The first Russian diesel tanker under the new deal between Russia and the United States is now heading for New York with a 40,000-metric-ton cargo, enough to cover barely two hours of American demand.
The deal began with a phone call, in which Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to
On Thursday, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removed Venezuela from the list of countries subject to restrictions on U.S. investment.
RELATED:
Venezuela’s Acting Pres. Delcy Rodríguez Meets 2015 Assembly Delegations
Established under the 2025 Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act (COINS Act), the list still includes countries such as China, Russia, Cuba, Iran and North Korea.
To justify Venezuela’s removal from the list, the Treasury Department said the reasons that led to the country’s inclusion no longer exist and that the current government does not meet the definition established by the COINS Act.
However, the OFAC announcement included a warning: The rule could still apply to certain investments in Venezuelan entities, although no details were provided.
“The COINS law significantly expanded the scope of U.S. controls on capital flowing abroad. The proposal requires notification in six sectors and five designated countries, and imposes a total ban on artificial intelligence. The public can submit comments through Dec. 7; the final rule will follow,” the financial website PitBullChain explained.
“The key distinction that must not be overlooked is that this is a mechanism for scrutinizing outbound investments. It is not a lifting of the OFAC sanctions regime. Removal from the COINS list does not mean that existing restrictions on specific individuals and entities disappear.”
“Venezuela’s removal from the COINS list can be interpreted as a sign of reduced friction: less friction for a U.S.-based exchange, a payment processor or a small fund to consider operating with Venezuelan counterparties without automatically falling into the category of a country under scrutiny,” the financial website added.
The list of countries included under the COINS Act was originally advanced with bipartisan support. Its goal was to expand oversight of capital flows into sectors considered sensitive to U.S. national security.
Regarding the scope of the policy, Treasury Undersecretary Chris Pilkerton explained that the program’s purpose “is to ensure that we have the ability to monitor and potentially prohibit those types of investments” that could pose risks to U.S. national security.
teleSUR/ JF
Sources: PitBullChain – OFAC
The Kremlin has announced plans for renewed negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and the United States in Abu Dhabi during the first half of November, reviving a diplomatic process that has repeatedly failed to produce a settlement to Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Friday, 23 October, that the discussions would concentrate on post-war security arrangements. He also left open the possibility of eventual European participation, although the initial meeting is intended to remain trilateral.
The announcement follows talks in St Petersburg between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. Yet the emerging American proposals reveal a fundamental problem: Washington appears increasingly prepared to offer Russia substantial economic incentives, while Moscow has provided little indication that its political objectives in Ukraine have changed.
According to details reported on 23 October, citing The Economist, the American proposals involve Ukraine abandoning its ambition to join NATO in exchange for investment, security arrangements and the prospect of European Union membership.
Russia would receive sanctions relief, renewed commercial relations with American companies and potentially the restoration of natural gas exports to Europe. A demilitarised zone in Donbas is also reportedly under consideration.
The commercial dimension extends beyond theoretical proposals.
American and Russian representatives have discussed investment in the Nord Stream pipeline system and possible arrangements involving Lukoil’s international assets. The negotiations surrounding Russian energy infrastructure suggest that Washington regards commercial cooperation as a potential instrument for securing Moscow’s agreement.
There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Jared Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally benefit from these arrangements. Nevertheless, the involvement of investors in strategically important Russian assets raises questions about whether economic agreements might advance independently of a settlement acceptable to Ukraine.
The Trump administration has already demonstrated its willingness to relax economic pressure. On 16 October, the president waived major provisions of the Graham sanctions legislation, which he had signed into law only four weeks earlier.
As EU Today previously examined, the decision suspended measures designed to increase the economic costs of Russia’s continuing aggression. Washington justified the waiver on the grounds that sanctions could interfere with negotiations.
The central weakness in a settlement built around commercial incentives is the assumption that Putin’s territorial and political demands can ultimately be exchanged for economic advantages.
Russia’s objectives have never been confined to Donetsk, Luhansk or access to Western markets.
In his July 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, Putin advanced a conception of the two nations as belonging to a single historical and cultural space. His interpretation, examined by the Centre for Eastern Studies, challenged the legitimacy of Ukraine’s development outside Moscow’s political influence.
These ideas preceded the full-scale invasion of February 2022. They also followed Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its intervention in eastern Ukraine.
Putin’s demands therefore concern more than military geography. They involve the extent to which Ukraine can exercise independent political authority, determine its international alliances and integrate with Western institutions.
Even a settlement granting Moscow substantial territory could leave this larger objective unresolved.
An independent Ukraine, increasingly integrated into the European economy and protected by Western security commitments, would remain outside Russia’s political control. For a Kremlin leadership that has repeatedly questioned Ukraine’s separate historical identity, such an outcome would represent a limitation on its wider ambitions.
Putin reinforced this position on 22 October when he again described Ukrainian territory in Donbas as historically Russian.
This creates an apparent contradiction. Why would Moscow return to negotiations if its broader objectives remain incompatible with the proposed settlement?
One explanation is that participation itself offers Russia strategic advantages.
Negotiations can preserve diplomatic engagement with Washington, complicate attempts to introduce additional sanctions and maintain American pressure on Kyiv to accept territorial concessions.
They also provide opportunities to negotiate economic arrangements before fundamental security questions have been resolved.
For Putin, the political timetable in Washington is relevant. Trump’s presidency is constitutionally limited to January 2029. Moscow can seek to exploit the present administration’s interest in a diplomatic agreement while continuing military operations.
None of this establishes that Putin has definitively rejected compromise. However, the Kremlin’s willingness to attend negotiations is not equivalent to a willingness to abandon its demands.
Russia continues attacking Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure. As EU Today reported on 22 October, Russian forces launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv shortly after Witkoff’s discussions with Putin.
The simultaneous pursuit of diplomatic engagement and military pressure allows Moscow to negotiate while attempting to alter conditions on the battlefield.
The proposed return of Russian gas exposes another contradiction in Washington’s approach.
The European Union has already adopted binding legislation to phase out Russian gas imports, with full restrictions taking effect during 2027.
The European Commission reiterated on 19 October that it had no plans to reverse its position. Reopening Nord Stream would also face sanctions, infrastructure and political obstacles, particularly in Germany.
Consequently, Washington cannot independently promise Moscow renewed access to European energy markets.
Nor can it guarantee Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Membership requires agreement among the existing member states, completion of accession negotiations and ratification of the relevant treaty.
A settlement negotiated primarily between Washington and Moscow would therefore depend on European decisions over which neither government has unilateral authority.
This helps explain the significance of Peskov’s remarks about possible European participation. Moscow needs European cooperation to secure meaningful sanctions relief and access to markets, even while seeking to negotiate Europe’s security arrangements principally with Washington.
Trump’s approach rests on the proposition that economic incentives can make a settlement more attractive to Moscow than continued warfare.
Putin’s position presents a different calculation. The Russian president must weigh the benefits of restored commercial relations against the political implications of recognising Ukraine’s durable independence and Western orientation.
Those objectives may prove incompatible.
A settlement that restores Russian energy revenues without credible guarantees against renewed aggression could reduce Moscow’s economic constraints while leaving the causes of the war unresolved.
The decisive test in Abu Dhabi will therefore not be whether negotiators can agree on investment, pipelines or sanctions relief. It will be whether Russia is prepared to accept a Ukrainian state whose sovereignty, political direction and future European integration remain beyond Moscow’s control.
Until that question is answered, renewed negotiations may offer Washington the prospect of a diplomatic achievement while allowing the Kremlin to pursue objectives it has not publicly abandoned.
U.S. President Donald Trump may be considering further sanctions relief for Russia following his recent diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, several Ukrainian and U.S. officials familiar with the matter told the Kyiv Independent.
The potential move would fit an approach in which the Trump administration offers
Yiğit Saner
Únete a nosotros en Telegram , X y VK .
Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su
Estados Unidos se ve arrastrado a su propio «dilema de Malaca»
El sistema de pago que Irán pretende imponer a los buques que atraviesan el estrecho de Ormuz está inspirando también a otros países. Esta fuente de inspiración amenaza no solo los equilibrios de poder regionales, sino también el propio «orden mundial».
Recientemente, Talmiz Ahmad, un diplomático que anteriormente ocupó el cargo de embajador de la India en Arabia Saudí, Omán y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, advirtió de que está aumentando el riesgo de que el estrecho de Malaca se utilice para generar ingresos.
Indonesia, Malasia y Singapur bordean el estrecho de Malaca. Malaca es una ruta comercial tan importante como Hormuz. Aproximadamente dos meses después de que comenzara la guerra de Irán, el ministro de Hacienda de Indonesia propuso cobrar a los buques que atravesaran Malaca. Los ingresos se repartirían entre los tres países ribereños del estrecho.
Singapur rechazó la propuesta, Malasia abogó por un compromiso e Indonesia anunció que, por el momento, no se impondrían tasas de tránsito. Sin embargo, la idea de implantar un sistema de este tipo en Malaca u otros estrechos ha pasado a formar parte del debate mundial.
Se proponen cortar el cordón umbilical de China
Los expertos entrevistados por The Diplomat advierten de que el estrecho de Malaca podría convertirse pronto en un punto donde «se cruzan los intereses comerciales, las preocupaciones de seguridad nacional y la competencia geopolítica». Tienen buenas razones para hacerlo, ya que la cuestión no se limita a la imposición de tasas de tránsito de una u otra forma, sino a la influencia estratégica que podría llegar a tener el estrecho. Las siguientes cifras bastan por sí solas para ilustrar la importancia geopolítica de Malaca:
Si bien esta ruta satisface las necesidades de China, la dependencia que genera constituye también una vulnerabilidad estratégica. Esta situación se conoce como el «dilema de Malaca».
Sin embargo, la amenaza no proviene únicamente de la propia dependencia de China. Durante años, los estrategas estadounidenses también han estado debatiendo formas de convertir esta vulnerabilidad en un arma contra Pekín.
Un artículo publicado en el Georgetown Journal of International Affairs en 2023, titulado «El reto de la seguridad económica de China», sostenía que Estados Unidos y sus aliados deberían dificultar que China superara su dilema de Malaca.
Un estudio de 2024 de la Brookings Institution, titulado «After Primacy: US Military Options in Contemporary East Asia» (Tras la primacía: opciones militares de EE. UU. en el Asia Oriental contemporánea), incluía entre las opciones militares disponibles en caso de un conflicto en torno a Taiwán un contra-bloqueo basado en una coalición dirigido al tráfico marítimo comercial de China. Dicho bloqueo podría extenderse a puntos estratégicos clave como Malaca. El análisis también señalaba que tal medida podría acarrear elevados costes para la economía mundial.
De la vulnerabilidad a la ventaja
Según el periodista Andy Browne, ganador del Premio Pulitzer, los estrategas estadounidenses llevan aproximadamente 25 años considerando el bloqueo de las importaciones marítimas de petróleo de China como un arma poderosa contra Pekín. Aunque esta estrategia sigue siendo objeto de debate en la actualidad, la guerra de Irán ha presentado un panorama que pone en tela de juicio las hipótesis en las que se han basado los estrategas estadounidenses:
A la luz de estas realidades, los expertos estadounidenses reconocen ahora que el cierre del estrecho de Malaca podría dejar a los aliados de EE. UU. en la región sin petróleo antes de que ello afectara de manera significativa a China.
Según Andy Browne, la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta de China se ha convertido en una «medida defensiva», que crea rutas alternativas para eludir un bloqueo energético al tiempo que refuerza las conexiones euroasiáticas.
Pero la cuestión no termina ahí. La guerra de Irán también ha puesto de manifiesto las vulnerabilidades de las bases, los destructores y los portaaviones estadounidenses en la región de Asia-Pacífico. Los misiles hipersónicos, de crucero y balísticos de China podrían alcanzar estos objetivos, del mismo modo que los misiles iraníes han alcanzado activos estadounidenses en Asia Occidental. Las reservas chinas de misiles avanzados son enormes.
Dado que los actores asiáticos también debaten la posibilidad de generar ingresos a partir del estrecho, Washington se ve abocado a su propio «dilema de Malaca».
Una reacción en cadena que trastoca la doctrina estadounidense
La ecuación multidimensional que se está configurando actualmente indica que el objetivo de «controlar la alta mar» y «actuar como garante de la libertad de navegación» —la columna vertebral de la hegemonía estadounidense desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial— se enfrenta a su crisis más grave de la era posterior a la Guerra Fría.
La pérdida efectiva del control de Washington sobre estrechos estratégicos clave como Ormuz y Bab el-Mandeb está desencadenando una reacción en cadena que podría extenderse a la región de Asia-Pacífico y a otros estrechos críticos. A medida que convergen los avances en la tecnología de misiles, las amenazas asimétricas y las reivindicaciones de soberanía e ingresos de los actores locales, la capacidad de proyección de poder a escala mundial en la que Estados Unidos ha confiado durante décadas se está erosionando rápidamente.
El fin de la libertad de navegación garantizada por Washington en algunas regiones, y su creciente vulnerabilidad en otras, representa ahora algo más que un fracaso de la política exterior. Supone una grieta en el pilar marítimo fundamental que sustenta la hegemonía global de Estados Unidos.
Publicado originalmente por United World International
Traducción: Geopolítica rugiente
Login