The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have captured Mokha – a key Red Sea port in southwestern Yemen near the Bab al-Mandab (BAM) Strait. There are also reports they seized two islands located in the Red Sea shipping lanes. These moves against the Saudi Arabian-backed forces that previously held these areas could further cement the Houthis’ control over the narrow chokepoint to the Gulf of Aden, where the group has already imposed a blockade on Saudi oil exports.

The Houthis’ drive to control the BAM has been emboldened by the U.S. being stretched thin in its ongoing fight against Iran. Combined with Tehran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, this threatens to add to the Islamic Republic’s command over the flow of oil from the Middle East. It is a maximum pressure campaign on the U.S. and global markets, something we have predicted for years. Amid all this activity, the per-barrel price of Brent Crude is well over the $100 mark now.

The rapid advance on Mokha was planned and backed by Iran, according to the leader of Saudi-backed forces that retreated from Mokha, which is about 50 miles north of the BAM. It took place as Tehran has taken a more belligerent stance in the region that has seen it reportedly damage U.S. aircraft in a recent attack on Jordan earlier this week and get closer to striking U.S. Navy warships with ballistic missiles.

“The Joint Forces have formed a command center south of the city of Mokha, following Houthi breakthroughs across various combat axes under heavy fire, in which the Houthis used various types of weapons,” Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Lt. Gen. Tareq Saleh, said in his acknowledgment that his forces lost the port. The PLC was created in 2022 to represent the internationally recognized government of Yemen.

“The armed forces on the West Coast — the National Resistance, the Giants [Brigades], and the Homeland Shield — in addition to units of the Taiz axis west of the governorate, have paid a heavy price, martyrs and wounded, over the past days as they confronted the Houthi attack, which was planned by Iran, supported by it, and carried out with the participation of its various proxies/tools.”

“Thanks to God, our armed forces were able to repel an enemy combat formation a short time ago in the province of Taiz, forcing it to withdraw,” Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree proclaimed. “This was achieved by targeting it with a number of locally manufactured surface-to-air missiles.”

Videos have emerged showing Houthi forces inside Mokha and its airport and a large amount of equipment being seized.

The people of the port city of Al-Mokha gave a warm reception to Yemeni armed forces fighters following the city's strategic liberation. pic.twitter.com/0XDrveJPxU

— IRNA News Agency ☫ (@IrnaEnglish) September 10, 2026

BREAKING: The Houthis have announced a Cessation of Combat Operations along the Coast of Bab al-Mandab Strait following the Collapse of Pro-Saudi Forces

The Core Military of the Houthis has entered the City of Mokha

Additionally, all Islands Key to Controlling the Bab… pic.twitter.com/95HI4TJ6Bm

— Iran Observer (@IranObserver0) September 10, 2026

Houthi forces captured the key coastal city of Mokha overnight after Saudi/UAE backed forces retreated.

Seen here, Houthi fighters pose with an abandoned M-ATV MRAP at the city’s critical seaport. pic.twitter.com/1WD6l08MVc

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) September 10, 2026

Houthi fighters were filmed on the runway of Mokha international airport after capturing the city. pic.twitter.com/56Rc4BwsNf

— Open Source Intel (@Osint613) September 10, 2026

Holy score. This footage from Al Jazeera shows some of the equipment that was left behind for the Yemeni to capture in Mokha. https://t.co/yc0nwRlIse pic.twitter.com/Jn8VT571LY

— Reno (@theRenoNara) September 10, 2026

Even before the capture of Mokha, the rebel group held the BAM under threat with its array of drones and missiles, some of which it launched from deeper in Yemen. In fact, the group became the first to fire anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) at vessels during its campaign against Red Sea shipping.

Mokha, however, provides a potential new surveillance and launching point for the Houthis to deploy mines as well as aerial drones and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) they can use to attack shipping. As we have reported previously, the rebel group pioneered the operational use of some of these weapons.

The Houthis “are determined to control the ports in order to use booby-trapped boats from areas close to shipping lanes,” Col. Abdul Basit Al-Baher, a Yemeni army officer and military analyst, told Arab News last month as the rebels were pushing closer to the port.

You can see video and images of a Houthi USV that struck the Greek-owned ship Tutor in the Red Sea in 2024 below.

Photos of Houthi kamikaze USV right before it struck Greek-owned cargo ship Tutor.

The ship's guard were totally confused as to what they were observing.

They couldn't even react before it hit the ship. https://t.co/ZwFlWnsFAR pic.twitter.com/8ORRrvZWH6

— Clash Report (@clashreport) June 17, 2024

In addition to Mokha, the Houthis also reportedly captured two important islands that could also add to its control over shipping through the strait. However, TWZ cannot independently confirm this.

There are claims that the Houthis seized Perim Island, which sits right in the middle of the BAM. In 2021, satellite images we obtained showed completion of a new, approximately 6,150-foot-long runway on the island as well as hangars and other facilities. The installation was supposedly meant primarily to support drone operations and was built by the United Arab Emirates.

This strategically located island sits in the narrowest part of the BAM, less than two miles west of Yemen and about 13 miles east of Djibouti, giving the Houthis a commanding presence at the mouth of the Red Sea.

Zuqar Island, which was also reportedly captured, sits in the middle of the Red Sea about 80 miles north of Perim Island. In the custody of the Yemeni government since 1998, it was being “used by government forces to track shipping traffic, monitor movements by Houthi rebels and stop weapons smuggling in the Red Sea,” according to The National.

Last year, images emerged of construction of a runway on the island.

It is unclear who built this island runway, though there have been indications that it could have been the United Arab Emirates once again.

A closer look at the new 2.1 km runway on Yemen’s Jabal Zuqar Island in the southern Red Sea shows a small apron with one completed aircraft hangar and another likely under construction, plus a taxiway leading to two military emplacements, likely to shelter aircraft or UAVs. https://t.co/cnphe6yCeO pic.twitter.com/iOwr7C6I91

— Rich Tedd (@AfriMEOSINT) October 20, 2025

Zuqar Island sits about 7 km east of the northbound shipping lane in the Red Sea. Control over these two islands could allow the Houthis to mirror the pattern Iran established in the Strait of Hormuz by directing traffic to pass through a narrow passage between Qeshm and Larak islands.

The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis grew out of a civil war in Yemen that erupted in 2014. It expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis and raged on until the parties reached a tenuous ceasefire in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis, and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. Tensions, however, reignited after that conflict ended when the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter. In addition to the aforementioned blockade, the Houthis began striking Saudi refineries.

The Houthis already control the port of Hodeidah, about 100 miles to the north. Capturing Mokha and the two islands extends their reach even closer to the BAM. 

In the wake of the Houthi blockade imposed in July, traffic in the BAM fell by 15%, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence.

“On average, 273 ships sailed through the chokepoint each week between 27 July and 23 August,” the organization reported. “The naval ban on Saudi Arabia came into effect on 20 July, and the weekly average in the run up date was 319. Still, traffic remains above volumes seen before the crisis in the Middle East Gulf that led to a flurry of activity in the Red Sea as Saudi oil was redirected to Yanbu.”

As we have explained in the past, Saudi Arabia has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities near the Persian Gulf.

The biggest impact of the blockade, Lloyd’s List Intelligence notes, is that it is driving up the cost to deliver oil by forcing traffic north through the Suez Canal, “extending voyage times and tying up capacity. In the Middle East, rising use of Hormuz shuttle tankers and multiple STS transfers is creating delays and increasing vessel utilization. Combined, these rising inefficiencies have led to the third VLCC spot-rate spike since the beginning of the crisis in the Middle East Gulf.” 

The Houthi strikes on Saudi’s oil infrastructure, including a Houthi missile and drone attack against the Saudi Aramco refinery at Jazan on the Red Sea earlier this week, add a further dilemma for Riyadh, making it harder to get its product to points of shipment.

Video of of the aftermath of those strikes, which you can see below, emerged on social media.

Following Houthi strikes, fires can be seen raging at the Jizan oil refinery in Saudi Arabia. pic.twitter.com/tAqOPlsmvS

— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) September 8, 2026

All this is raising the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations, if supporting such an operation is even possible at all at this point. The Navy, and other key elements of the U.S. military, is overstretched and worn down by continuous deployments for many months leading up to Venezuela and then Iran, and now six months after Operation Epic Fury.

U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf are under increasing pressure as tensions with Iran continue to simmer. On Tuesday, several U.S. Air Force jets were damaged in an Iranian missile barrage on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, according to CBS News. An A-10 Thunderbolt II close support jet lost a wing and about eight F-15E Strike Eagle multi-role fighters were slightly damaged and returned to service, the network noted.

There is also a report that Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao said Iranian forces “blew the hell out of Bahrain” where the U.S. military has a number of key facilities, including the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The country has been the subject of frequent Iranian barrages since the U.S. and Israel first attacked on Feb. 28.

Cao’s assessment matches what we have seen and heard prior to his comments and raises anew the question of whether the U.S. will return to Bahrain and other bases in the region heavily attacked by Iran.

In an exclusive interview, Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao told me that Iranian forces "blew the hell out of Bahrain."

While open-source analyses have long indicated that the U.S. Fifth Fleet Headquarters at Naval Support Activity Bahrain sustained extensive damage in the early…

— Ryan Morgan (@R_S_Morgan) September 10, 2026

On the sea, Iranian missiles are getting closer to hitting U.S. Navy warships, the Wall Street Journal reported.

“At least three times in the past week, Iranian forces have launched missiles at American warships, including an aircraft carrier, taking direct aim at the U.S. Navy in a way it hasn’t done since the start of the war,” the newspaper noted. “The attempted strikes on warships have led to much closer calls than previous attempts, with Iran using maneuverable warheads, people familiar with the attacks said.”

Amid this activity, traffic through the Strait remains suppressed.

“Vessel transits via the Strait of Hormuz fell on Wednesday to seven from 12 ​the previous day, preliminary ship-tracking data showed on Thursday, with ‌levels also below the 10-day average of 14,” Reuters reported. “Out of these seven ships, four vessels exited and three entered, according to the data.”

However, an exact figure is hard to come by. Some vessels could be sailing through the ​waterway with their transponders turned off and would not be counted ​toward the totals, the outlet added.

As it is, oil prices are skyrocketing. As of noon Thursday, the per barrel price of Brent Crude exceeded $107, the highest price since July when it fell to just over $77 per barrel, according to OilPrice.com.

It will take some time before we get a better picture of how the Houthi seizure of the port of Mokha, and possibly Perim and Zuqar islands, will affect the global economy due to rising oil prices, either through reduced supply, increased cost of delivery or some combination of the two. With no end in sight to the U.S. conflict with Iran that helped to drive these actions, the Yemeni rebel group has incentives to inflict economic pain wherever it can.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Houthis’ Stranglehold On Strategic Bab Al-Mandab Strait Grows Stronger appeared first on TWZ.

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Transcript

A transcript will be provided when ready

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The next phase of the war between the US and Iran may be decided not in the Gulf but in Yemen. The Houthis’ decision to blockade Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea—including by attacking two Saudi ships as well as Aramco’s oil infrastructure—could become a turning point in the wider conflict. Such escalation could force Riyadh to reconsider the diplomacy-first strategy that has defined both its response to the Iran war and its handling of Yemen after a costly military intervention failed to uproot the Houthis.

Staying out of the war

Since the Iran war began in February, Riyadh has maintained channels with Tehran and urged Washington to pursue de-escalation, diplomacy and an end to the war. This strategy stems from Saudi Arabia’s exposure to prolonged turmoil and its determination to avoid being dragged into a war.

There is also a more immediate Saudi calculation. By keeping lines open with Tehran, Riyadh sought, with partial success, to persuade Iran to spare the kingdom the kind of retaliation it directed at the UAE, whose support for the US-led war has been overt. Restraint has also strengthened Saudi diplomacy with the Houthis and helped preserve an uneasy truce.

This diplomatic approach has also allowed Riyadh to keep exporting oil even as Hormuz remained closed. Crude continued to flow through the East-West Pipeline from the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea, preserving access to Asian markets, which account for up to 70% of Saudi crude exports. While the route still handles only a fraction of export volumes during peacetime, it provided Saudi Arabia with an economic lifeline while easing pressure on global markets.

That arrangement is now under strain. After Saudi-backed forces in Yemen struck the runway at Sana’a airport to prevent Iranian aircraft from landing (arguing they were enforcing a no-fly embargo on military supplies), the Houthis launched ballistic missiles and drones at southern Saudi Arabia, ending a four-year truce.

The attacks appear to reflect a shift in Iran’s strategy towards the kingdom. As the US expanded its attacks on Iranian infrastructure, Tehran has reportedly asked the Houthis to prepare to close Bab al-Mandab and threatened the East-West Pipeline directly, declaring a “port against port” doctrine under which Gulf infrastructure hosting American operations would become targets. By threatening both Hormuz and the Red Sea, Tehran appears to seek to raise the global cost of the American campaign—while again overestimating Riyadh’s ability to press Washington for de-escalation.

Riyadh’s choice

Saudi Arabia must now decide how to respond. If the Houthis fail to cause meaningful disruption at Yanbu and the East-West Pipeline, it may seek a new exclusion agreement with the group and Iran. Under such an arrangement, Saudi tankers, ports and infrastructure would be removed from their target list in exchange for restrictions on refuelling American aircraft and on intelligence support for American operations, as well as tighter controls on the Saudi-backed Yemeni forces. Tehran would also expect Riyadh to keep pressing the White House for de-escalation. The Houthis would likely demand concessions of their own too, such as resumed flights to Sana’a, access to the port city of Hodeidah, salary payments and a more formal recognition of their authority in northern Yemen.

If, however, the Houthis continue to block Saudi exports while attacking Yanbu, the East-West Pipeline or other critical infrastructure such as Aramco facilities, Riyadh may conclude that diplomacy has become a mechanism for managing its own strangulation. At that point, accommodation could be more dangerous than escalation. Saudi Arabia could then move closer to the American campaign against Iran while also reviving its own war against the Houthis. That would draw the Arab world’s most influential state directly into the conflict, making it far harder to contain.

After their public split around Yemen, the two Gulf powers now have a shared incentive to confront a common enemy

Riyadh would first try to deal with the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has already struck Houthi sites at the port of Hodeida and on Kamaran island. The next steps would likely involve coordination with the UAE. Abu Dhabi has long argued that Riyadh’s accommodation with the group was doomed to fail. After their public split around Yemen, the two Gulf powers now have a shared incentive to confront a common enemy. The UAE-backed forces in the south have already mobilised alongside the Saudi-backed internationally recognised Yemeni government, attacking Houthi missile and drone launch sites as well as weapons depots in Marib and Al-Jawf.

Avoiding a wider war

Such an escalation would be an enormous gamble for all sides. Iran would end up facing a broader coalition. Saudi Arabia would be joining an American military campaign that is yet to deliver a decisive blow against Iran, while reopening a conflict in Yemen that it previously failed to settle. Iran has already demonstrated that it can keep Hormuz closed despite US strikes, showing it retains highly dispersed missile and drone systems able to sustain a prolonged war at a very low cost. The Houthis can do much the same in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, a renewed ground war in Yemen could reignite the country’s longstanding civil war.

Europe has every interest in preventing that outcome. A prolonged closure of Bab al-Mandab would disrupt the Suez route, increase energy and shipping costs and heap further pressure on the European economy. If Saudi Arabia abandons restraint against Iran and the Houthis, the chances of a diplomatic settlement that addresses both Hormuz and the region’s wider security architecture would diminish significantly. The EU is now considering expanding the mandate of Operation Aspides to include minesweeping, amid concerns that Iran or the Houthis could use naval mines to keep Bab al-Mandab closed even after de-escalation. But naval and economic plans should support, not replace, diplomatic efforts. Europeans should use their channels with mediators, including Pakistan, Qatar and especially Oman to dissuade Iran from opening new fronts in Bab al-Mandab and against Saudi Arabia, while also pressing Trump to hold back from widening American attacks to core Iranian infrastructure.

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