Is Turkey now globally recognized as a major military-industrial power?

The question assumes significance as, in a span of 48 hours, Turkey has signed two significant agreements that enhance its military-industrial power projection.

In Doha on October 21, it signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan, Qatar, and Indonesia for joint defense production, integrated manufacturing chains, and technology sharing.

In Ankara on October 22, it signed a Strategic Partnership with Canada, including a formal Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership, alongside deals on energy and air transport.

Four senior ministers signed the Badr Memorandum (BMU): Pakistan’s defense minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Turkey’s defense minister Yasar Guler, Qatar’s Deputy PM Sheikh Saud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Indonesia’s Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Yusuf Jauhari.

Prof. Dr. Haluk Görgün, President (Secretary) of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) in Turkey and regarded as the “architect” of the BMU, was present at the signing ceremony.

Incidentally, Badr refers to the Battle of Badr in 624 AD, when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers defeated their opponents in one of Islam’s earliest battles in the Arabian Peninsula.

Turkey’s defense ministry explained the name “Badr” as “full moon”. It said that “the four participating nations complement one another through this pact, which holds significant military and economic importance”.

In a statement, it added that “by leveraging the capabilities of each country in the field of military production, cooperation and integration will be achieved, defense industry capacities will be developed, and the needs of allied and friendly nations can thus be met.”

Similarly, the statement made by the Qatari Defense Ministry said the “Badr” Memorandum of Understanding “aims to foster cooperation in the field of defense manufacturing, enhance defense capabilities among the four countries, and promote collaboration in technical defense training, as well as in research and development areas, thereby contributing to the creation of solutions and industries worthy of the evolution of modern defenses”.

According to Arda Mevlutoglu, managing director of Ankara-based Mergen Analytical Strategies, the BMU’s implications could extend well beyond the four participants. “We may be witnessing the emergence of an interconnected network of defense and security arrangements extending from the Gulf to South and Southeast Asia, rather than a single formal alliance”.

Under the agreement, each country will bring its own resources and skills to the table.

“Turkey contributes technological expertise, systems integration and a mature defense industry; Pakistan and Indonesia offer manufacturing capacity, skilled workforces and sizable domestic markets; and Qatar provides investment potential and demand. Together, the four nations could establish integrated supply chains, allowing these countries to jointly develop, manufacture and sustain defence systems”, Mevlutoglu told Al Jazeera.

This means each member brings a complementary, not equal, asset. Turkey provides the industrial core, with establishments like Baykar (drones), TAI (aerospace), Aselsan (defense electronics), Roketsan (Missiles and munitions), STM (naval systems), and proven export models like the TB2 and Akıncı unmanned air-combat vehicles.

But Turkey seeks scale, co-production markets, and capital. Qatar can provide the finance. Pakistan and Indonesia can serve as markets.

Reportedly, Pakistan wants to diversify its military imports and not rely solely on China. It wants technology transfer and self-reliance through collaborations.

Indonesia is an emerging market and production base. Jakarta has bought Turkish weapons before — Kaplan tanks, MILGEM-derived frigates — and wants to build its own defense industry under Prabowo’s doctrine, with access to NATO-standard tech without full Western political conditions. The doctrine is championed by President Prabowo Subianto, who is aggressively executing a multifaceted supplier-diversification and co-production strategy.

However, the BMU is not the Mecca Pact of August 2026 that Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia signed in Riyadh and reportedly contains a collective defense clause—an attack on one is an attack on all.  It is an industrial MoU.

But one could argue that the initiative reflects Gulf countries increasingly looking toward the Global South and fellow Muslim countries, as recent Middle East conflicts have exposed vulnerabilities tied to dependence on foreign suppliers, technology restrictions, and supply chain disruptions.

By anchoring a defense-industrial coalition with Qatar, Pakistan, and Indonesia, Ankara seems to have signaled that it could be the technological and industrial nucleus of the Global South. And the global validation of its strategy has come through “the three-year action plan” with Ottawa.

Reports describe the optics of Prime Minister Mark Carney being received at the Presidential Complex in Ankara with full honors by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as historic. Carney is the first Canadian Prime Minister to make a dedicated bilateral visit to Turkey, although he traveled to Ankara in July to attend the NATO summit.

The visit resulted in the signing of three agreements: a Defense Industry Partnership between SSB Chairman Haluk Gorgun and Canadian Foreign Minister Anita Anand; an Air Transport Agreement; and a Joint Declaration on Energy Cooperation.

Remarkably, a few years ago, the two countries’ defense relations had virtually collapsed.

In October 2019, Canada imposed an arms embargo on Turkey after “Operation Peace Spring” in northeastern Syria. It was a military offensive launched by the Turkish Armed Forces and the allied Syrian National Army (SNA) against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG).

In October 2020, Canada suspended and later canceled export permits for L3Harris Wescam camera and targeting systems after confirming they were used on Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones supporting Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In fact, Canada adopted a presumptive-denial policy for military exports to Turkey. The Turkish defense industry saw Canada as a technology chokepoint.

However, over the last two years, Canada and Turkey have rebuilt their defense relationship. In January 2024, Ottawa quietly lifted arms-export restrictions and returned to a case-by-case assessment. In July 2026, at the NATO Summit in Ankara, the two defense ministers signed a “Statement of Intent”  on military dialogue.

“In an increasingly complex global security environment, rising geopolitical uncertainties, and evolving humanitarian challenges, a strong and resilient Canada-Turkiye partnership is essential, providing a foundation to mitigate shared threats and capitalize on new opportunities,” said a joint statement by Carney and Erdogan on Thursday.

Canary’s own statement was more emphatic: “Today’s new Agreement on Defense Industry Partnership will connect Canadian and Turkish companies to work together, creating good jobs at home, export opportunities abroad, greater security for our citizens, and contributing to a stronger NATO alliance”.

The partnership’s three-year action plan rests on four pillars: trade and investment; defense and security; energy; and ties between people.

On trade, investment and innovation, the two leaders agreed to “work toward the successful conclusion of a Canada-Turkey Free Trade Agreement”. They will also expand bilateral trade and investments in priority sectors, including energy supply, defense production, aerospace, and artificial intelligence (AI).

On defense and security, Carney and Erdogan “underlined their intent to deepen bilateral and multilateral cooperation”. They also agreed to “strengthen cooperation in support of peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, including Ukraine, South Caucasus, and the Middle East, in particular Gaza”.

The three-year action plan calls for exploring co-development in aerospace, defense production, AI, critical minerals, LNG, and nuclear energy.

Of course, what Canada has agreed is not about Turkey alone. Carney is in the middle of a full-scale trade war with Washington. President Donald Trump’s tariffs and rhetoric questioning Canadian sovereignty have forced Ottawa to pursue a deliberate diversification strategy.

Carney has already reset ties with Saudi Arabia, India and China — all strained under his predecessor Justin Trudeau. Turkey, with 87 million people, NATO’s second-largest army, and a growing industrial base, fits perfectly into his “reliable partners” and “collective resilience” narrative.

For Turkey, the gain is more strategic than commercial. A G7 member and a Five Eyes country, which once embargoed it, Canada now legitimizes its defense industry as a partner. No wonder Erdogan was quick to link Thursday’s agreement to his pet project — “the Defense, Security and Resilience Bank” , announced by nine countries at the NATO summit in July 2026 to finance defense production.

Few will contest that Turkey’s defense industry has grown steadily. From an import-dependent country with 20% local production in 2002 to over 80% today, with $7.1 billion in exports in 2024, it is now a top-15 arms exporter. The fact that both Canada, which embargoed it, and Indonesia, which has options from South Korea and France, want co-production with Turkey is the recognition of Turkey’s defense ecosystem.

Apparently, the narrative has shifted from “Turkey buys” to “Turkey builds with.” Both the Badr agreement and the deal with Canada use the language of “joint production and technology sharing”, not a “buyer-seller” arrangement.

Secondly, Turkey is building a parallel architecture. A formal NATO ally, it is also becoming the leader of a non-Western defense network.

Thirdly, it is showing “Sanctions Resilience”. Western restrictions for its intervention in Syria and the controversy over its buying the S-400  from Russia seem to have taught Turkey to indigenize. Now that indigenization is proving to be its selling point.

However, some reality checks are needed. Turkey’s achievements need not be projected as triumphalism.

After all, both the Agreements made at Doha and Ankara are  MoUs and framework agreements. No specific defense program has been identified that would allow assessment of impact on regional military balance. “Badr” has no factory, no joint venture company yet. In defense deals, MOUs are one thing, but their eventual shape is a different matter.

Second, there is the technology ceiling. Turkey still depends on Western subsystems — engines for Kaan and Altay, critical minerals processing, and high-end semiconductors. Canada can help with the latter, but Ottawa’s case-by-case export control means strategic tech will still be gated.

Engaging pragmatically with strategically vital G20 and NATO allies without requiring complete alignment on all domestic values, Canada is meeting this moment with what it calls “values-based realism”.

It is “pragmatically” dealing with other countries, but it will not cross a line when its commitment to the fundamental values of freedom, human rights, sustainability, and solidarity is challenged.

So, it remains to be seen how long Canada will remain silent on the widely reported sweeping and unprecedented nationwide crackdown by the Turkish government on dissent and civil society, heavily focusing on the systematic dismantling of LGBTQ+ and HIV-advocacy organizations.

However, all this does not detract from the fact that Turkey is emerging as a second-tier military-industrial power like South Korea and Israel. Its products are innovative and export-driven. But it has miles to go before reaching the status of the US, France, and Russia, which set global standards.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Canada Deal Cements Turkey’s Position as a Military-Industrial Power. Comes After Makkah & Badr Pacts appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

For the first time, a Royal Air Force (RAF) Eurofighter Typhoon flew alongside the French nuclear-capable Rafale during a simulated nuclear-strike mission, showcasing rare coordination between Europe’s two most advanced fighter jets. 

The UK deployed a small contingent of Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4s to France’s Saint-Dizier air base—a key facility in northeastern France that hosts Rafale squadrons of the deterrence force—for Exercise Rummy held over two days on October 20 and 21, 2026.

The exercise took place over France and the Mediterranean, with the Typhoons serving as a defensive counter-air (DCA) escort for the mock nuclear-armed Rafales during a simulated long-range nuclear strike sortie. The A330 MRTT refueling tankers supported the package.

“Taking off from the nuclear-capable air base at Saint-Dizier, the French and British crews demonstrated a very high level of interoperability and an ability to coordinate. The French and British nuclear forces remain independent,” the French Chief of the Defense Staff, General Fabien Mandon, said in a post on X.

Notably, the exercise did not involve any real nuclear warheads, although images published by French officials and Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin show French Rafales armed with ASMP (an air-launched land-attack cruise missile that can carry a nuclear payload) and Mica air-to-air missiles. Meanwhile, the Eurofighters were seen equipped with the short-range ASRAAM air-to-air missiles and fuel tanks.

“Conducted under robust safety and security arrangements, the exercise did not involve nuclear weapons. The exercise focused on improving how our forces work together, ensuring that if the UK faces a serious threat, our military can respond quickly and effectively alongside our closest European ally,” the UK Ministry of Defense said in an official statement on October 23, 2026.

Under the Conventional Support for Nuclear Operations (CSNO) concept, which is an established approach of NATO, the conventionally armed Eurofighter Typhoons could provide conventional escort and protection for the nuclear-capable Rafales without carrying, controlling, or deciding on the use of nuclear weapons.

As the nuclear-armed aircraft’s main air defense, the Typhoons would have unrestricted movement around the Rafales’ perimeter to identify and, if required, neutralize any radar contacts.

Optimized for high-altitude, high-speed air superiority and carrying weapons for both short- and long-range combat, the Eurofighter Typhoons can detect, intercept, and engage enemy fighters that threaten the strike package during a nuclear mission.

In a real mission, the Typhoon’s high-altitude intercept capability and the Rafale’s low-observable, terrain-following performance would lower overall mission risk and improve the chances of the strike aircraft reaching the launch point.

Nuclear Cooperation Without Sharing Nukes

Both the UK and France are nuclear powers, although Britain stopped using air-launched nuclear weapons in 1998 following the Strategic Defense Review (SDR), and currently only possesses the Trident submarine-launched missiles for nuclear weapons. France, by contrast, has both sea- and air-based nuclear launch capability.

France, in turn, retains exclusive political and operational control over its nuclear forces. Therefore, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force; it shows only that two independent deterrents can practice the tactical and procedural interface of a nuclear mission, including communications, escort, tanker support, and deconfliction, without combining their weapons, targeting, or the final decision to fire.

That said, France and Britain signed the Northwood Declaration to strengthen cooperation on their respective nuclear arsenals during French President Emmanuel Macron’s three-day visit to Britain in July 2025. 

“This morning, we signed the Northwood Declaration, confirming for the first time that we are coordinating our independent nuclear deterrence,” the former British PM Keir Starmer said at the time. ”From today, our adversaries will know that any extreme threat to this continent would prompt a response from our two nations. There is no greater demonstration of the importance of this relationship.”

Later that year, the newly formed Nuclear Steering Group met for the first time in Paris, and British officials observed Exercise Poker, a regular nuclear deterrence exercise conducted by French Air and Space Forces, marking the first time foreign officials had been given that access. Notably, the UK went from mere observer to participant, providing conventional support in a nuclear deterrence drill, in 10 months.

“Having independent nuclear forces doesn’t exclude coordination. By coordinating, our nuclear forces demonstrate that they can contribute even more significantly to the overall security of the alliance and the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic zone,” French Armed Forces Minister Catherine Vautrin stated.

Meanwhile, British Defense Secretary Wes Streeting said, “As Europe’s nuclear powers, we have a shared responsibility to contribute to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region. This exercise demonstrates the depth of our partnership, the credibility of our deterrents and our determination to stand together in the face of emerging threats.”

France has been collaborating with several European partners on the idea of “forward deterrence” amid uncertainties about US security guarantees for Europe and escalating security threats from Russia. Earlier this year, German Eurofighter Typhoons flew alongside French nuclear-capable Rafales in a joint “forward deterrence” exercise earlier this year.

In July 2026, two Luftwaffe Eurofighter Typhoons from Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 31 “Boelcke” at Nörvenich and two French Air and Space Force Dassault Rafale Bs from the Forces Aériennes Stratégiques at Saint-Dizier conducted their first joint air activity.

In March this year, French President Macron announced some changes in the country’s nuclear policy, including increasing the size of the country’s nuclear arsenal and extending the deterrent to cover other European countries.

“The next 50 years will be an era of nuclear weapons,” he exclaimed. The President noted that the UK, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark had all agreed to participate in the new “advanced deterrence” plan. He emphasized that the eight European nations could host air bases where France’s nuclear bombers could be based as well as participate in exercises of France’s air-launched nuclear capability. 

This would allow France’s Strategic Air Forces (FAS) to “spread out across the depth of the European continent… and thus complicate the calculations of our adversaries”, the president said at the time. This hinted that the country was eager to spearhead the continent’s nuclear posture amid rising security threats from Russia and a strained transatlantic relationship that has heightened insecurity among European states.

That said, Exercise Rummy does not create a shared European nuclear force, nor does it amount to a French nuclear umbrella in the classic extended-deterrence sense. Instead, it shows France systematically testing how far it can bring conventional partners–including Europe’s only other nuclear power–into the operational orbit of its airborne nuclear forces while retaining full control over the nukes in line with the larger “forward deterrence.”

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

 

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Four of China’s new KJ-3000 airborne early warning aircraft have been spotted at the Xi’an Aircraft Company complex, suggesting the type may have entered low-rate or serial production just 22 months after its first flight. 

Satellite images captured around October 4, 2026, by Vantor and posted to social media show four KJ-3000 early warning aircraft at the Xi’an Aircraft Company (XAC) complex in Yanliang. Three were spotted near the Y-20 production facilities, and the fourth was seen at the adjacent China Flight Test Establishment (CFTE).

Senior Fellow J. Michael Dahm of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies analyzed all available images in depth and assessed that the presence of four aircraft at Xi’an’s Y-20 production facility indicates the KJ-3000 has entered serial production. 

However, Chinese military aviation specialist Andreas Rupprecht seemed to agree with Dahm’s assessment, though he noted that the images could instead signal that the aircraft have entered low-rate production.

“Consequently, this could indeed be a sign that production or LRIP has begun; however, it could also be that all 4 previously known prototypes are in place. What we therefore need are clear photographs of the aircraft, their serial numbers, and, at best, showing them in PLAAF grey,” he argued, adding just the amount of caution required vis-à-vis Chinese platforms.

The KJ-3000, expected to be China’s most advanced early warning aircraft, first broke cover in December 2024, right after the sixth-generation prototypes, the J-36 and the J-50, were seen flying for the first time.

A pixelated image of the KJ-3000 in flight was posted to social media, as the EurAsian Times had reported at the time. Another highly pixelated image of a primer-painted aircraft bearing serial number 7821 surfaced in May 2025.

Notably, AEW&C aircraft serve as “eyes in the sky,” providing real-time surveillance and command and control over large areas. They are crucial force multipliers that coordinate air operations, guide fighters, and integrate data from multiple sources, including satellites, other aircraft, and ground-based sensors, serving as airborne command centers. Thus, playing a vital role in complex, dynamic battlefields where rapid decision-making is key.

Although details about the KJ-3000 are scarce, it is based on the Y-20B transport aircraft and powered by a WS-20 high-bypass turbofan engine.

The aircraft has a noticeable set of antennae on the forward fuselage and a large circular radome positioned over the rear fuselage. It also features a prominent intake at the base of the tailfin, likely to supply cooling air for its numerous onboard electronics. Additionally, it has an aerial refueling probe above the cockpit.

The aircraft is expected to have a detection range of 360 to 500 kilometers, although some estimates put it at 600 to 1,000 kilometers. These conjectures couldn’t be verified.

The massive early warning radar aircraft is likely intended to replace the KJ-2000, China’s only large jet-powered AEW&C platform to date. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) had a limited fleet of about four KJ-2000 aircraft, converted from Russian Ilyushin Il-76MD transports in the early 2000s, as the program stalled due to limited access to suitable Il-76 airframes and reliance on Russian engines and spares.

The KJ-3000 is believed to be a massive improvement over the KJ-2000. It can reportedly carry up to 66 tons of payload (16 tons more than the KJ-2000), and the WS-20 engines provide more thrust (about 31,000 pounds) and fuel efficiency, enabling longer flights.

The KJ-3000 would serve as a high-end airborne command, control, and surveillance node, significantly enhancing China’s ability to detect, track, and coordinate forces across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific in a potential conflict with the United States.

Its large AESA radar—mounted on a high-flying, long-endurance Y-20B platform—provides a much greater radar horizon than ground-based radars or existing smaller Chinese AEW&C aircraft.

Operating at higher altitudes and with aerial refueling will allow the KJ-3000 to provide persistent coverage over key maritime approaches, the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine Sea, or the South China Sea.

The aircraft could detect aircraft, ships, and potentially low-observable or low-flying threats (such as drones and bombers) farther away, giving Chinese forces earlier warning and more time to decide on a fast-moving battlefield.

The KJ-3000 is designed as a “sky command center.” It can track multiple targets at once and direct Chinese fighters, such as the J-20 stealth aircraft, as well as long-range air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and drones.

Furthermore, the KJ-3000 detects and tracks carrier strike groups, airborne tankers, AWACS, and strike packages at longer ranges, feeding targeting data to ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, and helping Beijing’s painstakingly built Anti-Access/Area-Denial structure.

A Mismatch Between Chinese & US Capability

Interestingly, China’s expanding early warning capabilities contrast sharply with those of the United States Air Force, which continues to grapple with the transition of its own heavy advanced early warning from the E-3 to the more advanced E-7 Wedgetail.

The E-3 Sentry fleet is aging, and its airframe and radar limitations are becoming more acute with every passing day. The planned replacement, the Boeing 737-based E-7 Wedgetail, already in service with allies such as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, and soon the United Kingdom, was originally planned for the USAF at 26 aircraft. However, budget uncertainty and shifting priorities have repeatedly delayed procurement.

Last year, for instance, the previous US Air Force plan to acquire 26 Boeing E-7 Wedgetail aircraft remained under review during the fiscal 2026 budget process under the current Trump administration, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

However, Congress pushed back against potential cuts and cancellation of the program.

In March 2026, the USAF changed strategy and awarded contract modifications to continue development and procure additional engineering-and-manufacturing-development (EMD) aircraft, bringing the contracted total to about seven. Later, in May 2026, the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated the department’s “mindset” had changed and that the E-7 “has a future” and a place on the battlefield.

Finally, reports in June 2026 noted that the Pentagon was seeking diversion of money from the US Navy’s E-2D Hawkeye and classified Air Force accounts to fund a $1.55 billion spending plan for its revived E-7 Wedgetail program in fiscal 2027. However, it has not yet committed to the large production run of the originally planned 26 aircraft.

The continued delay has raised concerns about a potential gap in airborne battle management amid rising security threats, especially since the E-3 is becoming outdated and the US has only about 15 of these aircraft (after one loss in the Iran war). 

By contrast, China is not only improving its early warning capabilities but also expanding its AEW&CS fleet—something that could trouble the US and its allies in an Indo-Pacific conflict.

China is Amassing Early Warning Aircraft

Early warning platforms are among an air force’s most strategic assets, especially since a single high-end platform can cover hundreds of thousands of square kilometers and track multiple targets during combat. However, no air force can rely on a handful of expensive, slow-moving, vulnerable early-warning aircraft alone.

So, China appears to have created somewhat of a layered AEW&C force structure.

Under this strategy, instead of fielding one type of aircraft, Beijing is working on deploying complementary tiers of platforms optimized for different roles, ranges, basing options, and threat environments. This is intended to create persistent, resilient, multi-domain surveillance that adversaries find harder to suppress.

China has developed newer early-warning aircraft based on existing designs, including the KJ-500, which forms the backbone of the PLAAF’s early-warning capability and is based on the Shaanxi Y-9 turboprop, and the KJ-200, a legacy aircraft based on the older Y-8.

The KJ-200 and KJ-500 are smaller than the high-end KJ-3000. They are considered ideal for regional operations, including in volatile areas like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, and would play a major role in a potential contingency in these flashpoint areas.

The KJ-200s, for one, provide supplementary coverage and experience while the PLAAF expands and simultaneously upgrades its KJ-500 fleet.

China has also developed the KJ-700, a next-generation Y-9-derived design intended as a more capable complement to the KJ-500. It features improved sensors and enhanced networking and is designed to handle denser, more complex threat environments, including low-observable aircraft and large numbers of drones. It is likely designed for missions anticipated in a future conflict with the United States.

China has also developed the KJ-600 for carrier-based operations, giving the PLA Navy massive reach and the ability to detect incoming threats from farther away, allowing it to project power far from its coast. With a twin-turboprop design, folding wings, and a large AESA rotodome, the KJ-600 entered operational service on the CATOBAR carrier Fujian in 2025 and has been observed on the ski-jump carrier Shandong.

The KJ-200 could be classified as a low-tier legacy aircraft, while the KJ-500 and KJ-700 could be clubbed as medium-tier and advanced medium-tier aircraft, respectively.

Meanwhile, the KJ-600 is a specialized carrier aircraft. The larger, more capable KJ-3000 falls into the high-tier category, and its serial production would let China field multiple aircraft for continuous coverage, attrition resilience, or simultaneous operations.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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In a “landmark” agreement, the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin have agreed to a framework agreement to buy F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the next 10 years.

Under the multi-year production and sustainment agreement, Lockheed Martin will produce 1,560 F-35 Lightning II aircraft for the US and its international customers at a rate of 156 fighters per year.

The US will buy at least 850 of these stealth fighter jets.

The agreement also covers associated initial spares, 10 years of modification kits, and a sustainment package for the global F-35 fleet.

It creates a stable, long-term procurement signal to modernize and expand America’s 5th-generation tactical aircraft. However, the agreement’s execution still depends on Congressional authorization and appropriations.

The US Congress is already considering granting the Pentagon authority to enter into multi-year procurement agreements with defense companies, specifically Lockheed Martin for the F-35 fighter and Boeing for the F-15EX Eagle.

The Pentagon also wants to buy at least 268 F-15EX fighters over the next decade.

The multi-year procurement and sustainment framework was first envisioned in the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization bill, released in May.

“We have fundamentally changed how we stabilize the American defense industrial base to produce at speed and scale,” said Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey in a statement.

“This agreement with Lockheed Martin proves it. By aligning financial incentives with actual performance, we are ensuring our warfighters are equipped with the lethal capabilities they need to fight and win.”

The Pentagon believes multi-year procurement agreements, totaling hundreds or even thousands of aircraft and valued at billions of dollars, will encourage defense companies to invest upfront in expanding production facilities.

Earlier this week, while commenting on the US Air Force’s updated fighter force structure report, under which the force envisions a 1,509 combat-coded fighter fleet by 2035, Lt. Gen. David Tabor, deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, has underlined that pushing multi-year procurement packages will provide financial stability to defense contractors and encourage them to invest in production facilities.

Notably, the US fighter force structure report is also pending before Congress, and it envisions a 60% stealth fleet by 2035.

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The 60% stealth force will include 40% F-35s and 20% F-22 Raptors and F-47s.

If the report is approved, by 2035, two out of every five combat-coded fighters in the USAF will be F-35As.

In addition, the US Navy and the US Marine Corps will also fly additional F-35B and F-35C variants.

The ten-year procurement framework with Lockheed for 1,560 F-35s over the next decade, including 850 exclusively for the US, will help the company invest in expanding and streamlining its production facilities to meet extraordinary global demand for the F-35.

To meet the demand, Lockheed will have to produce 156 F-35s annually.

Under the framework agreement with the Pentagon, Lockheed Martin has agreed to invest at least US$7 billion of its own money into projects to support the F-35 program.

“This multiyear framework strengthens the way we can plan and invest in the F-35 enterprise,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

“With the greater certainty that comes from the U.S. government’s transformative approach to F-35 production and sustainment, we can make the upfront investments needed to expand capacity, improve efficiency, and build a more resilient supply chain. That’s good for the taxpayer, good for our suppliers, and, most importantly, good for the United States and its allies.”

Lockheed Martin said in a statement that if the U.S. Congress grants multiyear authority and associated appropriations in the coming months, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin will finalize contract terms, pricing, and schedules through a formal contract award.

The statement added that the framework agreement will offer several advantages, including predictable, multi-year procurement planning, high-volume procurement efficiencies, and transparent, data-driven decision-making.

Notably, the F-35 Lightning II program relies on more than 1,400 domestic and global suppliers and contractors.

According to Lockheed Martin, the company manufactures nearly 30 to 42 percent of the jet outside the US across three continents before final assembly in Texas.

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While Lockheed Martin is the primary contractor, the UK’s BAE Systems is a principal partner. BAE supplies much of the software code, the F-35’s rear fuselage, tails, the AN/ASQ-239 Barracuda electronic warfare system, the antenna, various avionics, and more.

Another British contractor, Martin Baker, is providing the ejection seats. The LiftSystem found in the F-35B variant is made by the UK’s Rolls-Royce (the only company building that type of STOVL lift fan).

Northrop Grumman is also a principal contractor, and it designs and produces critical F-35 components, including the center fuselage, AN/APG-81 AESA radar, communications subsystems such as the AN/ASQ-242 Integrated Communications, Navigation, and Identification (CNI) system, and the EO/IR Distributed Aperture System.

Leonardo and Cameri in Italy, GKN Fokker in the Netherlands, ASDAM Group in Australia, and nearly 30 companies in Canada also supply crucial parts for the F-35 fighters.

Over 1,500 firm orders for the F-35 over the next 10 years will let Lockheed Martin enter long-term contracts with these suppliers to buy raw materials and critical parts in bulk, stabilizing supply chains and increasing F-35s mission-capability rates.

It said the integrated procurement model, which pairs aircraft production with purchases of spare and modification parts, will deliver high-volume procurement discounts, drive down unit prices, and give the U.S. government the cost predictability it requires.

Meanwhile, during the October 22 earnings call, Lockheed reported third-quarter 2026 sales of US$20.7 billion, up from $18.6 billion in the third quarter of 2025.

It also reported a record backlog of US$292.0 billion, including US$52.5 billion tied to the multi-year award to produce PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors.

Notably, Lockheed Martin’s market capitalization is approximately US$127 billion, so its current backlog of US$292 billion is 2.3 times its market value.

Together, the multi-year agreements for PAC-3 MSE interceptors and F-35 fighter jets will provide Lockheed with a stable source of income for years to come.

If Congress approves the F-35 multi-year procurement framework, Lockheed Martin’s backlog order book could easily cross US$350 billion.

“In the third quarter each of our four segments posted growth year-over-year, sales topped $20.7 billion and net earnings exceeded $1.8 billion, increases of 11% and 14%, respectively. We delivered $3 billion of free cash flow in the quarter, and increased our backlog to a record $292 billion, allowing us to raise our dividend for the 24^th year in a row,” said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.

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Taiclet also reiterated the company’s desire to integrate sixth-generation fighter-jet technologies into the F-35, upgrading it into what he called a “Ferrari” F-35.

Taiclet first voiced this desire in April last year after Lockheed lost to Boeing for the USAF’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, the F-47. He claimed that the company can integrate 80% of sixth-generation NGAD technology into its fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II, which is already in production, at half the cost.

If the multi-year F-35 agreement is approved and it provides Lockheed with 1,560 firm orders and stable cash flow over the next decade, then the company can invest in integrating some of these sixth-generation technologies into the F-35.

Notably, the F-35 is already the world’s most popular stealth aircraft.

Lockheed Martin has already delivered nearly 1,300 F-35s to the US and its international customers, more than all other stealth fighters combined, including the US F-22 Raptor, China’s J-20 and J-35A, and Russia’s Su-57.

A firm order for 1,560 more F-35s would bring the total close to 3,000 fighters by 2035.

The final decision, however, rests with the US Congress.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from The University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

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