RT | October 29, 2026

Lithuania will introduce universal male conscription despite public resistance to compulsory military service, the country’s government has announced.

The Baltic state reinstated selective conscription in 2015, seven years after abolishing it. Under the new plan, the draft would be extended to all eligible men, while women would continue to serve voluntarily.

Annual recruitment will increase from just over 5,000 to around 7,500 men, President Gitanas Nauseda announced on Thursday following a State Defense Council meeting.

Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevicius described universal conscription as “necessary and inevitable.”

The decision follows similar recruitment pushes elsewhere in Europe. Poland is considering restoring compulsory service, which was abolished in 2009, and introducing a system covering both men and women. A recent poll, however, found that 53% of Poles aged 18–24 opposed reinstatement of the draft.

Germany has already introduced mandatory military registration for 18-year-old men. Enlistment remains voluntary, but parliament can activate compulsory service if recruitment falls short or the security situation deteriorates.

Berlin’s recruitment drive has met resistance, with some 45,000 people joining student protests across roughly 100 German cities and towns in September, with some carrying banners reading “We won’t fight in your wars” and “Russia is not our enemy.”

Applications for conscientious objector status reached over 12,000 between January and August, compared with 3,879 throughout 2025, according to figures reported by German media.

European officials have nevertheless continued discussing preparations for a possible war with Russia by the end of the decade. Estonian Defense Minister Martin Herem “joked” last month that if Estonia mobilized and Russia did not attack, it would be “economically more correct to attack ourselves” rather than keep troops waiting.

Moscow has repeatedly stated that it has neither reason nor intention to attack NATO countries, describing such allegations as “horror stories” intended to prepare European populations for further militarization.

Russian officials have warned that Europe’s military buildup could itself lead to confrontation and that expanding NATO infrastructure near Russia’s borders would prompt additional security measures. Moscow has stressed that it is prepared to defend itself if attacked.

Why Norway and Finland Were Right to Call Putin

By Glenn Diesen | October 29, 2026

The leaders of Norway and Finland are criticised for breaking with the European consensus on boycotting diplomacy by calling President Putin. Their decision to undermine this solidarity is seen as dividing and weakening Europe. I argue the opposite. It was a brave and necessary move, as the European consensus is based on a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes it increasingly irrelevant, and risks taking it to war with Russia – the world’s largest nuclear power. I will make a further argument: we should develop a healthy scepticism towards the notion that speaking with one voice is always a strength.

How to Speak with One Voice: The Rhetorical Trap

Ask yourself: how can 27+ countries with different political, economic, and security interests agree on a common foreign policy and speak with one voice? A common voice can be achieved by defining collective interests or by setting a rhetorical trap. A rhetorical trap is set when politicians use shared values and earlier commitments to pressure others into supporting policies they would otherwise oppose. Disagreement is portrayed as a betrayal of these values, making it politically costly to dissent, even when the policy goes against national interests.

The easiest way to force a consensus is to frame every issue as a struggle between good and evil. Once political disagreements become moral questions, those who challenge the consensus can be shamed rather than answered. If every issue is reduced to a choice between freedom and imperialism, it becomes much easier to speak with one voice. The obsession with speaking with one voice makes Europeans vulnerable to Manichean thinking and warmongering policies.

Europeans unite around absurd slogans such as “Putin is Hitler” and “Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union”. These slogans do not help us understand Russia or develop sensible policies to mitigate the security competition. Their purpose is to establish moral clarity and enforce political conformity. Challenging these slogans with well-documented arguments is considered immoral and a threat to European unity. This rhetorical trap is extremely dangerous because, in a struggle between good and evil, we reach the conclusion that diplomacy is appeasement and weapons are the path to peace.

The End of Debate

Consider the debate about European security after the Cold War. We once recognised the principle of indivisible security, which means that one state should not strengthen its security at the expense of others. Discussions about security entailed balancing deterrence with reassurance. These principles have largely disappeared from European political discourse. It is now only about deterrence. It is heresy to contest the notion that NATO is a “force for good”, and all concerns about NATO expansionism are framed as opposition to democracy and freedom. How can we resolve a security competition if we are not even allowed to discuss its causes?

Instead, European leaders increasingly measure the success of their policies by their moral intentions rather than their consequences. Sanctions are presented as a demonstration of resolve, the willingness to fight a war as an expression of solidarity, and refusing diplomacy as standing firm against aggression. But what happens when these policies fail to produce the intended results? The answer is usually more sanctions, more war, and less diplomacy. The policies themselves cannot be questioned without appearing to undermine the moral foundations of European unity.

Weaponising Solidarity

The demand for solidarity is also weaponised to override reason. WikiLeaks exposed how Norwegian officials had initially expressed serious concerns that US strategic missile defence would disrupt the nuclear balance with Russia and destabilise the world. The US ambassador reported to Washington that the Norwegians could be persuaded to change their position, not through arguments, but by emphasising the need for NATO solidarity. If the Norwegians were presented with a choice between “repeating Russian narratives” and defending NATO solidarity, they would fall in line.

Later, the American ambassador sent another cable to Washington confirming that their work with NGOs, think tanks, journalists, and politicians had delivered the message, and that the Norwegians were abandoning their security concerns. This was not the result of arguments, but of pressure to show solidarity in a world where everything is framed in black-and-white terms. Since then, the nuclear arms control architecture has largely collapsed, and the world faces a dangerous future – but the political class takes comfort in the fact that it was all done in solidarity.

This is a dangerous way to organise European security. If solidarity means that countries must abandon their own security assessments to support a common position, then solidarity itself becomes a source of insecurity. The purpose of cooperation should be to reconcile different interests and develop better policies, not to pressure governments into repeating the same empty arguments.

Speaking with One Voice or Correcting Course?

A strong Europe should be able to tolerate disagreements among its members. Indeed, such disagreements are necessary if Europe is to correct mistaken policies. When dissent is treated as disloyalty, political mistakes become almost impossible to reverse. Leaders become prisoners of their own rhetoric.

Norway and Finland should therefore not be criticised for challenging the European consensus on diplomatic isolation. They should be encouraged. Europe needs countries willing to question policies that have become resistant to criticism, especially when those policies concern war and peace.

The current European consensus is sustained by a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes the continent increasingly irrelevant, and risks dragging us into war. I therefore argue for a little less solidarity and a little more common sense.

RT | October 29, 2026

The Pentagon has fired its top military strategist as Washington draws up contingency plans for a possible escalation of hostilities with Iran.

Army Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia has been removed from his position as director for strategy, plans, and policy (J5) on the Joint Staff, a spokesman confirmed late Wednesday, following media reports of his dismissal.

His predecessor, Lt. Gen. Joseph McGee, was forced into retirement a year ago amid reported friction with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine. Sylvia previously served as vice director of the J5.

The Pentagon did not explain Sylvia’s departure. His responsibilities included developing military strategies and plans to advise the chairman and the US president. He joins nearly two dozen senior military and civilian officials removed during Hegseth’s tenure.

The secretary has portrayed the dismissals as part of an effort to reduce the military’s bloated ranks of generals and make the armed forces more efficient and lethal. Critics, however, have characterized the shake-up as an ideological “purge.”

President Donald Trump has repeatedly raised the possibility of renewing large-scale hostilities with Iran, including resuming the intensive bombing campaign conducted during the first 40 days of the conflict, which the US and Israel launched in late February. A potential escalation could be timed around the November midterm elections.

Military experts have widely expressed concern that another bombing campaign would fail to “finish the job,” as Trump has put it, while further increasing the conflict’s economic toll worldwide. Tehran has repeatedly warned that it is prepared to retaliate against US allies in the Gulf region if it faces renewed attacks.

Conversely, speculation has emerged that Trump could dismiss Hegseth after the midterms, when the opposition Democratic Party is expected to make gains in both chambers of Congress. Critics of the Iran war, including Republican Rep. Thomas Massie, have argued that firing the secretary could help Trump avoid a potential impeachment battle if Democrats take control of the House.

Trump’s public rhetoric remains supportive of Hegseth and his policies.

Il Consiglio europeo del 15-16 ottobre ha reso evidente la nuova realtà finanziaria della guerra: mentre Washington riduce progressivamente il proprio impegno, Kiev presenta all’Europa un fabbisogno aggiuntivo di circa 70 miliardi di euro per il solo 2027.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Il Consiglio europeo del 15 e 16 ottobre ha avuto il merito, forse involontario, di rendere esplicita una questione che da mesi aleggiava sul futuro del conflitto ucraino: chi continuerà a pagare la guerra se gli Stati Uniti ridurranno ulteriormente il proprio coinvolgimento? La risposta che emerge da Bruxelles è sempre più chiaramente «l’Europa». Ma tra l’affermazione politica secondo cui l’Unione Europea sarebbe pronta a prendere il posto di Washington e la capacità effettiva di farlo esiste una distanza considerevole, che riguarda non soltanto il denaro, ma anche la struttura stessa della potenza europea.

Intervenendo al vertice, Volodymyr Zelens’kyj ha quantificato in 155 miliardi di euro il costo complessivo della guerra per l’Ucraina nel 2027, chiedendo ai partner europei di trovare almeno altri 70 miliardi «per la difesa, per le armi e per la nostra resilienza». Ursula von der Leyen ha successivamente confermato l’esistenza di un divario finanziario dell’ordine di 70 miliardi, precisando che il fabbisogno per il 2026 è invece coperto.

Si tratta di una richiesta che arriva quando l’Unione Europea sta ancora implementando il gigantesco prestito da 90 miliardi di euro destinato all’Ucraina per il biennio 2026-2027, deciso dal Consiglio europeo nel dicembre 2025 e successivamente tradotto nel relativo quadro legislativo. Di questa cifra, 30 miliardi sono destinati al sostegno macroeconomico e al bilancio dello Stato ucraino, mentre ben 60 miliardi sono riservati alle esigenze militari e allo sviluppo e approvvigionamento delle capacità dell’industria della difesa. Il finanziamento avviene attraverso emissioni di debito dell’Unione sui mercati, garantite dal bilancio europeo, mentre il rimborso da parte ucraina dovrebbe avvenire solo una volta ottenute eventuali riparazioni dalla Russia (ovvero mai).

Il problema è che una somma che alla fine del 2025 appariva enorme si è rivelata insufficiente meno di un anno dopo. Le conclusioni ufficiali del Consiglio europeo del 16 ottobre si limitano a constatare che sono state individuate le risorse necessarie per coprire le esigenze di bilancio e difesa dell’Ucraina nel 2026 e rinviano a una nuova valutazione della Commissione Europea e del Fondo Monetario Internazionale per gli anni successivi. Ma il linguaggio diplomatico non nasconde la sostanza: per continuare la guerra, Bruxelles deve trovare un’altra ingente quantità di denaro, e deve farlo rapidamente.

Già alla vigilia del vertice, il commissario europeo per l’Economia e la Produttività Valdis Dombrovskis aveva spiegato che l’Unione dispone di circa 45 miliardi di euro già previsti per il 2027, ma che la somma non sarebbe sufficiente. Bruxelles punta a coprire approssimativamente due terzi del fabbisogno ucraino, lasciando il restante terzo ad altri partner quali Regno Unito, Norvegia, Canada, Giappone e Svizzera. La stessa Commissione sta valutando di anticipare parte dei fondi già programmati per guadagnare tempo in attesa che altri governi mettano sul tavolo nuove risorse.

Nonostante il possibile contributo di partner esterni all’UE, il cambiamento rispetto ai primi anni del conflitto è comunque notevole. Secondo i dati dello Ukraine Support Tracker dell’Istituto di Kiel, l’Europa ha ormai superato gli Stati Uniti nel volume complessivo degli aiuti militari assegnati all’Ucraina e nel 2025 ha aumentato sensibilmente il proprio contributo nel tentativo di compensare la drastica riduzione delle nuove allocazioni statunitensi. Nel primo semestre del 2026, inoltre, le istituzioni europee hanno ulteriormente incrementato gli stanziamenti attraverso il nuovo prestito da 90 miliardi.

Le istituzioni dell’UE stimano ormai in oltre 220 miliardi di euro il sostegno complessivamente mobilitato dall’Unione e dai suoi Stati membri dall’inizio della guerra, comprendendo aiuti finanziari, economici, militari, umanitari e sostegno ai rifugiati. Una cifra che dimostra come l’Europa sia già diventata il principale finanziatore dell’Ucraina in termini aggregati.

Allo stesso tempo, analizzando i dati emerge una palese contraddizione. Lo stesso Istituto di Kiel rileva che circa il 30% degli acquisti effettuati dai Paesi europei per sostenere militarmente l’Ucraina nella prima metà del 2026 proveniva dall’industria statunitense. Nel meccanismo NATO PURL, destinato a soddisfare le esigenze prioritarie ucraine, oltre il 90% degli armamenti provenienti da scorte esistenti era di origine nordamericana. Lo Ukraine Support Tracker ha sintetizzato il problema sottolineando come l’Europa continui a dipendere dall’accesso ai sistemi d’arma statunitensi, mettendo a nudo le vulnerabilità sia economiche che militati di Bruxelles.

Il problema riguarda soprattutto quelle capacità che non possono essere semplicemente sostituite aumentando uno stanziamento di bilancio: intercettori Patriot, intelligence satellitare, allarme precoce contro i missili balistici, comunicazioni militari satellitari, manutenzione e munizionamento per piattaforme di origine statunitense. Anche gli F-16 forniti da Paesi europei continuano a dipendere in misura significativa da componenti, armamenti e assistenza tecnica nordamericani.

Allo stesso tempo, il progressivo disimpegno dell’amministrazione Trump pone l’UE davanti al problema strategico che per anni è stato rimandato. Gli Stati Uniti, infatti, possono diminuire i trasferimenti finanziari e militari diretti verso Kiev sapendo di possedere comunque alcune delle capacità tecnologiche decisive dalle quali gli alleati continuano a dipendere; l’UE, invece, può aumentare la quantità di denaro impegnata senza acquisire automaticamente la capacità di sostituire Washington nelle funzioni più sofisticate della guerra.

Gli sviluppi delle ultime settimane rendono tale vulnerabilità ancora più evidente. I rapporti tra Donald Trump e Volodymyr Zelens’kyj si sono ulteriormente deteriorati, mentre Washington ha drasticamente ridotto le forniture dirette di armi e ha dato segnali di voler utilizzare alcuni strumenti di sostegno – dall’intelligence ai sistemi satellitari e alle forniture militari – come leve nelle trattative con Kiev e Mosca. Gli Stati Uniti non sono scomparsi dal conflitto, ma il loro ruolo sta cambiando: sempre meno finanziatore incondizionato dell’Ucraina e sempre più potenza esterna che conserva gli strumenti indispensabili per condizionarne le scelte.

A Bruxelles, nel frattempo, rimane soprattutto un salato conto da pagare.

Anche sotto il profilo puramente finanziario, tuttavia, il passaggio di consegne è tutt’altro che semplice. Il prestito europeo da 90 miliardi è stato possibile attraverso un nuovo ricorso al debito comune garantito dal bilancio dell’UE. Il primo ministro estone Kristen Michal ha già indicato apertamente che un nuovo prestito europeo appare la soluzione più probabile per coprire il fabbisogno aggiuntivo del 2027. Ma già il precedente pacchetto era stato approvato tramite cooperazione rafforzata, con la partecipazione di 24 Stati membri e l’esclusione dagli obblighi finanziari di Repubblica Ceca, Ungheria e Slovacchia.

In altre parole, persino il consenso sul finanziamento dell’Ucraina è meno uniforme di quanto suggerisca il linguaggio delle dichiarazioni finali.

A questa divisione politica se ne aggiunge una economica. L’Europa si trova contemporaneamente ad affrontare bassa crescita, elevato indebitamento pubblico, costi energetici ancora pesanti per famiglie e industria, aumento delle spese per la difesa e pressioni derivanti dall’invecchiamento della popolazione. Il Fondo Monetario Internazionale prevede una crescita dell’Eurozona di appena l’1,2% nel 2027 e segnala che il debito pubblico medio potrebbe passare dall’88,7% del PIL nel 2025 al 91,2% nel 2027. Alla luce di questi dati, lo stesso FMI chiede a gran parte dei governi europei nuovi sforzi di consolidamento fiscale.

Nasce così una contraddizione politica difficilmente sostenibile all’infinito. Agli Stati membri viene chiesto contemporaneamente di rispettare le regole fiscali, aumentare drasticamente la propria spesa militare, finanziare la transizione energetica e industriale, proteggere sistemi sociali sottoposti a crescente pressione e trovare decine di miliardi aggiuntivi ogni anno per sostenere lo Stato ucraino.

La risposta delle istituzioni europee è che il costo del mancato sostegno a Kiev sarebbe superiore a quello dell’assistenza: una vittoria russa renderebbe l’Europa meno sicura e imporrebbe spese militari ancora maggiori nel lungo periodo. È l’argomento fondamentale utilizzato per giustificare il trasferimento progressivo dell’onere finanziario dagli Stati Uniti al continente europeo. Ma proprio perché tale impegno viene ormai presentato come strutturale e potenzialmente pluriennale, il problema del consenso pubblico diventa inevitabile.

Le tensioni politiche sono già visibili: in Francia, Marine Le Pen ha messo in discussione la possibilità di continuare ad aumentare indefinitamente il contributo francese ai programmi europei per l’Ucraina; in Ungheria e Slovacchia, la resistenza a nuovi impegni è ormai consolidata. E il 2027 sarà un anno elettorale particolarmente delicato in diversi Paesi europei, circostanza che spiega perché alcuni governi vogliano chiudere un nuovo accordo finanziario prima che il tema finisca al centro delle campagne elettorali.

Alla luce delle considerazioni emerse, la domanda, dunque, non è più soltanto chi pagherà per l’Ucraina nel 2027. È fino a quando l’Europa e gli europei saranno disposta a pagare, quanto di quel costo verrà trasferito sui bilanci e sui contribuenti degli Stati membri e quale sarà il prezzo politico di una strategia nella quale Washington conserva buona parte del potere decisionale mentre Bruxelles assume una porzione sempre maggiore degli oneri economici.

By Jack Hunter | The American Conservative | October 28, 2026

Donald Trump and his coalition have rocked the Republican party more than any other right-wing movement this century.

So much so that some Republicans now long for the party as it was before MAGA, the ostensibly “traditional” pre-Trump GOP.

Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) is one of them. The senator, who decided not to run for re-election this year, is promoting a new book that presents himself as, if not a Never Trumper, then at any rate a dissident from MAGA. “What [Trump’s] done is he’s created a coalition that, in my opinion, will not stay with Republicans once we go back to traditional Republican platform priorities,” Tillis said of the GOP’s future in an interview last week. “I think a lot of the elements of the populism that Trump created to expand a base that made him successful running for president, I don’t think that stays with the party long term.”

On X, The Blaze’s Auron MacIntyre shared a clip of Tillis saying this and added, “They’re admitting out loud that they’re running out the clock on Trump so they can return the GOP to factory neocon settings.”

MacIntyre is not wrong.

Another figure who longs for the GOP before Trump is Rahm Emanuel, the former chief of staff to President Obama who is currently making a bid for the 2028 Democratic nomination. He wants Democrats to embrace what he calls “McCain-Romney Republicans” who now vote Democrat.

“The top story from the 2026 cycle will be the electoral opening Democrats seized—and will have to maintain,” Emanuel wrote for the Wall Street Journal last Wednesday. “Most important, the McCain-Romney Republicans, who are politically homeless, need to be welcomed into Democrats’ governing and electoral coalition.”

Emanuel urged his fellow Democrats to make common cause with these kinds of centrist Republicans, and to avoid embracing the hard-left socialist Democratic candidates who are faring well at the moment.

“Millions of McCain-Romney voters are redefining their political identities, and they will be most responsible for Democratic gains in November,” Emanuel explained. “These voters don’t want to be associated with MAGA, and they see themselves as free agents.”

It’s true that many Republican voters who might go for Democrats this election don’t want to be associated with MAGA. But they might not want to revert to the supposed good ol’ days of John McCain, Mitt Romney and George W. Bush either.

President Ronald Reagan’s former Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman shared Emanuel’s op-ed and added, “McCain-Romney neocon warmongering GOP campaign loot collectors from the MIC (military-industrial complex)? You are barking up the wrong tree, Rahm.”

Stockman is on point.

Tillis and Emanuel are both right that voters, and especially Republicans, are mad at Trump and his party, and most predict this anger will be on full display in the upcoming election.

But both are wrong to dismiss populism. The establishmentarian politics that Tillis and Emanuel represent within their respective parties is what so many voters were rejecting when they embraced the current “Drain the Swamp” president.

Populism is not only not the problem, it’s not likely to be going anywhere. The upcoming midterm elections won’t mark some return to party-elite form, but another populist revolt against the apparently insincere populism Americans voted for two years ago.

This isn’t rocket science: Trump’s coalition is mad because the erstwhile “no new wars” president who promised to put America first and keep prices low instead started a brand new war at the behest of Israel and the expense of working-class Americans. The Republican establishment was also on board with the war—until recently, when even a few historically hawkish candidates in tight races have started saying it should end.

On the Iran War, the issue that seems to be defining Trump’s second term the most, this president has delivered what the neocon favorite Mitt Romney seemed to promise as the 2012 Republican presidential nominee, and what the 2008 GOP nominee and neocon favorite John McCain campaigned on. Trump is now compared to that most “traditional” of 21st century Republicans, George W. Bush. The former president’s brother, Jeb Bush, has praised Trump for starting a war with Iran. Marc Thiessen, an alumnus of the George W. Bush White House, is a big fan of Trump and his war. And the neoconservative pundits Mark Levin and Ben Shapiro now praise Trump for having a foreign policy that looks a lot like what was on offer from McCain and Romney.

On the other side of the aisle, many of the Democrats challenging Republicans in seats once thought safe are finding success with populist campaigns that focus on combatting rising prices, opposing the overwhelmingly unpopular war, and, perhaps most amusingly, putting America First. Abdul el-Sayed, the Democrat who is running against “traditional” Republican Mike Rogers for Senate in Michigan, has regularly appeared on Fox News and constantly pitches to (former?) MAGA voters.

It’s worth noting that there was a Republican party before Trump, under whose banners Tillis was first elected to the Senate in 2014. This is how POLITICO reported Tillis’s victory in the GOP primary for that seat: “Tillis Beats Tea Party in N.C.: The GOP establishment scored a victory Tuesday when its preferred candidate soundly defeated a pair of grass-roots insurgents in a North Carolina primary.” One of those insurgents was Greg Brannon, who had the endorsement of the Tea Party Republican and war skeptic Rand Paul. (Paul, of course, won his own Senate seat in 2010 by running against the pre-Trump, pro-war neoconservative-marinated Republican brass.)

There was a Republican uprising against the party’s establishment well before Trump burst on the scene, and Tillis was definitely not part of it.

In fact, there was much dissent and intra-party challenging of Republican elites in those post-Bush years. Obama’s 2008 victory was largely a rejection of the old GOP and its wars, which McCain fully embraced, and Romney’s 2012 loss was due in no small part to Americans not wanting another extension of Bush-Cheney.

The “traditional” McCain-Romney Republicans haven’t been popular enough to win a presidential election since Bush in 2004, and the first Republican to do so won by calling Dubya a liar and his war in Iraq a “big, fat mistake.”

Now Trump is making his own mistake in Iran, and many of his 2024 voters appear eager to correct their mistake this year. Not because they yearn for a return to the Republican party as it was before him, but because Donald Trump promised to beat that party and dispose of it—and has failed.

Jack Hunter is the former political editor of Rare.us. Jack has written regularly for the Washington Examiner, The Daily Caller, Spectator USA, Responsible Statecraft and has appeared in Politico Magazine and The Daily Beast. Hunter is the co-author of the The Tea Party Goes to Washington by Sen. Rand Paul.