Russia has fired more than 925,000 shells at Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast since late 2022 and now sends up to 6,500 drone attacks against it every week. Oleksandr Prokudin, head of the Kherson regional military administration, set out the toll at the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Strasbourg.

Approximately 70% of Kherson Oblast remains under Russian military occupation, primarily across the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River, while Ukrainian forces control and have liberated the right bank, including the regional center of Kherson city.

“Everything except nuclear weapons”: the toll Kherson carried to Strasbourg

Prokudin told European partners that his region has spent nearly five years at the epicenter of the war, a few kilometers from Russian positions.

“It used everything except nuclear weapons. A separate danger is the ‘drone safari,’ today up to 6,500 drone attacks a week. This is deliberate, targeted terror against civilians, children, medics and rescuers. But we stayed, adapted and learned to counter this terror,” Prokudin said.

What nine European countries are now coming to learn

The region has answers that are already keeping 140,000 residents alive, he said: coordination among local authorities, the military, emergency services and volunteers; underground schools and hospitals; the pace of demining in deoccupied areas; and anti-drone defenses that let Ukraine’s forces bring down most of the incoming UAVs.

“We paid an extremely high price for this knowledge. That is why our unique experience of civil-military administration is already being studied by nine European countries, from the Baltics and Scandinavia to Germany and Poland,” he stressed.

His central message, he added, was that a large-scale crisis leaves no time to prepare, and that Europe must ready its communities, energy, medicine and local government, not only its armies, while it still holds the one thing Ukrainians lacked in February 2022, which is time.

“Our pain must gain meaning, and our lessons must save thousands of lives,” Prokudin added.

He thanked the Council of Europe and international partners for their solidarity with the region.

The lesson for NATO is not to abandon armored warfare, but to rethink how it is conducted. That is the argument Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko draws from Operation Vivaldi, the Third Army Corps’ counteroffensive near Lyman, which he says proves tanks still have a place on a battlefield many had already written them off.

Vivaldi is Ukraine's counteroffensive aimed at disrupting Russian forces' plans to encircle the fortress-belt cities in Donetsk Oblast from the north and south that protect the region from the entire occupation. Among them are Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka. These cities have helped hold back Russian forces since 2014.

Kovalenko's claim runs against a view that hardened as drones came to dominate the front: that massed armor is finished, kept alive only by habit.

It matters because NATO’s own recent exercises have fed that view, with small Ukrainian drone teams beating Alliance armor again and again. Kovalenko says the Alliance now risks taking the wrong lesson from its own defeats.

What NATO’s war games got wrong about the tank

Kovalenko points to two drills. At Estonia’s Hedgehog exercises in May 2025, Ukrainian FPV-drone units ran rings around NATO troops, who he says lost vehicles by the dozen and failed one task after another.

In one episode, Ukrainian pilots notionally knocked out a large combat group built around a British brigade.

A year later, during the Aurora 26 exercises on the Swedish island of Gotland, the pattern repeated, and the NATO units, in his telling, in a sense lost control of the island.

The skeptics’ case leaned on exactly these results, Kovalenko says, with many concluding that the Alliance faltered in part because it still fielded large amounts of armor, a tool they believe has lost its relevance in modern warfare.

How the Third Army Corps made armor move again

Vivaldi is the counterexample, Kovalenko argues. During it, the Third Army Corps carried out two mechanized assaults that pushed into the Russian rear, not armor used the old way.

A similar idea appeared in the 2024 Kursk operation, he notes, paired there with intense electronic warfare; Vivaldi widened the package, with deeper reconnaissance and dedicated work against the enemy’s own strike systems.

The vehicles carried extra passive and active protection, and crews trained for the task, and Ukrainian forces moved to suppress Russian surveillance and communications.

None of these ingredients is new on its own, he says. What mattered was adapting the working formulas to attack a heavily outnumbered enemy.

“Ukrainian forces are showing that even what seems at first glance to be a battlefield anachronism can be adapted and given a new function,” Kovalenko says.

The corps’ commander made the same point about armor specifically.

“These operations prove that maneuver by armor remains possible on a battlefield increasingly dominated by reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions and precision weapons,” Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi, who leads the Third Army Corps, said in a comment Kovalenko cites.

His own conclusion is a warning: NATO armies are stuck near Cold War templates for attack and defense, and unless they study and absorb what Vivaldi did, the Alliance could one day find itself routed not in an exercise but on a real battlefield.

Ukraine is opening grant money for home-built air-to-air missiles and radars, aiming to shoot down Russia’s fastest drones without paying a huge price. The Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, and the Brave1 defense-tech cluster are launching the competitions, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara announced in an address to manufacturers, adding that a grant contest for turbojet engines will follow.

Ukraine is being forced to use expensive air defense missiles against relatively inexpensive Russian drones and cruise missiles. Developing cheaper interceptors, domestically produced radars and engines could change the economics of warfare.

The move comes as Russia leans harder on faster, jet-powered drones that strain the cheapest layer of Ukraine’s defenses. It also follows an earlier round of Brave1 grants that had already flagged anti-bomb systems and Ukrainian radars as priorities.

What Kyiv wants built, from navigation to radars that see the faint targets

Khmara laid out the threats the money is meant to answer: ballistic missiles, cheap cruise missiles, high-speed drones and guided bombs.

From Ukrainian producers, the ministry wants domestic navigation systems, stronger electronic warfare, radars able to pick out low-signature targets, and affordable designs that can be developed in quantity.

“Our requirements are clear: effectiveness, affordable cost, interoperability between systems, and sufficient volume of supply,” Khmara says.

The grants are one tool among others, meant to carry developments that can later scale for the Security and Defense Forces. Earlier, the ministry and Brave1 ran a large-scale test of drones with AI-assisted targeting.

The next contest targets the guided bombs Ukraine still cannot reliably stop

The minister singled out a separate job for manufacturers: new ways to counter Russia’s guided aerial bombs, known in Ukraine as KABs, and to blunt their use.

These are the glide bombs Russian aircraft release from a distance, and Ukraine has struggled to answer them without reaching the launch aircraft themselves.

“It is important to create innovative solutions that let us act ahead and prevail. We need asymmetric effect. We need technologies that change the rules of the game in our favor,” he argues.

Grants for turbojet engines, the ministry says, are the next step after the missiles and radars.

A year ago, Ukraine’s 125th heavy mechanized brigade was written off as beyond saving, manned at 17% with not a single tank, gun, or drone crew to its name. A year on, the brigade says it now ranks first among the army’s heavy brigades and that 1,500 soldiers who had gone absent without leave have returned to serve.

The 125th, part of Ukraine’s Third Army Corps, drew the comparison as it summed up its first year under new command. It comes as Ukraine struggles with a force-wide shortage of soldiers and leans on the Third Army Corps, the formation the 125th now fights under, for its counterattacks around Lyman.

The figures behind a brigade rebuilt from 17% strength

In the unit’s telling, the collapse was never the whole story.

“We were told the brigade couldn’t be saved. But they didn’t account for the main thing, people,” the brigade recalls.

By its own count, manning has risen 430% over the year, and its main units now stand at 95-100%. The crews that grew fastest were the ones flying drones: the number of aerial-reconnaissance teams is up 1200%, FPV crews 950%, heavy-bomber crews 1400%, and fixed-wing drone crews 600%.

The brigade also built units of uncrewed ground vehicles from scratch and stood up its own training, air defense, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and medical structures.

Now, it is among the most effective brigades for destroying Russians, mining, artillery, air defense, ground robots, and reconnaissance, and for three months running it has placed first among the army’s heavy mechanized brigades on those combined measures.

From two pickups and a minibus to Bradleys and Leopards

The starting point was close to empty. At the beginning of the reform, the brigade had almost no combat equipment, its commander, Volodymyr Fokin, told ArmyInform in June.

“For the whole brigade we had two pickups and one minibus,” he said.

In the first six months, he added, the brigade replaced about 90% of its commanders in key posts and stood up a tank battalion, a drone battalion and a ground-robotics company.

Today it fields American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, German Leopard tanks and artillery of various calibers.

A captain with the callsign “Skamer” told ArmyFM in July that the new equipment came with new ways of running the brigade, with more authority given to commanders who had real combat experience.

Ukraine should pass the bill to join Europe’s single euro-payment zone without delay, because it would save Ukrainians up to €100 million a year. For businesses that buy goods or equipment in the EU, the cost of a transfer would fall several-fold and settle in minutes or hours instead of five to seven days, says the country’s representative to the EU, Taras Kachka.

The bill, No. 14327-d, aligns Ukraine’s rules against money laundering and terrorism financing with EU standards and those of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), part of the commitments on its path to EU membership. It has to move soon: the simplified route into the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is open only until November 2026.

Ukraine must apply before November

If Ukraine misses that window, new stricter EU anti-money-laundering directives take effect, raising the bar and risking years of delay.

Even once parliament passes the bill, connecting Ukraine’s banks will take about another year and a half, with full launch set for 1 January 2028. In Kachka’s words: “Passing the European-integration legislation for Ukraine to join the Single Euro Payments Area is critically necessary, needed ‘yesterday.’”

He said he hopes lawmakers will use the opportunity to pass the changes.

Small business gains the most

Kachka expressed hope that Ukraine's parliament would vote in favor of the necessary amendments, using this important political moment to benefit society.

“This will truly help businesses of all sizes, traders, manufacturers, importers and, of course, ordinary people who have so many relatives and colleagues in Europe and interact with them regularly,” Kachka noted.

SEPA's greatest practical value lies with small and medium-sized firms, including limited liability companies and sole proprietors. Membership would allow them to make cross-border euro payments on the same day at minimal cost, with no need to provide founding or confirming documents for each transfer.

Additionally, Ukrainian producers who export to the EU would be paid on their invoices instantly, as easily as inside the country.

“It really is help for every small and large business, traders, producers, importers and, of course, ordinary people who have so many relatives and dealings with colleagues in Europe,” Kachka adds.

Ukraine has offered its soldiers a fixed term and a guaranteed way home under new contracts to encourage more people to enlist. However, in more than four months, only about 8,600 have signed, a drop in the ocean for a force of around a million, Ukrainska Pravda reports.

The system, launched on 15 June 2026 as an experimental government project, lets soldiers sign for a fixed term for the first time: infantry-assault contracts of 6 to 14 months, and combat and base contracts of two years, each ending in a guaranteed discharge and a deferral from re-mobilization.

That guarantee was meant to draw people in, but many soldiers, even some who signed, do not believe the state will let them go when their term ends.

Soldiers don’t trust the way out

The most common answer soldiers give is flat: “I don’t believe that after the contract ends I will really be able to leave and get a deferral.”

The doubt has history: officials have promised fixed service terms since 2023 and kept pushing them back. About 2,000 had signed a month after enrollment opened, and the total has crept only to around 8,600 since.

Veterans have a second grievance: those who have served since 2022 can sign for the same terms as raw recruits and get the same deferral, which starts at six months, too short, many say, to rebuild a civilian life before the draft reaches them again.

The raises that split the ranks

Meanwhile, new pay is reaching the troops. Higher combat payments are going out after some early paperwork delays, commanders confirm.

“The guys are getting good money. Everyone is very satisfied,” says Oleksandr Nastenko, who commands the 475th separate assault regiment “Code 9.2” under the callsign Flint.

The increases, though, were uneven, now one of the sorest points in the ranks. Infantry and assault troops saw the biggest jump, from about $2,700 to between $6,700 and $10,300 a month, while drone operators and other combat specialists who often share the same trenches received no comparable raise.

Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara’s team is now weighing which parts of the experiment to carry into a future reform bill.

Ukraine may have to revisit its blackout measures if Russia begins mass-using the Susanin optical navigation module on Geran-5 drones and other drones and missiles at night, Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, a defense-technology adviser to Ukraine’s president, says. Road and highway lighting will be the first concern.

Russia keeps upgrading the weapons it sends against Ukrainian cities. It has already fitted its jet-powered Gerans with machine vision that lets them recognize and track targets on their own in the final seconds of flight, which Ukraine’s electronic warfare cannot easily defeat.

Flash says Ukraine would act deliberately this time

In 2022, Ukrainians switched off lights out of fear. Flash says that if optical navigation spreads, darkness may have to become a deliberate defense.

“If our enemy begins to use the Susanin optical navigation module en masse on the Geran-5 and other drones (missiles) at night, we may have to revisit the question of light masking,” Beskrestnov says.

This especially concerns the lighting of roads and stretches of highways, where cars are especially vulnerable to drone and missile attacks, with Ukrainian rescuers named being in a vehicle during a strike as one of the most dangerous places.

Meanwhile, Beskrestnov does not say how widely Russia already uses the module.

Russia’s air war grows faster and more frequent

Jet-powered Gerans already fly too fast for the mobile gun teams and light interceptors that stop slower drones, and Ukraine is still testing jet interceptors of its own.

“Credit to the Russians. They know how to scale,” Serhii Bratchuk, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Volunteer Army, said in September.

By August, Russian forces were striking Kyiv almost twice a week on average, each attack costing the city about $12 million, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said. Ukraine’s Economy Ministry expects losses from Russian strikes to reach up to $10 billion this year.

The great powers may be about to sit down and carve up the world’s spheres of influence again, and that is exactly what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warns against. He says a possible meeting of US President Donald Trump, Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin would likely focus on the Middle East and Ukraine, and that he does not want it to become a new “Yalta.”

At the Yalta Conference in 1945, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill carved postwar Europe into spheres of influence, settling the fate of smaller nations without them at the table.

Zelenskyy warns that a meeting of today’s great powers could revive that practice.

Who stands to gain

Zelenskyy is blunt about who such a format would serve. He says he cannot see what China would gain from it, while Russia stands to gain a great deal.

“I just don’t see the benefit for China, and I definitely see the benefit of this format for Russia. We’ll see what kind of meeting this will be,” Zelenskyy says.

That advantage, he argues, would build on the 2025 Alaska summit, the Trump-Putin meeting that ended without a deal but which Moscow has since invoked as a baseline for its demands.

Zelenskyy warns against a new Yalta

What the three powers would actually discuss is not yet settled, Zelenskyy says, but Ukraine would be on the table whether or not it is in the room.

“They will certainly talk about the Middle East. They will certainly talk about Ukraine. I really don’t want this to be ‘Yalta 2, 3, 4,’ when there is a redistribution of influence,” he says.

He adds that he would like the trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi to take place before any meeting in China.

Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the Azot chemical plant in Novomoskovsk, Tula Oblast, Russia, one of the country’s largest nitrogen-fertilizer producers, on 28 October. The attack set off a major fire at the facility overnight, Exilenova+ reports.

Russia’s munitions need explosives, and those explosives start from nitric acid, a basic industrial chemical. Azot is one of Russia’s biggest sources of it, a plant Ukraine has struck before and hit again overnight.

Nitric acid feeds Russia’s explosives

Military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko explains why the plant matters for Russia. Azot is one of Russia’s biggest producers of ammonia, ammonium nitrate, urea, and methanol, and in 2023 the company reported supplying more than 60 countries, he says.

For the war economy, he argues, one product stands out from the rest.

“The main reason for its strategic importance is nitric acid and its role in producing explosives for munitions,” Kovalenko says.

The acid goes into the chemical synthesis behind some of Russia’s most powerful explosives, and ammonia, further up the chain, is the base feedstock that the whole of nitrogen chemistry runs on.

Azot supplies the makers, not the munitions

Kovalenko is careful not to overstate what the plant does. Ammonium nitrate, the compound most associated with Azot, is first of all a fertilizer and only secondarily a raw material for industrial explosives.

“The fact of its production alone does not mean the plant makes military munitions,” he stresses.

The same holds for methanol and the plant’s other chemicals, whose military weight depends on which enterprise they are shipped to and what it builds there.

What gives Azot its place in the war machine, in his account, is that it sits one step back from the weapon, feeding the factories that make explosives rather than making them itself.

“Azot does not necessarily produce finished explosives itself. Its role is to supply raw materials to the next-link enterprises that produce energetic materials,” Kovalenko says.

The clearest trace of that role runs through a single customer: recorded deliveries of nearly 5,000 tons of nitric acid to the Sverdlov plant, sanctioned by Ukraine for actions threatening its sovereignty, between 2022 and 2024, with data from 2026 showing the reagent concentrated among a handful of Russian firms.

Ahead of a harsh winter, the Netherlands is giving Ukraine €1.2 billion to keep the lights and water on under Russian strikes. Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Sjoerd Sjoerdsma announced the aid during a visit to Kyiv on 28 October.

The package comes as Russia targets Ukraine’s energy system every winter. Last winter’s strikes damaged or destroyed roughly 80% of the grid, and Moscow’s next target is Ukraine’s water supply.

“Ukraine is under heavy fire and faces a very harsh winter,” Sjoerdsma said.

That, he stated, is why the government is taking additional steps now. The funds will be distributed over the next three years.

Earlier, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy said Kyiv needed $8-10 billion to get through winter, TSN reported.

The Netherlands shores up Ukraine’s power and water

Also, the Netherlands is fast-tracking €40 million this year to Ukraine’s Energy Support Fund for urgent repairs to power and water facilities, which are increasingly targeted by Russian strikes.

Another €55 million goes to in-kind support: energy equipment supplied by Dutch companies to Ukrainian partners through the Netherlands Enterprise Agency.

The money will also help build emergency reserves and train staff in the energy and water sectors.

Dutch business steps into Ukraine’s reconstruction

Most of the rest goes to business. Some €136 million will go to the Partnership Facility with Ukraine and other programs, and a further €19.5 million is added to export credit insurance, on top of an existing €60 million line, to lower the risk for Dutch companies entering the Ukrainian market.

Separately, the Netherlands signed a letter of intent to contribute €10 million to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s “Industrial Ramstein” initiative, which aims to restore and modernize the production capacity of Ukrainian companies. Sjoerdsma traveled to Kyiv with Koen van Oostrom, chair of the business association VNO-NCW.

The support also covers the search for Ukrainian children abducted by Russia, through the UN, as well as housing, humanitarian aid, healthcare, demining, and the restoration of cultural heritage.

In all, the Netherlands is confirming the previously promised €878 million in non-military aid and an additional €327 million, much of it delivered through the EBRD, the World Bank, and the European Investment Bank.

The same day, President Zelenskyy said he had arrived in the Netherlands on an official visit. The two sides plan to discuss defense and economic cooperation, strengthening Ukraine’s air defenses, and further support for Ukraine. Zelenskyy is also set to have an audience with King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands.

Ukraine is remaking its air force on NATO’s model, down to the way its squadrons are organized and the aircraft they fly. The reforms are planned to be completed by 2035 and include modernizing its F-16s while pursuing the Swedish Gripen jets, Air Force Spokesperson Yurii Ihnat says, per Tse Baza.

Ukraine’s fighters are working hard against Russia’s air war, and in the previous month alone the Air Force faced around 3,500 jet-powered targets, with F-16s heavily used to intercept Russian drones. The new reform is meant to build an air force that can be sustained over the long term and can contest Russian jets and glide bombs, not only survive the next wave.

Wings and universal air bases

The central change, Ihnat said, is a move to the “wing” units that NATO air forces use. The first steps have already been taken: Ukraine has set up the 107th F-16 wing, which now has its own Facebook page and may publish material about its work.

Ukraine also plans to build universal air bases on the operational airfields it has used through the full-scale war. In the future, Ihnat says, those bases should be able to receive and service different models of combat aircraft, as NATO does.

A worn fleet, and the jets Ukraine wants next

Currently, the F-16s Ukraine flies are older Block 15 jets, used by other countries before they arrived, and intensive combat has left them in need of repairs, service life restoration, and upgrades.

Ukrainian officials discussed modernization with the American manufacturer Lockheed Martin, while Kyiv would prefer the newer Block 70/72 version, which Ihnat says would let its pilots stand up more confidently to Russia’s Su-35 fighters.

Keeping the current fleet flying has been hard: fewer than half of Ukraine’s F-16s may be operational, held back by slow maintenance abroad.

At the same time, Lockheed Martin and Kyiv are discussing a special F-16 variant for Ukraine, with a modern AESA radar, longer range, and a wider choice of weapons, though no firm deal exists yet.

Ukraine is also counting on Swedish Gripen fighters. Ihnat says Ukrainian pilots are drawn to them for their lower operating costs and simpler maintenance, with the country likely to receive older C/D models first, before the newer Gripen E that Saab is developing.

Ukrainian pilots have already begun their training on the Gripen, a jet seen as a counter to the Russian aircraft dropping guided glide bombs on the front, though delivery timing depends on further agreements.

For 14 years, Serbia’s government kept the country close to Moscow. Now, the opposition “Student List” has won the country’s snap parliamentary election, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says Ukraine is ready to deepen its cooperation with Serbia, welcoming the result as “a new page” in a post on X.

The win could end the 14-year rule of President Aleksandar Vučić’s political force and weaken Moscow’s position in the Balkans. Serbia has remained an important Kremlin partner in Europe since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Belgrade never joined the EU's sanctions against Moscow.

“A new page”

In his post, written in Ukrainian, Zelenskyy said that "changes have taken place in Serbia, the victory of the Student List, and this is clearly a new page in the history of the country and its people."

“We wish Serbia success, real development, and warm relations with the European community,” he wrote.

He said Ukraine was grateful to Serbia “for the respect shown to our people and our state, our independence,” and added: “We are ready to keep increasing our cooperation, and may all the good hopes of the people of Serbia come true.”

But the winners rule out sanctions on Russia

Vučić had earlier predicted that a new government could impose restrictions on Moscow by March or April, according to Novosti. The Student List says otherwise: it has no plans to align with the EU or to sanction Russia over the war in Ukraine, according to Reuters.

Its candidates frame Serbia’s reliance on Russian gas, with Gazprom as the largest supplier at around 2.2 billion cubic meters a year at below-market prices, as an acute economic dependency rather than a geopolitical alignment.

The movement’s top candidates have also said a future government would end all arms exports to war zones, including sales to Western intermediaries who pass weapons to Ukraine. Around €800 million worth of Serbian ammunition has reached Ukraine through that route since 2022.

Ukraine has held its first international course in military surgery and resuscitation, under instructors from the American College of Surgeons and other Western trauma bodies, the Defense Ministry says. “Tryzub”, or Trident, has been conducted for front-line surgeons and anesthesiologists.

The week-long drills put 16 doctors, eight surgeons, and eight anesthesiologists through three standard Western trauma programs: Advanced Trauma Life Support, Definitive Surgical Trauma Care, and Advanced Surgical Skills for Exposure in Trauma. All of them work at stabilization points close to the fighting.

The course has been run with the International Association for Trauma Surgery and Intensive Care and the Global Medical Knowledge Alliance, a non-profit that helps rebuild Ukraine’s healthcare, with support from Razom4Ukraine and Expertise France.

The wounds have changed

The course answers a battlefield that has grown deadlier. Ukrainian combat medics say modern combat trauma has fundamentally changed: drones and shrapnel now cause most of the complex wounds, often tearing through several parts of the body at once.

Bleeding has become the main cause of death on the battlefield, and the window to stop it is measured in minutes. That is the gap a well-drilled surgical team near the line is meant to close.

“People who will do everything to save his life”

Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara has framed the course as a promise to troops at the front.

“When a soldier goes into battle, he must know that if he is wounded, there will be people beside him who will do everything they can to save his life,” Khmara says.

Experience, he added, is a kind of trust that matters enormously at the front.

“That is why we want our medics to have the best knowledge and skills, and to be able to act as one team," he states.

Ukrainian front-line medicine already draws international notice: one Azov brigade medic was named Europe’s best military medic of the year, and off-duty Ukrainian medics recently saved a man’s life at a London crash scene.

Captured Russian soldiers have a rule for one stretch of the Kupiansk front: go anywhere, but not there.

That stretch is the “safety corridor” the “Orion” unit of Ukraine’s Offensive Guard brigade “Pomsta” says it has built for its ground robots. The zone is so lethal that, by the unit’s count, 88% of attacking Russians are killed before they reach their positions, and Russian armor cannot get within 25 kilometers, the military outlet ArmyInform reports.

Behind that shield, the unit says its ground robots have run dozens of fully autonomous missions through the most dangerous ground on the axis, with a success rate of 99.57%. The results made Orion the top-ranked unit for effectiveness on the South-Kupiansk axis in September within Ukraine’s battlefield management system, DELTA.

“You can go anywhere, just not into the Orion zone”

The claim that the Russians now avoid the sector, the unit says, comes from them themselves.

“Prisoners admit in interviews: 'You can go anywhere, just not into the Orion zone.' Eighty-eight percent of the enemy is destroyed before reaching their positions, and Russian equipment cannot approach closer than 25 kilometers,” the unit says.

That is what opens the corridor. Where a human supply run would be a death sentence, a robot can cross, and cross again.

The quiet blood of the front

The point, the unit says, is to take the soldier out of the deadliest job on the front: carrying ammunition and the wounded across open fire.

“We broke the stereotype that supplying the army takes truck convoys and hundreds of soldiers under targeted fire. Our robotic systems are the ‘quiet blood’ of the front,” Vladyslav Zolotarov, an officer in the unit’s staff control group, says.

When Russia thinks our positions are depleted, a tracked platform quietly comes in at night and brings in a ton of ammunition.

In September alone, the unit says, its wheeled and tracked robots ran 85 of the hardest combat missions and hauled more than 30,000 kilograms of cargo. Its evacuation record is the line it is proudest of: four missions pulling wounded soldiers out by robot, all four successful, not one man lost.

Ukraine has bet heavily on this kind of machine, aiming to field 50,000 ground robots to keep its troops out of the drone-ruled kill zone.

Whoever controls Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation wields enormous influence over law enforcement, judges, and government officials. The EU wants Ukraine to reform it, and Ukraine’s government is likely to pass changes that satisfy monitoring requirements on paper while leaving the body effectively under the President’s Office’s control, the investigative outlet Texty reports.

The stakes are money and power at once. The State Bureau of Investigation, known by its Ukrainian initials DBR, investigates officials, judges, prosecutors, and soldiers. So choosing an independent director is one of the rule-of-law conditions the EU has tied to Ukraine’s 2026 and 2027 budget aid.

Yet the version the government may pass would change how the director is chosen only for the one after next, in 2032. Brussels wants the model used at the anti-corruption bureau NABU, where the chief cannot be confirmed without the votes of independent foreign experts.

Who picks the watchdog

Today a nine-member commission selects the director:

1. three named by the president
2. three by a parliament his party dominates
3. three proposed by the government on international partners’ suggestion.

That leaves the foreign experts without a decisive vote and the President’s Office effectively choosing the winner. Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy promised in January that a reform bill would reach parliament within a month.

It is now October, and there is none.

Director Oleksii Sukhachov’s term ends this year, so his successor will be picked under the old rules.

Sukhachov has publicly argued that overhauling the bureau during the war would threaten the state.

The deadline to adopt the reform was October. To carry it out, the end of 2026. Miss it, and Ukraine risks reputational damage and the European funding it needs amid a budget deficit, money the EU has frozen before when anti-corruption guarantees slipped.

A factory of “procedural nightmaring”

What makes the fight so bitter is that the bureau’s searches, seizures, and summonses are levers over individuals and whole institutions.

For example, NABU’s Operation Midas tapes, from the $100 million kickback case at the state nuclear company Energoatom, mention the bureau’s entire leadership. In March 2025, its investigators searched the commission that vets and appoints Ukraine’s judges, itself reformed with international experts, in what the commission called pressure that could stall the courts.

Cases against the bureau’s own officials, meanwhile, are handled by a unit inside the bureau. And its director sits under his own cloud: the outlet Slidstvo.Info reported that his brother bought 143 apartments cheaply from a developer. Nevertheless, a court banned publication, and eight newsrooms jointly ran the story.

SpaceX founder Elon Musk says that if Ukraine fires through Starlink, Russia would be entitled to shoot the network down. That is why Starlink must remain a civilian operation and cannot be used for outright offensive strikes that would put its very existence at risk.

The warning lands in the middle of a fight over Musk’s own hand on that network. Weeks ago, his company unexpectedly throttled the service Ukraine’s drones depend on amid US President Donald Trump diesel deal with Russia, which led to the disruption of a few operations on the front.

The US Treasury authorized the sale, delivery, offloading, and import of Russian-origin diesel fuel, effectively suspending sanctions on that trade until 7 April 2027, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) said on its website on 9 October.

The diesel deal combining intelligence halt and military Starlink, with pressure on Ukraine to make a quick peace deal, has angered both Democrats and Republicans ahead of the US elections on 3 November, where Democrats could win.

Meanwhile, a Ukrainian official interprets Musk's talk of strikes as an attempt to build an alibi before a possible investigation into that decision.

A civilian network, or a target

Musk was responding to a post warning that if Starlink shifted from a civilian network into a military system, Russia could treat it as a target for retaliation, and that destroying satellites in orbit could scatter enough debris to make space unusable for years or centuries.

“An adversary blowing up Starlink satellites would create a domino effect of destruction that would generate a vast field of debris, making space unusable," he writes.

When the shield and the warnings failed together

Overnight into 14 October, SpaceX quietly capped the speed of Starshield, the military version Ukraine’s drones run on, without telling Kyiv. Ukrainian units said the limit broke a series of missions, with connections dropping mid-flight and leaving drones hard to control.

At the same time, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine relies on the network for air defense, not attack, to intercept the Russian drones Moscow sends to its cities, and that once the speed was cut, his forces could no longer stop some of them as effectively as before.

Simultaneously, Ukraine's other American lifeline also went dark: for about three days, the US stopped passing the intelligence that warns of Russian ballistic launches. On 12 October, Russian ballistic missiles hit Kyiv before the air-raid alert reached people, with no advance data from partners. In a strike during that window, three people were killed in the capital, the sirens sounding only after the blasts.

A Ukrainian official sees alibi-building

Meanwhile, Andrii Kovalenko, the ex-head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, read Musk’s statement as self-protection rather than physics

“Musk, having taken responsibility for the restrictions on Starlink and Starshield for Ukraine, is now trying to build himself an alibi before a possible investigation into that decision,” he wrote.

He said that regardless of who was behind the idea of restricting Starlink and Starshield access for Ukraine, it represents a strategic setback for the US in the long run, as it risks portraying the country as an unreliable partner that may fail to honor its commitments.

"Europe purchases around 60% of its imported weapons from the US. Trust in the US as a security guarantor directly supports sales for American defense companies. Moves like this only undermine that trust and encourage European countries to develop their own systems," he said.

The US has sent a message that its guarantees may not be reliable and that even paid-for services can be subject to political decisions, Kovalenko stressed.

If Democrats win the House, and possibly the Senate, a result nonpartisan analysts call plausible, they would gain the power to bring new Ukraine aid to a vote and to push back on President Donald Trump’s deals easing pressure on Russia, Reuters reports in an analysis of how US foreign policy could shift.

The stakes are concrete. Trump has largely halted direct US aid to Ukraine, which lawmakers of both parties had backed, and its current supplies run from packages passed under his predecessor.

Weeks ago, he also waived the sanctions on Russian energy that Congress had written into law and struck a deal to bring Russian diesel back to the market, angering Republicans and Democrats alike.

What a Democratic Congress could do for Ukraine

With both chambers, Democrats could put new Ukraine aid on the floor, and given the bipartisan support such aid has drawn, it could pass with the two-thirds majorities needed to override a Trump veto.

Other steps could be taken, too. Representative Gregory Meeks of New York, in line to chair the House Foreign Affairs Committee if his party wins control, has already introduced bipartisan legislation to block Trump’s plan to return Russian diesel to the global market.

Democrats are also readier than Trump’s Republicans to rein in military spending. They blocked his request for an unprecedented 67% rise in the military budget, to $1.5 trillion, in the Senate, and many say they will try to restore the foreign aid he has withheld or canceled.

The limits of a slice of power

The leverage has limits. Even with both chambers, Democrats would still face a president who can veto, and overriding him would require two-thirds of each chamber. The pattern has already been visible in Iran: Trump launched that war on 28 February without congressional approval, and when a War Powers resolution passed with a handful of Republican votes, his administration ignored it.

The US midterms could restore Ukraine’s American aid and curb Trump’s Russia deals, if Democrats win Congress

Ukraine has just become the first country with which NATO’s weapons-buying agency has ever established a dedicated partnership. Under a new agreement, Kyiv has gained the right to purchase weapons through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), and Ukrainian firms can bid on its tenders, the Defense Ministry reports.

The deal, approved by the Ukrainian government in August and signed last week, is called the Security Cooperation Support Partnership. Through it, Ukraine can tap the agency’s 45 procurement partnerships, which cover the purchase, maintenance, and lifecycle support of weapons systems.

A single window into NATO’s arms market

For Ukraine’s military, the partnership is meant to make buying faster and cheaper. Orders can run through existing NSPA contracts or through new tenders, including an emergency-procurement track, and pooling Ukraine’s needs with those of other countries is designed to sharpen prices.

The purchases can be paid for from Ukraine’s state budget, by international partners, or through joint financing.

“Ukraine is the first and only country, and a non-member of NATO at that, for which a separate partnership was created as a single entry point to the agency’s work, and Ukrainian industry was given broad access to the agency’s tenders,” said Deputy Defense Minister Mstyslav Banik.

And a way in for Ukraine’s arms makers

The agreement cuts both ways, too. Ukrainian defense companies can now register in the agency’s supplier database, submit proposals, compete in tenders on equal footing with foreign firms, and sign contracts with NSPA under a mechanism that runs for five years from April 2025.

“We want our partners to gain access to this experience and these technologies, and Ukrainian producers to gain new opportunities for cooperation,” said Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Hvozdiar.

This is a partnership that benefits both sides, the Ukrainian official added.

The signing was announced on 14 October at an NSPA industry event in Kyiv that drew about 150 Ukrainian defense manufacturers.

The hardest part of ending Russia's war is making sure it cannot start it again. As the peace talks have escalated ahead of the US elections, Ukraine is weighing three options for its postwar security.

Among them are NATO membership, direct US guarantees modeled on NATO’s Article 5, and a European “Coalition of the Willing” backed by Washington, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says, according to UNIAN. But none of them have been agreed to yet.

Zelenskyy describes the guarantees as a single package, with each layer still under discussion with partners. All of it, he says, rests on a strong Ukrainian army, in both numbers and quality.

Three guarantees, none of them signed

Everyone counts on NATO, Zelenskyy says, but Kyiv is also negotiating direct guarantees from the US, including an Article 5-style collective-defense clause, alongside the European Coalition of the Willing that would act together with Washington. The arithmetic, he said, is already done.

“Our colleagues in Europe and America know this. We have already calculated everything: both the financing and the corresponding number of our soldiers, so that our state can be at peace,” he states.

Why Zelenskyy says even Russia should want Ukraine in NATO

He went further, arguing that NATO membership would serve not only Ukraine and the Alliance but also Russia.

“I think, honestly, the Russians need our accession to NATO too, because for them that is more security than Ukraine outside NATO,” he claims.

The talks come as Washington pushes toward negotiations. Zelenskyy says he expects signals from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio within a day or two, as well as a call with envoy Steve Witkoff. He adds that Jared Kushner, on his way to Kyiv in November, told him Russia supports a trilateral meeting of the US, Ukraine, and Russia, at the level of technical teams.

Ukraine now builds far more weapons than it can afford to buy. A year ago, it promised to sell the surplus abroad and turn the proceeds back into its own army. However, 12 months later, that promise has barely materialized: a state fee of up to 30% is pricing Ukrainian arms out of foreign markets, and no one can say how much the army has actually gained, said Ihor Fedirko, executive director of the Ukrainian Council of Armorers.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the resumption of controlled weapons exports in October 2025, resting it on four promises: 1) sell what Ukraine makes beyond its own needs, 2) channel part of the proceeds into a special fund for the army, 3) open export offices in Europe and the US, and 4) establish joint ventures abroad.

The surplus is real: Ukraine's defense output is projected to reach $55 billion in 2026, far beyond what the state can finance. A year on, Fedirko checked each promise in turn.

1) Export of surpluses: rules that strangle businesses

On 1 July 2026, the government approved rules for controlled arms exports. They shortened the maximum application review period from 90 to 30 days, but also introduced an export fee: 20% for finished products and technologies, and 30% for components. For finished products exported under the special procedure, the contract value must be at least $334,000.

In September, the Ukrainian Council of Armorers, together with other associations, proposed a zero rate, no advance collection of the fee, refunds for deals that fall through, and simplified test shipments. The industry was promised that its amendments would be taken into account and that the resolution would be rewritten.

Even in early October, however, the rules still needed work. According to Fedirko, the new mechanism has effectively not started working. Whether it can bring in additional funds for defense depends on how acceptable the export terms are to manufacturers.

Fedirko says, though, that judging by current decisions, the state intends to keep the export fee.

“The industry is ready to discuss its contribution to defense financing. But the rate must be economically justified,” he says.

2) Procurement for the Ukrainian military: balance is only being established

He adds that the Ukrainian Council of Armorers intends to push for a rate significantly lower than 20%, one that would let companies fulfill contracts and invest in production.

With such high rates, Fedirko says, the competitiveness of Ukrainian weapons on foreign markets is in question, as is the ability to send even small test batches to potential buyers.

“The fundamental requirement is post-payment: after the contract has actually been fulfilled and the manufacturer has been paid. A company should not pay the state in advance a share of income it has not yet received,” he says.

He added that, given all this, the real export figures remain unclear, as does how much exports have actually brought the military.

“The military and manufacturers must feel the benefit of exports. I sincerely hope that next year will bring much better results,” he says.

In addition, on 12 October, the Ukrainian Parliament passed bill No. 15400 in the first reading. It provides for crediting the export fee to a special fund directed to the Ministry of Defense: 50% for the procurement, modernization, and repair of weapons and equipment, and 50% for the pay of Armed Forces personnel.

The bill has not yet been adopted, but Fedirko says he expects “final adoption and launch of the mechanism.”

3) Export offices: offices in Germany and Denmark

On 3 November, the Ukrainian government named the first cities for export offices: Berlin and Copenhagen. On 15 December, it again spoke of preparing an office in Berlin. In reality, Fedirko says he does not know the office’s status, and it likewise remains unclear how companies can apply to it and how many contracts it has helped close.

4) Joint ventures abroad: There are concrete results in this area

According to Fedirko, eight joint ventures have been created, five of which are already supplying products to Ukraine. He stresses that this is the result of work by Ukrainian companies, foreign partners and the state, and that it deserves recognition.

As early as February 2026, the authorities spoke of plans to create ten joint ventures in Europe within a year. At the same time, they announced Quantum Frontline Industries in Germany, with a planned annual capacity of 10,000 drones for Kyiv.

Beyond the number of ventures and deliveries, however, it is important to understand how other manufacturers can join the Build with Ukraine program.

“Who accepts applications, by what criteria are decisions made, and what support does a company receive?” Fedirko asks.

In other words, joint ventures are already delivering results, but the rules of participation and the state support mechanism must be clear to companies that want to develop production abroad.