When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy met a Lockheed Martin team led by Orlando Sanchez Jr., head of its aeronautics division, in Kyiv on 19 October, the talk was of Patriot interceptors and of repairing the Ukrainian air force's small but growing fleet of ex-European F-16 fighters inside the country. Lockheed designed the F-16 and still builds it.

But the Lockheed officials may have had other things on their minds. They gave Zelenskyy a scale model of a new and improved F-16 variant in Ukrainian livery, according to a photo posted by the MilitaryNewsUA account.

In late September, Ukraine's air force commander, Lt. Gen. Anatolii Kryvonozhko, and Lockheed discussed a possible move to newer F-16s. Now we have a clearer idea what those F-16s might look like—and what they might be capable of. The model Lockheed officials gave to Zelenskyy appears to be based on the Block 70/72 version of the classic supersonic fighter that Lockheed manufactures at its factory in Greenville, South Carolina.

A model of the F-16 Block 70/72 fighter that Lockheed Martin representatives gifted to Volodymyr Zelenskyy during their personal meeting yesterday. pic.twitter.com/tprj5yuj2z

— MilitaryNewsUA (@front_ukrainian) October 20, 2026

It's a world-class jet. But a pricey batch of factory-fresh Block 70/72s isn't actually at the top of the Ukrainian air force's wish list. Not as long as the air force's existing warplanes lack munitions.

The Block 70/72 boasts a better radar, more fuel capacity, and a tougher airframe compared to older F-16 models, which have been flying since the late 1970s. The F-16 is still one of the most numerous fighter types in US Air Force service. Surplus 1980s-vintage F-16s from Denmark and the Netherlands make up the bulk of the Ukrainian air force's front-line fleet. Norway's six are still being refurbished, and Belgium's are coming.

Whether Ukraine ever gets new F-16s is anyone's guess. Kyiv would need to pay around $100 million per copy, or find an ally to finance the purchase. Either could be a heavy lift. And to be sure, Ukraine has options as it rebuilds its battered air force. Sweden is donating 16 older Saab Gripens, the first due early next year, and Kyiv plans to buy 20 newer ones. Kyiv has negotiated to buy 16 Dassault Rafales from France, which may not arrive until 2028. Belgium has promised as many as 53 older F-16s, the last of them perhaps not until 2029.

Welcome jets

But new Block 70/72 F-16s would be welcome. The Block 70/72 builds on what already makes the F-16 great: its agility, flexibility, reliability, excellent electronic warfare systems, and compatibility with a wide array of munitions.

Where the Block 15 Mid Life Update F-16s Ukraine currently flies have the older analog AN/APG-66(V2) radar, the Block 70/72 has a digital APG-83 active electronically scanned array radar. It can also carry overwing conformal fuel tanks for extra range.

Perhaps most exciting for the Ukrainian air force, a newly made Block 70/72 is good for 12,000 hours of flight: enough for about 30 years at 400 flying hours a year. An aging Block 15 has a structural life of about 8,000 hours, and Ukraine's jets fly hard. Zelenskyy has said about half of them spend long stretches abroad for repairs, many at Sabena Aerospace Engineering in Belgium, a process that can take months.

Ukraine F-16 Pilots Rationing Missiles as Russian Attacks Intensify | NEWSMAX2

Ukraine’s American-made F-16 fighter jets are defending the skies against Russian drones and cruise missiles — but a critical shortage of U.S.-made missiles is putting that mission at risk.

In an… pic.twitter.com/WQgbasdks5

— Ukrainian Air Force (@KpsZSU) September 16, 2026

Newer F-16s require less maintenance. They can fly and fight more often. In that sense, 50 Block 70/72s are worth more than 50 Block 15s.

But the availability of airframes isn't the biggest problem in the 107th Aviation Wing, the Ukrainian air force's sole F-16 unit. The wing is desperately low on air-to-air missiles. Its pilots often resort to gunning down Russian drones and cruise missiles with the F-16's built-in 20-mm cannon—a risky tactic given how close a fighter must get to its target to make use of its gun.

While a few billion dollars' worth of fresh F-16s could keep the 107th Aviation Wing in fighting shape for decades to come, fresh airframes aren't actually the most urgent priority. Given a choice between getting new F-16s or getting substantial supplies of missiles for its old F-16s, the wing would surely opt for the latter.

The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps' Operation Vivaldi—its secretive counteroffensive east of Sloviansk in northern Donetsk Oblast—started earlier than first reported, and by the time it ended on 14 October it had cost the Russians more than 8,000 troops, by the 3rd Army Corps' count.

It was a major Ukrainian victory in one of the most important sectors of Russia's 56-month wider war on Ukraine. But it could prove to be a temporary win, one the Russians may be able to partially reverse, if the administration of US President Donald Trump continues to throttle Starshield, the military version of Starlink that Ukraine's drones and commanders rely on.

The Ukrainians' former command and control advantage, largely attributable to once-reliable Starlink and Starshield access, was pivotal as Operation Vivaldi played out in the Donbas region in stages starting in March. That advantage shrank practically overnight on 14 October, when a new speed cap began cutting off Ukraine's Starshield terminals whenever they moved faster than about 160 km/h (100 mph).

The 3rd Army Corps attacked east of Sloviansk and north of Lyman as early as March, analyst and mapper Clément Molin concluded after scrutinizing official videos and interviews the Ukrainian defense ministry recently released. "The operation began much earlier than initially thought," Molin wrote.

We are now 5 months after the start of Ukraine's Vivaldi operation and it has now officially ended

A month after the operation was revealed, we know have much more information on the biggest Ukrainian success of the year.

THREAD1/18 pic.twitter.com/MgCoSv7Yhr

— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) October 20, 2026

The timing was probably no accident.

In early February, SpaceX, working from a Ukrainian defense ministry whitelist, switched off the thousands of stolen and smuggled Starlink terminals the Russians had been using.

That had the effect of grounding many Russian drones and blinding many Russian commanders. Taking advantage of the Russians' confusion, Ukrainian troops attacked in several key sectors: in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts in the southeast, and east of Sloviansk in northern Donetsk.

The Donetsk attack expanded into a full-blown counteroffensive under conditions of strict secrecy as the 3rd Army Corps probed for weaknesses along the flanks of the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies, then overextended along the axis between the Zherebets River in the east and the outskirts of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban conglomeration in the west.

The Russians had been threatening to lay siege to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, the last two big free cities in Donetsk Oblast, from two directions: the north and the south. Operation Vivaldi eliminated the northern threat—and at great cost to the Russian 20th and 25th CAAs.

Drones lead

Aerial drones and unmanned ground vehicles led the attack, taking the Russians by surprise. "For an offensive operation, the Ukrainians sustained relatively few casualties compared to previous engagements," Molin explained. "Conversely, the defending Russian forces suffered significantly higher losses, largely due to the rapid encirclement of at least three regiments, not all of which managed to escape the area."

It's unclear how many casualties the Russians suffered, but they might number in the thousands. The 20th and 25th CAAs were particularly fragile because the 3rd Army Corps and supporting drone units had been bombarding their supply line with so-called "middle strike" drones.

But many middle strike drones rely on civilian-style Starlink satellite terminals or the more rugged, better-performing Starshield. Now that the 3rd Army Corps has wrecked Russia's 144th Motor Rifle Division, which the Institute for the Study of War assessed on 20 October has effectively ceased to exist as an organized fighting force, and pushed the Russian survivors back to the far bank of the Zherebets River, the Ukrainians are probably "consolidating their gains and adopting a defensive posture," according to Molin.

But that defensive posture, protecting Sloviansk from a northern attack, depends on reliable communications and responsive drones. On 14 October, a new speed cap hit Ukraine's Starshield terminals, cutting the link on any drone flying faster than about 160 km/h. Who ordered it is disputed. Sources told Reuters the order came from inside the White House, and that Pentagon leaders were told the service needed to be slowed.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Musk himself ordered the slowdown, and that he and Trump discussed it soon after it became public. While Trump has denied ordering the speed limit, it's worth noting that the American president has become more overtly friendly toward Russia as his Republican Party looks likely to lose control of the US Congress in the November mid-term elections.

The speed limit renders many of the faster middle-strike drones unflyable. As a result, "Ukrainian drone strikes have diminished significantly following yesterday's crippling of Ukraine's Starlink/Starshield connections, Russian sources report," the military history account ChrisO_wiki wrote on X on 15 October, the day after the speed limit took Ukrainian operators by surprise.

A reduction in middle strikes on Russian supply lines could help Russian field armies recover from recent setbacks, including their retreat back across the Zherebets River. And if the communications confusion resulting from the partial loss of Starlink/Starshield connectivity persists, it could give the Russians the same kind of opportunity the Ukrainians had back in the spring.

An opportunity to go back on the attack—and an Azov communications engineer warned Euromaidan Press in February that the shoe might be on the other foot.

That's the worst-case scenario for the Ukrainians now that Operation Vivaldi has ended. The best case is that they get full Starlink and Starshield access back—or find command and control alternatives—and duplicate, in other sectors, the same success they enjoyed in northern Donetsk.

"Now that the northern flank of Donbas is secured, at least for some time, the focus will concentrate on the southern flank," Molin predicted.

Russia's latest jet-propelled Geran-4 and Geran-5 one-way attack drones fly at 500 km/h or more, nearly three times as fast as an older, propeller-driven Geran-2.

That's too fast for many of Ukraine's air defenses. In particular, the inexpensive interceptor drones that Ukrainian forces deploy by the thousand.

Russia launched more than 2,700 jet Gerans at Ukraine in September, and Ukraine is shooting down only about 55% of them, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The speed disparity is a big part of the problem.

Ukrainian forces are scrambling for new defenses against the speedy Gerans. Among the best is actually a Ukrainian take on the Geran-4 and Geran-5: a fast, jet-propelled one-way attack drone that the Ukrainians have modified for air-to-air use.

Against jet drones, the air-to-air Bars have a hit rate of around 30%, Zelensky said during a joint press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Kyiv on 4 October. "The Bars have shown positive results," Zelensky said. "They currently have the highest percentage. Others are also catching up."

In July, Ukraine and Germany agreed to jointly produce Bars, with Germany financing the first phase. Ukraine has reportedly been launching Bars at targets on the ground since at least the summer of 2025. But it was only recently that clear photos and videos of the drones have circulated.

Over the weekend, Ukraine’s 1021st Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade released footage of one jet drone hunting another. Observers identified the interceptor as a Bars and its target as a Geran-5. After launching from an elevated ramp with help from a rocket booster, the drone's operator—seeing what the drone saw through a front-facing infrared camera—steered the drone toward the Russian drone, possibly destroying it.

Exactly how the operator controlled the Bars—whether by satellite or mesh radio or some other command and control system—is unclear. Equally unclear: what kind of warhead a Bars would employ in the air-to-air role. Many smaller interceptor drones lack warheads. Instead, they simply slam directly into their targets, wrecking them in the collision.

Ukraine’s 1021st Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade has released the first footage of the Ukrainian Bars jet-powered drone in its interceptor configuration engaging a Russian Geran-5 drone. https://t.co/FRBKZQR9lF pic.twitter.com/njPJWXsDwo

— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) October 17, 2026

Mystery drone

Bars isn't small. It likely packs an explosive warhead. Potentially one that the operator can remotely trigger when the interceptor passes near its target.

Bars is adaptable. Its maker has reworked it from a 22-kg warhead and a 700-km range to a 60-kg warhead and a stated range of more than 1,000 km, and a heavier variant can carry a 105-kg warhead.

In the air-to-air interceptor role, long range is terribly important but speed is everything. There's an obvious way for the Ukrainians to boost the Bars' speed from its reported 700 km/h top speed to potentially even faster. They could shrink the drone's warhead and its fuel load, making it lighter in order to make it faster.

That may explain how a Bars can chase down a Geran-5 even as the Russians, by one Ukrainian analyst's estimate, try to push the Geran-5 toward 700 km/h or more.

Cost is important, too. Russia churns out Gerans for an estimated $100,000 or so per drone. The cheaper the drone, the more copies the Russians can fling at Ukrainian cities. If it takes three or more interceptor drones to take down each of those 2,700 jet Gerans, Ukraine may need to deploy 8,000 to 10,000 interceptors a month.

Ukraine already builds more than 2,000 Bars a month, its maker says, but mostly in strike versions. How many go to air defense, and how much each costs, isn't public.

The supply of small jet engines could be a constraint. “Engines are a key element; we really import them in large quantities,” Zelensky said in an interview with Financial Times. "There are also domestically produced engines, but there are not enough of them.” A Ukrainian-made engine for Bars passed final tests in September.

Belgium has announced it will accelerate the delivery of surplus Lockheed Martin F-16 fighters to Ukraine. Instead of delivering three flyable F-16s before the end of the year, Brussels will ship 10.

It's unclear how many will be flyable. Previously, Belgian officials explained the first seven secondhand F-16s would include just three airworthy examples. The other four would be broken down for spare parts.

It's good news for Ukraine, but hardly cause for nationwide celebration. The handful of flyable F-16s that should arrive in the coming two months could make good recent F-16 losses. But those shipping-soon Belgian F-16s won't actually grow Ukraine's F-16 fleet by much, if at all.

The dozens of supersonic F-16s in action in Ukraine fly often and fight hard. They shoot down Russian drones and cruise missiles, tangle with Russian warplanes, and lob precision glide bombs at Russian forces on the ground. Russia launched about 2,000 jet-powered drones at Ukraine in September, up from some 350 in June, and F-16s are among the few weapons fast enough to catch them, the Wall Street Journal's editorial board noted. Every 300 flying hours, each jet must go abroad for a lengthy inspection.

The main constraint on the pace of F-16 sorties, besides maintenance demands and the availability of trained pilots, is munitions: running low or out of air-to-air missiles and glide bombs, the F-16s routinely aim their 20-mm guns at Russian targets. But even 20-mm ammunition sometimes runs low.

The busy F-16s and their equally busy pilots need reinforcement. But reinforcements are slow coming. Belgium is only slightly accelerating its F-16 shipments amid reports it will eventually give Ukraine all 53 F-16s it's gradually retiring as new Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters arrive to re-equip the Belgian air force.

Further complicating the picture, Norway's six F-16s, promised in 2023, were still being refurbished in Belgium this spring. Some arrived there in pieces.

Yes, Ukraine got 24 fight-ready F-16s from the Netherlands and most of the 19 Denmark promised. But it's lost five of those jets since 2024. And others are so worn out from relentless flying that they're badly in need of maintenance. The Belgian firm Sabena, which services Ukrainian F-16s, has struggled to keep up, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said about half of the jets spend long stretches abroad for repairs. That slows the return of repaired planes and further squeezes the front-line force.

One wing, too few jets

Donor	F-16s promised	Reached Ukraine	Status
Netherlands	24	24	Complete
Denmark	19	At least 12	Further deliveries due
Norway	6	0	Being refurbished in Belgium
Belgium	53	0	10 by end of 2026, the last in 2029
Total	About 100	At least 36, five since lost	Fewer than 40 in service

In short, it's possible the Ukrainian air force's 107th Aviation Wing, its sole F-16 unit, has fewer than 40 ready-to-fight F-16s. Those 53 Belgian F-16s will help grow the wing, but piecemeal. Ukraine should expect a handful of operational jets from Belgium this year. Under a schedule from May, the last 27, half the total, may not arrive until 2029.

To be clear, additional F-16s support the 107th Aviation Wing. The Netherlands sold 18 of its old F-16s to Romania for a token price in order to equip a training squadron, funded by a consortium of Ukraine's allies, that feeds trained pilots to the 107th Aviation Wing. But these 18 jets aren't available for front-line use. They don't even legally belong to Ukraine.

The delays in supplies of combat-ready F-16s matter because the Ukrainian air force is under stress. Its last few dozen ex-Soviet warplanes, including Mikoyan MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, are even older and wearier than the ex-European F-16s are. And they've suffered staggering losses in the air and on the ground in nearly 56 months of hard fighting in the wider war.

The air force does have a few ex-French Dassault Mirage 2000s that are at least as capable as the F-16s, but France has donated only a handful of the supersonic jets—and one has crashed. Any further supplies of Mirage 2000s could be complicated by the French presidential election in April 2027. The leading far-right and far-left parties are both friendly toward Russia and hostile to Ukraine.

Some relief is coming, although not quickly. Sweden has pledged 16 surplus JAS-39C/D Gripen fighters to the Ukrainian war effort; the first of these could arrive early next year. Later on, Ukraine also plans to buy 20 newer JAS-39E/Fs. Kyiv has also negotiated to purchase 16 new Rafale fighters from Paris, but the soonest these could arrive is 2028.

For now, F-16s are the main solution to Ukraine's air defense problems. Kyiv surely wishes it had more of them, sooner.

Overnight on 14 and 15 October, the Ukrainian navy fired a clutch of Long Neptune cruise missiles at Borisoglebsk air base in Voronezh, in western Russia some 260 km from the border with Ukraine.

The results were devastating. The ground-launched Neptunes struck the tarmac where six Russian air force Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers were parked nearly wingtip to wingtip in uncovered positions.

Satellite imagery from the morning of 15 October depicted piles of smoldering wreckage. The navy said it hit all six jets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said four Su-34s were destroyed and a further two were damaged. "I thank the warriors of the Ukrainian navy for their precision!" he wrote.

The jets, he said, were loaded with aerial bombs and ready for new strikes on Ukraine. An analyst reading the imagery counted wreckage of two to four aircraft and two empty spots where damaged jets had been moved.

An Airbus Pléiades satellite image from 11 October, four days before the strike, showed the six Su-34s on open aprons. Next to them were structures that the Russian independent outlet Istories said looked like anti-drone nets or their frames. Nets can snag a small drone. A cruise missile goes through.

At roughly $50 million apiece, by the Ukrainian Air Force's estimate, the four destroyed jets alone cost Russia some $200 million. The twin-engine, two-seat, supersonic Su-34 is the Russian air force's best fighter-bomber. Almost every day, Su-34s lob KAB precision glide bombs at Ukrainian troops and civilians.

Satellite images of Borisoglebsk Air Base as of October 15, 08:25 UTC

On the night of October 15, several Su-34 were destroyed at Borisoglebsk Air Base. pic.twitter.com/3ZNBWhU6UD

— AviVector (@avivector) October 15, 2026

In nearly 56 months of hard fighting in Russia's wider war on Ukraine, the Russians have now lost no fewer than 37 Su-34s destroyed, with several more damaged, by open-source counts. Sukhoi continues to deliver new Su-34s in small batches, the latest handed over on 7 October, helping the Russians sustain their overall inventory despite heavy losses.

They've still got plenty of Su-34s, but that doesn't mean the Russians shouldn't worry. As long as they're parking warplanes out in the open within range of Ukraine's best deep strike munitions, those planes are vulnerable to attack. Russia's air defenses are spread too thin to intercept every Ukrainian munition.

Satellite imagery showing the aftermath of a Neptune missile strike on six Su-34 fighter-bombers at Borisoglebsk Airfield.

Coordinates: 51.36315, 42.18560 pic.twitter.com/7TNpxGIaB0

— Dnipro Osint (@GarbuzYe) October 15, 2026

The strike may also hit the Russian air force's training pipeline. Borisoglebsk air base is home to the 160th Aviation Training Regiment. The regiment operates Yakovlev Yak-130 trainers for more basic flight training plus—for more advanced training—front-line combat aircraft including Su-34s, Sukhoi Su-35s, and Sukhoi Su-30s.

Russian bloggers are aghast, according to a round-up of posts on Russian social media by analyst ChrisO_wiki. "How is it that, four years after the start of the Special Military Operation, there are no protective structures for aircraft at airfields located within range of Ukrainian air strikes?" blogger Ramsay wrote. "And where did the billions of rubles allocated for their construction go?"

"Much can be said about the need to build a sufficient number of concrete shelters at all airfields," blogger Vladimir Romanov pointed out. "Reality shows that, to date, sufficient measures have not been taken."

Close parking

Ramsay asked why the Su-34s were concentrated in one area, apparently so that ground crews could quickly service all of them with a single ground power unit, a mobile generator that starts an aircraft's systems before flight. "How is it that the APA, a utilitarian piece of equipment, has become so scarce that it forces an entire group of combat aircraft to be parked in a single area, making them an ideal target for attacks?"

The best defense is an active one, however, the Fighterbomber channel stressed. "Protecting aircraft by the usual method of moving them out of the line of fire at such ranges from long-range strike systems won’t work here; the only way to defend against them is with a full-scale, echeloned air defense system—both ground-based and airborne."

1/ Russian warbloggers are furious at the news that a Ukrainian missile has destroyed between 4 and 6 Su-34 jets on the ground at a Russian airfield. How is it possible, they ask, that the Russian air force is still parking aircraft close together without protection? pic.twitter.com/BrTvfCMRfH

— ChrisO_wiki (@ChrisO_wiki) October 15, 2026

Ukrainian planners know this. Which is why, for more than a year now, they've been systematically striking Russian radars, surface-to-air missile batteries, and mobile air defense systems. By March, Ukrainian forces were “collaps[ing] the layered defensive architecture that the Russian integrated air defence doctrine depends upon to function,” according to an in-depth investigation by Tochnyi.info.

The strikes on Russian air defenses—at least 492 of them between June and early March—are part of a carefully scripted plan. Destroying the right air defenses faster than the Russians can replace them has the effect of “facilitating strikes on more critical targets deep within Russian territory,” Tochnyi.info explained.

The critical targets include air bases such as Borisoglebsk and the expensive warplanes parked on its tarmac.

On or just before Wednesday, 14 October, Russian Geran-4 one-way attack drones struck two more cargo ships—one in the Buh River Estuary near Mykolaiv and another in Chornomorsk, 20 km south of Odesa.

They're the latest strikes in competing Russian and Ukrainian countershipping campaigns that have, since this summer, throttled Black Sea grain exports.

The jet-propelled Geran-4s are Russia's weapons of choice for these ship strikes. The drones haul warheads of up to 90 kg at up to 500 km/h and can fly more than 700 km. They already had AI-assisted targeting, and the Russians recently added terrain-matching navigation to make them less reliant on satellites and harder to jam with signal-scrambling electronic warfare.

For months, the Geran-4s and other Russian munitions have pummeled Ukrainian ports and the ships hauling grain from them. But Ukrainian forces were actually the first to escalate the shipping fight in an effort to squeeze Russian logistics.

Russian Geran-4 jet-drones struck two more cargo ships, in the Buh River Estuary and at Chornomorsk Port in Odesa Oblast. pic.twitter.com/wOXcJFAj5O

— AMK Mapping (@AMK_Mapping_) October 14, 2026

As recently as early this summer, hundreds of Russian tankers and dry cargo ships plied the Black Sea and adjacent Sea of Azov, hauling fuel and bulk supplies between ports in Russia and Russian-occupied ports in southern Ukraine.

Most of the Russian vessels were unregistered and sailed without transponders, making them a kind of regional adjunct of Moscow’s “shadow fleet” that ships Russian oil and other goods to the global market in defiance of international sanctions.

Ukrainian drones had already hit ships hauling stolen Ukrainian grain out of occupied ports in June.

On 6 July, Ukraine’s deep strike drone force finally started hunting the rest of the Russian ships. By day eight of the countershipping effort, the Ukrainians had hit 105 vessels. By day 12, drones including AI-assisted Fire Point FP-1/2s had struck 159, even a few tugboats sent to assist the damaged tankers.

Just a few days after Ukraine launched its countershipping campaign, Russia launched a retaliatory campaign targeting Ukraine’s Black Sea grain ports as well as the ships, many of them foreign-flagged, that haul grain through Türkiye’s Bosporus Strait out to the Mediterranean Sea and onward to foreign ports.

Soon, the Russian shadow fleet’s hundreds of ships were either drifting, disabled, or sheltering in Russian ports. On the other side of the Black Sea, Ukraine’s lucrative grain trade was in a state of collapse. Ports were under constant attack. International shippers were increasingly reluctant to send their vessels into the Black Sea.

Trade freefall

Grain shipment figures on both sides tell a stark tale. According to the Russian Grain Union, in September approximately 1.36 million tons of wheat shipped from Russian ports, including ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, compared to 5.4 million tons in September 2025—a 75% reduction.

Meanwhile, Ukraine exported 1.094 million tons of wheat in September, down from 2.051 million tons in September 2025—a 47% reduction. The only thing preventing further throttling of Ukrainian grain exports was Izmail, Renia, and Kilia—the country’s three small ports on the Danube River, which forms Ukraine’s southern border with Romania and flows into the western Black Sea a relatively short 435 km from the Bosporus Strait.

But the Russians were beginning to target the Danube ports and the grain ships heading to and from them, too. In October, Russian drones sank the Saint Kitts-flagged M/V Royad Mammadov, bound from Izmail to Ravenna, Italy, with Ukrainian grain, and the Togo-flagged M/V Alfa Watan, and damaged the Palau-flagged M/V Able, killing at least two seafarers.

“The Black Sea grain standoff, in which both Russia and Ukraine continue to suffer losses, persists,” Polish open-source intelligence analyst Thorkill wrote.

With global food prices rising partially as a result of the bottleneck in grain exports through the Bosporus, the United Nations and Türkiye have been trying to arrange talks between Russia and Ukraine regarding a possible Black Sea ceasefire.

A previous grain deal, brokered by Türkiye and the UN in 2022, collapsed a year later. Ukraine kept ships moving through its own corridor until Russian strikes shut it down this summer.

Update, 16 October: Drones hit at least four more merchant ships off Bulgaria and Romania between 13 and 15 October, sinking the HS Dignity off Krapets. At least 17 seafarers are missing. Romanian President Nicușor Dan called the attacks “attempts by Russia” to destabilize Romania and Bulgaria and said NATO’s North Atlantic Council would discuss them.