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Moscow Hails Africa as Multipolar Pillar Ahead of Russia-Africa Summit

28 October 2026 at 19:25
Russian President Vladimir Putin accompanied by President of Burundi, Chairperson of the African Union Evariste Ndayishimiye and Libyan Presidential Council Chairman Mohamed al-Menfi, attends a meeting with the leaders of regional African organizations on the sidelines of the 3rd Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow. Photo: EFE.

Serguéi Lavrov described Africa as a civilization in its own right and one of the pillars of an order that, in his view, is replacing five centuries of Western hegemony. Russia opens the third summit on Wednesday with 48 delegations and an offer to support the continent’s industrial and technological sovereignty, with the El Dabaa nuclear plant already under construction.


Serguéi Lavrov spent nearly an hour and a half on Tuesday with the heads of Africa’s leading media outlets, gathered in Moscow on the eve of the third Russia-Africa summit, and laid out how Russia sees the continent.

“We regard the African continent as a distinct civilization, one of the most important pillars of the multipolar world that is now, as an objective course of history, actively taking shape on the international stage, replacing the hegemony that Western countries have exercised for more than 500 years,” the Foreign Minister said.

RELATED: Russia-Africa Summit Opens in Moscow with 48 National Delegations

According to Lavrov, Russia wants to help strengthen the sovereignty of African states, the development of their industries and greater self-sufficiency in the economy, finance and technology. The summit agenda, on October 28 and 29, groups those goals into four areas, namely political and economic cooperation, security, science and technology, and cultural and humanitarian ties.

Nearly all the delegations from the 48 confirmed countries are already in Moscow, and 22 of them are led by heads of state. On the table are 33 documents, among them an agreement on cooperation in artificial intelligence, and the 2027-2029 joint action plan, which Vladimir Putin and Burundi’s Évariste Ndayishimiye, the current chair of the African Union, will adopt at Thursday’s plenary session. Putin also has 24 bilateral meetings scheduled, with the leaders of Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali and Libya, as well as Iran and Qatar, in a week when the Russian capital is also hosting the Gas Exporting Countries Forum.

From Sochi to Moscow

Seven years separate this gathering from the first one, held in Sochi in 2019, which closed with 92 agreements worth some $12.5 billion. The second brought together delegations from 48 countries in St. Petersburg in July 2023, and since then the Russian Foreign Ministry has created the Department of Partnership with Africa to follow up on what was signed, while intergovernmental commissions grew from four in 2023 to nine in 2025. In August, Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova announced that Moscow would bring to this summit a package of contracts on peaceful nuclear energy, independent payment systems, food security, digitalization and artificial intelligence.

Paul Kagame confirmed his attendance after several Western governments suspended part of their financial aid to Rwanda in 2025, and in Moscow he will sign the creation of a cooperation commission with a country he has already invited to build fertilizer plants. Ghana, whose parliament is processing a military-technical cooperation agreement with Russia, has an open tender for its first nuclear power plant, a 1,000-megawatt facility, in which Rosatom is competing with suppliers from China, South Korea, Canada and the United States.

Payments Outside the Dollar

Trade between Russia and Africa exceeded $27 billion in 2025, and Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development projects it will grow 1.5 to 2 times by 2030, to between $40.5 billion and $54 billion. That same year, China posted record trade of $348 billion with the continent, while the European Union traded more than €356 billion with Africa in 2024.

In 2023, oil, refined products, wheat and metals made up 90% of Russian exports to Africa, while Russia bought mainly fruit, cocoa and coffee. The balance leaves Russia with a surplus of more than $10 billion a year.

Settling that trade became harder when Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT in February 2022 cut off the usual channels of Russian banks. Moscow responded with its own payment network, in which the ruble already covers 84% of transactions with Africa, backed by the Russian financial messaging system, China’s CIPS, crypto assets and the A7 payment agent, which operates in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. For African importers the circuit still carries costs, since obtaining rubles requires a double conversion through dollars, exposes them to the volatility of that currency and leaves their banks open to Western secondary sanctions, which is why several banks on the continent refuse to process payments linked to Russia.

Egypt, which accounts for 30% of Russia’s trade with Africa, hosts the Russian Industrial Zone on the Suez Canal, agreed in 2018 for 50 years, which took its first step in July 2026 when Moscow selected the developer. An Egyptian government source estimates investment of up to $5 billion and completion in 2028, and goods made there with more than 30% local content will enter as Egyptian products the markets where Cairo has preferential agreements. Benedict Oramah, President of Afreximbank, the African Export-Import Bank, urged Russian companies to seize an open market in energy, mining, railways and health, and in June the bank signed contracts with four Russian manufacturers.

Uranium for Europe, Blackouts in Niger

On Egypt’s Mediterranean coast, at El Dabaa, Rosatom is building four 1,200-megawatt reactors that will supply 10% of the country’s electricity. A Russian state loan covers most of a cost set in 2017 at $28.75 billion, which other estimates put at $30 billion, and the first unit is due to come online between 2028 and 2029.

The Russian corporation, which is carrying out 27 of the 31 nuclear plant export projects underway worldwide, offers a complete package covering the reactor, fuel, waste management and staff training over a 40- to 60-year lifespan, to a continent where some 600 million people live without electricity. The International Energy Agency estimates that universal access requires $15 billion a year, six times what was committed in 2023 for sub-Saharan Africa.

Niger, the world’s eighth-largest uranium producer, supplied France’s power plants for more than five decades (France gets about 70% of its electricity from nuclear power) and in 2022 provided almost a quarter of the natural uranium delivered to European plants. Only 20% of its 25 million inhabitants have electricity, and in Arlit and Agadez, where the ore is mined, coverage is close to zero. French company Orano took 86.3% of all the uranium sold from the Somaïr mine since 1971, more than its 63.4% shareholding. General Abdourahamane Tiani’s government nationalized the mine and the power utility Nigelec in June 2025, and although a tribunal of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ruled in Orano’s favor in September and barred the sale of the ore, some 1,000 tonnes of concentrate are waiting at Niamey airport. The French press reported a deal to sell them to Rosatom.

Niger’s Mines Minister, Ousmane Abarchi, brought to Moscow a proposal for two reactors totaling 2,000 megawatts. “Electricity must be accessible to everyone on this planet; it should not be a privilege,” he said, and his Russian counterpart for energy, Sergei Tsivilev, replied that Moscow wants to build a complete peaceful nuclear energy system in Niger, beyond mining.

A plant of that size takes ten to fifteen years from contract signing to the first unit in operation, and costs tens of billions of dollars. The Russian model, tested in Egypt and Bangladesh, rests on state loans repaid over decades, and analysts following the case note that in Niger the most visible collateral is the uranium itself.

In Namibia, the world’s third-largest uranium producer, Rosatom plans to invest $500 million in a mine set to start production in 2029. Rwanda signed a roadmap in June for small modular reactors, Ethiopia signed another in March for its first power plant and Nigeria resumed the design of two plants. South Africa, home to Koeberg, the continent’s only commercial nuclear plant, launched a tender for 2,500 megawatts in which Rosatom is competing with French, South Korean, Chinese and U.S. companies.

RELATED: Russia Bets on Global Majority in Africa Summit Build-Up

Sovereign Alliances in the Sahel

Rosoboron export has military-technical cooperation agreements with 46 African countries and has signed some 150 contracts worth more than $20 billion since 2023. Between 2020 and 2024, Russia was the continent’s leading supplier of heavy weapons, with 21% of imports, ahead of China and the United States, helped by a Soviet-era arsenal that still needs spare parts and by contracts free of political conditions. Even with the war in Ukraine, which cut its global arms exports by 64% between 2021 and 2025, Africa accounts for 30% of the state company’s order book.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger asked French troops to leave, formed the Confederation of Sahel States and opened their barracks to the Africa Corps, the force that replaced the Wagner Group under the direct command of Russia’s Defense Ministry. The “3+1” pact, signed in Niamey, extends cooperation to the economy and the central banks of the three countries, and Moscow plans to use the Togolese port of Lomé as a sea outlet for a landlocked region.

In July, during the second round of consultations with the Sahelian foreign ministers in Niamey, Lavrov spoke of building together “a fair multipolar world order” against “neocolonial practices.” Russia reopened its embassy in Niger this year, and Putin asked his Foreign Minister to invite the three presidents to the summit.

The alliance is fighting the jihadist coalition JNIM, which in September 2025 blockaded fuel supplies to Bamako and in April 2026 forced the Africa Corps out of Kidal. When Human Rights Watch attributed killings of civilians to Russian forces in July, Moscow and Bamako jointly rejected the accusation.

Lavrov announced in August a security memorandum with ECOWAS, the bloc the three Sahelian countries left in January 2025, and offered to mediate between the two; the regional organization has not yet confirmed the scope or the signing date.

Washington Tries the Russian Formula

The break with Niger cost the United States the withdrawal of 1,000 troops and a $110 million drone base in 2024, and Donald Trump brought a transactional approach. Massad Boulos, the presidential adviser for Africa, toured Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in early 2026 and acknowledged past mistakes in the name of sovereignty, while Erik Prince, owner of a military contracting firm and an informal adviser to Trump, has been meeting with Madagascar’s junta since late 2025.

A U.S. company agreed in late 2025 with Mali’s state mining company to revive a gold deposit valued at $11 billion. In Madagascar, Washington is negotiating the $700 million Toliara project to extract titanium, zirconium and rare earths, along with a proposal for a military presence at the former naval base of Antsiranana. Colonel Michaël Randrianirina, who came to power after the overthrow of Andry Rajoelina, received Russian drones and instructors and U.S. envoys almost at the same time.

The Washington think tanks that call the Russian offer a “survival package” for military governments now note how their own government is adopting a similar scheme, with security in exchange for minerals.

From Classrooms to Fields

The places Russia funds for African students rose from 2,100 in 2021 to about 4,800 in 2026, and some 35,000 young people from the continent are now studying at Russian universities. The Association of African Universities opened an office in October at St. Petersburg Mining University, and Rwanda already has 24 graduates in nuclear fields working at its Atomic Energy Board and the country’s regulator.

Russia’s ambassador to Burkina Faso, Igor Martynov, pledged technology transfers in agronomy, fertilizers, irrigation, fisheries and animal vaccines. In Togo, which signed a military agreement with Russia in 2024 and keeps its security channels with the West open, the first intergovernmental commission closed on October 1 with a protocol, a memorandum on cultural heritage and plans for mechanization and fertilizer production from local phosphate.

Egypt is building its nuclear plant with Rosatom without distancing itself from Washington or the Gulf monarchies, South Africa defends its non-alignment and Ethiopia joined BRICS without breaking with its Western lenders. According to an analysis published within that bloc’s orbit, Russia is welcome in Africa wherever it offers what others do not.

This week’s 33 documents will add to the 92 from Sochi and those from St. Petersburg, and the 2027-2029 plan will have its first milestones at the Suez industrial zone in 2028 and, a year later, at the first unit of El Dabaa and the Namibian mine. With those projects, Moscow seeks to give concrete form to the idea of Africa as a pillar of the multipolar world that Lavrov laid out on Tuesday before the African media.

The Bolsonaro Clan Faces Systemic Corruption Probes in Brazil

28 October 2026 at 18:57

An in-depth look at thirty years of dynastic clientelism, illicit property purchases, and attacks on democratic institutions

The Bolsonaro family’s political trajectory marks a polarizing era in modern Brazilian history. Led by patriarch Jair Bolsonaro, a former army captain who served nearly three decades in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, the political clan built its brand on anti-establishment rhetoric, militarism, social conservatism, and zero-tolerance policies toward crime.

RELATED:
Brazil’s Court Probes Foreign Funds in Flávio Bolsonaro’s Campaign

Despite promoting an image centered on traditional values and law enforcement, investigative records and judicial proceedings of the Bolsonaro family depict a political network deeply tied to public fund diversion, money laundering, and connections with armed paramilitary groups.

The Bolsonaro family expanded its influence into a dynasty, embedding sons Flávio, Carlos, and Eduardo across local, state, and federal offices.

Flávio Bolsonaro served as a Rio de Janeiro state deputy for sixteen years before his election to the Federal Senate in 2018. Carlos Bolsonaro directed public messaging as a Rio city councilor, while Eduardo Bolsonaro represented São Paulo as a federal deputy.

The structural base of this network began unraveling following political shifts, election defeats, and growing scrutiny from the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and federal authorities.

Clientelism, Militias, and the Rio de Janeiro Subculture

Jair Bolsonaro’s public life began in the late 1980s following his departure from the Brazilian Armed Forces. Elected to the Rio de Janeiro City Council in 1988 and to Congress in 1990, Jair Bolsonaro established a conservative political base anchored in military sector interests, opposition to progressive social policies, and public defense of paramilitary activity.

During his parliamentary career, Jair Bolsonaro openly defended Rio de Janeiro’s irregular security forces, known locally as milícias. These militias are armed paramilitary groups formed by former and active police officers who exercise territorial control over neighborhood communities.

Unlike drug trafficking networks, militia groups operate illegal local monopolies in extortion, land sales, private security, public transport, and cooking gas distribution. In parliamentary speeches, Jair Bolsonaro repeatedly characterized these militia groups as “self-defense units” that brought order to neglected communities.

The expansion of the Bolsonaro family’s political influence relied heavily on these political networks. In 2002, Flávio Bolsonaro was elected to the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro (ALERJ) at age twenty-one. Carlos Bolsonaro secured his city council seat in 2000 at age seventeen.

This strategy allowed the family to secure multiple legislative budgets, employ political operatives across jurisdictions, and maintain influence in local communities.

During his time at ALERJ, Flávio Bolsonaro maintained direct political and employment ties with figures associated with Rio’s militia structures. Flávio Bolsonaro employed Raimunda Veras Magalhães and Danielle Mendonça da Costa—the mother and ex-wife of Adriano Magalhães da Nóbrega—in his legislative office.

Nóbrega was a former Special Police Operations Battalion captain who led the Crime Bureau (Escritório do Crime), a professional hit squad linked to militia extortion and high-profile assassinations.

Official records show Flávio Bolsonaro conferred the Medal of Tiradentes, the highest honor awarded by the Rio legislature, on Nóbrega in 2005 while Nóbrega was incarcerated on murder charges.

Financial audits showed that funds drawn from legislative payrolls were routed through accounts controlled by Nóbrega’s family members, linking parliamentary staff operations directly to informal militia networks.

Defeated Brazilian presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro and his family have landed in Miami after fleeing his country.

This comes a day after they were granted United States visas by the Trump administration. pic.twitter.com/oB91ejWab5

— The Associated Press (@AP) October 28, 2026

Flávio Bolsonaro and the Rachadinha System

During his mandate in the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro, Flávio Bolsonaro operated a systematic financial embezzlement enterprise through his parliamentary office.

This illicit network relied on a practice known locally as a salary kickback scheme (rachadinha), a scheme in which legislative staff members are required to return a substantial portion of their public salaries to the elected official or an appointed intermediary.

Investigations conducted by the public prosecutor’s office of Rio de Janeiro and financial intelligence reports from the Council for Financial Activities Control (COAF) revealed that numerous staff members appointed to Flávio Bolsonaro’s office did not perform their legislative duties, functioning instead as nominal ghost employees.

Fabrício Queiroz, a retired military police officer, long-term associate of the Bolsonaro family, and former advisor to Flávio Bolsonaro, served as the primary operator of the collection network. COAF reports identified atypical financial transactions moving through Queiroz’s bank accounts, including transfers directed to members of the Bolsonaro family.

Investigators documented that a significant portion of the embezzled funds was funneled back to cover personal expenses for the Bolsonaro family, ranging from utility and school tuition payments to real estate acquisitions.

To legitimize the illicit funds generated through the rachadinha structure, Flávio Bolsonaro acquired commercial and residential properties and established a franchise business, a chocolate shop located in a Rio de Janeiro shopping mall.

Financial audits of the chocolate business revealed statistical anomalies: cash deposits into the store’s accounts frequently mismatched daily retail sales volumes, indicating the business operated partly as a front to inject cash from the legislative payroll scheme into the formal financial system.

Public prosecutors formally denounced Flávio Bolsonaro for embezzlement, money laundering, and running a criminal organization based on these findings.

Flávio Bolsonaro just two days ago:

“I will not give up on my Brazil.”

Two days later, he has reportedly fled Brazil for the U.S. pic.twitter.com/f91KsZ3V74

— Clash Report (@clashreport) October 27, 2026

Broader Crimes and Systemic Attacks on Brazilian Democracy

The financial allegations against Flávio Bolsonaro formed part of a broader pattern of asset accumulation and institutional interference linked to the wider Bolsonaro family network.

Investigative reports tracking real estate transactions across Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília revealed that a substantial portion of the family’s property acquisitions over three decades were conducted using physical cash payments.

Public registries and journalistic investigations showed that family members purchased multiple residential and commercial units without utilizing standard banking mortgages or formal credit lines, raising concerns regarding the origin of the funds and potential systemic money laundering.

Beyond financial offenses, the family’s political dominance was maintained through continuous friction with investigative bodies and democratic institutions.

Throughout Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential term and the subsequent legislative mandates of his sons, the administration systematically attempted to alter leadership positions within federal agencies, including the Federal Police and the Federal Prosecutor’s Office.

The systemic subversion extended to public discourse, where state apparatuses were utilized to discredit journalists, civil society organizations, and judiciary members examining the clan’s legal exposures.

By framing routine judicial oversight and anti-corruption investigations as partisan political persecution, the Bolsonaro network undermined public trust in regulatory institutions while insulating its members from administrative accountability.

These maneuvers laid the groundwork for an escalating judicial crisis that culminated when electoral outcomes shifted control of the executive branch and removed institutional protections from the family’s inner circle.

The Anatomy of the Bolsonaro Exodus

The national elections on October 25 and subsequent rulings by the magistrate Alexandre de Moraes, representing Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court, marked a decisive shift in the legal landscape surrounding the Bolsonaro family.

As anti-corruption investigations advanced, the Supreme Federal Court, under the leadership of justices overseeing inquiries into financial crimes, institutional subversion, and antidemocratic acts, began tightening judicial restrictions on key figures within the clan. For this reason, Justice Moraes prohibited Flávio Bolsonaro from leaving Brazil and ordered the seizure of his passports—both his ordinary and diplomatic ones. After 24 hours, as he had not physically surrendered them, the Federal Police proceeded to officially cancel his travel documents.

It has been known through the medias that since October 27 Flávio Bolsonaro, along with his family, traveled via private transport to cross Brazil’s border; they are currently in the United States, having arrived there by private plane.

This strategic retreat mirrored patterns observed among regional political figures seeking to evade national accountability systems through foreign asylum or extended stays abroad.

The exodus highlighted broader questions regarding international cooperation and judicial jurisdiction. Right-wing political factions and sympathetic organizations abroad played a facilitative role, offering platforms and legal assistance to political figures fleeing Latin American jurisdictions.

Other media outlets reported that a U.S. State Department official stated that Flávio Bolsonaro and his family would be granted visas, allowing them to reside in the United States following his loss in the Brazilian election to Lula.

The departure of key family members underscored the challenges facing Brazilian legal institutions as they sought to enforce judicial rulings against individuals with transnational resources and foreign political allies.

WATCH: Brazilian President Lula on Flávio Bolsonaro leaving Brazil for the U.S.:

For the Bolsonaro family, Brazil is their second homeland.

Their first homeland is licking boots in the United States, just as they are accustomed to doing. pic.twitter.com/ugCdYWD9gg

— Clash Report (@clashreport) October 27, 2026

Impunity vs. Institutional Resilience in Brazil

The trajectory of the Bolsonaro family and the specific criminal charges leveled against Flávio Bolsonaro illustrate the structural contradictions of contemporary populist right-wing political movements.

While campaigning on platforms of moral renewal, fiscal discipline, and strict law enforcement, the Bolsonaro’s constructed a sophisticated network of public fund embezzlement, real estate money laundering, and structural alignment with paramilitary groups.

The legal actions and subsequent international flights of Flávio Bolsonaro and his family carry profound implications for Brazilian democracy. On one hand, the coordinated evasion of judicial mandates highlights the enduring vulnerability of state institutions when confronted with entrenched political dynasties possessing international safety valves.

On the other hand, the rigorous investigative work conducted by federal prosecutors, financial intelligence units, and the judiciary demonstrates the operational capacity of Brazil’s democratic framework to investigate and prosecute powerful political actors regardless of office.

Ultimately, the handling of the Bolsonaro family’s legal exposures serves as a critical test for the rule of law in Latin America.

As Brazilian courts continue to address the financial and institutional infractions of the Jair Bolsonaro administration, the outcome will define the boundaries of accountability for political elites in the region for decades to come.

Sources: Brasil de Fato – Agência Brasil – Gov.br – O Globo – Folha de S.Paulo – O Estado de S.Paulo – El País – CNN Brasil – EFE – TeleSUR – NYT

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