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‘The most expensive group deportation flight in German history’ – Deporting just 33 people cost EU taxpayers €518,000

Germany’s efforts to deport more illegal immigrants is hitting an operational and fiscal roadblock, as official figures show that voluntary departures are now outstripping state-executed deportations. Despite significant financial expenditure, almost 9,000 removal attempts failed in the first six months of the year alone.

The financial burden of these operations is highlighted by a number of incredibly expensive or aborted deportation operations. In May, a chartered flight from Leipzig to Pakistan carrying 33 individuals subject to departure — escorted by 75 federal police personnel — cost approximately €518,000.

The operation is now being referred to as “the most expensive group deportation flight in German history,” with funding provided by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex.

By contrast, German taxpayers directly absorbed the costs for two unassisted charter flights to Afghanistan in April and June, which each exceeded €300,000. Operations to various African nations, including Nigeria, regularly reached €400,000 per flight with Frontex support, while an additional €5.93 million went toward security personnel for repatriations.

In other words, even small-scale deportation efforts are leading to exploding costs. Deportation numbers are also now falling, according to government data released following a parliamentary inquiry by the Left Party. The report reveals that federal authorities executed 9,663 deportations between January and June, a decline of 18.2 percent compared to the same period in the previous year. During this same timeframe, nearly 9,000 planned deportations failed to occur.

While state-enforced deportations may be falling, more and more people appear to be willing to leave the country of their own volition. Border officials confirmed that 17,892 individuals required to leave the country departed on their own, with roughly 9,300 taking advantage of federal financial assistance to do so.

Despite these exits, Germany’s overall backlog remains huge, according to Welt newspaper. By mid-year, roughly 259,000 foreign nationals obliged to exit the country remained in Germany. Of this group, 77 percent were granted temporary suspension of deportation and slightly more than 60 percent represented individuals whose asylum applications had been formally rejected.

Even after cases were handed over to the German Federal Police, deportations were interrupted by administrative issues and even physical resistance. Out of 734 cancellations that occurred during this final phase, “130 were due to acts of resistance, and in 56 cases there were medical concerns.”

At the same time, many pilots appear to be refusing to transport migrants slated for deportation. Pilots refused passage to scheduled deportees in 280 instances during the first half of the year, a notable rise given that 514 total refusals were logged throughout the entirety of 2025. Official records do not track the specific reasons pilots refuse to conduct these repatriations.

To enforce compliance during transit, police utilized physical restraints in 786 cases, with such measures used “particularly frequently during repatriations to Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria.”

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Spain’s Great Replacement: Half of unskilled construction workers are now foreign laborers

Spain’s construction industry is undergoing rapid demographic changes. Foreign-born workers in unskilled construction roles now make up 52.6 percent of all workers, according to data from Randstad from the first quarter

The data shows that foreign workers now exceed Spanish nationals for these unskilled roles by nearly 11,000 workers. The contrast is stark compared to pre-pandemic figures, when domestic laborers outnumbered foreign counterparts by more than 33,500.

Overall, the construction industry has lost 22,711 Spanish workers since 2019 while gaining 238,451 foreign employees, a figure that includes individuals with dual nationality. As a result, almost 36 percent of all construction workers, both skilled and unskilled, are now of foreign origin in the country.

The shift is equally evident among bricklayers. In 2019, Spanish bricklayers outnumbered foreigners by 111,000. Seven years later, that gap has narrowed to just 18,000 workers. Foreign labor has gained more than 16 percentage points in this category and currently accounts for roughly 48 percent of bricklayers working in Spain. While Spaniards remain the majority in most skilled roles for now, the statistical gap continues to shrink rapidly. Experts also predict that foreigners will increasingly dominate skilled and managerial positions in the future.

This transformation extends into specialized technical trades. The count of Spanish plumbers fell from 70,932 in 2019 to 57,781 today, while foreign representation doubled after adding over 10,000 workers. One in four plumbers in Spain is now foreign-born. Electricians show a similar dynamic, with about 32,000 foreign workers joining the profession since 2019, driving foreign representation up from under 11 percent pre-pandemic to nearly three out of ten today.

Industry analysts expect these patterns to hold due to impending retirements and low replacement rates among younger Spaniards.

Spain, like many other nations, is attempting to automate the construction industry as much as possible. However, instead of relying on advanced robots, Spain has so far shifted toward a modular construction approach in which concrete panels, bathrooms, and complete structural modules are built indoors in automated, factory-controlled settings that use machinery and assembly lines similar to those in the automotive sector. Cranes then assemble these modular components on site, requiring significantly fewer workers and dramatically cutting project delivery times.

Countries such as South Korea, by contrast, are racing ahead in automated construction, precisely because nations like Spain continue to rely on mass immigration, which is often cheaper in the short term but more costly over the long run.

South Korea does not only use automated construction in planning, but also in deploying commercialized robotics, automated modular manufacturing, and government-mandated smart construction.

Automated facilities, such as Space Factory, use advanced robotic arms to cut materials, assemble structural panels, seal joints, and fit window frames without direct manual intervention.

Unlike standard build sites in Spain, South Korean contractors actively deploy field robotics directly to job sites.

Automated rebar-tying robots and robotic concrete sprayers and finishers are routinely used by major developers, such as Samsung C&T and Hyundai E&C, to reduce heavy physical labor on high-rise residential projects. In addition, unmanned excavators and bulldozers guided by real-time GPS and drone mapping handle heavy site preparation.

Robots are even acting as supervisors to some extent, with autonomous quadruped robots, such as Boston Dynamics’ “Spot,” owned by South Korea’s Hyundai Motor Group, continuously patrolling construction sites, performing 3D laser scans to verify that progress matches digital blueprints.

As Remix News has previously reported, automation, robotics, and AI are all leading elements of Asian economies, which have chosen efficiency and technology over mass immigration and cheap foreign labor.

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Germany: African migrant tries to rape 3 women in a matter of minutes, then grab’s policewoman’s crotch during arrest

A 24-year-old man from Gambia remains in custody after police arrested him in connection with a rapid series of alleged sexual attacks on three women in Heidelberg. During the incidents, he allegedly attempted to rape the three women in short succession by dragging them into a cornfield.

Authorities say the incidents unfolded within roughly half an hour on Tuesday morning, Aug. 18, 2026, in an open field area beside the Pfaffengrund cemetery.

According to statements from the Mannheim police headquarters and the Heidelberg public prosecutor’s office, the suspect was walking in the fields around 10:00 a.m. when he approached a woman who was out with her dog. He is accused of grabbing her by the chest and attempting to pull her into a nearby cornfield. The woman shouted and fought back, managing to break free and run away, according to German newspaper Wochenblatt.

Minutes later, between approximately 10:25 and 10:30 a.m., the same man allegedly targeted two other female walkers separately. In each case he seized their hands or wrists and tried to force them toward the cornfield. Both women resisted vigorously, and he eventually released them without succeeding.

Witnesses who saw the confrontations contacted emergency services. Officers launched an immediate search and detained the suspect a short time later. During the arrest, he is further accused of grabbing a female police officer’s crotch.

The following day, the 24-year-old appeared before an investigating judge at the Heidelberg District Court. At the prosecutor’s request the judge issued an arrest warrant on suspicion of multiple counts of attempted sexual assault, sexual harassment, and additional related offenses. He was then transferred to a correctional facility.

Investigators have indicated they are examining possible other incidents linked to the same individual. The joint probe by the Heidelberg public prosecutor’s office and the criminal police continues.

The case has parallels with many other cases covered by Remix News over the years, including a case where a woman successfully fought off a migrant with a horse whip when he tried to drag her off her horse and rape her.

The post Germany: African migrant tries to rape 3 women in a matter of minutes, then grab’s policewoman’s crotch during arrest appeared first on Remix News.

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Romania’s years-long crisis of democratic legitimacy deepens

Romania’s ongoing political crisis is entering a more critical phase, with a collapsed government, an unresolved battle over the presidency and a growing conservative-nationalist challenge to the political order that has dominated the country for years.

At stake is not just who governs Bucharest, but whether Romania’s institutions can recover public legitimacy after the extraordinary cancellation of the 2024 presidential election.

The crisis dates back to November 2024, when independent nationalist candidate Călin Georgescu—to the surprise of many—finished first in the opening round of the presidential vote.

Citing alleged electoral irregularities and intelligence—evidence that still hasn’t been disclosed to the public—claiming Russian interference in favor of Călin Georgescu, Romania’s Constitutional Court subsequently annulled the election.

The court’s decision, therefore, erased an election result already delivered by Romanian voters and triggered one of the most serious democratic controversies in the European Union.

Romania’s democratic clampdown deepened even further in March 2025 when Georgescu was barred from taking part in the rerun presidential election. The Constitutional Court upheld his exclusion, leaving the person who had won the original first round unable to compete when Romanians were sent back to the polls for a second time.

The sequence of events became, for a broad cross-section of Romania’s population, undeniable proof of what many observers have begun to describe as “managed democracy”—meaning elections across the EU are “legitimate” only until voters choose someone “unacceptable” to the ruling establishment.
It didn’t take long for news of the crisis to reach across the Atlantic. Vice President JD Vance used his 2025 Munich Security Conference speech to accuse Romania of having “straight up canceled the results of a presidential election based on the flimsy suspicions of an intelligence agency and enormous pressure from its continental neighbors.”

The U.S. State Department’s subsequent Report on Human Rights Practices also leveled criticism that the annulment represented political interference and an unusually severe restriction on disfavored political speech. Elon Musk, for his part, in several posts to social media attacked the Romanian state’s treatment of Georgescu and described one official connected with the process as a “tyrant.”

How can a judge end democracy in Romania? https://t.co/9MFhlq6YwQ

— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) March 10, 2025

This guy is a tyrant, not a judge https://t.co/ghE9X4W5G3

— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) February 20, 2025

The episode resonated well beyond Romania because it touched a wider fault line running through European politics. Nationalist movements challenging Brussels on sovereignty, mass migration, security, green policy, cultural questions, and foreign affairs increasingly argue that institutional mechanisms are being weaponized to contain alternative political forces that can no longer be easily defeated—and may even be winning outright—at the ballot box.

Romania’s own long-established, ruling elite class has since begun to fracture. Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan’s Brussels-aligned government was brought down on May 5 after the Social Democratic Party (PSD) abandoned the coalition and joined nationalist AUR and other opposition forces in backing a no-confidence motion.

The result was overwhelming—281 lawmakers voted to remove the government, compared with only four against, well above the 233 votes required. The scale of the defeat exposed the government’s lack of legitimacy and revealed how quickly the firewall around Romania’s nationalist opposition had begun to crack.

Especially noteworthy was the decision by the PSD, long one of the pillars of Romania’s establishment, to cooperate with the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). Whatever the parties’ differences, that cooperation showed that excluding AUR indefinitely from parliamentary influence was becoming increasingly difficult.

President Nicușor Dan, so far, has failed to find a legitimate replacement. His nominee Adrian Veștea went before Parliament in June but secured only 189 votes—44 short of the 233 needed to install a government.

The failure prolonged a political vacuum that has continued into August. Bolojan remains interim prime minister, while Dan has held repeated consultations with former coalition parties in an effort to maintain fiscal measures and secure Romania’s remaining EU recovery funds.

The government’s paralysis has placed greater scrutiny on Dan himself. The right-wing S.O.S. Romania party formally initiated a constitutional procedure seeking his suspension under Article 95, alleging serious violations involving the separation of powers, government formation, the judiciary and democratic oversight of the intelligence services.

S.O.S. leader Diana Șoșoacă said more than 400,000 Romanian living in the country and abroad had expressed support for Dan’s removal. She also claimed that 155 parliamentarians had indicated agreement with the suspension initiative, although the names of lawmakers outside her party were not publicly disclosed.

The accusations against Dan include claims that he has blurred the constitutional boundaries of the presidency by involving himself too directly in judicial affairs. Critics have also objected to his public comments concerning the Constitutional Court and his consultations with magistrates.

Another point of contention is Dan’s insistence on constructing what he has repeatedly called a pro-Western governing majority. His opponents argue that the Constitution requires the president to facilitate government formation rather than impose ideological tests on parties capable of assembling parliamentary support.

Dan, for his part, has defended his approach as an effort to maintain Romania’s strategic orientation and produce a workable government. His supporters say the country’s position on NATO’s eastern flank, next to Ukraine, makes political and foreign-policy continuity especially important.

The intelligence services have become another sensitive issue. Critics point to the absence of permanent civilian leadership at the Romanian Intelligence Service while proposals have circulated to expand the security apparatus into areas including corruption and tax enforcement.

Such controversies carry particular historical weight in Romania, where memories of communist-era surveillance and the political power of the security services remain deeply embedded. Measures that might be treated elsewhere as routine institutional disputes can therefore trigger much deeper fears of political control.

A separate 2026 rule-of-law report cited by critics has further intensified the argument over Romania’s Constitutional Court. The Civil Liberties Union for Europe report was cited as arguing that the court had effectively changed the law in its handling of electoral candidacies, raising questions about legal certainty and the scope of judicial power.

The same report raised concerns over procedural protections for excluded candidates and discussed structural reform of the Constitutional Court itself. It also highlighted problems involving media independence, opaque political financing, and poorly defined anti-disinformation measures that can potentially restrict legitimate speech.

Those findings have strengthened the case made by Georgescu’s and his supporters that the 2024 election annulment, described by many analysts as a constitutional coup, was never merely about one TikTok campaign. They see it as a confrontation over who ultimately sets the boundaries of acceptable politics—Romanian voters or institutions increasingly tied to a globalist, Brussels-centered political consensus.

Romania’s crisis has moved beyond constitutional theory, as its political breakdown now collides with an economy facing some of the heaviest fiscal pressures in the European Union.

Earlier predictions that Fitch could push Romanian sovereign debt into junk territory did not materialize this August. Fitch instead maintained Romania at BBB-, the lowest investment-grade level, while keeping a negative outlook and warning that prolonged political instability could undermine deficit reduction and jeopardize access to European recovery money.

The reprieve should not be confused with economic security. Fitch expects Romania’s economy to contract by roughly 0.6 percent in 2026 and projects a budget deficit of about 5.9 percent of GDP—an improvement from previous years, but still exceptionally high for a BBB-rated state.

S&P has likewise kept Romania at BBB- with a negative outlook. Both agencies have pointed to the ongoing political fragmentation, financing pressures, and the difficulty of sustaining fiscal consolidation while governments rise and fall in Bucharest.

For ordinary Romanians, warnings like these translate into something much more tangible than ratings-agency terminology. They mean higher borrowing costs, increased pressure on household incomes, weaker growth, and further uncertainty over the country’s economic future. That helps explain why anger at political elites has persisted even as officials insist Romania remains firmly anchored inside the EU and NATO.

The nationalist political revolt in Romania also forms part of a wider European trend. From the AfD in Germany and Marine Le Pen’s movement in France to populist forces in Italy, Austria and elsewhere, parties demanding national sovereignty, stricter immigration controls and, increasingly, remigration have forced issues once excluded from respectable debate into the political mainstream.

Romania’s version of that revolt has developed around Georgescu and AUR, whose supporters increasingly compare their struggle with the movement that formed around Donald Trump in the United States. They view sovereignty, national identity, demographic security, economic accountability, and a nationally oriented foreign policy not as threats to democracy, but as core issues that any genuine democracy must be free to decide for itself.

The Romanian establishment—and by extension its backers in Brussels—now faces an uncomfortable problem: attempts to isolate Romania’s traditional, nationalist, and patriotic electorate have not only failed to make it disappear, but have made it much stronger. The collapse of the governing coalition and the cooperation between PSD and AUR have shown that the old cordon sanitaire is becoming harder—if not impossible—to maintain.

The post Romania’s years-long crisis of democratic legitimacy deepens appeared first on Remix News.

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