have been the world’s worst earthquake ever. The agency retracted the warning a few minutes later, but it still alarmed large parts of the country and unsettled people who had witnessed horrifying disasters.

The JMA estimated a magnitude 9.9 earthquake in the Kuril Islands off Hokkaido on October 16, 2026, but quickly rescinded the alert on account of an error.

The early-warning system had incorrectly placed the earthquake’s epicenter in the Kuril Islands (Chishima Islands) off Hokkaido and calculated a magnitude of 9.9. However, JMA officials later said the system wrongly assumed the quake was about 680 kilometers farther from Japan than it actually was, near Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula.

The JMA, which has a near-flawless warning system, warned that Hokkaido and the Tohoku region in northeastern Japan would experience shaking up to 7, the highest intensity on the country’s seismic scale. However, a magnitude 6.9 earthquake near Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula produced only intensity 1 shaking in Hakodate, Hokkaido.

The JMA withdrew the alert just eight minutes after issuing it, marking the first full public retraction of an emergency earthquake warning.

Officials said the magnitude was overstated because its computer system misidentified the earthquake’s focus, though they ruled out a cyberattack. Some local reports noted that one contributing factor may be applying magnitude-calculation methods designed for earthquakes within Japan’s dense observation network to a distant event outside coverage.

Ayataka Ebita, director of the agency’s Earthquake and Tsunami Observation Division, apologized to the public at a news conference, saying, “We deeply apologize for causing great inconvenience.” Meanwhile, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara told reporters that the government regretted the incident. “We caused a great deal of worry and placed a burden upon those who took shelter or took action to ensure their safety, as well as on others such as transport systems and businesses that were affected,” he said.

Several Japanese citizens had learned about the alert through municipal public address systems, TV and radio broadcasts, or their smartphones.

As expected, the false alarm sparked chaos in several parts of the country, disrupting daily life and domestic transit. In Sapporo, Hokkaido, for example, 14 trams stopped for a few minutes after the warning until their operator decided it was safe to continue service. Additionally, bullet train operations between Shin-Yokohama and Toyohashi stations on the Tokaido Shinkansen Line were briefly halted, although the operator later noted that the suspension was not directly caused by the earthquake warning.

Moreover, people sought shelter unnecessarily in some places, and social media later buzzed with netizens expressing confusion after the alert was retracted.

A false magnitude-9.9 earthquake warning jolted people because it is exceptionally scary, and no instrumentally recorded earthquake has ever reached magnitude 9.9.

According to publicly available information, the largest instrumentally measured earthquake in history—magnitude 9.5—was the 1960 Valdivia earthquake in Chile that killed more than 1,600 people, injured at least 3,000, and left two million people homeless. The rupture zone stretched 500 to 1,000 kilometers along the country’s coast.

A rupture zone is the area along a fault or rock mass where stress exceeds the material’s strength, causing it to break or fracture during an earthquake.

The false warning could have triggered panic because Japan’s geography puts it in an area of extreme seismic risk.  Japan sits at the convergence of four major tectonic plates—Pacific, Philippine Sea, Eurasian, and North American—along the Pacific “Ring of Fire,” making it one of the most earthquake-prone places on Earth.

In fact, about 20% of the world’s magnitude-6.0 or larger earthquakes occur in or around Japan.

Initially, the system located the epicenter near the Kuril Islands off Hokkaido, where a possible magnitude-9-class event is believed possible. Official scenarios for such an event have earlier predicted tsunami heights of up to 30 meters in some places; possible death tolls of close to 100,000; and widespread destruction of buildings and infrastructure.

The so-called erroneous warning predicted intensity 7 shaking across northern Japan. If it had come true, nearly all buildings would have suffered severe or total damage, and landslides, ground cracks, and infrastructure collapse may have occurred.

In a country where even moderate earthquakes bring an otherwise bustling country to a standstill by triggering automatic train halts, elevator shutdowns, and immediate public action, a maximum-intensity alert over such a wide area may have shaken the people.

The eight minutes that the alert was live may have brought back the trauma of 2011 when Japanese people stood witness to the worst natural disaster to hit the country.

The Shadow of the 2011 Disaster

In 2011, Japan suffered its worst natural disaster when a magnitude 9.0 to 9.1 megathrust earthquake struck off Tohoku’s Pacific coast, about 130 kilometers east of Sendai.

The earthquake hit on March 11, 2011, at 2:46 p.m. local time. On that fateful day, a massive undersea megathrust earthquake measuring 9.0–9.1 occurred in the Pacific Ocean some 72 kilometers east of the Oshika Peninsula in Japan’s Tohoku region.

According to publicly available information, the quake was relatively shallow, at about 24-32 kilometers deep, and lasted six minutes. However, it was so violent that it shifted the seafloor and generated a series of powerful tsunami waves.

The waves hit the coast about 30 to 40 minutes after the main shock, toppling seawalls and inundating about 561 square kilometers of land along Japan’s northeastern Pacific coast. In places such as Miyako, these waves attained a maximum run-up height of 133 feet.

The tsunami swept entire towns and coastal communities in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures, among others, leaving widespread devastation. 

Following the tsunami, hundreds of people were reported dead, and hundreds more were reported missing.

As rescue efforts began and the scale of the destruction—particularly in coastal areas—became apparent, the numbers in both categories sharply increased. After two weeks of the disaster, about 10,000 people were officially counted as deceased by the Japanese government, and about 1.5 times as many were still listed as missing and believed dead.

Finally, the official Japanese government or Reconstruction Agency figures were reported to be more than 19,729 dead, more than 2,553 missing, and about 6,200 injured.

The vast majority of fatalities resulted from drowning in the tsunami rather than the earthquake shaking itself. Over 120,000 buildings were completely destroyed, with hundreds of thousands more severely or partially damaged. Furthermore, the disaster also severely damaged and disrupted critical infrastructure, including roads, railways, ports, airports, power lines, and water systems.

Adding to this massive toll on the country’s people and economy, the disaster also triggered a major nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Although the earthquake triggered an automatic shutdown of the reactors, floodwaters inundated the facility and disabled both off-site power lines and emergency diesel generators. Without cooling, three reactor cores melted down, triggering hydrogen explosions and releasing radioactive material, which sparked evacuation en masse.

The event was subsequently rated Level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale—the highest level, shared only with the 1986 Chornobyl disaster.

The earthquake and tsunami following the disaster had long-term social, economic, and environmental impacts across northeastern Japan. In fact, recovery and reconstruction from the accident took more than a decade, including rebuilding communities, infrastructure, and coastal defenses, and managing the Fukushima site going forward.

Against this background, the recent false warning was uniquely unsettling because it briefly presented the public with a scenario worse than 2011, as it would have released roughly 20 times or more the energy of the Tohoku quake. Moreover, the predicted location lies along the same subduction zone system that produced the 2011 disaster.

The recent false alarm did not trigger an earthquake, but it may have forced the country to briefly confront the scale of another possible disaster.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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Jio Platforms set the price band for shares sold in its IPO, with the company set to raise a maximum of INR302.1 billion ($3.2 billion) from the float.

In a stock market filing, parent company Reliance Industries announced shares would be priced at between INR1,065 and INR1,119 with 270 million units available. Employees are set to receive a INR54 per share discount.

The latest filing came hours after the publication of a prospectus confirming the offer is scheduled to open on Wednesday 21 October and close two days later. Anchor investors can bid from the start of the week.

Reuters reported if Jio reaches the $108.3 billion valuation the top end would equate to, the company would become India’s fourth largest by market capitalisation behind Reliance Industries, Bharti Airtel and bank HDFC.

It also noted the IPO represented a record offering in the country.

Jio stated in its prospectus the net proceeds are set to be used to pay down debt and for general corporate purposes.

The IPO has been a major media talking point for some time, especially in India. In June 2026 Reuters reported the company was aiming for around $3.8 billion from a sale, a significant drop from how much Bloomberg estimated Jio was targeting from a float during 2025.

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Japan will pump $20 billion in funding into two new semiconductor facilities in the US as part of a trade agreement between the two countries, with GlobalFoundries selected to operate the sites.

The move forms part of a wider trade deal between the countries for Japan to invest $550 billion in return for the US lowering tariffs of Japanese goods.

GlobalFoundries will build the new sites at its Malta, New York, campus with the initiative designed to accelerate trusted semiconductor manufacturing in the US, strengthen critical supply chains and support growing demand across automotive, industrial and connected infrastructure markets.

Japan will make an initial investment of approximately $10 billion, accelerating construction of a new 300mm semiconductor fab which is expected to come online in 2029. It will add approximately 900,000 wafers of annual manufacturing capacity when fully operational.

An additional $10 billion will fund a second fab, which will produce the same amount of wafers. The entire project is expected to create about 27,000 construction and ecosystem jobs and more than 1,000 highly skilled manufacturing jobs in New York’s Capital Region.

Bold
GlobalFoundries has also agreed a deal with the US Commerce Department to amend an existing award under the CHIPS and Science Act to reallocate $995 million towards investments in silicon photonics and other areas. This will expand manufacturing capacity for technologies “increasingly critical to communications infrastructure and data centres”.

As part of a separate arrangement, the US government will receive approximately 4% equity in GlobalFoundries, taking its total stake to 7%.

Tom Breen, CEO of GlobalFoundries said the initiative was a bold new step for semiconductor manufacturing, bringing together the US and Japan with differentiated technology and decades of manufacturing expertise.

Howard Lutnick, US secretary of commerce added President Donald Trump’s historic US, Japan trade deal “is delivering another massive manufacturing investment into America”.

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The GSMA board outlined the industry’s connectivity priorities, calling for action on smartphone affordability, online scams and network investment while backing closer international cooperation on future 6G standards.

Following a board meeting in New Delhi, India, the industry association stated that although 97% of the global population live within mobile broadband coverage, 3.4 billion people remain unconnected to mobile internet. The cost of devices remains a significant barrier, with an entry-level internet-enabled handset equivalent to 44% of average monthly income for the poorest 20% of people in low- and middle-income countries.

The GSMA highlighted potential measures to improve affordability including financing schemes, targeted tax cuts and closer cooperation between device makers and memory suppliers.

It also identified scams and fraud as a growing threat, warning that although the mobile industry continues to strengthen network detection and cyber defence tools, “no single sector can tackle the threat alone”. The GSMA noted AI-generated content and deepfakes further add to risks for consumers, public trust and government objectives, calling on the industry to “join forces to counter scams with practical solutions”.

Sustained investment
The GSMA also highlighted the need for network investment and supportive policy to accelerate connectivity growth. It found mobile technologies and services generated $6 trillion in economic value in 2025, equivalent to 6.4% of global GDP. This figure is forecast to reach $11.3 trillion by 2030.

In addition, operators are projected to invest $1.2 trillion in capital expenditure between 2025 and 2030 to expand and upgrade networks, with 57% of mobile connections expected to use 5G by the end of the decade.

GSMA director general Vivek Badrinath said the sector’s next priority must be to translate 5G expansion into “meaningful value”, ensuring more people can participate in the digital economy. “This will require sustained investment, enabling policy and collaboration across the wider ecosystem,” he stressed.

Looking ahead, the industry association reiterated its support for global standards and harmonised spectrum as 6G development continues. It highlighted countries representing more than 80% of the world’s population support mobile use of the upper 6GHz band, which could provide the 200MHz to 400MHz channel bandwidths expected to be needed for 6G.

GSMA chair Gopal Vittal said that “by working through global standards and collaborating across markets, we can accelerate innovation, strengthen trust and resilience” as the industry develops the next generation of connectivity.

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India’s Adani Enterprises Limited and Apple supplier Jabil signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to form a 50:50 joint venture, tasked with manufacturing AI and data centre equipment in the country.

The JV is the next step on from a deal struck by the duo in June 2026 to form a strategic alliance to develop an AI and data centre infrastructure manufacturing ecosystem.

Once established, the pair stated the venture will supply hyperscalers, neoclouds, data centre operators and enterprises, serving accelerating data centre demand.

The companies cited industry forecasts which project India’s AI capacity will reach between 5 gigawatts to 8 gigawatts by 2030 and more than $50 billion in planned hyperscale spending across data centre, cloud and AI ecosystems.

In total, the pair peg the global market opportunity at more than $3 trillion over the next seven years, driven by investment in AI computing.

The duo will look to cash in on this demand by providing a manufacturing base in the country to serve domestic demand and support exports.

Adani Group, which runs the enterprise division, has made a $100 billion commitment to develop 5 gigawatts of green-energy powered, hyperscale AI-ready data centres by 2035, and the proposed venture adds hardware manufacturing to the group’s presence across infrastructure, energy and logistics.

Jabil makes components for Apple and will use the JV to expand its engineering footprint across India. It reported revenue of $36 billion in fiscal 2026.

Gautam Adani, chairman of Adani Group, said “the AI revolution will demand far more than just breakthroughs in algoritms” and the proposed JV would “help build the physical backbone of the global AI economy”.

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After years of delays and missed timelines, Taiwan recently received its first two F-16V (Viper) fighter jets from the US. Despite the arrival of two cutting-edge jets, Taipei’s problems may have just begun.

The two jets are part of a US$8 billion deal for 66 F-16Vs approved in 2019 during US President Donald Trump’s first term.

Taiwan was originally scheduled to receive the first new F-16V Block 70 fighter jets in 2023, but severe production and software-related delays pushed delivery back nearly three years.

Lockheed is expected to deliver all 66 F-16V Block 70 jets by 2028; however, Taiwan is still negotiating with authorities to finish the deliveries by the end of next year.

Taiwan has already upgraded 140 of its F-16A/B Block 20 fighter jets to the advanced F-16V (Viper) standard under the US$4.5 billion modernization initiative, the Peace Phoenix Rising program, completed in December 2023.

When Lockheed Martin delivers the 66 new jets by 2028, the Taiwanese Air Force will have more than 200 F-16 Viper fighter jets, making it the largest Viper-standard fleet in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Challenge

However, this large F-16 Viper fleet will help Taiwan deter China only if the country has experienced, trained pilots to fly them, which seems like a problem right now, as the country is struggling to find new fighter pilots and retain experienced ones.

To tackle fighter pilot shortages, Taiwan’s defense ministry now plans to allow military pilots to serve until age 58.

Under the plan, pilots could serve until they turn 58, up from about 48 for lieutenant colonels and 52 for colonels, extending their current service limits of 26 and 30 years, respectively.

Effectively, lieutenant colonels will get a 10-year extension, and colonels will get a six-year extension.

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Taiwan believes a longer service period will attract new talent, help retain experienced fighter pilots, and address chronic pilot shortages in the air force.

The Taiwanese Air Force would also create 72 additional posts for highly qualified lieutenant colonel and colonel pilots with at least 14 years of service, allowing them to keep their rank and focus on flying rather than command or administrative duties.

These 72 additional posts would be outside the regular personnel establishment, meaning they would not take positions from other officers or have to assume command roles.

“Their job would simply be to fly,” Koo said.

They would also help train and mentor younger pilots, he added.

These changes – allowing fighter pilots to serve longer, creating additional posts so that they can focus exclusively on flying, and reducing their administrative and command duties – are meant to retain fighter pilots in the Air Force when many of them are taking voluntary premature retirement to pursue more lucrative and less stressful careers in civilian airlines.

The Executive Yuan in Taipei is currently considering the defense ministry’s proposals.

Defense Minister Wellington Koo Li-hsiung said earlier this week that the arrangement was designed to keep experienced pilots in uniform when many faced a choice between remaining in the military and pursuing longer, potentially more lucrative careers with commercial airlines, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported.

Notably, civilian airline pilots can fly until age 65, giving Air Force fighter pilots a strong incentive to switch while they’re still young.

As mentioned earlier, before the changes, lieutenant colonels in Taiwan could fly fighter jets until age 48 and colonels until age 52, meaning they could fly 13 to 17 years longer in commercial airlines.

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Extending their service term until age 58 will narrow this gap considerably.

“If they can serve until 58, the gap with civilian airline pilots, who can fly until 65, will not be that large,” Koo told lawmakers in the parliament.

The plan would still require annual health checks and other regular reviews, the minister said. Officers who failed the tests could no longer continue flying.

He said 57 air force pilots had retired so far this year, broadly in line with previous years but fewer than last year. All had completed the minimum required service period.

Defense Minister Koo also underlined that the post-pandemic expansion in commercial airlines has created a lucrative market for pilots, which is making it difficult for the Air Force to retain its fighter pilots.

As a result, many fighter pilots apply for voluntary premature retirement once they reach the minimum service age (20 years), well before the maximum service period for Air Force pilots: 26 years for lieutenant colonels and 30 years for colonels.

The defense ministry proposals also highlight how air forces worldwide place a higher premium on retaining experienced fighter pilots than on recruiting and training new ones.

Recruiting and training new pilots is expensive, time-consuming, and requires lots of effort and resources.

The defense ministry proposals also highlight that air forces worldwide place a higher premium on retaining experienced fighter pilots than on recruiting and training new ones.

These proposals to retain experienced fighter pilots come even as Taiwan has met its recent targets for recruiting new pilots.

The ministry said pilot recruitment reached 96.2 percent of its target in 2024, 112 percent in 2025, and 98.6 percent in 2026.

It also reported that the air force currently has an 87.8 percent personnel fill rate.

Experienced aviators, however, possess accumulated knowledge of aircraft systems, combat tactics, and operational procedures that newly trained pilots cannot easily replicate.

Retaining experienced fighter pilots is even more pressing, as Taiwan will receive over 60 new F-16V fighter jets in the next two years.

Notably, the Block 70 F-16V is an upgraded variant of the F-16 jets the Republic of China (another name for Taiwan) Air Force (RoCAF) has flown for nearly 30 years.

Taiwan first ordered 150 F-16 jets in the 1990s and received the first Block 20 fighters in April 1997.

It still has nearly 140 of these older F-16 jets, now upgraded to the Viper standard.

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As a result, many of Taiwan’s fighter pilots already have years of experience flying these jets. This experience could be invaluable as the country starts integrating new F-16 Viper jets into its air force.

Taiwan plans to assign at least 100 fighter pilots to its fleet of 66 new F-16 Viper jets. The ministry informed that the air force had increased pilot positions and training in preparation for the new aircraft.

The first two of the 66 F-16V Block 70 fighters landed at Chihhang Air Base on October 2.

Koo said 63 of the 66 aircraft had entered production, including six that had reached the flight-test stage.

Another factor putting pressure on the RoCAF is almost daily violations of Taiwanese airspace by China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

For instance, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) reported 181 violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ in September alone. Responding to these airspace violations is taking a toll on the RoCAF’s staffing ratio.

These near-daily PLAAF violations mean the RoCAF must keep aircraft and pilots ready at all times.

Asked about pilot fatigue from near-daily PLAAF airspace violations, Air Force Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Lee Ching-jan said the air force had moved away from scrambling fighters to shadow PLA aircraft one-for-one.

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Instead, Taiwan was using a combination of fighters already on patrol, naval vessels, and land-based missile systems to monitor and respond to PLA activity, reducing strain on both pilots and aircraft, he added.

It remains to be seen whether Taiwan’s government will accept the proposals and what impact they would have on retaining experienced pilots in the air force.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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Malaysia expects to receive its Korean-made FA-50M light combat aircraft on schedule, Defense Minister Khaled Nordin said, with the first jets due this month or next.

“According to the schedule, the aircraft will arrive this month or next month – I will announce the arrival date later. So far, I have not received any information regarding a delay in the delivery of the aircraft,” Khaled told reporters after the launch of the Warriors’ Fund Campaign 2026/2027.

In May 2023, Malaysia signed a nearly $920 million contract with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) for 18 FA-50 Block 20 light combat aircraft, designated FA-50M, for the Royal Malaysian Air Force.

Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, India’s LCA Tejas was also competing for a Malaysian fighter-jet contract.

Malaysia, which has long needed to modernize its fast jet fleet, commenced the FLIT-LCA requirement in June 2021. 

The country launched the tender to acquire a Lead-In Trainer-Light Combat Aircraft as part of the air force’s Capability 55 plan, released in 2018 and outlining the air force’s objective to achieve an ideal force structure by 2055.

The tender quickly gained traction from several countries, including India. Other contenders included the Turkish Hurjet, China-Pakistan’s JF-17, Russia’s MiG-35, and the Korean FA-50.

The FA-50 and Tejas were the two final shortlisted candidates, with the South Korean aircraft ultimately prevailing. Malaysia selected the FA-50 aircraft over India’s Tejas, with officials citing the Korean jet’s proven service record and combat record as key factors.

Korea Aerospace Industries confirmed in February 2023 that it had secured the Malaysian deal.

Then-Defence Minister Mohamad Hasan said the jet’s service record was the primary consideration. “We cannot take the risk and acquire assets that are still at the prototype stage. Our personnel will use this jet, so safety is in our criteria,” he told a press conference in May 2023, echoing comments made in parliament the previous month.

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A Korea Aerospace Industries representative later told Channel News Asia that the Royal Malaysian Air Force viewed the Tejas as lacking an export record, while the FA-50 was already proven in combat.

The Philippine Air Force has used the FA-50, including during the 2017 Marawi campaign, and several regional air forces, including Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, operate it.

Sources at India’s HAL acknowledged the outcome. “We were short-listed for the Malaysian LCA contract. We were hopeful as we were very competitive on several criteria, but unfortunately this has not gone our way,” one source said.

HAL Chairman C.B. Ananthakrishnan reportedly said the company was optimistic after being shortlisted from multiple bidders but had received indications that the order was going to the Korean contender, though it had not yet received formal notification.

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FA-50 Light Combat Aircraft

KAI and Lockheed Martin jointly developed the supersonic T-50 advanced jet trainer, with the TA-50 as the Lead-in fighter trainer and the FA-50 as a light combat aircraft variant.

The T-50 partly resembles the F-16 Fighting Falcon and is 80% of its size. Development began in the 1990s, funded 70% by the South Korean government, 17% by KAI, and 13% by Lockheed Martin.

The aircraft made its first flight in August 2002 and entered service by February 2005.

KAI and Lockheed Martin pursued a joint international marketing program for the T-50.

The T-50/FA-50 family is operated (or on order) by the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Iraq, Poland, and Malaysia. Total firm orders across the family exceed ~290 airframes, with roughly 220–230 already built or delivered as of late 2026 (around 70 still in production or pending delivery).

The T-50 is equipped with a GE F404 engine built under license by Samsung Techwin. GE provides engine kits to Samsung Techwin, which also produces some parts and performs final engine assembly and testing.

The fighter/attack variants are equipped with the Elta EL/M-2032 fire-control radar, the same as the initial LCA MK1. The TA-50 can operate as a full-fledged combat platform with PGMs, air-to-ground weapons, and air-to-air missiles.

The TA-50 can carry pods for reconnaissance, targeting assistance, and electronic warfare. Reconnaissance and electronic warfare variants are also being developed, designated RA-50 and EA-50, respectively.

The TA-50 has an internally mounted three-barrel M61 Vulcan cannon. Wingtip rails can accommodate the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile, and underwing hardpoints can carry a variety of additional weapons.

South Korea is considering arming the FA-50 with a smaller version of the Taurus KEPD 350 missile to give it a 400 km stand-off engagement capability. The aircraft has an internal fuel capacity of 2,655 liters. It can carry 1,710 liters in the three external fuel tanks.

The aircraft has a max take-off weight of 12,300 kg. Its ferry range is 1,851 km, and its thrust-to-weight ratio is 0.96. The seven hardpoints can carry up to 5,400 kg of payload.

The FA-50 can carry more internal fuel, and the engine could be either the Eurojet EJ200 or the General Electric F414, providing up to 25% more thrust. Other AESA radars, such as Raytheon’s AN/APG-79 and Northrop Grumman’s AN/APG-83, are options for future production.

In January 2019, KAI began developing an improved FA-50 known as the Block 10 and Block 20 upgrades. The Block 20 adds munitions such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM. Raytheon PhantomStrike and Northrop Grumman AN/APG-83 were being considered as the future AESA radars.

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MBDA has offered to integrate the Meteor and ASRAAM medium- and short-range air-to-air missiles on FA-50 and future KF-X fighter jets.

The T-50/FA-50 lost several competitions or was blocked from sales. The UK arms embargo on British components, such as the ejection seat, thwarted Argentina’s interest. Israel and Singapore instead chose the Italian M-346. Taiwan developed its own T-5 Brave Eagle based on its F-CK-1 fighter. The US chose Boeing’s T-7 and also blocked a proposed sale to Uzbekistan, citing concerns that the technology could reach Russia.

• Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

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Thailand’s Queen Suthida flew a solo sortie in the Royal Thai Air Force’s Saab JAS 39C Gripen fighter jet, becoming the first Thai female Gripen pilot and the first reigning Queen anywhere in the world to fly a modern combat jet solo.

Without an instructor or a co-pilot in the back seat, Thailand’s Queen Suthida took off from a military airbase in southern Surat Thani on October 8, 2026.

For about 41 minutes, the Queen of Thailand owned the air even as King Maha Vajiralongkorn waited with flowers and a golden patch, an honorary Swedish insignia for those who have flown the aircraft.

Local media reported that the flight marked the culmination of extensive simulator training at the base and about 10 hours in a two-seat JAS39D Gripen. However, she was already a pilot before she began training on the Gripen-C, which forms the cornerstone of the RTAF.

On May 13, 2010, the Queen made her flying debut aboard a Cessna T-41D belonging to Fleet 604 at Wing 6 in Bangkok. Since then, she has amassed 1,188.48 flight hours in various aircraft, including the Cessna T-41, CT-4E Airtrainer, Pilatus PC-9, Mooney M20M, Piper PA-34 Seneca, Boeing 737-400, Boeing 737-800, and a twin-seater Gripen-D.

In the past, the Queen has reportedly served as the king’s co-pilot on both domestic and overseas flights while performing royal duties. The royal duo even successfully landed a royal aircraft at Paro Airport in Bhutan in April 2015, widely regarded as one of the world’s hardest airports for pilots.

Notably, only a few precedents exist of royalty or heads of state flying aircraft beyond performing duties. However, a few notable examples exist.

The Spanish Crown Princess Leonor, for instance, flew her first solo flight in December 2025, piloting a Pilatus PC-21 turboprop trainer. She reportedly concluded her air force training with a joint flight alongside her father, King Felipe VI, with both piloting separate Pilatus PC-21 training aircraft.

Some reports also say she flew in an F-5 fighter jet with an instructor.

Meanwhile, Princess Salma bint Abdullah of Jordan, daughter of King Abdullah II, became the first woman in the Jordanian Armed Forces to complete fixed-wing pilot training and receive her wings in 2020.

She even joined the kingdom’s royal air force in providing humanitarian aid to the war-torn Gaza Strip after Israel launched a devastating bombing campaign on the enclave following the October 7 attack by Hamas.

Interestingly, the Jordanian princess comes from a long line of pilots trained to fly both civilian and military aircraft. Jordan’s current leader, King Abdullah II, qualified as a pilot of a Cobra attack helicopter and other types during his military career. He is also purportedly known for his hands-on involvement with the Royal Jordanian Air Force, which operates F-16 AM/BM fighter jets based at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base. 

King Abdullah II’s father, King Hussein, was also a highly skilled pilot who flew a variety of military and civilian aircraft, including the De Havilland Vampire and the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter, Lockheed L-1011 TriStar, and Boeing 737, to name a few.

In one instance, the king, flying an unarmed, twin-engine De Havilland Dove prop airplane, was intercepted by two Soviet-built Syrian MiG-17 fighter jets but managed to get away using low-level maneuvers, as documented in several reports.

Britain’s King Charles III earned his Royal Air Force (RAF) wings in 1971 after completing jet pilot training at RAF Cranwell in Lincolnshire. He trained as a fast-jet pilot on the BAC Jet Provost, but unverified reports suggest he also flew a Hawk and some helicopters. Similarly, King Felipe of Spain trained across the services and flew with the Spanish Air Force, including the Pilatus PC-21 turboprop trainer and the Dassault Falcon 900B.

Meanwhile, former US President George H.W. Bush was a combat-decorated WWII naval aviator. He performed 58 combat flights throughout the war and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for valor after the Japanese shot down his torpedo plane on September 2, 1944. He later flew the Convair F-102A Delta Dagger supersonic interceptor jet while serving in the Texas Air National Guard between 1970 and 1973. 

Some civilian heads of state have also flown in military aircraft purely for the love of the game, though they did not pilot them themselves.

For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin flew in the pilot seat of a modernized nuclear-capable Tu-160M “White Swan” supersonic strategic bomber during a 30-minute flight departing from the Kazan Aviation Plant in 2024. Before this, he flew the previous model of the Tu-160 bomber in August 2005. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi flew in the cockpit of the Tejas LCA, though only as a passenger. 

The Thai Queen, however, has achieved a milestone no other reigning queen in the world has, thereby registering her name in the annals of history.

This development may also boost the popularity of the Gripen, a Swedish-origin jet that forms the backbone of the RTAF alongside the F-16s.

Thailand’s Gripen

Thailand ordered the Gripen C/D fighter jets in 2008, with the first batch comprising six aircraft arriving at Wing 7 in Surat Thani in February 2011.  

In 2015, the Thai Gripen-C/D overpowered the Chinese J-11 aircraft during Exercise Falcon Strike 2015. During the first two days of the war game, the J-11s shot down 16 Gripens in a visual-range battle without taking any losses. But the Gripens completely annihilated the J-11s during beyond-visual-range engagements, as the EurAsian Times explained earlier.

The aircraft were deployed for combat as hostilities broke out with Cambodia last year.

On July 26, 2025, as shelling intensified near the Phu Ma Kua ridge and the ancient Ta Muen Thom temple, the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) deployed its Gripen C/D fighters in a targeted strike against Cambodian artillery positions—marking the combat debut of the type not just within the RTAF but anywhere in the world since the jet became operational.

The RTAF is now upgrading by acquiring the Gripen-E/F, the most advanced aircraft in the Gripen family.

In August 2025, Thailand approved buying a dozen Saab Gripen-E fighter jets instead of the American Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70/72, which was also on offer.

The newly purchased Gripen-E variant will replace the aging F-16s and integrate into the RTA’s existing SAAB Gripen jets.

Whether the Queen will join the Gripen-E’s cockpit as a solo pilot remains to be seen.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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The best victory is “winning without shedding a drop of blood” is an ancient Chinese proverb attributed to Sun Tzu’s ‘The Art of War,’ written nearly 2,500 years ago.

In 2026, that old strategy has a new rendering: ‘Learning without Bleeding.’

China is treating the Russia-Ukraine War as a “living textbook” for adapting the war-fighting strategy of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), learning drone warfare, and systematically converting battlefield lessons into PLA training, procurement, and force design without having to fight itself.

According to a recent paper by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China is running the most systematic effort of any outside power to convert lessons from the war in Ukraine into military advantage, absorbing the errors of both sides.

“Chinese analysts are explicit about the value of Russia’s war against Ukraine” and are adopting the war’s lessons into policy debates, weapons procurement, and military doctrine at a breakneck pace.

Analysts in Beijing are describing 2024 as “year one of world drone war,” when the two sides fielded enough drones to show the contours of the new mechanized battlefield.

For the study, the authors reviewed more than 90 Chinese-language sources published over more than four years, from July 2022 to August 2026.

These Chinese-language sources include PLA outlets, defense journals, university research papers, peer-reviewed journals, and research institutions linked to defense industries.

The authors of these Chinese papers include participants in the military learning system. They include researchers at PLA universities and academies, engineers at defense industrial design institutes, civilian academics working alongside numbered military units, and military acquisition organizations that turn battlefield lessons into requirements and procurement.

The study highlights how China is adopting lessons from the war in Ukraine at a breakneck pace.

It finds that “Chinese analysts pick up new battlefield techniques within an average of four months, but turning them into hardware, training, and force structure takes a year or more.”

Essentially, within four months of a new weapon system or war-fighting doctrine/strategy being introduced on the battlefield in Ukraine, Chinese analysts take note and start discussing it in their research papers.

However, filtering these lessons into Chinese military structure, procurement, and industrial production takes nearly a year.

For instance, Sea drones appeared in the war in Ukraine by September 2022, and by November, Chinese analysts were discussing these new weapon systems in their research papers.

Similarly, Fiber-Optic Drones first appeared on the battlefield in Ukraine in March 2024, and Chinese research papers began discussing them that same month. By March 2025, PLA units were already training with Fiber-Optic Drones.

Interceptor drones appeared in the war in Ukraine in February 2024; Chinese analysts noted them by July 2025, and PLA units began training on such interceptor drones by October 2026.

These instances show how quickly Chinese analysts note new weapons systems in the war in Ukraine, followed by PLA units adopting them within a year.

China’s lessons learned fall into two broad areas: offensive capabilities and defensive capabilities.

China copies offensive techniques from Russia, whose army resembles the PLA’s and whose fixes have been tested in combat.

China derives defensive requirements from Ukraine’s attacks and builds them into hardware. Beijing believes that if China goes to war with any Western power, it will face attacks similar to those Russia faced.

However, both offensive and defensive lessons are primarily derived from drone warfare.

Meanwhile, industrial lessons flow into a manufacturing base that already leads the world.

Offensive Learnings in Drone Warfare From the Russian Army

Among offensive techniques, Beijing’s most important lesson is economic.

In March 2025, the PLA Daily treated the claim as settled fact: a single reconnaissance-strike drone costs less than 1 percent of a modern fighter while achieving more than 90 percent of its battlefield coverage.

According to the study, while these figures are rough, the Central Military Commission’s newspaper takes them at face value.

Chinese analysts noted that in 2014, both Ukraine and Russia purchased and used more than a million drones. The Chinese Naval Academy estimated that this amounted to an average of two drones hovering over each soldier deployed on the front line.

The second lesson from drone warfare that China internalized is speed.

According to the National Defense University’s Joint Operations College, Russian forces can strike a detected target within three to five minutes—compared to hours in earlier wars

Researchers at a PLA unit attribute this to Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex, in which a low-cost reconnaissance drone pushed deep into the enemy rear serves as the observer and guides another drone’s strike, with Orlan-10s cueing Kub and Lancet loitering munitions.

The copying target is not any single platform but rather the connection between them: drones wired directly into artillery and command networks.

For China, the drone warfare’s third critical lesson is overcommunication and connectivity.

Chinese analysts treat electronic warfare as the deciding factor in the drone war, recording heavy losses on both sides to jamming and countermeasures.

They have also noted with interest Russia’s fiber-optic first-person-view (FPV) drone steered through a thin cable, which is immune to jamming.

The PLA Daily flagged the shift in May 2024, weeks after the fiber-optic drone’s operational debut, and by April 2025, state media were weighing its trade-offs in detail. In the same month, China Central Television (CCTV) showed a People’s Armed Police unit in Yunnan training with FPV drones and researching fiber-optic models.

Defensive Learnings in Drone Warfare From the Ukrainian Army

While China has tried to internalize Russia’s offensive drone warfare techniques, Beijing has paid even more attention to some of the drone warfare techniques adopted by Ukraine.

Beijing believes that in the event of a military conflict with the West, it could face similar attacks as Russia faces from Ukraine in the ongoing war.

Chinese analysts were especially alarmed by two attacks from Ukraine: first, the use of sea drones for attacking Russian ships, warships, harbors, and bridges.

In the journal of the state shipbuilder’s underwater-warfare institute, a team from the Naval University of Engineering tallied repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian ships, ports, and the Kerch Bridge and found more than 10 large naval vessels damaged.

They concluded that a systematized sea-drone offensive could be met effectively only with counter–sea–drone equipment that also fights as a system.

Another researcher proposed countering suicide boats with interceptor swarms, in skirmishes devoid of humans entirely.

Another Ukrainian attack that caught China’s attention and alarmed it was Operation Spider’s Web.

On June 1, 2025, Ukraine attacked Russia’s strategic bombers, deep inside its territory, by using FPV drones launched from within Russia.

Chinese Foreign Ministry’s magazine estimated Russian losses at 11 strategic bombers and identified the raid’s novelty in being launched from inside Russia, at close range.

The PLA’s training system answered within four and a half months.

In an October 2025 exercise, a brigade defended against a drone attack team of more than 20 operators, using detection gear that locates drones by their radio emissions and matches them against a catalog of more than 800 commercial models, paving a path for Chinese response to a Spider’s Web–style drone infiltration.

Chinese analysts also concluded that a successful drone interception strategy must account for the economics of interception.

According to a Global Times analysis of Ukraine’s interceptor drones, “the cost of procuring one man-portable air-defense missile buys several hundred air-defense FPV drones.”

Therefore, Chinese analysts concluded that the best weapon against a drone is another drone.

China also concluded that if it is attacked, it will be attacked by drones en masse, and therefore it must defend itself against thousands of drones.

In this respect, China has also noted Russia’s defense strategy.

 A 2026 review from a Chinese state aerospace design institute recorded that Russia “has built in combat a counter-drone equipment system of electronic jamming first, firepower interception as the backstop, and self-defense interception as the supplement.”

Beijing also noted that Russia was forced to pull its strategic bombers back about 6,000 kilometers to the Chukotka Peninsula and deploy retractable protective nets.

The study noted how quickly these studies are being adopted into hardware.

At the Zhuhai air show in November 2024, the counter-drone systems of the state electronics, ordnance, and aerospace groups dominated Chinese coverage, led by CETC’s Tianqiong, NORINCO’s Hurricane 3000 microwave weapon, and CASIC’s LW-60 laser.

The September 2025 military parade put counter-drone missile-gun systems, high-energy lasers, and high-power microwave weapons on state display.

In late July 2026, CCTV aired footage of an army drone crew putting a missile into a fast boat maneuvering at sea, and in August the army flew armed KVD002 drones against sea drone targets in exercises.

China has also learned that in a war of attrition, production wins.

For Chinese analysts, a drone war is won by the side that can build more, and no country builds more drones than China. So here, China only needs to build on its advantages.

China also recognizes Starlink’s importance in the Ukraine War and has concluded that low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite constellations will play a decisive role in any future war. China is therefore working to build its own LEO satellite constellations.

The CSIS study concludes that China is learning from and implementing lessons from the Ukraine War faster than any other country.

As Russia and Ukraine fight a ‘war of attrition,’ China could be the biggest winner.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post China Logs Ukraine’s Newest Drone Tactics in Months, Fields Hardware Within a Year — “Learning Without Bleeding” appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

After claiming it intercepted foreign aircraft on two separate occasions last year, China has made another major claim: a “foreign warship” lost power while pursuing a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) Type 055 destroyer, seemingly an indirect reference to the USS Benfold.

Zhang Jun, a captain on the PLA Navy’s Type 055 “Zunyi” destroyer, said a foreign warship lost power while his warship, engaged in a routine training exercise at the time, the Chinese state-owned publication Global Times claimed.

Speaking on China Central Television (CCTV), the officer said the destroyer had multiple encounters with foreign warships and aircraft during the exercise. 

“During that mission, we were conducting routine training exercises when a foreign warship began tracking our ship. As we sailed at high speed, the foreign vessel had to match our speed. While we were in a standoff, its power and electricity all suddenly went out, its radar stopped emitting, and its navigation lights went dark,” Zhang said. “This lasted for nearly half an hour. But our equipment and our crew had no problems at all,” he added.

When asked whether the engagement made him nervous, the Chinese officer said, “Why should I be nervous? I was definitely not nervous. As long as you are within range of my missiles, I can definitely destroy you.”

The officer stopped short of providing more details, including the time and place of the encounter and the name of the foreign warship. However, the claims appear aimed at the US Navy warship USS Benfold, which apparently lost power and was stranded in the South China Sea in July 2026, as previously reported by the EurAsian Times.

“On July 24, 2026, while conducting routine operations in the Indo-Pacific, Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65) reported an engineering casualty involving its generators, causing a loss of power,” Navy Cmdr. Matthew Comer, spokesperson for the 7th Fleet, said in a statement to USNI News in August  2026.

“There were no injuries to the crew, who demonstrated resilience, grit, professionalism and unwavering steadiness in their response,” he added.

The incident reportedly occurred while the USS Benfold was engaged in routine operations in the Indo-Pacific as part of the USS George Washington carrier strike group (CSG).

After the power loss, the guided-missile destroyer reportedly drifted for four days and was supplied by other ships in the South China Sea, which China claims as its sovereign territory and where frequent standoffs occur between Beijing and other forces.

The Seventh Fleet spokesperson did not mention a high-speed pursuit of a Chinese vessel or any engagement between the US carrier strike group and PLA Navy warships, although these encounters are not uncommon in the region.

When asked whether China’s claimed scenario is plausible, Indian Navy veteran and commentator Rear Admiral Girish Kumar Garg (retd) told the EurAsian Times, “For an Arleigh Burke-class ship, high-speed propulsion has nothing to do with total power loss. Complete power failure can happen if all onboard power generators fail or the power distribution system malfunctions. Although rare, it is not impossible.”

Further, when probed about potential reasons for the complete power loss, Rear Admiral Garg said, “Can be many reasons- fuel contamination can be a major cause. Power overload due to too many systems operating and loaded on the running generators can also cause them to trip. However, generally, if all onboard power generators are running and connected, then they cater for full ship’s electrical load plus some extra load margin.”

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The USS Benfold power loss incident was not the first of its kind. Earlier, the USS Higgins had an “engineering casualty” in its electrical system in May 2026,  which caused it to lose power and propulsion for many hours in the Indo-Pacific area. No chase of another vessel had occurred at the time.

Nonetheless, state media and Chinese experts used the opportunity and their purported claims to highlight the enviable capabilities of the PLAN’s Type 055 warships.

Chinese military expert Shi Hong told the Global Times that the Type 055 is considered the world’s best large destroyer in terms of comprehensive capabilities. Meanwhile, Xu Yi, another crew member on the ship that was involved in the purported encounter, said, “We have a powerful offensive and defensive system. In the future, we will definitely conduct operations externally in formation. In fact, we have already begun integrating multiple formations and exploring what makes for the best combination.”

Some pro-PLA observers on social media widely amplified the Chinese claims, aligning with similar previous instances.

However, Beijing deliberately makes specific claims while avoiding direct naming of the foreign assets to avoid a diplomatic response and to eliminate the possibility of a counter-narrative from official sources and a potential bilateral tussle.

Chinese Military Keeps Confronting Foreign Assets

In the past few years, China has claimed to have intercepted and expelled unidentified foreign aircraft from the same region on multiple occasions.

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Last year, Chinese state media, CCTV, released a video on June 29 showing two J-16 fighter jets—considered the cornerstone of the PLA Air Force’s interception efforts—being dispatched to warn and drive out a “foreign aircraft” that allegedly breached China’s territorial sea boundary. 

“The foreign aircraft flew over at a low altitude, not very disciplined, almost at a vertical 90 degrees, breaching our territorial sea line,” air force aviation brigade member Zhang Zhanfang stated on the broadcast at the time.

The Chinese media did not disclose the exact date or location of the incident, making it challenging to identify the foreign aircraft in question.

Later that year, Global Times reported on a documentary shown on CCTV in October 2025, in which a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) pilot from the special mission aircraft formation claimed he could simultaneously lock two foreign stealth fighter jets while flying the J-16 fighter jet and force both jets to withdraw.

“They headed straight toward our two aircraft. Their intention was very clear—it was a provocation. With our backs to the territorial sea line, we had to intercept them,” Li Chao, a pilot from the People’s Liberation Army’s Western Theatre Command, said while recounting the incident that allegedly took place during a coastal training exercise in 2024.

Although the Chinese did not disclose which foreign stealth aircraft it was referring to, only two aircraft fit the description: the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II of the US Air Force (USAF).

Both aircraft are frequently deployed in the Indo-Pacific for training, war exercises, and other operational missions, as the EurAsian Times noted in a detailed report published at the time. 

Washington did not acknowledge the claim, but the incident drew a wide debate over whether a 4.5th-generation jet could intercept US fifth-generation stealth fighters.

Separately, US and Chinese ships have had sporadic encounters in international waters, as the US Navy conducts regular FONOPs (Freedom of Navigation Operations) in the region.

Earlier this year, in January 2026, reports noted that a Chinese warship, CNS Taiyuan, encountered a foreign warship during “a long-range training exercise” in undisclosed waters. The report said the foreign ship meant to provoke the Chinese crew, but the crew instead followed orders and drove the vessel away.

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Similarly, in January 2025, reports noted that China had claimed that its navy “drove away” a “foreign warship that attempted to spy on its Shandong aircraft carrier during a long-distance training mission. At the time, a Chinese sailor attached to the Type 055 destroyer CNS Yan’an crew said a foreign warship attempted to engage in “illegal reconnaissance” and infiltrate a formation led by the carrier during a routine training mission. 

In June 2023, a US destroyer, USS Chung-Hoon, had a close encounter with a Chinese warship in the Taiwan Strait. The US Navy alleged that the Chinese ship executed an “unsafe” maneuver, crossed the US ship’s path, and forced it to slow down to avoid a collision.

Another significant incident occurred in 2018 when a Chinese warship came dangerously close to the USS Decatur in the South China Sea. The US Navy described the action as “unsafe and unprofessional.

Despite a thaw in ties between Chinese and US leaders, the fight over Indo-Pacific dominance continues.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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Indonesia is awaiting the first batch of Chinese J-10C multi-role fighter jets in the first half of next year, according to new reports.

Once and if the aircraft arrive, the Indonesian Air Force could become the first in the world to operate both the Chinese J-10C and the French Dassault Rafale jets.

Indonesia could receive its first Chengdu J-10CE fighter jets in six months, Republika Online, a local Indonesian news outlet, reported. Citing informed sources, the report claimed the first delivery could take place as early as April 2027, although the number of jets to be delivered is currently unknown.

So far, neither the Chinese nor the Indonesian side has officially confirmed it. EurAsian Times has reached out to Indonesian authorities and awaits a response.

However, Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Mohamad Tonny Harjono urged the public to “just wait” for the arrival of the Chinese Vigorous Dragons, according to Republika Online, suggesting a purchase may have been made.

Notably, the reports come a year after the Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin confirmed in October 2025 that the country would soon buy the jets from China as part of its military modernization drive.

“They will be flying over Jakarta soon,” Sjafrie said, without providing further details. Separately, Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa had confirmed that his ministry had approved a $9 billion budget to purchase the Chinese aircraft, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

Interestingly, Indonesia communicated the decision to buy the aircraft months after its J-10C fighters made their combat debut against the Indian Air Force in an intense four-day conflict in May 2025.

At the time, Pakistan claimed to have downed multiple Indian fighters, including the Rafale, using long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles launched from the J-10C. India, in turn, claimed to have downed multiple Pakistani jets, including JF-17s and F-16s, but the list did not include China-supplied J-10Cs.

The Rafale shootdown claims, although unverified and not officially accepted by India or Dassault Aviation, were blown out of proportion and amplified by Beijing to promote the J-10C in the international market. French intelligence officials even accused Beijing of running an anti-Rafale campaign to discredit the Rafale jets.

China offered Indonesia a “battle-tested” J-10C less than a month after the May 2025 Indo-Pakistan conflict, according to Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister Donny Ermawan Taufanto. By then, only Pakistan had acquired the combat jet, even though Beijing positioned it as an affordable alternative to the F-16, Rafale, and Eurofighter Typhoon.

If reports are to be believed, Indonesia is on track to become the third buyer of the type after Pakistan and Uzbekistan. The latter released footage of its newly acquired J-10CE fighter jets on August 28, 2026, as part of the country’s Independence Day celebrations. In a state broadcast, at least six J-10CE fighters were shown flying in formation, approaching the runway, and receiving a water-cannon salute.

Bangladesh has been exploring the purchase of China’s J-10CE fighter jet to modernize its aging Air Force since 2024.

Separately. China is also reportedly trying to sell the aircraft to Azerbaijan. Last month, it displayed a full-scale J-10CE mock-up in Azerbaijani markings at the sixth Azerbaijan International Defense Exhibition (ADEX-2026), in what appeared to be a targeted appeal.

J-10C & Rafale To Fly Together?

There is no doubt that J-10CE has drawn significant international attention after the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Armed with PL-15 missiles, the J-10CE’s beyond-visual-range air warfare capabilities are impressive.

Meanwhile, Jakarta is undertaking a massive modernization drive to replace aging aircraft like its US-made F-16A/Bs and Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters. 

As part of this effort, Jakarta signed a contract for 42 Dassault Rafale F4 fighters from France in 2022, and the first of these jets were delivered earlier this year. In addition, the Southeast Asian country signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) to acquire additional Rafale fighters during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit in May 2025.

Indonesia also signed a contract to acquire 48 KAAN fighter jets from Turkey in July 2025, covering extensive collaboration in manufacturing, technology transfer, and engineering. 

Beyond these acquisitions, Indonesia had also committed to co-developing the KF-21, but reportedly abandoned those plans in June this year after a “comprehensive evaluation” of the program’s effectiveness, technology transfer, economic value, and internal defense requirements.

Nonetheless, it would still buy the South Korean jets.

It is currently unclear how the Indonesian government would finance these varied fighter jet acquisitions amid budgetary constraints, and whether buying J-10Cs would mean Jakarta would not place an additional order for French Rafale jets.

If Indonesia goes ahead and acquires J-10C jets, it would be an interesting development because the two aircraft are often compared as rival 4.5-generation multirole fighters in the export market. Both jets use a delta-canard configuration, feature advanced AESA radars, modern electronic warfare suites, and beyond-visual-range missile capability.

However, China is pitching the jets as more cost-effective alternatives with little to no strings attached.

An early delivery of Chinese jets could temporarily strengthen Indonesia’s air combat posture while the Rafale fleet builds up. However, acquiring the J-10C may come with its own risks, particularly those of operating a diverse fleet. Analysts like Nitin J Ticku, who also serves as editor of EurAsian Times, wrote in an article that a mixed fleet could become a logistical nightmare for Jakarta.

Meanwhile, Chinese experts argue that buying weapons from multiple sources would be a smart move to safeguard Indonesia’s interests rather than ‘putting all eggs in one basket.’

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

The post Rafale & J-10C: This Asian Country Could Become The Only Air Force to Fly Both French & Chinese Jets appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Washington has sent two contradictory signals on Taiwan in the last few days. Whether these signals reflect strategic ambiguity or strategic confusion in the coming days has become a matter of debate among the strategic experts.

On the one hand, Trump is holding back a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan, pre-approved by the U.S. Congress, despite a bipartisan group of senators explicitly urging him to “formally notify . But the U.S. President has described his decision to pause as a “very good negotiating chip” for his talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Whether that worked in his summit meeting with Xi last week in Washington is not known. But Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo confirmed yesterday (October 6) that he has “not heard” of any new sale being cleared, even in smaller chunks.

On the other hand,  the Pentagon is seemingly doing the opposite of this pause.

According to reports, the U.S. Department of Defense will station two representatives on a long-term basis inside Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense headquarters in Taipei from 2026 to 2028.

One official will come from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [OUSD-Policy] — the office that writes U.S. national security and defense strategy. The second will come from the Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA] — a federally funded think tank that does mathematical modeling for war games and combat capability assessment.

The program is called the “Taiwan-US Defense Ministry Joint Cooperation Assessment,” with a total budget of NT$471 million [$14.8 million], including NT$152.5 million this year for personnel, consultancy, travel, data collection, and even interpretation for classified-level meetings.

If confirmed, this will be unprecedented.

This would mark the first time U.S. defense officials are permanently embedded inside Taiwan’s military headquarters, shifting cooperation away from traditional channels managed through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Washington’s de facto embassy.

The military relationship between the United States and Taiwan is highly integrated yet formally unofficial. It is governed by the legal framework of the “U.S. Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA), which Congress passed on April 10, 1979.

Congress enacted it immediately after the U.S. formally terminated its previous “Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan)” to officially recognize “the People’s Republic of China (PRC)” in Beijing.

Rather than abandoning Taiwan, Congress designed the TRA as a legal framework to ensure that “robust, unofficial security, commercial, and cultural ties” continue uninterrupted.

In short, the TRA provides a domestic legal workaround for treating Taiwan as a country without formal diplomatic recognition. However, under it, the U.S. is also obligated to maintain Taiwan’s capacity to resist force or coercion in general and the forcible annexation by the PRC in particular.

Over the years, U.S. personnel have served in Taiwan as trainers and advisers. Hundreds of active-duty U.S. military advisors—often colloquially referred to locally as “English teachers” to maintain a low profile—are routinely deployed across Taiwan.

U.S. military observers are present within Taiwan’s annual “Han Kuang live-fire military exercises”. They actively guide Taiwan’s defense strategy toward decentralized command, logistics, and real-world combat readiness.

Taiwanese fighter pilots undergo advanced combat training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona.

The US remains Taiwan’s primary foreign weapons supplier, with a total backlog of orders nearing $20 billion.

In fact, Taiwan received its first new batch of two advanced Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 fighter jets on October 2.  This was part of an $8 billion deal approved in 2019 for 66 new-build F-16 Block 70 jets, with the remaining 64 aircraft scheduled for future delivery.  out of a 66-aircraft fleet on order.

However, all these coordination efforts between Washington and Taipei are usually routed through the AIT intermediary, as the U.S. adheres to its  One China” policy. In that sense, the new proposal to station Pentagon personnel directly inside the Taiwanese Defense Ministry represents a shift from this historical status quo.

The new arrangement puts Americans directly into the core of Taiwan’s defense policymaking, including policy coordination, Han Kuang exercise planning, asymmetric warfare doctrine, and major weapons procurement evaluations, it is said.

Of course, the U.S. routinely sends military and civilian defense officials to work directly inside the defense ministries of partner and allied nations. Established by the Pentagon in 2009, the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program specifically trains and deploys high-performing senior U.S. Department of Defense civilians.

These advisors are embedded in partner-nation defense ministries to support institutional capacity building, strategy, financial management, and logistics.

The U.S. also actively deploys specialized defense consultants directly to the defense ministries of nations looking to transition away from historical adversaries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and various Balkan nations looking to exit Moscow’s orbit.

The U.S. has a long history of embedding liaison officers in allied countries. For example, it has a Joint Political-Military Group in Israel that embeds officers in missile-defense cooperation for Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and now Iron Beam. But American officials do not operate inside the Kirya (Israel’s defense headquarters).

Similarly, despite 54,000 US personnel stationed in Japan, no U.S. officer sits inside Japan’s Ministry of Defense to assess combat capability.

Perhaps in NATO countries and South Korea, U.S. military officials are believed to sit together often.

There are also “Offices of Defense Cooperation” (ODC), or United States Military Groups, which are technically attached to the local U.S. Embassy for diplomatic protection. These teams provide security assistance and work in routine, day-to-day coordination with host ministry personnel.

However, what makes the proposed U.S. officials sitting directly within Taiwan’s military headquarters unique is that Taiwan is not an ally of America in the strict sense, as the U.S. lacks formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, and these officials will bypass the traditional AIT.

Of course, multiple reports in recent years have claimed that U.S. special forces are permanently stationed in Taiwan to assist its 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion special operations force, though Washington has officially denied it.  The same has been the case with the speculations about the coming and going of U.S. military personnel from the Army Special Operations Command base in Taoyuan.

How will Beijing React?

At the time of writing, Beijing had not issued an official reaction, possibly because Taiwanese media outlets only recently brought details of this long-term Pentagon deployment to light. It has not been declared officially.

But it goes without saying that Beijing would be “certain to protest” and could respond “with expanded exercises and intimidation”, according to  Zivon Wang, a military analyst at the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies in Taipei.

He expects U.S. personnel not to wear uniforms at the Ministry of National Defense because it could be interpreted as a more formalized US-Taiwan military relationship and might further provoke Beijing.

Incidentally, China has made more air and naval incursions across the median line in the Taiwan Strait since 2022. Although Chinese military aircraft had occasionally crossed the median line (established informally in 1954) in the past, the practice became significantly more frequent from 2022, particularly after Nancy Pelosi (then Speaker of the House of Representatives) visited Taiwan in August that year. What had once been an informal but largely respected buffer increasingly became a zone of routine Chinese military activity.

Therefore, it remains to be seen whether China will respond to the Pentagon’s proposed deployment with loud exercises.

It may also remain silent, as nothing is official yet and Trump has his “negotiating chip” of holding back Taiwan’s military package.

Trump’s admirers often see his unpredictability as useful in negotiations with an adversary, because the other side cannot be sure how far he is willing to go.

But his critics argue that his unpredictability becomes counterproductive when allies cannot distinguish a negotiating threat from a real change in American policy.

It remains to be seen who will prove to be right in the case of Taiwan.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

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