Customs and Border Protection (CBP) insists that it has the right to search Americans' private data without a warrant when entering the country. But ordered to explain one of these searches by a judge, the agency is now trying to wiggle out from under the microscope, invoking its own data privacy.

On Friday, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia ordered CBP to explain the seizure of a local psychiatric nurse's phone and laptop at Washington Dulles International Airport. CBP argued that the court should seal this information from both the public and the nurse himself in order to protect "privileged law enforcement information."

Brinkema initially agreed to let CBP file parts of its response "sealed and ex parte," meaning that neither the public nor the nurse would get to look at them. After reading the filings, the judge declared on Tuesday afternoon "that most of the redacted information is not privileged law enforcement information and should not be sealed." She gave CBP until Thursday at noon to object to unsealing the documents.

"Without knowing what happened, we cannot assess the extent of CBP's violation of our clients' rights. This raises serious concerns about government improperly invoking privilege to cover up wrongdoing," says Jenin Younes, a civil libertarian lawyer and president of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, who is representing the nurse. "The court was right to unseal most of the redacted material so we can assess the extent to which the government behavior was improper."

Younes has stacked up a series of victories against CBP's electronic searches. Over the past few months, she sued on behalf of lawyer Jalal "Jay" Shehadeh and (non-Arab) journalist Max Blumenthal, both of whom had their phones seized at the airport by CBP without explanation. CBP tried to preempt a legal battle by giving their phones back almost immediately. Younes is still pressing to get information about what happened to their data.

Although CBP policy states that the agency will delete all data within 21 days unless there is "probable cause to believe the information contains digital contraband or evidence of a violation of law that CBP is authorized to enforce or administer," a 2018 lawsuit seemed to show that CBP was holding onto the data until someone bothered to demand its return.

Psychiatric nurse Muhammad Numaan Imam's case started similarly to Shehadeh's and Blumenthal's cases. CBP agents demanded to open his phone at the airport without explanation. He refused, arguing that patient emails and case-management software were protected by privacy laws. CBP then confiscated all of his and his wife Khadijah Mansoor's electronics. Almost immediately after Younes filed the suit on his behalf, CBP tried to argue that the case was moot because it was giving back the phone.

But Brinkema immediately agreed with Imam and Mansoor's "legitimate concerns about what was done with their electronic devices," ordering CBP to "explain why the devices of both plaintiffs were seized" and to provide sworn statements from "each person who handled any of the devices" describing exactly what was done to them.

On Monday night, the court published heavily redacted declarations from CBP Assistant Port Director Lauren Colgan, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) technician Caige McCabe, and CBP technician Ashlie Fisch.

"Mr. Imam and Ms. Mansoor presented valid, un-expired travel documents to CBP Officers in the primary inspection and were referred for secondary inspection," Colgan's declaration states. The next few sentences are blacked out. The declaration then recounts the couple explaining their early return from their anniversary vacation in Turkey and states that the CBP officer asked to open their electronics, without explaining why.

"Because of Mr. Imam's and Ms. Mansoor's refusal to provide access to their electronic devices, CBP informed Mr. Imam and Ms. Mansoor their devices would be detained to continue the border search," Colgan continues, noting that Port Director Christine Waugh signed off on holding the devices for more than five days, as CBP policy requires.

On October 17, a day after CBP seized the phones, it asked DHS headquarters for "technical assistance" with Imam's devices according to McCabe. "My examination of Mr. Imam's phone was limited to device specifications and high-level file-system structure," he states in the declaration. The next few sentences are blacked out. "I did not access or view the contents of Mr. Imam's laptop," McCabe continues. The next few sentences after that are also blacked out. "I did not access any medical information" on either the phone or laptop, McCabe concludes, stating that the devices were in his custody until he handed them back to CBP on October 21.

Fisch then received Imam's devices at CBP Laboratories and Scientific Services. Everything of substance in her declaration is redacted, beyond taking the devices on October 21 and sending them back to Washington Dulles Airport the next day. There is no unredacted explanation of what happened to Mansoor's devices.

Brinkema argued in her Tuesday order that only two sentences, both from Colgan's declaration, were legitimately blacked out. "Accordingly, the Court will unseal all other redacted information in the Declarations unless the defendants can show good cause why such information should not be unsealed," she wrote.

U.S. law gives border officers much wider authority to search for contraband in situations where normal police would need a warrant or probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. CBP argues that its powers extend to searching and seizing travelers' electronics without any explanation at all. Courts have given contradictory rulings on how far those searches can go, and the Supreme Court hasn't weighed in yet, leaving a gray area that CBP is happy to take advantage of.

Imam's case has resulted in "the most detailed explanation of what the government did with our clients' electronic devices—or it would be if so much wasn't redacted," Younes tells Reason. "I look forward to seeing the unredacted versions."

The post CBP Really Doesn't Want To Reveal What It Does to Americans' Phones appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Do you have a right to privacy on public roads? Hoover fellow and Stanford legal scholar Orin Kerr joins me in this episode to discuss Flock cameras, the networked license plate readers fueling debate over police surveillance. We discuss how the Fourth Amendment applies to tracking people's movements; whether police should need a warrant to search camera databases; how to balance investigative benefits with the potential for abuse; and what we still don't know about these tools' effectiveness in protecting public safety.

Jane Bambauer, my regular cohost, couldn't join us this episode, but will be back as usual in the next one. And also check out our past episodes:

Also check out our past episodes:

• Can the President Kick Reporters out of the White House?
• Spoiler Alert: Can You Get Sued For Revealing A Plot Point?
• The Process Is The Punishment: ABC v. FCC with Stuart Benjamin
• Can AI Libel You? The Robby Starbuck Case
• Shrexting: Free Speech or Criminal Harassment?
• The First Amendment and Privacy Rights
• 'Defamacast' and More: How American Defamation Law Works
• Speech, Not "Conduct": Supreme Court Rules on Conversion Talk Therapy
• Equal Time, Stephen Colbert, and the Future of Political Broadcasting
• Student Speech, Threats, and the First Amendment
• Can Journalists Be Charged for Involvement in Protests? The Don Lemon Dilemma
• 2025: The Year In Free Speech
• Does the First Amendment Protect Supposedly "Addictive" Algorithms?
• Defamation Law in the Age of AI with Lyrissa Lidsky
• Free Speech and the Future of Legal Education
• From Brandenburg to Britain: Rethinking Free Speech in the Digital Era with Eric Heinze
• Kimmel, the FCC, and the Government's Power Over Broadcast Speech
• A Conversation with FIRE's Greg Lukianoff
• A Burning First Amendment Issue: President Trump's Executive Order on Flag Desecration
• Free Speech and Doxing
• The Supreme Court Rules on Protecting Kids from Sexually Themed Speech Online
• Free Speech, Public School Students, and "There Are Only Two Genders"
• Can AI Companies Be Sued for What AI Says?
• Harvard v. Trump: Free Speech and Government Grants
• Trump's War on Big Law
• Can Non-Citizens Be Deported For Their Speech?
• Freedom of the Press, with Floyd Abrams
• Free Speech, Private Power, and Private Employees
• Court Upholds TikTok Divestiture Law
• Free Speech in European (and Other) Democracies, with Prof. Jacob Mchangama
• Protests, Public Pressure Campaigns, Tort Law, and the First Amendment
• Misinformation: Past, Present, and Future
• I Know It When I See It: Free Speech and Obscenity Laws
• Speech and Violence
• Emergency Podcast: The Supreme Court's Social Media Cases
• Internet Policy and Free Speech: A Conversation with Rep. Ro Khanna
• Free Speech, TikTok (and Bills of Attainder!), with Prof. Alan Rozenshtein
• The 1st Amendment on Campus with Berkeley Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky
• Free Speech On Campus
• AI and Free Speech
• Free Speech, Government Persuasion, and Government Coercion
• Deplatformed: The Supreme Court Hears Social Media Oral Arguments
• Book Bans – or Are They?

The post Free Speech Unmuted: Flock Cameras and the Fourth Amendment, with Orin Kerr appeared first on Reason Magazine.

From today's opinion in Jackson v. Thomson Reuters Am. Corp., by Fourth Circuit Judge Paul Niemeyer, joined by Judges Steven Agee and Pamela Harris; the law covers :

West Virginia's Daniel's Law …, which is designed "to enhance the safety and security" of judicial and law enforcement officials, prohibits the disclosure by any person or entity of the home addresses or unpublished telephone numbers of … {"any active, formerly active, or retired judicial officer, prosecutor, … public defender, … or law-enforcement officer"} if a reasonable person would believe that such a disclosure would create a risk of harassment or harm. The law authorizes protected persons to bring a civil action for damages….

As distinct from the Daniel's Laws in other States, … West Virginia's version does not require that the Covered Person, upon discovering an improper disclosure, notify the person or entity that disseminated the information and request that the person or entity delete the information before liability arises. In addition, for liability to arise under West Virginia's version, the person or entity need not know that they have disclosed a Covered Person's information. The only limiting principle of § 5A-8-24(e) liability is that the information must have been disclosed "under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that providing such information would expose another to harassment or risk of harm to life or property." …

For generations now, home addresses and telephone numbers have been disseminated to the public, initially through Whitepages and Yellow Pages and now through "people search" services on the Internet. The public has thus long had the facility to look up the name of a person and obtain that person's address and telephone number. Sharing that information has been the gateway to communication and the exchange of ideas or messages that have long been protected by the First Amendment. In the digital age, such information may now be shared with greater efficiency, but the tradition continues with the understanding that it is protected speech.

In a similar vein, it has long been custom and practice to record for public examination the names and addresses of persons buying, selling, and financing real property. And it has been the tradition to share publicly information about taxes, appraisals, liens, and voting.

To be sure, while the dissemination of such information is protected speech necessary to the exchange of ideas, it can also contribute to abuse and the pursuit of harmful and, indeed, malicious ends, as exemplified by the murder of Daniel Anderl. To address such abuse, governments have enacted laws like Daniel's Law in an effort to restrict the dissemination of home addresses and unpublished telephone numbers of specified public officials who serve in roles important to society. And the parties here agree that those governments have a compelling interest in enhancing the safety and security of such officials. The task, therefore, is to draw an appropriate line between protecting the dissemination of such information while, at the same time, excepting from dissemination the same information when it creates a potential for harm of specified public officials.

Because of the high value that our Constitution and longstanding practices place on the free dissemination of information and the exercise of free speech, we draw the line with the greatest caution, requiring that governments regulate speech about the home addresses and telephone numbers of designated public officials in a manner that is the least restrictive of speech.

In this case, West Virginia was fully justified in attempting to regulate such speech in light of the compelling government interest in enhancing the safety and security of certain public officials, but its efforts reached more broadly then necessary to accomplish the task; it did not employ the least restrictive means of doing so. For that reason and only that reason, we agree with the district court that West Virginia could have regulated more narrowly to accomplish its purpose and thereby be less restrictive of what is otherwise protected speech. Thus, we agree that the provision of West Virginia's Daniel's Law at issue here … violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

The court concluded that the law is a speech restriction, not just a restriction on "data":

[Jackson argues] that speech must be communicative such that it "convey a particularized message" with "the likelihood … that the message would be understood by those who" received it. Since Daniel's Law regulates disclosures of "pure facts" that lack a particularized message, he argues, the law is not subject to any First Amendment analysis….

[But] the Supreme Court has clearly held that the scope of "speech" regulated by the First Amendment is broader and includes data, reasoning that facts are "the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs." Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc (2011). Indeed, the Court has noted more specifically that statutes like West Virginia's Daniel's Law, which address only the disclosure of information, involve the regulation of speech protected by the First Amendment, observing, "If the acts of 'disclosing' and 'publishing' information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that category …." Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001).

The court then concluded that the law was content-based:

West Virginia's Daniel's Law …, on its face, distinguish[es] between different disclosures based on communicative content alone. It restricts disclosure of certain kinds of information (home addresses and unlisted telephone numbers), and it does so for certain individuals (judicial and law enforcement officers and their families)….

This means, for example, that a disclosure that a grocery store clerk lives at 100 Main Street is permitted, while a disclosure that a police officer lives at 100 Main Street is prohibited. The only difference between the two disclosures is the communicative content, or what the disclosures mean. In the hypothetical, the latter disclosure is prohibited because it identifies 100 Main Street as being the home address of the police officer, while the earlier disclosure is permitted because it identifies 100 Main Street as belonging to the grocery store clerk.

The court held that the law wasn't limited to "commercial speech" (which generally refers to commercial advertising), a category of speech that is entitled to lower protection:

While a speaker's economic motivation for speech may be a relevant factor in determining whether speech is commercial, economic motivation alone is insufficient to justify a categorization of that speech as commercial. Furthermore, because, even under Jackson's argument, only some of the regulated speech would be commercial, that fact does not render the law subject to the intermediate scrutiny of commercial speech. When a statute "applies with equal force to both commercial and noncommercial messages" with "no exception for noncommercial speech," the fact that some of the regulated speech is commercial does not justify an application of intermediate scrutiny….

And the court held that the law, as a content-based speech restriction, had to pass strict scrutiny, which is to say that (among other things) it had to be the "least restrictive means" of serving a "compelling government interest"; and the court held that the law failed such scrutiny:

[T]he parties agree, as do we, that the law's purpose of enhancing the safety of judicial and law enforcement officials is a compelling government interest …. [But] West Virginia's Daniel's Law does not employ the least restrictive means of serving the law's purpose.

Section 5A-8-24(e) imposes liability on a data broker immediately upon its disclosure of addresses and telephone numbers, regardless of whether the data broker had knowledge that the information related to Covered Persons. Whenever an entity such as a data broker collects names and addresses of all persons in a particular town using public land records and then publishes that information in some form of a directory, it undoubtedly violates the law because that directory includes, albeit unknowingly, information about, for instance, a police officer or public defender…. When a restriction on speech creates liability without a knowledge requirement, speakers are understandably incentivized to engage in self-censorship to avoid inadvertently incurring liability. See Counterman v. Colorado (2023) (noting that "prohibitions on speech have the potential to chill, or deter, speech outside their boundaries")….

Jackson argues, however, that the law is much more limited because it imposes liability only if "a reasonable person would believe that providing such information would expose another to harassment or risk of harm to life or property."

That provision, however, is hardly limiting, … because every disclosure of a person's name and address on the Internet exposes that person to harassment or a risk of harm…. [Indeed, in his complaints, Jackson] alleged that the mere disclosure of home addresses and unpublished telephone numbers "exposed [him] and his peers to harassment and/or risk of harm to life or property." And to support that unremarkable proposition, he quoted the FTC's report on "Data Brokers," which highlights the "potential risks to consumers from data brokers' collection and use of consumer data," including the fact that "people search products can be used to facilitate harassment, or even stalking, and may expose domestic violence victims, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, public officials, or other individuals to retaliation or other harm." Indeed, Jackson added that the FTC's report explains why the defendants' disclosures are "so dangerous." Thus, the argued "limitation" in § 5A-8-24(e) is actually not limiting but universal, as it is inevitable that every disclosure of personal information on the Internet poses an additional risk of harassment or harm to the person whose information is disclosed.

Additionally, States other than West Virginia that have enacted Daniel's Laws have uniformly required that, before liability attaches to a disclosure of home addresses and unpublished telephone numbers, Covered Persons give notice of their request that the data broker (or any other disclosing party) remove the information. Only on the failure to comply does liability attach. But West Virginia's Daniel's Law alone does not require notification as a precondition of liability. Thus, this aspect of the law fails to provide the least restrictive means of furthering the law's compelling interest.

While we hasten to note that requiring notice prior to imposing liability is one method for narrowing the law, it is not the only way. But it is the way that Congress and virtually every other State has chosen to narrow their laws and render them less speech-restrictive.

At bottom, we agree with the district court's conclusion:

[D]ue to its lack of a notice requirement, [§ 5A-8-24(e)] of West Virginia's Daniel's Law is far more restrictive then its comparators [in other States] and is definitively not the least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest. Section [5A-8-24(e)] of West Virginia's Daniel's Law therefore fails strict scrutiny even as other more narrowly tailored federal and state statutes aiming at the same compelling interest pass constitutional muster….

The paragraph endorsing the district court's conclusion strongly suggests that the panel endorsed laws limited to situations where a covered person first demands that covered material be removed. But it's not clear whether the panel would endorse broad versions of such laws, which apply even when the address or phone number is relevant to a matter of public concern (see Kratovil v. City of New Brunswick (N.J. 2025), which upheld such a broad law), or whether it would insist that there be an exception for such public-concern situations (as there is in the federal version of Daniel's Law).

Samir I. Deger-Sen (Latham & Watkins LLP) argued on behalf of the defendants.

The post W. Va. Law Restricting Disclosing Home Addresses and Phone Numbers of Judges and Police Struck Down, but … appeared first on Reason Magazine.