© Ramil Sitdikov/Reuters
The Pentagon is reportedly aiming for U.S. military installations to be able to continue essential operations for at least 90 days, or roughly three months, without any external support. The installation of new small nuclear reactors and other infrastructure is key to this part of a larger plan called Fortress America. The main intent is to ensure America’s armed forces can remain functional and ready to protect the homeland in the face of any massive disruptions to power grids and other supply chains due to major conflicts or other crises. For years, TWZ has been sounding the alarm about the glaring vulnerabilities of America’s critical civilian energy infrastructure, including to drone swarms and cyberattacks, which could cripple key military capabilities right where they live.
Fox News was first to report on the 90-day base resiliency goal yesterday, citing documents it said it reviewed. This is part of the extremely wide-reaching Fortress America initiative the Pentagon announced last month, which covers everything from improved physical and cyber defenses at facilities to securing reliable access to critical defense industrial resources. The “Fortress” in Fortress America is technically an acronym that stands for Federal Operations for Resilience, Troop Resources, Energy Supply, and Survivability.
Today, at Secretary Hegseth’s direction, the Department of War is announcing FORTRESS America—a national insurance policy for the American homeland.
— Sean Parnell (@SeanParnellASW) September 30, 2026
Every major military installation in America will generate its own power.
We are bringing our critical supply chains home.
We… https://t.co/2kMQtw2r81 pic.twitter.com/Ptu8VQ5pv3
“Under FORTRESS, every major military installation in the continental United States would be expected to sustain essential operations independently for at least 90 days, including access to electricity, water, fuel and communications,” according to Fox.
Fox News’ story also includes comments about Fortress America from Pentagon chief spokesperson Sean Parnell, but it is unclear if he explicitly confirmed the 90-day target. TWZ has reached out for more information.
Parnell did put particular emphasis on the importance of reducing reliance on civilian power generation as part of the larger Fortress America plan. Previous reports have said that Parnell was key to formulating this initiative. He has also been discussed as a potential frontrunner to become the next Secretary of the Army.
“Power is combat now. Without electricity, you lose communications, water, logistics, assembly lines and just basic military command structures,” Parnell told Fox. “We don’t want to rely on standard civilian municipal infrastructure to run our national defense. We just simply can’t. It’s an intolerable risk.”
It should be pointed out here that some U.S. military bases do have their own power plants now, but this is not something that is far from universal across the board.
Secretary Pete Hegseth made similar comments when he first unveiled the Fortress America initiative during a speech to service members at the U.S. Marine Corps’ base in Quantico, Virginia, in September.
“We are launching Fortress America, a national insurance policy for the American homeland,” Hegseth said at that time. “Every major military installation in America is going to generate its own power, independent of the civilian grid. If an adversary takes down the grid by cyber attack, by sabotage, or by any means, our bases stay lit, our aircraft keep flying, our command centers never go dark.”
Fox News’ report says that “portable nuclear reactors,” as well as “large-scale battery storage and microgrids capable of disconnecting military installations from the civilian electrical grid,” are key elements of the plan to achieve this independence when it comes to generating electricity.
The U.S. military, in cooperation with the Department of Energy, has already been heavily investing in the development and installation of so-called microreactors at bases across the country. In August, the U.S. Army, in partnership with the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), notably cut new deals with five companies as part of a plan to install more than 20 microreactors at bases, starting in 2028. This effort, called the Janus program, is not limited to Army installations.
The video below offers an overview of one of several microreactor designs the U.S. military is currently pursuing.
Establishing new microgrids and other supporting energy infrastructure has also been an important focus for the U.S. military in recent years.
Details about how bases are expecting to maintain supplies of water and fuel, as well as communications connectivity, for 90 days or more are, as yet, still not entirely clear. All branches of the U.S. military have already been exploring new and novel options for ensuring the availability of water and fuel in future contingencies, though generally with more of an eye toward tactical operations. Relevant developments, including the possibility of using a process called carbon transformation to turn ambient air into fuel, could easily be applicable in a homeland defense scenario.
Fox News’ story also makes no mention of how sufficient food for personnel at these facilities would be sustained, but that would have to be part of the equation. In his remarks in September, Secretary Hegseth also made clear that making sure supply chains delivering munitions, medicine, and even blood would be unbroken in any future crisis was part of the Fortress America vision. As already mentioned, the initiative also extends much more broadly into matters of physical force protection, cyber defense, and the resilience of America’s defense industrial base.
“For decades, we built the most powerful military in the world,” Hegseth said at Quantico. Then we “regrettably made it dependent on foreign mines for rare earths, on overseas factories for microchips, on foreign supply chains for weapons, and on a civilian power grid to keep the lights on at our bases.”
“We’re bringing our critical supply chains home: the rare earths, the specialty metals, the semiconductors, the propellants, mined in America, refined in America, built in America by American workers,” he added at the time. “We are building long-overdue strategic reserves, deep enough to fight through disruption.”
More specific details about how the Pentagon now intends to pursue these aims have yet to be more fully defined.
“The Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment is directed to stand up the FORTRESS America Program Office within thirty (30) days,” according to a memo dated September 30, which was released after Hegseth’s September speech. “The Program Office shall report directly to the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment who will appoint a member of the Senior Executive Service to lead the day-to-day operations, assisted by a two-star Military Advisor, and shall begin as a lean core cell that scales to full operating capability within months – delivering results in weeks, not years.”
There is also a question of how much of the Fortress America initiative will actually be new. As mentioned, just when it comes to increased energy resiliency, including through the installation of new microreactors, this is something that has already been top of mind for the U.S. military for years now. In 2022, the U.S. Army had a publicly stated goal for every one of its bases to have its own microgrid by 2035 as part of a larger plan to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. In 2024, the Department of the Air Force rolled out its own Installation Infrastructure Action Plan (I2AP) that included a target to have new microgrids in place at 16 bases by Fiscal Year 2030. In May, the U.S. Navy announced plans to demonstrate the ability of the supercarrier USS Gerald R. Ford to act as a floating nuclear power plant as part of broader “energy resilience and mission assurance” plans.
The U.S. military has also already been heavily engaged in efforts to secure access to critical resources, especially rare Earth elements in light of China’s continued dominance in that market globally, and otherwise expand America’s domestic defense industrial base. Physical hardening of bases, especially against emerging drone threats, has been more of a heated debate, as TWZ has been following closely for some time now. However, even before Fortress America was unveiled last month, there had been signs that institutional attitudes were shifting.
“The [Fortress America] program aligns basing and infrastructure projects to ensure they are collectively advancing toward greater independence,” the aforementioned September 30 memo itself notes.
There are additional questions to be answered as to how the U.S. military expects to fund its expansive Fortress America ambitions and the schedules for implementing them. This will all be heavily influenced by how much the initiative leverages efforts that were already ongoing. At the same time, concerns about underinvestment in infrastructure modernization, in general, across America’s armed forces, and the worrisome cascading impacts thereof, are hardly new.
There are still key elements of the Fortress America initiative that have yet to be fully proven out. This is particularly visible when it comes to microreactors, which hold the promise of being simpler and safer to build and operate compared to traditional nuclear power plants. Despite significant progress with this technology just in recent years, environmental, proliferation, and other concerns continue to be raised. You can read more about all of this here.
Today, the Department of War will execute Operation Windlord, the first C-17 airlift of a nuclear reactor, in partnership with the Department of Energy and Valar Atomics.
— Isaiah Taylor – making nuclear reactors (@isaiah_p_taylor) February 15, 2026
Three C-17s Globemasters carrying the 8 modules of the Ward250 reactor will fly from March ARB to Hill AFB. pic.twitter.com/uIL7LMxACQ
On top of all this, it should be noted here that the U.S. military and the rest of the U.S. government already have mechanisms in place to ensure key functions can continue, even in the midst of the gravest of crises, such as a limited nuclear attack. This is known as continuity of government planning, and includes a network of hardened and otherwise resilient facilities designed to support continued military operations and other activities in those ‘doomsday’ scenarios. But these facilities are few in number and focus on strategic capabilities compared to what the Fortress America plan envisions.
At the same time, the dangers posed to civilian power grids in the United States, in particular, are only growing in scale and scope, both in the physical and cyber domains. Existing domestic U.S. energy infrastructure is aging and has been increasingly strained to meet routine day-to-day demands for decades now.
The potential for uncrewed aerial attacks on power plants and power lines has been real for years. The basic barrier to entry when it comes to weaponized drones, including converted commercial types, is also already low. Drone threats, broadly speaking, are only set to expand as swarming technology and artificial intelligence-driven capabilities continue to proliferate, as you can read more about in this past TWZ feature. A well-informed enemy could concentrate a small number of resources on highly critical points in the grid to have vastly outsized effects, using drones or any other kinetic means.
The threat of various types of cyberattacks is also no longer limited to blockbuster movies and other popular media. This was made clear all the way back in 2021 with the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline, a key American oil pipeline system, and has only become more evident since then, including in the course of the war in Ukraine. U.S. authorities have run major exercises to help prepare for exactly these kinds of threats in the past. These are also capabilities where the barrier to entry has been steadily lowering over the years. Increasingly open access to powerful artificial intelligence agents with the ability to overwhelm networks and software to find critical vulnerabilities faster than humans can react is perhaps the most concerning layer of risk.
We have been reporting on this coming together for some time, it’s incredibly important. More so than a new fighter or an additional destroyer every couple years. Absolutely critical, and becoming more so with each passing day. Yes it’s scary, but it’s far scarier not doing this https://t.co/u09x0PeHZ7
— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) October 25, 2026
If a major conflict with a global competitor like China were to break out, physical and cyberattacks on energy infrastructure would be an extremely attractive avenue to hobble U.S. military forces, including airpower, before they can even leave their bases. The capacity to threaten grids in the United States, at least to certain degrees, has become worryingly within reach of smaller nation-states, as well as non-state actors and even lone wolf attackers, too. Firmly attributing cyberattacks to a nation-state, at all, can be challenging.
There is also a secondary component to all of this for responding to major natural disasters, which are another way U.S. grids can end up being knocked out for extended periods of time. These same circumstances could easily leave military bases, as well as their surrounding communities, without access to fresh water and other supplies. The U.S. military routinely plays a key role in responding to such crises.
“This is not a wait-and-see kind of a thing. We want to move out pretty quickly to get to that energy [resilience]. Those solutions can include investments in microgrids, battery backup storage,” a senior U.S. defense official said last week at a Defense Writers Group roundtable, according to a separate report from Air & Space Forces Magazine. “First and foremost, it’s doing the assessments of the installations to make sure we understand power generation and where we’re going to go with that, and then getting those deployed.”
The Pentagon is certainly making a new push now to make sure that, as Secretary Hegseth put it last month, “America cannot be starved out, shut down, or cut off.” However, there is clearly still work to be done to meet a goal of bases being able to go three months without outside help and the many other aims of the Fortress America plan.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post 90 Days No Help: Fortress America’s Goal To Make Bases Resilient Bastions In A Crisis appeared first on TWZ.
In the Daily Sceptic's final exclusive extract from Chris Morrison's new book on the 'climate crisis': trying to run a modern economy on windmills is insane, but eye-watering sums from green billionaires say it isn't.
The post How Green Billionaires Convinced the World to Build Thousands of Useless Windmills: Final Exclusive Extract From Chris Morrison’s New Book on the Invented ‘Climate Crisis’ appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
The Trump administration has encouraged former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to run for UN secretary-general and discussed a joint US-Russia-China candidacy with Moscow and Beijing, the Wall Street Journal’s (WSJ) editorial board wrote on 25 October, citing sources in three countries. Russia’s biggest ally in the EU, Orbán has been out of office since May, when Péter Magyar became Hungary’s prime minister.
The UN secretary-general can influence the war through diplomatic negotiations, mediation, and by drawing the Security Council’s attention to Russia’s aggression. António Guterres’s term ends on 31 December, so the council has to settle on a successor within weeks.
According to the WSJ, US officials discussing the next UN chief kept saying they wanted “someone like Orbán,” and their Russian and Chinese counterparts agreed. The US then brought the idea to Orbán himself. Russia and China are believed to support his bid based on those earlier talks with Washington, and the plan is for him to be the three countries’ joint candidate.
Orbán is receptive but has not decided, and he does not want to enter the race unless he is sure he can win, the editorial board wrote. A State Department official counted eight Security Council votes as safe for him and 10 within reach. A candidate needs nine of the 15 votes and no veto from a permanent member. The editorial board asked whether Britain and France, typically cautious in using their veto, would stand in the way. Any announcement is being held until after the 3 November US midterm elections.
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha wrote on X that Orbán as secretary-general would put to good use “the masterful veto and blackmail skills” he developed over years of derailing major EU decisions. Ukraine, he added, could share its “great experience of taking him out for coffee at the right moment,” a reference to the December 2023 EU summit, where Orbán left the room so the other leaders could open accession talks with Ukraine without his veto.
Orbán’s 16 years of “illiberal democracy” eroded democratic values in Hungary. Since 2010, Fidesz has built an enormous partisan media ecosystem. Before the vote, it amended the electoral law twice and gerrymandered more than a third of the electoral districts, so the opposition might need around 55% of the popular vote to win a simple majority. Orbán still lost the 12 April election. Magyar’s Tisza won 138 of 199 seats, a two-thirds majority in parliament.
Orbán kept close ties with Moscow throughout the full-scale war. When he met Putin in Beijing in October 2023, he spoke of “the military operations and the sanctions” rather than a war. In summer 2024, while Hungary held the EU Council presidency, he flew to Moscow on what he called a peace mission, and the EU distanced itself from the trip. In November 2025, he went back to Moscow, seeking to keep Hungary’s access to Russian oil and gas. He is widely considered Putin’s closest partner among EU leaders. After that visit, he said the only solution was for Ukraine to become a buffer state again, and that the longer peace was delayed, the more people and territory Ukraine would lose.
He used Hungary’s veto against Ukraine until his last weeks in office. In February, Orbán vetoed a €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine amid the disruption of Russian oil supplies through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia. Hungary lifted its veto in April after repairs to the pipeline were announced. Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó phoned Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov from EU meetings for years with “live reports on what’s been discussed,” a European security official told The Washington Post. Szijjártó did not respond to the Post’s request for comment.
Last week, the Liberty Justice Center (the public interest group I worked with on the case challenging Trump's earlier IEEPA tariffs, which led their invalidation by the Supreme Court) filed the first lawsuit challenging President Donald Trump's massive Section 338 tariffs against a variety of Canadian imports. Three days later, Trump exempted some previously covered Canadian products from the tariffs, probably to help Maine Sen. Susan Collins and other congressional Republicans fearful of voter backlash in the upcoming midterm election:
President Donald Trump signed a proclamation on Friday that removes some Canadian products from tariffs imposed under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and adds others, the White House said. The changes take effect Oct. 30.
Plywood sheets, some paper products, certain machinery and refrigeration equipment, and certain packing crates and boxes come off the list. Some valves, along with carpets, waste products and other goods, take their place.
The tariffs, set at 50% according to CNBC, apply whether or not a good originates under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement….
The fact that American businesses and consumers in states like Maine are suffering from the tariffs gives the lie to the notion that only foreigners are burdened by them. Trump's action here also underscores how the tariffs have become highly unpopular, and a drag on GOP prospects in the upcoming election.
While Trump may have (perhaps only temporarily) lifted some of the Section 338 tariffs, most remain in place. As noted above, he imposed additional tariffs on some goods, even as he lifted them on others. And the Section 338 tariffs are still still illegal for a variety of reasons I summarized in my previous post on the LJC lawsuit against them, as well as earlier writings:
I have previously written about why Trump's Section 338 tariffs are harmful and illegal. See my recent Montreal Economic Institute paper on this topic, and earlier pieces here, here, and here. To briefly summarize, the tariffs on Canada are illegal because 1) Section 338 has been superseded by later legislation, 2) even if Section 338 is still operative, Trump's tariffs do not meet its requirements because the Canadian actions they supposedly respond to do not "discriminate" against US goods, as the law requires, 3) Trump's tariffs do not "offset" the Canadian actions (as Section 338 also requires), but go far beyond that, 4) the administration's interpretation of Section 338 runs afoul of the "major questions" doctrine, and 5) if Section 338 is operative and does authorize the Trump actions, it would violate the constitutional nondelegation doctrine (which restricts delegation of legislative power to the executive).
The LJC complaint advances all five of these arguments. To prevail, they need win on only one.
Trump has also used Section 338 to ban some Canadian imports entirely. That too is illegal, though the bans (unlike the tariffs) are not directly at issue in the LJC case. They may well be challenged in future litigation, however.
In addition to illegally usurping congressional power over taxation, the Trump trade war against Canada damages our economy and poisons relations with a key ally. Courts should strike it down, just as they did with the IEEPA tariffs and the more recent Section 122 tariffs. They should also invalidated the massive Section 301 "forced labor" tariffs, which have been challenged in three cases currently before the US Court of International Trade.
UPDATE: It's worth reiterating that giving one person the power to impose and lift tariffs whenever he feels like it is an affront to the rule of law.
The post Trump Exempts Some Canadian Products From Section 338 Tariffs—But His Illegal Trade War Continues appeared first on Reason Magazine.
di Alessandro Bartoloni
La capacità di negoziare è uno degli strumenti fondamentali del potere politico. Si può essere in disaccordo con un avversario, imporgli sanzioni o sostenere militarmente i suoi nemici, ma rinunciare al dialogo significa rinunciare anche alla possibilità di influenzare l’esito di un conflitto. E quando si smette di parlare con qualcuno, non lo si cancella dalla realtà: si lascia semplicemente che siano altri a trattare con lui e a decidere le condizioni della pace.
È la lezione che l’Unione europea sembra aver imparato nel modo più umiliante.
Dopo anni trascorsi a inseguire la contrapposizione con la Russia, a inasprire le sanzioni economiche, a sostenere militarmente l’Ucraina e a perseguire l’isolamento politico di Mosca, Bruxelles starebbe ora valutando la nomina di un rappresentante di alto livello incaricato di dialogare direttamente con Vladimir Putin.
Una prospettiva che, se confermata, avrebbe un significato politico enorme. L’Unione europea, che per anni ha presentato la propria linea come l’unica moralmente e strategicamente accettabile, si ritroverebbe a cercare disperatamente un canale diplomatico proprio con quel governo con cui aveva promesso di non normalizzare i rapporti.
La questione non è soltanto chi verrà mandato a parlare con il Cremlino. La domanda è molto più scomoda: com’è possibile che una delle maggiori potenze economiche mondiali si sia ridotta a inseguire gli altri per ottenere un posto al tavolo delle trattative su una guerra che coinvolge direttamente la sua sicurezza?
Il presidente ceco Petr Pavel avrebbe sollevato la possibilità di nominare un negoziatore europeo incaricato di trattare con Mosca. Tra i possibili candidati sarebbe emerso il nome del presidente finlandese Alexander Stubb, sebbene non risulti ancora definita alcuna nomina.
Il solo fatto che questa ipotesi venga presa in considerazione è già indicativo della crisi politica europea.
L’Unione dispone infatti di un apparato istituzionale e diplomatico imponente. Ha una presidente della Commissione, un presidente del Consiglio europeo, un Alto rappresentante per gli Affari esteri e un servizio diplomatico destinato a coordinare la propria azione internazionale. Eppure, quando si tratta di affrontare il dossier più importante per la sicurezza del continente, tutto questo apparato sembra non bastare.
Il motivo è semplice: avere istituzioni non significa avere una strategia, così come disporre di una diplomazia non significa essere in grado di negoziare.
Ursula von der Leyen è diventata uno dei simboli della linea dello scontro con Mosca: sanzioni, sostegno militare a Kiev e isolamento della Russia. Una linea che può raccogliere consenso in determinati ambienti politici europei, ma che rende estremamente difficile presentarsi al Cremlino come un’interlocutrice credibile e disposta a esplorare un compromesso.
Lo stesso problema riguarda Alexander Stubb, che si è distinto per il suo sostegno all’Ucraina e per le sue dure critiche alla Russia. Posizioni che possono rafforzarne il profilo presso una parte della classe dirigente europea, ma che non costituiscono necessariamente un vantaggio quando si tratta di sedersi al tavolo con la controparte.
Bruxelles rischia così di confondere ancora una volta la fedeltà alla propria linea politica con la capacità di ottenere risultati.
Il problema, infatti, non è trovare un politico abbastanza importante da rappresentare l’Unione. È trovare qualcuno che possa parlare a nome dell’Europa senza essere considerato da Mosca il semplice portavoce di una politica di ostilità.
E qui emerge tutta la contraddizione di una classe dirigente che ha investito enormi risorse politiche nel confronto con la Russia, salvo poi scoprire che per negoziare con un avversario non basta condannarlo, sanzionarlo o dichiarare che prima o poi sarà costretto a cedere.
Il fallimento della strategia europea emerge con particolare evidenza se si guarda a Washington.
Secondo la ricostruzione citata, Vladimir Putin avrebbe incontrato a lungo a San Pietroburgo l’inviato statunitense Steve Witkoff, dopo consultazioni a Oslo che avevano coinvolto rappresentanti ucraini ed europei.
Al di là delle possibilità concrete di raggiungere un accordo, la sequenza è politicamente eloquente: gli Stati Uniti continuano a mantenere un canale diretto con Mosca, mentre l’Unione europea fatica a conquistarsi un ruolo autonomo nel processo negoziale.
In altre parole, Washington tratta con il Cremlino mentre Bruxelles rischia di restare a guardare.
Il paradosso è evidente. L’Europa è direttamente esposta alle conseguenze della guerra: dalla sicurezza continentale ai rapporti energetici, dalle sanzioni economiche agli impegni militari e finanziari a sostegno dell’Ucraina. Eppure, proprio quando si discute del possibile assetto futuro del continente, rischia di essere relegata a un ruolo marginale.
Chi negozia ha la possibilità di avanzare proposte, sondare la disponibilità al compromesso, modificare le priorità e influenzare le condizioni di un accordo. Chi resta fuori deve invece limitarsi a reagire alle decisioni altrui, cercando di correggere a posteriori gli equilibri che altri hanno contribuito a definire.
È questo il prezzo dell'irrilevanza diplomatica: non essere necessariamente privi di potere, ma non riuscire a trasformarlo in influenza politica.
I dirigenti europei possono ripetere quanto vogliono che nessun accordo sulla sicurezza del continente dovrebbe essere concluso senza il coinvolgimento dell’Europa. Ma le dichiarazioni solenni non bastano. Per sedersi al tavolo bisogna essere considerati interlocutori necessari, capaci di offrire qualcosa, modificare le proprie posizioni e assumersi la responsabilità delle proprie scelte.
Non basta rivendicare un posto al tavolo. Bisogna avere qualcosa da negoziare e la capacità di farlo.
La contraddizione più grave riguarda la politica delle sanzioni.
Von der Leyen ha ribadito la propria opposizione alla revoca delle restrizioni sull’energia russa prima della fine del conflitto, continuando a promuovere una maggiore integrazione del sistema energetico europeo.
La linea è chiara: mantenere la pressione economica su Mosca e proseguire nel percorso di distacco energetico dalla Russia. Ma se l’obiettivo è anche quello di ottenere un accordo, sorge una domanda inevitabile: quale margine di trattativa intende lasciare Bruxelles?
Le sanzioni non sono soltanto una dichiarazione politica. Possono essere uno strumento negoziale, perché la loro modifica o revoca rappresenta una possibile contropartita da offrire in cambio di concessioni. Se, invece, la loro rimozione viene esclusa preventivamente da qualsiasi discussione seria, l’Unione finisce per privarsi volontariamente di una delle poche leve economiche che potrebbe utilizzare al tavolo delle trattative.
In sostanza, Bruxelles pretende di negoziare senza mettere in discussione nessuno dei pilastri della propria strategia.
Ma questa non è diplomazia: è la pretesa di ottenere risultati senza accettare il rischio di un compromesso.
Le difficoltà non riguardano soltanto le sanzioni. Secondo la ricostruzione citata, il consigliere presidenziale russo Yuri Ushakov avrebbe espresso scarso entusiasmo per le proposte trasmesse a Mosca dopo le consultazioni di Oslo.
E anche qualora riprendessero i colloqui trilaterali tra Russia, Ucraina e Stati Uniti, non vi sarebbe alcuna garanzia di un accordo.
Per questo la nomina di un inviato europeo, da sola, servirebbe a ben poco. Se Bruxelles non chiarirà quali obiettivi sia disposta a perseguire, quali compromessi possa prendere in considerazione e quali risultati sia realisticamente in grado di sostenere, il nuovo rappresentante rischierà di essere soltanto un altro funzionario incaricato di ripetere formule già respinte.
C'è un altro aspetto che la classe dirigente europea sembra fare fatica ad accettare: la diplomazia non si svolge nel vuoto, ma dentro rapporti di forza concreti.
Mosca è in una posizione militare favorevole e, secondo la ricostruzione citata, non sembra disposta ad accettare proposte che lascino irrisolte le sue principali richieste.
Washington, dal canto suo, sembra interessata a individuare una soluzione diplomatica, pur continuando a perseguire obiettivi che non coincidono necessariamente con quelli russi.
L’Europa si trova invece davanti a un problema che ha contribuito a creare: come conciliare il sostegno agli obiettivi dichiarati di Kiev con la possibilità che l’esito finale della guerra sia diverso da quello auspicato dai governi europei?
Per anni, una parte della leadership dell’Unione ha presentato il confronto con Mosca attraverso una narrazione nella quale la pressione economica, il sostegno militare all’Ucraina e l’isolamento internazionale avrebbero dovuto condurre a un risultato politico favorevole all’Occidente. Oggi, la difficoltà di ritagliarsi un ruolo autonomo nei negoziati mostra quanto sia pericoloso scambiare le proprie aspettative per una descrizione realistica dei rapporti di forza.
L’Europa non è priva di strumenti. Il suo peso economico rimane considerevole; le sanzioni, l’assistenza finanziaria e le future garanzie di sicurezza possono incidere sull’esito di una trattativa.
Ma queste risorse devono essere trasformate in una strategia. E una strategia richiede la capacità di distinguere gli obiettivi desiderabili da quelli concretamente raggiungibili, di valutare i costi delle proprie decisioni e di modificare la propria linea quando i risultati smentiscono le previsioni iniziali.
È proprio questa capacità che oggi sembra mancare.
Ma la realtà non si piega ai comunicati di Bruxelles.
La questione decisiva è quindi un’altra: il nuovo rappresentante avrà il mandato di esplorare compromessi reali oppure sarà incaricato soltanto di ribadire le posizioni di Bruxelles, anche quando queste non trovano alcuna disponibilità dall’altra parte?
Nel primo caso, la nomina potrebbe rappresentare un passo verso il recupero di una capacità diplomatica autonoma. Nel secondo, rischierebbe di essere l’ennesima operazione di facciata, utile soprattutto a salvare le apparenze di fronte all’emarginazione europea.
Ma la diplomazia non funziona così. Per negoziare bisogna essere disposti ad ascoltare, riconoscere i rapporti di forza, formulare proposte credibili e accettare che un accordo non coincida necessariamente con la realizzazione integrale dei propri obiettivi.
La vera domanda, dunque, non è chi l’Europa manderà da Putin. La vera domanda è se i dirigenti europei saranno finalmente disposti a cambiare politica, oppure se intendono continuare a proclamare la propria fermezza e ipocrisia contro gli interessi dei propri popoli mentre altri decidono il futuro del continente.
Iran’s rapid post-strike recovery of its Eagle 44 airbase proves that hardened mountain shelters remain a decisive shield against precision firepower, transforming how inferior air forces survive and deter superior adversaries. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that Iran is actively repairing and expanding its subterranean Eagle 44 airbase in Hormozgan province, despite having […]
The post Iran’s mountain shelters offer Taiwan a China survival playbook appeared first on Asia Times.
© Bizuayehu Tesfaye/Las Vegas Review-Journal/Tribune News Service, via Getty Images
Nuclear power has historically been a divisive issue: During the Cold War, an entire generation feared annihilation at the hands of the same basic technology that some want to use to power their homes.
That's unfortunate, because nuclear energy has considerable benefits—a reliable source of power with very few greenhouse gas emissions—with increasingly lower risks.
Thankfully, it seems that message is catching on with people from both major political parties.
"About six-in-ten U.S. adults now say they favor more nuclear power plants to generate electricity," Pew Research reported in October 2025. "That's up from 43% in 2020, driven by increasing support among both Republicans and Democrats." The authors noted that "Republicans are more likely than Democrats" to favor the policy, with "roughly seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican-leaning independents" expressing support, but it still included 52 percent of Democrats and independents who lean in that direction.
Gallup found similar results earlier this year. The pollster "asked whether the U.S. should put more emphasis, less emphasis or about the same emphasis as it does now on producing domestic energy from each of six sources," wrote Megan Brenan. The six sources were solar, wind, nuclear, natural gas, oil, and coal.
"Nuclear energy is the only one of the six sources to see support grow since 2021, rising seven points to 46%," Brenan added. "This shift is notable given that preferences for nuclear energy had historically been more evenly divided among responses of more, less and the same." Instead, those favoring more emphasis on nuclear power outranked both those who want less and those who wish for it to stay the same, by about 20 points each.
It seems the consensus has been building: In 2024, a poll of first-time voters in The Wall Street Journal found overwhelming support for nuclear energy as a means of fighting climate change.
The trend is welcome, and it marks a major reversal of anti-nuclear sentiment that goes back decades.
The China Syndrome, a film about a possible meltdown at a fictional California nuclear plant, premiered in the U.S. in March 1979. One character in the film warns that a meltdown could "render an area the size of Pennsylvania permanently uninhabitable, not to mention the cancer that would show up later."
Less than two weeks later, in a disastrous bit of timing, a malfunction caused a partial meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
Thankfully, Three Mile Island was not a disaster. "Some radioactive gas was released a couple of days after the accident, but not enough to cause any dose above background levels to local residents," according to the World Nuclear Association. "There were no injuries or adverse health effects."
But those details were lost on the public. Several recording artists formed Musicians United for Safe Energy (MUSE), an activist group that opposed nuclear power. Just six months after Three Mile Island, MUSE held a series of "No Nukes" concerts at Madison Square Garden, plus a rally in Central Park that drew nearly 200,000 attendees.
That populist support spilled over into politics, particularly among Democrats. Running for president in 1980, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D–Mass.) called for a two-year moratorium on new nuclear plants. In its national platform, the Democratic Party pledged to "retire nuclear power plants in an orderly manner."
After the Three Mile Island incident, 39 planned nuclear plants were canceled.
That's a shame, for many reasons. As Reason's Ronald Bailey wrote in 2018, in a theoretical world where the development of U.S. nuclear power continued at its previous pace, "by 2015 it would have replaced all coal-burning and three-quarters of gas-fired electric power generation….Cumulative global carbon dioxide emissions would be about 18 percent lower, and annual global carbon dioxide emissions would be one-third less."
Yet even decades later, plenty of people—again, particularly Democrats—still opposed nuclear energy.
"Of all the Democratic divides on climate," Politico wrote in 2019, "the role of nuclear power may be the biggest. Progressives and some environmental groups have long lumped it into a category with fossil fuels, and some have spent decades opposing it."
At the time, a number of people were running to be the Democratic Party's presidential candidate, and many of them had strong opinions on nuclear energy. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.) said that she would not license any new nuclear reactors; Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) pledged to go one step further and not renew the licenses of any existing reactors.
But things have changed in just a few short years, and nuclear energy is now an issue with potential bipartisan support. When did this pivot take place, and why?
"It was really around 2021, 2022, I would say that things really began to shift," James Walker, CEO of Nano Nuclear Energy, tells Reason. "A lot of the popular support looks like it's coming from younger people….It is a zero-carbon-emission power, and they have been raised to [be] more climate goal-focused" than older generations.
It's not just Gen Z either: Lawmakers are more keen on nuclear power now too. Earlier this month, the MORE American Fuel Act, sponsored by Sens. Cynthia Lummis (R–Wyo.) and Mark Kelly (D–Ariz.), passed the Senate unanimously. The bill "modernizes outdated Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing requirements for uranium enrichment facilities and aligns them with the process already used for other nuclear facilities and reactors," according to a press release from Lummis. It also "lets enrichment companies begin construction at their own risk instead of waiting years for a construction license before breaking ground, while preserving public participation and the NRC's rigorous safety standards."
"What we've seen up in Washington is that there is a nervousness around keeping pace with AI development," Walker adds. "There is a concern that rivals that are also investing very heavily into AI, such as China, are building nuclear reactors like crazy, and one of the reasons they're doing that is just so they have baseload power that allows them to scale up their systems. They are building two gigawatt-scale nuclear power plants every year at the moment, and a lot of it is to try and catch up with the U.S. tech industry."
The post Nuclear Power Now Has Bipartisan Support appeared first on Reason Magazine.
With polls showing Democrats in good position to retake at least one chamber of the US Congress, several Pentagon insiders are reportedly lining up to offer up damaging information about Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in hopes that a new Democratic majority will impeach him. According to a report published Wednesday by The Telegraph, current and […]
The post Pentagon insiders will ‘spill their guts’ to see Hegseth impeached appeared first on Asia Times.
Last July, President Donald Trump imposed 50 percent tariffs on various Canadian goods, a list he subsequently expanded to include additional imports, some of which he banned outright. His legal justification was Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which Congress approved in 1930. Section 338 authorized tariffs in response to discriminatory trade practices. But in the 96 years since it was enacted, no president had ever used it to impose tariffs.
Why is that? According to a lawsuit that the Liberty Justice Center (LJC) filed on Tuesday in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT), the answer is clear: Section 338 was superseded by subsequent legislation that likewise targeted discriminatory trade barriers, beginning with the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and culminating in Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Section 301, the current remedy, includes requirements that Trump apparently sought to dodge by invoking Section 338 instead.
That maneuver is illegal, the LJC argues. "Congress already gave the executive branch a tool for responding to unfair foreign trade practices: Section 301, which requires an investigation, public comment and other safeguards," says Jeffrey M. Schwab, the LJC's director of litigation. "The administration cannot skip those protections by reaching for a 1930 statute that no president had ever used to impose a tariff."
Why not? "Where provisions in two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one," the lawsuit says. "Where a later act covers the whole subject of an earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it operates similarly as a repeal. And a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute controls the construction of an earlier one even absent express amendment."
Even if Section 338 somehow survived congressional approval of contrary laws, the LJC adds, Trump's tariffs exceed the authority it grants. And if Trump's interpretation of Section 338 were correct, the lawsuit says, the provision would violate the nondelegation doctrine, which bars Congress from delegating its tariff power to the president without providing "an intelligible principle" to guide and constrain his exercise of it.
Trump's Section 338 tariffs, in short, are "the Administration's latest attempt to exercise, through a statute never designed for the purpose, the tariff power that the Constitution assigns to Congress." That pattern should be familiar by now.
Shortly after taking office in 2025, Trump claimed to have discovered a previously unnoticed delegation of extensive tariff authority in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 law that does not mention import taxes and had never been used to impose them. That claim was rejected by every court that considered it, and last February the Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs at all.
Trump responded to that decision by immediately announcing similarly broad tariffs under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act, which addresses "fundamental international payments problems" caused by "serious United States balance-of-payments deficits." In May, the CIT ruled that the new tariffs were illegal because Trump had failed to "identify balance-of-payments deficits within the meaning of Section 122."
Trump then switched to Plan C, invoking Section 301 of the Trade Act, which authorizes tariffs in response to a foreign "act, policy, or practice" that is "unreasonable or discriminatory" and "burdens or restricts" U.S. commerce. He claimed that provision justified tariffs on 86 trading partners, accounting for nearly all U.S. imports, because they had failed to "impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor." The CIT is currently weighing challenges to those tariffs, including an LJC lawsuit.
Trump's Section 338 tariffs have now added to the CIT's caseload. The LJC represents Gellert Global Group, an importer that was hit hard by those taxes after Trump added cheese to the list of disfavored Canadian goods. The lawsuit asks the CIT to certify a class of importers, numbering in "the hundreds, if not the thousands," that likewise have been clobbered by Trump's 50 percent tariffs.
Since Trump obviously is aware of Section 301, why did he resort to a never-used, seemingly obsolete provision to justify the tariffs on imports from Canada? As the LJC notes, Section 301 requires an investigation by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, "consultation with the foreign country concerned, notice, public comment, a hearing, and determinations within statutory deadlines." It also requires "that action be equivalent in value to the burden imposed, that duties be preferred over other import restrictions, and that actions terminate after four years absent a request for continuation and review."
Can Trump avoid those constraints by invoking Section 338 instead? The LJC thinks not: "Congress did not intend to leave in place a parallel authority that would allow the President to impose the same remedies, for the same conduct, free of every one of those safeguards."
Section 338 has been "impliedly repealed," the LJC argues. "At a minimum, Section 301 controls where, as here, the President seeks to respond to foreign practices within Section 301's scope, and the President may not impose duties in response to such practices while disregarding the procedures and limits Section 301 imposes. Because the President did not proceed under Section 301, the Section 338 Tariffs are unlawful whether or not Section 338 survives."
Even if you ignore subsequent legislation, the LJC argues, the Canadian policies that Trump cited when he announced the tariffs do not qualify as "discrimination" under Section 338. "Canada's motor vehicle surtax and its provinces' alcohol purchasing decisions are responses to tariffs that the United States imposed on Canada, not discrimination by Canada against the United States," it says. Trump also complained that Canada treats European cheese imports more favorably than U.S. cheese imports. But "when Congress enacted Section 338, a preference granted under a reciprocal agreement was not 'discrimination.'"
Section 338 "addresses discrimination: measures that single out United States commerce for worse treatment than the commerce of the world at large," the lawsuit says. "It is not a general authorization to impose tariffs whenever the President disagrees with a trading partner's policies, or whenever a trading partner responds to tariffs the United States has imposed on it."
Trump also was unfazed by Section 338's requirement that the president set duties to "offset" the costs imposed by discriminatory practices, which implies proportionality. Rather than attempt that, the LJC notes, Trump imposed "the statutory maximum rate of 50 percent without tying it to any measured burden."
As interpreted by Trump, the lawsuit warns, Section 338 authorizes the president to "impose tariffs of up to 50 percent on any products of any country that extends better treatment to any other country in any respect—including through any of the hundreds of preferential trade agreements to which the United States is not a party—or that responds to tariffs the United States has imposed on it." Yet Section 338 "contains no clear statement authorizing that power," contrary to the "major questions" doctrine, which applies to assertions of executive authority with "vast economic and political significance."
If Section 338 conferred the sort of unfettered authority that Trump is claiming, the LJC says, it "would supply no intelligible principle constraining the exercise of Congress's power to lay duties." His reading "would convert a narrow, fact-dependent provision into an effectively unrestricted delegation of Congress's tariff power," which would be "an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."
This case "is not about the president," says LJC CEO Sara Albrecht. "It is about the presidency. No president should have the power to pull a dormant statute off the shelf and use it to impose sweeping tariffs or import bans without the limits Congress required."
The post Trump's 50% Tariffs on Canadian Goods Illegally Rely on a Superseded Statute, a Lawsuit Argues appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Today, the Liberty Justice Center (LJC) filed Gellert Global Group Corp. v. Trump, the first lawsuit challenging President Donald Trump's massive Section 338 tariffs against a variety of Canadian imports. The case was filed in the US Court of International Trade (which has jurisdiction over tariff-related cases); Gellert Global Group is an importer of Canadian cheese subject to the tariffs. LJC is the same public interest group that I worked with on the case challenging Trump's earlier IEEPA tariffs, which ultimate resulted in their invalidation by the Supreme Court. I am not directly involved in the present case. But I support it and believe it deserves to prevail.
LJC has also filed cases challenging Trump's massive Section 122 and Section 301 tariffs. They have become America's premier public interest law group standing up for free trade and enforcing constitutional constraints on executive power over trade restrictions.
Section 338 was part of the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930, which gravely exacerbated the Great Depression. It has never been used before, likely because it was superseded by later laws.
I have previously written about why Trump's Section 338 tariffs are harmful and illegal. See my recent Montreal Economic Institute paper on this topic, and earlier pieces here, here, and here. To briefly summarize, the tariffs on Canada are illegal because 1) Section 338 has been superseded by later legislation, 2) even if Section 338 is still operative, Trump's tariffs do not meet its requirements because the Canadian actions they supposedly respond to do not "discriminate" against US goods, as the law requires, 3) Trump's tariffs do not "offset" the Canadian actions (as Section 338 also requires), but go far beyond that, 4) the administration's interpretation of Section 338 runs afoul of the "major questions" doctrine, and 5) if Section 338 is operative and does authorize the Trump actions, it would violate the constitutional nondelegation doctrine (which restricts delegation of legislative power to the executive).
The LJC complaint advances all five of these arguments. To prevail, they need win on only one. They also add a few more technical points that I will not try to cover here. LJC further seeks a class action certification for a class of all those importers subject to the Section 338 tariffs. If this succeeds, it would block all enforcement of Section 338 tariffs, not just those paid by Gellert.
This lawsuit does not directly challenge Trump's extension of the Section 338 action to categorically ban some Canadian imports, in addition to imposing tariffs. As far as I can tell, Gellert does not import goods subject to the ban (as opposed to the tariffs). However, as I explained here and here, the legality of the bans is dependent on that of the initial tariffs. In a recent Lawfare article, I outline the reasons why executive-imposed import bans are subject to most of the same legal constraints as executive-imposed tariffs.
Like the IEEPA, Section 122, and Section 301 tariffs, Trump's use of Section 338 is an attempt to convert a limited delegation of authority into a blank check enabling the president to impose tariffs whenever he wants. Courts should reject all of these power grabs.
I commend LJC for bringing this important case. And I hope and expect it may not be the last lawsuit challenging the Section 338 measures. Future cases might well challenge the import bans directly, as well as the tariffs.
The post Liberty Justice Center Files First Lawsuit Challenging Trump's Section 338 Tariffs Against Canadian Imports appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Georgetown law Professor Steve Vladeck is one of the leading critics of the conservative majority on the Supreme Court. But in an insightful recent post on his substack, he outlines key reasons why "court expansion" is a bad response to its flaws. The cure is likely to be worse than the disease:
[I]t seems to me that those who are fully onboard the expansion-or-bust train should have to do more than simply assert that having four new Democratic appointees on the Court in 2029 would be a self-evidently "good" thing. If nothing else, proponents of expansion should have to answer the following four questions:
- How do we avoid touching off a race to the bottom, where each time one party controls the House, Senate, and presidency, it expands the Court to ensure an ideologically and politically sympathetic majority?
- If a race to the bottom is unavoidable, how do we avoid further (and potentially fatal) erosion of public confidence in the Court—which will quite transparently be little more than a lever of power for whichever party last had such a trifecta?
- If eroding public confidence in the Court is a feature, and not a bug, how do we insulate against the same erosion of public confidence in lower federal courts?
- What is the case for why expansion is a better way to achieve the desired reforms than alternatives that would (or, at least, should) avoid many of these forward-looking concerns?
He adds that court-packing could easily "permanently undermine judicial review as an institution." The rest of his piece (which is behind a paywall) offers far from reassuring answers to these questions.
I have offered similar criticisms of court-packing in a long series of articles and blog posts, most recently in a June Lawfare article where I explained (among other things) why the Supreme Court's recent decision in Louisiana v. Callais doesn't justify packing, and in a July UnPopulist article critiquing a court-packing proposal advanced by Andy Craig. In these pieces, I explain why the Court's record of checking dangerous abuses of government power - though not without serious flaws - is considerably better than many critics claim. In addition, I argue that court-packing is likely to undermine effective judicial review - not only by the Supreme Court, but also by lower courts.
Like Vladeck, I think some of the issues that concern critics of the Court can be more effectively addressed in other ways. For example, in the Lawfare article, I explain how Congress can fix the flaws of the Callais decision by banning or restricting gerrymandering. It could also enact a binding ethics code for the justices. Justice Alito was wrong to suggest otherwise, back in 2023. That said, if your main goal is a sweeping reversal of much of the Court's recent jurisprudence, there may be no easy way to achieve that quickly without court-packing or something like it. I would argue that any benefits that might achieve are outweighed by the enormous costs of destroying judicial review.
In addition, if your objection to the Court's recent decisions is that they often don't do enough to constrain unconstitutional actions by other branches of government or by the states, court-packing is likely to make that problem worse, not better. Destroying judicial review won't enforce tighter constitutional constraints on the executive or bring back Roe v. Wade. To the contrary, it would largely destroy any hope of doing so.
In another recent piece, I assessed "non-packing" rationales for increasing the size of the Supreme Court. There, I argue that these rationales are mostly weak; and, to the extent they have merit, there are better ways to address them than an expansion that amounts to court-packing. I even outline possible ways to increase the size of the Court without creating an opportunity for court-packing (this would require allowing the party that doesn't hold the White House to pick some of the new justices).
The post Steve Vladeck's "Hard Questions About Court Expansion" appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Have we passed peak oil – are fossil fuels running out? Richard Lyon says yes, and the transition to 'renewables' is making it worse. But peak oil is a myth, says Tilak Doshi, as he reviews Lyon's book The Energy Trap.
The post Are Fossil Fuels Running Out? appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
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