Is Turkey now globally recognized as a major military-industrial power?
The question assumes significance as, in a span of 48 hours, Turkey has signed two significant agreements that enhance its military-industrial power projection.
In Doha on October 21, it signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan, Qatar, and Indonesia for joint defense production, integrated manufacturing chains, and technology sharing.
In Ankara on October 22, it signed a Strategic Partnership with Canada, including a formal Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership, alongside deals on energy and air transport.
Four senior ministers signed the Badr Memorandum (BMU): Pakistan’s defense minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Turkey’s defense minister Yasar Guler, Qatar’s Deputy PM Sheikh Saud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Yusuf Jauhari.
Prof. Dr. Haluk Görgün, President (Secretary) of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) in Turkey and regarded as the “architect” of the BMU, was present at the signing ceremony.
Incidentally, Badr refers to the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers defeated their opponents in one of Islam’s earliest battles in the Arabian Peninsula.
Turkey’s defense ministry explained the name “Badr” as “full moon”. It said that “the four participating nations complement one another through this pact, which holds significant military and economic importance”.
In a statement, it added that “by leveraging the capabilities of each country in the field of military production, cooperation and integration will be achieved, defense industry capacities will be developed, and the needs of allied and friendly nations can thus be met.”
Similarly, the statement made by the Qatari Defense Ministry said the “Badr” Memorandum of Understanding “aims to foster cooperation in the field of defense manufacturing, enhance defense capabilities among the four countries, and promote collaboration in technical defense training, as well as in research and development areas, thereby contributing to the creation of solutions and industries worthy of the evolution of modern defenses”.
According to Arda Mevlutoglu, managing director of Ankara-based Mergen Analytical Strategies, the BMU’s implications could extend well beyond the four participants. “We may be witnessing the emergence of an interconnected network of defense and security arrangements extending from the Gulf to South and Southeast Asia, rather than a single formal alliance”.
Under the agreement, each country will bring its own resources and skills to the table.
“Turkey contributes technological expertise, systems integration and a mature defense industry; Pakistan and Indonesia offer manufacturing capacity, skilled workforces and sizable domestic markets; and Qatar provides investment potential and demand. Together, the four nations could establish integrated supply chains, allowing these countries to jointly develop, manufacture and sustain defence systems”, Mevlutoglu told Al Jazeera.
This means each member brings a complementary, not equal, asset. Turkey provides the industrial core, with establishments like Baykar (drones), TAI (aerospace), Aselsan (defense electronics), Roketsan (Missiles and munitions), STM (naval systems), and proven export models like the TB2 and Akıncı unmanned air-combat vehicles.
But Turkey seeks scale, co-production markets, and capital. Qatar can provide the finance. Pakistan and Indonesia can serve as markets.
Reportedly, Pakistan wants to diversify its military imports and not rely solely on China. It wants technology transfer and self-reliance through collaborations.
Indonesia is an emerging market and production base. Jakarta has bought Turkish weapons before — Kaplan tanks, MILGEM-derived frigates — and wants to build its own defense industry under Prabowo’s doctrine, with access to NATO-standard tech without full Western political conditions. The doctrine is championed by President Prabowo Subianto, who is aggressively executing a multifaceted supplier-diversification and co-production strategy.
However, the BMU is not the Mecca Pact of August 2026 that Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia signed in Riyadh and reportedly contains a collective defense clause—an attack on one is an attack on all. It is an industrial MoU.
But one could argue that the initiative reflects Gulf countries increasingly looking toward the Global South and fellow Muslim countries, as recent Middle East conflicts have exposed vulnerabilities tied to dependence on foreign suppliers, technology restrictions, and supply chain disruptions.
By anchoring a defense-industrial coalition with Qatar, Pakistan, and Indonesia, Ankara seems to have signaled that it could be the technological and industrial nucleus of the Global South. And the global validation of its strategy has come through “the three-year action plan” with Ottawa.
Reports describe the optics of Prime Minister Mark Carney being received at the Presidential Complex in Ankara with full honors by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as historic. Carney is the first Canadian Prime Minister to make a dedicated bilateral visit to Turkey, although he traveled to Ankara in July to attend the NATO summit.
The visit resulted in the signing of three agreements: a Defense Industry Partnership between SSB Chairman Haluk Gorgun and Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand; an Air Transport Agreement; and a Joint Declaration on Energy Cooperation.
Remarkably, a few years ago, the two countries’ defense relations had virtually collapsed.
In October 2019, Canada imposed an arms embargo on Turkey after “Operation Peace Spring” in northeastern Syria. It was a military offensive launched by the Turkish Armed Forces and the allied Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG).
In October 2020, Canada suspended and later canceled export permits for L3Harris Wescam camera and targeting systems after confirming they were used on Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones supporting Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
In fact, Canada adopted a presumptive-denial policy for military exports to Turkey. The Turkish defense industry saw Canada as a technology chokepoint.
However, over the last two years, Canada and Turkey have rebuilt their defense relationship. In January 2024, Ottawa quietly lifted arms-export restrictions and returned to a case-by-case assessment. In July 2026, at the NATO Summit in Ankara, the two defense ministers signed a “Statement of Intent” on military dialogue.
“In an increasingly complex global security environment, rising geopolitical uncertainties, and evolving humanitarian challenges, a strong and resilient Canada-Turkiye partnership is essential, providing a foundation to mitigate shared threats and capitalize on new opportunities,” said a joint statement by Carney and Erdogan on Thursday.
Canary’s own statement was more emphatic: “Today’s new Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership will connect Canadian and Turkish companies to work together, creating good jobs at home, export opportunities abroad, greater security for our citizens, and contributing to a stronger NATO alliance”.
The partnership’s three-year action plan rests on four pillars: trade and investment; defense and security; energy; and ties between people.
On trade, investment and innovation, the two leaders agreed to “work toward the successful conclusion of a Canada-Turkey Free Trade Agreement”. They will also expand bilateral trade and investments in priority sectors, including energy supply, defense production, aerospace, and artificial intelligence (AI).
On defense and security, Carney and Erdogan “underlined their intent to deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation”. They also agreed to “strengthen cooperation in support of peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, including Ukraine, South Caucasus, and the Middle East, in particular Gaza”.
The three-year action plan calls for exploring co-development in aerospace, defense production, AI, critical minerals, LNG, and nuclear energy.
Of course, what Canada has agreed is not about Turkey alone. Carney is in the middle of a full-scale trade war with Washington. President Donald Trump’s tariffs and rhetoric questioning Canadian sovereignty have forced Ottawa to pursue a deliberate diversification strategy.
Carney has already reset ties with Saudi Arabia, India and China — all strained under his predecessor Justin Trudeau. Turkey, with 87 million people, NATO’s second-largest army, and a growing industrial base, fits perfectly into his “reliable partners” and “collective resilience” narrative.
For Turkey, the gain is more strategic than commercial. A G7 member and a Five Eyes country, which once embargoed it, Canada now legitimizes its defense industry as a partner. No wonder Erdogan was quick to link Thursday’s agreement to his pet project — “the Defense, Security and Resilience Bank” , announced by nine countries at the NATO summit in July 2026 to finance defense production.
Few will contest that Turkey’s defense industry has grown steadily. From an import-dependent country with 20% local production in 2002 to over 80% today, with $7.1 billion in exports in 2024, it is now a top-15 arms exporter. The fact that both Canada, which embargoed it, and Indonesia, which has options from South Korea and France, want co-production with Turkey is the recognition of Turkey’s defense ecosystem.
Apparently, the narrative has shifted from “Turkey buys” to “Turkey builds with.” Both the Badr agreement and the deal with Canada use the language of “joint production and technology sharing”, not a “buyer-seller” arrangement.
Secondly, Turkey is building a parallel architecture. A formal NATO ally, it is also becoming the leader of a non-Western defense network.
Thirdly, it is showing “Sanctions Resilience”. Western restrictions for its intervention in Syria and the controversy over its buying the S-400 from Russia seem to have taught Turkey to indigenize. Now that indigenization is proving to be its selling point.
However, some reality checks are needed. Turkey’s achievements need not be projected as triumphalism.
After all, both the Agreements made at Doha and Ankara are MoUs and framework agreements. No specific defense program has been identified that would allow assessment of impact on regional military balance. “Badr” has no factory, no joint venture company yet. In defense deals, MOUs are one thing, but their eventual shape is a different matter.
Second, there is the technology ceiling. Turkey still depends on Western subsystems — engines for Kaan and Altay, critical minerals processing, and high-end semiconductors. Canada can help with the latter, but Ottawa’s case-by-case export control means strategic tech will still be gated.
Engaging pragmatically with strategically vital G20 and NATO allies without requiring complete alignment on all domestic values, Canada is meeting this moment with what it calls “values-based realism”.
It is “pragmatically” dealing with other countries, but it will not cross a line when its commitment to the fundamental values of freedom, human rights, sustainability, and solidarity is challenged.
So, it remains to be seen how long Canada will remain silent on the widely reported sweeping and unprecedented nationwide crackdown by the Turkish government on dissent and civil society, heavily focusing on the systematic dismantling of LGBTQ+ and HIV-advocacy organizations.
However, all this does not detract from the fact that Turkey is emerging as a second-tier military-industrial power like South Korea and Israel. Its products are innovative and export-driven. But it has miles to go before reaching the status of the US, France, and Russia, which set global standards.
The post Canada Deal Cements Turkey’s Position as a Military-Industrial Power. Comes After Makkah & Badr Pacts appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
Reuters
A NATO drone maker is teaming up with Ukraine's defense industry and building drone parts underground. The company's CEO said it's seeking to learn lessons in wartime production that could prove critical for Western defense companies in a crisis.
Croatian drone technology company ORQA and Ukrainian drone maker General Cherry are jointly developing and manufacturing interceptor drones, components, and other counter-drone systems in both countries. As part of the partnership, they are building an underground factory in Ukraine to make components.
Working amid Ukraine's wartime risks teaches the company valuable lessons in manufacturing while under attack, ORQA CEO Srđan Kovačević told Business Insider. Producing components in Ukraine is also more efficient than making them in NATO and shipping them to the Ukrainian military, he said.
Kovačević said his company is "learning from Ukraine," where industry is "under constant threat."
"They were also compelled to go underground, to go wide, to de-risk their assets in distribution," he said. "So I think that's the way forward for any critical capabilities."
Ukrainian defense firms are splitting their manufacturing across multiple sites, frequently relocating, and moving some work underground to avoid being targeted by Russian attacks. It's less efficient, but more resilient to attacks. Some Western officials and companies warn that it's time for European industry to learn these practices amid concerns about Russian aggression.
"Distributed systems are much more resilient to any disruption than concentrated systems, centralized systems," Kovačević said. "It's simply about not having a single point of failure."
Ukraine has "this immensely valuable lived experience of building and scaling under fire," the ORQA CEO said, "that's being often abstracted and neglected by Western companies." That, however, is starting to change, he said.
"I think the thinking is really shifting on the European side as well, that this distributed nature actually reinforces resilience even though there are economic downsides to it."
AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky, File
Raivis Melnis, the defense minister of Latvia, told Business Insider that NATO companies work in a far more concentrated way than Ukrainian ones do, and "the question is whether we are ready to produce the systems in different locations, dispersed, and how we organize that."
He wants Latvian and Ukrainian defense industries to work together in part so they can learn how Ukrainian companies maintain production during a war.
Davyd Aloian, the deputy secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, told Business Insider earlier this year that defense companies within parts of NATO should "definitely" start breaking up their production more.
Some defense industry figures have voiced similar concerns about the state of production in the West. Karmo Saar, the head of sales for Estonian drone maker Krattworks, told Business Insider that in a war with Russia, if European companies don't disperse more, "I think we're going to be punished."
Dispersing production is not without trade-offs, though. Achi, CEO of the Ukrainian-Estonian defense technology company and ground robot maker Ark Robotics, told Business Insider that such defensive steps are "necessary," but "not ideal." Operations would be easier with everything in one place.
Some Ukrainian companies have begun setting up production in NATO countries, both to better share their expertise with partner nations and to operate without the risk of Russian attacks.
But Kovačević, whose company makes drones as well as drone technology, including controllers, receivers, goggles, video equipment, and flight simulators, said that building in Ukraine comes with upsides.
The company, which supplies 24 NATO allies, could have done all of its work with General Cherry in Croatia, but instead, they are spreading their joint work across both countries.
Kovačević said building components in Europe and then importing them into Ukraine is "more inefficient than actually doing it in Ukraine." It's also more expensive, and Ukraine has shown its ability to produce in large volumes.
AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File
Localizing the supply chain also means that all parties can "exchange information more efficiently," including about what's happening and what's needed on the battlefield.
He said he understands why some Ukrainian companies are building gear on NATO soil, but he sees value in partnering with General Cherry in Ukraine. He said the Ukrainian company, one of the country's largest drone makers, has "a high operational excellence in running their own manufacturing operations in a safe manner, even under constant threat."
The partnership also offers lessons beyond manufacturing. He said that while the West "has a very deep technology expertise," it lacks "this lived experience of taking that technology and applying it to the operational reality of the 21st-century warfare."
The goal is to both supply Ukraine and to equip NATO with weapons shaped by Ukraine's battlefield experience and expertise. In Croatia, the partners are establishing a joint serial-production facility for co-developed interceptor drones and other counter-drone systems destined for NATO, while in Ukraine, they intend to create drone components, including electronics and communications systems, which General Cherry says it will supply to "all our partners in Ukraine," not just use itself.
Ukraine is already able to make the drones that the partnership will produce in Croatia, but "what they lack is the capacity to build components that go into those systems," Kovačević said, explaining the focus of the Ukrainian facility. He said the project won't disrupt Ukraine's existing supply chains. One of ORQA's priorities is to reduce reliance on Chinese products, and it wants to help Ukraine's industry do the same.
"Now," he said, "it's time to merge the two and emerge better off on both sides of this partnership."
Ukrinform/Ukrinform/Sipa USA
The fast-moving arms development race amid Russia's war against Ukraine means that the defense companies can't ever really consider a product finished or stop making regular updates, a leading Ukrainian drone maker told Business Insider.
Ukraine's defense companies gather constant feedback from soldiers using their products in combat and make frequent updates, sometimes daily. Many companies and soldiers say that without these updates, their gear could become irrelevant on the battlefield within weeks.
Oleg, an executive at major Ukrainian fiber-optic and interceptor drone maker TechEx, told Business Insider that "the most important thing is that you want this product to evolve over time. There will never be a moment when you just build a product, and it's just good."
If a defense company "just stays with one single product, I think within three months, it will be outdated, and nobody will use it," he said, speaking on the condition that only his first name be used for safety purposes.
TechEx's drones, he said, are updated weekly, sometimes with major modifications and other times with adjustments of just a few millimeters or grams.
In this war, he said, "when you build a good product, the enemy builds the countermeasure." To stay in the fight, weapons makers must keep adapting. "You need to work constantly."
Ukraine's Frontline Robotics, for example, told Business Insider that it gets feedback from soldiers 24/7 and makes small changes to its products up to 20 times a month, with major updates coming roughly every six months.
Carlo Bravo/Anadolu via Getty Images
Ark Robotics, another Ukrainian company, said it may make about half a dozen different changes to a product over a few weeks.
Companies are baking the ability for fast and regular updates into their design from the very beginning, making them modular and software-first so changes can be made remotely, quickly, and without needing to redesign or rebuild the entire product from scratch.
The traditional model for Western weapons development is slower. A design is typically matured and tested before production, then is built in relatively stable batches for years, with changes made around scheduled upgrades rather than thinking about constant redesign.
An analysis published by RUSI in December wrote that Western weapons systems "are treated as indivisible wholes, with procurement cycles often stretching over 10 to 20 years and upgrades requiring entire programme restructurings. This legacy approach treats innovation as a rare event rather than a continuous process."
In Ukraine, companies and soldiers are allowed to directly communicate and innovate. Companies text, Whatsapp, and video call soldiers even when they are in the field to exchange constant feedback and requests. Ukraine's model is bottom-up and decentralized.
Oleg said that TechEx's technical support department works with over 100 units to constantly support them and get battlefield feedback. Ukrainian companies often have employees who visit soldiers near the front lines, gather feedback, and help them make repairs or upgrades that can then be integrated back into the products. Soldiers often surprise Ukrainian companies with how they use or modify their gear, which in turn influences what they build and what features they add.
Pavlo Bahmut/Ukrinform/Sipa USA via Reuters Connect
Western companies have long operated differently. Feedback from typically comes through a slower, formal chain rather than straight from the soldier who is using it. But many Western companies are starting to change their processes, particularly those with products in use in Ukraine.
Earlier this year, US Air Force Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, who oversees NATO military operations as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, told Business Insider that NATO wants to establish the same kind of battlefield feedback loop that Ukraine has, and that's something allies are working on.
The drawback to constantly changing or redesigning weapons is that it makes it much harder to produce at scale.
Achi, the CEO of the Ukrainian-Estonian robot, drone, and software company Ark Robotics, previously told Business Insider that when "talking about scale manufacturing, any change comes at a very high price," slowing down or even halting production.
But change is essential. "You cannot afford not to be able to make changes," he said. That forces manufacturers to anticipate changing battlefield needs while trying to maintain production.
Oleg said that European partners need to prepare for the reality of constant adaptation in weapons development, a warning echoed by other Ukrainian companies and officials. He cautioned that Russia is "really good at technology" and at developing countermeasures to even Ukraine's best weapons. "They're being underestimated by a lot of people."
For Ukrainian weapons makers, that means there may never be a point when a product is truly finished.
For the first time, a Royal Air Force (RAF) Eurofighter Typhoon flew alongside the French nuclear-capable Rafale during a simulated nuclear-strike mission, showcasing rare coordination between Europe’s two most advanced fighter jets.
The UK deployed a small contingent of Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4s to France’s Saint-Dizier air base—a key facility in northeastern France that hosts Rafale squadrons of the deterrence force—for Exercise Rummy held over two days on October 20 and 21, 2026.
The exercise took place over France and the Mediterranean, with the Typhoons serving as a defensive counter-air (DCA) escort for the mock nuclear-armed Rafales during a simulated long-range nuclear strike sortie. The A330 MRTT refueling tankers supported the package.
“Taking off from the nuclear-capable air base at Saint-Dizier, the French and British crews demonstrated a very high level of interoperability and an ability to coordinate. The French and British nuclear forces remain independent,” the French Chief of the Defense Staff, General Fabien Mandon, said in a post on X.
Notably, the exercise did not involve any real nuclear warheads, although images published by French officials and Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin show French Rafales armed with ASMP (an air-launched land-attack cruise missile that can carry a nuclear payload) and Mica air-to-air missiles. Meanwhile, the Eurofighters were seen equipped with the short-range ASRAAM air-to-air missiles and fuel tanks.
“Conducted under robust safety and security arrangements, the exercise did not involve nuclear weapons. The exercise focused on improving how our forces work together, ensuring that if the UK faces a serious threat, our military can respond quickly and effectively alongside our closest European ally,” the UK Ministry of Defense said in an official statement on October 23, 2026.
Under the Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations (CSNO) concept, which is an established approach of NATO, the conventionally armed Eurofighter Typhoons could provide conventional escort and protection for the nuclear-capable Rafales without carrying, controlling, or deciding on the use of nuclear weapons.
As the nuclear-armed aircraft’s main air defense, the Typhoons would have unrestricted movement around the Rafales’ perimeter to identify and, if required, neutralize any radar contacts.
Optimized for high-altitude, high-speed air superiority and carrying weapons for both short- and long-range combat, the Eurofighter Typhoons can detect, intercept, and engage enemy fighters that threaten the strike package during a nuclear mission.
In a real mission, the Typhoon’s high-altitude intercept capability and the Rafale’s low-observable, terrain-following performance would lower overall mission risk and improve the chances of the strike aircraft reaching the launch point.
Both the UK and France are nuclear powers, although Britain stopped using air-launched nuclear weapons in 1998 following the Strategic Defense Review (SDR), and currently only possesses the Trident submarine-launched missiles for nuclear weapons. France, by contrast, has both sea- and air-based nuclear launch capability.
France, in turn, retains exclusive political and operational control over its nuclear forces. Therefore, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force; it shows only that two independent deterrents can practice the tactical and procedural interface of a nuclear mission, including communications, escort, tanker support, and deconfliction, without combining their weapons, targeting, or the final decision to fire.
That said, France and Britain signed the Northwood Declaration to strengthen cooperation on their respective nuclear arsenals during French President Emmanuel Macron’s three-day visit to Britain in July 2025.
“This morning, we signed the Northwood Declaration, confirming for the first time that we are coordinating our independent nuclear deterrence,” the former British PM Keir Starmer said at the time. ”From today, our adversaries will know that any extreme threat to this continent would prompt a response from our two nations. There is no greater demonstration of the importance of this relationship.”
Later that year, the newly formed Nuclear Steering Group met for the first time in Paris, and British officials observed Exercise Poker, a regular nuclear deterrence exercise conducted by French Air and Space Forces, marking the first time foreign officials had been given that access. Notably, the UK went from mere observer to participant, providing conventional support in a nuclear deterrence drill, in 10 months.
“Having independent nuclear forces doesn’t exclude coordination. By coordinating, our nuclear forces demonstrate that they can contribute even more significantly to the overall security of the alliance and the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic zone,” French Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin stated.
Meanwhile, British Defense Secretary Wes Streeting said, “As Europe’s nuclear powers, we have a shared responsibility to contribute to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. This exercise demonstrates the depth of our partnership, the credibility of our deterrents and our determination to stand together in the face of emerging threats.”
France has been collaborating with several European partners on the idea of “forward deterrence” amid uncertainties about US security guarantees for Europe and escalating security threats from Russia. Earlier this year, German Eurofighter Typhoons flew alongside French nuclear-capable Rafales in a joint “forward deterrence” exercise earlier this year.
In July 2026, two Luftwaffe Eurofighter Typhoons from Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 31 “Boelcke” at Nörvenich and two French Air and Space Force Dassault Rafale Bs from the Forces Aériennes Stratégiques at Saint-Dizier conducted their first joint air activity.
In March this year, French President Macron announced some changes in the country’s nuclear policy, including increasing the size of the country’s nuclear arsenal and extending the deterrent to cover other European countries.
“The next 50 years will be an era of nuclear weapons,” he exclaimed. The President noted that the UK, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark had all agreed to participate in the new “advanced deterrence” plan. He emphasized that the eight European nations could host air bases where France’s nuclear bombers could be based as well as participate in exercises of France’s air-launched nuclear capability.
This would allow France’s Strategic Air Forces (FAS) to “spread out across the depth of the European continent… and thus complicate the calculations of our adversaries”, the president said at the time. This hinted that the country was eager to spearhead the continent’s nuclear posture amid rising security threats from Russia and a strained transatlantic relationship that has heightened insecurity among European states.
That said, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force, nor does it amount to a French nuclear umbrella in the classic extended-deterrence sense. Instead, it shows France systematically testing how far it can bring conventional partners–including Europe’s only other nuclear power–into the operational orbit of its airborne nuclear forces while retaining full control over the nukes in line with the larger “forward deterrence.”
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A growing share of the world’s electric-vehicle batteries contains nickel from Obi, an Indonesian island where the mining company Harita Group has long paid for goodwill, according to alleged leaked documents published on October 22 by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). When accusations of such payments reach an Indonesian courtroom, accountability usually […]
The post Green batteries built on dirty dealings in Indonesia appeared first on Asia Times.
Four of China’s new KJ-3000 airborne early warning aircraft have been spotted at the Xi’an Aircraft Company complex, suggesting the type may have entered low-rate or serial production just 22 months after its first flight.
Satellite images captured around October 4, 2026, by Vantor and posted to social media show four KJ-3000 early warning aircraft at the Xi’an Aircraft Company (XAC) complex in Yanliang. Three were spotted near the Y-20 production facilities, and the fourth was seen at the adjacent China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE).
Senior Fellow J. Michael Dahm of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies analyzed all available images in depth and assessed that the presence of four aircraft at Xi’an’s Y-20 production facility indicates the KJ-3000 has entered serial production.
However, Chinese military aviation specialist Andreas Rupprecht seemed to agree with Dahm’s assessment, though he noted that the images could instead signal that the aircraft have entered low-rate production.
“Consequently, this could indeed be a sign that production or LRIP has begun; however, it could also be that all 4 previously known prototypes are in place. What we therefore need are clear photographs of the aircraft, their serial numbers, and, at best, showing them in PLAAF grey,” he argued, adding just the amount of caution required vis-à-vis Chinese platforms.
The KJ-3000, expected to be China’s most advanced early warning aircraft, first broke cover in December 2024, right after the sixth-generation prototypes, the J-36 and the J-50, were seen flying for the first time.
A pixelated image of the KJ-3000 in flight was posted to social media, as the EurAsian Times had reported at the time. Another highly pixelated image of a primer-painted aircraft bearing serial number 7821 surfaced in May 2025.
Notably, AEW&C aircraft serve as “eyes in the sky,” providing real-time surveillance and command and control over large areas. They are crucial force multipliers that coordinate air operations, guide fighters, and integrate data from multiple sources, including satellites, other aircraft, and ground-based sensors, serving as airborne command centers. Thus, playing a vital role in complex, dynamic battlefields where rapid decision-making is key.
Although details about the KJ-3000 are scarce, it is based on the Y-20B transport aircraft and powered by a WS-20 high-bypass turbofan engine.
The aircraft has a noticeable set of antennae on the forward fuselage and a large circular radome positioned over the rear fuselage. It also features a prominent intake at the base of the tailfin, likely to supply cooling air for its numerous onboard electronics. Additionally, it has an aerial refueling probe above the cockpit.
The aircraft is expected to have a detection range of 360 to 500 kilometers, although some estimates put it at 600 to 1,000 kilometers. These conjectures couldn’t be verified.
The massive early warning radar aircraft is likely intended to replace the KJ-2000, China’s only large jet-powered AEW&C platform to date. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) had a limited fleet of about four KJ-2000 aircraft, converted from Russian Ilyushin Il-76MD transports in the early 2000s, as the program stalled due to limited access to suitable Il-76 airframes and reliance on Russian engines and spares.
The KJ-3000 is believed to be a massive improvement over the KJ-2000. It can reportedly carry up to 66 tons of payload (16 tons more than the KJ-2000), and the WS-20 engines provide more thrust (about 31,000 pounds) and fuel efficiency, enabling longer flights.
The KJ-3000 would serve as a high-end airborne command, control, and surveillance node, significantly enhancing China’s ability to detect, track, and coordinate forces across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific in a potential conflict with the United States.
Its large AESA radar—mounted on a high-flying, long-endurance Y-20B platform—provides a much greater radar horizon than ground-based radars or existing smaller Chinese AEW&C aircraft.
Operating at higher altitudes and with aerial refueling will allow the KJ-3000 to provide persistent coverage over key maritime approaches, the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine Sea, or the South China Sea.
The aircraft could detect aircraft, ships, and potentially low-observable or low-flying threats (such as drones and bombers) farther away, giving Chinese forces earlier warning and more time to decide on a fast-moving battlefield.
The KJ-3000 is designed as a “sky command center.” It can track multiple targets at once and direct Chinese fighters, such as the J-20 stealth aircraft, as well as long-range air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and drones.
Furthermore, the KJ-3000 detects and tracks carrier strike groups, airborne tankers, AWACS, and strike packages at longer ranges, feeding targeting data to ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, and helping Beijing’s painstakingly built Anti-Access/Area-Denial structure.
Interestingly, China’s expanding early warning capabilities contrast sharply with those of the United States Air Force, which continues to grapple with the transition of its own heavy advanced early warning from the E-3 to the more advanced E-7 Wedgetail.
The E-3 Sentry fleet is aging, and its airframe and radar limitations are becoming more acute with every passing day. The planned replacement, the Boeing 737-based E-7 Wedgetail, already in service with allies such as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, and soon the United Kingdom, was originally planned for the USAF at 26 aircraft. However, budget uncertainty and shifting priorities have repeatedly delayed procurement.
Last year, for instance, the previous US Air Force plan to acquire 26 Boeing E-7 Wedgetail aircraft remained under review during the fiscal 2026 budget process under the current Trump administration, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.
However, Congress pushed back against potential cuts and cancellation of the program.
In March 2026, the USAF changed strategy and awarded contract modifications to continue development and procure additional engineering-and-manufacturing-development (EMD) aircraft, bringing the contracted total to about seven. Later, in May 2026, the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated the department’s “mindset” had changed and that the E-7 “has a future” and a place on the battlefield.
Finally, reports in June 2026 noted that the Pentagon was seeking diversion of money from the US Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye and classified Air Force accounts to fund a $1.55 billion spending plan for its revived E-7 Wedgetail program in fiscal 2027. However, it has not yet committed to the large production run of the originally planned 26 aircraft.
The continued delay has raised concerns about a potential gap in airborne battle management amid rising security threats, especially since the E-3 is becoming outdated and the US has only about 15 of these aircraft (after one loss in the Iran war).
By contrast, China is not only improving its early warning capabilities but also expanding its AEW&CS fleet—something that could trouble the US and its allies in an Indo-Pacific conflict.
Early warning platforms are among an air force’s most strategic assets, especially since a single high-end platform can cover hundreds of thousands of square kilometers and track multiple targets during combat. However, no air force can rely on a handful of expensive, slow-moving, vulnerable early-warning aircraft alone.
So, China appears to have created somewhat of a layered AEW&C force structure.
Under this strategy, instead of fielding one type of aircraft, Beijing is working on deploying complementary tiers of platforms optimized for different roles, ranges, basing options, and threat environments. This is intended to create persistent, resilient, multi-domain surveillance that adversaries find harder to suppress.
China has developed newer early-warning aircraft based on existing designs, including the KJ-500, which forms the backbone of the PLAAF’s early-warning capability and is based on the Shaanxi Y-9 turboprop, and the KJ-200, a legacy aircraft based on the older Y-8.
The KJ-200 and KJ-500 are smaller than the high-end KJ-3000. They are considered ideal for regional operations, including in volatile areas like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and would play a major role in a potential contingency in these flashpoint areas.
The KJ-200s, for one, provide supplementary coverage and experience while the PLAAF expands and simultaneously upgrades its KJ-500 fleet.
China has also developed the KJ-700, a next-generation Y-9-derived design intended as a more capable complement to the KJ-500. It features improved sensors and enhanced networking and is designed to handle denser, more complex threat environments, including low-observable aircraft and large numbers of drones. It is likely designed for missions anticipated in a future conflict with the United States.
China has also developed the KJ-600 for carrier-based operations, giving the PLA Navy massive reach and the ability to detect incoming threats from farther away, allowing it to project power far from its coast. With a twin-turboprop design, folding wings, and a large AESA rotodome, the KJ-600 entered operational service on the CATOBAR carrier Fujian in 2025 and has been observed on the ski-jump carrier Shandong.
The KJ-200 could be classified as a low-tier legacy aircraft, while the KJ-500 and KJ-700 could be clubbed as medium-tier and advanced medium-tier aircraft, respectively.
Meanwhile, the KJ-600 is a specialized carrier aircraft. The larger, more capable KJ-3000 falls into the high-tier category, and its serial production would let China field multiple aircraft for continuous coverage, attrition resilience, or simultaneous operations.
The post In Just 22 Months — China’s Four KJ-3000 AEW&C Aircraft Spotted at Xi’an. Experts Hint at Serial Production appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.
This is an adapted excerpt from the Oct. 22 episode of “The Briefing with Jen Psaki.”
This week, we learned about an incident that feels like a perfect metaphor for the moment we are in.
For decades, two globes used by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower during World War II had been carefully preserved in the custody of the U.S. Army. That is, until this year, when one of those globes ended up broken on the floor of the Defense Department — the bottom smashed down into its ornamental base, which punched a large hole directly through the continent of Antarctica.
So how did that priceless artifact end up broken? In the most predictable way possible, of course.
According to reporting from The Washington Post, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth wanted Eisenhower’s globe for his office and ordered the artifact to be moved earlier this year, and the Army office in possession of the globe “had expected to consult with experts at the U.S. Army Center of Military History on how to ensure its safe transport and properly document its relocation to Hegseth’s office, according to two people familiar with the matter.” But at the time, “the history staffers were furloughed due to a partial government shutdown.”
When the experts could not be reached, according to the sources who spoke to the Post, Hegseth’s staff decided to move the globe themselves. An “apparent lack of patience appeared to be a factor,” according to a person familiar with the situation. Their impatience was especially unfortunate, given that the partial government shutdown ended the very same day the globe was clumsily damaged.
After the Post published the story, a Defense Department official provided the outlet with a brief, unattributed statement acknowledging the broken globe, writing that accidents “happen.” The statement said the globe was in the process of being repaired but did not say how much those repairs would cost or when they are expected to be completed.
For an insecure man baby, there is nothing worse than when the people taking back control from them are women.
The story is a perfect metaphor for what it feels like to live in this country right now: a country run by small, insecure, petulant little men with too much power — men who will break the world if they don’t get what they want, when they want it.
We see it every day among the impulsive man babies in President Donald Trump’s inner circle. And often the world they are wrecking isn’t just a replica.
For example, consider what is happening in Ukraine right now: For over a week, the Ukrainian army has been blindsided by the sudden slowdown of Starshield, a critical military-grade satellite system run by Elon Musk’s company SpaceX. Lives were at stake while the Ukrainian army could not operate its missile interceptor systems at full capacity, which meant more Russian missiles and drones were able to get through.
You would think when an ally like Ukraine raises the alarm about a life-threatening problem like that, leaders in the United States would immediately try to remedy the situation. But instead, we have spent the past week watching a game of “he said, he said,” as both Musk and the White House try to deflect blame for the fiasco. All the while, more Russian missiles and drones were getting through.
When members of Congress had the audacity to suggest they would investigate what happened, Musk lashed out like an angsty teenager whose parents took away his favorite video game. “Live by the sword, die by the sword,” he threatened in a statement posted to his social media platform, X. “Those who pick fights with me should understand that I will find out who is really pulling the strings and come for them, not just their puppets.”
For a full week, we have watched Trump and Musk deliver exactly what Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted, while they thumped their chests, pretending they are all-powerful but also not responsible for anything that has gone wrong.
It was only on Thursday, more than a week after Ukraine lost this critical service, that, as The Wall Street Journal first reported, Trump called Musk and told him to restore full access to Starshield.
This was all happening while Musk was hard at work trying to amass more power that he can wield recklessly. Musk-backed super PACs have now spent more than $400 million supporting Republicans in the midterm elections, according to the latest filings.
We also learned that he’s putting up $1 billion for a stake in a new megamedia company run by one of Trump’s allies. It’s a move I see as less about protecting the freedom of the press and more as an effort to exert control over the media.
There is clearly no amount of power Musk can obtain that will satisfy his own insecurity. To Musk, the world is one big, ornamental globe that he thinks he’s allowed to break.
For two years now, we have watched man babies like Hegseth, Trump and Musk act this way. Whenever their power is threatened, whenever someone dares defy them, they lash out. They hate losing control, and they hate it when someone takes power back from them. And for an insecure man baby, nothing is worse than when the people who are taking back control from them are women.
We saw that most recently on Thursday, when an angry Trump decided to jump headfirst into the controversy roiling the race for Ohio governor.
As you probably know by now, the Republican candidate in that race, Vivek Ramaswamy, has sparked national outrage for airing an ad featuring the estranged mother of his opponent, Amy Acton. The 60-second video shows Acton’s mother calling her a liar. However, it leaves out the important context that Acton was removed from her mother’s custody at age 12, when her stepfather was criminally charged with raping her (he fled the state before he could be put on trial).
The ad caused national outrage, and even Ohio’s sitting Republican governor called on Ramaswamy to take it off the air.
But when Trump was asked about his thoughts on the ad, he decided to go absolutely all-in on defending it and attacking a childhood rape victim. Speaking to reporters at the White House, the president said the press had “ganged up on a woman making a horrible statement about her daughter” and insisted Acton was “fair game.”
The truth is, Trump cannot stand the idea that he and his party have lost control of this moment. He cannot stand that most of the country has, understandably, taken the side of a woman who survived serious trauma at the hands of a man with power over her. And he cannot stand that a woman chose to take that power back.
Trump has not forgotten how a movement of women taking back power from their abusers overshadowed his first inauguration as president. He has not forgotten how a woman stood up to him in court and accused him of abusing her — and how a jury sided with that same woman against him.
There have been several moments over the last year when Trump seemed to be afraid. But nothing reveals his insecurity, nothing shows you the whites of his eyes, quite like these moments.
This moment can feel really dark at times, but here’s the good news: We are just over a week away from Election Day, when half the population will get a chance to show this group of insecure man babies exactly how they feel.
Allison Detzel contributed.
The post Trump’s man babies keep breaking what they can’t control appeared first on MS NOW.
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