The US Air Force (USAF) is evaluating its bombers, including the next-generation B-21 Raider, for potential air-to-air combat roles, and they could also operate alongside Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones.

So far, the USAF has used its bombers, including the B-52 Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2 Spirit, for a variety of missions, including conventional ground strikes, nuclear deterrence, maritime anti-ship operations, and close air support roles.

However, adding air-to-air missiles to bombers and pairing them with CCAs would also enable them to perform air-superiority missions in a contested environment.

The plans are part of the USAF’s latest fighter force structure report, submitted to the US Congress for approval earlier this month.

The report, titled “Long-Term USAF Fighter Force Structure,” also envisions a combat-coded fleet of 1,509 fighters by 2035, along with at least 500 CCAs.

The plan calls for adding hundreds of new fighters as the USAF increases its current fighter fleet from 1,288 aircraft, while also accounting for hundreds of F-16s, older F-15s, and F-22 Raptors due for retirement in the coming years.

The 2035 plan envisions a 60% stealth force, including 40% F-35A Joint Strike Fighters, 20% F-47s and F-22 Raptors, and 40% upgraded fourth-generation fighters, with an even mix of F-16s and F-15EXs.

The USAF will build the new fleet by procuring Lockheed Martin’s F-35s and Boeing’s F-47 and F-15EX fighters.

However, the report acknowledges that meeting its ambitious fighter procurement targets may not be achievable because of “fiscal realities and industrial production limitations.”

To meet the 2035 target, the USAF will need to add more than 70 fighters to its fleet each year for the next ten years.

The report therefore discusses other recapitalization options for the USAF, including acquiring an entirely new fighter, relying more on semi-autonomous drone fighters known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft, and giving bombers air-to-air roles and capabilities, Air & Space Force Magazine said after reviewing the report, which has not been released in the media.

“Accordingly, the USAF is also evaluating additional recapitalization options, including a new capacity fighter, increased reliance on CCAs, and developing air-to-air capabilities on bombers.”

As EurAsian Times reported last week, the new fighter could be Lockheed Martin’s upgraded F-16, termed F-16G, or Boeing’s already-in-production F-15EX variant. Lockheed Martin is also discussing adding new sixth-generation capabilities to the F-35 fighter.

However, the report’s most unusual suggestion is to add new air-combat munitions to the USAF’s bomber fleet, including the under-development B-21 Raider stealth bomber.

Air-To-Air Missiles For Bombers

The USAF’s fighters have long carried air-to-ground munitions, such as precision-guided JDAMs, laser-guided bombs, and Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs).

Bombers, however, have traditionally not carried air-to-air missiles, severely limiting their ability to conduct air-to-air missions.

For instance, during the recent Operation Epic Fury, the USAF employed B-2 Spirit, B-1B Lancer, and B-52H Stratofortress Bombers, but used them exclusively for long-range standoff ground strikes, penetrating stealth strikes, or stand-in ground strikes once Iranian air defenses were sufficiently suppressed.

These bombers therefore mostly flew in strike packages with F-35s and F-22s, as well as F-15s and F-16s, tackling aerial threats and conducting air superiority and SEAD/DEAD missions.

Adding air-to-air capability will allow USAF bombers to support air superiority missions.

Additionally, pairing them with CCAs will let the bombers serve as airborne nerve centers and communication nodes for a networked strike package, with a bomber aircraft at the center controlling multiple combat and reconnaissance drones.

The USAF plans to have at least 500 CCA drones in service by 2032.

The bombers, including the B-21 Raider, could therefore be programmed to launch air-to-air missiles and drones. Some of these drones could launch air-to-air missiles themselves, thereby greatly extending bombers’ combat range.

Given bombers’ size, payload capacity, and range, a single bomber could carry multiple air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, as well as drones, a capability that could be crucial over the long distances of the Pacific theatre.

For instance, a B-2 Spirit bomber could carry over 27,000 kg of weapons payload, more than three times the F-35’s maximum payload capacity (8,200 kg).

Similarly, the B-2 Spirit’s unrefueled range of 6,000 nautical miles is nearly five times that of the F-35 (1,200 nautical miles).

Adding long-range air-to-air missiles and pairing combat drones with bombers will further extend their combat range.

Notably, the US is already developing several very long-range air-to-air missiles.

The US Navy has already fielded the AIM-174B air-launched version of the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6).

While the exact range of the AIM-174B is classified, widely cited estimates put it at 130 to 250 miles.

Separately, the US is also developing another very long-range AAM missile, the AIM-424 Malice, expected to reach over 250 miles.

In June, the USAF issued a call for a new anti-air missile with a range of at least 1,000 nautical miles.

Integrating such very long-range AAMs with bombers could redefine air warfare.

In addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on the LongShot program to test the feasibility of an air-launched drone that can launch air-to-air missiles.

The air-to-air capability of the bombers could also include self-protection systems, such as carrying air-launched anti-missile interceptors. In fact, Northrop Grumman, the B-21’s prime contractor, has already patented an anti-missile defense system for stealthy aircraft that fires hard-kill interceptors.

Notably, this is not the first time the USAF has explored adding air-to-air munitions to its bomber fleet.

Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin signaled in October 2024 that the B-21 Raider stealth bomber could play a greater role in the service’s air-dominance plans.

At the time, the USAF was reviewing its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter program, which Boeing eventually won in 2025 and named the F-47.

When asked whether the air superiority review could give the B-21 a more prominent role, Allvin said, “We have not taken that off the table.”

However, the USAF force structure report has not detailed what the bomber fleet’s potential air-to-air role would entail. Nor has it specified which USAF Bombers will be programmed for air-to-air combat roles.

However, because the B-21 Raider is still in early production, the bomber is best suited to be paired with AAM and CCA drones.

While the USAF initially planned to buy 100 B-21 Raiders, later reports suggested the force could increase that number to 140.

Besides, the USAF also has about 76 B-52 Stratofortresses, 44 B-1B Lancers, and nearly 19 B-2 Spirits.

The 2035 Force Structure Report suggests that the USAF is hedging on multiple options to maintain its dominance and fighter numbers, including buying a new aircraft (possibly F-16G), “increased reliance on CCAs,” and considering new air-to-air roles for bombers.

All these plans will compete for US funding. The US Congress will only know which programs are approved and funded when it approves the Force Structure Report.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post What If the B-21 Raider Could Shoot Down Enemy Fighter Jets? The U.S. Air Force Just Put the Idea on Table appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

After nearly a decade of struggling to win new orders, Swedish defense manufacturer SAAB reported “better than anticipated” third-quarter earnings, driven by a steady surge in orders for the JAS-39 Gripen fighter jets and the GlobalEye early-warning aircraft.

This coincides with the 71st anniversary of the first flight of one of Saab’s most distinctive earlier designs, the J-35 Draken.

Saab recently announced at a quarterly earnings call that new order intake more than tripled year on year. “It is a very strong quarter,” Saab CEO Micael Johansson said in an interaction with Reuters. “Very good order intake, quite a few large orders, strong sales growth — over 30% organic — as well as increased profitability and strong cash flow,” he added, signaling that the company would meet its financial targets.

The new orders reportedly exceeded FactSet projections of 56.4 billion kronor ($5.68 billion), coming in at 65.8 billion Swedish kronor ($6.6 billion), up from 20.9 billion kronor ($2.10 billion) a year ago. Meanwhile, the third-quarter sales exceeded FactSet’s forecast of 20 billion kronor ($2.01 billion), coming in at 20.6 billion kronor ($2.07 billion), while EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) exceeded projections of 1.9 billion kronor ($191.3 million), coming in at 1.95 billion kronor ($196.4 million).

Saab’s operating profit rose to 1.95 billion kronor ($196.4 million) from 1.37 billion kronor ($138 million) the previous year, exceeding the mean estimate of 1.91 billion kronor ($192 million) in an LSEG analyst survey.

The largest single contributor was the SEK 24.6 billion ($2.54 billion) contract for 16 Gripen E fighters for Ukraine, signed on 30 June 2026 and booked in the third quarter. “The growing customer demand is reflected in major contract awards, including Gripen for Ukraine, GlobalEye, and an order related to Germany’s new frigates,” CEO Johansson said.

The latest sales, including the order from Ukraine, highlight a major turnaround for a company that struggled to sell its aircraft—particularly the Gripen-E/F—to exporters who kept choosing the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter or the Dassault Rafale.

The most advanced Gripen variant made an official comeback last year, with Thailand ordering 4 of these jets and Colombia ordering 17. SAAB is now pushing the aircraft for export to countries including Canada.

If the export campaigns result in a contract, the company would see another significant surge in orders and earnings. The company has also reportedly offered the aircraft to countries like the Philippines and Peru.

“From a purely logical standpoint, I believe it would be a very good solution for Canada, and it would make for a very good partnership between Canada and Sweden,” the SAAB top boss told Reuters when asked about a potential deal with Ottawa, which placed its F-35 purchase on review last year and has been seeking a replacement ever since.

What If the B-21 Raider Could Shoot Down Enemy Fighter Jets? The U.S. Air Force Just Put the Idea on Table

Separately, Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson said earlier this year that the Swedish Air Force was considering purchasing the two-seat Gripen-F variant to expand training capacity, which would further boost the 4.5th-generation combat aircraft.

In addition to the Gripen-E, the GlobalEye early warning aircraft also drove profits this quarter. SAAB received a SEK 10.1 billion ($1.02 billion) order in July for two GlobalEye aircraft from a Middle Eastern country, as the EurAsian Times reported earlier.

The GlobalEye is also sweeping orders as Europe modernizes and strengthens NATO’s overall combat posture amid sustained security threats from Russia. Earlier this month, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that the alliance would begin formal negotiations with the company for up to 10 GlobalEye aircraft to replace its fleet of 14 Boeing E-3A Sentry AWACS aircraft, whereas Canada picked the aircraft in May 2026.

However, neither NATO nor Canada has placed a firm production order yet, so further sales growth from these programs remains prospective.

Further, a contract with German shipbuilder TKMS drove Saab’s profits. In July 2026, the company signed a SEK 8.7 billion ($876 million) contract with German naval defense company TKMS to deliver and integrate combat systems, composite structures, and sensors onto four of the German Navy’s new MEKO A-200 DEU-class frigates.

USS Colorado to Sail into AUKUS History as 1st U.S. Nuclear Submarine for Australia. Will Arrive Late 2027

While Saab’s recent growth has been driven primarily by the Gripen E/F and related systems, the timing of the results invites a look back at another landmark Swedish design that first flew exactly 71 years ago.

The SAAB Draken 35 Flew More Than 7 Decades Ago

About 71 years ago, on October 25, 1955, the iconic Saab 35 Draken—whose name means “the Kite” or “the Dragon” in Swedish—made its maiden flight, marking the start of the most daring and transformative chapter in Swedish military aviation history. 

Sweden developed the Saab 35 Draken during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States-led Western bloc, amid concerns that the Cold War might spill over its borders and threaten its sovereignty because of its proximity to Russia.

So, the country wanted an aircraft that could combat Soviet fighters and intercept its bombers at high altitudes, which ultimately led to the development of the Saab 35 Draken.

The Swedish Air Force demanded that the new combat aircraft could operate from reinforced public highways that would serve as wartime airbases. It wanted the aircraft to operate from its unique airbase system, Bas 60, which emphasized distributing Swedish air power across several air bases to increase survival chances in the event of conflict.

More importantly, however, the requirements emphasized supersonic speed, all-weather capability, quick turnaround by conscripts, and single-pilot operation, among other things.

Led by designer Erik Bratt, the team adopted a radical double-delta wing: a sharply swept inner section of approximately 80 degrees optimized for high-speed flight, combined with a more moderately swept outer section of about 60 degrees for improved low-speed handling.

The configuration blended the wing and fuselage so thoroughly that the aircraft dispensed with a conventional horizontal stabilizer, producing a distinctive stingray-like silhouette often described as resembling a kite.

Needless to say, the Draken-35 was distinguished as the most aesthetically pleasing combat aircraft. The aircraft had a service ceiling of 66,000 feet and a maximum speed of 2,450 kilometers per hour.

To validate the concept, Saab first built a half-scale testbed, the Saab 210 “Lilldraken,” propelled by the Armstrong Siddeley Adder jet engine, which flew in 1952.

The first full-scale Draken prototype, fitted with a license-built Rolls-Royce Avon Mk 21 engine, took off on 25 October 1955 and soon achieved supersonic speed in level flight.

The second prototype, equipped with an afterburner, unintentionally exceeded the sound barrier during its first climb.

The Saab 35 Draken was a revolutionary aircraft that set multiple records. It was the first Western European combat aircraft that could fly at true supersonic speeds. Later variants reached top speeds of Mach 2.0 to 2.3 (around 2,125–2,450 kilometers/hour) at altitude, with a service ceiling of about 18,000–20,000 meters and a very high rate of climb. 

It was a single-engine aircraft that could carry the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile among other weaponry. The Swedish aircraft could also carry a payload of nearly 6,400 pounds, including internal rockets and bombs.

Most versions of this supersonic combat aircraft carried one or two 30 mm ADEN cannons, with later Swedish models often retaining only a single gun to make room for additional avionics.

Because the Draken’s fuselage was designed to split into front and rear sections, early versions of the aircraft had issues, including a tendency toward “superstall” at high angles of attack.

At times, it became uncontrollable regardless of pilot input, making ejection the only plausible option. Unfortunately, this caused several tragic accidents.

Swedish pilots developed recovery techniques, including the “kort parad” (short parry) maneuver—widely regarded as a precursor to the later “Cobra”—that allowed them to manage and even exploit the behavior.

Third 6th-Gen Fighter Program Bubbles in Europe as Germany Explores Spain-Sweden Deal

The main Swedish Draken variants progressed from the initial J 35A to the improved J 35B with better radar and integration into Sweden’s air-defense network, and onto the two-seat Sk 35C trainer, the more powerful J 35D, the S 35E reconnaissance variant, and the definitive J 35F interceptor equipped with advanced radar and missiles.

Additionally, the aircraft was built in four export variants for Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Austria.

All Drakens were interceptors with limited air-to-ground capability except for the Danish Drakens, which served as strike aircraft and carried AGM-12 Bullpup air-to-ground missiles, electronic countermeasures, and enhanced internal and external fuel storage.

Despite early technical challenges, the Draken earned a strong reputation for performance and reliability, as shown by its about fifty-year service life. In fact, Austria (the last operator of the type) used it until 2005. 

Sweden introduced the Draken into front-line service in 1960 and retired the last examples in the late 1990s,  by which time the Saab 37 Viggen had largely replaced them and the Draken was bridging the gap until the JAS 39 Gripen arrived.

Nonetheless, a handful of aircraft have continued flying in civilian and historic roles, including with the Swedish Air Force Historic Flight and the US National Test Pilot School, according to reports.

Although the Draken never saw real combat, its striking double-delta shape, long service life, and design ingenuity secured its place as one of the most recognizable European fighters of the Cold War era.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

The post Saab’s Gripen-E Fighter Jet Booms in Export Market as Sweden’s Iconic Draken Turns 71 appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The US Navy recently awarded Boeing a $16.7 million contract to support the shutdown of production lines for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler.

The Department of War said: “The Boeing Co., St. Louis, Missouri, is awarded a $16,667,607 firm-fixed-price order (N0001926F1139) against a previously awarded basic ordering agreement (N0001926G1002).

This order provides planning, analysis, engineering, and program management support for the shutdown of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler production lines.

This effort includes inventorying and assessing government-owned production equipment and tooling; developing retention, storage, and disposition recommendations; and delivering a master property inventory and disposition plan. Work will be performed in St. Louis, Missouri (60%); El Segundo, California (37%); and Bethpage, New York (3%), and is expected to be completed in November 2030.

Fiscal 2024 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $16,667,607 will be obligated at the time of award. This order was not competitively procured. Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.”

Super Hornets Fail to Attract Customers

Boeing announced in 2023 that it would halt Super Hornet production by late 2025. The deadline was pushed back when the US Navy awarded Boeing a $1.3 billion contract to acquire 17 Block III Super Hornets and deliver a technical data package essential to the aircraft’s maintenance.

Boeing later said that it will shutter its production lines once it completes delivery of its last order, projected for 2027.

Despite production coming to a full halt, Boeing will continue upgrading the aircraft. Earlier, it received a new $930.77 million contract from the US Navy to continue work on the Super Hornet Service Life Modification (SLM) program.

The program will increase the service life of up to 60 F/A-18E/F aircraft from 6,000 to 10,000 flying hours, keeping them operational well into the future. Additionally, the US Navy has contracted Boeing to upgrade all the older Super Hornets to the latest Block III standard.

What If the B-21 Raider Could Shoot Down Enemy Fighter Jets? The U.S. Air Force Just Put the Idea on Table

Boeing’s official said on February 23, 2023: As we invest in and develop the next era of capability, we are applying the same innovation and expertise that made the F/A-18 a workhorse for the US Navy and air forces around the world for nearly 40 years.”

Boeing spokeswoman Deborah VanNierop confirmed then that the remaining congressionally added US jets would be “the last American Super Hornets ever built” (absent an Indian Navy win, which did not materialize).

Indian Snub

Despite its best efforts to promote the Super Hornets to customers such as Canada, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Switzerland, Boeing failed to secure any new contracts. The last snub came from India, which was looking to replace its Russian-supplied MiG-29 K jets.

Boeing said it would extend the deadline by 2 years to 2027 if the Indian Navy selected the F/A-18 Super Hornet Block III over the French Rafale-M.

Boeing pitched the Super Hornets to India in 2022 and announced a roadmap to greatly increase its investments, in line with the “Make in India” initiative.

It also promised technology transfer (ToT) to the Indian industry if Delhi selected the Super Hornets. However, after a series of trials, India selected Rafale-M jets over the Super Hornets. You can read a full analysis of why the Super Hornets lost to the Rafale-M jets here.

Why India Rejected F/A-18 Super Hornets Despite Its Navy Loaded With American Military Platforms?

“We ran several international campaigns or competitions that we were unsuccessful in previous years,” Mark Sears, Boeing vice president for fighters, said in a 2024 interview. “That kind of played out, and there are no active discussions with the Navy about additional F-18s beyond these.”

He added that Boeing was focused on delivering the remaining jets on schedule “because we know how badly the Navy needs this capability,” while pivoting the St. Louis workforce to other programs (F-15EX, T-7A, MQ-25).

Super Hornets

The Super Hornet was developed to close a critical capability gap in US naval aviation during a period of major service restructuring.

The A-6 Intruder fleet was aging, the F-14 Tomcats were becoming difficult & expensive to maintain, and the baseline F/A-18 Hornets lacked the range and payload for deep-strike operations, creating a capability gap for the US Navy in the 1980s.

Because building a new jet from scratch would require a significant investment in an austerity-dominated era, McDonnell Douglas proposed developing a 70% larger, extensively redesigned F/A-18 Hornet.

McDonnell Douglas established the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet production line in the mid-1990s, and Boeing acquired the company in 1997. The aircraft made its maiden flight on November 29, 1995, and Boeing began full-rate production in September 1997.

The first production Super Hornet flew in November 1998, with deliveries to the US Navy beginning in January 1999.

It replaced the F-14 Tomcat in fleet defense, assumed the A-6 Intruder’s strike role, and eventually became the model for the EA-18G Growler. This dedicated Electronic Warfare combat aircraft entered service with the US Navy in 2009.

“The Super Hornet is the second major model upgrade since the inception of the F/A-18 aircraft program, highly capable across the full mission spectrum: air superiority, fighter escort, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, close air support, air defense suppression and day/night precision strike,” as per information on the official website of NAVAIR (Naval Air Systems Command).

The production line, primarily at Boeing’s St. Louis, Missouri, facilities, has continued to churn out these cutting-edge jets since then.

The aircraft was upgraded to Block II standard in 2002, adding Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, improved sensors and avionics, increased range, and the ability to employ a precision-weapons arsenal.

Saab’s Gripen-E Fighter Jet Booms in Export Market as Sweden’s Iconic Draken Turns 71

This aircraft then became the workhorse of the US Navy’s carrier operations and recently received its most advanced Block III upgrade.

The US Navy is the largest operator of the Super Hornets.

The aircraft has seen extensive combat, including the current conflict in the Middle East, since it made its debut with a strike against hostile targets in Iraq’s no-fly zone in November 2002.

• Mail us at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post The Hornet’s Nest is Closing! U.S. Navy Pays Boeing to Wind Down Production Lines of Super Hornets appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

On October 22, India’s Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) chief, Shatrujeet Singh Kapoor, stated while addressing ITBP personnel in Alwar, Rajasthan, that the threat from China continues to persist. He said there had been face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops at several locations in Arunachal Pradesh in the preceding days, and that these were continuing. 

Kapoor stressed that conventional military methods alone would not suffice against China, given the People’s Liberation Army’s extensive modernization. He called for stronger drone and anti-drone capabilities.

The ITBP chief’s call for stronger drone and anti-drone capabilities needs to be viewed in the correct perspective. Media coverage of military threats tends to focus on an adversary’s high-value weapon systems—ballistic and cruise missiles, fighter aircraft, bombers, warships and tanks. These systems are conspicuous, expensive and relatively easy to identify, quantify and assess in terms of their capabilities and the threats they pose.

The threat from drones, however, is fundamentally different and often underappreciated. Their low cost, small signatures, ease of deployment, and the difficulty of reliably detecting, identifying, and tracking them make the threat particularly hard to assess.

Drone Evolution

Drone warfare has evolved rapidly since the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022.

Initially, small drones were widely deployed for short-range reconnaissance and attack, including as loitering munitions. Their range was often limited by their dependence on line-of-sight communications and control.

Ukraine and Russia also fielded medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drones, which provided reconnaissance and strike capabilities broadly analogous to those of close air support aircraft.

However, their effectiveness depends inversely on the strength of the adversary’s air defenses. As a result, both sides have increasingly relied on these drones for reconnaissance and target acquisition, rather than operating them freely in heavily defended airspace.

Drone warfare capabilities have improved significantly since the start of the war through advances in propulsion, navigation, communications and machine vision. The evolution from short-range reconnaissance and attack drones to low-cost, long-range precision-strike systems has created a capability that, in some missions, can compete with that of cruise missiles.

Propulsion

Initially, many drones relied on internal combustion engines, which could be noisy, while smaller electric drones offered quieter operation but generally had more limited range and endurance.

Advances in battery technology have improved electric propulsion, although energy storage remains a constraint.

The development and wider availability of relatively low-cost jet engines have enabled some drones to fly at high speeds and altitudes over long distances, potentially complicating ground-based detection and interception.

Communication

Line-of-sight communications remain important, particularly for smaller drones. Their limitations can be mitigated through relay systems and mesh networking, while satellite links can extend communications beyond the radio horizon.

Geostationary satellite links generally have higher latency than low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite links, which can provide lower-latency communications. Together with improved networking, these technologies have expanded the scope for remote piloting and long-range operations. However, communications remain vulnerable to jamming and disruption.

Navigation and Precision Attack

Drones have traditionally relied on satellite navigation (SatNav) and other navigation methods to reach their targets. SatNav is vulnerable to jamming and can become unreliable in contested environments. A significant advance has been the development of AI-enabled terrain matching and machine vision, which allow drones to navigate using terrain features and visual cues rather than relying solely on satellite signals.

Machine vision has also improved precision-strike capabilities through target identification. Meanwhile, advances in counter-drone technologies have helped shape the evolution of strike drones, driving the development of systems designed to overcome increasingly sophisticated defenses.

Drone Development Cycle

Drone development and operational fielding cycles are considerably shorter than those of manned aircraft and helicopters.

Lower development costs and shorter timelines allow drone warfare to evolve rapidly in response to battlefield conditions. Drone designs and capabilities can be tailored to the specific challenges of a battlefield and the objectives of a particular campaign.

The design and capabilities of attack drones depend on the targets they are intended to engage. Attacking bridges, troop concentrations, moving road vehicles, or logistical storage facilities presents different operational requirements and calls for different drone capabilities. These requirements must also account for the counter-UAS systems deployed by the adversary.

The same principle applies to drone interceptors: their capabilities must match the threats they are designed to counter. For instance, countering high-speed, jet-powered attack drones may require equally fast, jet-powered interceptors, although other interception methods may also be effective.

Both the targets to be attacked and the capabilities of the adversary vary from one conflict to another. Consequently, drone development is driven by the specific operational requirements of each battlefield and the continuing interaction between attack drones and the defenses designed to defeat them.

Drone Warfare Enabling Technologies

A formidable drone warfare capability cannot be built merely by developing drones with impressive specifications. It requires drones whose capabilities are tailored to specific targets and tactical scenarios. For example, interdicting road supply lines requires drones that can identify and engage moving supply trucks while distinguishing them from other vehicles. Such drones may be unsuitable for attacking bridges.

The key is to master the enabling technologies that allow drones to perform specific tasks.

These broadly encompass five areas:

Propulsion: Low-cost, efficient engines for the required combination of speed, range, and endurance.

Communication: Resilient, low-latency communications, including LEO satellite links, for responsive remote piloting and target engagement.

Navigation: AI-enabled machine vision and terrain matching for navigation that does not depend solely on satellite navigation (SatNav).

Precision attack: Machine vision and target recognition for accurate engagement of intended targets.

Warheads: Payloads tailored to the intended targets and desired effects.

A nation cannot become a leader in drone warfare simply by developing drones. It must master these enabling technologies and continuously improve them to meet evolving battlefield requirements.

India’s mastery of drone-warfare enabling technologies remains limited in several critical areas, particularly when compared with China’s industrial scale and technological capabilities.

The Chinese Threat

China has substantial capabilities in many of the enabling technologies discussed above. More importantly, it has a formidable drone-component manufacturing ecosystem spanning electric motors, flight controllers, sensors, machine vision, navigation and communications modules, as well as drone propulsion.

Its experience with mesh networking can support low-latency drone control and coordination. China is also developing large-scale LEO satellite constellations, although their specific contribution to military drone operations should not be assumed without further evidence.

China could potentially develop and field drones tailored to exploit specific vulnerabilities in Indian Army capabilities or tactics within relatively short periods. It could also adapt its systems to counter tactical innovations introduced by Indian forces.

Along the border, China’s industrial capacity could enable it to manufacture and field drones in large numbers, threatening Indian troop movements by day and night. Supply lines, radars, tanks and artillery could all face persistent drone attacks.

Without comparable capabilities, the Indian Army would risk losing operational ground.

Long-range precision strikes by Chinese drones could also threaten IAF airbases, radars, air-defense units and logistics bases, potentially degrading India’s ability and willingness to sustain a prolonged conflict.

If this scenario seems overstated, consider how Russia, despite possessing a formidable layered air-defense network, has struggled to prevent Ukraine’s sustained drone attacks.

Ukrainian long-range strikes have benefited from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support, including Western assistance. Satellite communications, including Starlink, have also played a role in some Ukrainian drone operations.

China possesses substantial ISR and communications capabilities of its own, although their effectiveness in a conflict along the Indian border would depend on operational conditions and the resilience of the systems involved.

Given India’s resource constraints and technological gaps, it could struggle to withstand a sustained, large-scale Chinese drone campaign unless it develops comparable capabilities in drone production, deployment, and counter-drone warfare.

• Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
• Views Personal of the Author
• Follow the author @vkthakur

The post India-China Clash: How Beijing’s Industrial Edge Makes Its Drone Threat Bigger Than the Drones Themselves: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

As Germany seeks a new partner to develop its next-generation fighter after the collapse of FCAS, it now faces two choices: join the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) or forge a new partnership with Sweden and Spain.

If the proposal materializes, Europe could have three sixth-generation fighter programs: GCAP and the French initiative.

In June 2026, the Friedrich Merz administration pulled the plug on the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) that it was pursuing with France and Spain, over irreconcilable differences between industry partners Airbus (representing Germany and Spain) and France’s Dassault Aviation.

Berlin has been seeking a partnership to develop a sixth-generation aircraft ever since.

Earlier this month, reports indicated it held “exploratory talks” about joining the GCAP led by the UK, Japan, and Italy, and British Prime Minister Andy Burnham officially raised Germany’s involvement in GCAP.

However, Airbus had also earlier hinted it could potentially partner with Swedish defense manufacturer Saab to develop its sixth-generation fighter.

German defense officials have reportedly encouraged Berlin to seek a new fighter-aircraft collaboration with Sweden and Spain rather than join an existing deal involving the United Kingdom.

The internal ministry assessment notes that forming a new German-Swedish-Spanish partnership is “the more advantageous and promising” than joining the current GCAP. The evaluation does not, however, indicate that Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has approved the recommendation or that it represents a final government decision.

A New Partnership

Airbus had been exploring alternatives even before formally exiting the FCAS manned fighter program.

In May 2026, shortly before the collapse, Michael Schoellhorn, head of Airbus Defense and Space, told the Swedish newspaper Dagens Industri that he was looking forward to working with Sweden and Saab on a new next-generation fighter.

He emphasized Saab’s deep expertise in combat aircraft design and production and noted that discussions with the Swedish and German governments were already underway.

After the FCAS collapse, Schoellhorn said the company remained open to joining forces with Britain, Italy, and Japan for the GCAP, provided Germany secured a significant share of the work and meaningful leadership.

“What we’re ready to do is to join something or to build something where we have a significant portion of the work and the leadership. That’s currently being explored,” he said.

Days after Germany pulled out of FCAS, a group of companies led by Airbus, operating under the banner “Team Gen 6,” also submitted a position paper to the German government outlining a sixth-generation fighter concept, underscoring industry’s push for influence over the path forward.

Airbus has since invested heavily in the new path.

With a decision still pending and talks ongoing with both sides, Germany can swing either way. However, the German Defense Ministry’s inclination toward a new partnership with Sweden and Spain reflects the complexities of joining GCAP, now at an advanced stage.

Unlike the FCAS, GCAP Stays on Track

Edgewing, GCAP’s industrial joint venture to design and develop the next-generation fighter, is led by Leonardo (Italy), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan), and BAE Systems (the UK), and is advancing toward the aspirational milestone of flying its first demonstrator by 2027 and fielding the aircraft by 2035.

For Germany, joining the GCAP program at this stage could be thorny. Although the UK and Italy have openly expressed willingness to welcome more partners into the GCAP, Japan has been reluctant, concerned that renegotiating everything with a new partner would delay the program.

In fact, Tokyo—which needs to replace its F-2 combat jet with a sixth-generation fighter amid tensions with China—had earlier blocked cash-rich Saudi Arabia’s entry for similar reasons.

Even if Japan conceded, reopening delicate talks on industrial participation, production shares, and intellectual property could cause friction.

In that scenario, Germany may be offered a junior role, with limited say over design, architecture, and key decisions, which could be unacceptable to both Airbus and Berlin. British industry representative in the program, BAE Systems, is already believed to dominate it and has reportedly been unwilling to share technology with other partners, as Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto alleged earlier in April 2025.

This could limit the German industry partner’s room to maneuver within the program.

Moreover, the German Defense Ministry’s assessment specifically targets BAE Systems, citing bad experiences during the Eurofighter program (pursued jointly by the UK, Germany, Spain, and Italy).

The Ministry has reportedly accused BAE of prioritizing exports over German and Italian development interests and warns that British dominance would be incompatible with a partnership of equals.

Another disadvantage for Germany in joining the GCAP is a clear mismatch between operational requirements and the aircraft’s design philosophy.

The GCAP is reportedly being built around a maritime scenario, whereas Berlin would want an aircraft suited to its own geography and continental use, much like the Eurofighter or the F-35A Lightning II it is acquiring from the US.

Beyond these overarching issues, the existing GCAP members already have different priorities. Japan wants to replace the F-2 with a new fighter by the mid-2030s, while the UK and Italy reportedly want GCAP to create a state-of-the-art “system of systems,” a fighter that can operate with a swarm of drones, on a less strict timeline.

Admitting a new partner could further complicate the program’s internal workings.

Germany with Saab

In contrast, Germany’s collaboration with Sweden and Saab appears much more promising, at least in theory.

For one, if Germany forges a new partnership with Sweden and Spain, it would gain industrial influence and an equal partnership from the start, better alignment with continental European operational needs, and a more balanced industrial starting position.

For example, FCAS got off to a decent start in 2017, with all partners onboard and a division of work, but it eventually stalled over disagreements on work-share arrangements, with French contractor Dassault refusing to cede space to Airbus in developing the Next-Generation Fighter (NGF), the program’s centerpiece.

In its next partnership, Germany would want more influence and a greater workshare that actually benefits its industry.

The three countries could establish an Airbus–Saab joint venture, potentially using Saab’s Gripen E as a technological stepping stone or baseline while developing a new aircraft.

Both sides bring vast experience developing combat aircraft, which would come in handy for the new program. Moreover, bringing Spain into this partnership would give Airbus continuity and likely stronger bargaining power within the grouping.

That said, building a new partnership from the ground up also carries significant risks. The partners would need to establish governance structures, align requirements, agree funding shares, define intellectual property rules, and negotiate work-share from scratch.

This would push fielding past 2035, potentially into the late 2030s or beyond. Moreover, the exact problems that killed the FCAS manned fighter—work-share, leadership, and IP control—could easily reappear between Airbus and Saab, two strong design houses with distinct cultures.

Despite these risks, a pure continental European next-generation fighter partnership would preserve greater decision-making autonomy and manufacturing work for German, Spanish, and Swedish industry. More importantly, it would support long-term European defense-industrial capacity without the complications of late entry into an existing program with set architecture and priorities.

Saab is already conducting independent studies on sixth-generation technologies and has publicly stated it remains open to collaborations, including on fighter aircraft. “Saab remains open to a variety of collaborations and partnerships across a wide range of defense-related areas, including fighter aircraft.

Large-scale cooperation projects of this kind are typically addressed at the political level, with participation decisions made by the governments concerned,” a Saab spokesperson was quoted as saying in the POLITICO report. “Consequently, any questions about possible Swedish involvement should be directed to the Swedish government.

As always, Saab stands ready to support Sweden’s future fighter requirements,” it added. Meanwhile, Airbus boss Michael Schöllhorn shed some light on the company’s relationship with Saab in an interview with Handelsblatt earlier this week, emphasizing that they had “always worked well” together.

For now, it remains to be seen which way Chancellor Merz’s government will swing. The choice is between accepting a subordinate but potentially faster role within a mature program, or insisting on industrial leadership and requirements fit, at the cost of delays and the risk of repeating past mistakes and failures.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post Third 6th-Gen Fighter Program Bubbles in Europe as Germany Explores Spain-Sweden Deal appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Russia is using fighter jets from both ends of its inventory, its most advanced fifth-generation Su-57s and the rare MiG-35s, to counter Ukraine’s long-range drones, though for sharply different operational reasons.

While reports of Su-57s deployment for Moscow’s air defense and shooting down Ukrainian drones have appeared frequently, a Telegram channel belonging to the specialized community Soniashnyk and connected to Ukrainian aviation reported on October 21 that Russia deployed a MiG-35 to shoot down Ukrainian drones.

The Telegram channel also published an image of a russian pilot in the cockpit of a MiG-35 allegedly involved in intercepting Ukrainian drones.

What makes MiG-35s alleged involvement in anti-drone operations unusual is the fact that these jets are still in the experimental stage and have rarely been used in the war in Ukraine.

In fact, while the war in Ukraine is already in its fifth year, there have only been three known instances where MiG-35s were involved in combat operations, and every time they were used for anti-drone operations.

The first reports of MiG-35 involvement in anti-drone operations emerged nearly three years ago, in November 2023; however, at the time, the story was based entirely on claims from Russian industry, with no supporting images or videos.

Sergei Korotkov, Chief Designer at the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), told RIA Novosti that the MiG-35 was already participating in operations related to the conflict in Ukraine.

He said the aircraft “is already participating in all ongoing operations” amid the current events in Ukraine, and that the Ministry of Defense still needs to decide on serial procurement before further test flights.

Then nearly one-and-a-half years later, in May 2025, Russian sources claimed the MiG-35 was used for the first time since the start of the special military operation to intercept Ukrainian UAVs.

Now, nearly 17 months later, and for the first time, a Telegram channel associated with Ukrainian aviation has reported the use of the MiG-35 to counter Ukrainian drones. This time, it also published an image of the MiG-35 pilot.

Clearly, Russia has scarcely used MiG-35s in the war in Ukraine, and only for anti-drone operations.

So why is Russia using the latest, most advanced fighter jet from the legendary Mikoyan factory, which Moscow markets as a 4+++ generation fighter, so sparingly and strictly only for anti-drone operations?

Why is the MiG-35 Missing From Action?

Part of the reason is the numbers themselves.

So far, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) have received only six MiG-35s (four single-seat MiG-35S and two two-seat MiG-35UB variants).

All six fighters belong to an experimental/pre-production batch that took five years to produce, from 2018 to 2023. Two of these fighters (both two-seat MiG-35UB variants) are trainers.

The Mig-35 aircraft has not entered serial production yet.

The extremely limited numbers and experimental status mean that neither enough jets are available for combat nor have they matured enough to serve in frontline combat roles.

In fact, while Russia placed its first order for the MiG-35 eight years ago in 2018, and the fighter entered operational service in 2019, Moscow has placed no subsequent orders.

Russia initially planned to order 37 MiG-35s; later, it reduced that number to 24. However, in the end, Russia ordered only six aircraft.

Russia backed multiple Sukhoi models, including the Su-34, Su-35, and fifth-generation Su-57, over the cheaper MiG-35.

Similarly, although Russia presented the MiG-35 to international customers at the 2017 Moscow air show and entered it in numerous export contests, including the massive Indian MMRA contest for 114 fighter jets, it won no export orders.

Other export customers, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Iran, and Egypt, also overlooked the MiG-35.

The lack of substantial domestic orders and zero export orders clearly points to the fighter’s below-par performance.

In fact, analysts have consistently pointed out that while the MiG-35 was promised as a 4++ generation aircraft, it offers only marginal improvements over the 1980s MiG-29 in range, engine performance, and payload capacity, rather than a transformative leap.

They point out that the MiG-35 airframe is essentially a rebranded late-model Fulcrum airframe with slight modifications, such as more internal fuel and a larger wing area.

It currently has a PESA radar, not the promised AESA radar. The serial-production aircraft lacks thrust-vectoring control, as previously planned.

Its RD-33 derivative engines have underperformed, delivering no real gains in thrust, fuel economy, or reliability.

Analysts also point out that with air combat changing dramatically, the MiG-35 increasingly looks like an outdated combat aircraft.

It is not a stealth platform and lacks long-range weapons, sensor fusion, potent electronic warfare capabilities, and network-centric warfare.

No wonder neither Russia nor export customers are ordering MiG-35s.

Countries that want high-capability, high-performance fighters pick Rafale, F-35, F-15 Eagles, and F-16V.

Countries seeking cheaper alternatives gravitate toward the Chinese JF-17 and JF-10 and the Swedish Gripen.

Until MiG-35s receive new capabilities such as AESA radar, thrust vectoring, long-range weapons, and sensor fusion, the aircraft is ill-suited for modern warfare.

However, Ukrainian swarm drone attacks and the falling number of Russian combat aircraft due to wartime losses mean that Moscow is deploying every airborne asset that it can mobilize to counter Ukrainian drones.

Further, the limited deployment of MiG-35s in the Ukraine conflict serves two other purposes for Russia: it can give Moscow valuable real-world data to improve the aircraft and signal to international customers that the fighter has been combat-tested.

In fact, there is a case for resurrecting the flop MiG-35; it is substantially cheaper than Sukhois like the Su-34 and Su-35. Its operating costs are also much lower than the heavier Sukhoi fighters.

Once the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will need a cheaper alternative to expensive, heavy Sukhoi fighters to quickly rebuild the VKS fleet with more numbers to account for heavy wartime losses.

In fact, last year Breaking Defense reported that Yuri Slyusar, shortly before leaving his post as head of the United Aircraft-Building Corporation (OAK), confirmed that the MiG-35, now designated a “4+++ generation fighter,” would begin large-scale production.

Russia may be deploying the MiG-35 in limited counter-drone operations to test its performance in real-world conditions and use the data to improve the serial-production variant once the war ends.

Russia, however, is deploying the fifth-generation Su-57 for very different reasons.

Why is Russia Deploying Su-57 to Hunt Drones?

Another Russian fighter that has seen only a limited role in the war in Ukraine is the fifth-generation Su-57.

During a Ukrainian swarm drone attack on Russia’s largest Omsk oil refinery in July, online footage from locals showed the silhouette of the elusive Su-57 shrieking overhead.

Earlier, pictures emerged showing a Su-57 fitted with R-73 air-to-air missiles on its wing pylons rather than in its internal weapons bay. Another set of pictures has shown the Su-57 carrying short-range R-73/R-74 (AA-11 Archer) series air-to-air missiles.

Carrying the missiles beneath the wing pylons would compromise the Su-57’s stealth; however, if the jet is deployed primarily for anti-drone operations, stealth is unnecessary. Similarly, short-range AAMs are effective only against drones.

These pictures provide conclusive evidence that Russia used the Su-57 for counter-drone operations.

Critics argue that Moscow is deliberately limiting the Su-57’s exposure to protect its export potential. Any confirmed losses to Ukrainian forces, they say, would severely damage the jet’s credibility in the international export market.

Russia is therefore using the Su-57 for low-risk counter-drone operations.

The war of attrition in Ukraine, which is already in its fifth year, the high aircraft loss ratio for both sides, and the intensity of Ukrainian swarm drone attacks have created a peculiar situation for Russia, where it is deploying its most advanced fighter, the Su-57, and perhaps the least promising, the MiG-35, mostly for low-risk counter-drone operations.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Su-57 and MiG-35: How Russia is Using Its Best and Worst Fighter Jets To Fight Ukraine’s Drones appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Is Turkey now globally recognized as a major military-industrial power?

The question assumes significance as, in a span of 48 hours, Turkey has signed two significant agreements that enhance its military-industrial power projection.

In Doha on October 21, it signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan, Qatar, and Indonesia for joint defense production, integrated manufacturing chains, and technology sharing.

In Ankara on October 22, it signed a Strategic Partnership with Canada, including a formal Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership, alongside deals on energy and air transport.

Four senior ministers signed the Badr Memorandum (BMU): Pakistan’s defense minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Turkey’s defense minister Yasar Guler, Qatar’s Deputy PM Sheikh Saud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Yusuf Jauhari.

Prof. Dr. Haluk Görgün, President (Secretary) of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) in Turkey and regarded as the “architect” of the BMU, was present at the signing ceremony.

Incidentally, Badr refers to the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers defeated their opponents in one of Islam’s earliest battles in the Arabian Peninsula.

Turkey’s defense ministry explained the name “Badr” as “full moon”. It said that “the four participating nations complement one another through this pact, which holds significant military and economic importance”.

In a statement, it added that “by leveraging the capabilities of each country in the field of military production, cooperation and integration will be achieved, defense industry capacities will be developed, and the needs of allied and friendly nations can thus be met.”

Similarly, the statement made by the Qatari Defense Ministry said the “Badr” Memorandum of Understanding “aims to foster cooperation in the field of defense manufacturing, enhance defense capabilities among the four countries, and promote collaboration in technical defense training, as well as in research and development areas, thereby contributing to the creation of solutions and industries worthy of the evolution of modern defenses”.

According to Arda Mevlutoglu, managing director of Ankara-based Mergen Analytical Strategies, the BMU’s implications could extend well beyond the four participants. “We may be witnessing the emergence of an interconnected network of defense and security arrangements extending from the Gulf to South and Southeast Asia, rather than a single formal alliance”.

Under the agreement, each country will bring its own resources and skills to the table.

“Turkey contributes technological expertise, systems integration and a mature defense industry; Pakistan and Indonesia offer manufacturing capacity, skilled workforces and sizable domestic markets; and Qatar provides investment potential and demand. Together, the four nations could establish integrated supply chains, allowing these countries to jointly develop, manufacture and sustain defence systems”, Mevlutoglu told Al Jazeera.

This means each member brings a complementary, not equal, asset. Turkey provides the industrial core, with establishments like Baykar (drones), TAI (aerospace), Aselsan (defense electronics), Roketsan (Missiles and munitions), STM (naval systems), and proven export models like the TB2 and Akıncı unmanned air-combat vehicles.

But Turkey seeks scale, co-production markets, and capital. Qatar can provide the finance. Pakistan and Indonesia can serve as markets.

Reportedly, Pakistan wants to diversify its military imports and not rely solely on China. It wants technology transfer and self-reliance through collaborations.

Indonesia is an emerging market and production base. Jakarta has bought Turkish weapons before — Kaplan tanks, MILGEM-derived frigates — and wants to build its own defense industry under Prabowo’s doctrine, with access to NATO-standard tech without full Western political conditions. The doctrine is championed by President Prabowo Subianto, who is aggressively executing a multifaceted supplier-diversification and co-production strategy.

However, the BMU is not the Mecca Pact of August 2026 that Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia signed in Riyadh and reportedly contains a collective defense clause—an attack on one is an attack on all.  It is an industrial MoU.

But one could argue that the initiative reflects Gulf countries increasingly looking toward the Global South and fellow Muslim countries, as recent Middle East conflicts have exposed vulnerabilities tied to dependence on foreign suppliers, technology restrictions, and supply chain disruptions.

By anchoring a defense-industrial coalition with Qatar, Pakistan, and Indonesia, Ankara seems to have signaled that it could be the technological and industrial nucleus of the Global South. And the global validation of its strategy has come through “the three-year action plan” with Ottawa.

Reports describe the optics of Prime Minister Mark Carney being received at the Presidential Complex in Ankara with full honors by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as historic. Carney is the first Canadian Prime Minister to make a dedicated bilateral visit to Turkey, although he traveled to Ankara in July to attend the NATO summit.

The visit resulted in the signing of three agreements: a Defense Industry Partnership between SSB Chairman Haluk Gorgun and Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand; an Air Transport Agreement; and a Joint Declaration on Energy Cooperation.

Remarkably, a few years ago, the two countries’ defense relations had virtually collapsed.

In October 2019, Canada imposed an arms embargo on Turkey after “Operation Peace Spring” in northeastern Syria. It was a military offensive launched by the Turkish Armed Forces and the allied Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

In October 2020, Canada suspended and later canceled export permits for L3Harris Wescam camera and targeting systems after confirming they were used on Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones supporting Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In fact, Canada adopted a presumptive-denial policy for military exports to Turkey. The Turkish defense industry saw Canada as a technology chokepoint.

However, over the last two years, Canada and Turkey have rebuilt their defense relationship. In January 2024, Ottawa quietly lifted arms-export restrictions and returned to a case-by-case assessment. In July 2026, at the NATO Summit in Ankara, the two defense ministers signed a “Statement of Intent”  on military dialogue.

“In an increasingly complex global security environment, rising geopolitical uncertainties, and evolving humanitarian challenges, a strong and resilient Canada-Turkiye partnership is essential, providing a foundation to mitigate shared threats and capitalize on new opportunities,” said a joint statement by Carney and Erdogan on Thursday.

Canary’s own statement was more emphatic: “Today’s new Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership will connect Canadian and Turkish companies to work together, creating good jobs at home, export opportunities abroad, greater security for our citizens, and contributing to a stronger NATO alliance”.

The partnership’s three-year action plan rests on four pillars: trade and investment; defense and security; energy; and ties between people.

On trade, investment and innovation, the two leaders agreed to “work toward the successful conclusion of a Canada-Turkey Free Trade Agreement”. They will also expand bilateral trade and investments in priority sectors, including energy supply, defense production, aerospace, and artificial intelligence (AI).

On defense and security, Carney and Erdogan “underlined their intent to deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation”. They also agreed to “strengthen cooperation in support of peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, including Ukraine, South Caucasus, and the Middle East, in particular Gaza”.

The three-year action plan calls for exploring co-development in aerospace, defense production, AI, critical minerals, LNG, and nuclear energy.

Of course, what Canada has agreed is not about Turkey alone. Carney is in the middle of a full-scale trade war with Washington. President Donald Trump’s tariffs and rhetoric questioning Canadian sovereignty have forced Ottawa to pursue a deliberate diversification strategy.

Carney has already reset ties with Saudi Arabia, India and China — all strained under his predecessor Justin Trudeau. Turkey, with 87 million people, NATO’s second-largest army, and a growing industrial base, fits perfectly into his “reliable partners” and “collective resilience” narrative.

For Turkey, the gain is more strategic than commercial. A G7 member and a Five Eyes country, which once embargoed it, Canada now legitimizes its defense industry as a partner. No wonder Erdogan was quick to link Thursday’s agreement to his pet project — “the Defense, Security and Resilience Bank” , announced by nine countries at the NATO summit in July 2026 to finance defense production.

Few will contest that Turkey’s defense industry has grown steadily. From an import-dependent country with 20% local production in 2002 to over 80% today, with $7.1 billion in exports in 2024, it is now a top-15 arms exporter. The fact that both Canada, which embargoed it, and Indonesia, which has options from South Korea and France, want co-production with Turkey is the recognition of Turkey’s defense ecosystem.

Apparently, the narrative has shifted from “Turkey buys” to “Turkey builds with.” Both the Badr agreement and the deal with Canada use the language of “joint production and technology sharing”, not a “buyer-seller” arrangement.

Secondly, Turkey is building a parallel architecture. A formal NATO ally, it is also becoming the leader of a non-Western defense network.

Thirdly, it is showing “Sanctions Resilience”. Western restrictions for its intervention in Syria and the controversy over its buying the S-400  from Russia seem to have taught Turkey to indigenize. Now that indigenization is proving to be its selling point.

However, some reality checks are needed. Turkey’s achievements need not be projected as triumphalism.

After all, both the Agreements made at Doha and Ankara are  MoUs and framework agreements. No specific defense program has been identified that would allow assessment of impact on regional military balance. “Badr” has no factory, no joint venture company yet. In defense deals, MOUs are one thing, but their eventual shape is a different matter.

Second, there is the technology ceiling. Turkey still depends on Western subsystems — engines for Kaan and Altay, critical minerals processing, and high-end semiconductors. Canada can help with the latter, but Ottawa’s case-by-case export control means strategic tech will still be gated.

Engaging pragmatically with strategically vital G20 and NATO allies without requiring complete alignment on all domestic values, Canada is meeting this moment with what it calls “values-based realism”.

It is “pragmatically” dealing with other countries, but it will not cross a line when its commitment to the fundamental values of freedom, human rights, sustainability, and solidarity is challenged.

So, it remains to be seen how long Canada will remain silent on the widely reported sweeping and unprecedented nationwide crackdown by the Turkish government on dissent and civil society, heavily focusing on the systematic dismantling of LGBTQ+ and HIV-advocacy organizations.

However, all this does not detract from the fact that Turkey is emerging as a second-tier military-industrial power like South Korea and Israel. Its products are innovative and export-driven. But it has miles to go before reaching the status of the US, France, and Russia, which set global standards.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Canada Deal Cements Turkey’s Position as a Military-Industrial Power. Comes After Makkah & Badr Pacts appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

For the first time, a Royal Air Force (RAF) Eurofighter Typhoon flew alongside the French nuclear-capable Rafale during a simulated nuclear-strike mission, showcasing rare coordination between Europe’s two most advanced fighter jets. 

The UK deployed a small contingent of Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4s to France’s Saint-Dizier air base—a key facility in northeastern France that hosts Rafale squadrons of the deterrence force—for Exercise Rummy held over two days on October 20 and 21, 2026.

The exercise took place over France and the Mediterranean, with the Typhoons serving as a defensive counter-air (DCA) escort for the mock nuclear-armed Rafales during a simulated long-range nuclear strike sortie. The A330 MRTT refueling tankers supported the package.

“Taking off from the nuclear-capable air base at Saint-Dizier, the French and British crews demonstrated a very high level of interoperability and an ability to coordinate. The French and British nuclear forces remain independent,” the French Chief of the Defense Staff, General Fabien Mandon, said in a post on X.

Notably, the exercise did not involve any real nuclear warheads, although images published by French officials and Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin show French Rafales armed with ASMP (an air-launched land-attack cruise missile that can carry a nuclear payload) and Mica air-to-air missiles. Meanwhile, the Eurofighters were seen equipped with the short-range ASRAAM air-to-air missiles and fuel tanks.

“Conducted under robust safety and security arrangements, the exercise did not involve nuclear weapons. The exercise focused on improving how our forces work together, ensuring that if the UK faces a serious threat, our military can respond quickly and effectively alongside our closest European ally,” the UK Ministry of Defense said in an official statement on October 23, 2026.

Under the Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations (CSNO) concept, which is an established approach of NATO, the conventionally armed Eurofighter Typhoons could provide conventional escort and protection for the nuclear-capable Rafales without carrying, controlling, or deciding on the use of nuclear weapons.

As the nuclear-armed aircraft’s main air defense, the Typhoons would have unrestricted movement around the Rafales’ perimeter to identify and, if required, neutralize any radar contacts.

Optimized for high-altitude, high-speed air superiority and carrying weapons for both short- and long-range combat, the Eurofighter Typhoons can detect, intercept, and engage enemy fighters that threaten the strike package during a nuclear mission.

In a real mission, the Typhoon’s high-altitude intercept capability and the Rafale’s low-observable, terrain-following performance would lower overall mission risk and improve the chances of the strike aircraft reaching the launch point.

Nuclear Cooperation Without Sharing Nukes

Both the UK and France are nuclear powers, although Britain stopped using air-launched nuclear weapons in 1998 following the Strategic Defense Review (SDR), and currently only possesses the Trident submarine-launched missiles for nuclear weapons. France, by contrast, has both sea- and air-based nuclear launch capability.

France, in turn, retains exclusive political and operational control over its nuclear forces. Therefore, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force; it shows only that two independent deterrents can practice the tactical and procedural interface of a nuclear mission, including communications, escort, tanker support, and deconfliction, without combining their weapons, targeting, or the final decision to fire.

That said, France and Britain signed the Northwood Declaration to strengthen cooperation on their respective nuclear arsenals during French President Emmanuel Macron’s three-day visit to Britain in July 2025. 

“This morning, we signed the Northwood Declaration, confirming for the first time that we are coordinating our independent nuclear deterrence,” the former British PM Keir Starmer said at the time. ”From today, our adversaries will know that any extreme threat to this continent would prompt a response from our two nations. There is no greater demonstration of the importance of this relationship.”

Later that year, the newly formed Nuclear Steering Group met for the first time in Paris, and British officials observed Exercise Poker, a regular nuclear deterrence exercise conducted by French Air and Space Forces, marking the first time foreign officials had been given that access. Notably, the UK went from mere observer to participant, providing conventional support in a nuclear deterrence drill, in 10 months.

“Having independent nuclear forces doesn’t exclude coordination. By coordinating, our nuclear forces demonstrate that they can contribute even more significantly to the overall security of the alliance and the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic zone,” French Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin stated.

Meanwhile, British Defense Secretary Wes Streeting said, “As Europe’s nuclear powers, we have a shared responsibility to contribute to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. This exercise demonstrates the depth of our partnership, the credibility of our deterrents and our determination to stand together in the face of emerging threats.”

France has been collaborating with several European partners on the idea of “forward deterrence” amid uncertainties about US security guarantees for Europe and escalating security threats from Russia. Earlier this year, German Eurofighter Typhoons flew alongside French nuclear-capable Rafales in a joint “forward deterrence” exercise earlier this year.

In July 2026, two Luftwaffe Eurofighter Typhoons from Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 31 “Boelcke” at Nörvenich and two French Air and Space Force Dassault Rafale Bs from the Forces Aériennes Stratégiques at Saint-Dizier conducted their first joint air activity.

In March this year, French President Macron announced some changes in the country’s nuclear policy, including increasing the size of the country’s nuclear arsenal and extending the deterrent to cover other European countries.

“The next 50 years will be an era of nuclear weapons,” he exclaimed. The President noted that the UK, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark had all agreed to participate in the new “advanced deterrence” plan. He emphasized that the eight European nations could host air bases where France’s nuclear bombers could be based as well as participate in exercises of France’s air-launched nuclear capability. 

This would allow France’s Strategic Air Forces (FAS) to “spread out across the depth of the European continent… and thus complicate the calculations of our adversaries”, the president said at the time. This hinted that the country was eager to spearhead the continent’s nuclear posture amid rising security threats from Russia and a strained transatlantic relationship that has heightened insecurity among European states.

That said, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force, nor does it amount to a French nuclear umbrella in the classic extended-deterrence sense. Instead, it shows France systematically testing how far it can bring conventional partners–including Europe’s only other nuclear power–into the operational orbit of its airborne nuclear forces while retaining full control over the nukes in line with the larger “forward deterrence.”

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

The post Rafale Jets Lead Nuclear Strike Package, Eurofighter Typhoons Provide Air Cover in 1st UK-France Nuke Drills appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Four of China’s new KJ-3000 airborne early warning aircraft have been spotted at the Xi’an Aircraft Company complex, suggesting the type may have entered low-rate or serial production just 22 months after its first flight. 

Satellite images captured around October 4, 2026, by Vantor and posted to social media show four KJ-3000 early warning aircraft at the Xi’an Aircraft Company (XAC) complex in Yanliang. Three were spotted near the Y-20 production facilities, and the fourth was seen at the adjacent China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE).

Senior Fellow J. Michael Dahm of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies analyzed all available images in depth and assessed that the presence of four aircraft at Xi’an’s Y-20 production facility indicates the KJ-3000 has entered serial production. 

However, Chinese military aviation specialist Andreas Rupprecht seemed to agree with Dahm’s assessment, though he noted that the images could instead signal that the aircraft have entered low-rate production.

“Consequently, this could indeed be a sign that production or LRIP has begun; however, it could also be that all 4 previously known prototypes are in place. What we therefore need are clear photographs of the aircraft, their serial numbers, and, at best, showing them in PLAAF grey,” he argued, adding just the amount of caution required vis-à-vis Chinese platforms.

The KJ-3000, expected to be China’s most advanced early warning aircraft, first broke cover in December 2024, right after the sixth-generation prototypes, the J-36 and the J-50, were seen flying for the first time.

A pixelated image of the KJ-3000 in flight was posted to social media, as the EurAsian Times had reported at the time. Another highly pixelated image of a primer-painted aircraft bearing serial number 7821 surfaced in May 2025.

Notably, AEW&C aircraft serve as “eyes in the sky,” providing real-time surveillance and command and control over large areas. They are crucial force multipliers that coordinate air operations, guide fighters, and integrate data from multiple sources, including satellites, other aircraft, and ground-based sensors, serving as airborne command centers. Thus, playing a vital role in complex, dynamic battlefields where rapid decision-making is key.

Although details about the KJ-3000 are scarce, it is based on the Y-20B transport aircraft and powered by a WS-20 high-bypass turbofan engine.

The aircraft has a noticeable set of antennae on the forward fuselage and a large circular radome positioned over the rear fuselage. It also features a prominent intake at the base of the tailfin, likely to supply cooling air for its numerous onboard electronics. Additionally, it has an aerial refueling probe above the cockpit.

The aircraft is expected to have a detection range of 360 to 500 kilometers, although some estimates put it at 600 to 1,000 kilometers. These conjectures couldn’t be verified.

The massive early warning radar aircraft is likely intended to replace the KJ-2000, China’s only large jet-powered AEW&C platform to date. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) had a limited fleet of about four KJ-2000 aircraft, converted from Russian Ilyushin Il-76MD transports in the early 2000s, as the program stalled due to limited access to suitable Il-76 airframes and reliance on Russian engines and spares.

The KJ-3000 is believed to be a massive improvement over the KJ-2000. It can reportedly carry up to 66 tons of payload (16 tons more than the KJ-2000), and the WS-20 engines provide more thrust (about 31,000 pounds) and fuel efficiency, enabling longer flights.

The KJ-3000 would serve as a high-end airborne command, control, and surveillance node, significantly enhancing China’s ability to detect, track, and coordinate forces across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific in a potential conflict with the United States.

Its large AESA radar—mounted on a high-flying, long-endurance Y-20B platform—provides a much greater radar horizon than ground-based radars or existing smaller Chinese AEW&C aircraft.

Operating at higher altitudes and with aerial refueling will allow the KJ-3000 to provide persistent coverage over key maritime approaches, the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine Sea, or the South China Sea.

The aircraft could detect aircraft, ships, and potentially low-observable or low-flying threats (such as drones and bombers) farther away, giving Chinese forces earlier warning and more time to decide on a fast-moving battlefield.

The KJ-3000 is designed as a “sky command center.” It can track multiple targets at once and direct Chinese fighters, such as the J-20 stealth aircraft, as well as long-range air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and drones.

Furthermore, the KJ-3000 detects and tracks carrier strike groups, airborne tankers, AWACS, and strike packages at longer ranges, feeding targeting data to ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, and helping Beijing’s painstakingly built Anti-Access/Area-Denial structure.

A Mismatch Between Chinese & US Capability

Interestingly, China’s expanding early warning capabilities contrast sharply with those of the United States Air Force, which continues to grapple with the transition of its own heavy advanced early warning from the E-3 to the more advanced E-7 Wedgetail.

The E-3 Sentry fleet is aging, and its airframe and radar limitations are becoming more acute with every passing day. The planned replacement, the Boeing 737-based E-7 Wedgetail, already in service with allies such as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, and soon the United Kingdom, was originally planned for the USAF at 26 aircraft. However, budget uncertainty and shifting priorities have repeatedly delayed procurement.

Last year, for instance, the previous US Air Force plan to acquire 26 Boeing E-7 Wedgetail aircraft remained under review during the fiscal 2026 budget process under the current Trump administration, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

However, Congress pushed back against potential cuts and cancellation of the program.

In March 2026, the USAF changed strategy and awarded contract modifications to continue development and procure additional engineering-and-manufacturing-development (EMD) aircraft, bringing the contracted total to about seven. Later, in May 2026, the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated the department’s “mindset” had changed and that the E-7 “has a future” and a place on the battlefield.

Finally, reports in June 2026 noted that the Pentagon was seeking diversion of money from the US Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye and classified Air Force accounts to fund a $1.55 billion spending plan for its revived E-7 Wedgetail program in fiscal 2027. However, it has not yet committed to the large production run of the originally planned 26 aircraft.

The continued delay has raised concerns about a potential gap in airborne battle management amid rising security threats, especially since the E-3 is becoming outdated and the US has only about 15 of these aircraft (after one loss in the Iran war). 

By contrast, China is not only improving its early warning capabilities but also expanding its AEW&CS fleet—something that could trouble the US and its allies in an Indo-Pacific conflict.

China is Amassing Early Warning Aircraft

Early warning platforms are among an air force’s most strategic assets, especially since a single high-end platform can cover hundreds of thousands of square kilometers and track multiple targets during combat. However, no air force can rely on a handful of expensive, slow-moving, vulnerable early-warning aircraft alone.

So, China appears to have created somewhat of a layered AEW&C force structure.

Under this strategy, instead of fielding one type of aircraft, Beijing is working on deploying complementary tiers of platforms optimized for different roles, ranges, basing options, and threat environments. This is intended to create persistent, resilient, multi-domain surveillance that adversaries find harder to suppress.

China has developed newer early-warning aircraft based on existing designs, including the KJ-500, which forms the backbone of the PLAAF’s early-warning capability and is based on the Shaanxi Y-9 turboprop, and the KJ-200, a legacy aircraft based on the older Y-8.

The KJ-200 and KJ-500 are smaller than the high-end KJ-3000. They are considered ideal for regional operations, including in volatile areas like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and would play a major role in a potential contingency in these flashpoint areas.

The KJ-200s, for one, provide supplementary coverage and experience while the PLAAF expands and simultaneously upgrades its KJ-500 fleet.

China has also developed the KJ-700, a next-generation Y-9-derived design intended as a more capable complement to the KJ-500. It features improved sensors and enhanced networking and is designed to handle denser, more complex threat environments, including low-observable aircraft and large numbers of drones. It is likely designed for missions anticipated in a future conflict with the United States.

China has also developed the KJ-600 for carrier-based operations, giving the PLA Navy massive reach and the ability to detect incoming threats from farther away, allowing it to project power far from its coast. With a twin-turboprop design, folding wings, and a large AESA rotodome, the KJ-600 entered operational service on the CATOBAR carrier Fujian in 2025 and has been observed on the ski-jump carrier Shandong.

The KJ-200 could be classified as a low-tier legacy aircraft, while the KJ-500 and KJ-700 could be clubbed as medium-tier and advanced medium-tier aircraft, respectively.

Meanwhile, the KJ-600 is a specialized carrier aircraft. The larger, more capable KJ-3000 falls into the high-tier category, and its serial production would let China field multiple aircraft for continuous coverage, attrition resilience, or simultaneous operations.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post In Just 22 Months — China’s Four KJ-3000 AEW&C Aircraft Spotted at Xi’an. Experts Hint at Serial Production appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.

Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.

The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.

The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.

It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft. However, the agreement’s execution still depends on Congressional authorization and appropriations.

The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.

The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.

The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.

“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.

“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”

The Pentagon believes multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to invest upfront in expanding production facilities.

Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.

Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.

Why India Rejected F/A-18 Super Hornets Despite Its Navy Loaded With American Military Platforms?

The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.

If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.

In addition, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants.

The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.

To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.

Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.

“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”

Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.

The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.

Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.

According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.

China Outbuilt the U.S. by Over 2X in Naval Tonnage in 2024–25. How Did Beijing Outpace America?

While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.

Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).

Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.

Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will let Lockheed Martin enter long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.

It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.

Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.

It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.

Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.

Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.

If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.

“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24^th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

Three Decades After Subic Bay Withdrawal, U.S. Military Returns to the Philippines With a New Model to Check China

Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.

Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.

If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.

Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.

Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.

A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.

The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post F-35 Stealth Fighter: Why Pentagon is Locking Production For a Decade—and Lockheed’s $7B Counter-Bet to Make It Work appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.

Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.

The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.

The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.

It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft.

However, the agreement’s execution remains subject to Congressional authorization and appropriations.

The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.

The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.

The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.

“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.

“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”

The Pentagon believes that multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to make upfront investments in expanding production facilities.

Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.

Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.

The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.

If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.

Besides, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants of the fighter.

The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.

To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.

Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.

“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”

Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.

The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.

Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.

According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.

While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.

Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).

Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.

Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will allow Lockheed Martin to enter into long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, thereby stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.

It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.

Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.

It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.

Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.

Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.

If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.

“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24^th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.

Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.

If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.

Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.

Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.

A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.

The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post The $7 Billion Bet Inside Lockheed’s F-35 Framework: Why Pentagon Wants to Lock Production for a Decade appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The Indian Navy is conducting trials of the French Dassault Rafale-M, the naval aircraft that edged out the American F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in a tight contest. 

Interestingly, the Indian Navy already operates a substantial number of American platforms. Against that backdrop, Boeing had expected to secure yet another major Indian contract.

Why did the French Rafale-M ultimately edge out the Super Hornets?

In April 2025, India ordered 26 Rafale Marines to replace the Russian-origin MiG-29K, which currently operates from Indian aircraft carriers– INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant.

More than a year after signing the contract, the Indian Navy is running Rafale-M trials at the Shore-Based Test Facility (SBTF) at INS Hansa in Goa and is reportedly considering some minor modifications to its aircraft carriers to accommodate the French aircraft.

According to the reports, the service is considering these small modifications because the Rafale-M fighters were originally designed to operate from CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) carriers—such as the French carrier Charles de Gaulle—whereas Indian carriers use a Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) system.

Additionally, the Rafale-M has a wingspan of almost 10.9 meters, and unlike the MiG-29K, it is not designed to fold its wings to take up less space on the deck. This creates a larger deck or hangar footprint. So, the Navy is purportedly examining minor procedural workarounds, such as temporarily detaching the wingtip missile launch rails to reduce the effective span to roughly 9.6 meters, along with handling and stowage adjustments.

Rafale-M deliveries are expected to begin in 2028 and likely conclude by 2030, marking the first time in a decade that the Indian Navy will operate a non-Russian or Western fighter. Its last Western carrier fighter was the British Sea Harrier aircraft, which it retired in 2016 after more than three decades of service.

Notably, the Indian Navy has operated French equipment before, though never on this scale.

Earlier, it acquired 12 Breguet Alizé carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft that participated in the 1961 Goa operations and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and served the Navy until 1991. The service has also operated the HAL Chetak, a French-designed light utility helicopter produced in India for decades, though it is now being phased out in favor of more advanced indigenous aircraft. 

By contrast, the Indian Navy operates a range of US-origin equipment, from helicopters to spy aircraft, making the choice of a French carrier-based jet particularly interesting.

Indian Navy: Full of US-Origin Weapon Systems

Despite the push for indigenization, the Indian Navy has steadily acquired American platforms and weapons over the past few decades.

One of the most important items on this list is the P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft. India first ordered eight P-8I aircraft in January 2009, becoming the type’s first international customer.

It signed a follow-on order for four additional aircraft in 2016, significantly enhancing its maritime surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and ISR capabilities and positioning it as a critical asset in the Indian Ocean Region. In February 2026, the Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) officially cleared an additional P-8I purchase.

In addition to the Poseidon, the Indian Navy ordered 24 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-mission naval helicopters in February 2020. It has since received 21, and the rest are expected to arrive in 2027. These helicopters can conduct anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, shipborne multi-role operations, and networked operations, arming the Navy with the capability to detect and neutralize underwater and surface threats in the Indian Ocean.

The Navy has also leased two MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones from US-based General Atomics since 2020. It is supplementing these by leasing two more as per a contract signed in August 2026. These drones have supported maritime surveillance and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in the Indian Ocean Region, complementing the Navy’s P-8I and helping maintain vigilance.

India also signed a $3.3 billion deal with the US in October 2024 to acquire 31 MQ-9B High-Altitude Long-Endurance UAVs. Of the 31 Sea Guardians the MoD purchased, the Indian Navy will receive 15 drones, while the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force will each receive 8 to strengthen surveillance along the northern and western borders.

The Indian Navy operates one US-acquired INS Jalashwa (the former USS Trenton), an Austin-class amphibious transport dock with a sealift capability for over 3,500 troops and a squadron of armored vehicles.

Furthermore, the service has also acquired several lethal US munitions over the years, including the AGM-84 Harpoon Block II anti-ship missile, Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes, and the AGM-114 Hellfire, to name just a few. 

Despite these rather high-value acquisitions, the Indian Navy has never purchased or operated an American fighter jet. When it finally got the chance to buy a US aircraft, i.e., the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the service chose the Rafale-M instead.

Why did India Opt For Rafales over Super Hornets?

When India opened the contest for a carrier-based fighter to replace the MiG-29K jets, Boeing offered its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Block III.

In 2022, Boeing India marketed the F/A-18 Super Hornet Block III as a carrier-based fighter designed for high-load, high-stress operations, and stressed that the multi-role naval fighter would be fully compatible with Indian Navy carriers.

Boeing pitched the Super Hornet as a jet that required minimal support equipment and had a remarkably low cost per flight hour while maintaining high mission readiness. It tried to woo the Indian Navy by emphasizing that the aircraft would become a force multiplier because it could interface with the P-8I and other US-origin systems the service operates.

To sweeten the deal, Boeing also announced a roadmap to significantly increase its investments in line with the “Make in India” initiative and pledged to transfer cutting-edge technologies to Indian industry if the Super Hornet was selected. 

However, the Super Hornet had to dogfight with the French Rafale, a cutting-edge fighter for India’s carrier-borne aircraft tender.

In a tightly fought contest, both jets underwent extensive testing at a shore-based facility, including take-off trials from both ski-jump and catapult launchers. Both aircraft reportedly met the Indian Navy’s requirements, but the Rafale-M ultimately won.

Speaking to the EurAsian Times earlier, an ex-Indian Navy pilot who had flown both the Super Hornet and Rafale said both aircraft were extremely capable and on a level playing field. “The only issue I can think of is that the F-18 is a heavier aircraft, and the Rafale M is lighter. So, when it comes to arrested landing on the aircraft carrier, Rafale has more flexibility,” the naval aviator said at the time, requesting anonymity.

The Rafale-M shared a very high degree of commonality with the 36 Rafale jets operated by the Indian Air Force (IAF). This meant several parts, tools, and test equipment could be interchanged, and India could share ground-support systems, simulators, and diagnostic software.

Additionally, India had already established maintenance infrastructure, trained technicians, and supply chains for the IAF Rafales, which could support the Rafale-Ms.

The Navy would have assessed that Rafale-Ms would reduce costs by creating an inventory of maintenance facilities, spare parts, logistics, and potential future overhauls. Meanwhile, introducing the Super Hornet would require building an entirely separate support ecosystem.

In this scenario, the air force can familiarize itself with the Marine aircraft, while naval pilots can transition to the IAF’s twin-seat Rafales.

The  IAF is now poised to acquire 114 Rafale multi-role fighters, most of which will be manufactured locally. Therefore, one could argue that the decision to choose French jets for the Indian Navy may have been driven by the need for uniformity and interoperability, which are crucial in fast-paced conflict zones.

A secondary factor could have been the Infrared Search and Track (IRST) system, which provides a stealthy advantage in detecting and engaging threats, including potential low-observable aircraft. The Rafale-M came with an integrated IRST, whereas the Super Hornet Block III lacked one, although Boeing offered a podded solution.

Moreover, the Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile on the Rafale also offered superior standoff capability compared to the Super Hornet’s AIM-120 AMRAAM.

More importantly, however, strong defense ties between India and France, smoother government-to-government negotiations even in past deals, the potential for indigenous weapons integration, and the presence of French fighter jets in the IAF played a crucial role in the decision.

India has never acquired US fighter jets for several reasons, including export controls and restrictions on their use.

Despite its best efforts to market the Block III jet to potential customers such as Canada, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Switzerland, Boeing failed to secure any new contracts and kept losing out to rivals such as Saab Gripen, Dassault Rafale, and the Lockheed Martin F-35.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

The post Why India Rejected F/A-18 Super Hornets Despite Its Navy Loaded With American Military Platforms? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Last year, Turkey signed a deal for 20 new Eurofighter Typhoons after a long and grueling campaign to bolster its aging Air Force. Now, it is looking to strike another deal—this time with Qatar to buy its surplus Typhoon jets.

In its weekly media briefing on October 22, Rear Adm. Zeki Aktürk, the chief spokesperson of the Turkish Ministry of Defense (MoD), said Turkey is keen to finalize an agreement with Qatar to purchase its used Eurofighter combat aircraft. 

“Efforts are ongoing to procure Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft from Qatar to meet the operational needs of our [Turkish] Air Force Command,” he stated. “Within this framework, inter-delegation meetings held in August and September addressed the scope of aircraft and ammunition to be procured, the training of pilots and maintenance personnel, and technical and logistical support for the maintenance and operation of the aircraft.”

Although Qatar has not officially confirmed whether it was looking to sign a deal, the Turkish Defense Ministry said, “It is expected for Qatar to prepare the draft training program and the sales contract to be sent to our country.”

Turkey signed a deal in October 2025 to buy 20 Eurofighter Typhoon combat jets from the United Kingdom, a major step in its bid to modernize its air force.

After the deal was announced, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said he was exploring purchasing surplus Eurofighters from both Qatar and Oman. The UK deal allowed Turkey to buy Eurofighters from other operators, but through a separate contract.

Currently, Erdogan seems particularly focused on Qatari Eurofighters because they are reportedly more advanced than Oman’s.

It is currently not clear how many Eurofighters Turkey is seeking from Doha. However, previous reports hinted that Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler and Air Force Commander General Ziya Cemal Kadıoğlu visited Doha in October last year to negotiate a deal for 12-24 Tranche 3A Eurofighters.

Qatar currently operates 24 Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3A aircraft and has ordered an additional 12 Tranche 4s for the Qatar Emiri Air Force (QEAF).

Theoretically, Qatar could transfer 12 of these existing jets to Turkey, giving it a ready-made batch that would equip a squadron. Besides Eurofighters, Qatar also operates about 48 F-15QAs and about 36 Rafales.

Turkey and Qatar have strong bilateral defense ties that have deepened significantly since the early 2010s. In fact, military ties are the backbone of the relationship, with Qatar hosting 3,000 Turkish soldiers at a military base in Tarqiya, Qatar.

Turkey To Close Capability Gap With Eurofighter

Turkey has been eager to secure surplus QEAF Eurofighter Typhoons to bolster its Air Force, which currently relies on an aging F-16 fleet.

The Turkish Air Force has come under immense pressure in recent years, especially after Ankara was expelled from the F-35 consortium in 2019 and sanctioned under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) for buying the Russian S-400 air defense.

The sanctions also made upgrading and sustaining the F-16C/D fleet harder, more expensive, and more complicated.

At the same time, Turkey’s arch-nemesis, Greece, has acquired 24 Rafale and signed a contract for 20 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters amid rising regional tensions with Ankara, particularly over the Aegean Sea. This power vacuum has put Ankara in a tough spot.

Turkey is now upgrading its F-16 fleet to counter Greek F-16s, pushing to purchase F-35s to counter Greek F-35s, and acquiring the Eurofighter Typhoon to rival the Greek Rafale.

Ankara has also advanced work on its own fifth-generation aircraft, the KAAN.

However, developing a fifth-generation fighter requires years of testing, software development, weapons integration, and pilot training. Moreover, the Turkish Air Force would receive the first jet only in 2028, and it would take much longer to reach operational maturity and even longer to field a substantial number of these jets.

Meanwhile, the Turkish administration is lobbying the United States to authorize an F-35 sale to Ankara and is actively pursuing a strategy to divest itself of its Russian-made S-400.

Last month, President Erdogan said Ankara could regain access to the stealth fighter, adding that he expects Washington to take “concrete” steps toward Turkey’s return. “US President Donald Trump expressed a positive willingness regarding Turkey’s return to the F-35 program,” the Turkish President stated at the time.

While both KAAN and F-35 will change the region’s security landscape by adding teeth to Turkish air power, their arrival is not imminent.

This makes buying second-hand Eurofighter Typhoons more significant for Ankara. 

Eurofighter Typhoon is a twin-engine, 4.5th-generation multirole aircraft. It is extremely agile, making it a very powerful dogfighter. The aircraft has a reduced radar cross-section, AESA radar, sensor fusion, advanced avionics, and supercruise capability.

“The Eurofighter Typhoon is the world’s most advanced swing-role combat aircraft,” the Airbus website states. “No other fighter has integrated such a large number of European and US weapons, making it combat-ready for any mission.”

The aircraft is designed for high-performance aerial combat, combining powerful engines, advanced sensors, and a high rate of climb with the ability to carry modern air-to-air missiles, such as the Meteor.

Acquiring the Typhoons from Qatar could help bridge the capability gap until new-build Eurofighters arrive.

Furthermore, Qatar’s aircraft could also give Turkey valuable experience with the Eurofighter platform before more aircraft arrive. Turkish pilots and maintenance crews would need training, while engineers would have to establish procedures for servicing the aircraft and supporting their weapons.

The Eurofighter would give Turkey another modern multirole fighter capable of conducting air-superiority missions, intercepting hostile aircraft, and carrying out precision strikes against ground targets.

It could be particularly useful for air patrols and missions over the Aegean, the eastern Mediterranean, and other areas where Turkey needs to maintain a strong air presence, even as it bolsters its air force with other cutting-edge fighters.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

 

The post As Rival Gets F-35 & Rafale Jets — Turkey Turns to Qatar for Eurofighter Typhoons to Boost its Air Force appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

China produced more than twice the ship tonnage of the United States in 2024–25, a new report says, indicating Beijing is closing the naval gap with Washington. 

The World Defense Shipbuilding report, compiled by Flottes de Combat and the French maritime industry association Gican and released ahead of the Euronaval defense show, states that China built about 636,208 tons of combat ships over two years through December 2025, while the United States built about 270,509 tons in the same period. 

China accounted for more than a third of the global naval tonnage built in 2024-25, the report states, presenting the magnitude of China’s shipbuilding capability.

“We are seeing a fairly substantial expansion of naval forces, and consequently of shipbuilding,” Philippe Missoffe, Gican’s general director, said in a press briefing on October 20. “We’re seeing an increase in power capabilities, particularly nuclear-powered attack submarines, for example,” he added.

In the two-year period, China’s combat-vessel building was valued at $43.5 billion, while US construction totaled $26.8 billion, according to the report. It also notes that  China’s shipyards produced 202,520 tons in 2022–2023, while the US produced 245,703 tons in the previous two-year period, indicating a clear year-on-year surge for China.

The US Navy still leads China in the overall fleet tonnage.

As of January 1, 2026, US warships weighing more than 200 tons totaled 3.11 million tons, compared with China’s 1.44 million tons, says the report. However, just two years ago, the figures were 3.22 million tons for the US and 1.3 million tons for China, showing how Beijing is closing the displacement gap.

China has already surpassed the US Navy in ship count. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has more than 370 battle-force ships, whereas the US Navy has over 290.

This gap is expected to further increase. US-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) predicted in its 2025 report titled “Ship Wars – Confronting China’s Dual-Use Shipbuilding Empires” that China would have a 425-ship-strong fleet by 2030, compared to the US Navy’s 300 vessels.

That said, adding more tonnage is different from simply churning out ships faster, which a navy can do by producing many small or medium-sized ones. Meanwhile, tonnage measures the total displacement of those ships. One large destroyer or amphibious ship can displace as much as several smaller frigates, and higher tonnage means more overall mass in the fleet, more weapons, sensors, fuel, aviation facilities, troops, and endurance.

Currently, China appears to be doing both, expanding the fleet by accelerating production of smaller combatants while also adding displacement to bigger, more sophisticated vessels. The strategy is meant to make the PLAN combat-ready in the future. 

Notably, the latest Euronaval report findings are significant but hardly surprising, given that American senators and congressional researchers have repeatedly warned that the US may not be able to keep up with Beijing’s growing naval fleet because of China’s ever-expanding shipbuilding capacity, and the delays and bottlenecks in US naval production.

As of now, the US Navy has many qualitative advantages over the PLAN, including 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, a large and capable submarine force, greater overall tonnage, higher missile capacity per ship in many classes, and extensive combat experience. However, these could erode if China sustains high output of modern ships.

For now, China producing more naval tonnage than the US reflects a sustained advantage in Chinese industrial capacity. However, Beijing did not build twice the tonnage of the United States from a purely military-industrial base.

Its ability to expand naval tonnage production compared with the US stems from its enormous dual-use shipbuilding industry and economies of scale the US no longer has.

Civilian-Military Fusion Is Driving Construction

China’s maritime development has accelerated as the lines between military and commercial shipbuilding have blurred, as in other strategic areas.

The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)—the world’s largest shipbuilder—is the poster child for China’s seamless fusion of civil and military shipbuilding capabilities.

The CSSC operates several shipyards, factories, and research institutes under the oversight of China’s top political and military leadership. It has built warships for the Chinese Navy, including the Type 003 Fujian aircraft carrier, the Type 055 destroyers, and the Type 075 amphibious assault ships, among other popular combat ships.

At the same time, it is acing civilian shipbuilding. The CSSC built more commercial vessels by tonnage in 2024 than the entire US shipbuilding industry had since WWII, as the EurAsian Times reported earlier. Chinese shipbuilders produced 53.69 million deadweight tons (DWT) of commercial vessels in 2025, or about 56.1% of the world’s output. They also scored 107.82 million DWT in new orders, and closed the year with an orderbook of 274.42 million DWT, or 66.8% of the global outstanding work.

Order volume from foreign customers suggests the world is rapidly becoming dependent on Chinese shipyards to meet demand for commercial trading vessels, allowing the CSSC to redirect commercial revenue toward naval warship construction.

The expansion of China’s commercial shipbuilding industry directly supports higher naval tonnage production, primarily through shared physical infrastructure, including the same large dry docks, slipways, heavy-lift cranes, and fabrication halls used to build container ships, tankers, and bulk carriers, to build warships. In fact, several major CSSC shipyards routinely build commercial vessels and naval ships side by side, meaning that China does not need a completely separate, underutilized set of military-only yards.

Open-source analysis and satellite imagery have documented this physical integration of civil and military ships on multiple occassions. For instance, gray-hulled battleships and commercial hulls were previously seen being built concurrently at the huge Changxing Island complex in Shanghai. It is not much different at other shipyards in Dalian, Hudong-Zhonghua, and the Longxue Island complex near Guangzhou.

Not every Chinese yard is dual-use in the same way, and some high-end naval facilities have become more specialized as the PLA Navy moves toward larger, more complex platforms. In fact, a 2024 RAND working paper noted that certain yards producing the newest surface combatants and carriers had reduced their commercial output.

Nonetheless, wherever civil-military fusion is widespread, commercial work keeps tens or hundreds of thousands of skilled welders, fitters, engineers, and managers employed year-round. This basically gives it an experienced labor pool it can direct toward naval projects.

Moreover, sustained commercial volume accelerates learning and process improvements that transfer to warship building.

China’s astounding rise in commercial shipbuilding has given it access to dual-use technologies such as specialized engines and propellers, navigation and control systems, integrated electronics, and radar modules.

Another advantage of this civil-military fusion is that the high-volume commercial production creates robust domestic supply chains for steel, engines, electrical systems, coatings, and other components. China uses these suppliers to support naval ships.

Additionally, high supply volumes drive down unit costs through economies of scale.

The machinery keeps running smoothly, with revenue flowing in from expanding commercial orders. These profitable commercial contracts, many from foreign buyers, generate cash flow that Beijing uses to fund yard expansion, integrate new equipment, and upgrade technology.

However, China’s rise as a shipbuilder did not happen overnight. It resulted from a long-term strategy that combined government support, investment in industrial infrastructure, a large workforce, and an extensive domestic supply chain. China developed the capacity to manufacture ships at an enormous scale while ensuring that many of the materials, components, and industrial facilities needed for production were available domestically. This helped Chinese shipyards become highly competitive in cost, capacity, and output.

“China has risen because, in 2015, they declared that seas are the future of prosperity and trade. Therefore, China needed to build robust maritime infrastructure and a strong PLAN to protect its interests.

These are two factors that made them realize that shipbuilding infrastructure should serve a twin purpose, so the facility can be used to its full potential since this infrastructure is expensive to build,” Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, a retired Indian Navy officer, earlier told the EurAsian Times.

By contrast, the US lacks this industrial base and has struggled to expand shipbuilding capacity to counter Beijing.

It is now deliberately drawing on the advanced commercial and naval shipbuilding expertise of its closest Indo-Pacific partners, including South Korea and Japan, to bolster shipbuilding and prevent delivery delays and cost increases that have become common for US Navy programs.

However, the latest figure suggests Washington may have to do more, and faster. 

China’s sustained high output of modern ships, underwritten by dual-use commercial strength, continues to narrow the quantitative gap. The United States retains qualitative and experiential advantages for now, but those edges are not permanent.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post China Outbuilt the U.S. by Over 2X in Naval Tonnage in 2024–25. How Did Beijing Outpace America? appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

When both Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base were closed as active American military facilities in the early 1990s, the Philippines was said to be the sick man of US alliances. The same Philippines now seems to have emerged as America’s pivot in the Indo-Pacific.

General Ronald Clark, Commander of US Army Pacific, made it clear in an October 18 interview with the Financial Times that the Philippines, alongside Japan and South Korea, is central to US deterrence against hostile forces (implying China) in the Indo-Pacific.

The commander of US Army Pacific, a component of Indo-Pacific Command, said he wanted to demonstrate more “exquisite” military capabilities to help “show the adversary some things that they should be concerned about.”

As part of that push, US Army Pacific has expanded its role, including by temporarily deploying weapons in the Philippines, Japan, and other parts of the region that would play a critical role in a war with China, including over Taiwan, according to General Clark.

He revealed how Typhon, a mobile missile launch system that fires SM-6 missiles at ships, and Tomahawks that could strike parts of coastal China from the Philippines, have been used in recent joint exercises with the Philippines.

The US Army has also been using the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) in ways designed to send a clear message to China about the joint military capabilities of America and its allies, Clark said.

Mentioning an exercise earlier this year in which the army moved long-range precision weapons from the US to the Philippines and brought ammunition from South Korea for a live-fire mission, Gen. Clark stressed that it was important for deterrence.

“It causes them to go: ‘Hey, this is something that we have to think about,’” he said,  adding, “You can see it operate and we can do it at scale at a time and place of our choosing. So, you reveal capability in order to give your adversary pause.”

Incidentally, in an earlier conversation with the Wall Street Journal, Gen. Clark, who commands 107,000 soldiers, talked about the “tyranny of distance” that made it impossible to fight China with just air and naval power.

He argued that China’s vast geographic expanse and its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities make it impossible or too risky to rely solely on air and naval power.

Here, Gen. Clark argues that the Philippines’ geography is a major advantage. The country’s 7,641 islands sit near vital maritime routes, the South China Sea, and the Luzon Strait/Taiwan Strait, making it an irreplaceable staging ground for US surveillance, logistics, and coastal defense.

From Batanes in northern Luzon—100 miles from Taiwan—to Palawan facing the Spratlys in the south, the archipelago locks the two hottest flashpoints: the north controls the Taiwan Strait, and the south controls the South China Sea.

For the US  military, it is the only territory that can monitor both the Taiwan Strait and the West Philippine Sea simultaneously. The archipelago can thus complicate the movement of Chinese naval forces from their coastal waters into the wider Pacific.

Incidentally, America is rebuilding its military presence in the Philippines after its 1992 withdrawal.

China Outbuilt the U.S. by Over 2X in Naval Tonnage in 2024–25. How Did Beijing Outpace America?

The return to Subic Bay and the expansion of US military cooperation across the Philippines mark a major strategic reversal. Washington is once again developing access to facilities that can support its operations in the western Pacific.

The US has access to nine Philippine military sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and is investing more than $300 million to upgrade infrastructure.

However, all 9 (nine) bases are owned by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), but the US has been granted rotational access. The first 5 (five) were agreed in 2014, with 4 (four being added later in 2023 by President Marcos Jr. to deal with threats from the South China Sea.

The nine sites are being turned into A2/AD nodes that complicate any Chinese movement through the First Island Chain.

Notably, rather than building massive permanent bases, the US and the Philippines are building a flexible, distributed network that complicates targeting by China and raises the costs of a potential conflict (“deterrence by denial”).

Viewed thus, it is understandable why the US has introduced, as seen in Gen. Clark’s  FT interview,  advanced mobile-strike and missile systems such as the Typhon mid-range missile system into the Philippines, capable of reaching targets in the South China Sea and southern China.

One could further argue that Gen. Clark’s interview was not about the Philippines alone. It was about a new American way of fighting a war in the Indo-Pacific that is distributed, land-based, visible, and anchored on three democracies of  Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. That is why he put the Philippines in the same sentence as Japan and Korea.

One can thus surmise that, in a future contingency arising from Chinese actions, Japan will provide airfields, South Korea ammunition, and the Philippines firing positions.

This aligns with the US 2026 National Defense Strategy that EurAsian Times explained earlier. The idea is to build “a strong denial defense” along the First Island Chain.

In this scheme of things, Japan is the northern anchor — with long-range missiles, US-Japan command integration, and bases. South Korea is the arsenal and logistics hub — Clark himself cited a live-fire exercise in the Philippines using ammunition brought from South Korea, showing how Korean stockpiles now sustain Philippine operations.

The Philippines is the southern anchor and now a vital Indo-Pacific center for the US. The 12th Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue, held in Manila on February 16, 2026, officially reaffirmed both allies’ commitment to maintaining a vigilant posture, strengthening deterrence across the First Island Chain, and keeping critical sea lanes open.

Apparently, Washington is not only institutionalizing this triangle, the US, Japan, and the Philippines, but also widening its scope by involving Australia and forming the “Squad.”

The Squad’s core focus is to counter maritime pressure and escalation in the South China Sea and East China Sea and reinforce freedom of navigation.

Accordingly, defense officials and defense chiefs from the four nations have increasingly aligned through mini-lateral dialogues, joint exercises (such as Balikatan), and security assistance packages (including transfers of Japanese warships and patrol aircraft to the Philippine Navy).

The developments above make it clear that the Philippines has become the centerpiece of Washington’s strategy to deter China in the Indo-Pacific. As Elbridge Colby, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, said this year, Manila is Washington’s “model ally”.

In his words, “When our partners are strong, deterrence is strong. And that is exactly what we have here in Manila, under the leadership of President Marcos, Secretary of National Defense Teodoro, and other key leaders. We see and respect a resolute and proud nation that is determined to strengthen its own capabilities to better defend itself and its interests. A model ally.”

The Philippines now strengthens America’s network of strategic positions running from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Both are developing capabilities intended to make Chinese military operations more difficult, costly, and uncertain.

But as explained above, that is in a manner that affords more operational flexibility for America through access to ports, airfields, and other facilities that can help US forces disperse, sustain operations, and respond more quickly during a crisis, without depending on a small number of major bases.

In other words, thirty-four years after losing its sovereign bases in the Philippines in 1992, the US military has returned with comparable power, but by shifting its status from a base owner to a rotational guest.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Three Decades After Subic Bay Withdrawal, U.S. Military Returns to the Philippines With a New Model to Check China appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Amid stiff competition from Silicon Valley-based, AI-focused defense companies, Northrop Grumman, part of the US defense market’s ‘Big Five,’ has posted better-than-expected sales and a record order backlog of US$ 109.6 billion.

Notably, at nearly $110 billion, the company’s order backlog is nearly 1.4 times its US$78 billion market cap and equals about two and a half years of sales.

Northrop Grumman’s record backlog suggests that traditional prime contractors in the US defense-industrial complex continue to win substantial new orders even as their leadership faces increasing pressure from AI-focused defense firms such as Palantir and Anduril.

For instance, Anduril, founded in 2017, is already worth US$ 90 billion, more than Northrop Grumman’s and General Dynamics’ market caps.

Meanwhile, Palantir, founded in 2003, is already worth nearly US$480 billion, more than any of the Big Five.

Northrop Grumman’s steady sales and record US$109.6 billion backlog should reassure investors that traditional defense primes can continue to thrive alongside the rapid growth of AI-focused defense companies.

The Virginia-based defense contractor reported third-quarter revenue of US$11.12 billion, up 7% from US$10.42 billion a year earlier.

Net income rose to US$1.12 billion from US$1.10 billion a year earlier.

However, the biggest surprise came in the company’s backlog order book. The company received US$16.4 billion in net contract awards during the third quarter (Q3) of 2026, pushing its net outstanding backlog to US$109.6 billion.

A year ago, at the end of Q3 2025, the company’s backlog stood at US$91.4 billion. Since then, it has received new contracts worth US$18.2 billion.

“In a complex world with the growing need for solutions that scale and perform, our customers continue to turn to Northrop Grumman,” Chair, Chief Executive and President Kathy Warden said in the earnings announcement.

According to company filings, the company’s third-quarter contracts totaled US$16.4 billion, which included US$4.6 billion for classified programs, US$2 billion for the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program, and US$1.4 billion for Virginia-class submarines.

The company also received US$1.3 billion in awards related to the F-35 fighter jet and US$1 billion for the E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft.

The Q3 contracts show strong demand for the company’s products in fighter jets, AWACS, missiles, submarines, and space programs.

Overall, Defense Systems accounted for the largest portion of the company’s backlog at US$36.5 billion, followed by Aeronautics Systems at US$26.8 billion and Space Systems at US$26.3 billion.

U.S. Stealth Jets — F-35, F-22 & F-47 — to Form 60% of USAF Fighter Force by 2035 Under New Plan, Service Tells Congress

Strong Demand for Northrop Grumman’s Aeronautics Systems

In Q3, Northrop Grumman reported aeronautics systems revenue of US$3.58 billion, up 14% year-on-year, and won new contracts worth over US$3 billion.

Strong aeronautics systems performance is driven by demand for the F-35 fighter jet, progress on the B-21 Raider program, maintenance work on the B-2 Spirit bomber, and work on Army helicopters such as the AH-64 Apache, CH-47 Chinook, UH-60 Black Hawk, and others.

Northrop Grumman is a principal contractor on the F-35 Lightning II program, with Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor. The company contributes roughly 25% of the aircraft and produces or supports several major structural and mission systems for all three variants – F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C.

Northrop Grumman designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

It also leads mission systems development, pilot and maintenance training courseware, and low-observable technology support to ensure readiness and modernization across all three F-35 variants.

The company also received new contracts worth US$1.3 billion for F-35 fighter jets.

It also won contracts worth US$1 billion for the E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft.

Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), and sole designer, developer, and manufacturer of the E-2 Hawkeye family, including the current E-2D Advanced Hawkeye.

Northrop Grumman is also the prime contractor for both the B-2 Spirit and the B-21 Raider.

In 2024, Northrop won a US$7 billion award for the B-2 Spirit modernization and sustainment program, including programmed depot maintenance of the fleet, sustaining engineering, software maintenance, support equipment, logistics elements, and interim contractor support.

This B-2 Spirit modernization and sustainment work continues at Palmdale, California; Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri; Tinker AFB, Oklahoma; Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio; Edwards AFB, California; and Hill AFB, Utah, and is expected to be completed by May 2029.

In 2015, Northrop Grumman won the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) program, also known as the B-21 Raider.

However, the US Air Force has deliberately withheld detailed pricing for the program.

Earlier this year, the USAF and Northrop agreed to expand B-21 Raider production capacity by about 25% with roughly US$4.5 billion in government funding.

A 2021 Pentagon Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) study estimated that developing, procuring, and operating a fleet of 100 B-21 Raider aircraft could cost about US$203 billion over the next 30 years.

In September, Northrop Grumman also won a US$4.84 billion Army contract for CIRCM (Common Infrared Countermeasure) laser-based missile defense systems to protect Army helicopters, such as the AH-64 Apache, CH-47 Chinook, UH-60 Black Hawk, and others, from infrared-guided missiles. The program will run through 2035.

The Bombers U.S. Paid to Scrap Weakened Ukraine, Helped Russia. Why Did Kyiv Clip Its Own Wings?

Another critical program is Northrop’s role in the Sentinel missile program, a key part of the US Nuclear triad.

In the third quarter, the company won a US$2 billion contract for the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program.

Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor for the LGM-35A Sentinel program, also known as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD).

Under the program, Northrop will design and produce a new three-stage solid-propellant ICBM with improved range, accuracy, reliability, and modularity compared with Minuteman III.

It will also construct hundreds of new or heavily modernized hardened launch silos and related facilities across multiple states, and new nuclear command-and-control networks. Sentinel will provide the US with on-alert nuclear deterrence through 2075.

Northrop Grumman is also a major supplier and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for key components on Virginia-class submarines. It won a US$1.4 billion contract in Q3 for the Virginia-class submarines.

Northrop also plays an important role in the Patriot missile defense system. It supplies the solid rocket motors, ignition safety devices, and related propulsion elements for PAC-3 MSE missiles.

Patriot interceptors are in global demand due to the two ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East.

In August, the Department of War (DoW) signed framework agreements worth US$3 billion for expanding Patriot interceptor missile production.

The contract allocates nearly US$2 billion for solid rocket motors and ignition safety devices, in which Northrop will play a key role.

Northrop is also the prime contractor for the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), which integrates Patriot with other air- and missile-defense assets.

The company is also executing many of the USAF’s classified space-segment programs.

Many of these contracts, such as the B-21 Raider, F-35, Sentinel, and Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, will run for decades, providing Northrop with a steady source of income. However, execution risk remains.

Demand for many of the company’s products, such as aircraft, missiles, and space systems, remains strong; however, investors’ key question is whether Northrop can turn its record US$109.6 billion backlog order book into improved margins and earnings.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Northrop Wins Fresh F-35, B-21, Sentinel & Virginia-Class Work as Backlog Hits Record $110 Billion appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Australia and East Timor (Timor-Leste), ASEAN’s eleventh member state, have signed a defense framework to boost cyber and maritime security as Canberra attempts to keep China away from its island neighbors.

Richard Marles, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, said: “Australia and Timor-Leste are close neighbors, trusted partners and longstanding friends. Signing the Defense Cooperation Framework with Timor-Leste marks an important milestone in our defense relationship and provides a modern foundation for deeper cooperation in the years ahead.

Australia is proud to be Timor-Leste’s largest defense and security partner, and we remain committed to supporting Timor-Leste’s defense capability.

Together, we are strengthening our ability to work together to respond to shared security challenges, support humanitarian and disaster relief efforts, and promote a peaceful, stable and resilient region.”

He added: “Australia and Timor-Leste share a history of deep security cooperation, underpinned by decades of security cooperation and strong people-to-people ties. This package reflects the trust and friendship between our countries. As Timor-Leste takes on a greater role in our region as ASEAN’s newest member, Australia is proud to stand alongside our close neighbor and work together in support of a peaceful, stable and prosperous region.”

Foreign Minister Penny Wong said: “The Partnership Joint Declaration is driving a new era of cooperation between Australia and Timor-Leste, and these initiatives are a demonstration of our close partnership and friendship. As close neighbors and partners, Australia and Timor-Leste are working together to address shared challenges and ensure the peace, stability and prosperity of our region.”

East Timor is around 700 kilometers northwest of Australia and gained independence from Indonesia in 2002. It joined ASEAN in October 2025.

Earlier in August, China said its Defense Minister, Dong Jun, met with East Timor’s leaders in Dili and offered to “take military-to-military relations to a new level”. The visit was the first by a Chinese defense minister and coincided with commemorations for the FALINTIL-Defence Forces.

Dong met President Jose Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao.

Marles and Gusmao signed the pact under which Australia will provide $62 million (US$43.56 million) over five years for cyber security, maritime security, infrastructure, disaster relief, and training.

More than $19 million of that is earmarked for a cyber-security uplift, including specialist advisers and protection of critical systems. Australia will also give East Timor new police vessels for maritime patrols, search and rescue, and countering transnational crime.

PM Gusmao told reporters the agreement will help East Timor fight organized crime and illegal fishing. The package expands the long-running Timor-Leste Police Development Program and supports the country’s role as ASEAN’s newest member.

East Timor’s upgraded ties with Beijing have caused regional security concerns.

Earlier in September 2023, President Jose Ramos-Horta had assured Australia and Indonesia that the country had not forged any military base arrangements with Beijing.

“We don’t have a Chinese military base of any sort. We never discuss that with China, even. The Chinese never approach us on that,” Ramos-Horta had said. He highlighted that Timor-Leste maintains normal relations with all partners while prioritizing expanded defense and maritime security cooperation with Australia.

“Indonesia and Australia…we can include Singapore and Malaysia…they are the countries closest to us…can always sleep at peace. Timor Leste will not be a nuisance, a concern in terms of security,” Ramos-Horta has confirmed to Reuters.

Western critics frequently caution against Beijing’s attempts to establish military outposts by taking over infrastructure from nations that default on loan repayments, a practice often labeled “debt trap diplomacy.”

In Sri Lanka, China took over Hambantota port after the country defaulted on loan repayments.

Canberra has grown concerned about China’s efforts to forge security ties with nearby developing nations.

In 2022, China signed a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, raising concerns that it could eventually lead to a Chinese naval presence.

Although it assured it will not host a base, Canberra remains apprehensive.

Since then, Australia has pursued agreements across the Pacific, including with Vanuatu, to reinforce its role as the primary security partner and constrain third-party arrangements with an eye on China.

Damien Kingsbury, Emeritus Professor, Deakin University, believes that “Small countries such as East Timor risk having large investors and donors such as China swamp their local economy and thus lose the capacity to make independent economic decisions.

China could end up having an outsized influence in policymaking.”

“When China looks at investing in another developing country, they do so with one eye, certainly on a viable business, but with the other eye, very much on a longer-term strategic interest.”

Kingsbury has also noted Timor-Leste’s economic pressures, including the expected depletion of its petroleum fund, as a driver of closer ties, while highlighting past caution by Dili (e.g., rejecting a Chinese radar proposal whose range exceeded Timorese waters).

Australia’s Key Role in East Timor

Australia played a prominent role in restoring order in East Timor after violence erupted following its 1999 independence vote. It led the International Force East Timor (INTERFET), a multinational mission that paved the way for the territory’s formal independence in 2002.

Indonesia ruled East Timor from 1975 to 1999. In August 1999, the United Nations organized a referendum. More than three-quarters of voters chose independence.

The result triggered widespread violence by pro-Indonesian militias. Homes were burned, people were killed or forced from their homes, and hundreds of thousands were displaced. Pro-Indonesian militias destroyed much of the territory’s infrastructure.

In response, the UN Security Council authorized INTERFET on 15 September 1999. Australia agreed to lead the force. Troops began arriving in Dili on 20 September under Major General Peter Cosgrove’s command.

Australia provided the largest contingent, about 5,500 personnel from the army, navy, air force and police. This was Australia’s largest military deployment since the Vietnam War. 22 countries took part, including New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States, among others. At its peak, the force numbered around 11,000.

INTERFET was tasked with restoring peace and security, protecting UN staff, and helping deliver humanitarian aid. The force quickly brought the situation under control. Indonesian troops withdrew, militia activity largely stopped, and by early 2000, the immediate crisis had eased.

In February 2000, INTERFET handed over to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which governed the territory while it prepared for independence.

On 20 May 2002, East Timor became fully independent—the first new country of the 21st century. Australia continued to support the new nation through the follow-on UN mission (UNMISET) and by helping to train and equip the fledgling East Timorese defense force. Australian personnel remained involved in security and capacity-building for several more years.

On 13 September 2024, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, marking the 25th anniversary of INTERFET’s arrival, in Dili had said: “The arrival of INTERFET was a beacon of hope. The relief and joy our people felt when INTERFET arrived was immeasurable. INTERFET’s contribution to helping put an end to the violence in Timor-Leste is remembered with deep gratitude by all Timorese.”

“Our regional neighbors, including Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, played leading roles in this mission, which marked a turning point in our fight for freedom.”

• By: ET Online Desk
• Mail us at: editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

The post China’s “Military-to-Military” Proposal Fizzles as Australia & Timor-Leste Sign Defense Cooperation Framework appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The U.S. Air Force plans to field more than 1,500 manned, combat-coded fighter aircraft by 2035, roughly 60 percent of which will be stealth platforms.

The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35As and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s. The sixth-generation Boeing F-47s are gradually expected to replace the aging Raptors.

If the plans materialize, then by 2035, every three out of five U.S. Air Force fighters will be stealth platforms, and every two out of five fighters will be F-35s.

The new plans are part of an updated fighter force structure report the USAF submitted to Congress last week, and Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, revealed them at a media briefing in the Pentagon on October 20.

About 40 percent of the fleet could be F-35s, Tabor said.

Another 20 percent would be a mix of F-22 Raptors and F-47s as the sixth-generation fighter replaces the Raptor, Tabor said, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

The USAF built 186 F-22 Raptors and plans to replace them with an equivalent number of sixth-generation F-47s.

Tabor did not provide a breakdown of the remaining 40% of the force structure; however, he said the remaining fleet would likely split evenly between F-15 Eagle variants and F-16 Fighting Falcons.

Notably, the F-35A Lightning IIs currently make up about 30 percent of the USAF fighter fleet, with the F-22 Raptors contributing another 10 percent.

The stealth platforms currently make up about 40% of the USAF fighter fleet.

The Air Force plans to increase the share of stealth platforms from 40% to 60% over the next nine years, with the F-35A share increasing from 30% to 40%, and the F-22 Raptors and F-47s contributing the remaining 20%.

He did not provide the breakdown of how many F-22s and F-47s the USAF plans to operate in 2035.

In March 2025, Boeing won the contract to design and develop the F-47 fighter under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) effort. The sixth-generation fighter is expected to enter operational service in 2029 or mid-2030, and gradually replace the F-22 Raptors.

The F-15 Eagles’ share is expected to rise from 15% to roughly 20%, while the F-16 Fighting Falcons’ share is expected to fall sharply from 45% to 20%.

By then, the USAF will phase out all A-10 Thunderbolts.

The USAF had about 162 A-10C Thunderbolt IIs at the beginning of 2026. The U.S. Congress blocked the Air Force’s request to retire them all in FY2026 and required the USAF to keep at least 103 aircraft until October.

The USAF now plans to retire them all by September 2030. Notably, the current breakdown of the USAF fighter fleet does not include the A-10C Thunderbolts: 45% F-16s, 30% F-35s, 15% F-15s, and 10% F-22s.

USAF Needs To Add Over 70 Fighters Annually For The Next Decade 

The USAF aims to increase its fighter fleet from the current 1,271 fighters (including 103 A-10C Thunderbolts) to 1,509 combat-coded aircraft by 2035.

Notably, last year’s report set a 2030 target of 1,369 combat-coded fighters.

The USAF will therefore need to add another 238 aircraft over the next nine years. When accounting for the 103 A-10C Thunderbolts set to retire by 2030, the USAF will need to add 341 fighters.

However, the USAF will need to add many more fighters, as nearly 200 F-16s, at least 60 F-15Es, and some F-22 Raptors will also retire during this time.

The USAF will therefore need to add nearly 700 fighters over the next nine years to reach its target of 1,509 manned, combat-coded fighters, while also accounting for fighters that will retire during this time.

The USAF officials have consistently maintained that the service needs to buy 72 new fighters each year to replace its older, retiring jets and modernize the fleet.

The U.S. has not reached that target yet; in 2027, the budget request proposed adding 62 new fighters, including 38 new F-35s and 24 F-15EXs.

Tabor said those purchases can “ramp over time” to hit the numbers the Air Force needs.

“The question is, can industry produce at those levels?” Tabor said. “They’ve assured us that they can, and we believe them, but we also actually need to see it manifest.”

The Continued Relevance Of Fourth-Gen Fighters

On an aside, the USAF report submitted to the U.S. Congress makes it clear that even in 2035, the force intends to have a substantial fleet of fourth-generation fighters, nearly 40 percent, split evenly between upgraded F-15EXs and newer F-16s.

Put differently, even in 2035, two out of every five USAF fighters will be non-stealth platforms, underscoring the force’s belief that these upgraded fourth-generation fighters will remain relevant over the next decade.

The USAF has already tested this doctrine of flying a mix of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters in the Iran War.

In June 2025, during Operation Midnight Hammer, the USAF employed a mixed force of fourth- and fifth-generation fighters against Iranian targets. The F-35As reportedly led the penetration of Iranian airspace, conducting SEAD/DEAD missions against air-defense systems and escorting B-2 bombers to their targets; F-22s provided air superiority, while F-15Es and F-16s also participated in the broader strike package.

This operation provided a real-world test of using fifth-generation aircraft to suppress defenses and enable follow-on strikes by fourth-generation fighters.

The USAF followed the same strategy during Operation Epic Fury.

The USAF, therefore, continues to invest in upgraded fourth-generation platforms, such as F-15EXs.

According to the 2027 budget documents, the USAF plans to procure up to 268 new F-15EX aircraft over the next 10 years, potentially costing U.S. taxpayers over US$ 37 billion.

Meanwhile, the USAF is also considering an upgraded F-16 variant called the F-16G.

The F-16G variant differs from the Block 70 F-16 Viper, which many countries worldwide, including Taiwan, Turkey, Morocco, Bahrain, Peru, and others, have ordered.

Buoyed by the F-15EX’s success, Lockheed Martin is aggressively pushing the F-16G variant to the USAF.

Tabor clarified that while the USAF is considering the F-16G variant, it does not have to decide “immediately.”

“We’re not in a position where that decision has to be made immediately.”

He said the decision likely won’t be made in the 2028 budgeting process, but perhaps in the years that follow.

“There is a spectrum of capability that we might want to replace the F-16s with,” he said.

“It’s not urgent, frankly. What we don’t want to get to is a point where it is urgent, and we haven’t done the homework and decided ‘hey, this is really the right place to be.’ We do have time to churn through that and make sure that we have a good option going forward.”

One advantage to buying more F-16s is that “it’s practically a ready-made aircraft,” Tabor said.

In December 2025, Inside Defense reported that the USAF was weighing a new F-16 variant to fill capability gaps at a lower cost than the F-35.

Ordering upgraded F-16s also offers the USAF other advantages.

The U.S. already has an established F-16 production line in Greenville, South Carolina. So, ordering new F-16s wouldn’t require establishing a new production line or reviving a dormant one.

However, it remains to be seen whether the F-16G achieves the same success as the F-15EX.

Tabor stressed that pushing multi-year procurement packages, as the USAF is currently exploring for the F-35 and F-15EX, will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in expanding their production facilities, which will help meet the USAF’s ambitious target of adding 72 fighters every year.

Tabor also clarified that the USAF will continue investing in crewed fighter jets, even as it adds hundreds of autonomous drone fighters, known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), to its fleet.

The USAF aims to field 500 CCAs by 2032.

“CCA is very much a reality,” Tabor said.

“It is going to be a part of our future, and there is absolutely a world in which the incorporation of CCAs into the force will mitigate the requirement for the number of fighters. That’s not the CCA that we have right now, but it is advancing very, very rapidly. We’re confident that it will play a major role in future versions of the fighter force structure report.”

For the foreseeable future, the USAF is seeking to balance crewed fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-generation platforms with autonomous drone fighters.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post U.S. Stealth Jets — F-35, F-22 & F-47 — to Form 60% of USAF Fighter Force by 2035 Under New Plan, Service Tells Congress appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

In a major milestone, the U.S. Navy’s Nimitz-class aircraft carrier remotely controlled an MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial refueller from more than 2,100 miles away, a capability that could eventually boost F/A-18 Super Hornets.

“In a historic U.S. naval aviation event, an aircraft carrier connected to and controlled an unmanned aerial refueler, the MQ-25A Stingray, more than 2,100 miles away,” the US Navy said in an official release.

The MQ-25 Stingray is designed primarily as an unmanned aerial tanker, though it could also be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.

During what the Navy described as a preliminary sea trial, the ship’s Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC), used by Air Vehicle Pilots (AVPs) for controlling future MQ-25 Stingray airborne operations, employed its MD-5C Ground Control Station to establish a Beyond Line-of-Sight connection with an MQ-25A test aircraft through a Proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) satellite network, the service stated.

While the carrier was in the Pacific Ocean, Boeing kept the MQ-25 at its Illinois facility for the trial.

To provide command and control of the MQ-25A, the MD-5C GCS combined Lockheed Martin’s MDCX hardware and software with other government-made equipment and the Navy’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) network. The Navy also noted that this system will command and control the Navy’s future unmanned carrier aircraft and the Air Wing of the Future. 

“This first-ever underway connection between a carrier-based UAWC and an MQ-25A aircraft proves that the Carrier Air Wing of tomorrow is a reality today,” said Capt. Daniel Fucito, program manager for the Navy’s Unmanned Carrier Aviation Program Office.

This marks a momentous step toward integrating unmanned systems into carrier air wings and preparing the Navy’s first carrier-based unmanned tanker for operational use. The trial was part of a series of build-up exercises intended to verify protocols, networks, and interfaces.

Before this, the MQ-25 Integrated Test Team, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and the US Navy, conducted pier-side and at-sea tests with the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Program Office’s (PMA-268) Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System team.

Although the test showed remote connectivity and control over a significant distance, the Navy did not record an autonomous flight, aerial refueling operation, or carrier landing.

F-35, F-22 & F-47 to Form 60% of USAF Fighter Force by 2035 Under New Plan, Service Tells Congress

Nonetheless, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Hung Cao, said, “The MQ-25A Stingray’s carrier-based refueling capabilities enable F/A-18 Super Hornets to fly farther and longer. The integration of this unmanned aerial refueler demonstrates the transformational change our manned and unmanned asset integration provides the Fleet.”

Why Does This Long-Range Trial Matter?

This latest demonstration matters because it validated critical enabling technologies for unmanned carrier operations.

Notably, the earth’s curvature and the vast operating areas of carrier strike groups, such as the Pacific Ocean, limit traditional radio links. Routing commands and data through a resilient satellite constellation removes that constraint.

Against that backdrop, the latest trial confirms that the Navy’s MD-5C Ground Control Station architecture can operate in a realistic operational environment, not just in controlled shore-based or pier-side tests.

Furthermore, the successful use of a proliferated LEO satellite constellation from a moving warship proves that reliable beyond-line-of-sight command and control is achievable in a realistic at-sea environment.

Three U.S. Navy aircraft carriers feature Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC) infrastructure using Lockheed Martin Skunk Works-powered MD-5 ground-control systems. The USS George H.W. Bush served as the fleet’s initial developmental testbed, while the USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Ronald Reagan are officially designated as the Navy’s first and second fully operational, deployable drone-capable carriers.

Demonstrating that a carrier can continuously control an unmanned aircraft over intercontinental distances from its own Unmanned Air Warfare Center proves the viability of the shipboard control infrastructure already installed on these carriers.

This infrastructure is purportedly intended to support tankers and future uncrewed platforms performing intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, or other roles, enabling deeper manned-unmanned teaming between crewed and uncrewed platforms.

This capability counts because the MQ-25A is designed to serve as the Navy’s carrier-based unmanned tanker, taking over aerial-refueling duties that currently take time away from the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.

By validating long-range control from the carrier, the Navy has shown that operators aboard the aircraft carrier can direct the Stingray to deliver fuel to fighters hundreds of miles from the deck.

Stingray refueling will extend the carrier air wing’s combat radius and time on station while keeping more Super Hornets available for strike, air superiority, or other primary missions instead of diverting them into “buddy” tanker roles during crucial deployments. 

This would be a critical enhancement to the carrier wing’s capability in theatres like the volatile Indo-Pacific region, where distances are long and adversaries like China field sophisticated anti-access/area-denial systems.

Europe “Blind in Space”: Why Only U.S. Can See Russian Missiles as Ukraine Begs For American Help?

In a potential conflict with China, American carriers may need to operate farther from contested shorelines to reduce vulnerability to long-range missiles and other threats. In that scenario, a reliably controllable unmanned tanker that can be controlled from the ship will allow the air wing to project power over long distances without staying close to the carrier or relying on land-based or allied tanker support that may be hard to obtain.

That said, a proliferated satellite network also adds resilience, particularly because such constellations are harder to disrupt completely than single high-value satellites or line-of-sight links. This will improve the survivability of the command-and-control chain under contested conditions, and in a conflict with a near-peer adversary like Beijing.

Operationally, this will also help the Navy achieve its manned-unmanned teaming objective. The MQ-25 Stingray, for one, has been positioned as a trailblazer for the “Air Wing of the Future,” and is expected to help establish procedures, networks, and infrastructure that will support not only tankers but also future uncrewed systems for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and potentially even strike roles.

Earlier this month, for instance, Boeing announced a successful trial of the Stingray’s Link 16 datalink-based Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) command-and-control software during the Emerald Flag exercise at Eglin AFB, Florida.

The software was installed on a Beechcraft 1900D and a King Air E90 to demonstrate command and control between the two aircraft. This capability will eventually move into the MQ-25A and Super Hornet.

The latest trial is an important step before Stingray starts operating from carrier decks. The Boeing MQ-25 T1 test asset previously refueled three carrier-based aircraft—an F/A-18 Super Hornet, E-2D Hawkeye, and F-35C Lightning II —but it has yet to fly from a carrier.  The first production-representative MQ-25 flew for the first time in April 2026, and the service plans its first carrier launch next year.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

The post F/A-18 Super Hornets Move Closer to Full Strike Role as USS Ronald Reagan Controls MQ-25 Stingray from 2,100 Miles Away appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Since Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Starlink, and later Starshield, have become vital for Ukraine’s defense and even offensive capabilities.

Amid ongoing tussle over Starshield restrictions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced on October 20, 2026, that he had positive talks with the United States to resolve the issues.

“I spoke with Marco Rubio, and it was a substantive conversation – focused on the issues that matter. I am grateful for his readiness to help and his clear position. First, ballistic missile interceptors, which are needed to protect lives. Second, early warning of Russian ballistic missile attacks, which is vital.

Third, we need to restore the Starlink/Starshield situation. Of course, all of this comes against the backdrop of our diplomatic efforts to end this horrific war and the constant killing of people. We agreed to get in touch again soon for an update.

Thank you, Marco, for the constructive discussion! Thank you to everyone in America who supports fair approaches!” Zelenskyy said in a post on X.

However, the restrictions have highlighted Ukraine’s heavy military dependence on US-linked satellite systems amid political friction with the  Trump administration, including mounting pressure over Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure and related disputes over intelligence sharing and sanctions policy, even as Moscow intensifies attacks.

Why is Starshield?

To understand Starshield and its utility for Ukraine, one must understand Starlink.

Starlink is a satellite internet service developed and operated by SpaceX. It operates a constellation of thousands of smaller satellites at around 550 kilometers above Earth.

Notably, traditional terrestrial and satellite communication (SATCOM) networks cannot match Starlink’s bandwidth. Most conventional SATCOM systems also rely on geostationary (geostationary orbit) satellites, which introduce higher latency and limit the effectiveness of real-time applications such as remote piloting of UAVs, as the EurAsian Times explained earlier.

However, Starlink’s low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite architecture makes it more resilient to jamming and provides a more secure communication channel.

Starshield is SpaceX’s satellite program focused on government and national security. While Starlink is built for consumers, businesses, and general connectivity, delivering high-speed internet via a massive constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites, Starshield is purpose-built for government customers—primarily the US Department of Defense, intelligence agencies, the US Space Force, and allied countries and their military, like Ukraine.

Ukraine has used both: commercial Starlink terminals widely for communications and logistics, and Starshield for higher-security military needs where available.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, it systematically targeted fiber-optic cables, cell towers, and power grids, destroying all traditional internet and jamming military radios. This is when Starlink stepped in.

Ukraine wanted Starlink terminals because they don’t rely on ground infrastructure and operate in blacked-out or contested areas. Starlink and Starshield provide connectivity even when the enemy damages or destroys traditional telecommunications infrastructure.

Ukrainian troops currently rely on Starshield for long-distance video transmission for military operations, information gathering, and communication. It serves as the backbone for encrypted voice, messaging, and data links between units, headquarters, and isolated positions. This includes real-time situational awareness systems.

Satellite internet connectivity is especially important for drone operations, which are central to Ukraine’s offensive and defensive strategies. These unmanned Ukrainian systems rely on satellite connectivity because current operations frequently require constant contact between controllers and aircraft.

Starshield enables long-range control and live video feeds from reconnaissance and attack drones far beyond the reach of normal radio links. It also supports interceptor drones that pursue fast Russian jet-powered drones, including the notorious Shahed class.

Ukrainian officials recently alleged that Starshield receptors stopped working in Ukraine when mounted on fast-moving objects, impairing drones that depend on them for onboard guidance over Ukrainian territory.

In fact, a Ukrainian Defense Ministry official said the sensors worked when moving, but only up to 100 miles per hour (160 kph), meaning drones had to slow down significantly. Some units reported disruptions at even lower speeds.

When connectivity is sketchy or slows, missions slow, lose accuracy, and sometimes become impossible. In fact, military officers quoted in media reports alleged that connections were lost during operations and missions were canceled when connectivity failed. These constraints may have been especially painful because Ukraine increasingly uses drones for long-range strikes, as well as air defense and interception.

Ukraine also uses Starshield to launch strikes from ground-based systems. It allows targeting data to flow quickly from sensors and drones to guns and HIMARS, closing the sensor-to-shooter loop and improving precision.

Additionally, Starlink/Starshield are crucial to Ukrainian forces receiving intelligence from allies. Western partners provide Ukraine with surveillance data regarding Russian air strikes, missile launches, troop movements, anti-aircraft positions, and escape routes.

Put succinctly, Ukrainian forces rely heavily on Starlink for battlefield management, Secure communications, Drone operations, artillery coordination and precision strikes, cybersecurity and intelligence sharing, and logistics and command networks.

At the same time, Starlink has significant civilian applications. It has also been crucial for hospitals, emergency services, local administrations, journalists, and ordinary citizens in frontline or occupied areas, who use it to stay connected when conventional networks fail.

By 2025, roughly 50,000 Starlink/Starshield terminals were operating in Ukraine, according to analysis from the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich. As of now, Ukraine has no equivalent resilient, high-bandwidth LEO alternative available at comparable scale and speed of deployment.

What is The Ongoing Issue?

Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukraine’s former Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation, Mykhailo Fedorov, asked SpaceX owner Elon Musk on X to activate SpaceX’s Starlink satellites.

Musk complied almost immediately and shipped user terminals to Ukraine.

SpaceX’s satellite internet service has since provided resilient communications when ground networks were jammed or destroyed, supported drone operations, logistics, and reconnaissance, and helped maintain connectivity for civilians and the military. In fact, it has become the cornerstone of Ukraine’s offensive and defensive operations throughout the grinding war.

Earlier this month, Ukrainian forces were jolted by connectivity problems with Starshield terminals. The Ukrainian government alleged that the Trump administration and SpaceX had unilaterally restricted its access.

Serhiy Beskrestnov, a presidential adviser on defense technologies and well-known military blogger, stated: “Our armed forces did not receive a warning about these restrictions, and this led to the failure of a number of missions… It’s clear that this action cannot be a coincidence and is connected to the current political situation.”

President Zelenskyy said Russian forces appeared to exploit the disruption, noting that interceptor drones hunting jet-powered Shahed-type munitions depend on the connection.

“It is clear that the Russians are trying to take advantage of the problems with Starlink in Ukraine, as our interceptor drones depend on this connection among other things,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy posted to X.

Responding to the claims, Musk wrote on X that the US government owns and controls the Starshield systems, and that the US military and president control any limits on its speed or use. Starlink “cannot be used for offensive military action, as doing so would be inappropriate for a commercial company,” Musk highlighted in his post.

Citing sources, Reuters reported that the White House had ordered the Department of Defense to slow down Starshield services for Ukraine.

This sparked speculation that the crucial communications system was briefly restricted to add more pressure on Ukraine to stop its strikes on Russian refineries, which US President Donald Trump has repeatedly blamed for skyrocketing fuel costs that are hurting his Republican Party’s chances in the upcoming November midterm elections.

The Trump administration did not confirm these allegations.

However, the sudden Starshield outage coincided with massive Russian ballistic missile attacks for which Ukraine did not receive any warning from the US, just days after the Trump administration warned Kyiv to stop its attacks on Russian refineries or face suspension of intelligence sharing.

Another twist in this grueling tale came when The Telegraph reported that Musk approached Trump about slowing down Starshield in Ukraine.

However, Trump later said he did not believe that either he or Musk was responsible for Ukraine losing access to Starshield.

Over the weekend, Marco Rubio went on record saying Starshield is currently unavailable to Ukraine, adding that a request from Kyiv to use the system for attacks deep inside Russia was “under discussion.”

“Starlink is a commercial product, okay? And so it’s regulated and handled as a commercial product. Starshield is a defense product, a military product,” said Rubio in comments published by the Pentagon. “They’ve asked for access to it in order to conduct deep strikes inside of Russia. They don’t have access to it at the moment. That’s under discussion,” he added.

Ukrainian officials say the restrictions affected Starshield terminals they use for military operations. Secretary Rubio has stated that Starshield itself is not currently available to Ukraine and that Ukraine’s drone operations have relied on commercial Starlink. The two sides do not agree on which system was restricted.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post Starshield vs. Starlink: The Satellite Fight Complicating the Ukraine-Russia War and Kyiv’s Ties with the U.S. appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.