Three features of today’s unordered world are converging to create a devastating food crisis. Russia’s war in Ukraine is disrupting agricultural exports from both countries. The enduring blockage of the Strait of Hormuz is restricting fertiliser shipments. And this year’s El Niño (a sporadic warming of the Pacific Ocean generating widespread knock-on effects elsewhere) could be the most drastic on record, causing widespread droughts. As this year’s United Nations general assembly (UNGA) draws near, global food affordability and availability are at risk, and with them millions of lives and global security.

This looming catastrophe coincides with an absence of political leadership, including in multilateral institutions. As recently as 2022 a coalition of leaders convened by the UN secretary-general, António Guterres, managed to curb a food crisis. Today even that convening power is missing, with potentially more dire consequences. Political leaders face a test: amid war, climate crisis and diplomatic turmoil, is it still possible for groups of states and institutions to confront the direst humanitarian urgencies?

This note argues that a solution could still be found, requiring a comprehensive global effort on several fronts: drought, support for farmers, the Black Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and access to fertiliser. In all of this, Europe should lead.

The emerging calamity

Global food prices are already almost 75% higher than their 1999 lows. Almost 2.2 billion people face food insecurity. The coming trio of threats to food supplies will make that worse.

A “super El Niño” will likely bring heat and drought to southern Africa and significantly reduce food production in south and south-east Asia. It may reduce already falling rates of wheat production—which is expected to fall by 3% globally in 2026-27 (8% in the EU, 12% in Australia and 19% in Argentina)—and drive up rice prices.

Meanwhile the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked. It is the largest single conduit for the nitrogen fertilisers most directly linked to yield and is the export route of about half the global supply of sulphur, a vital component of phosphate fertilisers. Thus, about one third of global seaborne fertilisers cannot reach fields, especially afflicting smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa (where fertiliser prices are highest) and south Asia.

All this may well generate wider ripple effects lasting years. Rising prices and exhausted government subsidies in states like Malawi are deterring fertiliser use, which could depress future production. Historically, El Niño events are associated with protectionism (India has imposed export restrictions hitting countries in south-east Asia), which in turn raises prices, lowers margins and curbs investment in future output.

There are two bright spots among the big global agricultural producers: Ukraine and Russia, which together generate 30% of the world’s wheat exports, 20% of its corn, 60% of its sunflower oil and, from Russia alone, 20% of its fertiliser. But there too war has brought disruption. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s highly exposed grain and port infrastructure cut the latter’s exports by 75%, and more damage has already been done in August. Ukraine has been striking Russian port facilities and ships in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, taking over 90% of Russia’s grain export capacity offline.

In 2022, a UN- and Turkey-facilitated arrangement mitigated a similar crisis and kept Russian and Ukrainian grain and fertiliser supplies flowing through alternative routes. US and EU agricultural aid in sub-Saharan Africa also helped. In 2026, by contrast, multiple challenges stand in the way of a similar solution. Logistically, war damage to infrastructure and low water levels in the Danube make it harder to get grain out of the region. Diplomatically, the UN is approaching a leadership transition, the US has turned against the organisation, and there is no global focal point for action.

Preventing the worst

European leaders, including those of the UK and Ukraine if it wants, should move fast to convene a coalition of states influential among the combatants in the Iran and Ukraine conflicts (India, China and Turkey especially) and of states especially exposed to this nutritional crisis (states in sub-Saharan Africa and south and south-east Asia). This coalition could draw on arrangements from the 2022 deal, as well as new links between UN agencies and initiatives like the CGIAR agricultural innovation network. It should seek to transcend political and diplomatic tensions, bringing leaders or at least ministers together on the margins of UNGA in the week of September 21st.

The joint initiative should have the following core elements:

• A programme to distribute food relief and technical assistance on drought-resistant agriculture and soil fertility, headed by an adviser to the UN secretary-general and supported by UN agencies. Such assistance works: one led by the CGIAR reached almost 6m African farmers in 2023-5 and, to cite just one example, in Malawi delivered maize yields 64% higher than the national average.
• This will need to be funded. The World Food Programme’s conservative pre-El Niño budget needs for 2026 should be covered (only 34% met so far). But the initiative should also marshal resources for the medium-term response to the “super El Niño” and its geopolitical intensifiers. This would include a financial mechanism to subsidise efforts by states to mitigate higher input costs and shift agriculture to drought-resistant strains. A CGIAR-led sustainable productivity growth push should have a budget of $500m over three years, with the first portion delivered fast enough to support the upcoming planting season.
• Coalition members should strive for a partial ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, to include an end to attacks both on ships carrying grain and on ports and infrastructure identified as central to grain, fertilisers and inputs. Its European participants especially could undergird this with support for Ukraine’s farms, including mobile storage units, fertilisers, seed and repairs to infrastructure. Some of this work is already underway.
• The programme should also involve an agreement with Iran that fertiliser shipments be allowed to transit the Strait of Hormuz. Several attempts have been made in this direction already, with no results to date. Two elements should be added to make it more attractive. First, Iran’s own fertiliser and urea exports, and fertiliser shipments from other states, should be exempted from the US blockade and Iran’s imports of wheat and rice should be secured. Second, an expert-level group—akin to that used in the 2022 Black Sea arrangement—would oversee implementation and resolve disputes quickly and locally. Part-time negotiators must also secure practical arrangements to ensure results, not just agree on principles.

Unpalatable—but necessary

This effort would still face a series of obstacles. It would require multiple states to cross their red lines—or at least revisit established policies. There is a good chance that the two wars driving up food prices, in Ukraine and Iran, will escalate in the near future. Russia especially would likely be reluctant. The states most affected are a disparate and often antagonistic group. There is no single capital or organisation capable of appealing to all the decision-makers needed for a comprehensive solution.

But within this adversity dwells a constructive role for European governments. Along with the UN secretary-general, and a core group of middle powers including Brazil, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Mexico and Turkey, they can bring together the states most exposed to the crisis as the core of this new group. Along with partners from across the UN system, such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization, they can amplify those countries’ voices and help marshal the resources needed to make the programme outlined above meaningful.

Besides winning over the most affected states, the next step would be to bring on board those states with influence on combatants in the Ukraine and Iran conflicts. This means especially China and India. The UN secretary-general can play a particularly vital role there. Europeans can also help by appealing to Chinese and Indian claims to speak for developing countries in general. In turn, Brazil, India and South Africa can invoke Russia’s claims to share that mantle, as fellow members of the BRICS formation.

Europeans can also play a crucial role in recruiting Ukraine into the programme—even if the latter’s commitment to any ceasefire would depend on Russia’s position. They could see this anti-hunger coalition also as a way to help rally support for Ukraine in the global south, as the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, did in 2022 with his Grain from Ukraine initiative.

In the Strait of Hormuz, meanwhile, the coalition could present free passage for fertiliser exports as a means of trying out the Omani-Iranian technical plans for opening sea routes. It would present this as a win-win proposition: Iran would get some of its exports to global markets; the US would be supporting its Gulf allies; and both parties and their European interlocutors might see the long-term geopolitical benefits of a stabilising anti-hunger act along these lines (for example, curbing mass migration).

This initiative is intended to be a “no regrets” effort. Even if it takes time for the combatants to join—and it will—supporting farmers and global trade will improve the food situation. Progress in addressing hunger should provide an opportunity to highlight the further contribution that progress in the Black Sea and the Strait of Hormuz could bring. This sense of momentum may bring some or all combatants closer to agreement.

It will take leadership from both the most affected states and from wealthier countries to achieve this defiantly cooperative act in a world of unorder. But its very defiance, its assertion that common action is still possible, makes it all the more valuable.

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Berlin; late August: when politics normally stirs into life after the holiday lull. But this year, the lull never came.

German chancellor Friedrich Merz is beset by approval levels plumbing the depths of the depleted Rhine and Danube. His governing conservative CDU party spent the summer at war with itself over pension reform (not helped by a botched cabinet reshuffle). Some of the chancellor’s staunchest supporters are even openly wondering whether he is still up to the job. To get out of the hole they are in, Merz and his ministers now want to project a sense of Aufbruchstimmung—a feeling of renewal and restart.

Whether they succeed will determine Europe’s future.

Germany’s economy has endured six years of paltry growth. Its traditionally strong industries are screaming for protection against China, US tariffs and energy price shocks (and against their own past decisions). Strong end-of-the-republic vibes suffuse dark political commentary, “mainstream” parties oscillate between panic and despair, and resignation has set in among voters. What until recently seemed little more than a media talking point on an “Andy Burnham moment”—meaning the possibility of Hendrik Wüst, North Rhine-Westphalia’s minister-president, succeeding Merz as chancellor this autumn—could yet become reality.

For decades, Germany was Europe’s byword for political stability and predictability. Today, it is hard to overstate how little is now unthinkable in German politics. All bets are off. Decision-makers elsewhere in Europe should get ready for the possibility of a new kind of Germany: no longer boring, no longer stable—and no longer rich.

Why the Angst is now real

Germany is days away from elections in three eastern states which could shake the government in Berlin to its foundations. First up is Saxony-Anhalt, where on September 6th the far-right populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) could rewrite German post-war history and turn the decades-long mantra of “never again” into “actually, maybe”. Polling suggests even an absolute majority for the party is within reach. The AfD, the CDU and the Left could be the only parties to clear the 5% threshold for the state parliament. Two weeks after that possible momentous result, the states of Berlin and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern will also elect new parliaments.

While the situation for the political centre looks a little less dire in the latter two places, complicated three-party coalitions are the likely outcome in both. This will have a compounding effect on the stability of the federal government. The CDU leadership under Merz remains adamant that the “firewall” must hold, ruling out any coalition or cooperation with the AfD. Yet this position is increasingly being questioned by local politicians and by conservative thinkers within and around the party. Many in the CDU are frustrated by what they see as the strategic price of the firewall. With their preferred coalition partner, the liberal Free Democrats, now struggling to clear the 5% threshold almost anywhere, ruling out the AfD leaves the CDU ever-more dependent on centre-left coalitions. In critics’ view, this deprives the party of options and leaves it hostage to the remaining potential coalition partners.

An AfD minister-president would be a brutal demonstration of the political establishment’s inability to provide a convincing vision for the country

An AfD minister-president in one of Germany’s states would be more than a striking political development. It would be a brutal demonstration of the political establishment’s inability to provide a convincing vision for the country’s economic, political and social future. In recent years, German leaders have made more reform announcements than actual reforms. The previous government tried to adapt to the Zeitenwende without imposing any hardship on Germans—and failed. Now, the Merz government seems equally unable to muster the political strength for major reform.

Instead, it has too often looked to the past for answers: back to the combustion engine, back to looser labour rights, back to family values. The only policy area where the government now seems readier to change course is on China, where it has said it will push through a more active European position on protecting markets and punishing China’s predatory economic behaviour. In a revealing commentary, however, Merz himself announced this was enabled, not by his decisive political leadership, but by the altered posture of the German car industry.

This vacuum in dealing with the implications of the changing global environment leaves huge room for the political fringes, especially from the far-right. The AfD’s offer is revisionist—drastically curb immigration and asylum, reverse key elements of the energy transition, challenge European integration, end the euro and pursue a distinctly nationalist approach to foreign policy. All this is deeply unsettling to the political establishment, but resonates with a growing constituency of voters united by restrictive stances on migration and cultural issues.  

The strength of the AfD is a symptom, not a cause. It did not rise to prominence overnight and has been part of Germany’s political landscape now for more than a decade. But the party is now within striking distance of actual political power at a time when the country’s political and economic foundations are starting to crumble. The war in Ukraine, volatility in America and conflict over the Strait of Hormuz are stretching the limits of German leaders’ attention as well as the country’s fiscal space. Germany’s long-term trade relationship with China is now a liability and an epic drought has shrivelled what little hope remained for Germany’s economic recovery. Berlin is not only forced to reckon with the failures and missed opportunities of the past decade on everything, everywhere, all at once; but the politicians seem unprepared either to put up a real fight for survival or even adjust to this new reality in a form of managed decline.

No time for Schadenfreude

Germany is hardly the first European country to experience a radical reshaping of its party system and the rise of the far-right; Italy and France have been through similar upheavals. And Germany itself, amid deep economic problems, was called “the sick man of Europe” back in 1999, only to recover and to become the continent’s exporting powerhouse. Why should the rest of Europe now worry so much about Germany’s malaise?

The answer is: because a German crisis is a European crisis. Germany is too economically and politically important to fail. Its economic weight, role at the heart of the EU and position as Europe’s most populous member state mean this would be more than just another episode of national political turbulence. A Germany that is oozing 15,000 industrial jobs each month, becoming even more dependent on technology imports and increasingly incapable of internal reform risks dragging Europe towards fragmentation and exploitation.

Unless political leaders come up with something new, a German pall will blot all major items on the EU’s agenda: the next multiannual financial framework; the future of the bloc’s industrial policy; European efforts to rearm and build resilience; a more autonomous capacity on emerging technologies and the economic muscle to create international leverage behind a new global trading agenda. That is not to mention the serious consequences of a German disengagement for Europe’s continued support for Ukraine.

“German leadership is not optional”, Sweden’s defence minister said at a public event this month, attended by one of the authors. German political elites seem to disagree. Theirs is the third largest economy in the world, sitting at the core of the world’s largest single market, boasting leading international companies and building up one of the largest defence budgets anywhere. Yet they appear to lack any sense of their own domestic, let alone global, agency. The three upcoming state elections may give them their last chance and some momentum to turn things around. But if Berlin becomes entirely enfeebled under the ensuing political fallout, the rest of Europe is likely to suffer in the same way.

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This week, Mark Leonard is joined by Jörg Lau, international correspondent at Die Zeit and Jana Puglierin, head of ECFR’s Berlin office, to explore the political turmoil in Germany ahead of an electoral autumn. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government is becoming increasingly unpopular: it faces collapsing approval ratings, growing tension within the governing coalition and mounting pressure from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).

As regional elections approach, Jana argues that Germany’s traditional parties face difficult choices that could reshape the country’s political landscape, while Jörg discusses what the AfD’s rise means for Germany. A “firewall” has kept mainstream parties from cooperating with the far right in the post-war period—but Jörg reflects on the strain this is under, and whether the AfD’s first taste of regional power could transform German politics.

Together, Mark, Jörg and Jana assess the prospects for Merz’s leadership, the future of the CDU and whether Germany’s political centre can withstand such pressure. Are established parties capable of renewing themselves? What happens if the AfD makes gains at the regional level? And what would prolonged instability in Berlin mean for Europe?

This podcast episode was recorded on August 12th 2026.

Bookshelf
The Names, by Florence Knapp
The Nights Are Quiet in Tehran, by Shida Bazyar
The Invite, by Olivia Wilde

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The problem

For the second July running, a controversial decision from President Volodymyr Zelensky has sparked protests across Ukraine. Last year it was his attempt to weaken two anti-corruption bodies. This time it is the dismissal of his popular young defence minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, after just six months on the job. Zelensky cited a breakdown of relations between the ministry of defence and the military leadership as a key reason for his decision.

Fedorov was blunter. In a scathing statement, he criticised the commander-in-chief of the armed forces Oleksandr Syrsky for choosing loyalty over performance, sticking to outdated ways of war fighting, and sabotaging necessary reforms. “Instead of working out how to asymmetrically defeat Russia”, Fedorov said, “[Syrsky] has worked out how to split the country.” Such internal strife is the last thing Ukraine needs. But Fedorov’s allegations also call into question whether Western military assistance for Kyiv is being used in the best possible way. 

The solution

Zelensky has proposed Yevhen Khmara to replace Fedorov, subject to approval by parliament. Khmara is a respected military commander and the acting head of Ukraine’s security service, so has credentials as a military leader. But Ukraine’s parliament must also decide whether he can be a trustworthy manager in the job.

This is, of course, Ukraine’s sovereign decision to make. But it is a consequential one for the rest of Europe, too: at the end of the second quarter, defence accounted for roughly 80% of Ukraine’s annual budget, with almost a third of this coming from external partners (who also supply a lot of the country’s civilian needs). The EU and European countries are by far Kyiv’s biggest financial and miliary backers. And how these funds are spent matters for Ukraine’s success; as does whether its military strategy, supplies, recruitment and procurement are aligned. The resources also need to be used efficiently. Fedorov’s allegations thus deserve proper scrutiny.

Ukraine’s European partners should not back any one choice of new defence minister. But they should make clear that, whether it is Khmara or somebody else, Fedorov’s replacement must be a credible, competent and trusted partner. This means he or she should be proven as a commander, but also be able to continue Ukraine’s defence reforms and address problems related to mobilisation, relations with the military, and corruption in the sector. Fedorov’s replacement should also be committed to continuing to build up the country’s defence technology base.

Context

Before he became defence minister in January 2026, Fedorov headed Ukraine’s digital governance revolution. He transferred his tech-savviness to the ministry of defence and is widely credited with Ukraine’s recent advances in defence technology which helped turn the tide against Russia. Several military commanders have defended Fedorov’s work as defence minister and supported his claims against Syrskyi; others in the military have spoken in favour of the commander.

In his statement, Fedorov remained loyal to Zelensky but rumours about the outgoing official’s political ambitions have been circulating for weeks. Whether there is any truth in them or not, protesters see this as a motivation behind the president’s reshuffle. And the views of the public matter. Ukraine’s defence is a whole-of-society affair, partly sustained by volunteers and the private sector. So, Zelensky will need to dispel these rumours—a country at war can hardly afford to make decisions based on political preference at the expense of competence or defence logic.

The onus is now on Zelensky to convince everyone that Khmara is the man for the job. While parliament approved a new government led by Sergy Koretsky on July 15th, this did not include the names of the president’s (constitutionally required) proposals for defence and foreign ministers. Barring an extraordinary session, MPs will only reconvene in mid-August. This means they have time to reflect and engage in a dialogue. This should result in a defence minister who commands not just the president’s trust but also that of the military, society—and international partners.

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