Brazil’s Federal Police on Monday notified Senator Flávio Bolsonaro that he must surrender his passports and comply with a ban on leaving the country, measures ordered by Supreme Federal Court (STF) justice Alexandre de Moraes a day after Bolsonaro lost the presidential run-off to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
RELATED: Flávio Bolsonaro’s Party Recognizes Lula’s Victory in Brazil
Federal Police agents located the senator on Monday morning near his father’s home in Brasília, where former President Jair Bolsonaro is under house arrest. Police told Bolsonaro on Monday morning that he had 24 hours to hand over his documents. The order also bars him from contacting lawyer Willer Tomaz, who is under investigation for alleged money laundering.
The ruling was signed on Sunday night, after the results of that day’s runoff were announced. Flávio Bolsonaro, the far-right candidate, had lost the second round to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
Flávio Bolsonaro diz que foi intimado pela PF a entregar seus passaportes por decisão de Alexandre de Moraes pic.twitter.com/Ngvh19Pnmk
— Sam Pancher (@SamPancher) October 26, 2026
Text reads: “Flávio Bolsonaro says that he was subpoenaed by the federal police to surrender his passports by decision of Alexandre de Moraes.”
Flávio Bolsonaro alleged that the justice’s decision responds to remarks made last Friday by his brother, former congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, who said in an interview that the senator should leave Brazil and challenge the vote count in the event of a defeat, according to the senator.
The Liberal Party’s senator denied any intention to flee, called the ruling an attempt at political intimidation and said he will hand over the documents while his lawyers file an appeal. “I never said that,” he wrote on his official channels, referring to leaving the country. “Is that a reason to take away my passport? Is this justice?,” he added.
Legal experts typically note that travel bans and passport seizures are precautionary measures and not findings of guilt.
The order is tied to two cases pending at the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court. The first, led by Moraes and originating in proceedings in Rio Grande do Sul, examines alleged money laundering with Tomaz through betting companies and payment platforms. Last week the court ordered the freezing of up to 6 billion reais in assets linked to Tomaz, the suspension of his business activities and the lifting of his bank, tax and foreign-exchange secrecy.
Federal Police found that the senator appeared with a “master” user profile on an account of the firm Alcazar Holdings, and detected transactions of almost 130 million reais between March and May 2025 in accounts linked to the lawyer, the source says. Tomaz’s defense rejected the accusations and challenged the proportionality of the asset freezes.
The second case, assigned to justice André Mendonça, looks into alleged irregularities in raising private funds for the film “Dark Horse,” which focuses on Jair Bolsonaro’s political career. Investigators are analyzing audio and digital messages that link Flávio Bolsonaro to dealings with Daniel Vorcaro, the former owner of Master Bank, and police have asked for a 90-day extension to finish financial examinations and process international cooperation requests. Bolsonaro has acknowledged seeking funds for the film in earlier reports in this conversation and denies offering favors.
After Lula’s victory, Bolsonaro will be without public office from February 1, 2027, the first time in more than 20 years that he will be outside state service as he did not run for Senate reelection.
The Supreme Federal Court will keep jurisdiction over the cases against him, under a doctrine the court set in March 2025, approved by seven votes to four and complemented in May 2026, under which alleged crimes committed in office stay with the Supreme Court even after officials leave their posts.
From 2027, the senator will be without parliamentary immunity or public office, a condition that increases his exposure in the ongoing proceedings. The defense’s appeal and the pending expert reports mark the immediate path of the case.
Former Colombian President Gustavo Petro has been accused of trapping and exploiting 48 women for presidential parties, with officials alleging they were hired "just to be with President Petro."
Carlos Andrés Ríos, director of Colombia’s Administrative Department of the Presidency (DAPRE), claimed Petro oversaw a system that used service contracts to "systematically" control and weaponize the women, channeling public salaries in exchange for intimate relationships.
"We are going to prove to the Colombian people how the Casa de Nariño was unfortunately set up, organized, and tailored for something completely different — not to govern, but to party there every single day, bring in women," Rios said during a congressional hearing last week.
Petro issued a statement Sunday denying that he had used his public office to obtain sex.
"I have never given out a contract in exchange for sexual relations. I would vomit on myself if I ever did such a thing," Petro said in a post on X.
He argued that while his office provided state-funded aid programs for vulnerable women, he claimed that it is fundamentally different from giving contracts to individuals in exchange for sexual favors.
TRUMP-BACKED 'EL TIGRE' LOOKS TO CRUSH CARTELS, END COLOMBIA'S SOCIALIST ERA IN PIVOTAL ELECTION
"Helping poor women, female heads of households, and those engaged in sex work so that they have different life options — as I have demonstrated in public administration through concrete and funded programs — is something very different from giving out contracts in exchange for sexual relations. No person who has participated in those public programs will ever be able to say that I have done anything of the sort," he said.
Petro also acknowledged in the statement that he had occasionally visited establishments where sex work took place when he was young, saying he regretted the experiences and had stopped visiting such places decades ago.
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"When I was very young, I occasionally visited places where sex work was practiced. There, I experienced that paying for sex felt dirty to me, and I perceived the sadness of the men and women who attended those places. That is why I stopped visiting them decades ago," he said.
The accusations come amid broader criticism of Petro over alleged misuse of public funds, depletion of national budgets and drug trafficking.
Petro has dismissed the allegations as politically motivated attacks by figures such as President Donald Trump and Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella.
"After attempting to portray me as corrupt and a drug trafficker — an intention expressed by people like Abelardo de la Espriella and Donald Trump, without being able to present a single piece of evidence of corruption or drug trafficking, because I have never stolen a single peso from the public treasury and I have fought for over two decades against drug traffickers, exposing their political ties," Petro said.
Fox News Digital reached out to the White House for comment.
RT | October 26, 2026
The EU faces a growing budget squeeze after borrowing hundreds of billions for pandemic recovery and Ukraine. Rising repayment costs threaten future spending and rushed payouts raise fraud risks, its chief auditor has warned. Brussels is nevertheless seeking billions more for Kiev.
Speaking to Rapporteur, Tony Murphy, president of the European Court of Auditors, described the budget situation as a “pressure cooker,” with EU debt potentially reaching €1 trillion (1.12 trillion) by the end of 2027. The bloc’s debt stood at €739 billion (825 billion) in 2025, up from €601 billion ($671 billion) a year earlier.
“You have to pay it back at some time. It’s not free money,” Murphy said. He emphasized that “it’s real money that has to be paid back.”
However, concerns have repeatedly been raised about the EU getting back any of the billions it has spent on Ukraine, including its recent €90 billion ($100 billion) loan, which Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico recently slammed as “gifts” that Ukraine will “never pay back.”
Kiev is required to repay the loan only after receiving Russian reparations – something Moscow has vehemently ruled out. Ukraine’s own former Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov has also acknowledged that such scenarios are “just fairy tales” and that Brussels will never get its money back, which is being actively embezzled by Kiev.
The EU, however, must still repay the money it borrowed. According to Murphy, servicing pandemic debt alone would consume 8% of the bloc’s proposed 2028–2034 budget and governments have yet to agree on new revenue to cover the repayments, leaving Brussels with less money for other priorities.
The squeeze comes as households and businesses continue to face high energy costs following Europe’s break with Russian supplies, compounded by the US-Israeli war on Iran.
Murphy also warned about how quickly money is being spent. He called the requirement to process €90 billion in remaining pandemic recovery payments by December “crazy,” describing the impending payouts as a “tsunami.”
Pressure to meet deadlines could also encourage weaker checks and more abuse, he said, as European prosecutors are already investigating hundreds of suspected fraud cases involving recovery funds.
Despite the crisis, Brussels is again looking for more money for Kiev after Vladimir Zelensky requested another €70 billion ($78 billion) for 2027, beyond existing commitments. European Council President Antonio Costa said Friday that the EU expects to cover roughly two-thirds, with a decision potentially coming in November.
Princes and Thieves, a new book by investigative journalist Matthew Cole, may open a rabbit hole into financial connections between Middle Eastern dictators and President Donald Trump's family. Cole accuses Emirati monarch Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) of sending billions of dollars to various mercenaries and political operators, including Jared Kushner, son-in-law to President Donald Trump. Cole's reporting combines well-documented connections with secondhand accounts from anonymous sources.
On Thursday, Vanity Fair published an excerpt from the book, reporting that Dutch military intelligence hacked into Kushner's phone in 2018 and discovered hundreds of millions of dollars in bank transfers connected to MBZ. Also on Thursday, Kushner published a letter from his lawyers to Cole categorically denying the "incredible and false" allegations in the book. "Mr. Kushner never accessed foreign accounts and always followed all rules and regulations and only pursued goals that were in the best interest of the United States as directed by the President of the United States," they wrote.
Cole had originally written on his blog that the book was scheduled for release on October 27, but the publication date was pushed forward over the weekend.
The book purports to tie Kushner to a vast web of Emirati influence operations around the world. In Cole's telling, which matches other journalists' accounts, MBZ wants to reshape the Middle East and eastern Africa into an alliance of U.S.-backed dictatorships, where "tolerance" is enforced through high-tech surveillance and "democracy" is a synonym for terrorism. MBZ's use of mercenaries in pursuit of these goals is well-documented. So is Kushner's personal affinity with the Emirati monarch and his business ties with the Arab monarchies.
Soon after Trump won the 2016 election, MBZ held a widely reported meeting with Kushner. According to the book—and according to much of that earlier reporting—the monarch complained about the Obama administration's failure to back Arab regimes against popular revolutions, its decision to end the Iraq War, and its diplomacy with Iran.
Going much further than past reporting, Cole now claims Kushner was personally involved in MBZ's mercenary operations. MBZ and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman put a collective $2 billion into Emirati and Israeli bank accounts which were managed (but not technically owned) by Kushner, according to Cole's sources. Those same sources claim that parts of this secret "slush fund" went to Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, American military contractor Erik Prince, and Cuban hitman Felipe Vidal.
Haftar, a former CIA asset, became a general in Libya's 2011 revolution and then attempted to overthrow the new government with Emirati backing in 2014. Despite a 2020 ceasefire, his forces continue to control much of Libya. Prince, founder of the military contractor formerly known as Blackwater, moved to the UAE and helped build a secret army of Colombian mercenaries. He sued Cole for defamation after Cole reported on Prince's role in helping Haftar, but a judge threw out the case. Cole's sources claimed that Vidal, a self-described "hit man," helped the United Arab Emirates (UAE) fake an Iranian attack on oil tankers in May 2019, meant to provoke Trump into war.
Kushner's lawyers have denied any relationship with any of those three men, apart from a single meeting with Prince after the 2016 election. (According to Cole, both Vidal and Prince refused to comment for the book.) The position of the U.S. government is that the May 2019 incident was a genuine Iranian attack, not an Emirati false flag.
After the Vanity Fair article was published last week, Israeli negotiator Gershon Baskin pointed out in The Jerusalem Post that the Central Bank of Israel "does not offer private banking services to individuals," which would make it impossible for Kushner's money to be deposited in the Central Bank of Israel, as Cole claimed. The book addresses that argument, claiming that the money was deposited "in what would appear to be a government account," with Kushner and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu jointly authorizing transactions.
The Abraham Accords, which include an alliance between Israel and the UAE, have often been touted as a way for the U.S. to "spend less time and less resources in the Middle East," in the words of Vice President J.D. Vance. But Cole argues that the UAE actually used its alliance to entangle American interests in a future conflict. The book states that Kushner set up "a rainy-day defense fund" for war with Iran, using Emirati money deposited in a separate Central Bank of Israel account.
Cole also claims to have evidence that Kushner was on the take from the UAE's regional frenemy Qatar. In 2017, the UAE and Saudi Arabia issued an ultimatum for Qatar to rein in its foreign policy and blockaded the small nation. The Intercept later reported that Kushner's father had sought a Qatari bailout for the family real estate business just before the crisis, and the Qatari-linked company Brookfield ended up providing the needed investment in August 2018, leading to a congressional investigation into the deal.
Democrats are still digging for information on Kushner's business ties to Qatar, but three sources told Cole that the Qatari royal family authorized and paid for the Brookfield deal. The Qatari government "asked the White House how to resolve the blockade. And the Kushners kept saying, 'We have this great property that needs investment.' Eventually, the Qataris realized the only way to settle the blockade was to buy the building," a former U.S. intelligence officer said.
Kushner's lawyers write that they have "no evidence that Qatar impacted the investment decision. Any suggestion of his involvement in the transaction or any allegation of quid pro quo with the Qatari government is false and defamatory."
Other parts of the book are better-documented. Cole obtained a draft of Prince's autobiography, text messages from one of Prince's colleagues, and emails from Emirati government adviser George Nader, who was convicted of fraudulently funneling money into Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign. If nothing else, the book is a comprehensive account of the UAE's unofficial empire and its American ties. But the most explosive claims about Kushner's involvement in those activities rest on anonymous sources, making it a matter of Cole's word against Kushner's.
"I considered the responses from Kushner's attorneys carefully and consulted multiple sources about them. During the five years I have spent working on this book, I have tried to keep an open mind, and I am confident that my reporting is accurate. Kushner's lawyers' responses did not change that conclusion," Cole writes in the book's epilogue.
The post New Book Says Jared Kushner Funneled Money to Middle East Mercenaries. Kushner Denies It. appeared first on Reason Magazine.
The parliamentary election of 25 October represents more than the rejection of an increasingly centralised political leadership. It raises a fundamental question about the Serbian state: whether the institutions shaped by Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) can function independently of the political organisation that controlled them.
According to preliminary figures released by Serbia’s Republic Electoral Commission, the Student List secured 52.54 per cent of the vote against 39.29 per cent for Vučić’s United Serbia coalition, with 8,077 of 8,392 polling stations counted. Projections give the students approximately 140 seats in the 250-member National Assembly, enough to govern without coalition partners.
Vučić had resigned from the presidency in September, hoping to return to power as prime minister. Instead, the election deprived him of the parliamentary majority necessary to complete that manoeuvre. His concession has substantially reduced the immediate prospect of a disputed transfer of power, although the election results still require formal certification.
But losing an election and losing control of a political system are not necessarily the same thing.
Vučić’s political career provides important context for understanding the significance of his defeat.
He entered politics through the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Šešelj, and served as information minister in Slobodan Milošević’s government from 1998. During that period, Serbian authorities employed restrictive media legislation against independent newspapers and broadcasters, imposing substantial financial penalties and limiting critical reporting.
After Milošević’s removal in 2000, Vučić remained politically active. His subsequent association with the Serbian Progressive Party, formed in 2008 following a split within the Radical Party, allowed him to reposition himself as a politician promising economic modernisation and European integration.
This transformation proved remarkably successful.
The SNS came to power in 2012, and Vučić subsequently served as prime minister and president. Serbia attracted foreign investment, undertook major infrastructure projects and maintained its formal ambition of joining the European Union. At the same time, political authority became increasingly concentrated around Vučić and his associates.
The distinction between Serbia under Milošević and Serbia under Vučić should not be overlooked. The former governed during the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia and pursued policies that brought international isolation. The latter operated through electoral institutions, international economic partnerships and a declared European orientation.
Nevertheless, Vučić’s political career illustrates a continuity in personnel and political methods that Serbia’s post-2000 democratic transition never entirely resolved.
The OSCE’s assessment of Serbia’s 2023 parliamentary elections documented advantages enjoyed by the governing party, political pressure on public employees, media bias and the misuse of state resources. These findings demonstrated how electoral competition could continue while the conditions under which parties competed became increasingly unequal.
The Student List has now broken that pattern at the ballot box. Whether it can prevent its reconstruction remains uncertain.
The immediate origins of the political upheaval lie in the November 2024 collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad, which killed 16 people.
The disaster became a symbol of wider concerns about public procurement, construction oversight and political accountability. Demonstrations demanding responsibility subsequently developed into a nationwide movement challenging the government’s legitimacy.
As EU Today previously examined, the protests exposed a deeper conflict between Serbian society and institutions widely perceived by demonstrators as serving political interests rather than the public.
Unlike established opposition parties, the student movement did not depend on a familiar political leader or traditional party machinery. It mobilised university communities, academics, professionals and citizens who had previously remained outside organised political activity.
Its central demand was institutional accountability rather than a comprehensive ideological programme.
That distinction was crucial. By concentrating on corruption, democratic standards and the functioning of the state, the movement attracted voters with differing views on nationalism, foreign policy and European integration.
However, the same diversity that helped it win the election could complicate governing. Its candidates must now agree on economic priorities, ministerial appointments, foreign relations and the extent of institutional reform.
A protest movement can unite around opposition to a political leader. A government must reach agreement on decisions that inevitably divide its supporters.
One of the most important consequences of the election concerns Serbia’s relationship with Moscow.
Throughout his presidency, Vučić cultivated the image of a leader capable of maintaining productive relations with Brussels, Moscow and Beijing simultaneously.
Serbia continued its EU accession negotiations and benefited substantially from European investment and trade. Yet Belgrade consistently refused to join the principal European sanctions against Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The contradiction was particularly striking because Serbia’s economic relationship with the EU vastly outweighs its trade with Russia.
The European Commission’s assessment found that the EU accounted for 58.3 per cent of Serbia’s total trade in 2024. European markets, investment and regulatory structures have therefore become fundamental to the Serbian economy.
Vučić nevertheless preserved close political links with Moscow, benefiting domestically from nationalist sentiment and Russia’s diplomatic support for Serbia’s position on Kosovo.
He also attempted to demonstrate that relations with Russia did not preclude cooperation with Ukraine.
In June 2025, Vučić travelled to Odesa for the Ukraine–Southeast Europe Summit, where he met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and reaffirmed Serbia’s support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Serbia provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine but declined to sign the summit’s joint declaration. Its continuing refusal to impose sanctions on Moscow remained the most substantial distinction between Serbian policy and the EU position.
Yet a Student List government would not necessarily reverse that policy.
In September, the movement explicitly declared its opposition to imposing sanctions on Russia, referring to Serbia’s historical experience with international restrictive measures.
Vučić nevertheless predicted during his concession speech that the incoming government would introduce sanctions against Moscow by March or April. He also attributed his defeat to interference by European governments and what he called the American “deep state”, supposedly opposed to President Donald Trump.
His prediction about sanctions was therefore inconsistent with the movement’s publicly stated position.
This exposes an important misconception about Serbia’s political transformation. Opposition to Vučić does not automatically translate into support for every element of EU foreign policy. Serbian public attitudes towards Russia, Kosovo and national sovereignty extend beyond the electorate traditionally associated with the SNS.
The new government may pursue closer integration with European institutions while retaining positions that Brussels considers incompatible with membership.
The challenge extends beyond diplomatic relationships.
Russia’s presence in Serbia includes strategic energy interests, notably its controlling shareholding in Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), which operates the country’s principal oil refinery.
American sanctions against the Russian-owned company have complicated its operations, while negotiations over the proposed acquisition of the Russian stake by Hungary’s MOL Group illustrate how energy security, foreign ownership and international sanctions have become interconnected.
For an incoming administration, reducing such dependencies will require commercial negotiations, regulatory oversight and alternative energy supplies. Political declarations cannot achieve these objectives on their own.
Equally important will be the examination of public contracts and relationships between political officeholders and businesses that benefited from government decisions.
The European Commission’s 2025 Serbia report identified persistent corruption concerns, insufficient transparency in major infrastructure procurement and weaknesses in institutional accountability.
Any investigation into alleged wrongdoing under Vučić must be independent, evidence-based and subject to judicial scrutiny. Allegations of corruption do not themselves establish criminal responsibility.
A government elected to restore the rule of law would undermine its own mandate if it replaced politically selective justice with prosecutions directed by a new political majority.
The central objective must be to ensure that prosecutors, courts and oversight bodies can investigate former as well as current officials without political interference.
For the European Union, the election provides an opportunity to reconsider its approach towards Belgrade.
For years, European institutions confronted a government that professed commitment to EU membership while resisting reforms considered essential to the accession process.
In July 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution stressing that Serbia’s negotiations should advance only when measurable improvements are achieved in the rule of law, judicial independence, media freedom and the fight against corruption. Parliament also called for alignment with EU sanctions against Russia.
The Student List’s victory may improve the prospects for domestic institutional reform, but the disagreement over sanctions remains unresolved. Brussels cannot assume that a new Serbian government will satisfy every accession requirement simply because it defeated Vučić.
Nor should it overlook the political significance of the result.
The movement’s strongest mandate concerns the restoration of public accountability. Supporting independent institutions, transparent procurement and genuinely competitive elections would address both Serbian public demands and longstanding EU concerns.
There is also the unresolved question of Kosovo. A change of government in Belgrade does not remove the political and constitutional difficulties surrounding relations with Pristina. The new leadership will inherit negotiations that have repeatedly stalled under previous administrations.
The EU will therefore need to distinguish between areas where rapid progress is possible and disputes that require more sustained diplomacy.
Serbia has removed one of the central figures of its post-Yugoslav political order from government. It has not yet demonstrated that the system surrounding him can be dismantled through constitutional means.
The immediate tasks are substantial: forming an effective cabinet, protecting the independence of prosecutors, scrutinising public expenditure, reforming media regulation and ensuring that state institutions no longer operate as extensions of the governing party.
A separate presidential election must also follow Vučić’s September resignation, adding another important stage to the transition.
The greatest danger is not simply that the former governing party could eventually return to office. Electoral competition must allow that possibility in any democracy.
The more consequential danger is that the political methods associated with Vučić’s administration could survive under different leadership.
Serbia’s experience after Milošević demonstrated that removing a dominant political figure does not necessarily eliminate the structures, interests and habits of government accumulated during his rule.
The student movement has now been given an opportunity to confront that unfinished transition.
Its success will ultimately be measured not by the political fate of Aleksandar Vučić, but by whether Serbia develops institutions capable of investigating misconduct, restricting the arbitrary use of power and operating independently of whichever party wins the next election.
That would represent a more fundamental transformation than the defeat of any single political leader.
Serbia’s student-led opposition has secured a decisive parliamentary victory over Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling party, according to preliminary results, ending 14 years of political dominance by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and opening a new chapter in the country’s politics.
RELATED: Serbia’s Vucic Concedes Victory to Opposition Students Party
Vučić acknowledged the defeat on Sunday, saying initial projections indicated that the Student List would win between 135 and 140 seats, compared with about 105 for his party. The result follows nearly two years of student-led demonstrations against corruption and what protesters describe as growing authoritarianism.
The Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), a non-governmental organization, projected that the Student List would win 139 seats after 56% of ballots had been counted, against 104 for the SNS. Unofficial estimates from polling institute Ipsos put the student movement at 140 seats and Vučić’s party at 103, down 26 seats from the 2023 parliamentary election, when it secured an absolute majority.
The setback was compounded by the failure of the Socialist Party, a longtime ally of Vučić, to clear the 3% threshold for parliamentary representation. The party previously held 18 seats. Preliminary estimates also gave three seats to Serbia’s Hungarian minority party and two to the Albanian minority list.
Turnout approached 70%, the highest since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992 and close to the record set in the 2000 parliamentary election.
The student movement grew out of protests that began in 2024, after 16 people died when a canopy collapsed at a railway station in Novi Sad. The disaster prompted mass demonstrations across Serbia, with protesters demanding accountability over the collapse and the construction work carried out by a Chinese company following a tendering process criticized for its lack of transparency.
Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, turning the demonstrations into a broader challenge to corruption and the concentration of political power. The student movement emerged as a nationwide opposition force and sustained pressure on Vučić’s government for nearly two years.
Vučić, who had led the country for 14 years, resigned as head of state in September to run for prime minister.
The preliminary results sparked celebrations across Belgrade, where thousands gathered to dance, chant slogans and set off flares and fireworks. Crowds shouted “Victory” and “Vučić is leaving” as people embraced and wept with joy.
Slavija Square, a focal point of the mass protests against the government, filled with supporters of the student movement. At Pioneers Park, between parliament and the presidential palace, hundreds of people tore down the fence surrounding the grounds and entered the public space.
The park had been closed to the public for months and periodically occupied by groups of masked Vučić supporters, who were accused of being used as a force to confront government opponents.
The celebrations underscored the scale of the political shift after more than a decade of SNS rule. Vučić had weathered previous opposition challenges, but the student movement turned sustained street protests into an electoral campaign that defeated his party.
The Student List has presented itself as an alternative to Vučić’s centralized model of leadership. It operates through a horizontal structure and has avoided putting forward a single public face, arguing that political decisions should be made from the bottom up rather than imposed from above.
Its slate of 250 candidates includes university professors, actors and farmers, many of them little known to the wider public.
Radomir Sajcic, a University of Belgrade professor representing the movement, celebrated the result at its headquarters. “Dear Serbia, tonight the voice of the people can be heard,” he declared. “Tonight we celebrate victory; tomorrow we will build the future.”
Sajcic also described the outcome as “a victory of courage over fear, a victory of hope over indifference, a victory of faith that Serbia can and must be different.”
The movement’s platform calls for restoring the separation of powers and the autonomy of the prosecutor general’s office, as well as increasing investment in health care and education. It also pledges to tackle corruption and individual privileges to boost public revenue, while promoting technological modernization across the economy, including agriculture.
Serbia’s score in Transparency International’s corruption index has deteriorated during Vučić’s tenure. The European Union has also raised concerns about the country’s declining adherence to the rule of law.
European institutions have welcomed the student movement’s victory, describing it as an opportunity to advance democratic reforms, strengthen the rule of law and combat corruption.
European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen congratulated the students and offered support for reforms and greater press freedom. Council of Europe Secretary-General Alain Berset highlighted Vučić’s acceptance of the results and his commitment to a peaceful democratic transition.
Today, the people of Serbia turned out in record numbers to shape their country’s future.
— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) October 25, 2026
Congratulations to the Student List on its victory in the parliamentary elections.
We stand ready to support reforms on the rule of law, media freedom, the fight against corruption and…
Montenegrin Prime Minister Milojko Spajić and Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar also congratulated the winners and expressed their willingness to cooperate with them.
The election could also affect Serbia’s relations with the European Union and Russia. Under Vučić, the country has pursued EU membership while maintaining close ties with the Kremlin. Serbia has been an official candidate for EU accession since 2012.
Before the vote, EU foreign policy spokesperson Christian Wigand said the bloc would monitor the election closely and stressed the need for a free, fair and transparent process.
The Student List has offered fewer details about its international priorities than about its domestic reform agenda. Available indications suggest it may maintain Serbia’s EU candidacy while continuing to oppose sanctions against Russia, although the movement has yet to clearly outline its foreign policy plans.
The student movement’s victory marks a major political turning point for Serbia after 14 years of Vučić’s dominance. Its ability to convert demands for accountability and institutional reform into a parliamentary majority has reshaped the country’s political landscape, but the incoming government’s approach to domestic reform and foreign relations remains uncertain.
Whoever controls Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation wields enormous influence over law enforcement, judges, and government officials. The EU wants Ukraine to reform it, and Ukraine’s government is likely to pass changes that satisfy monitoring requirements on paper while leaving the body effectively under the President’s Office’s control, the investigative outlet Texty reports.
The stakes are money and power at once. The State Bureau of Investigation, known by its Ukrainian initials DBR, investigates officials, judges, prosecutors, and soldiers. So choosing an independent director is one of the rule-of-law conditions the EU has tied to Ukraine’s 2026 and 2027 budget aid.
Yet the version the government may pass would change how the director is chosen only for the one after next, in 2032. Brussels wants the model used at the anti-corruption bureau NABU, where the chief cannot be confirmed without the votes of independent foreign experts.
Today a nine-member commission selects the director:
That leaves the foreign experts without a decisive vote and the President’s Office effectively choosing the winner. Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy promised in January that a reform bill would reach parliament within a month.
It is now October, and there is none.
Director Oleksii Sukhachov’s term ends this year, so his successor will be picked under the old rules.
Sukhachov has publicly argued that overhauling the bureau during the war would threaten the state.
The deadline to adopt the reform was October. To carry it out, the end of 2026. Miss it, and Ukraine risks reputational damage and the European funding it needs amid a budget deficit, money the EU has frozen before when anti-corruption guarantees slipped.
What makes the fight so bitter is that the bureau’s searches, seizures, and summonses are levers over individuals and whole institutions.
For example, NABU’s Operation Midas tapes, from the $100 million kickback case at the state nuclear company Energoatom, mention the bureau’s entire leadership. In March 2025, its investigators searched the commission that vets and appoints Ukraine’s judges, itself reformed with international experts, in what the commission called pressure that could stall the courts.
Cases against the bureau’s own officials, meanwhile, are handled by a unit inside the bureau. And its director sits under his own cloud: the outlet Slidstvo.Info reported that his brother bought 143 apartments cheaply from a developer. Nevertheless, a court banned publication, and eight newsrooms jointly ran the story.
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