• The Army is working to cut delays between recruitment, training, and assignments.
• New scheduling tools aim to fill empty training seats and get soldiers into units faster.
• The Army also wants to consider family medical needs earlier in assignment decisions.

The US Army wants to streamline how it trains new soldiers and places them into roles, part of a larger push to cut bureaucratic delays that can leave recruits waiting months for training and create logjams down the line.

Service leaders want to cut the time soldiers spend waiting between recruitment, training, and assignments, while also ensuring specialties are consistently filled by personnel who are prepared for and interested in the jobs.

At the Association of the United States Army conference in Washington, DC, earlier this month, leaders from Army Human Resources Command discussed how they're modernizing personnel management to get soldiers trained into the jobs where they're needed faster.

The data-driven approaches are aimed at connecting what have long been separate processes to better match soldiers to specific locations and jobs based on the Army's needs and scheduling.

Part of the challenge for the service is getting "hundreds of disparate systems" to talk to each other, said Lt. Gen. Charles Lombardo, who's overseeing the effort.

The Army is tackling that problem through a broader technology overhaul touching systems spanning from personnel management to battlefield operations. The Army has described its wider human-resources overhaul as an effort to replace fragmented, paper-based processes with a unified data environment. It says that the effort is intended to improve forecasting, resource management, and real-time personnel services.

For training, Army leaders want better scheduling with an approach they're calling People Supply Chain Management.

Rather than handling enlistment, basic training, and advanced training as separate events, the service is examining how to better coordinate these processes to reduce downtime and fill empty training seats.

The Army announced the initiative last year, saying it recruits, trains, and assigns tens of thousands of people annually across more than 200 specialties. Some of the Army's most in-demand technical specialties, such as military intelligence and air defense, are top of mind because they have more specialized recruiting and training requirements. Without synchronization, bottlenecks can leave recruits waiting months for training or leave too many soldiers in particular job fields.

With this approach, if two dates are available for advanced training, the system would route soldiers graduating from basic training to the class that best fits their schedule or redirect soldiers to fill seats that open up if someone can no longer attend.

It's still early days for the program, and it remains to be seen whether the new approach can meaningfully reduce wait times, fill more training seats, and get qualified soldiers into units faster.

The service also hopes overhauls will improve assignments for families with members requiring special medical care or specific childcare by matching them with bases that have the necessary services and providers.The aim is to account for those needs before assigning soldiers to duty stations, rather than after a job match has been made.

An Indonesian taxi driver who went looking for work abroad ended up in Russia's army and died in his first battle in Ukraine, Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) said. Russian recruiters found him through a job application, and he reached the front in Donetsk Oblast within weeks of signing. HUR calls him one more foreigner drawn into Russia's war through deception.

Russia's war against Ukraine consumes men faster than the Kremlin is ready to replace them through another mobilization at home, so it keeps hiring abroad. Ukraine has identified nearly 46,000 foreigners who signed with Russia's army since 2022. On 26 October, a UN commission found “compelling evidence” that Russia trafficked men from 29 countries into its forces.

A résumé that reached Russian recruiters

Taufiq Muhammad, born in 1978 in Sorong, Indonesia, drove a taxi in Jakarta and had once worked in the US. Russian recruiters found him through a résumé he had sent out while looking for work, the agency said. He probably believed promises of “easy money” and traveled to Moscow. HUR sees his case as part of a pattern.

“In fact, he became yet another victim of Russia's scheme of recruiting foreigners for the criminal war through deception,” HUR said.

A week and a half of training, then the front

Muhammad signed a one-year contract with Russia's army in Korolyov, near Moscow, on 19 April 2026. HUR called that term typical for foreigners Russia uses as “disposable” infantry. Russia made him a machine gunner and gave him only a week and a half at a training center near Voronezh, Army Inform reported, citing HUR.

Russia moved him to occupied Ukraine in early May. He died almost at once, in his first battle. Russian troops were trying to advance from the village of Zelena Dolyna toward Novoselivka and Drobysheve in Donetsk Oblast, Militarnyi reported.

Indonesia is the newest recruiting ground

Russia's recruiters have been working in Indonesia for months. In August, Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service said it held documents on at least eight Indonesians recruited into Russia's army.

Another Indonesian, Rendi Apriyanto, 30, was reportedly killed in September, his family learned from an Indonesian fighting for Russia. Rendi had told his family he was recruited for logistics work, The Jakarta Post reported.

HUR has traced the same fast track before. In January, it identified a Filipino recruit killed in a Donetsk Oblast assault after one week of training. A Nigerian, 34, died in Kharkiv Oblast after a similar week of training, HUR said in May.

Russia courts Africa ahead of a summit

Ukraine's Foreign Ministry has counted at least 2,982 Africans recruited into Russia's army, and 486 of them have died. Ahead of a Russia–Africa summit on 28–29 October, Moscow plans military and port-access deals with a string of African states, HUR said. The deals would help expand the campaign of Russia's Africa Corps, the Defense Ministry-controlled force on the continent, Army Inform reported, citing HUR.

Each recruit Ukraine identifies gives his home government a documented case to act on. Jakarta has said citizens shown to have been deceived will get its protection, while those who enlisted by choice could lose their citizenship.

Russian authorities committed war crimes and crimes against humanity through attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine said in a report to the UN General Assembly on 26 October.

International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants for former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, issued in June 2024, already covered alleged crimes linked to Russia’s 2022–2023 strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The UN commission’s new report reaches into last winter, 2025–2026, and the cumulative toll since 2022, documenting what the attacks did to civilians living through outages in freezing temperatures.

“As the cold season approaches, the attacks have intensified once again, raising serious concerns about the threats to civilians’ lives and health,” commission chair Erik Møse said.

Russian commanders knew heating facilities were vital

The commission said Russian commanders knew that heating facilities in large cities were indispensable to civilians, particularly during winter. Russian authorities also made official declarations about further attacks and referred to a plan to carry them out, it said. It found that Russian authorities intentionally directed attacks against civilian objects, constituting war crimes.

The commission also concluded that the attacks were carried out under a state policy aimed at depriving civilians of electricity and other essential energy-dependent services and causing suffering. It classified these acts as crimes against humanity in the form of “other inhumane acts.”

Minus 21°C, weeks without heat, and shelters out of reach for older people

Last winter, temperatures fell to minus 21°C as millions of Ukrainians endured prolonged disruptions to heating, electricity, water, and gas, the commission said.

The commission relied on the accounts of 255 people from Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia, and Zhytomyr Oblasts, alongside officials, doctors, and nongovernmental organizations.

Older people and those with limited mobility were particularly affected. Fear of becoming trapped in elevators during blackouts prevented some residents from reaching shelters during air raid alerts. They remained in unheated homes, sometimes without access to life-support equipment.

A 53-year-old Kyiv resident told investigators he tried to stay awake at night because he feared he might not wake up if he fell asleep in the cold.

Meanwhile, school closures disrupted children’s education, and children fell ill in unheated homes, the report said.

Russia rejects the findings

Russia’s UN mission said Moscow did not recognize the commission’s mandate and dismissed its findings as “falsified data,” the Associated Press reported.

The commission also examined Ukrainian attacks on energy infrastructure in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine. It said it could not investigate their impact fully because Russia denied access and did not respond to its requests.

Foreign recruits trafficked to the front

The same report found “compelling evidence” that Russian authorities trafficked men from 29 countries into the Russian armed forces through deception and coercion.

Recruitment agents arranged visas and travel, presenting themselves as legitimate businesses. After arriving in Russia, the men were forced to sign military contracts in Russian and were sent to the front, where many were killed or went missing, the commission said.

• China, India, and the US have the largest active armed forces in the world.
• The International Institute for Strategic Studies compiled data about the world's militaries.
• The world's top armies spend hundreds of billions of dollars on defense each year.

The US military may lead the world in budget size and in the ambitions of its warfare technology, but there is one measure by which it is outsized by other nations.

Using data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' 2026 Military Balance report, Business Insider ranked the top 25 countries by the size of their active armed forces during 2025 and listed their defense budgets that same year.

Active-duty force size is a tally of a country's uniformed troops: airmen, soldiers, sailors, special operators, and Marines.

Armies, in particular, depend on size to gain and occupy ground during armed conflicts.

Militaries can also be a tool of domestic repression. North Korea, for example, is one of the world's most repressive states, led by a dictator who has repeatedly threatened neighboring South Korea — and it also has one of the world's largest militaries.

The number of active-duty military personnel is far from the only factor that matters when comparing military power between countries, but it reflects latent power.

"Numbers have value, but there's a lot more to military capability," Mark Cancian, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, DC-based foreign policy and national security think tank, told Business Insider.

IISS, a London-headquartered think tank, counts active armed forces, reservists, and paramilitaries as separate categories in its analysis, showing a fuller picture of each nation's manpower.

Some countries have significantly more reservists than others — Vietnam has the largest number in the world, estimated at 5 million — but the quality and longevity of their expertise can vary between systems.

"When you look at some countries' reserve numbers, you're often looking at people who haven't trained in 10 or 20 years," Cancian said. "It gives you a big number, but their military value is questionable."

Even when accounting for all of a military's manpower, personnel is only one of the factors that can qualify a nation's military strength, which also includes equipment and readiness.

There's also the role of technologies in global warfare, the size and sophistication of air forces and naval fleets, amphibious capabilities for landing assault forces, command-and-control systems, and nuclear forces, all of which shape military power.

Still, comparing global manpower offers insight into how countries prioritize military power.

See how the world's largest militaries stack up in terms of active troop numbers.

25. Iraq

Active armed forces: 193,000

Defense budget: $12.7 billion

24. Morocco

Active armed forces: 196,000

Defense budget: $7.5 billion

23. France

Active armed forces: 204,000

Defense budget: $70 billion

22. Japan

Active armed forces: 247,000

Defense budget: $58.9 billion

21. Saudi Arabia

Active armed forces: 257,000

Defense budget: $72.5 billion

20. Sri Lanka

Active armed forces: 260,000

Defense budget: $1.4 billion

19. Colombia

Active armed forces: 285,000

Defense budget: $8.3 billion

18. Mexico

Active armed forces: 301,000

Defense budget: $11.4 billion

17. Eritrea

Active armed forces: 302,000

Defense budget: Not reported

16. Turkey

Active armed forces: 355,000

Defense budget: $21.5 billion

15. Thailand

Active armed forces: 361,000

Defense budget: $5.8 billion

14. Brazil

Active armed forces: 375,000

Defense budget: $24.2 billion

13. Indonesia

Active armed forces: 434,000

Defense budget: $15 billion

12. Egypt

Active armed forces: 439,000

Defense budget: $2.3 billion

11. Vietnam

Active armed forces: 450,000

Defense budget: $8.4 billion

10. South Korea

Active armed forces: 450,000

Defense budget: $43.8 billion

9. Ethiopia

Active armed forces: 503,000

Defense budget: $484 million

8. Iran

Active armed forces: 610,000

Defense budget: $6.1 billion

7. Pakistan

Active armed forces: 660,000

Defense budget: $10 billion

6. Ukraine

Active armed forces: 677,000

Defense budget: $44.4 billion

5. Russia

Active armed forces: 1,264,000

Defense budget: $161.2 billion

4. North Korea

Active armed forces: 1,280,000

Defense budget: Not reported

3. United States

Active armed forces: 1,340,000

Defense budget: $921 billion

2. India

Active armed forces: 1,501,000

Defense budget: $78.3 billion

1. China

Active armed forces: 2,035,000

Defense budget: $251.3 billion

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kenya are seeking the return of citizens drawn into Russia’s war, Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) said on 25 October. According to relatives and officials the agency cites, many of the men had gone to Russia for work, only to be tricked or forced into its army.

Russia fills its ranks partly with foreigners. In April, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) said the Russian Defense Ministry plans to enlist at least 18,500 of them in 2026. Foreign recruits let the Kremlin put off hard choices about another mobilization at home, the Atlantic Council argued in May. Home governments have pushed back before, among them Ghana in August. The new statements show the limit of that pushback. Once a man is serving in Russia’s army, his government has to ask Russia to let him go.

Kyrgyz minister: contracts are forced in enlistment offices and jails

Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev addressed the problem at a parliamentary committee on 13 October, answering lawmakers’ questions. He said Kyrgyz citizens in Russia are forced to sign contracts at military enlistment offices or in pretrial detention centers. If warned in time, diplomats try to stop the men from reaching the front.

Kazakhstan is compiling a list for Moscow

Kazakhstan is negotiating with Russia over citizens in the combat zone. Its Foreign Ministry said on 7 October that it was checking each hotline request. Once the checks are complete, the ministry said, it will send the compiled list to the Russian side.

SZRU separately cited unnamed relatives of one Kazakh worker. After he complained about working conditions, they said, he and other men were taken to an enlistment office and forced to sign contracts.

Kenya wants five men held by Ukraine treated as possible trafficking victims

Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi, who also handles foreign affairs, gave lawmakers a count on 8 October. “The Ministry has records of 354 Kenyan nationals involved in the Russian-Ukraine crisis,” he told them. Families who petitioned Parliament dispute that number and put their own count at 841, Kenya’s The Star reported.

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Kenya says Russia agreed to stop recruiting its citizens – families of the missing are still waiting

Ukraine holds five Kenyans captured while fighting for Russia, and Nairobi has already appealed to Kyiv over them. The government told Parliament it wants them treated as people who may have been trafficked abroad.

For Kenyans still serving in Russia’s army, the way out runs through Russian officers. Moscow informed Nairobi that unit commanders will consider requests to end military contracts case by case, the same government response said.

Bohdan Vitvitsky examines the renewed dispute between Poland and Ukraine over the legacy of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, questioning Warsaw’s claims to moral authority over Ukraine’s historical memory and whether such interventions are consistent with European principles of sovereign equality.

The strange historical dispute between Poland and Ukraine, in which Polish officials keep making demands upon Ukraine, seems unwilling to die down.  Most recently, on October 20 the L’viv oblast (regional) council announced plans to honor the World War II-era Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and its military leader, Roman Shukhevych.  The council declared 2027 as the Year of the UPA, the Year of Shukhevych and the Year of Oleh Olzhych, a Ukrainian poet and political activist.  In response, the Polish charge d’affaires in Kyiv, Piotr Lukasiewicz, responded by stating that “glorifying the UPA and criminal figures runs counter to European values and the strategic and neighborly relations between Ukraine and Poland.”  Similar statements were then echoed by other Polish officials, including ministers.  Are the Poles right about it being the Ukrainians who are running afoul of European values?  And are Poles right to think that they have the right and the authority to police whom in history Ukraine chooses to memorialize?  I would suggest that the answer to both questions is no.

Sovereign equality is a fundamental principle in international law that asserts that all states are equal, regardless of their size or power.  The equality of states is a fundamental constitutional principle that governs how the European Union functions.  As a general proposition, it is, thus, contrary to European values for Poland or Polish officials to assume that Poland has some sort a special right to dictate to Ukraine whom it may or may not memorialize, as one can presume that Poland would vigorously reject Ukraine’s or anyone else’s attempt to tell Poland which historical figures it may or may not memorialize based on that outside country’s views of the demerits of Poland’s various heroes.

But given the spirit behind the set of values that developed after the horrors of World War II and after the Western European countries finally lost all of their colonies by the 1960s, there are certain actions by Ukraine or any European country that could merit criticism or even condemnation.  For example, it is incontestable that in the summer of 1943 the UPA, which was newly formed in Volyn, attacked Polish villages and there killed civilian men, women and children in the tens of thousands.  It is also incontestable that according to most definitions, that massacre was a war crime.  With respect to these events, what actions by contemporary Ukrainians could merit condemnation?  There are two.  First, if any Ukrainian official or political figure or public intellectual or organization were to deny that this massacre took place, he/she/they/it would clearly merit condemnation.  Have any current or recent Ukrainian officials or other spokespersons denied the occurrence of the Volyn massacre?  The answer is no.

Second, if any Ukrainian official or political figure or public intellectual or organization were to admit that the Volyn massacre took place but nevertheless deny that it was a war crime or actually condone it on the basis of some one or another historical Ukrainian grievance against the Poles, that would, in accord with contemporary European values, merit condemnation.  Have any current or recent Ukrainian officials or other spokespersons denied that the massacres of Poles were a war crime or maintain that for some reason these massacres were to be viewed approvingly?  The answer, once again, is no.

So why do Polish officials still complain?  They complain because in effect they want to assert that they have the right more generally to be the ones to define Ukraine’s historical past.  As the great British historian of Poland Norman Davies has pointed out, this is absurd.  About 4% or 5% of the soldiers in UPA participated in the Volyn killings, and in fact most of the members of UPA joined after 1943.  UPA is memorialized in Ukraine because of the extraordinary heroism of many, but certainly not all, of its members in the Ukrainian anti-colonial struggle against the Poles, the Germans and the Soviets that extended into the 1950s against the Soviets.  The Poles seem to think that, ignoring what UPA did against the Germans and for much longer against the Soviets, and regardless how large or how small was the percentage of the UPA that was involved in the 1943 massacre, it is what happened to the Poles who were massacred that is more important than all else and it must be that which defines who and what UPA was.  The Poles are of course entitled to view the UPA however they choose, but they insist on more.  They insist on having the right to dictate to Ukrainians how to view the UPA.

There is another major problem with Polish complaints about Ukrainian memorialization.  It is the problem of moral standing.  The Polish minority in Volyn, about at most 16% in the interwar period, represented the nation that had militarily conquered and then occupied Volyn and other parts of western Ukraine.  Ukrainians constituted between 65% and 70% of Volyn’s population.  Some among the Polish minority were the descendants of the Polish lords and their administrators who had colonized Ukraine in the 15^th – 17^th centuries when Ukrainians were enserfed, a form of slavery that continued into the 19^th century.  In the interwar period between World War I and II, the Polish minority maintained its political, economic, educational and cultural domination of the Ukrainian majority.  And, during World War II, the Polish government in exile in London continued to insist that Poland had the right to include Volyn in Poland and thus to continue to maintain dominion over the Ukrainian majority living there.  None of this obscures what was a war crime, but given the Polish history of domination and exploitation of Ukrainians, it does call into serious question whether today’s Poles as putative representatives of the historical Polish nation should today have moral standing to make complaints against Ukrainians.

Lastly, killing civilians is killing civilians.  It is a war crime.  As has been well documented, during World War II various Polish units, including units of the Polish Home Army, which army is widely venerated and memorialized in Poland, attacked Ukrainian villages and killed civilian men, women and children.  Those killings are often waived off as supposedly “retaliatory” attacks, but that is nonsense. The villages that were attacked were not even in Volyn but were simply Ukrainian.  So if today’s Poles think that they have a right to make grievance claims on historical memory relating to events multiple generations ago, then they must also accept the burdens of accepting grievance claims against them.  To put it in legal terminology, as regards history, it’s not as if Poles had clean hands.

In light of all of the above considerations, and with the exceptions discussed above, contemporary Polish officials do not have the right to routinely keep injecting themselves into Ukrainian decisions to memorialize historical figures that, for Ukrainians, were predecessors of Ukraine’s current efforts to fight off yet another attempt to subjugate it.

Dr. Bohdan Vitvitsky is a retired federal prosecutor and a former U.S. diplomat who holds a Ph.D. in philosophy.

Recent midlife upgrades to China’s older surface combatants highlight an ongoing debate over whether preserving naval fleet mass provides an operational edge over purely qualitative technological modernization in naval warfare. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has carried out an extensive midlife refit of its […]

The post China bets refitted destroyers can hold line in US numbers race appeared first on Asia Times.

Defence secretary says Britain must manufacture at scale as Germany’s Rheinmetall opens Midlands factory

For the last 20 years, Britain was unable to put a barrel on its tanks without buying from abroad. Relying on foreign allies seemed like a reasonable choice during years of relative security (for wealthy countries at least) after the end of the cold war.

But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has changed the calculation – and prompted a scramble to rearm among European countries, including the UK.

Poland has paused the delivery of a large military aid package to Ukraine after a Lviv regional council honored the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a WWII nationalist force, a source in the Ukrainian government told European Pravda on 21 October. A Polish Defense Ministry spokesperson told Fakt the report was untrue, though he told WP he knew nothing about a possible delay in shipment.

If confirmed, the freeze would carry a history dispute into Poland’s military aid. The row flared in May, when Kyiv named a special forces unit after the UPA, and in June Poland’s president stripped Zelenskyy of Poland’s highest honor. Even so, Ukraine’s ambassador said in August that Polish military aid was still flowing.

A vote and a disputed freeze

The Lviv Oblast Council voted on 20 October to name 2027 the year of the UPA, its commander Roman Shukhevych, and nationalist activist Oleh Olzhych. The UPA fought Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, but Poland holds it responsible for mass killings of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in 1943–1944. The resolution disappeared from the council’s website late that evening, RMF24 reported.

The source blamed what it called the councilors’ irresponsible actions, saying the vote came as Poland prepared the shipment and that work through closed channels is underway. The ministry spokesperson, Janusz Sejmej, called the report untrue. Asked whether it could reflect a delay in shipment, he said he knew nothing about that.

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Progress on a sore point for Ukraine and Poland: remains of over 40 Ukrainians killed by Polish WWII units found in Łasków

Polish officials push back

On 20 October, Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz wrote that Ukraine’s authorities must distance themselves from the council’s position.

The next morning, Prime Minister Donald Tusk called the vote unwise and harmful above all to Ukraine. He said he had warned Zelenskyy earlier that such gestures hinder Ukraine’s friends, though the president was not responsible for this vote. At such moments, Tusk said, Russians always rub their hands.

Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski then requested that councilor Sviatoslav Sheremeta, who proposed the resolution, be added to Poland’s list of unwanted persons. That afternoon, Interior Minister Marcin Kierwiński said the decision had been made. Sheremeta is barred from the Schengen zone until 2031, RMF24 reported. Poland had already barred him once, in 2017, the outlet said.

Kyiv asks for restraint

Earlier on 21 October, before the ban, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry called the vote counterproductive in a reply to journalists and urged Warsaw to avoid abrupt steps. Zelenskyy’s closest aides had also promised the resolution would not take effect, Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Bosacki told TVN24.

The U.S. Army wants to infuse new autonomous capabilities into its current and future fleets of amphibious landing ships and other watercraft. The service is also aiming to acquire up to 100 new purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV). The maritime assets the service has now, often referred to as ‘the Army’s Navy,’ are obscure and generally underappreciated. However, the small force offers an important additional set of naval logistics capabilities, especially for any future fight in the Pacific, which could be further bolstered with optionally-crewed or entirely uncrewed platforms.

Army Maj. Gen. Frederick Crist, head of 8th Theater Sustainment Command (TSC), issued plans for future autonomous watercraft capabilities during a talk last week during a talk at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium. 8th TSC, which has its main headquarters at Fort Shafter in Hawaii, is one of the top formations tasked with managing U.S. military logistics across the Pacific.

“In order to be able to increase theater distribution, we have the two composite watercraft companies, at end state there, west of the IDL [International Date Line],” Crist explained, referring to the Army’s future planned maritime force posture in the Pacific. “We continue partnering with industry to be able to move into autonomous watercraft systems to be able to conduct other means of maritime distribution.”

To take a step back quickly, as part of its broader regional role, 8th TSC also has forward-deployed elements in Japan. This includes the 5th Transportation Company, which is currently organized as what the Army calls a composite watercraft company. As of 2024, the unit had a pair of General Frank S. Besson class Logistics Support Vessels (LSV), as well as 10 smaller Landing Craft Utility (LCU) type vessels and four small tugs, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

The Army has eight LSVs, in total, and these are by far its largest and most capable ships. The two youngest LSVs, which were acquired in the mid-2000s, also form a distinct subclass, and their design is optimized for long-distance open-ocean operations, as you can read more about here. It’s not immediately clear which LSVs are currently assigned to the 5th Transportation Company. The unit is also set to receive new Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) landing craft.

Until very recently, the 10th Support Group (Regional), headquartered in Okinawa, was more directly responsible for overseeing forward-deployed Army logistics units in Japan. Earlier this month, the Army performed a so-called ‘reflagging’ of that formation, a largely administrative process that transformed it into the 45th Sustainment Brigade.

As part of the reflagging of the 10th Support Group into the 45th Sustainment Brigade, the Army has also been pushing ahead with plans for “the standup of a second composite watercraft company in Yokohama North Dock,” in the port city of the same name on the Japanese home island of Honshu, Maj. Gen. Crist explained last week. “That end state will have two composite water[craft] companies west of the IDL [International Date Line] under the command and control of the 45th Sustainment Brigade.”

When it comes to the watercraft assigned to these units, “we’re also moving into the autonomous lane,” Crist added. “Just in August, USARPAC [U.S. Army Pacific] had an opportunity to conduct an experiment by retrofitting an existing commercial vessel, the HOS Resolute [sic; HOS Resolution], with a kit to provide autonomous navigation.”

Maritime autonomy firm Sea Machines was able to integrate its SM300 software package on the HOS Resolution in just nine days for this demonstration. The ship is a 257-foot-long offshore support vessel more typically used to support oil and gas rigs. However, it features a stern ramp and four jack-up legs that also make it well suited to loading and unloading cargo at remote beaches.

For years now, the U.S. Marine Corps has also been experimenting with the HOS Resolution and other similar ships more generally. That service has been using the vessels to help refine its new expeditionary and distributed concepts of operations, which are themselves heavily centered on future conflict scenarios in the Pacific. The Marines have brought those capabilities to Army demonstration exercises in the past, as well.

The Army sees the August experiment as a potential stepping stone to integrating increasing degrees into its existing watercraft fleets.

“You could increase the fleet of autonomous vessels by tapping into the existing manned fleet,” Maj. Gen. Crist said. “Put on retrofitting kits to be able to conduct navigation, and then eventually propulsion and engine room activities, and eventually get to a fully autonomous system.”

Even just adding in autonomous navigation capabilities could help reduce the workload for the human crews on Army vessels and provide added margins of safety. Blending autonomy with “propulsion and engine room activities” could improve reliability and reduce maintenance demands. Being able to operate those ships in a fully uncrewed mode, if desired, would open up additional operational possibilities, including just for repositioning ships across the broad expanses of the Pacific.

Reduced manning requirements could be especially attractive for the Army’s ‘Navy,’ which is already a very small part of the service’s overall force structure. Last week, Maj. Gen. Crist also talked about further leveraging traditional crewed vessels owned and/or operated by contractors.

“It’s going to be a broad portfolio of systems of systems,” he said of the overall watercraft vision for the Pacific. “Army watercraft with Army Mariners will be, of course, one aspect of it. We also look for the opportunity to be able to leverage USTRANSCOM’s (U.S. Transportation Command) contracting capability to leverage operational support vessels that are commercially owned and commercially operated. We’re considering ways of being able to have commercial vessels that become manned by Army mariners.”

It is also interesting to note here how extremely similar this all sounds to the modifications the U.S. Navy made to the Spearhead class Expeditionary Fast Transport USNS Apalachicola ahead of its commissioning in 2023. However, despite tens of millions of dollars spent and successful demonstration of autonomous capabilities, the Navy curiously decided to put the Apalachicola into service without any plan to make use of these features operationally. There does not appear to have been any effort to integrate these capabilities more broadly within the Spearhead class since then, either.

Last year, the Navy struck the four oldest Spearhead class ships from its rolls entirely and has put several others on reduced operating status, ostensibly as a cost-saving measure. The service is still acquiring new Expeditionary Fast Transports, including members of the Expeditionary Medical Ship subclass that feature expanded medical facilities. The Spearhead class was born out of a program specifically to meet Army and Marine Corps requirements, and the ships are regularly used to support those services in the Pacific and elsewhere globally.

The Army also wants to expand its fleets of purpose-built uncrewed surface vessels (USV) for use in the Pacific, as well as elsewhere globally. Just earlier this year, Army Maj. Gen. Gavin Gardner, who preceded Maj. Gen. Crist as head of the 8th Theater Sustainment Command, said he wanted to rapidly acquire as many as 100 drone boats. His vision included larger USVs capable of carrying eight to 10 standardized shipping containers.

“I could see those operating in the U.S. PACOM area of responsibility,” Gardner told reporters at a roundtable in June, according to Military Times. “I think that gives you a ton of operations, inventory in motion, easy to respond. And then because they’re autonomous, and we can work with our partner nations forward, you have those berthed up everywhere from Korea to Japan, the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, etc.”

“Clearly, [the autonomous vessels] would be forward in the theater, kind of moving supplies, because we have a constant demand for Army watercraft time now, to deliver equipment and supplies forward in the theater,” Gardner added at that time.

One of the inherent benefits of the Army watercraft fleets, and its LSVs in particular, is their ability to help alleviate the need for the U.S. Navy to meet more localized littoral logistics needs, if they are even available to help in the first place. Navy amphibious and military sealift ships would already be heavily strained by high demand during any major conflict in the Pacific or elsewhere globally. This could easily be further exacerbated by threats to those supply lines. All of this has already been underscored this year by pressure on maritime logistics chains in the context of the war with Iran. The Army’s ‘Navy’ also offers valuable additional capabilities and capacity in non-combat contingencies, such as responding to natural disasters.

More generally, the Army has been working to expand its use of smaller USVs, including speedboat-like designs, in various roles. The service has clearly been paying close attention to Ukraine’s very successful use of drone boats in one-way kamikaze attacks, as well as ones armed with guns and rockets and examples configured as launch platforms for surface-to-air missiles and weaponized uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).

The 7th Infantry Division, one of the Army’s main maneuver combat formations in the Pacific, just recently experimented with a Ukrainian-developed Magura-series USV during an exercise in Michigan. That particular USV was configured to launch a quadcopter-type drone. Another member of the Magura family was observed being used in a one-way-attack configuration by U.S. Army Green Berets from the 1st Special Forces Group during the annual Balikatan exercise in the Philippines earlier this year.

The Army has also been experimenting with American-designed USVs. The aforementioned recent exercise in Michigan also featured a Saronic Corsair, the same type of USV that the Navy used to rescue the crew of an Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter that went down in the Gulf of Oman in June. Explosive-laden Corsairs were also used to carry out the first known U.S. kamikaze USV attack, which was launched against a coastal target in Iran in July.

During another separate exercise in the Philippines this year, Salaknib 2026, Army forces used unarmed Rampage USVs from U.S. firm Havoc, as seen below. As part of that exercise, the USVs escorted a crewed General Frank S. Besson class LSV to its destination, heading out in front to help spot potential hazards.

“There’s all the work that the Department’s already doing with autonomy and autonomous systems that we look to take advantage of in the [Pacific] theater, as well,” Maj. Gen. Crist said at AUSA.

The Navy and the Marine Corps have both been working to grow their operational fleets of smaller USVs, as well as larger ones, in recent years. At the same time, the Navy has suffered years of setbacks and shakeups in its efforts to operationalize bigger and more capable designs. The service awarded contracts for a total of 30 new medium-sized USVs last month in its latest attempt to reverse that trend.

In September, Secretary Pete Hegseth also announced several new initiatives aimed at further expanding use of uncrewed platforms and advanced autonomous capabilities across the U.S. military and all domains. The Pentagon is presently laying the groundwork for the establishment of an all-new top-level Autonomous Warfare Command (AUTOWARCOM), which it hopes to see come to fruition next year.

What is clear now is that the Army’s vision for future watercraft operations, especially in the Pacific, is increasingly autonomous.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post How The U.S. Army’s ‘Navy’ Aims To Go More Autonomous With Its Vessels In The Pacific appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine holds personal data on each of the nearly 46,000 foreigners it has identified as signing with Russia’s army since 2022, Dmytro Usov, secretary of its prisoner-of-war coordination headquarters, said on 19 October. If the current pace holds, he expects this year’s contracts to reach Moscow’s plan. Meanwhile, a survey of captured foreigners gave a split answer on how many knew they were heading to war.

Usov said 41% of surveyed foreign POWs signed at enlistment offices and recruitment points, which the headquarters reads as a sign of a systematic campaign. He also said the hiring is meant to ease the social and budget burden of Russia’s own losses. Russia has long turned to foreigners to offset shortages in its regular forces. In April, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) said enlistment offices had reportedly been assigned regional quotas.

A count built name by name

Usov, a brigadier general and secretary of Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, spoke at the international conference Crimea Global. He said Russia’s Defense Ministry has signed 45,959 foreigners from 151 countries. Ukraine’s records include each one’s rank, dog tag, and contract date.

The figure counts everyone who signed, not only those serving now. In April, Usov said his count left out North Korea’s regular troops, that 25–30% more recruits were likely still unidentified, and that at least 5,149 foreign recruits had died, Interfax-Ukraine reported.

This year’s contracts near the plan

Contracts have grown every year: 94 in 2022, 4,067 in 2023, 8,877 in 2024, and 16,085 in 2025. Some names surface late. At the same April event, Interfax-Ukraine reported, Usov had put 2025 at 13,997 and said the headquarters adds newly identified foreigners every month.

For 2026, Russia’s Defense Ministry planned 18,500 foreign contracts. Ukraine knows of 16,168 so far, roughly level with all of 2025. Another 668 contracts still have no year assigned. If the same dynamic holds, Usov said, the ministry will fully meet its plan and may even exceed it.

He named Indonesia, Peru, Chad, and Zimbabwe among the ten countries that drove the growth in recruits, Ukrinform reported. At the same time, he said, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry and POW agencies have cut recruitment in some countries and stopped it in others.

What captured foreigners told Ukraine

Ukrainian forces have captured citizens of 59 countries since the full-scale invasion began. Uzbeks, Tajiks, Belarusians, and Colombians are among the largest groups.

In the headquarters’ survey of foreign POWs, nearly half said they knew they would fight Ukrainian soldiers and civilians. Another 28% said they didn’t know, 14.8% weren’t sure, and 13.8% said they were deceived. The headquarters ran the survey, and neither report gave a sample size or explained how the shares fit together. Usov said the results showed most knew where they were going. Almost 47% said they signed up for Russian citizenship.

As he prepares for a potential future conflict on the continent, the commanding general of Multi-Domain Command Europe told TWZ that he envisions dispersing hundreds of high-altitude balloons at a time. The balloons, Brig. Gen. Steven Carpenter explained, would be used for a wide range of purposes, from serving as communications platforms to launching weapons. For years now, TWZ has been closely tracking the expanding use of high-altitude balloons and other lighter-than-air systems globally for intelligence gathering, networking, as platforms for launching drones, and in support of other missions.

Basically, in the European scenario, hundreds or possibly thousands of balloons would be sent east. They would provide attritable real-time reconnaissance, strike, and decoy capabilities, while also acting as a force multiplier for other assets by providing a resilient active network over the battlefield — one that could help fill in the gaps if the space-based layer gets degraded.

“We would like to proliferate the stratosphere with high-altitude balloons, but I mean 200, 300 at a time,” Carpenter told us during last week’s Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) conference in Washington, D.C., which TWZ attended. The Army would utilize high-altitude balloons “not only as decoys, a lot of decoys, but also communications retrans[mission platforms], electronic sensing, as well as electronic attack, and then obviously air-launched effects to be able to drop them down and use kinetic means as well.”

Air-launched effects (ALEs) is a collective term the U.S. military now commonly uses to discuss air-launched drones configured for a wide array of missions. The ALE umbrella encompasses designs that can be used for surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare tasks, or signal relay, and can act as decoys. It also includes loitering munitions often referred to as kamikaze drones, capable of carrying kinetic attacks.

In general, modern high-altitude balloons offer persistent deployment that can last for days, weeks or even months at a time. After navigating to an assigned operating area, some modern balloon systems can hold their position, in spite of prevailing winds, by modulating their altitudes to keep on station.

In addition, high-altitude balloons operate at heights providing excellent fields of view for radars, cameras, and other sensors in all directions and across very broad areas. From a perch of 60,000 feet or more, they also offer a way to peer into certain denied areas while still soaring in international airspace and keeping farther away from potential threats. During a conflict, the balloons could be deployed deep into enemy airspace as they are attritable.

Though some balloon systems can hold their general positions in many circumstances, Carpenter told us that seasonal weather changes will still play a role in deployment.

“The flight paths are different. We study that,” he noted. “We understand during what seasons where the best places are to launch those high-altitude systems, and then again to hold enemy cities and capabilities at risk at any time, so that we can defeat them at the time and place of our choosing.”

We asked Carpenter for more details about how he sees balloons being used by troops in Europe.

“I think everybody knows there’ll be a point where satellite communications are going to be degraded, if not eliminated,” he stated. “One of the things that we’re focusing on is in the stratosphere, so above 60,000 feet up to 80,000 feet, which is next to impossible to target unless you’re using one of your exquisite systems, fifth-gen fighters, SA-21 Bravo [S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile system], etc. to shoot that stuff down.”

Many of the balloons would be equipped with Link 16, a NATO-standard tactical datalink communication system central to U.S. and allied military operations, the general said. Link 16 allows coalition forces to seamlessly transmit and exchange real-time situational awareness data. You can read more about how Link 16 works, and its increasing dependence of space, in our story here.

As for using balloons as ALE delivery platforms, Carpenter told us there are “different technologies, different altitudes that we’d have to deliver those from” at “different ranges, different levels of yield or lethality. But for us, it’s really just a single arrow in a quiver full of arrows, utilizing space capabilities, cyber capabilities, or surface-to-surface capabilities. In this case, you’re talking just another air-to-surface capability with your air-launched effects off balloons.”

Carpenter said that when it comes to balloon-launched ALEs, he is looking at “everything from shorter range, lower yield, maybe targeting an adversary ballistic missile radar, to longer range, higher yield capabilities that you might use to maybe take out a ballistic missile system.”

In such cases, the balloons would carry drones deep into enemy territory, where they would be launched opportunistically to strike the targets Carpenter suggested. The size of the target, and how well it is protected, would determine what kinds of drones the balloons would launch, as well as their proximity to the target.

Should a fight break out in Europe tonight, Carpenter said he is confident he can rely on the technology.

“Our operating concept is proven,” he stated, noting that “we’ve already tested those capabilities against most modern adversary systems that exist. We’ve already validated our operating concept in terms of getting to mass and scale that we would need in large-scale conflict.”

As we have previously reported, while high-altitude balloons have been used for decades, the modern concept of these systems was recently employed operationally by the U.S. in a combat theater.

The Army had planned to demonstrate the ability of balloons to operate in swarms with a high degree of autonomy in the Pacific region last year before those assets were redirected to the Middle East. When exactly that deployment occurred and how long it lasted are unclear.

“We were asked to pivot and do some experimentation in combination with operations, and we pivoted and supported operations in CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command],” Andrew Evans, Director of Strategy and Transformation with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, or G-2, told Breaking Defense, according to a story the outlet published last week. “They were effective for the mission that they were assigned,” he added. However, Evans was not able to disclose the exact location and operational scenarios in which they were used.

Other countries, including U.S. allies and partners, are increasingly fielding balloon-based and other lighter-than-air systems, too. Ukrainian forces notably have been using balloons to conduct kinetic attacks and launch drones against Russian assets. On the other side of that conflict, the Russians have used balloons as decoys to confuse and misdirect air defenses.

The following video shows Ukrainian forces using balloons to launch kamikaze drones.

To achieve the effects he laid out, Carpenter told us that he will still need to surge capacity to Europe.

“The Army will make decisions on which vendors they’re going to go with,” he pointed out. “But the ability to field that at scale is just simply based on the resources provided. I’m talking about money to go ahead and bring them into theater.”

Pushed to provide details of how quickly he could have the desired number of balloons, Carpenter told us that “if the United States or NATO and its allies were on a wartime footing, it would be extremely rapid, but we would need to get them into theater before crisis turned to conflict. So we’d have to keep a close eye from an IC [intelligence community] perspective on indicators and warnings to make sure we have the right systems on the ground at point of need.”

The Army’s overall vision for balloons is not new; the service has been openly discussing it for at least six years now. However, the use of high-altitude balloons in this context is now being operationalized. Meanwhile, China has very actively shown off its ability to gather intelligence and conduct other missions using balloons and other lighter-than-air craft on a broad operational level across the Pacific. TWZ had been reporting on this reality for years before it was thrust fully into the public consciousness after a Chinese spy balloon passed over parts of the United States and Canada back in 2023.

The concept Carpenter laid out for how balloons will be used in a future European conflict is another example of the renaissance in lighter-than-air military technology and how the Pentagon is increasingly seeking to weaponize it on a grand scale.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Army’s Plan To Launch Hundreds Of Balloons Into Enemy Territory If A Future Conflict Breaks Out appeared first on TWZ.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces say they have carried out the world’s first frontline evacuation of a wounded soldier by aerial drone. The soldier, from the 30th Mechanized Brigade, is said to have been recovered successfully and is undergoing treatment and rehabilitation.

“This is a historic event, at least for our unit for sure,” said “Napalm,” a squad commander and programmer with the 92nd Assault Brigade’s uncrewed ground vehicle (UGV) company. The precise date and location of the operation have not been disclosed, and the claim of a global first has not been independently verified. However, a video of the event has been published by the 92nd, which you can watch below:

At this point, it should be noted that the footage has not been independently verified and could depict a staged demonstration rather than an actual combat evacuation. It should, at least, be treated with a degree of caution.

According to accompanying reports, the infantryman was wounded while holding his position. Mines and intense Russian drone activity prevented a conventional ground evacuation, prompting the 92nd’s specialists to attempt an aerial extraction. The video shows the soldier clipping himself to the underside of the drone via a harness before being flown to safety. The extemporized nature of the platform is underscored by the fact that, while in the air, the soldier dangles below its rigid landing legs.

The aircraft was a heavy hexacopter manufactured by Ukrainian company Gurzuf Defense, which provided it free of charge. A UAV operator from the 30th Mechanized Brigade piloted the drone. Throughout the recovery, the soldier remained in contact with the drone operator.

The operation involved the 92nd, 30th and 14th Mechanized Brigades, the 10th Army Corps and Gurzuf Defense.

Ukraine increasingly uses uncrewed ground vehicles to deliver supplies and evacuate casualties from exposed positions. According to Euromaidan Press, Ukrainian UGVs conducted approximately 112,000 logistics and evacuation missions between January and August 2026.

However, ground robots can struggle with mines, mud, and cratered terrain, while remaining vulnerable to drones and artillery. These obstacles make it especially difficult to conduct UGV operations in the battlefield’s “kill zone,” which can extend six to nine miles or more from the front line. You can read an in-depth account of Ukrainian UGV efforts in this previous story.

A video showing a Ukrainian UGV in action in the Donetsk region:

Aerial platforms are able to reach casualties in places where ground vehicles cannot safely travel, and can get there far quicker, without having to stick to specific routes.

The 92nd has not disclosed the evacuation distance or flight duration of the mission. If, as reported, the drone used was an Audag-6 model, this is stated to be capable of carrying a 200-pound payload over a distance of up to 15 miles.

Meanwhile, the recovery points to a growing trend in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Only days before the story of the evacuation broke, it emerged that Ukraine is also now testing the StarGate, a purpose-built aerial medical evacuation drone — also of the heavy hexacopter type — developed by the SkyFall company. This is a rather more tailored solution to the problem, with a covered, medical-grade stretcher slung below the drone. It has a reported payload capacity of around 330 pounds, uses AI-assisted navigation, and can also deploy nets against hostile drones attempting to intercept it.

The 92nd’s operation used a heavy-lift hexacopter adapted for an ad hoc casualty transport, rather than a more bespoke design. This means the soldier had to be adequately trained on how to strap in, and also had to be in a condition that they could actually perform this procedure. This would also be the case even if other soldiers were able to assist them in strapping in.

While these kinds of solutions may be new to the battlefield in Ukraine, using uncrewed aerial systems for personnel recovery and medical evacuation is far from new.

Back in 2016, the Army completed a demonstration of the Lockheed Martin K-Max helicopter in a casualty evacuation role. The K-Max can operate with and without a pilot and was used as a drone by the Marine Corps to deliver cargo in Afghanistan.

“Unmanned and autonomous platforms have the potential to completely rewrite the medical doctrine,” Army Col. Daniel Kral, head of the Army’s Advanced Technology Research Center (TATRC), explained during a conference at Fort Detrick in Maryland in 2017.

In 2019, TWZ reported on U.S. Army efforts to explore how uncrewed craft might speed up the casualty evacuation process. This work included evaluation of the Dragonfly Pictures, Inc. (DPI) DP-14 Hawk, a small, tandem-rotor drone with a 400-pound cargo capacity.

The emergence of autonomous air vehicles, or uncrewed ‘flying taxis,’ with short or vertical take-off and landing capabilities in the urban air mobility sector has also generated military interest. The U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, for example, has conducted studies into how craft such as these could be adapted for combat search and rescue, with the idea that they would be airdropped to recover a fighter pilot shot down while operating over hostile territory.

Closer to the Ukrainian hexacopter concept is the Flowcopter FC-100, a heavy-lift quadcopter drone that the U.S. Army tested in a medical evacuation capacity in Poland during the large-scale Saber Strike exercise earlier this year. Carrying a 220-pound payload, the drone has a range of more than 60 miles.

All of these concepts aim to address the inherent vulnerability of larger personnel recovery platforms in more contested environments.

In their favor, they offer the potential to rescue troops from more precarious situations, with the smaller drones touching down in relatively tight areas in mountainous, forested, or jungle environments. Autonomous navigation systems can guide the drones through smoke, dust, or bad weather, too.

On the other hand, these small craft have no space for a medic, pararescuemen, or other additional personnel. Bearing in mind their limited range and lower speeds, they also need to be in the right location to respond to emergencies as and when they occur.

For the Ukrainian Armed Forces, aerial medical evacuation drones are being rapidly developed and now fielded to help address another problem: the vulnerability of UGVs in areas of the battlefield that have long become far too hazardous for crewed medevac platforms to operate.

By now, both sides in the Ukraine war are relying heavily upon small, autonomous uncrewed aircraft to perform a wide variety of resupply, surveillance, communications, and strike roles on and around the front lines. With that in mind, the adaptation of these kinds of vehicles for casualty evacuation and personnel recovery missions is the next logical step.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Aerial Drones Appear To Be Picking Up Wounded Off The Battlefield In Ukraine appeared first on TWZ.

Army leaders preparing for a potential fight in the Pacific told us that some of the biggest lessons they’ve learned from the war in Ukraine and America’s now-paused fight against Iran are to move around assets that you can and find a better way to camouflage those that you can’t. While seemingly common sense, these lessons come from watching how war is now waged. The ubiquity of drones in Ukraine providing constant overwatch and strike capabilities, and U.S. troops killed and equipment destroyed or damaged by massive Iranian barrages on static installations are informing changes to how the Army trains, equips and operates.

These conversations took place during the recently wrapped Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) annual convention in Washington, D.C., which TWZ attended.

“A lot of the things that are happening right now in terms of long-range fires, integrated air and missile defense, and the lessons that we’re learning from them, we’re able to bring a lot of that to our potential challenges in the Pacific,” Gen. Ron Clark, commander of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), told us at a media roundtable. “Specifically, I am thinking through mobility and camouflage. So it’s one of those age-old Army forgotten sciences of how to hide in plain sight and how to camouflage ourselves from observation, because the ability to be able to see surface entities is almost ubiquitous.”

“Our ability to be able to use electronic warfare, to be able to use just good old-fashioned camouflage, and the ability to deceive our adversary is a must,” Clark added. You can read more about the U.S. military’s camouflage and deception efforts in our story here.

As we have frequently reported about the Ukraine war, both sides have been using a variety of “old-fashioned” tactics to duck, dodge and hide. They range from practices like smokescreens to hide from drones to updates on measures from the past like paint schemes designed to obfuscate vehicles and other equipment from AI-enabled targeting systems.

 As tough as things have been for Ukraine and for U.S. forces in the Middle East, the challenges will be even greater in the Pacific, Clark warned.

In Europe and the Middle East, “it’s not a near-peer adversary that we will be working against,” said Clark, referring respectively to Russia and Iran.

“Whereas in our theater, it absolutely is,” the USARPAC commander noted in a reference to China without naming the country. “So our ability to scale that and to think through the problem sets of how do we fight Type One, Type Two UAS? How do we think through ballistic missile defense holistically in the region? We spend a lot of time working with the joint force for solutions associated with that. How do we maneuver inside an archipelagic environment?”

For the Army, any fight in the Pacific will require soldiers to be able to hop islands and move through vast swaths of ocean, constantly hunted and frequently inside the Chinese weapons engagement zone. Clark said that the Army’s organic fleet of ships like landing craft, small tugs, and modular causeway systems operated by the service’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command will be vital for maneuver.

The Army, however, is struggling to keep its aging fleet of 70 of these vessels in the water and it got rid of a number of others over the years. Concerns about this underappreciated force have been something TWZ has raised for years.

“But we also have to be able to conduct tactical maneuver with forces on the ground that can provide long-range precision fires, as an example, and then move so that fires, radars, sensors are not easily targeted,” Clark added. “Because if they can see you, they can hit you. And if you know they have an opportunity to return fire, they will. So our lessons that we’re learning are, in some cases, are very, very relevant. In some cases, we can learn from some of the changing characteristics of war.”

Still, the wide-open plains and dense cities of Ukraine are quite different from the beaches and jungles of the Pacific, Clark reminded us.

“The way we generally fight does not equate specifically in the Ukraine piece to the maneuver that you would see out of U.S. forces if deployed in a conflict like that,” the USARPAC commander explained. “To be able to use operational maneuver and tactical maneuver in a way that it’s not just simply drone on drone or firing long range fires at one another at scale for an extended period of time. We find our way to work through that problem set and maneuver to positions of advantage and to prevail.”

Regardless of the terrain, the ubiquity of drones in the Ukraine war has made maneuver and resupply deadly endeavors, with much of the front lines bogged down with limited territorial advances by either combatant.

When we pushed further on that point, Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea, weighed in.

“To be able to move with sensors everywhere at all times causes us to achieve positions of advantage from distributed locations,” Brunson pointed out. “So the fight is: you look at maneuver. You might maneuver to a position of advantage, knowing that you’re going to change that again. The ability to utilize not only joint sensors but joint effectors, if you will, joint fires, to be able to use those things from different positions changes the shape of the operating environment.”

The bottom line, he added, is that “maneuver is always going to be maneuver. You’re going from A to B, but you might go from A to A1 to A2 to A3 to get to B, and that’s what I think we realize in this distributed fight that’s going on in Ukraine, and so we continue to watch to see what lessons might be coming back into” effect.

In part reacting to lessons learned from Ukraine and the Middle East, the Army is also changing how it trains, Clark stated. In South Korea, he said the service has to get out of the habit of concentrating so heavily on just two annual major training exercises.

“We recognize… that largely the two big exercises every year in Korea focus on large command posts,” Clark proffered. “We’ve got to move away from that. So what we intend to do is take advantage of the knowledge that we have of the threats that exist or that prevail in the Ukraine fight.”

Clark said these discussions are underway with his deputy commander, Republic of Korea Army Gen. Sungmin Kim.

“We talk about how we would operate in a distributed fashion. You know as well as I do, there’s a location that we go to to train every year in Korea, and we stay in that place,” Clark said in response to a question from another reporter. “What would it look like if we train from Jeju all the way up to Gyeonggi Province in the north? What would that look like, just with our headquarters alone?”

“So just imagine,” Clark postulated, “if we train across the entirety of the peninsula, and got ourselves in the shape where we would say [to North Korea], ‘You can’t utilize the things that you’ve learned in the fight and the battlefield in Ukraine on us, because we learned the same lessons and we’ve distributed ourselves in such a way that we don’t make ourselves the target. We won’t be moored in place,’ and that’s what I’m talking about when I talk about positional advantage. It might not be the same place to the continuum. It might not be the same place when you’re in crisis or conflict or competition. We might have to change that, and that’s what we’re learning.”

Another lesson from Ukraine that Army leaders should be paying attention to, said another panelist, is how both sides are using aerial and ground drones to supply frontline forces and evacuate the wounded because human efforts have now become too deadly, thanks to drones.

“I think you also can’t talk about Ukraine without talking about autonomy,” said Tara Murphy Dougherty, CEO of a company called Air, which provides AI-based sustainment solutions to the Army.

“One of the advantages that you get from using simulation and automation, and really using models and compute in order to create convoy plans, as opposed to humans with Excel spreadsheets, is you are able to do many fewer actual convoys because you’re using all of your capabilities so much more effectively and efficiently,” Dougherty posited. “And while it’s an indirect example, I think it does tie to soldier protection because you’re putting fewer soldiers out there in vulnerable settings. I see that not as an end-goal outcome; we need convoys.”

Ultimately, however, the Army will have to advance what Ukraine and Russia are doing with the deployment of aerial drones and uncrewed ground vehicles for logistics by creating “convoys” of autonomous vehicles.

“I see the end goal outcome as having as many autonomous convoys as possible, and we’ve heard today already at this event some of those ideas,” the CEO added. “In the interim, until we get to more autonomy in medevac and more autonomy in convoys when it’s non-soldier material that’s going out to the battlefield, let’s try and put fewer out there while actually getting more material and capability into the force where it needs to be.”

The Iranian missile and drone barrages on fixed U.S. bases across the Middle East have created some very costly lessons for American forces. As we noted earlier in this story, several troops were killed and critical air defense radars, aircraft and other important equipment were destroyed or damaged. U.S. installations across the region have also suffered damage.

In another media session, we pressed Army officials operating in South Korea about what they learned from watching the destruction caused by Iran and what they are doing to address it.

You can see a satellite image of damage to a U.S. radar site in Jordan below:

“We certainly are watching what’s happening, and we are learning from what is happening in Operation Epic Fury,” Lt. Gen. Joseph “Joe” Hilbert, commanding general of Eighth Army, stationed in South Korea, told us. “We’re learning what’s happening in Ukraine, and we are working through changes in our own tactics and techniques and procedures to be able to react to those threats and to be able to defend against them.”

For more details, he turned the microphone over to Col. Rosanna “Ro” M. Clemente, commander of the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade in South Korea.

“Drawing from those lessons learned, a lot of it is trying to understand how our systems are being hunted by the adversary,” she told us. “So, strictly into all of our training plans, and as we conduct our own internal exercises, all of our air defenders are practicing something as simple as mobility and survivability jumps, which is being able to reposition and displace your systems to different alternative locations based on any type of threat warnings that we receive. They’re very, very well trained. I think all of our soldiers know how to move their systems extremely, extremely well. They move them quickly, and they are able to move them and reposition them into different locations across the peninsula that still maintains that ballistic missile defense coverage.”

In addition, “we also have to rely on the other pillars of integrated air and missile defense, most specifically the passive defensive measures that we also have in place,” she added.

Those measures involve “a little bit more than just hardening – but a couple of other techniques that we’ve learned from the Russia-Ukraine war in terms of deception, how to move things around, create distractions, and make sure that we create different types of dilemmas for the adversary in terms of where our capabilities are and where are they positioned to protect its defended assets.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post What The Army’s Pacific Commanders Are Learning From Ukraine And Iran Conflicts appeared first on TWZ.

America’s adoption of long-range one-way attack munitions like the Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) is evolving quickly. Training on how to fold these relatively low-cost, but potentially highly destructive systems into a joint force playbook for targeting adversaries on land and at sea, from the Pacific to Europe, and anywhere in between, continues.

How exactly LUCAS drones, and other types to come, will be used in future fights globally was highlighted during a panel at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual symposium earlier this week, at which TWZ was in attendance. The discussion was centered on how Army training is changing to meet the extreme combat demands of the future.

The U.S. military first announced it had begun fielding LUCAS, which was reverse-engineered from the Iranian-designed Shahed-136, in December 2025. This came just months after TWZ laid out a detailed case for why the U.S. military should start acquiring Shahed-136 clones in large volumes. LUCAS made its official combat debut in the opening phases of major combat operations against Iran earlier this year. The pusher-propeller, combustion-engine-powered kamikaze drones, which are employed from static launchers that can be positioned on the ground or installed on ships, and with the help of a small rocket booster, were subsequently praised as “indispensable” by America’s top commander in the Middle East.

With all that in mind, “long-range strike drones like LUCAS, how is that fitting into your planning and training?” our Howard Altman asked the panelists at AUSA.

“We’ve taken our Bayonet Academy, as we call it, a training area at JBLM [Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington State], and have started incorporating the employment of long-range one-way attack. Like, how do I maintain it? How do I employ it? How does that then get orchestrated in order to achieve that effect?” Maj. Gen. Bernard Harrington, head of the 7th Infantry Division, responded. “So we see that playing a key role in order to be able to achieve that effect at mass, … [and] in an affordable manner, while also being able potentially to preserve something that’s more exquisite for something that requires an exquisite munition.”

Earlier this year, the Army brought the 7th Infantry and the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force together under the umbrella of what it now calls the Multi-Domain Command-Pacific (MDC-PAC). Maj. Gen. Harrington is also now the commander of MDC-PAC, and has talked previously about how he sees uncrewed capabilities as critical to overwhelming adversaries in future conflicts. The service’s MDTFs, of which there are now four, have been at the leading edge of fielding new long-range strike and other advanced capabilities.

In his response to Altman’s question, Harrington elaborated more on how he sees long-range one-way attack munitions like LUCAS factoring specifically into future fights in the Pacific, such as one against China. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has already established extensive anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) bubbles in the Western Pacific and is continuing to expand on that strategy.

“So as we start modeling out what it looks like to be able to penetrate a portion of the anti-access/area denial network in support of the joint task force in the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] area of operations, we started looking at, well, how do I bend – how do I achieve mass at a cost curve?” the 7th Infantry and MDC-PAC commander explained. “What effect am I really trying to achieve on a system in order to provide that window of opportunity for that joint force commander?”

“So maybe I don’t necessarily need to sink a ship, but if I take out certain systems on that vessel, well then it creates this temporal window opportunity,” he continued. “Then that joint force commander can surge in that carrier strike group or bomber task force.”

What the general is describing here is typically referred to as a mission kill. For years now, TWZ has repeatedly highlighted how long-range one-way attack drones and loitering munitions could be used in exactly this way against even larger warships. Damaging or destroying radars, communications antennas, and other subsystems could severely degrade a ship’s combat effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to follow-on attacks. The time and effort required for repairs could keep it sidelined for a protracted period of time.

“So when we started looking at that, we saw great value. That maybe I don’t have to use specifically or unmask an exquisite system to achieve that effect,” Harrington added. “If I can achieve [the] effect of mass utilizing lower cost systems, hey, maybe that will get me there. So we modeled that, and what we saw was, particularly with our unmanned surface vessels [USV], long-range one-way attack, long-range launch effects, the ability to synchronize and mass that could potentially get us to achieve that effect.”

As with long-range one-way attack drones, the adoption of kamikaze USVs by the U.S. military is evolving rapidly. America’s first use of this capability in real combat also came against Iran in July.

The term “launch effects” that Harrington used here is a catch-all term the U.S. military now routinely applies to a diverse array of uncrewed aerial systems designed to be launched from other platforms in the air, on the ground, and/or at sea. This includes loitering munitions, but also designs configured for surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, signal relay, and other tasks. The lines separating long-range one-way attack drones, launched effects, and traditional cruise missiles and decoys are in many cases now very blurry.

None of this is limited to the Pacific region or the Middle East, either.

“So, in terms of launch effects, I think you mentioned LUCAS. Covenant’s out there. There’s other systems that are out there,” Brig. Gen. Steven Carpenter, head of Multi-Domain Command-Europe (MDC-E), another one of the panelists, also said in direct response to Howard Altman’s question. “In Europe, we like that, more than accepting risk in an area, maybe we’re disintegrating an anti-access/area denial bubble in the center, and then way up north, we’re going to go ahead and accept some risk there. We like to use those systems to create counter-fire parity, long-range fires parity with an adversary.”

Similar to the establishment of MDC-PAC, MDC-E was formed last year by blending together the 56th Artillery Command and the 2nd MDTF, both of which are forward-deployed in Germany.

The “Covenant” mentioned by Carpenter is a U.S.-Israeli company that has been developing a long-range strike weapon system called Anthem. It was just confirmed in September that the U.S. Army has been actively engaged in testing of Anthem. This includes a live-fire demonstration in Morocco earlier this year. You can read more about Anthem and the current plans for it here.

“The reason we like those types of systems is because they’re EMI [electromagnetic interference] resilient, they’re longer range, and they’re higher yield, so they can go ahead and destroy like SS-26 systems, SS-21 systems,” the MDC-E commander added.

SS-26 Stone and SS-21 Scarab are the NATO reporting names for Russia’s Iskander-M and the older Soviet-designed OTR-21 Tochka short-range ballistic missiles, respectively. They are both fired from road-mobile launchers. Russia and Ukraine have employed Tochka in the course of their ongoing conflict, though their role on both sides has steadily diminished amid shrinking inventories. Tochka is also increasingly limited in service elsewhere globally. Iskander-M is a much more capable design that has factored heavily into U.S. military planning in Europe for years now. The U.S. military has previously acknowledged that war in Ukraine has led to improvements to that missile that make it even more dangerous and difficult to intercept.

Long-range one-way attack munitions like LUCAS are well suited to striking surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile launchers, along with other high-value and time-sensitive targets, as TWZ highlights regularly. It’s also worth noting that Iran’s Shahed-136, specifically, traces its roots back to pioneering Israeli developments in munitions of this kind, where the focus initially was explicitly on finding new avenues to neutralize hostile air defenses. Iran has shown Shahed-136s and other related designs being employed in exactly this way in large-scale exercises in the past, as seen in the video below.

More recently, Iranian forces demonstrated just how effective these capabilities could be in a real-world context in retaliatory attacks on prized air defense radars on the opposite side of the Persian Gulf after the United States and Israel launched their open waves of strikes back in February. TWZ previously explored the far-reaching ramifications of this in a detailed feature that you can find here.

Overall, as we’ve previously written:

“When it comes to this class of drone, speed and advanced guidance concepts do not define its utility. Range and cost do. Survivability comes in numbers, and due to their smaller size, use of composite materials, and small internal combustion engine, as well as their slow speed. These attributes, along with their low-altitude flight profile, mean they possess a reduced signature and general level of detectability that can be a challenge for traditionally configured ground-based radars. Despite their smaller signature, the fact that they are still somewhat vulnerable to interception is actually a positive, but we will get to that in a moment.”

“Above all else, the Shahed-136 and other long-range one-way attack drones exist to put a relevantly-sized warhead on a target far from their launch position at the lowest possible cost. It was previously estimated that the Russian Shahed-136 variant costs around $50,000 per copy, with some estimates being far lower. This cost has also likely declined significantly since Russia has mastered the design and drastically ramped up serial production. By comparison, traditional cruise missiles with similar range have costs in the millions of dollars per round, so the price differential is very dramatic. The Shaheds are also just far easier to build and can be produced in much less time than a typical cruise missile.”

The ‘mass’ afforded by LUCAS and other long-range kamikaze drones also imposes problematic cost calculations for opponents when it comes to the air defense equation, and offers a way to rapidly drain an opponent’s stocks of vital interceptors. These are realities the U.S. military is currently grappling with after expending thousands of anti-air interceptors in conflict with Iran and in other crises in the Middle East in recent years, as well as supporting allies and partners, such as Ukraine.

LUCAS, specifically, is already in line to become even more capable through the introduction of a swarming capability, made possible by the Hivemind autonomy software package from Shield AI. As we’ve explained before:

“Using the software, multiple LUCAS drones will be able to share tasks and maneuver cooperatively, making saturation attacks even more effective. As well as the drones dynamically rerouting, avoiding air defenses, and otherwise adapting to changing battlefield conditions, an AI pilot makes it easier for missions to continue despite hostile jamming or loss of datalink connectivity. Indeed, using AI, drone swarms can maintain near-perfect combat efficiency even if it loses members. Drones can be configured with all different payloads, with the swarm’s makeup tailored to each mission, and the AI system can maximize their collective effectiveness at all times.”

The U.S. Army still has many questions to answer about how it will field LUCAS and other long-range one-way-attack drones on a more widespread basis, as well as train personnel to employ them. As evidenced by the establishment of the MDTFs, and now the MDC-PAC and MDC-E formations, the underlying force structure that will go along with all of this is still evolving, as well.

The remarks from Maj. Gen. Bernard Harrington and Brig. Gen. Steven Carpenter at AUSA this week show senior Army leaders are working hard now to lay the groundwork to answer these questions. A clear vision for how LUCAS and similar weapons will be employed in future fights against land-based and maritime threats is taking shape already.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post The Army’s Plan For Employing LUCAS Kamikaze Drones Against Its Adversaries appeared first on TWZ.

Airbus recently put the demonstrator for its MQ-72C drone helicopter through the paces for the U.S. Army. The MQ-72C has been in development for several years now for a U.S. Marine Corps competition seeking a new uncrewed cargo-carrying Aerial Logistics Connector (ALC). The Marines see uncrewed logistics ‘connectors’ as key to future expeditionary and distributed operations, and a similar Army requirement could be on the horizon, especially to support long-range air assaults.

Jaysen Yochim, Senior Director for the ALC program at Airbus, talked about the demonstration for the Army with our Howard Altman at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention on Monday. Airbus is currently teamed with L3Harris Technologies, Shield AI, and Parry Labs on development of this drone helicopter for the Marines, as you can learn more about here.

The current iteration of the MQ-72C is based on the crewed UH-72B Lakota, which is in turn a variant of Airbus’ H145 twin-engine light helicopter. The Army operates crewed UH-72s today, but only in non-combat roles, including counter-drug and border patrol missions, and almost exclusively within the borders of the United States.

The MQ-72C demonstration for the Army, which Airbus self-funded, took place last week at Huntsville Executive Airport just outside of Huntsville, Alabama. The service has a major presence in the Huntsville area, which is focused heavily on supporting aviation and missile developments. As of April of this year, Airbus and its partners had already conducted four rounds of autonomous flight testing of the initial demonstrator version of this design, which is not in a fully uncrewed configuration.

“We did a demonstration for the Army down in Huntsville, really to show all the capabilities that we’ve been able to develop so far on the Marine Corps-funded program,” Yochim said. “We had a total of five demonstration flights that we did down there, showing everything from the autonomous capability of the aircraft in a hover.”

This included “complex hovering patterns, both step turns and fly-through turns, similar to what you’d see on an airfield, to just show how it can be integrated onto an airfield inside of the existing routing structure and everything that exists on an airfield,” he continued. “We did multiple traffic patterns to demonstrate just a normal traffic pattern, like a normal day would be, but also traffic patterns or a flight with a no-fly zone popping up in the middle of the flight.”

The video below shows previous flight testing of the MQ-72C demonstrator.

In that latter instance, the MQ-72C had to “autonomously make decisions” about how it was “going to route itself around the no-fly zones” once they popped up, he added. The human operator did provide the initial flight plan. There was also a pilot on board during the autonomous flight demonstrations, but only as an added safety margin, and they “never had to take control of the aircraft once,” according to Yochim.

Though the demonstrator now has provisions for a pilot, the intention is for the MQ-72C to eventually operate in a completely uncrewed mode. The current version of the design has two LIDAR sensors, facing front and back, as well as an electro-optical camera at the nose end, to help with navigation and otherwise provide situational awareness while operating in the uncrewed mode.

Those sensors feed “imagery into the flight computer with HiveMind that’s interpreting that through its perception systems to make decisions on the go,” Yochim explained. HiveMind is an autonomy software package from Shield AI, which is in use on a growing number of other uncrewed platforms, as you can read more about here.

Yochim also talked about work that has already been done to start laying the groundwork for controlling the MQ-72C in the fully uncrewed mode. Parry Labs has been leading ground control station work.

“Over the summer is really where now the aircraft, rather than having a pilot inside the aircraft, or sorry, an autonomous operator inside the aircraft, using a gaming computer to tell the aircraft what to do, now the aircraft is receiving commands from a ground control station,” he told us. “That is that human in the loop, sending commands to the aircraft over Starlink, so that it has beyond line-of-sight. We’ve had flights that have been autonomously commanded from up to 70 miles away. All of that is stuff that’s happened in the last year. We also have where the aircraft can be commanded from both a ground control station like this and also with the Samsung tablet.”

SpaceX’s Starlink space-based network and its more secure, government-focused cousin, Starshield, are in increasingly widespread use across the U.S. military for communications and other purposes. At present, Starlink also dominates the commercial market for these services globally. Starlink and Starshield offer highly persistent and robust connectivity that is ideal for uncrewed aircraft command and control operations.

The current MQ-72C demonstrator also lacks certain features that are expected to be found on the final configuration. Plans for a set of clamshell doors at the nose notably still have yet to be realized. The UH-72 design already features clamshell doors at the rear of the fuselage, as seen below. The end goal is for the uncrewed version to have an open pass-through main cabin, offering major advantages for loading and unloading cargo, and doing so rapidly.

The nose door arrangement has been “designed. It’s been 3D rendered. It’s gone through some testing on that end, but not flight testing,” Airbus’ Yochim told us. “The flight testing, wind tunnel testing, things like that, take time, and it’s just not been the priority to get there with getting the aircraft ready.”

Yochim said that Airbus is now looking toward the 2029-2030 timeframe for integrating the nose doors. This is tied, in part, to the Marine Corps’ ALC program, where delayed funding has shifted the schedule to the right. On that front, the Marine Corps is aiming for demonstration of this capability in an operationally relevant context next year. The Airbus-led team is also not the only one under contract for that program, with Near Earth Autonomy and Honeywell also working on a design based on the Leonardo AW139 helicopter. The expectation is that the Marines will eventually pick a single ALC design to actually acquire.

In the meantime, Airbus is clearly eyeing other opportunities, including with the U.S. Army. The company’s main arm in Europe is also now pitching a functionally identical U145 drone helicopter based on the current generation H145 design.

Airbus did the “demonstration to just show the Army the capabilities that we’ve been developing with the Marine Corps,” Yochim told us. “So the Marine Corps has been funding the program up to now, and so the message we are giving the Army is this is how far your sister unit [sic; service] has been able to get us with the funding that we’ve had. It’s already product that’s out there. It’s already product that’s working.”

As mentioned, the Marines see ALC as part of a larger family of uncrewed logistics ‘connectors,’ in the air and on the surface, which will be critical to supporting expeditionary and distributed operations involving units spread across far-flung forward locations. The service sees this as particularly central to an island-hopping campaign scenario in the context of a larger potential high-end fight with China in the Pacific, where traditional logistics chains will be top targets. The conflict with Iran has only underscored how disruptive those threats can be.

The Army is facing many of the same kinds of future operational scenarios, especially when it comes to supporting future airmobile operations. The service is already expecting air assaults to take place over far greater distances in the future thanks to the introduction of the MV-75A tiltrotor. Those units will need to be supported once they arrive at their objectives, which could be heavily contested.

“We did several [air assaults] over the last few years directly from Fort Campbell to the Joint Readiness Training Center, which is 500 miles, give or take. The [Marine Corps’ MV-22] Osprey can do that very fast and in one leap,” Army Maj. Gen. David Gardner, head of the 101st Airborne Division, told our sister site Task & Purpose at AUSA. “Our current helicopters, you’ve got to make some fuel and re-arming stops along the way, and the distance isn’t there. But now that helped us think through as a division how we were going to command and control something that moved, expanded our battlefield, so to speak, twice as far, three times, four times as far, and twice as fast.”

The 101st is the Army’s premier air assault formation and is set to be the first to fly MV-75As operationally.

“We can put some things inside the helicopter, and we can put some things under a helicopter with a sling load. We’re not going to sling load something moving 250-ish knots for 500 miles. We’re not going to hang Humvees under that,” Gardner also told Task & Purpose. “We learned some things about how we need to get our equipment to the battlefield, how we need to get our sustainment to the battlefield at those distances, how we might need to rely on autonomous logistics delivery systems.”

It should be stressed that the market for semi-autonomous aerial logistics support is heating up, and that the MQ-72C is not the only option to meet such a requirement. As noted, there is another competitor in the running just for the Marines’ ALC effort, the AW139-based offering from Near Earth Autonomy and Honeywell.

Last year, Sikorsky, now a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin, revealed that it was working on a fully uncrewed version of the Black Hawk helicopter that also features a clamshell nose. Sikorsky has also been working with Robinson Unmanned on a pilotless version of the smaller R66 helicopter that again features clamshell doors at the front of the fuselage. Bell, together with Near Earth Autonomy, is developing an uncrewed cargo-carrying version of its Model 505 Jet Ranger X, as well. The drone versions of the R66 and Jet Ranger X are aimed primarily at another Marine Corps ‘connector’ program called the Medium Aerial Resupply Vehicle-Expeditionary Logistics (MARV-EL).

As mentioned, the Army does already operate crewed UH-72s, but it also flies Black Hawks. The service is also expanding its use of contractor-operated R66s for pilot training.

The Army does not appear to have formalized any requirement for a cargo-carrying drone helicopter yet. At the same time, the comments from Maj. Gen. Gardner certainly suggest one may be emerging now.

There was at least enough interest within the Army already to accept Airbus’ offer of a demonstration of its MQ-72C last week.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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The U.S. Army is pursuing a family of modular and scalable laser directed energy weapons that can be fitted to any vehicle in its inventory. The service sees this as key to expanding the operational use of lasers, particularly to provide an extra layer of defense against drone threats, and outside of dedicated units. The Army is already fielding high-energy lasers operationally on a limited basis, including along the border wth Mexico, but the technology has faced continued hurdles to more widespread use in recent years.

Army officials and industry representatives discussed what is currently called the Enduring-High Energy Laser (E-HEL) program during a panel discussion this week at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ was in attendance. In September, AeroVironment received the first production contract under E-HEL to supply examples of its 30-kilowatt-class LOCUST X3 laser directed energy weapon system. The Army has already acquired earlier LOCUST variants, including vehicle-mounted and palletized types, through more experimental programs, and these are the systems now deployed along the southern border. The U.S. Navy has also at least tested a containerized version of LOCUST for shipboard use as part of its own larger laser ambitions.

“We’re focused on any vehicle in the motorpool. I want to try to integrate future capability of high-energy lasers into it,” Army Brig. Gen. Guy Yelverton, the Capability Program Executive for Defensive Fires with the Portfolio Acquisition Executive Office for Fires, said during the panel on Monday. “And, so, our E-HEL is on a sled. With that, I can look at integrating it onto multiple different vehicles.”

“And then, as I think about vehicle agnosticness, if I open up my aperture to MOS [military occupation speciality] agnostic, and ensure that it’s easy to train, easy to operate, I can not just focus on air and missile defense organizations,” he continued. “I can now look at any formation type to be able to put a high-energy laser capability into it for the counter-UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] fight.”

“That gives me even more opportunities to share this capability across all Army formations, and give our senior leaders [the] maximum amount of thought process and input into where the system goes, who the soldier is that’s operating it, and I’ve given them quite a solution,” he added. “It’s a great dilemma to have of where do I put all this capability.”

In 2022, the Army reactivated the 4th Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (4-60th ADA) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as part of plans to field new laser-armed Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD) systems based on the 8×8 Stryker light armored vehicle. Reliability and other issues with DE M-SHORAD vehicles led the Army to shift focus, and 4-60th ADA has since assumed a more traditional air defense role. The problems with the DE M-SHORAD system are indicative of struggles that have dogged laser-directed energy weapon developments across the U.S. military, and that have led to several other programs being severely truncated or outright cancelled in recent years.

The Army does now have the aforementioned LOCUST systems, including versions mounted on 4×4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) and Infantry Squad Vehicles (ISV), as well as the palletized types. Those systems appear to be currently fielded on a more ad hoc level to units at forward locations.

LOCUST is well suited to the Army’s current vision for fielding E-HEL without being tied to specific vehicles or unit types. At the core of the system is a turret with the laser beam projector, as well as built-in electro-optical and infrared video cameras for target acquisition and tracking. Other sensors, such as small-form-factor high-frequency radars and passive radio frequency signal detection systems on host vehicles, as well as off-board radars and other capabilities positioned elsewhere, can be used to cue the turret.

With the 30-kilowatt power rating, the new X3 versions of LOCUST the Army is acquiring now are still at the lower end of the power spectrum for laser directed energy weapons. All versions of LOCUST to date are geared explicitly toward countering small drones.

It is possible that the Army could field other types of laser directed energy weapon systems through E-HEL in the future. The service, in cooperation with other branches of the U.S. military, is also pursuing designs with far higher power ratings through separate programs.

Just being able to field LOCUST X3 more broadly would still offer valuable additional layers of defense against drones across different types of Army units. More broadly speaking, the central benefit that laser directed energy weapons offer is the promise of functionally unlimited magazine depth, though this is dependent on there being sufficient power and cooling capacity. This, in turn, translates to a substantial reduction in the cost-per-intercept equation compared to traditional anti-air interceptors. All of this is especially advantageous for tackling drone threats, which do not have to be large or expensive to present real dangers.

By miniaturizing and ruggedizing lower-power systems like LOCUST, the Army could distribute these capabilities across a broad area, or deploy them in a more concentrated fashion, depending on the fight. Even a convoy with a number of the vehicles sprinkled in with them could help defend it from pop-up attacks

In this context, mobility and flexibility are also important boons. LOCUST systems mounted on light vehicles can be readily positioned and repositioned to respond to changes on the battlefield, as well as be brought to forward locations slung under helicopters. Palletized and containerized versions offer additional kinds of flexibility for providing point defense at sites on land, as well as installation on ships.

At the panel on Monday, Brig. Gen. Yelverton stressed that when it comes to laser weapons systems, in general, the technology is no longer a matter of “science fiction” but has become “science reality.” The U.S. military says laser systems positioned along the border with Mexico have downed real targets, though many questions remain about those deployments. Regardless, challenges do clearly remain.

“Lasers are real. We can do it. We can go out. We can shoot things,” Kirk Williams, Chief Engineer at the Army’s Directed Energy Project Office, another one of the panelists, said. “But what we got to do now is make these systems reliable enough so that the soldiers have the faith in them when they need them, and that’s really the main point that we’re trying to go after right now.”

“We’re getting to the point where the systems are reliable enough, but we still have to make them maintainable and repairable because this is an Army system,” he continued. “It’s going to be on a battlefield. Things are going to break. We can break things in very creative ways, right? So if it’s not reliable, or if it’s not maintainable, if it’s not repairable, that’s a problem.”

“We’re also looking to reduce size, weight, and power,” he added. “JLTV has a lot better payload capacity than ISV. So we really need to be able to get something smaller if we want to have the same effectiveness on an ISV. So that same modular architecture will allow us to go in, take some of those components, make trade-offs.”

The focus on modular and open systems architectures will also help when it comes to integrating new and improved functionality down the line. It will also feed into the larger goal of having E-HEL options not tied to a particular vehicle or other platform.

“By going after the modular architecture, that gives us the flexibility to not only go after increases in reliability, but also increases in performance,” Williams further explained. “It gives us the way to inject new technology into existing systems, and then hopefully it also gives us a way of getting better prices out of some of our vendors.”

In addition, “one of the things we learned is you can have a really cool integrated system, and then when that truck needs an oil change, well, then your laser weapon system is down for the count,” he added. “So, trying to make it so that you can just pull it off of any vehicle, put it on any other vehicle is really one of the things that we’re trying to go after.”

The Army is also very cognizant of the basic fact that a single laser can only engage one target at once. The beam from any laser weapon system also drops in power as it gets further from the source, just because of the need to propagate through the atmosphere. Weather and other environmental conditions like smoke and dust then also become a factor. This has driven demand for more power (and cooling capacity) to improve effectiveness, especially at range. Developments in adaptive optics can also help overcome these issues to a degree, but lasers currently remain very short-range weapons overall.

“That’s why it’s important to us to get enough energy on the target to kill it as quickly as possible and move on to the next threat. Speaking about the magazine, you know I have battery power on there, so depending upon which system, around 80 seconds, 120 seconds, whatever that is, you know that’s the magazine depth I have,” Brig. Gen. Yelverton said on Monday. “The quicker I get on the target, kill it, and off the target, I start rebuilding, regenerating that magazine depth.”

“It’s the targeting system. It’s the optics system that lets you focus on the target,” Williams also chimed in at this point on the panel discussion. “I mentioned trying to make the trackers better and take some of the onus off of the operator. If we can do better aim point control and keep the laser in the same spot, it gives you a better and a quicker kill.”

Earlier on, Williams had highlighted how artificial intelligence-assisted targeting capabilities could be a particularly important addition to laser directed energy weapons. Networking multiple systems together could help with sorting and assigning targets as efficiently as possible.

When it comes to the actual operational employment of laser directed energy weapons, “as these systems get smaller, as they get more powerful, the quicker we could get them into our soldiers’ hands,” Army Col. Charles Kean, Deputy Commanding Officer for Support at the 7th Infantry Division at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state, another one of the panelists, said.

This, in turn, will open up important new opportunities to “operate with them forward, test them in the mud, the dirt, the humidity of the Pacific, test them down in the southern border where they’re different conditions, whether it’s in the Middle East and Europe, it’s applicable across the board,” Kean continued. “We have to understand it, get it in our hands as quickly as possible, so we could iterate it, iterate on it, and make it better and continue to iterate, because the adversaries continue to iterate in reverse against us.”

This last point is worth highlighting. The U.S. military’s chief global competitor, China, has been particularly active in the development and fielding of ground-based laser and other directed energy weapons, as well as designs for shipboard use. Chinese firms are selling laser weapon systems to foreign armed forces, as well. Other countries, including American allies and partners, are also very actively pursuing these capabilities.

Col. Kean also stressed that laser directed energy weapons would still only be one part of a larger layered air and missile defense ecosystem for the Army.

As it stands now, the Army hopes to have the first LOCUST X3 systems acquired through E-HEL in operational service by early 2028. A similar timeframe has been put forward for the separate Joint Laser Weapon System (JLWS) program, which the Army is also involved in. JLWS is aiming to produce a viable containerized 150-kilowatt-class laser directed energy weapon, with plans to work toward 300- and 500-kilowatt-class designs. At the panel on Monday, Scott Keeney, CEO of laser systems developer nLIGHT, which has been working together with AeroVironment on LOCUST, among other projects, said he saw further scaling up of capabilities to the one-megawatt-class as being on the horizon. This is a power rating the U.S. Navy has also talked about as a future goal.

The Army clearly sees E-HEL already as a path to truly operationalizing laser directed energy capabilities across the system, but the service itself acknowledges that there is still significant work to be done to make this goal a reality.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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