Before I walked into Milwaukee County Stadium in 1982, I had never been to a professional sporting event. I was 9 years old, and I can vividly recall being overwhelmed by the lights and the number of people there. The first-place Milwaukee Brewers were playing the Oakland A’s, and Rickey Henderson tied the record for most stolen bases in a season. The Brewers would go on to play in the World Series that year, losing to the St. Louis Cardinals in an epic seven-game series, and even though we didn’t get to celebrate a championship, I imagined a full life of cheering on a winning team.

It was the last time the Brewers would make the playoffs for 26 years. During that time, I grew hardened, believing I would die before I ever saw the Brewers return to the World Series. Bad personnel moves and a payroll that couldn’t match the league’s top-tier teams made winning seem like mere folly. Fans showed up at the games to cheer on the racing sausages more than the actual players on the field.

Yet when the Brewers and Tampa Bay Rays open the World Series on Friday, both teams’ highest-paid players will earn salaries rivaling the price of the animatronic bird that Kelly Clarkson so desperately desired. Neither franchise spends like a superpower. Neither plays in a media capital. And neither got here by doing what most of baseball has decided is the only way to win.

It would be tempting to cast these two teams as rebels against the analytics nerds, a pair of stubborn traditionalists sticking it to the spreadsheet. It would also be wrong.

The Brewers won a franchise-record 103 games, then swept the two-time defending champion Los Angeles Dodgers — a hedge fund masquerading as a baseball team — in the National League Championship Series. Milwaukee is making its first World Series appearance since 1982. The Rays, meanwhile, went 98-64 for the best record in the American League. They did it on a payroll that ranks 25th in baseball and in what is arguably the sport’s toughest division.

It would be tempting to cast these two teams as rebels against the analytics nerds, a pair of stubborn traditionalists sticking it to the spreadsheet. It would also be wrong. The Rays are perhaps the most analytically obsessive organization in professional sports. They treat roster construction the way a quant treats arbitrage. The Brewers’ pitching staff finished second in baseball in strikeouts, because Milwaukee believes in velocity and spin rate as devoutly as anyone in Silicon Valley believes in disruption. Nobody here is burning copies of “Moneyball.”

What these teams have figured out is subtler and more interesting. Analytics is a tool, not a philosophy. And the data, read honestly, keeps pointing back to things your Little League coach told you for free.

Look at how they score. Milwaukee and Tampa Bay finished first and second in the league in batting average. Both were top five in stolen bases. Both were top seven in ERA. The Brewers were tied for second-to-last in home runs, yet they finished second in all of baseball in runs scored. That last fact should be impossible in the modern game, where the prevailing theory holds that you swing as hard as you can, accept the strikeouts and wait for the three-run homer. Milwaukee kept putting the ball in play, taking the extra base and making the defense prove it could make a throw.

This is the real lesson of “Moneyball,” which was never entirely about on-base percentage. It was about finding what the market undervalues. In 2002, that was walks. In 2026, after a generation of front offices poured money into training hitters to focus on exit velocity and launch angles, the undervalued asset turns out to be the player who makes contact. Or the one who can play three positions. Or who goes first-to-third on a single. When every team bids up the same skill, the bargain bin overflows with fundamentals.

Call it situational hitting, tight defense and multidimensional players. Not long ago, that was just called “baseball.” It is also, not incidentally, more fun to watch. A ball in play is a play. A strikeout, a walk or a solo homer is an event the other eight fielders watch like spectators.

Contrast this with the New York Yankees, who have spent roughly the GDP of Lithuania assembling a lineup of lumbering sluggers. Their approach is built on the assumption that baseball is a home run derby with occasional defensive interruptions. It produces impressive highlight reels and October collapses in roughly equal measure.

Call it situational hitting, tight defense and multidimensional players. Not long ago, that was just called “baseball.” It is also, not incidentally, more fun to watch.

A lesson here extends well beyond the diamond. American institutions have spent the last decade optimizing for the home run. In politics, the cable news haymaker, the floor speech engineered for clips, the fundraising email written in all caps are all big swings meant to circumvent the actual work of legislating. Both parties have come to treat governing as something staffers do between appearances: passing a budget on time, staffing an agency competently and filling the potholes are the sacrifice bunts of public life. Nobody makes a highlight package out of them, and so nobody gets paid to do them.

But the scoreboard does not care about the highlight package. Teams that strike out 1,600 times a year still lose in October to pitchers who can deliciously locate pitches on the corners. And governments that specialize in outrage still find, eventually, that outrage does not deliver the mail. Competence is unglamorous until it becomes the only thing that matters.

The Brewers and Rays have shown that you can use every modern tool available and still respect what the old tools were for. Data told them where the inefficiencies were. Discipline let them exploit those inefficiencies. That combination is rarer than it should be, in baseball and everywhere else.

So whichever team wins, the 2026 World Series will crown a franchise that refused to confuse flash with substance. In a culture that increasingly prefers entertainment to competence, that alone qualifies as a revolutionary act, even if it looks a lot like the game your grandfather used to watch.

The post Why the Brewers-Rays World Series matchup is a revolution for Major League Baseball appeared first on MS NOW.

When the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act was still a work in progress, the Senate briefly inserted a ban on corporate ownership of single-family rental housing so sweeping that it might well have killed off the small but growing build-to-rent sector. 

After furious activism by the housing supply boosters, who had been the main advocates for the law's many other provisions, that investor ban was significantly pared back. 

The final version of ROAD, which became law in July, prohibits investors who own 350 single-family rental homes from buying new ones. But it also includes a long list of exemptions for large investor purchases of single-family rentals.

The primary exemptions include homes purchased as part of a build-to-rent project and dilapidated homes that the investor spends significant money renovating. 

The new restrictions go into effect this coming January. On Thursday, the Treasury Department released a proposed rule that would create definitions for terms that go undefined in the law and clarify the scope of "excepted purchases" of single-family housing that large investors can still make. 

Build-to-rent housing that large investors can still buy is defined as a new single-family home that's never been owned by an owner-occupier, is purchased within 18 months of the home receiving a certificate of occupancy, and is occupied by a renter. 

Protected "renovate-to-rent" homes are defined as homes that had major building code violations that were fixed by the large institutional buyer and for which the investor spent at least 15 percent of the home's purchase price on improvements. 

The rule also provides definitions for rental homes owned as part of a program to boost homeownership, which is another excepted purchase large institutional investors will be allowed to make. Those programs are generally defined as programs in which the renter has the right of first refusal to buy the home and where the rent receives financial support from the homeowner to purchase the home. 

Taken together, the clarified exceptions in the Treasury rule still leave a lot of room for large institutional ownership of single-family homes in keeping with the final text of the ROAD to Housing Act. They won't have to sell the homes they already own. They can still add to the supply of investor-owned rental housing through substantial rehabs and build-to-rent projects. 

Nevertheless, the Treasury rules will impose numerous paperwork burdens on investors who'll now have to track and report, for example, precisely how much money they've spent renovating a purchased rental house or else risk a huge fine. 

Large investors who purchase a single-family home in violation of ROAD are liable for a maximum civil penalty of $1 million per home purchase. 

The proposed Treasury rule highlights what a glaring exception the investor restrictions are to the overall spirit of ROAD. Through a variety of means, the law attempts to reduce the regulatory burden on new housing. Now, large investors will have to absorb significant compliance costs just to prove that they're adding new rental housing supply in precisely the right way. 

The post Under Proposed Treasury Rule, Corporate Homebuyers Who Don't Track Their Receipts Face $1 Million Fines appeared first on Reason Magazine.