The Pentagon has fired its top military strategist as Washington draws up contingency plans for a possible escalation of hostilities with Iran.
Army Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia has been removed from his position as director for strategy, plans, and policy (J5) on the Joint Staff, a spokesman confirmed late Wednesday, following media reports of his dismissal.
His predecessor, Lt. Gen. Joseph McGee, was forced into retirement a year ago amid reported friction with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine. Sylvia previously served as vice director of the J5.
The Pentagon did not explain Sylvia’s departure. His responsibilities included developing military strategies and plans to advise the chairman and the US president. He joins nearly two dozen senior military and civilian officials removed during Hegseth’s tenure.
The secretary has portrayed the dismissals as part of an effort to reduce the military’s bloated ranks of generals and make the armed forces more efficient and lethal. Critics, however, have characterized the shake-up as an ideological “purge.”
President Donald Trump has repeatedly raised the possibility of renewing large-scale hostilities with Iran, including resuming the intensive bombing campaign conducted during the first 40 days of the conflict, which the US and Israel launched in late February. A potential escalation could be timed around the November midterm elections.
Military experts have widely expressed concern that another bombing campaign would fail to “finish the job,” as Trump has put it, while further increasing the conflict’s economic toll worldwide. Tehran has repeatedly warned that it is prepared to retaliate against US allies in the Gulf region if it faces renewed attacks.
Conversely, speculation has emerged that Trump could dismiss Hegseth after the midterms, when the opposition Democratic Party is expected to make gains in both chambers of Congress. Critics of the Iran war, including Republican Rep. Thomas Massie, have argued that firing the secretary could help Trump avoid a potential impeachment battle if Democrats take control of the House.
Trump’s public rhetoric remains supportive of Hegseth and his policies.
Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on Thursday that three oil tankers exploded and caught fire after striking naval mines while attempting to cross an unauthorized southern route through the Strait of Hormuz.
The vessels disregarded warnings from Iranian naval forces and switched off their radar and navigation systems before entering the mined passage, according to the statement.
“Over the past 24 hours, three violating oil tankers exploded and caught fire after striking mines while attempting to pass through the unauthorised southern route of the Strait of Hormuz,” the IRGC said.
The navy reported that the tankers were left along the southern shores of the strait following the explosions. Their identities and flags were not immediately available, and no information was provided about casualties.
IRGC warns crews against relying on CENTCOM assurances
The IRGC Navy reiterated that the southern route remains mined, warning shipowners and crews against attempting passage in disregard of its instructions or relying on statements issued by US Central Command (CENTCOM).
“The IRGC Navy states that the unauthorised route through the Strait of Hormuz is mined, and that vessel owners and crews are responsible for transiting these routes and should not pay attention to CENTCOM’s delusions on social media,” the statement said.
It further warned that any provocative action backed by the US military that disregards Iran’s rules governing passage through the strait would be met firmly.
Iranian forces have repeatedly accused CENTCOM of encouraging commercial vessels to use the southern corridor near the Omani coast despite Iranian warnings.
In a statement issued on Wednesday, CENTCOM rejected earlier Iranian reports of commercial vessels striking mines and maintained that US forces had cleared all internationally recognized primary transit routes. It also said thousands of commercial vessels had used those lanes safely. The statement preceded Thursday’s IRGC announcement.
UKMTO receives report of vessel burning near Oman
Separately, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said on Thursday that a shipmaster had reported seeing another vessel on fire nine nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman.
The agency did not identify the vessel or establish the cause of the blaze. Its connection to the three tankers reported by the IRGC remained unclear.
The developments come amid restrictions on shipping through the strait since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28. Tehran maintains that vessels must coordinate their passage with Iranian authorities, while Washington has imposed a blockade on Iranian ports.
IRGC announces capture of US reconnaissance drone
In a separate statement, the IRGC Navy announced that its electronic warfare unit had captured a US drone in the western Strait of Hormuz and brought it down intact.
The navy identified the aircraft as an MQM-170 reconnaissance and decoy drone, saying it had been tasked with detecting Iranian air-defense systems along the Gulf coastline and the strait.
“The IRGC Navy announced that its electronic warfare unit had successfully captured a US MQM-170 drone during an offensive operation in the western Strait of Hormuz,” the statement said.
The presence of Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani officials in Tehran on 26 October reflected a growing recognition that Iran cannot be excluded from any serious regional security arrangement. Despite the US–Israeli war against Iran, Tehran remains central to the region’s military and political balance.
For Riyadh and its partners, the meeting also exposed the limits of the Mecca defense pact, particularly as Saudi Arabia faces renewed confrontation with the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).
Much of the speculation surrounding the four-country meeting centered on what Iran might be expected to surrender, particularly its relationship with Sanaa. Such expectations rested on the assumption that Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan had established a regional security order into which Iran was now seeking admission, with Tehran potentially offering concessions over Yemen in return.
Yet the political and military circumstances that brought the participants to Tehran suggest a different calculation. Iran has withstood sustained American and Israeli attacks, while Saudi Arabia and its partners have struggled to contain the YAF’s military operations. Any agreement that disregards these realities risks reproducing the confrontations it seeks to resolve.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry had identified Israel’s expansionist policies, Lebanon, and the US war against Iran among the subjects for discussion. Yemen was absent from the announced agenda and the subsequent press statement.
Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the gathering also served to congratulate Mohsen Rezaei, the council’s newly appointed secretary, and discuss regional security, including opposition to foreign interference, particularly by Washington. According to information obtained by The Cradle, Yemen was not discussed during the meeting.
On the morning of 27 October, a day after the talks, Rezaei met Yemen’s ambassador, Ibrahim Mohammad al-Dailami, in Tehran. Rezaei praised Yemen’s defense of Gaza and its confrontation with Israel, while the ambassador thanked him and the Iranian government for their positions.
The encounter came amid speculation that Tehran’s diplomatic engagement with Riyadh might come at the expense of its relationship with Sanaa. By publicly reaffirming those ties immediately after the summit, Iran signaled its intention to pursue regional diplomacy while maintaining its existing alliances.
Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s conservative daily Kayhan, wrote in a 27 October editorial that “Yemen’s revolutionaries are allies of Islamic Iran.” He warned that the visiting delegations might seek to create the impression that Tehran was distancing itself from Sanaa, offering Washington and its allies “breathing room, however brief” by encouraging expectations of an imminent settlement.
The Mecca pact’s limits
Iran has good reason to approach the Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani framework, commonly known as the Mecca pact, with caution. The agreement brings together three states with substantial military capabilities and extensive relations with Washington, raising questions about whether their security cooperation could eventually be directed against the Axis of Resistance.
For Riyadh, Yemen remains a central concern. Years of confrontation with the YAF have demonstrated Sanaa’s ability to impose high military and economic costs beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia’s renewed campaign has again brought its energy infrastructure and military installations within range of Yemeni retaliation, exposing the limits of the kingdom’s reliance on foreign military protection.
In Tehran, closer military coordination among the pact’s members could be seen as an attempt to contain the Axis of Resistance at a time when American security guarantees are becoming increasingly uncertain.
Iran’s participation in talks with the pact’s members carries no commitment to join their alliance. Tehran has made no such announcement, while Rezaei’s explanation of the summit emphasized the establishment of security through regional cooperation, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and an end to outside interference.
These objectives leave considerable differences between the participants. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan maintain security relationships with Washington, while Iran regards the American military presence as a principal source of regional instability. Their respective positions on armed resistance movements, Israeli aggression, and the obligations of any collective defense arrangement also remain unresolved.
The meeting produced a brief press statement confirming the participants’ intention to continue their dialogue, without setting out binding commitments. Rezaei indicated that further meetings would follow, suggesting that the four governments were exploring the foundations of a wider regional accommodation.
The initiative itself emerged from Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran the previous week, according to information obtained by The Cradle. Iranian officials also confirmed Pakistan’s proposal, describing the gathering as an opportunity to advance regional security arrangements based on shared interests and mutual trust.
Riyadh’s security dilemma
The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani alliance combines considerable military resources, diplomatic influence, and strategic relationships. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of its members to confront threats that may carry very different consequences for each country.
The limited assistance Pakistan and Turkiye have provided during the renewed confrontation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia illustrates these constraints. Although both countries have pledged support for Riyadh, their involvement has fallen short of the decisive intervention that might alter the military balance with the YAF.
Saudi Arabia’s own account of the visit was more restrained. In a statement following the meeting, Riyadh said the talks formed part of efforts to de-escalate tensions, encourage diplomatic solutions, and support mediation by Qatar and Pakistan. It also reaffirmed the Mecca pact’s role in promoting regional security and stability.
Islamabad and Ankara have also sought to limit their military involvement. Turkish officials have ruled out offensive operations against Yemen, while Pakistan has denied reports that its aircraft carried out strikes on Yemeni forces. These restrictions expose the distance between the pact’s collective defense commitments and its members’ willingness to enter a wider war.
The continuing Yemeni operations against Saudi targets have consequently strengthened the argument for direct engagement with Tehran. Riyadh must weigh the costs of further confrontation against the possibility of reaching an understanding with Iran, whose regional relationships and military capabilities remain central to the wider balance of power.
Despite the damage inflicted during the war, Tehran has retained the ability to influence the course and costs of regional confrontation. Its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and its capacity to retaliate against military infrastructure have complicated Washington’s efforts to impose a settlement on its own terms.
These developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, although translating military endurance into a durable security arrangement will require more than the recognition of its regional weight. Tehran must also demonstrate that cooperation with its neighbors can reduce the likelihood of renewed war without undermining the relationships that have helped it withstand external pressure.
For Saudi Arabia, the lesson is equally significant. Its security cannot be guaranteed indefinitely through military partnerships that exclude one of the region’s principal powers, particularly when those partnerships have struggled to prevent attacks on Saudi territory.
Yemen cannot be traded
The suggestion that Tehran might trade its relationship with Ansarallah for concessions from Riyadh overlooks the movement’s independent political interests and roots in Yemen. Ansarallah’s resistance to Saudi intervention grew out of a prolonged struggle over the country’s political future, during which its ties with Iran deepened.
The two sides share important strategic interests, but Yemen’s military and political decisions cannot be reduced to directives from Tehran. The YAF’s intervention in support of Gaza, its confrontation with Israel, and its continuing war with Saudi Arabia reflect calculations shaped by Yemen’s own circumstances.
Iran’s regional relationships have also evolved through years of confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv. The Islamic Republic’s resistance to American and Israeli pressure has become inseparable from its wider regional security calculations, particularly as the war has intensified the threats facing its allies.
Sanaa has paid a substantial price for its military and political positions, enduring years of bombardment, blockade, and attempts to dismantle its authority. Ansarallah’s survival has given it considerable influence over Yemen’s future, making any settlement negotiated without its participation unlikely to produce lasting results.
The assumption that Tehran could simply secure Yemeni compliance also underestimates the political consequences of such an arrangement. The Sanaa government would have little reason to accept an agreement that disregards its security interests or leaves Saudi military pressure intact.
Rezaei’s meeting with the Yemeni ambassador therefore served an important political purpose. As Tehran opened discussions with the Mecca pact’s members, it reaffirmed a relationship whose continuity remains important to the wider Resistance Axis.
Israel’s declining leverage
The summit’s joint statement made no reference to Israel, but Rezaei’s subsequent account of the talks placed Israeli military operations among the issues discussed. He said the participants had emphasized ending Israeli attacks and securing Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.
Before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Saudi–Israeli normalization was a serious diplomatic prospect. Washington sought to advance Israel’s integration into a regional security and economic framework that would strengthen its position while isolating Iran and its allies.
The wars that followed have disrupted those calculations. Israel’s military campaigns across West Asia, alongside the American war against Iran, have exposed the risks associated with a regional order built around Israeli military superiority and US security guarantees.
Rezaei’s public emphasis on Israeli aggression reflects the changing circumstances in which the talks took place. Riyadh has not formally adopted his characterization in the joint statement and maintains its longstanding relationship with Washington, but Saudi security concerns have increasingly brought it into direct contact with Tehran despite years of hostility.
The contrast with 2017 is especially revealing. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) then threatened to take the confrontation inside Iran, reflecting Riyadh’s confidence in its ability to challenge Tehran through regional pressure and military alliances.
Nearly a decade later, Saudi officials are in Tehran discussing regional security with the same government Riyadh once threatened to attack. Years of confrontation have failed to break Iran’s regional influence, while Washington’s ability to shield its allies from another war is increasingly in doubt.
Yemen’s ability to remain a consequential military actor despite years of Saudi-led operations has also shaped this reassessment. Its continued resistance has demonstrated the limits of attempts to impose regional arrangements through military force.
Tehran’s next move
The summit’s lasting significance will depend on whether the participating governments can translate their discussions into practical security arrangements. Iran has an opportunity to advance its longstanding position that West Asia’s security must be determined by the countries of the region, without dependence on foreign military intervention.
Such an arrangement would require Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan to recognize Iran’s security concerns and its existing alliances. Tehran would also have to address its neighbors’ security concerns without compromising those relationships.
The presence of all four countries in Tehran suggests that these questions are now receiving serious attention. Rezaei’s subsequent meeting with Yemen’s ambassador also indicated the basis on which Iran intends to participate: regional cooperation alongside continued support for its established allies.
Any regional agreement must also account for Yemen and the other members of the Axis of Resistance. Their military and political weight cannot be ignored, nor can their futures be decided through negotiations between Tehran and its neighbors.
Iran has emerged from the war with its regional alliances intact and greater room to negotiate. The question now is whether Riyadh and its partners are prepared to reach an understanding with Tehran that recognizes those alliances rather than seeking to dismantle them.
Donald Trump and his coalition have rocked the Republican party more than any other right-wing movement this century.
So much so that some Republicans now long for the party as it was before MAGA, the ostensibly “traditional” pre-Trump GOP.
Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) is one of them. The senator, who decided not to run for re-election this year, is promoting a new book that presents himself as, if not a Never Trumper, then at any rate a dissident from MAGA. “What [Trump’s] done is he’s created a coalition that, in my opinion, will not stay with Republicans once we go back to traditional Republican platform priorities,” Tillis said of the GOP’s future in an interview last week. “I think a lot of the elements of the populism that Trump created to expand a base that made him successful running for president, I don’t think that stays with the party long term.”
On X, The Blaze’s Auron MacIntyre shared a clip of Tillis saying this and added, “They’re admitting out loud that they’re running out the clock on Trump so they can return the GOP to factory neocon settings.”
MacIntyre is not wrong.
Another figure who longs for the GOP before Trump is Rahm Emanuel, the former chief of staff to President Obama who is currently making a bid for the 2028 Democratic nomination. He wants Democrats to embrace what he calls “McCain-Romney Republicans” who now vote Democrat.
“The top story from the 2026 cycle will be the electoral opening Democrats seized—and will have to maintain,” Emanuel wrote for the Wall Street Journal last Wednesday. “Most important, the McCain-Romney Republicans, who are politically homeless, need to be welcomed into Democrats’ governing and electoral coalition.”
Emanuel urged his fellow Democrats to make common cause with these kinds of centrist Republicans, and to avoid embracing the hard-left socialist Democratic candidates who are faring well at the moment.
“Millions of McCain-Romney voters are redefining their political identities, and they will be most responsible for Democratic gains in November,” Emanuel explained. “These voters don’t want to be associated with MAGA, and they see themselves as free agents.”
It’s true that many Republican voters who might go for Democrats this election don’t want to be associated with MAGA. But they might not want to revert to the supposed good ol’ days of John McCain, Mitt Romney and George W. Bush either.
President Ronald Reagan’s former Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman shared Emanuel’s op-ed and added, “McCain-Romney neocon warmongering GOP campaign loot collectors from the MIC (military-industrial complex)? You are barking up the wrong tree, Rahm.”
Stockman is on point.
Tillis and Emanuel are both right that voters, and especially Republicans, are mad at Trump and his party, and most predict this anger will be on full display in the upcoming election.
But both are wrong to dismiss populism. The establishmentarian politics that Tillis and Emanuel represent within their respective parties is what so many voters were rejecting when they embraced the current “Drain the Swamp” president.
Populism is not only not the problem, it’s not likely to be going anywhere. The upcoming midterm elections won’t mark some return to party-elite form, but another populist revolt against the apparently insincere populism Americans voted for two years ago.
This isn’t rocket science: Trump’s coalition is mad because the erstwhile “no new wars” president who promised to put America first and keep prices low instead started a brand new war at the behest of Israel and the expense of working-class Americans. The Republican establishment was also on board with the war—until recently, when even a few historically hawkish candidates in tight races have started saying it should end.
On the Iran War, the issue that seems to be defining Trump’s second term the most, this president has delivered what the neocon favorite Mitt Romney seemed to promise as the 2012 Republican presidential nominee, and what the 2008 GOP nominee and neocon favorite John McCain campaigned on. Trump is now compared to that most “traditional” of 21st century Republicans, George W. Bush. The former president’s brother, Jeb Bush, has praised Trump for starting a war with Iran. Marc Thiessen, an alumnus of the George W. Bush White House, is a big fan of Trump and his war. And the neoconservative pundits Mark Levin and Ben Shapiro now praise Trump for having a foreign policy that looks a lot like what was on offer from McCain and Romney.
On the other side of the aisle, many of the Democrats challenging Republicans in seats once thought safe are finding success with populist campaigns that focus on combatting rising prices, opposing the overwhelmingly unpopular war, and, perhaps most amusingly, putting America First. Abdul el-Sayed, the Democrat who is running against “traditional” Republican Mike Rogers for Senate in Michigan, has regularly appeared on Fox News and constantly pitches to (former?) MAGA voters.
It’s worth noting that there was a Republican party before Trump, under whose banners Tillis was first elected to the Senate in 2014. This is how POLITICOreported Tillis’s victory in the GOP primary for that seat: “Tillis Beats Tea Party in N.C.: The GOP establishment scored a victory Tuesday when its preferred candidate soundly defeated a pair of grass-roots insurgents in a North Carolina primary.” One of those insurgents was Greg Brannon, who had the endorsement of the Tea Party Republican and war skeptic Rand Paul. (Paul, of course, won his own Senate seat in 2010 by running against the pre-Trump, pro-war neoconservative-marinated Republican brass.)
There was a Republican uprising against the party’s establishment well before Trump burst on the scene, and Tillis was definitely not part of it.
In fact, there was much dissent and intra-party challenging of Republican elites in those post-Bush years. Obama’s 2008 victory was largely a rejection of the old GOP and its wars, which McCain fully embraced, and Romney’s 2012 loss was due in no small part to Americans not wanting another extension of Bush-Cheney.
The “traditional” McCain-Romney Republicans haven’t been popular enough to win a presidential election since Bush in 2004, and the first Republican to do so won by calling Dubya a liar and his war in Iraq a “big, fat mistake.”
Now Trump is making his own mistake in Iran, and many of his 2024 voters appear eager to correct their mistake this year. Not because they yearn for a return to the Republican party as it was before him, but because Donald Trump promised to beat that party and dispose of it—and has failed.
Jack Hunter is the former political editor of Rare.us. Jack has written regularly for the Washington Examiner, The Daily Caller, Spectator USA, Responsible Statecraft and has appeared in Politico Magazine and The Daily Beast. Hunter is the co-author of the The Tea Party Goes to Washington by Sen. Rand Paul.
Login
