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Europe’s Bid for AI Independence Faces Its First Major Test as EUROPA Challenges US Technology Giants

The European Union is attempting to establish itself as a developer of advanced artificial intelligence rather than primarily a regulator and consumer of technology produced elsewhere. An Italian-led consortium developing a large open-source AI model across all 24 official EU languages will provide an important test of whether Europe’s supercomputing infrastructure can support globally competitive systems.

Europe’s efforts to establish greater control over artificial intelligence technology are entering a new phase as the EUROPA consortium, led by Italian company Domyn, advances plans to develop one of the continent’s largest open-source AI models.

The initiative, supported by the European Commission and European high-performance computing infrastructure, aims to create an advanced artificial intelligence system capable of competing with models developed by leading American and Chinese companies.

Domyn chief executive Uljan Sharka told the Financial Times on 29 October that Europe possesses the technological resources and industrial expertise required to compete in advanced AI development.

However, he also identified two obstacles: the need for greater investment and the difficulty of persuading European businesses to adopt domestically developed systems.

These challenges extend beyond the development of a single language model.

They concern whether Europe can establish a commercially sustainable AI industry while reducing dependence on technology providers headquartered outside the EU.

EUROPA and the Frontier AI Grand Challenge

The European Commission selected EUROPA in June 2026 as the winner of its Frontier AI Grand Challenge.

The competition, launched in February, was designed to support the development of a European general-purpose AI model with more than 400 billion parameters.

EUROPA’s planned model is expected to contain approximately 500 billion parameters and support all 24 official EU languages.

The consortium brings together Domyn and Germany’s Fraunhofer research organisation, including the Fraunhofer IAIS and IIS institutes.

Its work will rely on the EuroHPC network of European supercomputers.

Under the competition arrangements, the winning consortium can obtain access to as much as 2.5 per cent of EuroHPC’s total computing capacity for one year.

This allocation is intended to address one of the largest barriers to advanced AI development: the enormous computing resources required to train models at this scale.

The final system is intended to be released under an open-source licence, allowing organisations to inspect, adapt and deploy the technology.

Nevertheless, parameter count alone does not demonstrate that a model is competitive.

Its actual performance will depend on training data, architecture, computational efficiency, evaluation results and the ability to perform reliably across different tasks.

A European Model for European Languages

One of EUROPA’s distinguishing objectives is its coverage of all official EU languages.

The commercial AI market has historically been dominated by models developed primarily for English-language applications, although leading international systems increasingly support multiple languages.

For Europe, linguistic capability has particular relevance to public administration, legal services, education and cross-border business.

A model designed specifically for the European market could potentially support specialised applications involving national legislation, administrative procedures and technical terminology.

However, multilingual availability will need to be assessed against measurable performance standards.

A system capable of producing fluent responses in a particular language is not necessarily equally reliable when interpreting specialised legal or scientific information.

The consortium will therefore need to demonstrate that linguistic coverage translates into practical capabilities rather than remaining principally a technical specification.

Europe’s Supercomputers Become Strategic Assets

The EUROPA project forms part of a wider effort to use European publicly supported computing infrastructure for commercial and scientific AI development.

The EuroHPC Joint Undertaking has invested in systems intended to provide advanced computing resources to researchers, businesses and public institutions.

Additional AI-focused infrastructure is being developed through the EU’s network of AI factories.

These facilities are intended to make specialised computing capacity available to organisations that would otherwise face considerable costs when developing or adapting AI systems.

However, infrastructure ownership does not necessarily provide complete technological independence.

European supercomputing projects continue to rely on internationally sourced semiconductor technology and specialised software.

Domyn itself has described a partnership with the American technology company Nvidia in its previous model-development work.

Consequently, European AI sovereignty is better understood as a question of control over important technological capabilities than complete separation from international supply chains.

Domyn’s Smaller Model Provides an Early Example

On 20 October, Domyn announced the initial release of Domyn Edge, a separate AI model containing four billion parameters.

According to the company’s technical announcement, the system was trained from scratch using approximately 13 trillion tokens on Europe’s Leonardo supercomputer.

Domyn has committed to making the model’s weights, training code, intermediate checkpoints and datasets available under open licences.

This approach is intended to improve reproducibility and allow external developers to examine how the model was constructed.

Domyn Edge is substantially smaller than the planned EUROPA system and should not be confused with it.

Nevertheless, the project provides an example of the company’s approach to developing AI models using European computing infrastructure.

Regulation Is Only Part of the Challenge

The EU has already established an extensive regulatory framework for artificial intelligence through the AI Act.

However, legislation governing the development and deployment of AI does not, by itself, create a competitive domestic technology industry.

Europe faces competition from American companies with substantial private investment, established cloud platforms and access to large commercial markets.

Chinese developers have also expanded their capabilities, including in open-weight AI systems.

EUROPA’s commercial prospects will therefore depend on more than technical performance.

European businesses must be willing to integrate the resulting technology into their operations, while developers will require dependable access to computing infrastructure and support services.

There is also the question of whether European institutions themselves will adopt domestically developed AI systems where they meet relevant security and performance requirements.

Without sufficient demand, even a technically successful model could struggle to establish a sustainable ecosystem.

The Test Will Be Commercial as Well as Technical

Domyn has indicated that it aims to release EUROPA during 2027, although public statements have differed over the precise timetable.

The company’s leadership has discussed a June target, while an earlier technical announcement referred to the second half of 2027.

The immediate challenge is completing development and demonstrating that the model can compete on performance, reliability and cost.

The longer-term challenge concerns adoption.

If European businesses and public institutions continue relying predominantly on foreign technology, access to an advanced European alternative may have only a limited effect on the market.

Conversely, a competitive and widely adopted open-source model could offer organisations greater control over deployment, customisation and sensitive information.

EUROPA is therefore more than a publicly supported technology experiment.

It is a test of whether Europe can convert research institutions, computing infrastructure and industrial expertise into AI products capable of competing in the international market.

The outcome will depend not simply on whether Europe can build an advanced model, but on whether organisations consider it sufficiently capable and economical to use.

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Big Tech Lobbying Raises Questions Over Europe’s Retreat from Digital Regulation

A new investigation into the activities of Google, Meta and other technology companies has intensified scrutiny of EU plans to revise data-protection legislation, placing Ireland and Germany at the centre of a dispute over corporate influence and European digital sovereignty.

European technology policy has become the focus of a dispute over corporate lobbying after researchers documented extensive contacts between major technology companies and political decision-makers during negotiations to revise EU data-protection rules.

An investigation published on 28 October by Corporate Europe Observatory and the German transparency organisation LobbyControl alleges that leading technology companies mounted a coordinated campaign to influence European governments and legislators.

The findings come one week after EU member states agreed a negotiating position on the Digital Omnibus, a legislative package intended to simplify aspects of European data-protection, privacy and cybersecurity regulation.

The campaigners argue that the proposed changes risk weakening existing safeguards in order to accommodate the commercial requirements of artificial intelligence developers.

Ireland, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, has rejected suggestions that its handling of the legislation was improperly influenced by technology companies.

The dispute exposes a fundamental disagreement over the balance between commercial innovation and the protection of personal information.

The scale of the lobbying campaign

According to LobbyControl’s investigation, non-European technology companies recorded 103 meetings with representatives of Germany’s federal government between May 2025 and September 2026.

Google accounted for 28 meetings, Microsoft 18, Amazon 16 and OpenAI 11.

Germany’s Digital Minister, Karsten Wildberger, participated in 18 meetings with representatives of major technology companies, the researchers reported.

In Ireland, the organisations identified extensive engagement involving Meta, Google and politicians ahead of the country’s assumption of the EU Council presidency in July.

Their findings indicate that Meta engaged with 41 Irish parliamentarians over the Digital Omnibus, while Google recorded 30 meetings.

The researchers also identified 655 lobbying meetings concerning the legislation involving members of the European Parliament.

According to their analysis, approximately 83 per cent represented business interests, compared with 11 per cent involving civil society organisations or trade unions.

These figures demonstrate the intensity of corporate engagement, although the existence of lobbying meetings does not, by itself, establish that particular legislative provisions were adopted because of that activity.

Why the Digital Omnibus matters

The legislative package forms part of a broader European Commission initiative to reduce administrative burdens and improve competitiveness.

Its provisions address several areas of digital regulation, including the General Data Protection Regulation, commonly known as GDPR.

The proposals seek to simplify compliance obligations, clarify the treatment of personal information and revise rules governing certain forms of data processing.

One particularly contentious issue concerns the use of personal data in developing and operating artificial intelligence systems.

AI developers require large quantities of information to train and improve their models. However, the collection and processing of personal information remain subject to European legal safeguards.

Technology companies have argued that regulatory complexity can discourage investment and make it more difficult for European businesses to compete internationally.

Privacy campaigners maintain that simplifying regulatory procedures must not become a mechanism for reducing substantive protections.

The disagreement concerns not merely administrative paperwork but the legal circumstances under which companies may process information relating to identifiable individuals.

Ireland rejects allegations of improper influence

Ireland occupies a particularly sensitive position in the debate.

The country hosts major European operations of several American technology companies, including Google and Meta, and has substantial economic interests in the digital sector.

At the same time, its presidency of the EU Council requires it to coordinate negotiations between member states.

According to RTÉ’s reporting on the investigation, the Irish government strongly rejected the allegation that it had weakened data safeguards in response to corporate pressure.

A presidency spokesperson emphasised that Ireland’s responsibility was to facilitate agreement between member states and that the negotiating mandate approved on 21 October enjoyed broad support.

The Council has presented the proposed changes as a means of reducing compliance costs while preserving established privacy protections.

In its official statement, the Council said its mandate retains the existing definition of personal data and introduces additional provisions governing pseudonymisation.

It also includes safeguards relating to sensitive information used for biometric verification and AI systems.

These details are significant because they demonstrate that the negotiating text contains protections alongside proposed simplifications.

Germany’s role in the negotiations

Germany has also emerged as an important participant in the controversy.

The investigation points to close contact between the German government and international technology companies during discussions about the future of European digital regulation.

Berlin has supported reducing administrative restrictions that it considers obstacles to innovation and the development of competitive AI technologies.

For Germany, the issue is connected to wider concerns about industrial competitiveness, investment and Europe’s dependence on foreign technology suppliers.

Yet an unresolved question remains.

Measures designed to assist European innovators may also benefit established American companies whose extensive computing infrastructure and data resources give them advantages over smaller competitors.

Consequently, easing restrictions does not necessarily guarantee a stronger European technology industry.

The European Parliament holds the next decision

The Council’s negotiating position does not make the Digital Omnibus law.

The European Parliament must establish its own position before negotiations between the institutions can determine the final legislation.

Parliamentarians will therefore have an opportunity to examine the treatment of personal data, the safeguards attached to AI development and the relationship between regulatory simplification and individual rights.

The lobbying investigation is likely to become part of that debate.

Its central political significance lies in the competing interpretations of European technological sovereignty.

For governments seeking investment, regulatory flexibility may provide an instrument for improving Europe’s international competitiveness.

For privacy organisations, the same flexibility could increase the influence of companies already dominant in global digital markets.

The outcome will help determine whether Europe’s future digital framework preserves the existing balance between commercial data use and individual protections, or establishes a different relationship between the two.

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Jordanian Airstrikes in Syria Spark Diplomatic Tension

Airstrikes carried out by Jordan on Monday night against positions in southern Syria—allegedly linked to the jihadist group Islamic State (IS)—have triggered a diplomatic rift between the two nations. The friction stems from a lack of prior coordination and the fact that the strikes resulted in civilian casualties, including children.

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On Tuesday, the Syrian Foreign Ministry criticized the Hashemite Kingdom for conducting the military operation without prior coordination, describing the action as completely unacceptable and a violation of Syria’s national sovereignty.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry also suggested that certain suspicious groups might be attempting to strain relations between Damascus and Amman, though it provided no further details regarding this claim.

Jordan framed the airstrikes as retaliation for an attack last Friday on a church in the western part of the kingdom, which left nine people dead and approximately 40 injured. Jordanian authorities attributed the attack to the Islamic State, although the organization has not yet claimed responsibility.

#Syria hardened its stance on the Jordanian attack carried out yesterday in the South.

While the Syrian Foreign Ministry initially expressed "reservations" about the Jordanian airstrikes in a statement last night, this morning, as the civilian death toll was confirmed, Damascus… pic.twitter.com/RvgfBLFVIV

— Qalaat Al Mudiq (@QalaatAlMudiq) October 27, 2026

Mohammad Momani, Jordan’s Minister of Government Communications and government spokesperson, stated on the social media platform X that the strikes were launched in response to the movements of these organizations and their acts against Jordan’s national security.

Momani expressed regret over the civilian casualties, maintaining that the armed forces had taken every possible precaution to avoid harming innocent people.

Syrian authorities confirmed that seven people were killed in the strikes, which targeted four areas in the southern province of Daraa. The victims included three children and an 80-year-old man.

Both countries have confirmed the establishment of an urgent joint committee to strengthen coordination in the fight against terrorism. Meanwhile, Momani expressed a commitment to developing bilateral ties for the mutual benefit of both nations.

#Syria | At least 14 people were killed and 11 injured in an explosion at a temporary weapons depot near Sarmada in Idlib province.
Rescue teams are searching the rubble for survivors, while authorities have not yet determined the cause of the blast.#Idlib #teleSUREnglish pic.twitter.com/q5utCtzkFE

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) September 9, 2026
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Mexico Detains Ex-Prosecutor on Treason Charges Over CIA Raid

Former Chihuahua prosecutor César Jáuregui Moreno faces treason charges over a CIA-linked operation in Mexico.

A former Chihuahua prosecutor faces federal charges over a drug-lab operation involving US intelligence agents, escalating a dispute over Mexico’s national sovereignty.


A Mexican federal judge has ordered the pretrial detention of former Chihuahua attorney general César Jáuregui Moreno on charges of treason, ruling that evidence supports allegations that he compromised national sovereignty by allowing US intelligence agents to take part in a drug-lab operation without federal authorization.

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Judge Ricardo Alfonso Santos Dorantes issued the order early Sunday after finding sufficient grounds to bring Jáuregui Moreno to trial. The former prosecutor will remain in a maximum-security prison in the State of Mexico while the case proceeds.

The charges stem from a mid-April operation to dismantle a drug laboratory in the Sierra del Pinal, in the northern border state of Chihuahua. According to Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office (FGR), agents from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) participated without the required notification to the Foreign Affairs Ministry or the necessary legal authorizations.

Prosecutors argue that Jáuregui Moreno’s failure to act enabled armed foreign personnel to operate on Mexican territory in activities reserved exclusively for the federal government, putting national security at risk.

Luego de aportar más de 150 datos de prueba, la #FGR obtuvo auto de vinculación a proceso en contra de César “N”, ex fiscal general del estado de Chihuahua, por su posible participación en el delito de traición a la patria. pic.twitter.com/sbhM0vY6cG

— FGR México (@FGRMexico) October 25, 2026

Text Reads: After providing more than 150 pieces of evidence, the #FGR obtained an order of linkage to trial against César “N”, former Attorney General of the state of Chihuahua, for his possible involvement in the crime of treason against the homeland.

The FGR presented more than 150 pieces of evidence at the hearing. Prosecutors also cited public statements in which Jáuregui Moreno said the operation had been planned for months by Chihuahua’s State Investigation Agency and its Special Strategic Operations Prosecutor’s Office. They argued that the account pointed to information being withheld from federal authorities and shared with foreign personnel.

The defense presented documents and witness testimony to challenge the federal allegations. However, Judge Santos Dorantes upheld the charges and set a two-month deadline for investigators to complete the supplementary investigation.

Jáuregui Moreno was initially arrested in Chihuahua city on Saturday under a state-level warrant accusing him of illegally exercising public office and collusion. A local judge ordered him to stand trial on the public-office charge but did not impose pretrial detention, leaving open the possibility of his release.

On October 18, agents from the federal Criminal Investigation Agency arrested him under a separate warrant as he was leaving detention. He was transferred to Mexico City and taken to El Altiplano, a maximum-security prison in the State of Mexico. The hearing on the federal treason charge began on Saturday afternoon and was held behind closed doors.

The case has fueled tensions between state and federal authorities and sparked a wider political dispute over the Chihuahua operation. The controversy has also drawn attention to a private meeting on September 19 in Ciudad Juárez between Chihuahua Governor Maru Campos and President Claudia Sheinbaum.

Campos later disclosed details of the encounter, which involved heated exchanges over the case. She said she went public to counter rumors that she had reached a political pact or a behind-the-scenes agreement with the federal government.

Jorge Romero Herrera, national leader of the opposition National Action Party (PAN), defended Campos’s decision to disclose details of the meeting.

“She is an adult woman; she makes her own decisions,” Romero Herrera said. He also reaffirmed his party’s support for Campos and other PAN officials, including governors and mayors.

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US-China AI race turning ASEAN neutrality into a liability

For decades, Southeast Asia has turned great-power rivalry to an economic advantage. By maintaining healthy ties with Washington and Beijing, ASEAN governments attracted investment, expanded trade and preserved room for diplomatic maneuver. The great-power race for artificial-intelligence dominance, however, is changing that bargain. As the United States and China build competing technology networks, neutrality may […]

The post US-China AI race turning ASEAN neutrality into a liability appeared first on Asia Times.

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Washington Threatens Retaliation Over EU Plans to Restrict American Satellite Operators

The United States has warned the European Union that proposed restrictions on American satellite operators could provoke commercial retaliation against European businesses, escalating a dispute over the future of satellite communications and Europe’s efforts to reduce its dependence on foreign technology.

US Ambassador to the EU Andrew Puzder has criticised plans under consideration in Brussels that would reserve parts of the radio spectrum for European operators, potentially restricting services provided by Elon Musk’s SpaceX and its Starlink satellite network.

According to details of Washington’s objections, the American administration believes the proposed arrangements would discriminate against US companies and undermine competition. Puzder has warned that European businesses could face substantial consequences if the restrictions proceed.

The disagreement comes as Brussels pursues a broader strategy intended to strengthen Europe’s technological independence in satellite communications, cloud computing and artificial intelligence. Washington has increasingly challenged European regulations that it considers detrimental to American technology companies.

A dispute over access to satellite frequencies

At the centre of the disagreement is the allocation of radio frequencies used by satellite communications systems. Access to suitable spectrum is essential for providing reliable services, particularly as operators deploy increasingly large constellations in low Earth orbit.

SpaceX has established a substantial commercial and technological advantage through Starlink, which operates thousands of satellites and provides broadband services to residential, commercial and government customers across numerous countries.

European operators argue that the expansion of American satellite networks could make it difficult for European competitors to secure sufficient spectrum and develop commercially viable services.

Washington takes a different position, warning that preferential treatment for European operators could restrict competition rather than strengthen it.

The precise legal form of the proposed EU restrictions, and whether they will proceed, remain unsettled. No final European prohibition on American satellite services has been announced.

Nevertheless, the dispute raises a question for Brussels: whether measures intended to protect European industrial capacity can be introduced without exposing European exporters and investors to American retaliation.

Europe’s satellite ambitions

The European Commission is investing heavily in IRIS², its secure satellite communications programme, which is intended to provide independent communications capabilities for governments, defence organisations and commercial customers.

Under arrangements confirmed in August, the programme’s principal constellation is planned to comprise 348 satellites operating in low and medium Earth orbit, with initial launches scheduled for 2029.

The system is designed to reduce Europe’s reliance on communications infrastructure controlled by companies or governments outside the EU, particularly during military emergencies, cyber incidents and interruptions to terrestrial networks.

The Commission’s technical programme envisages communications services supporting border management, crisis response, defence and other sensitive government activities.

However, IRIS² is not yet operational, and European commercial operators face significant competition from SpaceX.

Eutelsat, which operates the OneWeb satellite network, is among the European companies positioned to benefit from increased demand for alternatives to Starlink.

Its shares rose sharply on 14 October following reports of restrictions affecting Ukrainian access to certain Starlink services. The market reaction reflected renewed interest in European-controlled satellite communications.

OneWeb cannot simply replace Starlink across all applications. Differences in network architecture, terminal equipment and available capacity complicate any rapid transition.

Ukraine adds a security dimension

The dispute is particularly sensitive because Starlink has become an important part of Ukraine’s communications infrastructure during Russia’s invasion.

Ukrainian forces have relied on satellite connectivity for communications in areas where conventional telecommunications infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.

The strategic consequences of relying on a commercial provider became more prominent following reports that access to certain Starlink capabilities had been restricted.

For European governments, the episode has reinforced concerns about whether defence communications should depend on technology controlled by a company subject to political and commercial pressures outside Europe.

Yet restricting American participation before European alternatives are fully available could produce its own operational difficulties.

The Commission must therefore distinguish between developing independent European capabilities and limiting access to services that governments, businesses and military organisations currently require.

Another transatlantic regulatory confrontation

The satellite dispute follows disagreements over European regulation of American digital companies, including competition enforcement and restrictions on online platforms.

As EU Today reported in May, the European Commission had already proposed reserving much of the future mobile satellite spectrum for European operators.

Washington’s opposition introduces a different dimension because spectrum allocation affects market access directly.

The American administration is also linking the dispute to broader commercial relations, raising the possibility that measures affecting satellite companies could produce consequences for unrelated European industries.

Brussels has not announced a final decision on the disputed spectrum arrangements, while the United States has not specified which retaliatory measures it would impose.

The immediate issue is therefore regulatory rather than an enacted trade restriction. Whether it develops into a wider confrontation will depend on the Commission’s final proposals and Washington’s willingness to pursue its warning through commercial measures.

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Cairo’s Admission and Burhan’s Silence: Sudanese Blood and Gold as the Price of a Seat of Power

Twice in four months, Egyptian warplanes have bombed Sudanese miners inside their own territory, and dozens of bodies have failed to draw from Abdel Fattah al-Burhan a stance worthy of his citizens’ blood. Cairo, for its part, justifies its military operations, while Port Sudan hides behind a fact-finding committee, a cable of condolences and talk of contact between the two leaderships, without daring to name the party accused of killing its citizens.

This is the scene before us: a state acting on the Sudanese border by force of arms, and an army commander who avoids naming the party accused of killing Sudanese, for fear of losing an ally whose approval seems to matter more to him than their lives. On the morning of 10 October 2026, the mining site at Jabal al-Uqaydat in the Shamal al-Wadi area inside Sudan turned into a killing field after it was struck by five consecutive airstrikes, according to the testimony of a survivor relayed by Agence France-Presse. Thousands of miners had been searching for gold in a land exhausted by war; some ended up under the rubble, while others fled to the mountains without water or supplies.

In a significant pinpointing of the site of the bombing, The New York Times, in its report published on 12 October 2026, stated that the targeted mine is located in Sudan’s Red Sea State, about 25 miles from the Egyptian border, or roughly 40 kilometres inside Sudanese territory. Al-Hurra, in its coverage of the June attack, had cited an estimate placing Jabal al-Uqaydat about 20 kilometres inside Sudan; the forty-kilometre distance is cited here as attributed to the American newspaper’s determination of the location of the October strike, which keeps the question of sovereignty and the protection of civilians at the heart of the matter.

Agence France-Presse relayed from survivors that thousands of miners were working at the site, and “Emergency Lawyers” counted 72 dead according to preliminary information, while witnesses told the BBC of more than 60 dead and about 150 wounded. Survivors told Sudan Tribune that the dead numbered at least 200, with more than 15,000 workers fleeing, while the Sudan Doctors Network recorded a preliminary toll of 13 dead and 28 wounded, warning that it could rise.

Cairo Justifies the Bombing While Burhan Avoids Naming the Perpetrator

The “Emergency Lawyers” organization accused the Egyptian air force of targeting civilian miners, considering the attack a violation of international law. When Reuters asked Egyptian security officials about the raid, they did not deny the operation but justified it as ending what they described as border chaos and preventing Egyptian and Sudanese groups from taking control of mining areas.

Two days later, the Egyptian military spokesman announced the continuation of the “third phase” of the campaign, noting that warning leaflets had been dropped on those he described as criminal elements. However, the statement placed the operations inside Egyptian territory and did not include an explicit acknowledgment of carrying out a raid inside Sudan or of the killing of the miners.

Thus Cairo has a military justification for bombing a Sudanese site, while Burhan’s authority is incapable of issuing an explicit condemnation of the party that human rights organizations accuse of killing its citizens. The irony is that the state that is supposed to demand the victims’ rights appeared more concerned about its relationship with Cairo than about naming the party responsible for their blood.

From June to October: The Victims Change, the Silence Remains

The October raid was preceded by a strike that targeted the area on 16 June 2026. Agence France-Presse reported 23 dead, while Sudanese platforms estimated the toll at around one hundred. According to the testimonies received, the operations extended to Jabal al-Uqaydat, the Red Mountain and the area around Souk al-Ansari, and included raids by warplanes and drones followed by a ground incursion. The organization “Darfur Victims Advocacy” relayed from witnesses that an Egyptian force of about sixty armed vehicles had surrounded the miners and detained civilians, some of whom were beaten.

In the days following the June attacks, Radio Dabanga reported the arrival of about two thousand deported miners via the Argeen crossing, according to a local activist, while the crossing’s director spoke of more than three thousand over the preceding days, and the Egyptian army announced the arrest of 223 people, including 136 foreigners. On 22 June, Burhan appeared in Al-Ratj to say, according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: “Our northern neighbor — people must respect it and not cross the borders so as not to cause problems for themselves and for the state.”

Sudanese had been waiting for their army’s commander to defend their blood, but they heard him urging them to respect the borders of the neighbor accused of bombing them. When the raid was repeated in October, the Sovereignty Council repeated the scene: condolences over the “painful incident,” a fact-finding committee, and an assurance that the two countries’ leaderships are in contact.

Burhan’s adviser, Amjad Farid, described the bombing as an unjustified and unacceptable crime, noting that border violations could be addressed without warplanes, but his position did not translate into an announced official protest or a clear path to accountability.

Sudan’s Gold: A Wealth Guarded by Force

Al-Uqaydat lies within the gold-rich Nubian Shield belt, and the Chatham House institute estimated that about 60% of gold production in the Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states is smuggled to Egypt, in quantities exceeding one hundred kilograms per day, and more than sixty tonnes since the outbreak of the war through the end of 2024.

By contrast, official gold exports to Egypt in 2024 did not exceed about 16 million dollars, roughly 1% of Sudan’s total gold exports, according to Central Bank of Sudan data cited in the Chatham House report.

Miners told Sudan Tribune that they had observed drilling machinery and trucks carrying rocks across the border into Egypt, and that an Egyptian patrol had previously warned them against approaching a site it said lies inside Egyptian territory. Al-Hurra relayed testimony about friction between workers and personnel of an Egyptian mining company operating near them.

Egyptian Law No. 193 of 2020 authorizes contracting with the Egyptian Company for Mining and the Management and Exploitation of Quarries and Salt Works, affiliated with the National Service Projects Organization, to exploit the quarries and salt works specified by the law for a period of thirty years, while the state-owned Shalateen Mineral Resources Company is active in the south of the Eastern Desert. The businessman Naguib Sawiris also praised the June operation and linked it to investors’ confidence in the Egyptian mining sector.

In the same month, Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum denied statements attributed to its minister about agreements to establish 108 gold mines in northern Sudan, but the researcher Mohamed al-Hadi considered it likely that the attacks are linked to undisclosed understandings with the Sudanese government, a hypothesis that calls for an independent investigation.

Burhan: When the Ally Becomes More Precious Than the Citizen

The website Al-Hurra relayed from a miner that a group of pro-government joint forces withdrew from the mountain a day before the June raid, and that the Sudanese army did not arrive to evacuate the wounded and collect the bodies until the third day. The testimony raised workers’ suspicions about possible coordination between the two governments, without establishing that it took place.

But Burhan’s silence does not need those suspicions to be proven in order to become a matter of political accountability. Cairo supports the commander of the Sudanese army and considers the war on its borders a threat to its security. Agence France-Presse has verified satellite images showing the repeated presence of Turkish Bayraktar drones at an Egyptian base near Sudan, while reports spoke of facilitating the delivery of drones to the Sudanese army and training its crews inside Egypt, alongside broader military and intelligence cooperation.

An analysis published by the Horn Review in June held that the army’s silence over the raids is linked to Egyptian support for it.

Yet this relationship does not absolve Burhan of responsibility; it multiplies it. Whoever relies on another state’s support in his war cannot make the protection of his citizens a negotiable item, and his need for weapons and political backing must not become an immunity he grants to Cairo at the expense of Sudanese blood.

Sovereignty Tested With the Blood of the Poor

The raids reopen the wound of Halayeb and Shalateen, the disputed triangle under Egyptian control. Sudanese administrative maps confirm that the targeted mining sites lie inside Sudan, while Cairo treats them as part of the border area adjoining the triangle.

Human rights, political and trade union forces have called for an independent international investigation, and the “Sumud” alliance led by Abdalla Hamdok held the Egyptian side directly responsible.

Today, Egypt is required to answer for the bombing and the fall of civilians, not merely to classify them as criminal elements and offer security justifications, and Burhan is required to announce the results of the investigation, determine responsibility, demand compensation and accountability, and take the necessary diplomatic and legal measures.

As for settling for condolences, it is not a defense of sovereignty; it is a declaration that the alliance with Cairo is more precious to the authorities than the Sudanese people’s right to life and justice. At Jabal al-Uqaydat the bill is clear and admits no doubt: the gold crosses the border, the dead remain under the rubble, and Burhan guards his silence.

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The first national gold refinery: How Burkina Faso’s mining revolution advances its struggle for sovereignty

After expanding domestic control over mining to pursue economic sovereignty, Burkina Faso has moved up the value chain with its first gold refinery, inaugurated by its president, Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, on September 28.

Most of the gold mined in the country was previously exported as unrefined dore to be processed abroad. Now, it will be processed, tested for purity, and certified domestically at the Raffinerie Nationale d’Or du Burkina Faso, built at a cost of USD 19 million on more than 12 acres in the capital, Ouagadougou.​

“From now on, gold … must not only be extracted in Burkina Faso, it must be processed, controlled, valued and certified in Burkina Faso,” Traoré said, inaugurating the new facility.​

Inviting the country’s youth “to learn to master the whole value chain,” he added, “Natural resources belong to the people. They must contribute to improve their living conditions.”​

In the struggle for sovereignty​

Burkina Faso has long been one of Africa’s largest gold producers. However, proceeds from its extraction were historically siphoned out of the country by foreign companies owning its mines. Burkinabe ownership was limited to only one mine, which a former mines minister owned privately.​

The state-owned mining company, Société de Participation Minière du Burkina Faso (SOPAMIB), served only as a dormant holder of 10% stakes in Burkina Faso’s foreign-owned mines.​

Changes began in 2022 with the ouster of then-president Roch Kaboré in a popularly supported military coup amid mass protests against the Burkinabe state’s subjugation to French neocolonialism.​

Subsequently, in 2023, Traoré’s transitional military government (backed by the trade unions, the anti-France protest movement, and wide sections of the civil society) consolidated mass support by expelling French troops from the country, asserting Burkina Faso’s sovereignty.​

Recognizing that control over its own economy and natural resources is a central pillar of sovereignty, his government launched sweeping reforms to the mining sector in mid-2024.

It revived the dormant SOPAMIB and began transferring foreign-owned mines to the state-owned mining company, nationalizing five key gold mining assets within a year.​

Following the nationalization of yet another gold mine later in September 2025, six of the country’s 15 industrial mines, accounting for 40% of the national mining operations, are domestically owned – three by the state, and three by Burkinabe private companies.​​

In the remaining foreign-owned mines, the reforms raised SOPAMIB’s free stake from 10% to 15%. It also enabled the state to buy an additional paid stake of 30%, either entirely through SOPAMIB or in partnership with domestic private investors, potentially raising the Burkinabe stake in foreign companies to 45%.​

Mining revenues finance national development

As state revenues grew from its expanded ownership, the government undertook major infrastructural projects. In 2025, it laid 500 kilometers of low-voltage lines and 165 kilometers of transmission lines, connecting almost 160,000 new households to the national grid and electrifying 131 rural localities.

​Its National Development Plan (NDP) for 2026–2030 is one of the largest economic programs ever rolled out in the Sahel. It is a 64-billion-dollar plan, two-thirds of which is to be funded domestically from state revenues generated and citizen shareholding programs.

​Read more: Burkina Faso launches Five-Year plan

​Further inspiring confidence in the viability of its five-year plan, the government expanded the 2026 annual budget by 7.58% mid-year, having already collected almost 57.5% of the projected annual revenue. This has boosted infrastructural spending without increasing the budget deficit.

​The government has also used its rising revenues to improve its fiscal position. Cashing in on the rally in gold prices in 2025, the government repaid USD 2.13 billion in domestic debt last year. To systematize the use of additional revenue generated from the cyclical movement of mineral prices, it established the Burkina Faso Sovereign Mining Investment Fund (FSMIB) in May 2026.​

Read more: Burkina Faso asserts financial independence from the West with mineral-backed sovereign fund​

Financed by surpluses generated when international mineral prices rise above the state-set benchmark, the FSMIB is not for easing short-term budgetary pressures. It is ring-fenced for long-term strategic infrastructural and industrial projects to reduce the need for external funding, on which such projects have historically depended.​

The mining reforms have not only reorganized the distribution of mining proceeds away from foreign extraction toward national economic development, but have also helped to massively increase production itself.  The 94-ton annual output in 2025 is the highest ever recorded in Burkina Faso – a nearly 47% increase from the 64 tons in 2024.​

Formalization of artisanal mining – a game changer​

Critical for this rise was the formalization of artisanal mining. In the absence of state procurement infrastructure, artisanal miners have historically sold the gold they mined to smugglers who paid the international spot price in cash. Tons of gold were thus extracted from Burkina Faso every year with no paper trail, no taxes, and no yield to the national economy, beyond sustaining the meager livelihoods of the artisanal miners.​​

A meager quarter to less than half a ton of the gold extracted by artisanal mining annually entered the official channels overseen by the National Agency for the Supervision of Artisanal and Semi-Mechanized Mining Operations (ANEEMAS). [See: years].

​In October 2023, the government reorganized ANEEMAS into the National Society of Precious Substances (SONASP), tasking it with developing infrastructure to procure metals from artisanal miners. The annual official artisanal production rose in 2024 to 7.13 tons, a 15-fold growth over the previous year.

​When the annual gold production in 2025 reached a historic high of 94 tons, roughly 42 of those came from artisanal miners. Rising from just over seven a year ago, artisanal production was nearing the industrial mines’ output of about 52 tons by 2025, as SONASP’s procurement infrastructure expanded.

​To further help SONASP expand coverage in a concentrated manner, the government established nine new cooperatives of artisanal miners in the first half of 2026. It also delineated four mining corridors exclusively for artisanal miners, de-escalating the historic conflict between artisanal and industrial miners.

​With this state support structure in place, artisanal miners had already supplied 29 tons to SONASP this year by June 30, exceeding the 26 tons produced by industrial mines in the first half of this year. In this period, the government completed the construction of four new power plants, adding 126.4 megawatts of generating capacity to the national grid.

​Due in part to the improved power supply, the industrial mining output rose in the first half of this year by 7.25% over the first half of 2025. Official artisanal output grew by 45%.

​“We want to master everything to the last detail”​

“Comrades, producing in quantity is no longer enough. Extracting is no longer enough. Exporting our resources is no longer enough,” Mines Minister Yacouba Zabré Gouba said on September 28 at the inauguration of the country’s first gold refinery with an initial annual capacity of 164 tons.​

“The revolution we have engaged in requires that each national resource be used by the nation,” processing it across all stages of the value chain. “Our gold will no longer be used” by foreign companies “to create added value” while “our people remain in need,” he added.

​”We start with gold,” said Traoré. But there are “many other metals … in our subsurface that we want to extract,” including manganese, copper and zinc. “We want to master everything to the last detail.”

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The struggle for African unity today, an interview with Hakim Adi

Wars, neocolonial destabilization, the “aid” ideology, and the influence of Western financial institutions have sabotaged the African continent from the inside and kept it in a state of economic dependency. Yet its peoples have consistently expressed a desire for sovereignty and a rejection of external interference. 

What current manifestations of the struggle for African unity can we observe nowadays, and what continuity can be drawn with the Pan-Africanist movement of the 20th century? In the context of Trump’s administration US policies, which are targeting migrant workers, and the promotion of far-right ideology in the capitalist countries, can we say that African diasporas still play an important role in these challenges and in the emergence of a new Black power? 

Professor Hakim Adi, the author of “Panafricanism: a History” was interviewed by Alex Anfruns, a journalist and researcher, on the African struggles for emancipation.

“History has shown us that an attack on anyone

 is an attack on everybody”

Alex Anfruns: Let’s start from a chronological perspective. In the 1950s there were different strands within the Pan-Africanist movement that, despite sharing common goals such as anti-racism and anti-colonialism, diverged in their views on the liberation struggle. Which key figures and moments of that Pan-Africanism debate would you highlight?  

Hakim Adi: A key moment was the 1958 All African People’s Conference, which was held in Accra, Ghana, organized by two of the leading Pan-Africanists at the time: Kwame Nkrumah who was prime minister of Ghana, and George Padmore who was a Trinidadian Pan-Africanist and had been the main organizer of the famous 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress. That Conference held in1958 was a very important moment because at that time there were very few independent African countries. Ghana had just become independent, it had achieved its formal political independence from Britain.

Some countries were still fighting for their independence like Algeria … one or two countries were already independent but most of the African continent was not yet independent … So it was very important to have this conference to bring together people from across the African continent, as well as some from the diaspora, and to discuss the necessary unity between Africans and also the politics of Pan-African liberation. It was a very successful conference in the sense that it brought together many different people, leaders from across the continent, like Felix Moumié from Cameroon, Joshua Nkomo from Zimbabwe, Patrice Lumumba from Congo and many others, including many organizations…

One of the key participants was Frantz Fanon. He was a Caribbean and Martinican Pan-Africanist, who personified Pan-Africanism, as even though he came from the Caribbean, he gave much of his life to the liberation struggle in Africa, and he was a representative of the FLN in Algeria at that time. He came to that famous conference and put forward a perspective of the liberation struggle in Africa which was different to the perspective of the main organizers of the conference, Nkrumah and Padmore. They had argued that Pan-African liberation could be non-violent, if people were organized properly and so on…

Fanon came along and based on his experience, and indeed the experience of other countries in Africa, he put forward a different perspective and said that force and violence might be necessary to truly liberate Africa. So this was a very important moment: the recordings and personal memoirs of that conference highlight Fanon’s intervention, that he created a great debate, so that the organizers even tried to find ways to combat Fanon’s ideas … It demonstrated a major difference within the Pan- African movement at that time: how to actually achieve liberation?

It’s interesting that in 1945 in Manchester the conference congress decided that force would be necessary to achieve anti-colonial liberation. By 1958 two of the key participants in the Manchester Conference had changed their minds. Fanon had the experience of the Algerian revolution and therefore said: “hold on a minute, it may well be the case that force and violence is necessary.” So I think this is a very important moment and a significant difference between these key Pan-Africanist figures of the 1950s. Of course there are many others but I think that’s a good example of the differences which emerged in the movement at that time.

AA: In your other seminal work, you have exhaustively analyzed the relationship between Pan-Africanism and communism. How did communism influence the Pan-African movement during the fight for independence?

HA: When we talk about communism as it developed historically, we can define it as the condition for the liberation of the wealth producers, the workers. This is what communism is about. The communist movement of the 1920s, the 1930s, of the Third International took a very great interest in the liberation struggle in Africa as well and in other parts of the world. Just as Pan-Africanists in the US and Africa and the Caribbean and everywhere else took a very great interest in communism and the impact of the Russian Revolution, the ideas of Lenin and the Bolsheviks and so on.

People in Africa and in the diaspora were used to the impact of capitalism, to what the capitalist-centered system meant. It meant enslavement, it meant colonial rule and the division of the African continent. While the Russian revolution showed that this entire political system could be brought to an end, there was an alternative to it. That alternative opened many possibilities, for a different kind of society, where the majority of the people made the decisions, a society in which people who spoke different languages and different nations could live together.

The other thing that the communist movement brought to the colonies was a perspective of how you could struggle. If we look at the 1930’s, 1940’s, at that time generally speaking the approach of the Pan-African movement was to petition the big powers, the colonial powers, to say to the big powers: “hang on, colonial rule should be reformed, it should be made better and nicer…”

The communists said “that’s not going to change things”. What is going to change things is the organization of the masses of the people: organizing amongst the farmers, workers and so on. Secondly, the communists argued that force may need to be used and probably will need to be used to remove this system. And thirdly, this anti-colonial struggle of masses of people should be in unity with the struggles of people all over the world, whether in Europe, America, Asia, etc., who were struggling for common aims.

The communist movement brought this perspective to Pan-Africanism and was very influential during that period but also influential in the latter period: the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s. If we think about some of the key liberation struggles that took place in Africa in the period from the 1960s onwards, especially after Nkrumah was overthrown, but even before were influenced by Marxism. The liberation struggles in Angola, in South Africa, in Mozambique, in Zimbabwe, etc.

On September 12, we celebrated the anniversary of the birth of Amilcar Cabral, one of the greatest Pan-Africanists and leader of the liberation in Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde, who was also influenced by Marxism. If we think of the big figures in the South African struggles, they were all communists: Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, etc. So, the influence of communism in general and Marxism were a very big influence on the Pan African movement in general.

AA: Would you say that events like Lumumba’s assassination and the long Algerian War pushed new African countries toward a more radical Pan-Africanism?

HA: I don’t think so. It was a very difficult period: first of all, the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s, was in the midst of the cold war. The influence of anticommunism was immense and had a massive impact on Africa as well as on other parts of the world. This put pressure on African countries to do the impossible, to trying to find a way of achieving some kind of independence within the boundaries established by the big powers,

You might say that the fact that Algeria had to fight a war of ten years towards its liberation, that people in Kenya had to fight a war in order to achieve its liberation and other countries … this would have made clear to people in Africa the kind of struggle that was necessary…

Also the fact that in a country that had just achieved the independence like Congo, the big powers like Belgium, US and others could organize a mutiny within the army, could divide a country, arrest its leader and murder him … those facts would galvanize the whole continent and would have created a very different kind of Pan-Africanism. In fact, these events and particularly the arrest and murder of Lumumba did galvanize the continent amongst the masses of the people. It was a major event, but as far as the states were concerned, the governments were concerned, it was a different matter.

This is one of the things that we have to remember about this period: that the sixties were entering into the era of Pan-Africanism of states, and these states, even the most radical ones, we can call them, like Ghana, Algeria, Guinee perhaps, they operated within the conditions of that time. They tried to find a way of organizing that perhaps didn’t completely involve struggle, they tried to seek some kind of accommodation with the big powers. The majority of countries, especially the francophone countries, for example, maybe with one or two exceptions, nearly all of them stayed within the orbit of French imperialism.

It was a very difficult period and I don’t think those events in themselves pushed African states into different positions. It showed the limitations of this new independence, because African countries apparently had an independent state but then with a leader like Lumumba emerged, who showed a tendency to charter an independent cause, he was just removed like that by the big powers.

We saw the same thing a few years later when Nkrumah was removed, and that happened to many other leaders: Felix Moumié was assassinated in Cameroon. It showed more the strength and ruthlessness of the big powers, particularly the assassination of Lumumba. The struggle in Algeria did show what could be achieved by organizing among the majority of people and through armed struggle, but in most cases that wasn’t the course that was taken by African states.

AA: What do you think about the way Nkrumah and other liberation fighters analyzed neocolonialism in that period?

HA: There were analyses of neocolonialism by Nkrumah, Fanon and others but by then it was almost too late, Africa and Africans were not in the position to do very much about it, other than embark on new forms of struggle. These were lessons for the future. Neocolonialism meaning a new form of colonialism, where there appears to be an independent state, and an independent government and country but there is in fact a government which is tied to one of the old colonial powers, or perhaps a new power by economic ties, by military or political ties … and therefore it’s not operating in an independent way. Many people would argue that most of the states in Africa since the 1960s have been this kind of state. They have anthems and flags but they do not pursue independent paths that favor the majority of their citizens.

Nkrumah’s solution, or one of the things that Nkrumah argued for, was a United States of Africa, that if African countries could get together, they could be stronger economically, politically and perhaps also militarily, and that unity which would be able and strong enough to deal with neocolonialism.

The problem was that the nature, the characteristics of neocolonialism already existed in the 1960’s. And so the states that he was appealing to, for the United States of Africa were already essentially neocolonialist states, under the influence of the French, the British, the Belgians, and others, and so it became very difficult to unite in a way that Nkrumah envisioned.

Fanon wrote an incisive analysis of what neocolonialism was, how it worked, the reasons why it came about, the fact that it was a particular class of people that came to power, that economically they were dependent on foreign interests, and so on. That’s useful for everybody else, but for those governments existing in Africa, as well as in other countries, it hasn’t and could not have had a major effect.

What is important in the African context was that at least with all its limitations, these governments were able to come together in 1963 to form the Organization of African Unity. And with all its limitations, to struggle to unite for the liberation of the rest of the continent, from settler colonialism, so in other words against the colonial states: South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe … So they united to achieve those victories, but to go beyond that, we haven’t really seen too much other evidence. Indeed, even the African states recognized the limitations of the OAU and replaced it with the AU.

AA: In your book, you address the ongoing debates that shaped Pan-Africanism across different geographic regions, highlighting its vitality and the diversity of expressions within the movement. What shared goals did diaspora activists have, how did they connect with Africa, and what challenges did they face fighting from inside Western countries?

HA: Yes, I suppose the most well-known activist who many people like is Malcolm X in the US, and the Black Panthers in the US and so on. And there were other activists like Walter Rodney in Guyana and so on. I think that for all of them and many others Africa was a great inspiration, Malcolm X is the best example. He traveled to Africa in the 1960’s he was impressed with the fact that these countries were becoming independent, that Africans were beginning to determine their own affairs and make their own decisions.

In his speeches he constantly talked about the importance of Africa and African liberation. To such an extent that when he formed an organization he called it the Organization of African-American Unity, the OAAU. And to such an extent that he called the African leaders to take responsibility for those in the diaspora, saying that “we are the lost sheep and you are the shepherds and you should be concerned with us as Africans, as people with African heritage, and fight for us in the United Nations” and so on …The Black Panthers similarly even had at one time a headquarters in Algiers, and they were influenced by struggles that were going on in Congo and many other places.

But as Malcolm X and the Panthers found out the struggles were different, although one could influence the other. We have to remember that the kind of politics which emerged in the US in the 1960’s, we tend to talk about it as Black Power, also had its influence in Africa, particularly amongst people like Steve Biko and the Black Consciouness movement in South Africa. But the struggles were different, they were struggles that were made in the US, although they were struggles by African people, there were  struggles within the confines of the US and that meant that African Americans had to struggle alongside others in the US. The most far-sighted recognized that, people like the Black Panthers, they recognized they had to organize alongside other population groups within the US, and so they realized that liberation meant an alternative to the existing political and economic system.

Again, Malcolm X recognized that those who were oppressing African American in the US were also oppressing people in Africa. So removing that oppression, fighting to remove that oppression in the US would also help those in Africa. But, of course, they had many difficulties and many problems based on the way they organized, and also the fact that the US attempted to wipe them out, assassinated many of the leaders, including Malcolm X and many leaders of the Black Panthers, and imprisoned them …That was one of the main issues.

And then for someone like Walter Rodney, who was best known as an intellectual, a writer, an historian, and perhaps made the greatest impact in that way, but also in his analysis of what was going on in Africa, because he was involved in the work leading out to the 6th Pan-African Congress in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania in 1974. If we look at what he wrote, he was very critical of neocolonialism, critical of many African leaders including Nkrumah, and many Pan-Africanists like Georges Padmore, he said that they had lost their way, they lost sight of class struggle, that there were different classes involved and you had to struggle against them, as well as against the imperialist system of states, that you couldn’t just do things peacefully, without changing fundamentally the political system and the economic system.

He was also a victim of state’s terrorism, because he was assassinated in Guyana at a very young age. Those were some of the problems they faced, but there were many others…

AA: How are people fighting for African unity today, and how does it connect to the 20th-century Pan-African movement?

HA: Again, it’s very, very, difficult conditions today, it’s very complicated. I think the best example of modern Pan-Africanism would be something like the reparations movement. It is a movement for repair, to be carried out for the crimes of enslavement, of human trafficking, of colonialism and so on … and if we look at this struggle for reparations, that existed since the 20th century … even the 17th century! It has been one of the key elements of Pan-African struggles throughout the centuries, that restitution needs to be made, that repair that needs to be made for these crimes that have been carried out against Africans.

But if we look at that movement today, we see that it is headed by states. There has recently been a big conference in Barbados in the Caribbean about the reparation struggles, but it is led by the Organization of Caribbean States (CARICOM), the Organization of African Union (AU). Although these two organizations work together, there are differences within them and between them. Individuals and countries also have their own particular concerns, for example Algeria had a very big conference last year on the question of colonialism as a crime against humanity. It’s not a new perspective, but this is something that should be highlighted.

So we have these slightly different perspectives. Those in the Caribbean are most concerned with slavery, human trafficking, those in Africa are slightly more concerned with colonialism. These movements and organizations come together, but they are organizations of states. Then there are non-state actors in Europe, in the US, in the diaspora in general who say “hang on a minute, we are not being represented by any states, or more importantly we’re not represented in these deliberations.” It could be argued that the states don’t really have much of a mandate to represent the peoples of Africa and the Caribbean either, because they are not consulted any more than those in the diaspora outside these states.

So we have a movement which is very powerful, it is being discussed in the news all the time, there are conferences, it’s gathering momentum, but there are all kinds of tensions and contradictions within that make it quite difficult, yet it’s a very long lived movement that goes back to the 17th century … So it’s a very important movement and how it develops remains to be seen.

AA: How is the anti racist movement in the US and English-speaking world dealing with Trump’s anti-migrant policies?

HA: Well, the anti-racist movement is not only in the US, because it’s also important in Europe and elsewhere. In the US it’s a broad movement, it has different facets to it, because the Trump government in particular is launching an assault on everything: so we find first of all that it’s an attack on books, even the books that could be held in public libraries, school or university libraries are under attack, and are being banned or being burnt, that’s one struggle. And the next struggle is to defend books by black writers, about anti-racism, and books about all kind of other things too, because other people are also being attacked. Then there is an attack on the general principle of equality, what in the US they call the DEI (Diversity, Equality and Inclusion), in terms of employment, particularly in universities but also in government departments, public institutions … they’re also under attack.

Then there are other attacks, various forms of state racism, attacks by the police, and so on, then there are attacks by immigration officials, by ICE, then there are just general attacks that come from the government about people who they deem to be immigrant, or from immigrant backgrounds, since Trump makes racist speeches against Somalis, Haitians and others … So these are very serious escalations of attacks and they have influence also outside of the US, including in Britain and other countries as well, it then became seen as almost acceptable that somebody can be attacked.

We’ve recently had a case in Britain a Black professor in the University, we don’t have many Black professors, who was accused by some self-confessed racist of plagiarism, and this accusation was taken up and repeated by the whole of the British press, it was on the TV … and the consequence is that this young professor took his life … This was an openly racist attack, and there are many other manifestations.

Of course, those in the US are organizing, and I think the key again of this organizing is that it cannot be only African-Americans, or those from the Caribbean organizing, but people in general have to be organized against this attack on their rights, because history has shown us that an attack on anyone is an attack on everybody. So everybody has to organize against these attacks. So yes, these are very important struggles and of course they are linked to other attacks which the US are launching internationally against Cuba, Venezuela, Iran, Canada … against everybody else, against whoever. So it’s a very dangerous situation in the US and everyone needs to get together, but the Pan-Africanists have to be part of this broad struggle to change the situation in the US, Britain, and elsewhere.

Hakim Adi is an internationally renowned historian based in London, and the author of the book “Pan-Africanism: A History,” already published in Spanish, French, Portuguese and many other languages.

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Ghana swiftly rejects US health deal, calls it ‘humiliating’

Ghana has rejected a proposed health compact with the United States that would have provided an estimated $109 million in US health funding over five years, with President John Dramani Mahama saying the agreement raised serious concerns over health data, financing obligations, and Ghana’s regulatory authority.

The decision places Ghana among a few African countries that have pushed back against new US health agreements introduced as Washington restructures its foreign assistance following the dismantling of USAID. Zimbabwe has also rejected a similar agreement, while Zambia has raised concerns over provisions in its negotiations with the United States.

Ghana raises concerns over health data

Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on September 25, Mahama said the proposed compact was presented to Ghana as a replacement for health funding previously provided through USAID.

He said Ghana’s Ministry of Health reviewed the document before preparing a Cabinet Information Paper.

“Ghana is a sovereign nation, and we have our own processes. We are a democratic country,” Mahama said.

According to the President, the Cabinet identified several provisions that raised concerns, particularly those relating to Ghana’s health information.

“One, it says that we shall give the United States our pathogen profile,” he said, adding that the agreement also required Ghana to provide medical records.

“It also says we should give our medical records. I mean, who takes another country’s medical records? And so that was strange.”

Concerns over health-data sharing have been central to resistance to the new US health agreements in several African countries. 

No FDA inspection

Mahama also raised concerns about the treatment of medicines and other medical products supplied under the proposed arrangement.

He said Ghana would have been required to contribute funding to the program while, according to his account of the compact, the country’s Food and Drugs Authority would not have been able to inspect medicines or other medical products entering Ghana under the program.

“And then it also says that any medications or any medical products that shall be brought into our country, our Food and Drugs Administration has absolutely no right to inspect,” Mahama said.

“I mean, it was humiliating.”

Ghanaian officials had previously cited concerns about the proposed handling of sensitive health information as a reason for rejecting the agreement. Reporting on the negotiations also indicated that the proposed arrangement would have required additional investment from Ghana alongside the US contribution.

Cabinet rejected the agreement

Mahama said the proposal was rejected after the Health Ministry presented its assessment to the Cabinet.

He described the decision as unusually swift.

“It was the compact that was thrown out in record time in our Cabinet. I’ve never seen anything thrown out as fast as that.”

He said the government subsequently instructed the Health Minister to communicate Ghana’s position to the US ambassador.

“And so, of course, we rejected it. And we asked the health minister to inform the US ambassador that we didn’t need it. We’ll manage ourselves.”

The proposed agreement would have provided Ghana with about $109 million in US health assistance over five years. The negotiations had begun in late 2025.

A wider concern over health sovereignty

Ghana’s decision comes as the United States seeks to shift its approach to global health cooperation. The new US strategy places greater emphasis on recipient countries taking responsibility for financing and delivering health programs, while Washington reduces its traditional aid commitments.

Kenya became the first African country to sign the agreement which was challenged in court, followed by similar arrangements with Rwanda, Liberia, Uganda, Lesotho and Eswatini, among other countries. Ravi Ram from the People’s Health Movement (PHM) East and South Africa, told BreakThrough News in December 2025, that  “Bilateral agreements between the US and Kenya and other African countries are meant to limit the ability of any one ‘partner’ country to challenge the terms of implementing the agreement, due to the unequal power relations.”

The concerns among health activists and concerned Africans is the ability of African states to determine their own health priorities, regulate medicines, control sensitive health information, and collectively negotiate the terms of international health cooperation.

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