The Houthis (Ansar Allah) stepped up missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and its allies over the past week, while maintaining their dominance on the battlefield in Yemen.
On October 22, the Houthis announced four operations carried out over the preceding 48 hours, targeting Saudi Arabia’s Defense Ministry headquarters in Riyadh, King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, an Aramco facility in Yanbu and Abha International Airport. Saudi aviation authorities said an attack on King Fahd Airport killed two people and wounded eight.
Two days later, the Houthis announced seven more operations involving ballistic missiles and drones against Saudi targets. The reported targets included King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Aramco facilities in Yanbu, the Rabigh oil refinery, oil pumping stations, the East-West Pipeline, King Fahd Airport, Najran Airport and an air base in Khamis Mushait.
The Houthis also stepped up attacks on government-held positions in southern Yemen. On October 24, Yemeni authorities accused the group of launching ballistic missiles at Aden International Airport, the al-Tawahi port area and two Coast Guard facilities.
On October 26, the Houthis announced two additional missile operations targeting military positions and weapons depots in the Salah al-Din area of Aden and the al-Wahat area of neighboring Lahij province. The group said the strikes caused dozens of casualties and destroyed military vehicles and weapons depots. The claims were not independently verified.
The following day, the Houthis said that they had repelled an advance by Saudi-backed forces toward Bab al-Mandab. They said the advancing troops were targeted with ballistic missiles and heavy weapons, resulting in casualties and the destruction of several military vehicles.
Also on October 27, the Houthis said they had struck Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura oil refinery with a ballistic missile, sparking a fire at the complex. The group also reported attacks on two Saudi military transport aircraft at Najran Airport and an air base in Khamis Mushait.
Meanwhile, Houthi forces continued to tighten their siege of Taiz, capturing additional territory and roads around the city. These advances further restricted Saudi-backed forces’ access to water sources.
On October 28, the Houthis called for the immediate evacuation of Aden International Airport, alleging that a Saudi military cargo plane carrying weapons was at the facility.
The increasing frequency of Houthi strikes, alongside their continued territorial gains, underscores their position as the dominant force on Yemen’s battlefield. Against this backdrop, recent reports suggest that Saudi Arabia is seeking a diplomatic path to halt the escalation through Iranian mediation. One report indicated that Riyadh was prepared to offer the Houthis up to $1 billion in exchange for a ceasefire and an end to attacks on Saudi territory.
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The post Houthis Expand Strikes Across Saudi Arabia And Yemen appeared first on South Front.
Between these two roles lies a striking paradox in Saudi policy across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. By day, Riyadh calls on warring parties to cease fire; by night, it chooses its allies and backs them politically and militarily, leveraging its financial and security clout to reshape the balance of power in ways that serve its own interests.
From Port Sudan to Mogadishu, by way of Yemen and Eritrea, the question is no longer limited to whether Saudi Arabia can mediate between adversaries. It now extends to the kingdom’s position within the conflicts themselves, and then to its control over the balance of power around the Red Sea and its securing of ports and strategic corridors. Thus the image of the neutral mediator recedes in the face of the reality of a state seeking to build an axis of influence spanning both shores of the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia sponsored the Jeddah talks between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces in 2023, presenting itself as a party working to end the war and protect civilians. But its subsequent political stance showed a growing bias toward the army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
In January 2026, Reuters revealed negotiations over a $1.5 billion Pakistani arms deal for the Sudanese army, covering aircraft, drones and air defense systems, with a Saudi role in mediating it.
In April, the agency reported that Pakistan had suspended the deal after a Saudi objection and Riyadh’s withdrawal of its funding, according to security and diplomatic sources. On the same day, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received al-Burhan in Jeddah. Here the glaring paradox emerges: how can a mediator maintain an image of neutrality while being tied to a track of military support for one party to the conflict?
If Sudan reveals the overlap between mediation and partisanship, Yemen offers the clearest picture of Saudi military intervention. Since March 2015, Riyadh has led a military coalition, carried out air operations, and supported government forces and local armed groups, in addition to providing economic aid to the internationally recognized government.
Its presence has not been limited to confronting the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has become an influential party in the conflicts within the anti-Houthi camp, particularly as its dispute with the Southern Transitional Council has escalated. In early January 2026, Saudi aircraft struck Transitional Council positions in Hadramawt, while Riyadh-backed forces advanced to retake control of southern areas.
This came at a time when Saudi Arabia was calling on Yemeni parties to engage in dialogue, which reveals the duality of the tools in use: military pressure to alter the balance of control, followed by a political track to arrange the outcomes.
Riyadh’s relationship with the Yemeni Islah Party reveals a further paradox. The Carnegie Center documented Saudi Arabia’s reliance on forces linked to the party in confronting the Houthis, and its provision of military and financial support to them, despite Riyadh’s declared position toward the Muslim Brotherhood, to whose political current Islah belongs.
So in Yemen the picture is clear: Saudi Arabia does not appear to be an observer of the course of the war, but one of the forces that helped shape it, determine its allies, and influence its maps of control.
On the African shore of the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia has built close security ties with Eritrea that date back to the years of the war in Yemen, when Eritrean territory and ports were used within the coalition’s military arrangements. Political and security coordination between Riyadh and Asmara continued through 2025 and 2026, coinciding with rising tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia over access to the Red Sea. Regional analyses report that Saudi Arabia and Egypt lean toward supporting the Eritrean position against Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, while Addis Ababa views the rapprochement between Riyadh, Cairo and Asmara with concern.
The irony is that Saudi Arabia had sponsored the 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, before its own regional security relationships became part of the balancing calculations between the two sides. This reveals Riyadh’s shift from sponsoring reconciliation to building strategic partnerships with one of the two parties to the tension.
In Somalia, the Saudi presence took a more explicit course during 2026. After Riyadh announced its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity and its rejection of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Saudi Arabia and Mogadishu signed a military cooperation memorandum in February, alongside continued Saudi development and humanitarian assistance.
The agreement comes in a region witnessing escalating competition over ports and military influence, especially near Bab al-Mandab, where the interests of Gulf states, regional powers and international powers intersect. Regional studies read the Saudi-Somali rapprochement as part of Riyadh’s efforts to strengthen its security presence on the African shore of the Red Sea.
However, the military agreement in itself does not mean Saudi participation in Somalia’s internal war. Its political significance lies in adding Mogadishu to the network of Saudi security partnerships and strengthening Riyadh’s ability to influence the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
Any reading of Saudi policy is incomplete without pausing at the historical controversy over the financing of extremist groups through Saudi donors and institutions. Diplomatic cables from the U.S. published by WikiLeaks in 2010 revealed Washington’s concerns about financial flows from Saudi donors to extremist groups. The UN Security Council also placed branches of the Al-Haramain Foundation on sanctions lists linked to al-Qaeda, while Saudi Arabia and the United States took part in measures targeting specific institutions and financiers.
In Syria, we should read the lawsuits brought by the families of the victims of the September 11 attacks with the same eyes. Judicial developments have allowed accusations concerning individuals linked to Saudi Arabia to continue to be heard. The importance of this file is that it keeps past Saudi policies and the financing networks tied to individuals and institutions under continuing scrutiny, even as Riyadh seeks to present itself as a partner in counterterrorism and regional stability.
It is true that Saudi Arabia’s tools differ from one arena to another, but a political thread runs through them all: one meant to secure allies capable of protecting Riyadh’s interests in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
In Sudan, there is political backing for the army and a role attributed to Saudi Arabia in arranging its armament. In Yemen, the intervention takes a direct military form. In Eritrea, the relationship rests on security partnership and regional alignment. As for Somalia, it represents an expansion of the Saudi military cooperation network.
None of these facts mean that Saudi Arabia is fighting five direct wars, but they undermine its portrayal as a neutral party in all of these conflicts. Mediation can coexist with interests, but it loses its claim to neutrality when the mediator becomes part of the balance of power it is trying to manage.
Here the mask of the neutral mediator falls, not because Riyadh has stopped hosting negotiations, but because in a number of arenas it has become an influential party in determining who negotiates, who holds power, and who keeps the territory. From Port Sudan to Mogadishu, Saudi Arabia appears less concerned with standing outside the conflicts and more engaged in shaping their outcomes. A mediator who takes part in making the balance of war cannot ask others to treat him as a mere referee between the disputants.
The competitive gaming industry has grown rapidly over the past two decades, transforming from a niche subculture into a global phenomenon watched by millions of spectators worldwide. More than 3 million fans attended the 2025 Esports World Cup in Saudi Arabia alone, according to the tournament’s organizers, where professional players and teams competed for over […]
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