Ukraine may have to revisit its blackout measures if Russia begins mass-using the Susanin optical navigation module on Geran-5 drones and other drones and missiles at night, Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, a defense-technology adviser to Ukraine’s president, says. Road and highway lighting will be the first concern.

Russia keeps upgrading the weapons it sends against Ukrainian cities. It has already fitted its jet-powered Gerans with machine vision that lets them recognize and track targets on their own in the final seconds of flight, which Ukraine’s electronic warfare cannot easily defeat.

Flash says Ukraine would act deliberately this time

In 2022, Ukrainians switched off lights out of fear. Flash says that if optical navigation spreads, darkness may have to become a deliberate defense.

“If our enemy begins to use the Susanin optical navigation module en masse on the Geran-5 and other drones (missiles) at night, we may have to revisit the question of light masking,” Beskrestnov says.

This especially concerns the lighting of roads and stretches of highways, where cars are especially vulnerable to drone and missile attacks, with Ukrainian rescuers named being in a vehicle during a strike as one of the most dangerous places.

Meanwhile, Beskrestnov does not say how widely Russia already uses the module.

Russia’s air war grows faster and more frequent

Jet-powered Gerans already fly too fast for the mobile gun teams and light interceptors that stop slower drones, and Ukraine is still testing jet interceptors of its own.

“Credit to the Russians. They know how to scale,” Serhii Bratchuk, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Volunteer Army, said in September.

By August, Russian forces were striking Kyiv almost twice a week on average, each attack costing the city about $12 million, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said. Ukraine’s Economy Ministry expects losses from Russian strikes to reach up to $10 billion this year.

Starting in May, Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps began exploiting gaps in Russian lines just north of Sloviansk in eastern Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast. Five months later, the corps and its supporting drone units had cleared Russian troops from 277 sq km of northern Donetsk, inflicting what the corps says were 8,000 Russian casualties and pushing the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies back across a key terrain feature: the Zherebets River.

On 14 October, the 3rd Army Corps declared victory in its Operation Vivaldi. "Four seasons of Vivaldi are over. But the music plays on," the corps wrote on Telegram.

It was unclear at the time what the corps meant. Its commander, Brig. Gen. Andrii Biletskyi, has since been seconded to lead Ukraine's new Center Group of Forces. But it's clearer now. According to at least two observers, Ukrainian troops have continued attacking along the Zherebets River—and have even crossed the river at several points.

If true and confirmed, the crossings could ratchet up the pressure on the battered Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies following their hasty and chaotic retreat from their former salient north of Sloviansk. The Zherebets should have been a natural defensive barrier for the Russians.

Sheltering on the river's eastern bank, the Russians could have rested, reset, and reinforced in preparation for a renewed offensive next year. But if the Ukrainians keep attacking, rest might be impossible. And that could force the Russians to rethink any plans for a fresh push toward Sloviansk and neighboring Kramatorsk, the last two big free cities in Donetsk.

But an extension of Operation Vivaldi isn't without risk for the 3rd Army Corps. If the corps pushes too far, too fast across a difficult obstacle, it could expose itself to counterattack.

Ukraine's "Vilvadi" counteroffensive in the Lyman direction has not stopped, despite claims to the contrary.

Ukrainian forces have made new advances in several different areas over the last couple of weeks, crossing the Zherebets River onto its eastern bank at multiple different…

— AMK Mapping (@AMK_Mapping_) October 26, 2026

Continuing counteroffensive

Ukraine's Vivaldi counteroffensive in the Lyman direction "has not stopped, despite claims to the contrary," the mapping account AMK Mapping explained on Monday after noting possible Ukrainian forces on the eastern side of the Zherebets in recent weeks. "Ukrainian forces have made new advances in several different areas over the last couple of weeks, crossing the Zherebets River onto its eastern bank at multiple different locations." AMK Mapping also noted that many Ukrainian assaults over the past month had been repelled and that casualties were likely rising.

AMK Mapping isn't alone. On Monday, mapper Suriyak also logged Ukrainian troops on the far side of the Zherebets in three key settlements: Makiivka, Novosadove, and Terny. "They are establishing a significant bridgehead," Suriyak wrote.

The possible Ukrainian river crossings could defy recent expectations. "The Ukrainians have continued their push and advancement toward the Zherebets River," mapper Clément Molin wrote on 20 October. "They have reached it at several points, and Russian forces no longer control any territory west of this river—with the exception of the forest east of Lyman."

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1700-1704:
Situation on Luhansk front: During the last two weeks, Ukrainian army has managed to secure new positions on the western bank of the Zherebets River, including the south of Makiivka and the rest of Novolyubivka. However, military… pic.twitter.com/zfi1Txv3eA

— @Suriyak (@Suriyakmaps) October 26, 2026

But Molin didn't expect the 3rd Army Corps to force the river, a risky maneuver under the best of circumstances. "Despite various rumors, I have not been able to confirm that the Ukrainians have actually crossed the river," Molin wrote.

Instead, he expected the Ukrainian corps to do what the defeated Russian field armies were trying to do: consolidate in new positions and get ready for the next round of major fighting, potentially next year. "For the time being, I believe the Ukrainians will focus on consolidating their gains and adopting a defensive posture."

If indeed the 3rd Army Corps has crossed the Zherebets, it's a possible indication that the corps still has some combat power in reserve—and is eager to prolong its momentum for as long as possible, even if that means heavier losses in risky river crossings.

A major clash could occur if and when the 3rd Army Corps tries to seize full control of Terny, which anchors the Russian line on the east bank of the Zherebets. Two years ago, Terny was the site of intensive fighting as Russian forces fought their way across the Zherebets on their long march toward Sloviansk. That battle was a costly victory for the Russians as they sent mechanized column after mechanized column across a drone kill zone toward Terny.

The worst outcome for the outnumbered Ukrainian troops in northern Donetsk may be a mirror image of the Russian march through Terny in 2024. Yes, the Russians eventually captured Terny and secured a bridgehead on the western bank of the Zherebets. But the Russians overextended as they kept pushing toward Sloviansk, roughly 40 km to the southwest of Terny.

It's that overextension that afforded the 3rd Army Corps the opportunity to counterattack and roll back the hard-won Russian gains. To preserve its own recent victory on the western side of the Zherebets, the 3rd Army Corps may want to choose caution. Ukrainian forces "need to organize a coherent and solid defensive line," Molin advised.

That may mean not attacking across the Zherebets—despite the temptation to do so.

Ukraine’s Military Intelligence (HUR) has published the names of 49 Russian and Belarusian companies and institutions building Rassvet, Russia’s low-orbit satellite internet system, on its War&Sanctions portal, the agency said on 28 October. It needs it for its military purposes.

Russian troops ran front-line communications and long-range strike drones on smuggled Starlink terminals until SpaceX blocked them on 1 February 2026. Ukraine still flies on Musk’s network, and on 24 October it got back to full speed after a ten-day cap imposed abroad. Rassvet is meant to give Russia’s army satellite links under its own control.

HUR has said Moscow may struggle to obtain components for more satellites, and its list names the suppliers that sanctions would need to target while the network is still being built.

Terminals for Iskander-M command vehicles

Rassvet is first of all a military communications system. Russia plans to use it for command and control, strike platforms, and drones, and to install terminals in the command-and-staff vehicles of Iskander-M missile systems, HUR says.

The Central Research Institute of Automation and Hydraulics is involved in integrating Rassvet into army communications, including fitting command vehicles, Iskander ones among them, with terminals once 292 satellites are in orbit, according to the portal. The same institute produces guidance components for the Iskander-M and Kinzhal missiles.

Planned coverage takes in Ukraine and the EU first, and once it is wide enough, Russia could use the system in hybrid attacks on other countries. That is why partners should block Rassvet’s access to components, equipment, and software now, the agency said.

Roscosmos launches it, a Belarusian missile maker signs on

The lead company is Bureau 1440, part of the IKS Holding tech group. According to the portal, it is linking its flight control center to systems of the Russian Defense Ministry. Roscosmos launches the satellites into orbit, and its head, Dmitry Bakanov, personally oversees Rassvet.

Meanwhile, Belintersat, Belarus’s national satellite operator, signed a partnership with Bureau 1440 in May 2026 to bring Rassvet into Belarus’s telecom network. It is a branch of the Plant of Precision Electromechanics, Belarus’s lead missile developer and maker of the Polonez rocket launcher.

Another Belarusian firm, Aerospace Instruments, prototypes components for the system.

23 of 49 not sanctioned by Kyiv’s allies

Of the 49, 23, Roscosmos among them, are not under sanctions by any country in the sanctions coalition. The companies involved “must be included in all blacklists” of countries, banks, and businesses, the agency wrote.

32 satellites launched, seven launches to go

Russia launched its first 16 Rassvet satellites earlier this year. Stable communications would need 200–250 in orbit, Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, then adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister, said in May.

By August, Russia had launched 32 Rassvet satellites and planned seven more launches by the end of 2026, a HUR official told Janes. Only 12 of them, all from the first batch, had reached a sustainable altitude by the end of August, ISW reported.

A small Russian cruise missile of an unconfirmed type came down almost intact in Odesa Oblast, Militarnyi reported on 27 October. Its box-shaped airframe looks unlike the Geran-5 variant whose name a presidential adviser gave it.

Militarnyi describes Russia’s work on the Geran-5 line as iterative: features tested on one version reappear in the next. A variant reported in late September can correct its route by images of the ground instead of satellite signals, which Ukraine jams, according to the monitoring channel Polkovnyk GSh. Official Ukrainian sources have not confirmed that system. The airframe found in Odesa Oblast looks shaped for a different problem: radar. Russia now builds 4,000 jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month, Militarnyi says, most of them Geran-4. It is also building new launch sites for the Geran-5.

What the wreck shows

Local Telegram channel Odesa Info Live posted photos of the missile lying in open ground with little visible damage. Militarnyi described a compact cruise missile with a box-shaped fuselage, rounded edges, and a swept wing. The flat-sided body is probably meant to simplify production, the outlet said, and it may also cut radar visibility. A small turbojet engine exhausts through a V-shaped tail and draws air through intakes on both sides. Militarnyi read the dark composite skin as another measure against radar.

Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, the president’s adviser on defense technology, published the first photos of the new missile on 22 October. He wrote that it navigates optically and has greater range, speed, and flight altitude, and he labeled it the Geran-5 K5-K. However, Militarnyi noted that it looks substantially different from the K5-K variant already known by that name. In its 23 October overview, the outlet said Russia had started using two new small cruise missiles, probably developments of the Geran-5.

How Russia got here

Russia first used the original Geran-5 against Ukraine in early January 2026, Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) said, describing it as a jet-powered strike drone. Militarnyi now classes the whole line as small cruise missiles.

Until specialists open the airframe, its navigation, range, and speed rest on Beskrestnov’s word. What they find inside will show how much of the design is aimed at Ukraine’s radar.

A fire broke out in the area of a major Russian steel plant in Lipetsk late on 27 October, Kyiv time, as air defenses fired at incoming targets, the Ukrainian monitoring Telegram channel Exilenova+ reported. Ukrainian partisans said the strike may have hit the plant. The region’s governor denied any large industrial fire.

Whether or not it was hit, the plant matters to Ukraine. The Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant (NLMK) is Russia’s only producer of electrical steel, Ukrainska Pravda reported in April 2025. NLMK’s tax records, obtained by the outlet, showed sales of that steel to Moscow’s Avangard plant, which builds missiles for S-400 air defense systems. Russia also fires those missiles at ground targets in Ukraine.

Pantsir fires, no visible hit

The targets over Lipetsk were jet-powered, Exilenova+ wrote, citing preliminary reports of impacts and a fire toward the city’s airfield. Footage it posted showed a Pantsir air defense system firing, and the channel suggested the system may have failed to cope. It then reported the fire near NLMK, blaming air defense fire or a falling object.

We also observe a fire in the vicinity of NLMK (Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine) resulting from air defense activity or the impact of an object. pic.twitter.com/7bBqyqCP2j

— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) October 27, 2026

The Crimean Tatar-Ukrainian partisan movement Atesh said its agents in Lipetsk reported an impact, and in a follow-up said they believe it may have hit NLMK.

Contracts and denials

A 2022 investigation by Disclose and its partners tied 18 NLMK contracts, all signed after 2014, to eight Russian defense firms, including an S-300 maker. NLMK confirmed the contracts but said only a “negligible” amount of civilian steel grades went to those firms.

On 28 October, Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed air defenses downed 45 drones over the oblast overnight. He insisted reports of a large industrial fire were untrue, saying drone debris fell in a tree belt and sparked a fire, since contained. Debris also blew out windows in a Lipetsk apartment block, and one person sought medical help but needed no hospitalization, he added. Whether NLMK took any damage remains unconfirmed.

Earlier strikes on weapons suppliers

Earlier, UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles reportedly struck a battery plant in Yelets, in the same oblast, on 25 October. Two days before that, they reportedly hit an electronics plant in Oryol. OSINT channels described both as suppliers of parts for Russian missiles.

A test satellite for a future communications network under Ukrainian control is working in orbit, Ukraine’s Himera and Denmark’s GomSpace said on 27 October. The companies say it will work for Ukraine’s strategic security, and that the long-term aim is to rely less on foreign communications providers. Public launch records for the mission do not list a satellite by that name, though some of its objects are still unidentified.

Ukraine fights Russia on satellite links it doesn’t control, and the announcement comes two weeks after it saw what depending on an outside provider can cost. The satellite, the companies say, went up on 1 October, before that trouble began. Overnight on 14 October, Starlink and its military version, Starshield, began dropping links on fast-moving terminals, and Ukrainian officials said the cap disrupted drone missions. On 24 October, 10 days after the cap began, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry reported speeds restored. Who ordered the cap remains contested. That same day, Elon Musk wrote that Ukraine’s military had violated Starlink’s terms of service and that “that loophole was closed last week,” a claim a Ukrainian presidential adviser disputed.

What the companies say, and what launch records show

Obria Nano flew on SpaceX’s Transporter-18 rideshare mission, the release said. Aalborg-based GomSpace built it on Himera’s order, Himera co-founder and CEO Misha Rudominski wrote on Facebook. He added that the team received the first signals the next day and that the satellite is now working. Its tests are meant to inform the design of the full Obria system, the release said.

No satellite called Obria Nano appears on SpaceX’s published list for the mission, The Insider found. Public tracking catalogs show one Ukrainian satellite from that launch, named UASAT-Nano. Another 26 objects from the mission are still listed with placeholder names and no confirmed owner. The outlet said it is unclear whether the two names refer to one satellite.

UASAT-Nano is the satellite network Stetman, another Ukrainian company, is building, and its founder said the network’s first test satellite would launch in October. In April, Stetman and GomSpace agreed to set up a joint venture called UASAT and planned a first launch for fall 2026. The Obria release does not mention Stetman or UASAT.

Production in Ukraine is the stated next step

Rudominski wrote that Himera’s next stage is to produce satellites and ground terminals in Ukraine. He called it important not only to use the technology but also to gradually build domestic expertise and manufacturing.

“For us, this project is about more than launching a satellite. It is an opportunity to lay the foundation for an independent communications network for Ukraine,” Rudominski said in the release.

In the long run, the network would cover all of Ukraine and complement European satellite networks, the release said. The network does not exist yet, and Himera has given no timeline.

Replacing Starlink will not be quick. Lance Hunter, a political scientist at Augusta University, told Time that Ukraine cannot quickly swap out such technology, since diversifying it “takes a lot of time. It takes a lot of resources.” Meanwhile, one Ukrainian interceptor-drone maker has begun rethinking its air-launched designs after the slowdown.