LAHORE is choking again, and the government’s answer is to send more machines onto its streets. On Wednesday, its air quality index reached 296, putting children, outdoor workers, and the elderly at particular risk.
Yet Punjab plans to acquire 30 more truck-mounted fog cannons. These can suppress road dust locally, but their ability to reduce the fine particles most harmful to health remains questionable. Authorities must explain what the existing fleet has achieved in terms of measurable pollution reduction before spending more public money.
Last year, disruptions to Punjab’s air monitoring network raised suspicions that pollution levels were being hidden; officials cited technical faults. Whether equipment is recording pollution or spraying water, public confidence depends on transparent data and independent scrutiny. A temporary improvement at a pollution hotspot, or near a monitoring station, cannot prove that the city’s air is becoming safer.
Monitoring should expose pollution. Punjab must publish continuous readings and independent assessments of its interventions. It should also fund research into the relative contributions of traffic, industry, construction, and crop burning, how these change with the seasons, and which measures actually reduce exposure.
That scientific effort must extend beyond the border. Punjab officials say easterly winds have been bringing polluted air from India into Lahore. But this does not absolve Pakistan of responsibility for its own emissions. The air over the two Punjabs is shared, and both populations suffer when political hostility obstructs cooperation.
Calls for joint action are not new. Cooperation was proposed with Indian Punjab in 2017 and 2024. Yet neither initiative led to sustained cooperation. Environmental diplomacy with New Delhi should be prioritised, despite wider tensions. Both sides could begin by exchanging verified air-quality and weather data, jointly studying the movement of pollutants and developing common approaches to agricultural burning and industrial emissions. Universities and scientific institutions could help build a shared evidence base.
At home, dedicated research funding, stronger monitoring, and open evaluation of anti-smog spending are essential. Enforcement must continue, but decisions should follow evidence, not the visibility of machinery on city roads. Until the air itself improves, no amount of official activity can be called progress.
PESHAWAR: An inquiry into the recent deadly collapse of a school roof here has held the owner responsible for using substandard construction material.
It also pointed out negligence on the part of the relevant departments.
The inquiry report was presented to Governor Faisal Karim Kundi during a meeting chaired by him here, according to an official statement issued by his office.
The meeting was attended by adviser to the governor Dr Amir Abdullah, chief secretary Dr Fakhar Alam Irfan, education secretary Inayatullah Waseem and members of the inquiry committee.
At least 30 children and a schoolteacher were killed and dozens of others injured when the roof of a multi-storey private school collapsed in the Dir Colony area.
Rescue officials said that the ceiling of a classroom collapsed onto students after the roof of the floor above gave way, causing the two storeys to crumble.
The governor later ordered an inquiry into the incident.
On Wednesday, the inquiry committee held the school owner responsible for using substandard construction material.
The meeting, chaired by the governor, was also briefed about negligence by the relevant departments.
Mr Kundi received a detailed briefing on the causes of the incident, statements of the relevant officials, the responsibilities of various departments, the inquiry committee’s findings and its recommendations.
The governor directed authorities to examine the legal aspects of the report in consultation with the law department.
He said that strict action should be taken against those responsible for the school collapse.
KARACHI: Two young sisters were allegedly shot dead by their brother over their use of social media in Drigh Road, within the jurisdiction of Shah Faisal Colony police, on Wednesday, police said.
Korangi SSP Fida Husain Janwari told Dawn that Sobia, 25, and Hira, 20, were gunned down inside their home in New Rehmanabad by their brother, Rehan.
The senior officer said the initial investigation suggested that the suspect had warned his sisters against using TikTok, which appeared to be a possible motive behind the double murder.
He said the suspect had fled the crime scene and efforts were on to ensure his arrest.
The SSP added that the alleged killer had a criminal record and had been arrested multiple times and sent to jail in connection with criminal cases.
The bodies were shifted to the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre (JPMC) for medico-legal formalities.
Firing on under-construction building leaves watchman dead
A watchman was gunned down and two labourers were wounded in an armed attack on an under-construction building in the Garden area.
The Soldier Bazaar police said two armed men riding a motorcycle resorted to indiscriminate firing on the under-construction Jumani Square located on Nishter Road near Alibhai Auditorium. As a result, three persons sustained critical injuries and were taken to the Civil Hospital Karachi where Aslam, 30, was pronounced dead on arrival.
The police said the victim was watchman of the building. The injured labourers were identified as Shahid Ali, 25, and Shakir Ali, 28.
The police in a statement said the incident appeared to be related to extortion.
RUSSIA’S growing engagement with Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers is reshaping the regional diplomatic landscape. For Pakistan, which has historically maintained close links with Afghan political and religious networks, the development presents both a challenge and an opportunity.
The question is not whether Moscow will replace Islamabad as Kabul’s principal interlocutor, but whether Russia’s expanding diplomatic, security and economic engagement will give the Taliban greater room to manoeuvre in their dealings with Pakistan.
Russia’s approach towards the Taliban has been gradually shaping up. In July 2025, Moscow became the first country to recognise the Taliban government formally. Earlier, it announced the removal of the Taliban from its list of prohibited terrorist organisations in April that year. In May 2026, Russian officials announced plans to establish a “full-fledged partnership” with Kabul, encompassing security, trade, cultural exchanges, and humanitarian cooperation. That same month, a military-technical cooperation arrangement further underscored the deepening relationship. Moscow, therefore, has been moving beyond limited diplomatic engagement towards a more sustained relationship with the Taliban authorities. Multiple factors may be shaping Moscow’s approach toward the Taliban.
First, Moscow remains concerned about the spread of militant violence into Central Asia, narcotics trafficking, and the activities of Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K). The deadly 2024 attack near Moscow reinforced Russian concerns about transnational extremist networks.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, dealing with the Taliban is a pragmatic necessity — whatever its reservations about the nature of their government, the Taliban exercise effective control over Afghanistan’s state institutions and security apparatus.
In parallel, Russia seeks to preserve its influence in Eurasia and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a source of instability that could invite renewed intervention by external powers. Economic cooperation, including potential opportunities in energy, transport, agriculture, and infrastructure, adds another dimension to this policy. Moscow’s outreach should, therefore, be understood as an effort to protect its own interests and expand its regional options.
Russia’s close ties with Kabul won’t automatically ensure action against anti-Pakistan terrorists.
Second, Russia’s recognition of the Taliban has important implications for Pakistan’s diplomatic leverage. For years, Islamabad’s geographical proximity, economic connections, and historical links with the Taliban gave it considerable access to Kabul. Russian recognition gives Kabul an additional source of international legitimacy. Its expanding relations with Moscow also offer the Taliban another channel for diplomatic engagement, security cooperation, and economic opportunity. The more external partners Kabul acquires, the less dependent it may feel on Islamabad for diplomatic access and international engagement.
This does not mean that Pakistan’s influence will disappear. Geography, cross-border commerce, people-to-people links, and the management of shared security concerns remain important. However, these factors do not automatically translate into political compliance. Pakistan’s leverage will increasingly depend on whether it can demonstrate the mutual benefits of cooperation rather than rely on historical relationships or geographical realities alone.
Third, Russia’s approach to the TTP will be the most consequential test. Islamabad’s central security concern is that terrorist groups operating from Afghan territory threaten Pakistan’s citizens and security personnel. The Taliban authorities’ generalised statement is that Afghan territory will not be used against other countries, but they are reluctant to specifically say that Afghan territory will not be allowed to be used against Pakistan.
Moscow’s priorities, however, do not match Pakistan’s. Russia’s immediate security concerns centre particularly on IS-K and the threat of extremist violence spreading into Central Asia and Russia itself. Although the Taliban also oppose IS-K, this convergence does not necessarily mean Moscow will place Pakistan’s concerns about the TTP at the centre of its Afghan policy.
Pakistan should, therefore, avoid assuming that Russia’s close relations with Kabul will automatically produce action against anti-Pakistan terrorists. Russian influence could provide an additional diplomatic channel, but its effectiveness will depend on Moscow’s willingness to address the TTP issue and the Taliban leadership’s readiness to respond.
Fourth, Russia’s interest in regional stability gives it a potential role in facilitating dialogue, reducing tensions and encouraging practical cooperation. Pakistan should welcome constructive Russian involvement without outsourcing its Afghan policy to Moscow.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation could provide a useful multilateral framework. Pakistan, Russia, China, and the Central Asian states share an interest in preventing Afghanistan from becoming a base for transnational terrorism. Coordinated intelligence exchanges, border-security cooperation, counter-narcotics measures, and structured consultations with Kabul could help establish a regional approach. Such cooperation would be more sustainable than expecting any single country to exercise decisive influence over the Taliban.
Fifth, Pakistan needs to adapt its Afghan policy to a more competitive diplomatic environment. Islamabad should deepen engagement with Russia while maintaining direct communication with the Taliban leadership. It should also coordinate with China, the Central Asian republics, and other relevant regional actors to develop a common understanding of the threats emanating from Afghanistan.
At the bilateral level, Pakistan has to involve the Taliban in a meaningful dialogue and create a workable environment that builds the Taliban regime’s stake in the mutual benefits of the two countries. This could include arrangements to exchange information on terrorist networks, investigate cross-border incidents, prevent attacks, and maintain communication between security officials. Economic cooperation and the facilitation of legitimate trade should accompany these measures, giving both sides practical incentives to reduce tensions.
Diplomatically, Russia’s Afghan outreach is thus neither an inevitable strategic setback for Pakistan nor a guarantee of improved regional security. It is a development that reflects the Taliban’s efforts to widen their international options and Moscow’s decision to protect its own interests. Whether this produces greater stability or further competition will depend on how regional states use their expanding diplomatic channels.
Pakistan will have to carefully observe that Russia’s engagement helps address the region’s shared security concerns. Islamabad’s influence over Kabul will ultimately depend less on who has the closest relationship with the Taliban and more on who can help produce practical results: a secure border, action against militant violence, functioning trade routes and a stable regional environment.
The writer is a former special representative of Pakistan for Afghanistan. He served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the UAE and Iran.
LAST month, I argued in this space that Iran is emerging as a big regional power to our west. The question I left hanging was whether it would use its newfound centrality to avenge the past or to build a future. Last week offered the first real glimpse of an answer.
On Oct 26, Saudi Arabia’s defence minister, Pakistan’s defence chief, and Turkiye’s intelligence chief sat down in Tehran with Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The joint statement that followed was thin, pledging only continued dialogue on regional peace and security. But the significance of the Tehran huddle lies less in what was said than in the fact that it happened at all, and where.
Consider who came. The three visitors are the signatories of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed in August, a pact many read as a hedge against precisely the kind of Iran I described last month. Saudi Arabia was struck repeatedly by Iran during the war, hosted American forces that attacked Iran, and is under fire from the Houthis even now. Yet, the Saudi defence minister led the delegation, and they travelled to Tehran. Not Riyadh, Ankara or Islamabad, nor a neutral venue like Doha or Muscat.
When three of the region’s largest military powers, one of them nuclear-armed, come to your capital to talk about regional security, they are acknowledging that no regional security arrangement is possible without you, and that the road to one runs through your door. For a country that spent four decades behind a wall of sanctions and was treated as a problem to be contained rather than a party to be consulted, this is a milestone.
The significance of the Tehran huddle lies less in what was said than in the fact that it happened at all, and where.
It also happened in the teeth of American pressure. Washington was openly weighing a fresh round of strikes, US forces were reportedly ready to move within 96 hours of an order, and a naval blockade was choking Iran’s southern ports. The region’s middle powers came anyway, having concluded that Iran would still be standing after this war and that they need a working relationship with it whatever Washington decided.
The second thing worth noticing is what Iran chose to emphasise. Rezaei told state television that Tehran and its three guests had agreed that the region’s security is to be achieved through the countries of the region. A senior Pakistani security official told Reuters the meeting’s primary aim was a regional mechanism to prevent military attacks between them. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said for months that Tehran will welcome any regional security arrangement that excludes foreign forces.
Put these together and the outline of the order Iran wants comes into view. It rests on three pillars: non-aggression among the states of the region, an alignment of their interests, and the exit of outside powers, above all America, from the business of guaranteeing Gulf security.
This is a window into the kind of power Iran wants to project. Last month, I worried that once the Americans were gone, the Iranian military machine would turn its gaze to the riches of the Gulf monarchs and present bill after bill. That risk has not gone away. But the posture on display in Tehran was not that of a power seeking to dominate its neighbours by force. It was that of a power seeking to become the indispensable centre of a regional system it helps design.
The China analogy is instructive here too. In 1954, with Beijing still shunned by much of the world, Zhou Enlai put forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in negotiations with India. Mutual non-aggression sat at their heart, alongside non-interference in internal affairs. Non-aggression is the language of a power confident of its own weight, which wants its neighbours to accommodate it rather than fear it.
There is hard strategic logic beneath the soft language. A non-aggression architecture without foreign forces is the one in which Iran’s advantages count most. Take American bases and carriers out of the Gulf, and Iran’s hold over Hormuz, its missile arsenal, and its network of allies make it the pre-eminent power on the Gulf littoral by default. In that setting, a non-aggression pact is not a concession but a way of having one’s pre-eminence ratified by one’s neighbours.
Nor did the idea originate in Tehran. In May, Saudi Arabia itself floated a non-aggression pact between Iran and the states of the region, reportedly modelled on the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Iran is now taking an idea its rivals put on the table and making it the organising principle of an order with itself at the centre. That, too, is what emerging powers do.
None of this is settled. The factional contest I described last month is playing out in plain sight. The hard-line daily Kayhan treated oil above $115 a barrel as proof that pressure on shipping works better than diplomacy, while moderate papers warn of a wave of bankruptcies in Isfahan, Tabriz, and Arak as the blockade bites. Which camp prevails will decide whether the language of non-aggression is here to stay.
Pakistan has a particular stake in all this. An Iran that seeks pre-eminence through a regional architecture is a neighbour Pakistan can work with, and help shape from the inside. An Iran that seeks it through reparations, tolls, and coercion would place us in an impossible position between our western neighbour and the Gulf states on which so much of our economy depends.
The huddle does not answer last month’s question. But it shows that the option of building a future is on the table, in Iran’s own words, and that its neighbours are prepared to engage on those terms. That is a milestone. Whether it becomes a trajectory depends on whether the voices in Tehran speaking the language of non-aggression win the argument at home, and whether Washington, after its elections on Nov 3, lets them.
WASHINGTON: Global commodity prices are set to surge 23 per cent in 2026, the World Bank said on Wednesday, citing rising energy prices and disruptions to cargo shipping during the Middle East war, grain shipment problems in the Black Sea and high demand for safe-haven assets such as gold.
Oil, natural gas, food and metals prices all rose sharply this year as global shocks mounted, the World Bank said in its latest Commodity Markets Outlook. It said the situation could worsen if the conflict in the Middle East ratcheted up and damage to Russian oil infrastructure continued.
Commodity prices were expected to ease by 7pc next year, it said, but continued shocks — including forecasts for the worst El Nino weather effect since 1950 — could keep food commodity prices elevated, raising the spectre of higher inflation and tighter monetary policy.
The global economy was more vulnerable to future supply shocks at the moment. Global oil stocks have been depleted during the war in the Middle East, and global oil supply is expected to drop 5.2% in 2026, the biggest drop in four decades outside the 2020 global recession, the bank said.
Energy up 32pc, metals 25pc, gold 40pc in 2026; food prices face El Nino threat
“Commodity markets are being hit by several major shocks at once,” said Ayhan Kose, the World Bank’s deputy chief economist. “Higher energy costs and trade disruptions are driving up prices across a broad range of commodities, threatening to worsen inflation, food insecurity, and economic growth.” The bank released its twice-yearly report on Wednesday, two days before foreign ministers from the world’s 20 largest economies are due to gather in Atlanta, Georgia for a meeting that will focus on the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine.
Kose said the World Bank was focused on protecting the world’s poorest people and supporting low-income countries already grappling with heavy debt burdens.
The bank had already provided $8.7 billion in low-cost loans and other aid to 25 countries affected negatively by the war in the Middle East, the report said. This included 10 countries that retooled existing programs to cover crisis-related expenses, and 19 that had tapped new resources, with some using both.
The report, released twice a year, said global energy prices surged 32pc in 2026, reaching their highest level since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
With oil output down, Brent oil prices were expected to remain elevated in the near term, averaging $92 per barrel for the year. Prices would be even higher if oil demand were not forecast to drop 2.5pc this year, the third-largest drop behind the 2020 Covid shock and the 1980 oil crisis.
It said food commodity prices were set to rise just over 10pc in 2026 due to grain shipment disruptions caused by hostilities between Russia and Ukraine in the Black Sea, and another 7pc plus in 2027, for a cumulative increase of nearly 18pc.
An adverse scenario that coupled a record El Nino, more Black Sea grain shipment disruptions, escalation in the Middle East conflict and ongoing damage to Russian oil infrastructure could drive food prices 12pc higher than expected, it said. That could trigger a food crisis like the one seen in the early 2010s, when more than 40 million additional people were pushed into extreme poverty, the bank noted.
Fertiliser prices were expected to rise 14pc in 2026 due to a surge in urea prices, then return to 2025 levels in 2027.
Metals prices were projected to rise 25pc and hit a new high in 2026, with aluminium, copper and tin all setting new records as a result of supply disruptions and strong demand from investments in renewable energy, electric vehicles and data centres, the bank said.
Precious metals prices were projected to surge by 40pc in 2026, amid elevated demand for safe-haven assets triggered by geopolitical and policy uncertainty, with some moderation seen in 2027.
THE PPP appears quite perturbed over the fact that the creation of new provinces or administrative units continues to be discussed. Speaking at an event in Karachi on Tuesday, PPP chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari asserted that no one outside Sindh could decide its future. “So we should now put a full stop to this conversation as well.”
The Bhutto scion said the people of Sindh and their elected representatives had “given their verdict” on this matter, ostensibly referring to a Sindh Assembly resolution in early September.
Solely on principle, his position cannot be faulted. The Constitution does lay out a clear process for decisions of this sort, and it gives the elected assembly of each affected province a final say on the matter. Of course, there are public representatives from the same province, albeit from other parties, who disagree with the PPP chairperson’s view. However, that disagreement alone cannot be used to override a defined legal process.
Unfortunately, as recent events in KP have shown, the public’s mandate and verdicts delivered through the ballot box can be brushed aside if the centre is sufficiently motivated. For KP, its decisions are now being made not by its elected representatives, but by administrators handpicked by Islamabad.
It can be argued that this is, perhaps, not a fair comparison, but Mr Bhutto-Zardari should still realise that his position may not hold as much force as he thinks it does, and it will, therefore, not be as easy to bury this agenda as he would like. There are many voices within the federal government’s ruling coalition that are actively advocating for the division of all provinces into more ‘manageable’ units.
As was seen in KP, such voices can be amplified to find causa proxima, the trigger for an intervention, if it comes to that. Therefore, a better course of action would be to address governance grievances proactively.
The primary reason for governance failure in Pakistan is not the geographical size of the existing provinces but the reluctance of provincial capitals to empower local bodies. Few can convincingly argue that the local government system, as it exists today, is capable of positive change at the grassroots level.
At the same time, simply creating more provinces will only add heavy, expensive layers of provincial bureaucracy at a time when Pakistan can ill afford them. There are also steep social costs to consider, as pushing forward without public validation could trigger ethnic strife.
Therefore, empowered local bodies remain the best answer to all those issues which seem to warrant a fracturing of the provinces in the eyes of those demanding an administrative restructuring. The decrepit LG system needs to be revitalised, with resources invested in it judiciously. Doing so can improve service delivery at the neighbourhood level in a meaningful way.
• Court upholds FST order reinstating 40 officers linked to 2023 boat capsize off Greece
• Agency argues tribunal overturned sackings on technicalities; three-judge bench directs agency to fulfil requirements of due process
ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court on Wednesday cleared the way for the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to reopen a departmental inquiry against officials allegedly linked to the fatal 2023 Greek migrant boat capsize tragedy.
However, the court rejected the FIA’s appeal against an April 14 Federal Service Tribunal (FST) ruling, upholding the order to reinstate the dismissed FIA officers.
A three-judge Supreme Court bench, headed by Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar, took up appeals moved by the Directorate General Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) challenging the FST order.
Pursuant to the Greece boat tragedy of 2023, FIA had penalised and dismissed 40 officers who were found to have allegedly facilitated the human smuggling of vulnerable individuals.
Around 286 people departed from Libya, of whom 155 were killed when the boat capsized off the coast of Greece.
Representing FIA, Deputy Attorney General Raja Shafqat Abbasi argued that the FST had set aside the dismissal orders merely on technical and procedural lapses, such as the non-compliance of procedure and a lack of opportunity for cross-examination.
He argued that officers posted at the time at the Lahore, Karachi and Multan airports were under a statutory duty under their job descriptions to properly scrutinise tickets, passports, visas and the purpose of the visits to Libya, noting it was a war-torn country rather than a tourist destination.
It was the duty of the officers to apply their minds as to why more than 286 persons were travelling to Libya from different airports of the country, Mr Abbasi said.
The counsel submitted that there was at least gross omission and negligence, amounting to direct facilitation on the part of these officials, which enabled human smugglers to traffic innocent citizens from Pakistan to Libya and onward to Europe via a sea route.
This led to the deaths of 155 Pakistanis and caused serious damage to the image of Pakistan internationally, he added.
Mr Abbasi contended that if there was any procedural lapse in holding the departmental inquiry, the accused officials were not entitled to a “clean chit” of reinstatement in the job.
At most, a fresh opportunity should be given to the FIA to conduct a de novo inquiry after providing a due opportunity for hearing and cross-examination, so that appropriate action may be taken against those found responsible in accordance with the law, the counsel contended.
Concluding the hearing, the Supreme Court referred the matter to the FIA to initiate a fresh inquiry, if they deem it fit, in accordance with the law against the officials for whom evidence was on the record, after giving the officials an opportunity for a hearing.
• Border Health Services vaccination setup abolished; new ministry tender due in a month • Officials arrested for bypassing ministry via parallel procurement committees • Pilgrims asked to arrange jabs thru travel agents
ISLAMABAD: The Ministry of National Health Services has decided to issue a new procurement tender for meningococcal meningitis and influenza vaccines for overseas travellers within a month, following its decision to abolish the existing vaccination setup through Border Health Services (BHS).
The decision follows a high-level inquiry ordered by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif into the BHS. The probe exposed severe flaws and financial irregularities in a previously awarded public-private partnership contract.
Federal Health Minister Mustafa Kamal confirmed that authorities have halted the current vaccination process for religious pilgrims and overseas job seekers. Furthermore, all BHS officials involved in floating the unauthorised tender have been arrested for bypassing ministry oversight.
“I can assure that they will be fixed for keeping the ministry in the dark,” Mr Kamal said. “I am carrying a good reputation and have remained clean throughout my career. So I will not tolerate any attempt to defame me.”
With the BHS system dismantled, the ministry has directed pilgrims to arrange their mandatory vaccinations directly through their travel agents until the ministry’s central procurement committee floats a replacement tender.
The inquiry by the prime minister was triggered by allegations that the new contract inflated vaccination costs to approximately Rs4,500 per pilgrim, up sharply from around Rs1,250 per dose under the previous arrangement.
Meanwhile, seven companies petitioned the Islamabad High Court challenging alleged irregularities in the bidding process.
A five-member inquiry committee chaired by the Cabinet Division secretary examined the legal basis, rationale and approvals for the contract.
The panel included the Intelligence Bureau director general, the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (Drap) chief executive officer, the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority managing director and a representative from the Attorney General’s Office.
Official documents collected by the inquiry committee and reviewed by Dawn reveal that BHS officials created parallel committees to bypass federal oversight.
On May 9, the health ministry established an official six-member procurement committee chaired by BHS Director Dr Mir Muhammad Hassan Builo, alongside a grievance committee led by the federal director general of health.
However, on June 10, BHS unilaterally formed its own procurement committee chaired by Dr Pardeep Kumar and a separate redressal committee led by Dr Shahbaz Ahmed Hashmi, proceeding to float the tender independently.
A senior ministry official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, claimed the health ministry was kept in the dark.
“The major violation was that the PPRA rules were followed for a public-private partnership. In fact, Public Private Partnership Authority rules should have been applied for the tender,” the official explained.
“As per the agreement, the private company had to procure the vaccine, and the amount had to be deposited in a National Database and Registration Authority account. Nadra would then cut its charges and distribute the share between BHS and the private company. The positive thing was that not a single rupee had to be spent from the exchequer.”
The official noted the 1,250-rupee price in 2026 occurred because a company secured cheaper stock. Previously, per-dose charges for meningitis vaccines were Rs2,555 in 2025, Rs2,244 in 2024, Rs2,476 in 2023, and Rs2,550 in 2022. Influenza vaccines cost Rs1,426 in 2025 and Rs1,670 in 2024.
Another official noted the tender will be re-advertised but argued the seven petitioning companies should provide the 1,250-rupee rate they cited.
He noted the vaccine’s maximum retail price is around Rs1,300, but it was historically sold for over Rs2,000. Uncoordinated past procurements triggered the use of fake vaccination certificates, causing trouble for pilgrims and embarrassment for the federal government.
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