Ten suspected criminals killed in Karachi police ‘encounters’ in two days should trouble anyone concerned about public safety and the rule of law.
Seven died in separate incidents on Thursday and another three on Friday. In each case, police reported armed resistance, exchanges of fire, and the recovery of weapons.These accounts may be accurate, but cannot be accepted without scrutiny. Officers confronting armed criminals have every right to defend themselves and others.
Karachi’s residents, long exposed to street crime and violent robberies, deserve protection. Yet the frequency of these so-called encounters raises questions about how operations are conducted and whether suspects are given an opportunity to surrender.
Whether the police actions were legitimate or unlawful can only be established through credible investigations. There must be forensic examination of weapons, independent verification of police accounts, and proper documentation of injuries and evidence.
Such scrutiny should be routine whenever police gunfire causes death, regardless of the victim’s alleged criminal history. Otherwise, the public must rely entirely on the version offered by those who pulled the trigger. The concern extends beyond Karachi.
In Punjab, where the Crime Control Department faces allegations of staged encounters, the political response has exposed a dangerous willingness to equate police killings with justice. After a suspect in the killing of a teenage worker in Multan died in an alleged encounter, PML-N lawmaker Hina Parvez Butt celebrated it as “justice served immediately”. She deleted the post but defended her remarks as public sentiment.
Anger over a child’s murder is understandable. But an elected representative ought to know that public outrage cannot substitute for a trial, and that a police killing is not a judicial verdict. Punjab Information Minister Azma Bokhari criticised the comments, though the issue is larger than one politician’s embarrassment.
Governments must make clear that police performance will be judged by crimes prevented, offenders lawfully arrested, and cases successfully prosecuted, not bodies counted. Independent inquiries into disputed encounters should publish findings and establish responsibility if unlawful force is proved. Police officers need training, equipment and supervision that make arrest a realistic option where possible. A force that can shoot but cannot build a case offers little lasting security. The police are duty-bound to protect lives. They do not have a licence to kill.
THE nature of Pakistan’s role in global politics is once again the subject of much debate. Several officials are ferrying messages between Iran and the US for an end to the conflict, having helped organise a short-lived peace agreement earlier in the year.
Based on these and past events, there are a series of judgement calls that observers make about the Pakistani state and its position in the world order.
One set of views sees Pakistan as a client state of the US, that is, one that’s subservient to America’s imperial interests and its immediate allies in the region, the Gulf monarchies. This view is shared by sections of the left — globally, in the region, and within Pakistan — and disgruntled opponents of the current regime, who furnish as evidence for it the country’s role in global anti-communist politics in the 1950s and 1960s, its partnership with the US against the Soviets in Afghanistan, its role during the ‘war on terror’ between 2001 and 2013, and the proximity of ties with the Trump administration in recent months.
Ironically, conservatives and Islamists also cite the 1950s/1960s and the experience of US-Pakistan relations during the war on terror and especially in the last few years, as evidence of successive regimes siding with global secularist interests in subjugating both Islamic movements in the region and Muslim political identity at home.
The other view, held in the same time-space continuum, sees the country as ideologically fundamentalist, and simultaneously, a client of China and an unpredictable ally of the US — one that is capable of undermining the global hegemon on its own or in collaboration with the Chinese. This view is shared by much of the American and Indian mainstream, who cite CPEC and close military relations as an example of Chinese clientelism, previous support to the Taliban during the invasion of Afghanistan as an example of duplicity, and its approach to Kashmir, its recent diplomatic support for Iran, and the broader sociocultural and ideational life of its citizens, as an example of (religious) fundamentalism.
As with most sweeping observations, many may detect a kernel of truth in these otherwise clearly contradictory positions. Close proximity to American imperial interests has characterised many passages in Pakistani political history. Similarly, the relationship with China remains remarkably consistent since the 1970s. However, in an effort to account for Pakistan’s global and regional behaviour, these observations lapse back to the rather broad and imprecise categories of ‘client state’ or ‘fundamentalist state’.
The reality, just on the basis of the actions listed above, is that the state’s geopolitical and ideational positioning has varied considerably, which makes it hard to pin it down as a US ‘client’ of the same ilk as Japan/ South Korea or the Gulf monarchies, or as a Chinese client like North Korea.
There are a series of judgement calls that observers make about the state’s position in the world order.
What is consistent though is the subordinate role that the state here plays in global affairs, not just in terms of geopolitics but also — and more fundamentally — in terms of international economic processes.
How does ‘subordinate’ differ from ‘client’? Beyond mere semantics, a substantive difference is that a subordinate actor may have limited agency, but it retains the capability of understanding and developing its own interests. A client, on the other hand, would, by and large replicate the interests of its patrons.
On the evidence of the last seven decades, it would be incorrect to assert that the Pakistani state elite has not developed a sense of its own interests, even though some may disagree with the content of those interests or how those interests were developed.
There is, for example, a long-standing recognition of being in a ‘tough’ geography, with insecure borders on at least three sides. There is also a persisting notion that it faces a periodically existential threat from a much more powerful eastern neighbour and that this threat should be countered by a military deterrent. This in turn can only be obtained by forging reciprocal relations with more powerful states.
The presence of these interests/ ideas does not invalidate the fact that the state’s own actions and responses may have hastened insecurities in various ways. Nor can it paper over the fact that the processes through which the state recognises its context and develops its response are heavily skewed towards a largely insulated military-bureaucratic state apparatus. Both, in turn, lead to other domestic problems, including frequent civil-military political conflict and law and order insecurity in the peripheries.
However, while some reduce Pakistan’s subordination to its geography or the original conditions of its creation, one can make the more substantive case that it remains in that place by the nature of the global economic order since the 1970s and due to its own economic dysfunction.
With basic processes of capital accumulation stagnating or being rendered highly inefficient, the dollar requirement to ensure subsistence-level growth under global conditions of economic liberalisation can only be met through wilful subordination to varied benefactors. Periodic balance-of-payment crises since the 1980s have precipitated this pattern, and geopolitical posturing to extract IMF concessions or rents in other forms has cemented it.
Each successive crisis of the last four decades has found resolution via subordination in the geopolitical domain: favour garnered with the Gulf monarchies via military assistance or labour provision in exchange for reserve deposits; providing the US with regional geopolitical support in exchange for IMF approval, or allowing Chinese capital to make infrastructure investments to kickstart (fleeting) economic growth. Ultimately, each temporary staving off of an economic crisis has pinned down the state’s subordinate position. And in the process little has been done to fix the underlying issue of domestic economic dysfunction.
A WAVE of protests is sweeping across the world in a season of unrest. From West to East, the street is confronting the state. Led predominantly by students and young people, protests have been widening to encompass other disaffected groups in society. In some cases, they are morphing into a nationwide movement. On almost every continent, governments are being put on notice that there will be a price to pay for misgovernance and being indifferent to public demands.
India’s Gen Z has been in the streets in anti-government protests against the controversial revision of electoral rolls. Students in France began protesting against deteriorating school conditions with other groups, including trade unions, joining demonstrations over high living costs and inequality. In Italy, students, farmers and truckers took to the streets in protests driven by education costs, economic grievances, and anti-war sentiment. In Brussels, students marched over education funding. Spain saw protests over a housing crisis. In Albania, student-led demonstrations occurred over living costs and a controversial tourism project linked to Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law. In Portugal, protests erupted over housing and falling living standards. There were education protests across Greece. In Brazil, thousands joined a student march against the election bid of far-right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro. Tunisia’s capital witnessed protests demanding the president’s resignation and democratic rights.
The triggers vary, as do the underlying causes. Each protest is rooted in its own political context. But there are common themes. All reject the status quo and indicate disenchantment with traditional political parties. All voice anger against unresponsive governments and the state failing them on their socioeconomic demands.
The context for most protests is a cost-of-living crisis and deterioration or cuts in public services compounded by the state’s inability to deliver on education and jobs. Economic grievances and resentment of inequality are a driving force of the protests. A sense of disenfranchisement is another common thread.
The heavy-handed response by governments to the protests and draconian crackdowns further fuelled the unrest and sparked violent clashes in several places. But it energised demonstrators to keep returning to the street. Unfortunately, in France protests degenerated into looting and rioting.
Protests in Europe and India share a defining feature. They are propelled by a wave of student activism. At their core is youth frustration in a generation that sees broken promises and an uncertain future. It feels betrayed by the lack of educational and economic opportunities. Protesters have also been venting rage against political leaders who have ignored public needs and are seen as venal. Initiated by young people, protests have expanded into broader movements as other disaffected groups, with their own set of demands, joined the demonstrations. Social media has been a key mobilisation tool in all the protests.
Governments have been put on notice that misrule and ignoring public needs will have consequences.
None of the protests or movements have been party-led. Political parties have largely been sidelined, even as they tried to leverage the demonstrations; France’s left aligned itself with the protesters. In several European countries, protests are playing out in an environment of deep polarisation, which parties of both the left and right are trying to exploit. This is especially because elections are due next year in many countries including France, Spain, and Italy.
In India, the youth ‘Cockroach’ movement has spearheaded the protests and mounted the most significant challenge to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government so far. The ongoing protests came against the backdrop of student protests led by the Cockroach party over the leak of exam papers in May, which forced the resignation of the education minister. This time, the catalyst was the revision of voter lists by India’s election commission, which apparently involved the removal of around 130 million voters.
The government and the election commission’s claim that this was aimed at eliminating duplicate and ineligible entries was widely rejected. It was instead seen as a step towards mass disenfranchisement. It became the trigger for youth protests, demanding the resignation of the chief election commissioner and scrapping the revision. India’s opposition parties also joined the demonstrations and decried the move as a politically motivated purge to benefit the ruling BJP.
The Cockroach Janta Party used the opportunity to broaden its campaign. The government’s strong-arm tactics to suppress the popular upsurge only inflamed the demonstrators who accused Modi of “stealing democracy”. While these protests did not pose an existential threat to Modi, his jittery and increasingly autocratic government behaved as if they did — with arrests and a harsh clampdown. The scale of the protests and the government’s repressive response eroded Modi’s authority, weakened his grip on power, and dented his credibility and image.
The mass protests signified much more than opposition to the voter roll overhaul. They have been about democratic rights and democratic accountability and against pervasive injustice. As Indian academic Sudhir Kumar Suthar has argued, they have been driven by the quest for dignity as much as for rights. The message from the young is clear: “they deserve a more dignified life than what they have received from the system so far.”
The central question is what will be the outcome of mass protests and what will they achieve? A definitive assessment has to wait until the protests play themselves out as most are still unfolding. But one unintended consequence of the current wave of discontent in some European countries, especially France but to a degree also in Spain and Portugal, may be to strengthen the far-right. The far-right has led none of these protests but it stands to benefit from their fallout.
In a political landscape where the political centre is being hollowed out and centrist parties have lost touch with young people, unrest advantages the most organised opposition force that promises order. In France, that force is Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National. Where the hard-right is in power the advantage works differently. It enables governments to cast the protests as a law-and-order issue fuelled by migrants to justify harsher measures.
More generally, youth-led protests may force governments to take more seriously the needs and aspirations of young people which have rarely been a priority. What the streets are signalling is a breakdown of trust that can no longer be brushed aside. For now, the protests have put governments on notice: misrule has consequences.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
THE announcement of an indicative wheat price of Rs4,500 per 40 kilograms may have come too late for Sindh farmers, but it is welcome as far as it goes. That is not far.
The figure is Rs1,000 higher than last year’s and, by the government’s account, reflects rising production and fuel costs. It is also Rs500 short of what farmers demanded. And there is no word on who will buy the grain or when.
An indicative price is a signal, not a guarantee. Since April 2025, when the government dropped the support price and suspended large-scale procurement, farmers have been promised a market-based system that would serve them better. It has not.
The crop now being sown is the third to go into the ground without a floor. Punjab’s experience this April shows what happens when a procurement price is announced without a mechanism to enforce it. The province tried to revive buying through bank-backed private aggregators. The banks doubted the scheme’s viability, and the aggregators bought only 160,000 tonnes against a target of 2.5m tonnes. Prices fell anyway.
A price no buyer is obliged or financially equipped to pay is only a number. Growers seem to have grasped this before the government did.
Consumers, meanwhile, are not being spared. Over five years the price of wheat has gone up by 150pc, and that rise goes straight to the price of flour. Punjab has used the price as its only tool instead of working on the cost of farm inputs, which the federal government’s policies have kept high.
Flour in cities is selling for Rs160-190 per kilogram, which is hard on poor households. Even the government’s stocks are expensive. Sindh began selling government wheat this month at Rs12,500 per 100kg, or Rs5,000 per 40kg. That is more than the prime minister has offered farmers.
The test of wheat reform is not whether the government can step out of the market. It is whether the system that replaces government buying shares the risk fairly among farmers, traders, millers, banks, and the state, keeps flour affordable, and protects the country’s food supply.
For now, farmers carry most of the risk while everyone else looks after their own interests. With sowing already underway, the government should say in plain terms what it will buy, through which agency, with what money, and by when. It should adapt its imports to that plan. It should look at the cost of fertiliser and other inputs, instead of relying on price alone. And it should help poor households directly, instead of keeping flour cheap for all by squeezing the grower.
A price announcement with no buyer behind it will not persuade anyone to sow, and a market that works for only one side is not worth defending.
Pakistan’s new auto policy was meant to take effect on July 1. It is yet to be finalised. Meanwhile, the automotive industry continues pricing vehicles, opening letters of credit, and signing dealer agreements in the dark — unaware of the tax burden those cars will carry next year.
The latest bottleneck arose during the International Monetary Fund’s fourth review of the Extended Fund Facility. In late September, the Ministry of Industries and Production presented its draft Auto Policy 2026-31 to the IMF mission, but talks concluded without an agreement. The primary sticking point is the proposed one per cent sales tax on new energy vehicles. The Fund wants the standard 18pc rate. On a Rs10 million car, that single disagreement represents the difference between a tax of Rs100,000 and Rs1.8mn.
Low tax rates matter, but the rate itself is only half the story. The crucial second half is defining what this policy is actually for.
In FY26, Pakistan spent $16.9 billion on petroleum imports, a major portion of which was burnt on its roads. The government aims for 30pc of new vehicle sales to be electric by 2030, a transition estimated to save about $1bn annually in foreign exchange, 2bn litres of fuel, and 4.5mn tonnes of carbon emissions. For a nation recovering from devastating floods and choking on severe winter smog every year, these are not side benefits. They are the entire point.
Low tax rates matter, but defining the policy is also crucial
Both sides of the current argument are partly right. The Fund has watched Pakistan repeatedly carve up a narrow tax base through special rates and Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs), knowing temporary concessions almost invariably become permanent. The ministry is equally right that electric vehicles cost more upfront, charging infrastructure remains thin, and buyers harbour deep anxieties about battery life and resale value. Imposing the standard tax rate overnight would reduce the 30pc EV target to a line on paper.
However, the draft policy has a glaring weakness of its own. Customs duties on conventional cars are scheduled to fall sharply, but reports suggest this gap will simply be refilled through higher Federal Excise Duty and floor prices on imported vehicles – essentially building the same protective wall with different bricks.
In the meanwhile, tax rates keep moving by notification. The concessional 8.5pc sales tax on most hybrids expired on June 30 with the expiry of the last auto industry development and export policy, causing taxes on locally made hybrids to jump to 25pc. Then, in September, the Federal Board of Revenue issued SRO 1525(I)/2026, bringing locally manufactured hybrids up to 2,000cc back down to 18pc.
The relief was welcome, but the same car underwent three distinct tax rates in as many months, and the final adjustment came through SRO rather than any transparent policy. An investor deciding whether to establish an assembly plant does not mainly ask whether the tax is 1pc or 18pc. They ask what the tax will be in 2029, and whether that answer will survive the next budget cycle.
A better structure would rest on five sensible pillars:
First, agree on 18pc as the ultimate destination and legislate a clear roadmap to get there. Keep the 1pc tax rate until June 2027, when current concessions lapse, then step it up incrementally each year to reach the standard rate by FY2030. Low taxes in the early years build the market: China exempted electric cars from purchase tax for nearly a decade, and Norway waived VAT before both began phased rollbacks. Support should be generous at the start, but bound by a firm expiration date.
Second, target the relief. A Rs30mn luxury import does not need the same fiscal cushion as a compact car, a taxi, or a rickshaw. Capping concessions by price or battery size concentrates public money where the public benefit actually lies.
Third, set a clear tech ladder. The combined burden of duty and tax should be highest on conventional petrol cars, lower on hybrids, lower still on plug-in hybrids, and lowest on fully electric vehicles. Battery electric vehicles and range-extended EVs should share one tax structure at the bottom because their powertrain is fundamentally the same.
Fourth, follow the National Tariff Policy honestly. Bring duties on fully built imports down as announced, eliminate additional and regulatory duties by FY30, and do not rebuild protectionism through excise duty. Maintain a moderate, transparent gap between duties on built-up imports and kits for local assembly, fixed for the life of the policy.
Fifth, reward localisation through component tariffs, not sales tax exemptions. Offering low duties on battery packs, electric motors, and controllers for a fixed period from the start of local production is a far cleaner incentive that directly rewards genuine investment.
The last important point is that established assemblers and vendor networks support over a million livelihoods, as per PAAPAM, and their fear of a uniform tariff cut is legitimate: localisation that took decades to build can be dismantled in a year. But ‘raw’ protectionism alone has failed to deliver scale or competitiveness. Local content in Pakistani passenger cars averages about 58pc, compared to roughly 80pc in India.
The electric transition is a chance to rewrite that story. Localisation incentives should go to value added whether the carmaker is old or new, and vendors, who retool for electric components, should receive the same parts concessions and long-term financing.
The government has a short window before the revised draft goes to the Cabinet. The right path forward is simple to state: agree on the end-state with the Fund, publish a binding dated schedule, target support where it moves the most people and goods, classify tax tiers by technology, and leave the rules alone long enough for someone to build a factory around them.
Every day of delay is paid for in lost foreign exchange, dirtier air, and a target that slips further away. Low taxes will start the market. Only predictable taxes will build the industry behind it.
The writer is an energy finance professional with over 20 years of experience.
Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, October 26th, 2026
Pakistan’s agricultural crisis is generally framed around water scarcity, rising input costs, declining productivity and profitability and climate change. Yet another structural problem – the subdivision of agricultural land into smaller and scattered holdings – is worsening silently. Despite implications for farm efficiency, rural incomes and national poverty, the issue has received far less attention.
The seventh Agricultural Census released in July has come up with figures that must ring alarm bells. The number of farms has increased from 8.26 million in 2010 to 11.10m in 2024 – a rise of 34.4 per cent. Over the same period, average farm size fell from 6.4 acres to 5.3 acres, a decline of 17.2pc. Even more significant is the number of fragmented farms, which rose from 2.83m in 2010 to 4.98m in 2024 – an increase of 2.15m, or more than 76pc. The average division of separate plots held by each fragmented farm increased from three in 2010 to seven in 2024 – an increase of more than 133pc.
The general distribution of landholdings reinforces the picture. In 2024, 59pc farms were smaller than 2.5 acres, compared with 43.5pc in 2010. The proportion of farms below five acres rose from 64.7pc to 78pc, while more than 95pc are under 12.5 acres, up from 89.5pc in 2010.
This skewed structure has implications for all; individual farms, sectoral performance and policy makers. For farms, smaller and increasingly dispersed holdings make mechanisation next to impossible, raise cultivation and supervision costs, limit access to credit and modern technologies, and reduce farmers’ capacity to generate marketable surpluses and cash for themselves.
For many smallholders, farming is becoming less of a commercial enterprise than a means of meeting household subsistence needs
At the sectoral level, it risks slowing productivity, weakening commercial agriculture and increasing rural poverty as families turn to off-farm employment to supplement their incomes.
The policy implications are equally significant: improving agricultural performance requires more than addressing water scarcity and input costs. It demands initiatives to help smallholders overcome the disadvantages of scale, shared machinery services, equipment suited to small plots, accessible agricultural credit, cooperative farming arrangements, zoning and cluster development and incentivising voluntary land consolidation.
For many smallholders, farming is consequently becoming less of a commercial enterprise than a means of meeting household subsistence needs. Muhammad Nadeem, a three-acre farmer from Okara, describes the transition: “When a plot falls below a certain size, subsistence farming and traditional rural practices – growing one’s own staple and fodder for livestock – take precedence.”
Nadeem owns three buffaloes and divides his land between fodder, wheat and vegetables to meet his family’s basic needs. As the land is ancestral, he shares a return with his brother and sister. Farming is now a part-time activity: Nadeem and his brother work as labourers in Okara city, while his sister teaches at a local private school.
“The land generates virtually no income because the yields are barely enough to meet our needs,” he says. It is also because of expensive fertilisers. Credit is another obstacle. Even local middlemen, who typically finance inputs, are reluctant to lend as they know the limitations of the family’s landholding. “For us, farming is no longer a viable source of income. We continue to cultivate only for it provides a staple for family and fodder for animals.”
Nadeem’s experience shows how shrinking holdings can turn farming into a part-time survival activity, forcing families to seek off-farm employment while leaving no money for agricultural investment.
The challenge becomes greater when land is divided into scattered, non-contiguous plots. Five consolidated acres at one location are very different from the same size spread across several parcels. Dispersed holdings increase the time and cost of land preparation, irrigation, crop protection and harvesting. They also complicate supervision, delay essential operations and make machinery less efficient to deploy.
Former irrigation minister and south Punjab farmer, Mohsin Leghari, is deeply concerned about this trend. “Five acres in one place and five scattered across several locations are two completely different propositions. The latter increases cultivation costs, complicates mechanisation, makes supervision difficult, and delays critical farming operations,” he says. The shrinking average holdings could accelerate poverty and urban migration.
Mechanisation presents a particular challenge with multiplying division of land. While machinery can reduce labour requirements, improve efficiency and help farmers complete time-sensitive operations, the high cost of purchase and maintenance is difficult to recover from smaller acreage, especially if scattered across different locations.
Agricultural economist Mirza Irfan Baig argues that this problem extends beyond affordability. “For small farms, mechanisation is not simply a question of affordability or commercial viability; it is also a question of whether appropriate machinery is available in the first place,” he says.
Baig explains that modern agricultural mechanisation largely evolved to serve large-scale farming, particularly in the West, where extensive, contiguous holdings allow machinery to operate efficiently across large areas.
“Such machinery is not scale-neutral. Equipment designed for large, consolidated farms cannot be used efficiently on small, scattered plots. Its size, operating costs and capacity are not suited to smallholders. There is little incentive for manufacturers to develop specialised machinery for such a limited and fragmented market.”
This creates a structural barrier to modernisation. Even if money is available, farmers may not find machines suited to their holdings. Buying large equipment individually is often uneconomical, while the lack of affordable, appropriately sized alternatives limits mechanisation and productivity.
Addressing the problem does not necessarily mean the disappearance of small farms or the forced consolidation. Shared services, equipment rental markets, cooperative arrangements, zoning and clustering of land, and better coordination among farmers could help them acquire efficiencies of larger operations. Improved access to credit and technologies designed for small plots would also be essential.
The policy makers now need to look beyond cultivated area and the immediate pressures of water scarcity, input costs and climate change, and deal with this structural issue. It is also necessary because subdivision of agricultural land is not merely a farming problem; it is also a question of rural livelihoods and national poverty. If millions of farmers struggle to earn a viable income from land, the consequences extend from rural dwellings to national poverty.
Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, October 26th, 2026
• Spox rejects reports about core committee being ‘sidelined’ • ‘Strengthening’ of parliamentary body suggested, but not decided, says Panjutha
ISLAMABAD: Amid a deluge of reports suggesting a change in the party’s decision-making structure, the PTI on Sunday rejected the notion that its core committee had been ‘sidelined’, or its powers re-designated to another body.
Sheikh Waqas Akram, the party’s central information secretary, said the core committee, the political committee and the parliamentary party were separate forums, each with their own, distinct responsibilities.
Organisational and political decisions fell within the remit of the core and political committees, while the parliamentary party dealt with legislative and parliamentary issues.
He said the parliamentary party’s recommendations were given due consideration and could be referred to the relevant committees, adding that final authority over all decisions rested with PTI founder Imran Khan, who had delegated powers to the committees.
PTI leader Naeem Haider Panjutha told Dawn that during a meeting, Barrister Ali Zafar had suggested strengthening the parliamentary committee, but it was just a recommendation and no such decision was made.
“Imran Khan had entrusted the political committee with the authority to make decisions, while directing that the core committee should also be… taken into confidence before decisions were finalised. The core committee had a large membership, which made decision-making difficult. That was one of the reasons for forming the political committee — to facilitate decisions and reduce the chances of discussions being leaked,” he said.
He said that there was also a proposal to include heads of the party’s organisational bodies in the political committee.
“Subsequently, the mandate for the movement and negotiations was given to Mahmood Khan Achakzai and Raja Nasir Abbas, while Sohail Afridi was entrusted with the authority to lead the street movement. How can any change be made without Imran Khan’s approval?” he questioned.
Furthermore, the PTI also rejected a statement attributed to PTI interim chief Barrister Gohar Ali Khan suggesting that the KP chief minister could have avoided detention by staying in Mardan but he travelled to Peshawar as part of a “pre-planned master plan”.
Imran, Bushra’s ‘ordeal’
Meanwhile, in a separate statement, the party condemned the prolonged detention of its founder and his wife, the denial of their fundamental and constitutional rights, and the use of state machinery to intimidate political opponents.
The party warned that continued disregard for constitutional safeguards, due process and the sanctity of private homes was setting an alarming precedent that could threaten rights and freedoms of all citizens.
In a statement, Mr Akram claimed that Imran Khan had spent 1,177 days in detention at Adiala Jail, including 356 days in solitary confinement, while Bushra Bibi had remained behind bars for more than 911 days.
He said that the prolonged detention of both, restrictions on their meetings with family members, lawyers and party leaders, and growing concerns about Mr Khan’s health and medical care required immediate attention.
He demanded that Imran Khan and Bushra Bibi be granted all their legal, fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed rights, including regular meetings with family members, lawyers and the party leadership.
He called for appropriate medical care under the supervision of Imran Khan’s personal physician and a comprehensive examination by qualified medical specialists.
He also condemned the continued detention of Imran Khan’s sisters, despite the completion of their reported 30-day detention under the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) law.
He demanded their immediate release, along with that of detained PTI leaders, elected representatives and party workers, adding that preventive detention must not become an instrument for punishing political dissent or silencing opposition voices.
• Proposed legislation aims to merge Public-Private Partnership Authority and Privatisation Commission
• Seeks to provide immunity to incumbent, former chairmen, secretaries and other officials
ISLAMABAD: The government has introduced a bill in the National Assembly, for the establishment of a Privatisation and Public-Private Partnership Commission (PPPPC), by merging the existing Public-Private Partnership Authority (P3A) and Privatisation Commission, to prevent duplication of institutional functions and processes.
The proposed law that seeks amendments to both legal instruments — the Privatisation Commission Ordinance 2000 and Public Private Partnership Authority Act 2017 — also provides legal and investigation immunity to the current and all former chairmen, secretaries, board members, officials and consultants from any act of omission or commission in good faith and in personal capacity and commits public funds to contest any such cases.
The all-powerful commission will be led by the incumbent chairman Muhammad Ali and will comprise a majority of members from the private sector, including two women directors. It will collectively administer four public funds — privatisation fund, public contributory fund, viability gap fund and PPP project development funds — created through allocation in the federal budget, receipts from international lenders, income from investments or any other source.
The government claims that the PC Ordinance dealt with privatisation of SOEs under the government policy while P3A Act governed a separate body. Both frameworks were concerned with mobilising private sector capital and expertise in relation to public assets, infrastructure and services and their administration through two separate institutions entailed duplication of institutional functions and processes.
Therefore, the government’s policy decision was needed for establishing a single institutional framework and mechanism for carrying out privatisation and public private partnership transactions in an efficient manner. For this, it seeks to reconstitute the Privatisation Commission as the Privatisation and Public-Private Partnership Commission, to repeal the Public Private Partnership Authority Act 2017 and dissolve the P3A.
The bill provides for the reconstitution of the board with a majority of independent members, including members with public private partnership experience and at least two women, fixed terms of office and clear grounds for disqualification and removal. The bill also empowers the proposed reconstituted commission to conduct functions of advising on, appraising, structuring, facilitating and monitoring public private partnership projects and the establishment of the viability gap fund, the PPP project development facility, and the public contribution fund.
The draft claims that it provides a comprehensive legal framework for public private partnerships, including the contractual framework for PPP agreements, a federal PPP pipeline, the approval process, the risk management unit and PPP transaction execution committees. It also empowers the commission to set up PPP nodes within government agencies, settlement of disputes and an alternative process for below-threshold projects.
The proposed law enables the commission to utilise public contribution fund to meet any government obligations with respect to PPP projects, including land acquisition, site handover, right of way and any such other enabling actions as may be required in connection with the project. All these funds would be non-lapsable.
The PPP agreement between the public and private parties shall be a public document and any interested person shall be entitled to obtain its copy subject to applicable laws, and the government or the commission or the government agency shall not be held liable for any claim of the private party for a risk which is not specified in the PPP agreement. All existing contracts signed by P3A would stand transferred to the new commission without any disadvantage to the private parties.
The proposed law empowers the commission to require in writing from any government agency to submit a complete list of its existing, proposed and planned projects, including projects under consideration or development, whether or not identified as PPP projects within fifteen days. The agencies shall be obligated to comply with such a requirement with full accuracy and completeness. Where a government agency fails to comply with any such requirement, the PC chairman may refer the matter to the ministry or division concerned for compliance.
There will be a committee to review potential PPP projects proposed for inclusion in the federal PPP pipeline and shall provide its recommendations, which shall be placed before the board for consideration and decision.
All officers, consultants, advisers, auditors, employees and other staff of the P3A shall upon the dissolution of the P3A be retained by the commission for a period of six months or until the expiration of their respective contracts, whichever is earlier, on terms and conditions not less favourable than those applicable to them immediately before the dissolution.
SINCE early 2025, Pakistan’s relations with the US have taken an upturn after years of mutual disenchantment. Why did the US opt for this reset? And will this bonhomie last?
Historically, Pakistan and the US have come close only when their interests converged. America has preferred a transactional relationship with Pakistan based on specific issues of its geopolitical agenda.
The recent thaw in ties can, therefore, be better understood in terms of how global geopolitics is evolving. It is no longer a unipolar world led by the US. Since the dawn of this century, several centres of power have arisen while the US remains entangled in long, distant wars. The US reliance on its military might to subdue adversaries has taken a heavy toll on America’s world standing.
Into this evolving geometry of global power politics stepped Donald Trump, who has ruptured the trans-Atlantic alliance, pulled back support for Ukraine in its war against Russia, and sought to stabilise America’s ties with China. However, nothing has compromised America’s domestic and international standing more than the recent US-Iran war.
As for Pakistan-US ties, three developments seem to have contributed to the recent thaw. First is Pakistan’s role in countering terrorism. In March 2025, President Trump thanked Pakistan in his State of the Union address to Congress for apprehending the mastermind of a bombing in Kabul on the eve of the US exit from Afghanistan.
Three developments seem to have contributed to the recent thaw.
Second, the US, like the rest of the world, saw Pakistan robustly counter Indian aggression in May 2025. The US mediated a ceasefire on May 10. Pakistan acknowledged America’s positive role. New Delhi, on the other hand, was reluctant to acknowledge Trump’s role, even though India itself had asked the US to secure a ceasefire.
Third, Pakistan’s mediatory role in the recent US-Iran conflict has convinced Washington of Pakistan’s important role as a net stability provider in the region.
Meanwhile, America’s distrust of India has deepened because the latter has bought Russian oil while ignoring US sanctions, and has maintained continued economic ties with China while pretending to be a US partner to counterbalance China. America is no longer convinced that India can be a trustworthy counterweight to China.
How will this reset impact Pakistan’s other key relationship?
Islamabad’s close ties with Beijing are not unknown to Washington. The Chinese leadership is also well aware of the strategic nature of Sino-Pak relations. In an era where cooperation and confrontation coexist, Pakistan has ample space to pursue mutually beneficial relations with both China and the US based on its own national interest.
India is upset at the uptick in Pakistan’s ties with the US, and its own failure to isolate Pakistan diplomatically. As for Afghanistan, the US has not shown any interest in it, even as the country is on the cusp of becoming a safe haven for world terrorists. The US is also aware of the fine balance that Pakistan has always maintained in its ties with both Iran and Saudi Arabia.
How should Pakistan use this reset in its relationship with the US, even if it was transactional, for mutual benefit?
Several promising areas can be identified: Pakistan must ensure that its share of flourishing trade with the US is maintained and enhanced. The US offers bright prospects for Pakistan’s young, tech-savvy entrepreneurs, IT exports, startups, software development, growing digital adoption, and e-commerce.
American companies should be encouraged to invest in Pakistan’s shale oil potential and minerals sector, especially lithium, rare earth elements, and copper — crucial for the semiconductor industry, defence technology and robotics, among others. Other promising areas of cooperation include defence, security, and counterterrorism. Agriculture has been a legacy area of cooperation since the 1950s, as have education and public health.
However, all this will only be possible if Pakistan addresses its policy and regulatory hurdles, cost of doing business, security risks, and infrastructure issues.
Today’s Pakistan stands tall as a competent, self-confident power that can contribute to regional peace, stability, and development. However, this window of opportunity may be limited because global geopolitics is constantly evolving. What matters most is making the best use of the recent thaw in Pakistan-US ties while preserving our other key relationships, including with China.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US and is currently serving as chairman of the Sanober Institute.
Political radicalism sits uneasily within the paradigm of mainstream politics. Interestingly, this phenomenon has increasingly manifested among the middle classes.
The lineage of both left and right ideological extremes can be traced to two historical junctures. Left-wing radicalism finds its genesis in the 18th century French Revolution and right-wing extremism in the ascent of Nazism in 1930s Germany. In both instances, the working classes served primarily as foot soldiers. They were mobilised by middle class concepts and aspirations. The French Revolution was animated by the theories of ‘enlightened’ middle-class intellectuals and Nazism was built upon convoluted race theories conceived by middle-class thinkers.
In 18th century France, radical philosophies emerged from an ascending and fledgling middle class that felt its economic and social progress impeded by the remnants of the ancien régime, such as decadent monarchs, landed nobility and an exploitative clergy. These were overthrown through bloody upheaval, driven largely by downtrodden mobs. However, when this triumph’s middle-class architects attempted to translate their radical philosophies into governance, they plunged the nation into further turmoil.
This instability was checked by the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, who established a dictatorship. The resultant political trajectory finally matured into the secular democratic system that endures in France till today. The maturation was a synthesis of clashing ideas, crystallised by an overwhelming need for moderation and stability in a country that had been turned on its head.
From revolutionary France to contemporary Pakistan, radical movements have repeatedly demonstrated how the pursuit of political absolutism can become an instrument of self-destruction
By the 1930s, Europe’s middle class was expanding its influence within this evolving arrangement. But the arrangement was suddenly unsettled by the expansion of socialist movements following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. As socialist ideologies gained political traction among the growing working classes, the middle class began to experience severe insecurity. They felt they were being squeezed between entrenched elites and increasingly active working class constituencies.
In Germany, this middle class anxiety manifested as hostility toward democracy. It began being blamed for Germany’s economic ruin, military humiliation and the perceived infiltration of communism. To the middle classes, communism threatened the socio-economic hierarchy through which their own aspirations were sustained.
As a result, in 1933, a significant portion of the German middle class cast its ballots for Adolf Hitler’s radical far-right Nazi party, viewing it as a bulwark against communism. Many middle class intellectuals, professionals and jurists aligned themselves with traditional economic and religious elites to elevate a fanatic to power. But Hitler’s ensuing radical agenda plunged Germany into catastrophic warfare and widespread devastation, underscoring the destructive capacity of radicalism when integrated into mainstream statecraft.
Political radicalism in mainstream politics often operates through a self-consuming dynamic, ultimately destroying the very leaders and movements that champion it. According to American political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, when radical movements enter the political mainstream, their rejection of political norms invites counter-mobilisation and their own downfall. Radical actors trigger a chain reaction that eventually dismantles their power, fractures their movements, and leaves them vulnerable to judicial and political prosecution.
Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest that the main problem with bringing radical ideas into mainstream politics is that they simply do not work with normal governance or the art of working together. Governing effectively requires making deals and knowing when to compromise. Radical political figures who refuse to compromise or work within institutional rules eventually undermine their own ability to govern.
They view political rules and traditions not as guidelines, but as traps set by their ‘corrupt’ rivals. Their strict ‘no-compromise’ attitude makes it nearly impossible to build stable alliances. Moderate voices inside the party are slowly pushed out or silenced. This leaves the leader surrounded only by yes-men and extreme loyalists, destroying the party’s ability to think pragmatically or adapt when a major political crisis hits.
On a social level, political radicalism creates deep divisions in society and leaves the public exhausted. Indeed, tapping into anti-establishment anger can be an effective way to turn economic frustration into massive street rallies, but keeping that radical momentum alive requires the constant sustaining of the outrage. This leads to protest fatigue.
According to the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, radical populism splits society into hostile camps, turning normal debates over policy into dramatic ‘us versus them’ battles. Over time, average citizens, the more thoughtful voters, and the business community grow weary of the continuous turmoil. The country becomes politically exhausted and economically fragile.
The researchers Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan concluded that when society begins to crave stability, radical politics rapidly loses its broad electoral appeal. Its practitioners become isolated. When radical leaders urge their followers to confront state authorities directly, public sentiment gradually begins to move toward the desire for order and security, legitimising the state’s countermeasures.
In 1972, the British psychologist Irving Janis demonstrated that radical movements are driven by collective arrogance and a charismatic leader’s illusion of invincibility. Such leaders often develop “hubris syndrome”, mistaking mass rallies for absolute mandates. They believe they are immune to legal or institutional limits and begin to couple their personal political survival with the destiny of the nation itself. This prompts them to make constant strategic blunders.
A modern illustration of all this is Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI). PTI entered mainstream Pakistani politics by mobilising public discontent against established political parties. Khan put forward a radical agenda that mostly attracted the middle classes. However, after bumbling across his three-year government, and losing parliamentary support in 2022, he and his party escalated their anti-establishment rhetoric to unprecedented levels, framing the struggle for Khan’s political survival as a ‘national liberation’ movement.
This radical route culminated in the violent events of May 2023, and November 2024, where party supporters targeted state and military installations. The state responded with crackdowns, mass arrests and judicial trials. Khan’s strategic reliance on populist radicalism and uncompromising confrontation resulted in his imprisonment, and then his party’s gradual organisational paralysis, demonstrating how mainstream radicalism provokes its own undoing. PTI’s undoing now seems complete with the sidelining of its one remaining provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. What’s more, the party’s core middle class constituency followed it all the way till it crumbled into a political black hole.
Radical populists destroy their own political longevity by rejecting formal and informal political norms, and confusing their irrational bullheadedness as an uncompromising commitment. The German sociologist Max Weber warned of a mindset where leaders prioritise absolute moral purity over pragmatic political outcomes.
Weber argued that political figures driven by radical moral conviction inevitably produce catastrophic results and trigger their own downfall, whereas enduring statesmanship requires an “ethic of responsibility”, grounded in compromise, foresight and restraint.
KARACHI: A court on Saturday remanded over a dozen suspects in the custody of the National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (NCCIA) in the cases pertaining to alleged online sale and production of animated child sexual abuse and pornographic material and deceptive social media activities.
The NCCIA Karachi Zone claimed to have arrested the suspects on Oct 23 during a raid at Rabia City in Gulistan-i-Jauhar, targeting three firms allegedly involved in production, promotion, and online sale of sexually explicit animated cartoons, animated child sexual abuse material, pornographic digital content and other digital designing services to international customers.
The NCCIA officials produced 13 suspects before a judicial magistrate (East) and sought their custody for further investigation and arrest of their alleged accomplices.
They also submitted that mobile phones had been seized from the detained suspects and further time was required for technical examination and forensic analysis of these devices.
The magistrate handed over the suspects to the NCCIA on four-day physical remand with direction to produce them at next hearing along with the progress report.
Earlier, during the operation, 42 individuals, including company owners and employees, were arrested, while 45 mobile phones were seized.
Regarding their method of operation, officials said as per preliminary findings, the companies were operating through organised teams of online agents who approached foreign customers using various social media platforms, particularly Instagram and X.
The agents allegedly created and operated multiple social media accounts using fictitious identities, female names, and impersonated profiles to attract international clients.
KARACHI: An infant boy battling mpox for more than a week at a hospital died early on Saturday morning — the first mortality of a baby from the contagious viral infection in Karachi.
Sources told Dawn that the 52-day-old baby boy had reportedly contracted the infection during circumcision performed at an “illegal” hospital located in Malir. He remained under treatment at the Sindh Infectious Diseases Hospital & Research Centre (SIDH&RC) for at least 10 days.
Speaking on the condition of anonymity, a senior doctor at the hospital said that another infant patient with mpox was still in critical condition.
“His key health indicators are not good. The information gathered from his parents indicates that he too underwent circumcision at the Malir hospital that has been officially sealed recently over concerns related to lack of infection control measures,” he said.
Death takes Sindh’s tally to 12, with 98 cases reported so far this year
According to the sources, at least seven patients, including a SIDH&RC worker who is believed to have contracted the infection from the hospital, are currently under treatment for mpox at the healthcare facility. They all are residents of Karachi.
These cases include two workers employed at the fruit and vegetable market on Superhighway and a female patient, who reportedly contracted the infection from her husband.
First infant’s death in city
The sources said the latest death is the first death of an infant in Karachi.
Earlier, two patients with chronic lung and kidney diseases were admitted to the SIDH&RC with mpox.
They died during treatment but their chronic illnesses were recorded as the cause of their deaths.
With the latest death, the total number of mpox deaths recorded this year in Sindh has risen to 12 with 98 cases reported so far.
The sources said nearly all victims were either infants or newborns who contracted the infection from hospital/clinic settings lacking infection control protocols.
In April, an outbreak of mpox, which was earlier restricted to patients with a history of foreign travel, was reported from Khairpur, claiming the lives of at least seven infants. The babies were under treatment in the intensive care units of two hospitals. Investigations showed that these facilities lacked infection control protocols.
The district of Sukkur also saw two infants’ deaths from mpox.
Sources of transmission
According to experts, mpox transmission occurs through close contact with someone who has mpox, contaminated bedding, towels, medical instruments, surfaces or objects.
“People with mpox can spread it to animals or vice versa through close contact. Vertical and perinatal transmission is possible as well. Some people are infectious 1-4 days before getting symptomatic,” said Dr Samreen Sarfaraz, consultant infectious diseases and the Chairperson of Infection Control Services at the Indus Hospital.
Most patients, she said, recover fully within 2-4 weeks without treatment, while some develop complications.
“A patient remains infectious till his or her rashes are completely healed (and a fresh layer of healthy intact skin has formed underneath),” she said.
Prof Faisal Mahmood, senior infectious disease specialist at the Aga Khan University Hospital, said that mpox can spread through the air to a limited extent, but only when lesions or material from lesions are aerosolised.
“This may happen when a sample is taken or when lesions are in or around the airway. Compared with chickenpox, mpox is much less contagious. Chickenpox can spread through the air over a considerable distance and does not require direct contact. The same applies to measles,” he said.
He further added: “Mpox outbreaks can occur where infection prevention and control measures, such as environmental cleaning, are suboptimal, or where people are in close quarters or have significant body-to-body contact.”
It might be recalled that the Sindh Health Care Commission has recently sealed Ibn-i-Hassan Hospital at Malir 15 following a laboratory report confirming an mpox case in an infant, after concerns were identified regarding infection prevention and control practices.
SINCE September 2025, Pakistan has signed multilayered and multi-domain defence agreements with several Arab and Muslim states. It has signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia, the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) with Turkiye and Saudi Arabia, and a defence pact with Kuwait. Pakistan has recently signed another defence agreement — the Badr agreement. Pakistan, Turkiye, Qatar, and Indonesia are signatories to this pact.
These defence deals have, in the past year, increased Pakistan’s strategic relevance in the Middle East. Interestingly, each accord carries the explicit provision for joint defence production and investment in the defence industry. This clause in every defence pact reveals Islamabad’s long-term strategic objective of moving from a buyer-seller relationship to a co-production partnership with reliable partners in the region.
There are four primary strategic factors that have driven Islamabad’s emphasis on the joint defence production clause in each defence pact.
The India factor remains the primary driver. New Delhi’s defence budget now exceeds $80 billion, and its rapid induction of advanced platforms has widened the qualitative gap. Joint production arrangements with middle powers are likely to allow Pakistan to accelerate defence modernisation without bearing the full research and development cost. By manufacturing components and subsystems domestically, Pakistan can sustain a higher operational tempo and maintain credible conventional deterrence.
Islamabad believes that strategic parity in South Asia does not require numerical equivalence. It primarily requires the ability to absorb, adapt, and indigenise technology at a pace that may prevent New Delhi from achieving decisive superiority over Islamabad. These defence deals, therefore, function as a force-multiplier for Pakistan’s conventional and strategic capabilities.
Pakistan’s defence pacts over the past year have increased its strategic relevance.
Islamabad’s second strategic objective is the diversification of defence suppliers and reduced reliance of its defence supply chain on Western weapons.
Historically, Islamabad has relied on Chinese weapons but the extent of dependency has increased significantly in the last two decades. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has noted that this dependency is nearly 80 per cent. Although Pakistan and China enjoy unprecedented trust and depth in their all-weather strategic relationship, in theoretical terms, heavy reliance on any single external source worries Islamabad.
Similarly, Islamabad is increasingly seeking to decouple its military procurement from Western-reliant supply chains. This approach is rooted in Pakistan’s historically bitter experiences with sudden embargoes and sanctions, alongside Islamabad’s broader resistance to the West’s tendency to use defence exports as political leverage over the Global South during geopolitical crises.
Primarily, Islamabad is eager to cultivate robust, non-Western defence partnerships to secure reliable and uninterrupted arms supplies free from the influence of foreign powers. By integrating affluent Saudi and Qatari capital with the technologically advanced Turkish weapons industry, Pakistan is building an insulated, collaborative defence network with the middle powers to achieve this strategic objective. Islamabad believes that these defence deals, alongside its strategic alliance with China, may allow Islamabad to minimise its conventional vulnerabilities, help modernise its armed forces, and ultimately achieve a much higher degree of long-term strategic autonomy.
Moreover, Islamabad is acutely aware that the intensifying US-China strategic competition will make it increasingly difficult to maintain a purely China-centric defence supply chain in the long run. Therefore, by building parallel defence production partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkiye, and Indonesia, Pakistan is creating a middle-power buffer to avoid unwanted political pressure from the US. Interestingly, these countries are not fully aligned with either Washington or Beijing, and provide Islamabad greater room for manoeuvre.
Third, the economic factor equally occupies the strategic motivations of Islamabad. Pakistan wants to enhance its ability to modernise the defence production industry and increase defence exports. Pakistan’s official defence exports stood at approximately $280m in 2024. The recently concluded deals can significantly enhance defence exports to $650-700m by 2027, crossing the $1bn mark by 2030.
The Gulf states, seeking to reduce their own dependence on Western suppliers, constitute the most immediate and lucrative market for Pakistani defence exports. Joint ventures under the Badr agreement, MJDA and SMDA are designed to produce systems that meet the Gulf’s operational requirements, while carrying Pakistani certification, and, crucially, a lower price tag. Successful penetration of these markets would generate much-needed foreign exchange for Pakistan, create skilled employment, and justify further capital investment in the domestic defence industry.
Beyond the Gulf, there is also potential for niche exports to African and Central Asian countries that face similar budgetary constraints and seek cost-effective, reliable platforms.
The fourth objective linked to the third is to attract foreign direct investment to Pakistan’s defence sector. The joint production clauses are structured to encourage equity participation rather than simple technology licensing. Early commitments already indicate potential inflows of $1.2-1.5bn over the next five years in manufacturing facilities, testing ranges, and human capital development. These investments will upgrade the physical infrastructure of Pakistan’s public-sector defence industry. These inflows can stimulate related industries, including electronics, metallurgy, and software, while creating thousands of high-skill jobs for individuals who would otherwise migrate overseas.
Time will tell whether these defence deals can deliver a meaningful technology transfer. The most important question is whether such a multipronged approach can genuinely enhance Pakistan’s long-term strategic autonomy or will merely redistribute its dependencies. It is also unclear to what extent these defence deals can genuinely reduce Pakistan’s strategic vulnerabilities.
However, despite these uncertainties, these defence deals will bring critical capital and technical know-how, while reducing vulnerability to external supply shocks. Yet Islamabad must calibrate its exposure with precision. Over-commitment in the complex security theatres of the Middle East can risk entangling Pakistan in conflicts whose political and military logic lies beyond Islamabad’s core interests. Therefore, Pakistan must pursue these opportunities with strategic clarity and within well-defined red lines.
The writer is a strategic analyst of international security. The views expressed are his own.
ISLAMABAD: Bestway Group on Saturday launched Chinese automaker Geely Auto in Pakistan, acquiring the Proton plant at Port Qasim, Karachi, for assembly.
Bestway Automotive, Geely’s sole authorised distributor, will handle sales and after-sales service.
The Group Managing Director, Irfan Sheikh, said the company would focus on localisation and build a charging network to support its long-term presence.
The launch includes three models: the EX2 compact electric hatchback, the EX5 electric SUV, and the Starray EM-i with range-extended EV technology.
Bestway said it has invested over $350 million in Pakistan and created 20,000 jobs in the last three years.
Geely Auto International Corporation Vice President Evin Ye said Pakistan was Geely’s first market in South Asia, adding that it was the only automaker with a low-orbit satellite network.
DOES any such initiative exist in our country, or is it a figment of my imagination? For sure, there is an initiative for remittances — but not for exports. One wonders about the presence of one and the strange absence of the other.
Exports are stagnating, and remittances are rising. Are exports falling because of unwise policies or despite them? Are remittances rising because of good policy initiatives or despite them?
The point here is not to denigrate the remittances initiative or its continually renewed push, but to emphasise that exports should be given greater policy priority than remittances — because, in some growth-promoting way, exports matter far more than remittances. Here we explore the reasons.
This article focuses on increasing exports, not reducing remittances. In fact, remittances should continue to be promoted. Both exports and remittances matter to our economy. Both help contain the current account deficit.
Exports are driven by agricultural, industrial, and services output — sectors that already provide a direct impetus to employment in the country. This impetus also has an indirect impact on the economy through spending by household members employed in export industries.
Remittances follow increased output in foreign countries that employ Pakistani workers and pay them abroad. Part of their overseas earnings/ savings is sent home to their families.
The economic impact of remittances is indirect and arises from spending by remittance-receiving families. Hence, both help fill the gap in the current account, but the growth impact of exports is both direct and indirect, while it is only indirect for remittances.
Another, far more crucial point is that increasing exports to raise the economy’s productivity is paramount for growth. This is not true for rising remittances in Pakistan, although it is theoretically possible if a larger proportion of remittances goes towards export production.
Our policymakers seem to have forgotten the importance of exports. A policy to increase exports is more likely to raise productivity than a policy to increase remittances. Increased productivity can fuel long-term sustainable growth. Exporting exposes domestic firms to international competition, better management practices, international quality standards, global supply chains, and new technologies. There is considerable empirical evidence that exporters tend to be more productive and that export expansion can generate productivity gains. For example, the World Bank reports that a 10 per cent increase in exports across its cross-country sample was associated with higher employment, earnings, and productivity.
Another point to note is that exports are always preceded by the actual rise in production and employment (direct impact), as well as the indirect impact through consumption made possible by spending of wages by export-related employees. Contrast this with remittances, whose economic impact is not only indirect but also follows the receipt of remittances.
This means that prioritising sustained export growth would create more employment in the country and reduce the desperation of unemployed people pushed abroad to find jobs, even at the risk of their lives. At the same time, increasing exports would have boosted the productivity our economy so badly needs. This is why remittances should not be seen as a substitute for exports. Exports should be promoted with more vigour than remittances.
In terms of promoting growth, exports matter far more than remittances.
Our analysts tend to blame high unemployment almost entirely on high population growth. The fact is that our unwise economic policies are at the root of frequent economic crises that cause growth and productivity to decline. The resulting rise in joblessness leads to greater migration abroad, which, in turn, drives remittances up. Of course, Pakistan’s remittance initiative has helped. But if we had implemented prudent policies that avoided various crises, exports as a proportion of GDP would have risen much faster than remittances.
The export-to-GDP ratio peaked at 17.3pc in 1992 (according to World Bank data). It went down to only 10pc of GDP in 2025. The trajectory of the fall was not linear. Every onslaught of a balance-of-payments crisis precipitated a large decline. It fell to 9.6pc of GDP in 2000 in the wake of the 1998-99 crisis. With more prudent policies after the crisis, it recovered somewhat — only to decline again when imprudent policies followed, leading to other crises between 2000 and now.
In contrast, our remittances have been rising almost consistently during this period as a proportion of GDP. Remittances dipped from 3.2pc of GDP in 1992 to 1.1pc of GDP in 2000, then rose to 9.9pc.
The presence of a falling trend in exports and a rising trend in remittances indicates that exports always respond positively to prudent economic policies, while remittances largely show autonomous growth.
Refinements in the banking infrastructure have indeed helped to increase remittances, but economic policies also played a role that pushed people into boats to find employment abroad. Subsequent remittance growth has largely occurred despite these economic policies.
Pakistan’s export potential is much higher than its current level suggests. The simplest way to estimate what the level of exports could have been in 2026 is to assume the export-to-GDP ratio of 1992 (17.3pc). This translates to exports valued at $78bn, compared with the actual export value of $41bn (FY26 State Bank data).
Frequent balance-of-payments crises in our country seem to have clouded the thinking of our policymakers. When they think about exports or remittances or even foreign investment, they only think in terms of foreign exchange earnings or inflows that fill a gap in the balance-of-payments.
Constant firefighting and pressing short- and mid-term foreign financing needs have created a policy psyche that is obsessed with mobilising foreign exchange liquidity and has forgotten productivity and growth. Exports are badly in need of an initiative based on collective policy expertise in the country.
The writer is a former deputy governor of the State Bank of Pakistan.
AS speculation grows regarding fresh US-Israeli aggression against Iran, major Muslim states of the wider Middle East, as well as European powers, have clearly expressed their lack of appetite for any such misadventure.
Meeting in Istanbul on Friday under the ‘R4+E3’ umbrella, the foreign ministers of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkiye, the UK, Germany, and France discussed several global hotspots, including Iran and Ukraine. Italy also participated in the meeting. The Turkish foreign minister said that “no one supports” military intervention in Iran at this moment, while France’s top diplomat said any escalation “would only have losers”, besides increasing oil prices, which are already high.
There is good reason for the international community to be worried. Strong signals are emerging from Tel Aviv and Washington that the US and Israel are planning a new assault on Iran, reportedly after the American midterms on Nov 3 — perhaps even earlier.
US President Donald Trump has himself said that “we may do another little Epic Fury”, referring to the name America gave to the aggression launched in February. While the US leader is known for his bluster and often non-serious threats, in this regard he may actually mean what he has said.
The US has been sending more troops and military equipment to the Middle East, and American and Israeli forces have reportedly rehearsed attack plans. Tel Aviv is particularly enthused about going after Iran again.
Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results each time is equated with folly. But arrogance has blinded both the US and Israel to this reality.
Israel had first attacked Iran in October 2024, while both the US and the Zionist state initiated two more aggressive operations against the Islamic Republic, in June 2025 and February 2026. These attacks, particularly the assault launched this year, inflicted huge damage on Iran, decimating its military, political, and religious leadership. But the country regrouped, defended itself, and fought back against the aggressors. The Iranians have reaffirmed that any new attack will be met with “offensive” measures.
All of this is cause for alarm. The Gulf states that host American facilities will again be in the line of fire, which is why Muslim countries have warned against a new conflict. But will the war lobbies in Washington and Tel Aviv listen?
Many governments and most people of the Middle East are tired of war, and want to rebuild their lives and economies. If conflict and bloodshed return, the shockwaves caused by disrupted energy and trade flows will leave few economies unscathed.
Therefore, America should abandon its plans to further destabilise the region. Instead, it should rein in its ally Israel and its bloodthirsty leaders.
• Couple refuses to record statements under Section 342 of CrPC; judge directs them to respond at next hearing on Monday • Defence seeks delay in verdict pending IHC ruling on transfer plea
ISLAMABAD: While offering yet another opportunity to human rights lawyer Imaan Zainab Hazir-Mazari and her husband Hadi Ali Chattha to record their statements in a security breach case, an anti-terrorism court (ATC) on Saturday warned them that a verdict could come even without their testimony if they refused.
ATC Judge Tahir Abbas Sipra, who conducted the proceedings at Adiala jail, issued the warning after both accused declined to record their statements under Section 342 (power to examine the accused) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) during Saturday’s hearing.
The judge directed the couple to record their statements at the next hearing and adjourned the case until Monday, Oct 26.
During Saturday’s proceedings, Hadi requested the court, “Let the state counsel record the statement under Section 342 on our behalf.”
However, the judge replied that recording statements under Section 342 was a matter between the court and the accused, adding that they would have to respond themselves. “We will not record the statement under Section 342,” Ms Mazari stated.
The judge warned that if the accused did not comply, the court would mention in its order that no response had been submitted.
Ms Mazari and Mr Chattha are facing a jail trial in a 2024 case pertaining to the alleged disruption of an international cricket team’s security route and incitement to public unrest. The couple, accused of removing barriers from the route, was indicted on Oct 7.
At the last hearing, a state-appointed counsel had cross-examined all prosecution witnesses. The court appointed Atif Mehmood as the state counsel to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, replacing Taimoor Janjua, who was dismissed from the case over his past conduct.
The court had ruled to appoint the state attorney after the defence counsel failed to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses.
Separately, the defence filed an application requesting the trial court to refrain from delivering a final judgement until the Islamabad High Court decided a petition seeking the transfer of the case to another court.
The application stated that the transfer petition was already pending before the IHC and requested that this development be made part of the trial court’s judicial record.
The defence also pointed out that the appointment of the state counsel had been challenged before the IHC. The application urged the trial court to defer its final decision until the high court ruled on the transfer petition.
KARACHI: Amid inflationary pressure from costly oil imports linked to the Middle East conflict, economic stakeholders have called for a 50- to 100-basis-point hike in interest rates to curb inflation.
The State Bank of Pakistan’s (SBP) Monetary Policy Committee is scheduled to meet on Monday, while the financial market is filled with speculation. However, it was observed that most of the financial experts believe a 50bps hike in the interest rate is imminent. The SBP’s policy rate is 11.5 per cent.
Analysts and bankers said the central bank appears to be caught between a rate hike and the long-awaited breakthrough in economic growth.
“I am sure of a 50bps increase in the interest rate, but the market requires a 100bps hike to tame rising inflation,” said Rashid Masood Alam, a senior banker.
Bankers say 100bps hike needed to tame inflation as Middle East conflict drives up oil import costs
He said the looming US attacks on Iran are another factor that may push inflation higher and prompt the central bank to deliver a rate hike.
In the first quarter of FY27, CPI inflation stood at 10.2pc, up from 4.3pc in the same period last year.
“A 50bps hike looks like the sensible middle ground. Enough to acknowledge the changing risks, without unnecessarily damaging growth,” said Faisal Mamsa, CEO of Tresmark.
A 50bps hike may help preserve confidence and monetary stability but the longer-term challenge is considerably bigger, he said, adding that a100bps hike would increase borrowing costs for the government and private sector, with limited additional benefit over a measured 50bps increase.
All key central banks, including the Reserve Bank of India, have raised interest rates, while the IMF expects global inflation to reach 4.7pc in 2026, with a 4.1pc projection for 2027. Inflation is proving harder to contain than previously expected.
Experts said the government has decided to pursue growth after achieving sustainability, but many factors are against this approach. The primary concern is the escalating war in the region, rising oil prices, and serious problems for both exports and imports as shipping costs reach their peak. A larger hike would make borrowing and investment even more difficult.
“Pakistan has become better at maintaining stability, but we also need to find a way to grow without losing it,” said Mr Mamsa.
At the same time, the industry is on the other side, demanding a cut in interest rates to bolster economic activity.
“Raising interest rates merely in the name of controlling inflation would not prove effective in any way and would turn out to be a failed measure, the burden of which is always borne by traders and industrialists,” said Pakistan Chemicals and Dyes Merchants Association Chairman Saleem Mukati.
Korangi Association of Trade and Industry and SITE Association of Industry also demanded that the interest rate be brought down to single digits.
QUETTA: Balochistan Chief Minister Sarfraz Bugti claimed that no-go areas did not exist in the restive province and that lawmakers regularly visited their constituencies to attend public events.
Speaking at an open court during his visit to North Dera Bugti on Saturday, the CM said the government had taken concrete steps to ensure there were no no-go areas in the province.
He said resolving public grievances and providing basic facilities to people were among the government’s top priorities, adding that open courts were intended to allow citizens to present their complaints directly to the government and ensure that the relevant departments were held accountable.
He directed officials to act promptly on public complaints and ensure that people’s problems were resolved without delays. Highlighting the importance of regional development, CM Bugti said efforts had been made to secure the release of federal funds for a highway linking Taunsa in Punjab with Balochistan.
He said directives had also been issued to conduct a survey for the construction of a road linking the Chhapar National Highway with Kharar Buzdar. Upon completion, the project would provide Balochistan with an alternative route to Punjab.
• Bhagwant Mann says World Punjabi Conference organisers invited him; doubts BJP-led government will let him visit • Speaker Sandhwan jokes, ‘If you get permission, take us along as well’
INDIAN Punjab Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann expressed desire on Friday to attend the World Punjabi Conference in Lahore, claiming he had received an invitation, while taking a jab at the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) over whether it would allow him to visit Pakistan, according to a BBC report.
The 4th International Punjabi Conference is scheduled for Nov 27-29 in Lahore.
Mann made the remarks while addressing the Indian Punjab assembly. “They do not even let me go to France or Japan. How will they let me go to Pakistan?” he said, in a jibe at the BJP-led government in Delhi.
In a video posted on his official YouTube channel, Mann said many poets from Indian Punjab would travel to the conference. “I also want to go, because our roots are one, our problems are also similar,” he said.
The CM mentioned the invitation after reciting verses by Pakistani Punjabi poet Tajammul Kaleem. He said he had spoken to Pakistani Punjabi poet, Baba Najmi and received the invitation, adding that people on both sides of the border shared a culture and should interact.
Speaker Kultar Singh Sandhwan replied, “If you get permission, take us along as well.”
At this, voices of some other members also rose from within the house, endorsing what the speaker said.
Mann also demanded the reopening of the Kartarpur corridor, sacred to Sikhs.
Ties between India and Pakistan have been extremely strained since a four-day battle last year, with limited trade and diplomatic contact. Social media users in both countries called Mann’s wish pleasant despite the chill, according to BBC.
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