Standing on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, Secretary Pete Hegseth looked up at the flattop’s superstructure and got a good indication of many of the targets the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) destroyed during its six-month fight with Iran. In a photograph shared by the Pentagon’s image distribution site, Hegseth is seen examining a wall of so-called kill marks stenciled onto the superstructure.

By our count from the image and a video taken during Hegseth’s visit, both of which you can see below, there are 103 one-way attack (OWA) drone kill marks and 34 ship kill marks. These represent the number of each the CSG took out. It is unclear whether there are other kill marks we can’t see.

Though they resemble Shahed-136s, which are the most notorious of Iranian OWA drones, these silhouettes would represent all types shot down, and Iran has many. The same holds true for the ships. The photograph shows stencils of frigates or corvettes but these would be a generic symbol for surface craft kills.

To the sailors of the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN—

WELCOME HOME pic.twitter.com/AoQymN2yfZ

— Secretary of War Pete Hegseth (@SecWar) October 7, 2026

On board to welcome the ship and its crew as it headed back to its home port of San Diego after a tumultuous and historic deployment, Hegseth extolled the strike group’s accomplishments. Reading from the Presidential Unit Citation awarded to the strike group for its work during Epic Fury, Hegseth noted that it shot down 77 one-way unmanned attack drones and sank 64 Iranian vessels between the start of Epic Fury on Feb. 28 until it departed the region on Aug. 22.

The Lincoln CSG also conducted 3,693 combat sorties, delivered 1.37 million pounds of ordnance, launched 450 Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles (TLAMs), destroyed 21 anti-ship cruise missiles and defended against four fast-attack craft and explosive-carrying wooden sailing vessels.

Defense Secretary @PeteHegseth awards Presidential Unit Citation to USS Abraham Lincoln pic.twitter.com/DbS5YYu9oB

— CSPAN (@cspan) October 7, 2026

It is unclear at the moment why there are at least 26 more drone kill marks stenciled onto the Lincoln than the number of drones shot down listed in the unit citation and why there are 30 fewer ship kill marks than the tally noted in the citation. The Pentagon referred us to the Navy, and we are waiting for a response from the service.

There is a long tradition of kill marks being stenciled onto aircraft, vessels and other military equipment indicating the destruction of enemy equipment.

Kill marks on aircraft embarked aboard Lincoln indicate that the carrier strike group also destroyed several Iranian submarines and other weapons. These were not listed in the unit citation or in any kill marks stenciled onto the Lincoln that we could see.

An image provided to TWZ by aviation photographer Jeff Rojas, who goes by the handle @jro_photography on Instagram, shows a submarine kill mark on one of the F/A-18F Super Hornets of the U.S. Navy’s Strike Fighter Squadron 41 (VFA-41), the “Black Aces.” That is one of the aviation squadrons embarked on the Lincoln during Epic Fury.

Iranian naval vessels, including the country’s Russian-made Kilo class and other submarines, were top-priority targets during Epic Fury. The U.S. military has previously confirmed that air-launched AGM-114 Hellfire laser-guided missiles (likely fired from MQ-9 Reaper drones) and ground-launched Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missiles were employed against submarines, specifically.

In total, VFA-41 alone launched 421 missiles and bombs during its time supporting Operation Epic Fury. You can find the details in our story about the squadron here.

In addition, an image published by The Aviationist showed “an extraordinary array of target markings on a VMFA-314 F-35C, apparently representing an oil tanker, three submarines, a surface combatant, a Shahed-type drone, an artillery piece, and several ground-based launchers.”

Marine F-35C Also Sports Three Submarine Kill Markings After Operation Epic Fury

An exclusive image obtained by The Aviationist reveals an extraordinary array of target markings on a VMFA-314 F-35C, apparently representing an oil tanker, three submarines, a surface combatant, a…

— The Aviationist (@TheAviationist) October 5, 2026

It should also be noted that some of the drone kill marks seen on the Lincoln could have been the result of shootdowns by the carrier’s escorts. The Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers USS Frank E. Petersen Jr, USS Spruance and USS Michael Murphy all serve as critical air defense platforms for the carrier strike group. Those vessels were also the ones launching the TLAMs, as well as potential submarine involvement.

Late Thursday morning local time, Lincoln finally returned home. The carrier departed San Diego on Nov. 21, 2025, and an arrival closed out a total deployment of 321 days, by our count. That’s just shy of the 326-day record USS Gerald R. Ford set in May, representing the second-longest deployment in the modern carrier era.

USS Abraham Lincoln returns to San Diego https://t.co/0eEnTqJZdU

— Reuters (@Reuters) October 8, 2026

In addition to racking up successes against Iran, the marathon deployment drew scrutiny over the grueling conditions sailors and Marines experienced aboard. In August, crew families described supply shortages and difficult living arrangements, as TWZ reported at the time. The accounts led to widespread media coverage, which Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao called dishonest while also acknowledging that “a small number of mental health cases were treated with no loss of life, meal plans were adjusted when fresh resupply was unavailable, without a single meal being missed, calls home were limited when the operational threat was too high.” At least eight personnel across the strike group attempted suicide during the cruise, Cao wrote in a letter sent to Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand that was obtained by CNN.

The kill mark stencils weren’t the only symbols of Lincoln’s deployment. On Wednesday, Hegseth used symbology to push back against concerns raised about the long journey.

“There were a few folks in the media who tried to turn the USS Abraham Lincoln into some sort of a symbol,” Hegseth said. “A symbol of dysfunction, or a symbol of low morale, or a symbol of a failed mission. And what I look out right here or when I talk to your leadership, and I haven’t had a chance to talk to a number of you, I know it’s the exact opposite.”

UPDATE: 5:59 PM Eastern –

After the Lincoln pulled into its home port, new images emerged. The following picture shows additional kill marks, including 10 of submarines.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post USS Abraham Lincoln Comes Home With Its Island Superstructure Covered In Kill Marks appeared first on TWZ.

A newly updated Congressional Research Service (CRS) report counts 81 US military aircraft as lost or damaged in the ongoing conflict with Iran. EurAsian Times analyzes the losses Tehran sustained during the ongoing conflict. 

The latest figure is nearly double the 42 aircraft the Congressional Research Service tallied in a May 2026 report, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time.

The jump from 42 to 81 most likely reflects updated reporting and newly available public information.

In addition to the Congress research figures, two other reports published by the Congressional Budget Office and the Pentagon’s inspector general had earlier provided deep insights into the war. The latest CRS report reportedly cited that data.

“As of August 1, 2026, the armed conflict with Iran has cost DoD approximately $38 billion. That amount reflects the costs of replacing expended munitions and equipment lost in battle, increased flying hours, other operations, and increased fuel costs,” the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated in the report last month.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon’s IG report estimated the US campaign cost $33.4 billion between February 28 and June 30, with at least $22.3 billion spent on munitions alone.

Citing information published by the CBO, the latest CRS states that the overall cost of the lost aircraft is between $1.9 billion and $3.3 billion, depending on the Pentagon’s replacement costs. However, CNN News was informed by some unidentified sources that the cost of the war is much higher–at least $45 billion–excluding damage to US infrastructure and bases spread across the Gulf, repeatedly struck by Iranian forces.

The revised losses in the Congress report include manned aircraft, helicopters, and drones, though it clarifies that the total is not a count of destroyed aircraft, adding that some damaged aircraft may have returned to active service after repairs.

It lists 12 F-15E jets as destroyed/damaged, up from four F-15E Strike Eagle Fighter jets listed in the May 2026 report. The US lost three F-15E fighters in a friendly-fire incident related to the Kuwait Air Force aircraft, whereas the fourth was downed by Iran using shoulder-mounted air defense systems, as previously noted by the EurAsian Times. 

Both CBO and IG reports also earlier listed just four F-15E losses. Therefore, the eight F-15Es mentioned in the new report are likely the jets that were damaged in an Iranian strike on the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in September 2026. Citing an unidentified US official, Reuters earlier reported that Iran had struck an A-10 Warthog, leaving it with a missing wing, while eight F-15s sustained light damage and were returned to service.

The latest list also includes the F-35A, the US Air Force’s most prized and expensive stealth fighter. The CBO report had earlier noted that replacing/repairing the aircraft would cost $120 million, without saying whether it would be written off or repaired.

Although some OSINT observers at the time believed this acknowledged the F-35 loss, others warned that the CBO was only recording the repair cost while leaving room for a potential replacement.

Furthermore, the latest list also reiterates the loss of the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which was struck and damaged while on the ground at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, during an Iranian missile and drone attack.

However, instead of merely reporting the loss, it expressed concern about losing this highly specialized aircraft and the far-reaching effects it could have on the USAF.

“Congress may assess whether losses in certain high-demand platforms that are aging and limited in number, such as the E-3 Sentry, create capability gaps or increase risk in other theaters,” it stated.

Notably, the US Air Force has only 16 of these critical AWACS remaining in its inventory, and losing each could disproportionately affect American combat posture in the Western Pacific, where the threat of war with China is never off the table.

Another newly listed loss on the updated CRS is the US Navy’s MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter, which did not appear in the May 2026 list. On July 1, an MH-60S Sea Hawk from a George H.W. Bush aircraft carrier made an emergency landing in the Arabian Sea, although the Navy ruled out hostile action at the time.

Most of the rise since May is attributed to drones. The report now counts 45 MQ-9 Reapers lost, up from 24 in its May report. This is also a considerable increase from the 30 Reaper losses cited in the IG report. Furthermore, a US Army AH-64 Apache that was shot down over the Strait of Hormuz in June 2026 has also found its name on the list. 

Notably, the newly published report raises several issues for Congress to address, including whether the Pentagon provides enough detail about the losses for lawmakers to assess the consequences and potential solutions.

CRS notes that the Department of Defense’s reporting on the losses has been limited or vague, especially since even the September 2026 Lead Inspector General report relied in part on earlier CRS open-source tallies rather than providing a fully independent, comprehensive public accounting.

What Did Iran Lose In The War?

Iranian authorities have offered only limited, selective figures on their own military and civilian casualties and have not published a comprehensive accounting of equipment destroyed during Operation Epic Fury launched by the US in coordination with Israel.

Iran has nothing equivalent to the CRS list. Open-source counts already disagree: one tracker puts Iranian aircraft losses above 90 airframes, mostly transports and tankers, while a narrower documented list counts 43.

Open-source trackers have recorded dozens of Iranian aircraft—combat jets, transports, tankers, trainers, and helicopters—destroyed primarily on the ground at air bases early in the campaign, although a few were downed in air.

In the initial days of the war, two Iranian fighters, a Northrop F-5 and a F-4 Phantom II, were destroyed in an Israeli strike at Tabriz Shahid Madani International Airport. Around the same time, the US destroyed two Iranian Sukhoi Su-22 aircraft at Shiraz Shahid Dastgheib Airport, along with two Lockheed C-130 Hercules and an Il-76 transport aircraft.

CENTCOM released footage of the two Su-22s. Satellite imagery was later cited for the two C-130s and the Il-76 at the same airfield. Further Phantom losses have been reported at the 3rd Tactical Air Base in Hamadan, but not documented to the same standard.

A Qatari Air Force Boeing F-15QA shot down two Iranian low-flying Sukhoi Su-24 tactical bombers on March 2, 2026, after they failed to react to radio warnings.

In the second week of March 2026, Israel said it had destroyed multiple IRIAF F-14 Tomcats in a massive air strike on Isfahan Airport, and 16 aircraft used by the IRGC Quds Force at Mehrabad International Airport were also struck. At the time, experts posited that these strikes may have wiped out the entire Tomcat fleet, particularly since some of these jets had already been destroyed in the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025.

Historian Tom Cooper estimated that only about 10 Tomcats were flyable when the war began, compared with roughly 35 still listed on paper.

Satellite imagery confirmed at least two, and probably three, destroyed at Isfahan; some higher counts include airframes later described as wooden decoys. Iranian state media released footage on June 10 of an F-14 returning from a mission, so the “fleet finished” claim did not hold.

At Mehrabad, imagery after the Israeli strikes showed damage to at least 17 aircraft, including a Boeing 747 and a Harbin Y-12. Separate open-source lists also record Boeing 707 and 747 tankers destroyed at airfields between March and April.

An Israeli Air Force F-35I “Adir” stealth fighter jet shot down an Iranian YAK-130 aircraft over Tehran on March 4, as the EurAsian Times reported. On March 10, videos documenting the demolition of a Lockheed C-130 Hercules, a Lockheed P-3 Orion, and an Il-76 at Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani Airport in Kerman, Iran, were released by CENTCOM.

Later that month, reports also surfaced of Iranian J-7 fighter jets and Bell 214 helicopters. In addition to these, several Iranian drones–deployed on a large scale–were shot down by US forces, although these were mainly one-way attack platforms.

Those drone losses are the hardest to count. Many were expendable one-way airframes, and neither side has published a reconciled total. Iran also claimed shootdowns of Israeli drones, including Heron and Hermes airframes, in early March; those claims are likewise unreconciled.

Iran has not released an official inventory of destroyed ships, but the sinking of IRIS Dena in the Indian Ocean became one of the starkest and most unforgettable symbols of the US war against Iran, especially since it was the first such sinking since World War Two.

Dena was a Moudge-class frigate, sunk on March 4 about 19 nautical miles off Galle, Sri Lanka, while returning from India’s International Fleet Review. The US said the Los Angeles-class submarine USS Charlotte fired two Mark 48 torpedoes and one hit. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed a US submarine carried out the strike.

Sri Lanka recovered 32 survivors; Iran later put the dead at 104. Some reports said the ship carried no operational armament because of the exercise, and that its Bell 212 was not aboard.

The accurate historical marker is narrower than “first sinking since World War Two”: first ship sunk by a US submarine since 1945, and first submarine sinking in combat since ARA General Belgrano in 1982. India and Sri Lanka both joined the search.

Furthermore, the US forces destroyed 17 Iranian warships, including a submarine, in the early days of the conflict, as the EurAsian Times reported at the time. These numbers likely climbed in the weeks leading up to the April 7 ceasefire and may have risen further after hostilities broke out in July 2026.

In fact, The Aviationist recently published photos of an F-35C that returned from the theatre bearing markings of three submarines, a surface combatant, a Shahed-type drone, an artillery piece, and several ground-based launchers.

Those markings record claimed engagements. They are not a confirmed naval order of battle.

Over the months, US forces have repeatedly endorsed destroying or damaging Iranian Navy and coastal targets, with Donald Trump alleging that the whole force had been wiped out.

Open-source reporting has suggested that a large portion of Iranian air defenses that are part of a meticulously built layered network, including the S-300, Bavar-373, Khorad-15, to name a few, were also destroyed in US and Israeli strikes. Additionally, both the US and Israel claimed to have destroyed several ballistic missile launchers in the initial days.

Israel said one early wave put more than 25 fighters against over 35 missile storage and launch sites around Tabriz and Kermanshah. Without a pre-war inventory or a public battle-damage assessment, none of these claims can be turned into a share of the force destroyed. Mobile launchers are the largest gap: a struck site is not proof the missile was in it.

That said, these figures are not fully confirmed, as Tehran has not officially published its losses.

Nonetheless, despite suffering major losses throughout the war, Iran has survived, dealing a blow to joint US-Israeli aspirations of completely destroying its ballistic missile or even the Nuclear program.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post Calculating Iran’s Losses in Op. Epic Fury as CRS Nearly Doubles the U.S. Aircraft Count From 42 to 81 appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Pakistan has outrighty rejected a New York Times (NYT) report that claimed PAF fighter jets were involved in strikes against Houthis, calling the claim “fake and fabricated.”

“The claim in the above-referenced NYT report that Pakistan Air Force aircraft are being used against the Houthis is fake and fabricated,” Pakistan’s Information Ministry said.

In an X post, Pakistan’s Ministry of Information & Broadcasting wrote: Fact Check | Ministry of Information & Broadcasting NYT above referred story attributing employment of PAF aircraft against Houthis is fake and fabricated. International Media houses are again asked to avoid speculative reporting with regards to employment of Pakistan’s Military Forces under Makkah Joint Defence Agreement. Details of any employment, if necessary will be given by concerned authorities. Truth Prevails over Falsehood.

The report came days after Pakistan and Turkey agreed to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.

Earlier, a senior Pakistani military official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told NYT that Pakistan Air Force jets were being used in strikes against the Houthis.

Another Pakistani official said Islamabad’s role was aimed at degrading Houthi drone and missile threats through air support rather than a ground offensive in Yemen, the NYT claimed.

Col. David O. Smith, a former U.S. Army attaché in Pakistan and former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, said he had no classified figures, but that the analyst consensus was about 8,000 Pakistani troops deployed in Saudi Arabia. He said the force included a Pakistan Air Force contingent and Army air-defense units, that they would likely help secure oil infrastructure, and that Pakistani soldiers were unlikely to fight the Houthis directly because Islamabad is trying to preserve its relationship with Iran.

Pakistan’s military spokesman, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, confirmed to CNN that Pakistani troops are already in Saudi Arabia and described any role as defensive, without saying whether they would operate across the border in Yemen.

Interestingly, Pakistan earlier furiously denied a social media buzz that claimed Pakistan had lost three JF-17 fighter jets due to a Houthi missile attack that targeted King Abdulaziz Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

“This is absolutely fake. No credible or official source has also reported any sort of damage to PAF JF-17s,” the Ministry of Information reportedly said in its statement. The “deliberate fabrication of damage to PAF aircraft and their alleged evacuation is only blatant Indian propaganda, part of Hindutva deceit and a deceptive mindset,” the Ministry said.

The Pakistani Air Force jets and support aircraft, including JF-17 jets, arrived in April 2026 under the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed in September 2025.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s foreign minister has rejected sending troops to Yemen, despite the “Mecca pact” with Saudi Arabia.

“This is a defense agreement,” said Hakan Fidan, adding: “If one of the countries is attacked, you support its defense. This is not an offensive agreement.” Turkey “will not send its troops to another country’s territory to launch an attack”, he emphasized.

Fidan said Turkish and Saudi military delegations would work together to assess what defensive measures might be needed, without giving details.

• By ET Desk
• Mail us at editor (at) eurasiantimes.com

The post Pakistan Fighter Jets Bombing Houthis “Fake & Fabricated”. Islamabad Rejects NYT Report appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

Press TV – October 7, 2026

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei has dismissed claims by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Tehran has repeatedly squandered chances for an agreement, saying the inversion of historical facts cannot erase Washington’s pattern of treaty-breaking from public memory.

Baghaei, responding to an IRNA question on Rubio’s assertion that “Iran has missed opportunities for an agreement multiple times,” stated on Wednesday, “The inversion of historical truths cannot remove the reality of America’s repeated breaches of commitment from the mind of public opinion.”

He pointed to Washington’s successive acts of bad faith, including its unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal on May 8, 2018, the sabotage of diplomatic tracks, military aggression against Iran while negotiations were underway, and the subsequent violation of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding Iran reached on June 18.

Baghaei held the United States responsible for the insecurity prevailing in the region and for the economic consequences felt in America and worldwide.

“Blame-shifting and contradictory statements cannot overshadow the demand of American and global public opinion that those responsible for the illegal war and the crimes committed be held to account,” he said.

On the latest developments in contacts with the United States, the spokesman said the Islamic Republic’s considerations and conditions for ending the imposed war on all fronts and restoring security to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz have been set out explicitly and decisively.

The necessary response to the other side’s proposals will be conveyed through intermediaries. “The exchange of messages between Iran and the US is being conducted through intermediaries,” he added.

On diplomatic efforts related to regional peace and security, including commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, Baghaei stressed that the security of navigation in the waterway matters more to the Islamic Republic of Iran than to any other party. Iran, in consultation with Oman as the other littoral state, has spared no effort to restore security to the Strait.

“The consultation process between Iran and Oman has proceeded successfully. In addition to agreeing on the geographical coordinates of safe two-way routes in the Strait of Hormuz, the two sides have reached an understanding on how the matter will be presented to the relevant international body, a step that will, God willing, be taken soon,” he said.

Asked about the possibility of a joint meeting involving Iran, Oman, and other Persian Gulf states, Baghaei said Iran will continue its efforts to strengthen trust and engagement among the region’s countries.

“Defenders of the homeland, in both the diplomatic arena and the field, stand shoulder to shoulder, resolute and steadfast in defending Iran’s sovereignty and securing the nation’s interests and security,” he concluded.

Indian refiners have cut back Russian crude purchases for November delivery, as rising competition from China pushes up prices at a time when buyers can tap alternative shipments from the Middle East.

Operation Dawn has opened a new chapter in Yemen’s long-running war, bringing the strategically vital Bab al-Mandeb Strait back to the centre of the conflict, as Iran, the United States, Pakistan and Türkiye are increasingly drawn into a wider struggle. On 4th October, Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi said in a televised address, “Today, I announce […]

TEL AVIV – Every Israeli election of the past decade has been sold as the last chance to save the country, and every one has ended in the same place: a long night of counting, followed by weeks of bargaining among men who swore they would never sit together. The vote on October 27 has a stronger […]

The post Israel votes again but the arithmetic hasn’t changed appeared first on Asia Times.

OPED by Rear Admiral Girish Kumar Garg, VSM (Retd)

The difficulty in ending the Iran war is not identifying the ingredients of peace. The nuclear issue, missiles, sanctions, regional armed groups, freedom of navigation, and Israel’s security concerns are all well known. The harder question is: how adversaries who deeply distrust each other can take the first step without believing that they are making themselves more vulnerable.

Military action can change the battlefield, but it cannot by itself create a durable political settlement. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the danger that military calculations become disconnected from the strategic objective.

The answer may not lie in one grand bargain, but in a sequence of reciprocal bargains, each limited in scope, independently verifiable and linked to the next. The objective should not be to create trust between Iran, Israel and the United States. That is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

The objective should be to create a system that can function despite the absence of trust.

The broad issues are already clear. Iran wants recognition of its sovereignty, sanctions relief, and protection from military attack.

Israel wants assurance that Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon and that Iranian-supported groups cannot threaten its population. The United States wants to prevent nuclear proliferation, protect regional stability and avoid another open-ended war.

These objectives are not necessarily irreconcilable. The difficulty lies in sequencing them.

Iran fears that surrendering strategic capabilities before receiving meaningful concessions will leave it exposed. Israel fears that sanctions relief before Iranian capabilities are constrained will simply give Tehran resources to rebuild. Washington fears that concessions without Iranian compliance could be interpreted as weakness.

This is the classic security dilemma: each side sees its own actions as defensive while viewing the other’s actions as a threat that must be countered.

A successful peace process must therefore address not only what is negotiated, but how concessions are exchanged.

Replace the Grand Bargain with Reciprocal Bargains

The first step could be a time-bound Strategic Pause, perhaps lasting 30 days. During this period, the parties would freeze specified offensive operations, avoid attacks on civilian infrastructure and commercial shipping, and suspend actions that materially escalate the confrontation.

Compliance would need independent monitoring. More importantly, neither side should have to make a leap of faith. Each concession should trigger a corresponding concession by the other side.

A verified Iranian reduction in a specified category of nuclear activity could trigger suspension of particular sanctions. A verified reduction in attacks by regional armed groups could trigger defined relaxation of maritime or economic pressure. A verified violation would automatically suspend the corresponding benefit.

The settlement would therefore be built incrementally, with each step creating the conditions for the next.

Address Israel’s Security Dilemma

No settlement can succeed if it ignores Israel’s fundamental security concerns. From Israel’s perspective, Iran’s nuclear program is only one part of the threat. Iranian support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis has created a network of armed actors capable of imposing military pressure on Israel and disrupting regional security.

The practical approach would be to negotiate capabilities and behavior rather than political allegiance.

Iran could progressively restrict the transfer of specified advanced weapons, particularly long-range missiles, precision-strike systems and sophisticated drones, and commit to preventing attacks that deliberately target civilians or expand the conflict beyond agreed limits. In return, Iran would receive progressively stronger security assurances against direct attack.

The exchange is straightforward in principle: Iran reduces the forward military pressure it generates through its regional partners, while its security becomes less dependent on maintaining that forward deterrence.

For Israel, the benefit would be reduced military pressure on its territory. For Iran, the benefit would be a reduced perceived need to maintain an extensive regional deterrence architecture.

Hezbollah, Hamas & Houthis Need Different Solutions

These three groups should not be treated as one problem.

For Hezbollah, the central issue is Lebanon’s sovereignty and the presence of a heavily armed non-state actor on Israel’s northern frontier. A settlement should strengthen the Lebanese state’s authority and provide for a phased reduction or relocation of heavy weapons from sensitive areas. The immediate objective need not be the disappearance of Hezbollah as a political organization, but preventing any non-state actor from initiating a major interstate conflict without the Lebanese state’s consent.

Hamas presents a different challenge because it is inseparable from the unresolved Palestinian question. Requiring Hamas simply to disappear is unlikely to be realistic. A more viable pathway would involve Hamas relinquishing governance in Gaza, progressively reducing heavy weapons and transferring administration and security responsibilities to a legitimate Palestinian structure supported by the international community.

That process would need reconstruction and a credible political horizon for Palestinians. Otherwise, disarmament could simply create a vacuum for another armed movement.

The Houthis should be addressed through a separate Red Sea security arrangement. Iran could restrict the transfer of specified missile, drone, and maritime-strike capabilities, while a Yemeni political process provides the Houthis with a legitimate political future.

The objective would be to separate Yemen’s internal conflict from the wider Iran-Israel confrontation and restore freedom of commercial navigation.

Turn sanctions into an instrument for peace

Sanctions relief should also be redesigned. Iran is unlikely to make major concessions today in exchange for benefits that may arrive years later.

A Peace Escrow Mechanism could address this problem. Sanctions would be suspended in stages rather than simply lifted. Oil revenues, access to frozen funds, and selected financial channels could be released automatically when independent monitors verify specified Iranian actions.

The same principle would operate in reverse. If commitments are violated, the corresponding benefits would automatically pause.

Iran would therefore not have to trust that sanctions relief will eventually materialize; the economic benefit would be directly linked to verified compliance. At the same time, the United States and its partners would retain leverage until Iran demonstrated its commitments.

Sanctions would cease to be merely punishment or bargaining leverage and become an instrument for implementing the settlement.

Make Hormuz The First Test

The Strait of Hormuz offers an immediate opportunity for confidence-building because its security affects the entire international community.

Iran could provide a verifiable commitment to the safe passage of commercial shipping, while the United States and its partners could suspend specified maritime pressure measures during the Strategic Pause. An independent mechanism could investigate incidents and determine responsibility.

If commercial vessels can move safely while military forces exercise restraint, it would demonstrate that reciprocal commitments can work even when the parties remain deeply hostile.

That lesson could then be applied to the nuclear program, missiles and regional armed groups.

Peace Through Managed Distrust

The central mistake would be to expect trust to precede the agreement. Trust is more likely to result from repeated compliance.

The settlement should therefore rest on four principles: reciprocity, verification, gradualism and automaticity. Every concession should have a corresponding benefit; important commitments should be independently verifiable; major concessions should be broken into manageable stages; and agreed rewards or penalties should operate automatically rather than depend on renewed political bargaining.

This approach also gives each government a politically defensible narrative. Iran can present the process as an exchange of specific military concessions for tangible economic and security benefits rather than capitulation. Israel can demonstrate that its security concerns are being addressed through enforceable restrictions rather than political assurances. The United States can retain leverage while reducing the risk of another prolonged regional war.

Most importantly, the framework recognizes a basic reality of international politics: peace does not always begin with trust. Sometimes it begins with managing distrust.

The parties do not have to agree on history, ideology or regional ambitions. They need only agree that certain actions are too dangerous to continue and that restraint can produce tangible benefits.

A durable peace is therefore unlikely to emerge from one dramatic handshake or a single comprehensive treaty. It is more likely to emerge from a chain of smaller agreements in which each side discovers, step by step, that restraint produces greater security than escalation.

The real diplomatic breakthrough would not be an agreement that ends all disagreements. It would be an agreement that makes continued disagreement less dangerous, more predictable and progressively less dependent on the use of force.

The ultimate test of diplomacy will not be whether Iran, Israel and the United States learn to trust one another. It will be whether they can construct a system in which they do not need to trust one another to stop fighting.

• OPED By Admiral (R) Girish Kumar Garg
• This is an Opinion Article. Views Personal of the Author
• The writer is a retired Rear Admiral and was the Naval Officer-in-Charge (A&N Islands)

The post Hezbollah, Hamas & Houthis Cannot Be Disarmed With a Single Deal: U.S. & Israel Need New Mechanism: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

How Iraq’s energy sovereignty can be measured and achieved? How do the geography and sanctions matter? What is the U.S.’ impact in this area? And who determines Iraq’s energy choices? Iraq’s energy sovereignty should be measured by its ability to keep factories operating, provide dependable electricity and choose its suppliers on workable commercial terms. Yet, […]

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 7, 2026

After hesitating for weeks amid a deteriorating security situation in the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye (Turkey) have finally agreed to activate “deterrence measures” under the mutual security agreement, the Makkah (Mecca) Pact.’

Under the agreement, Pakistan and Türkiye have agreed to “rapidly deploy forces” in Saudi Arabia to counter the attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

This is the first time that the ‘Mecca Pact,’ signed in August, has been invoked.

“The committee agreed to activate collective deterrence measures, within the framework of the Alliance, in response to the attacks and all those responsible for them,” Khalid bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s defense minister, said.

The ‘Mecca Pact’ has a mutual defense clause, similar to NATO’s Article 5, that an armed attack against one country would be considered an attack on all three.

Under the agreement, Ankara could deploy its soldiers in the southern Arabian peninsula for the first time in over a century.

The last time Turkish soldiers served in Yemen was in 1919 under Ottoman rule. After the Ottomans’ defeat in the First World War, Ankara agreed to surrender garrisons outside Anatolia under the Armistice of Mudros.

After the Armistice, signed between the Ottomans and Allied nations in 1918, Ottoman garrisons in Yemen surrendered to the British forces one by one.

Therefore, activating the Mecca Pact could see Turkish forces return to the southern Arabian Peninsula after more than a century.

In fact, while the Mecca Pact was signed only in 2026, Turkey has been waiting for an opportunity to return to Yemen for over a decade.

In 2015, when Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Yemen against the Houthi rebels for the first time, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that “Depending on the course of events, we may consider providing logistical support.”

However, Ankara should not celebrate too soon, as history holds a sobering lesson for the Turks.

The mighty Ottoman Empire once ruled across the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Europe; controlled three of Islam’s holiest sites, including Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem; and controlled a huge territory in the European lands of the Balkans and southern Europe.

Ottomans, however, could never fully subjugate the Zaidi tribesmen of Yemen, the historical ancestors of today’s Houthi rebels.

Yemen, in fact, was frequently called the “graveyard of Anatolia” or the “graveyard of Ottoman soldiers”.

Yemen – The Graveyard of Turks (Ottomans)

Victoria Clark, in Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (2010), writes that by the 1890s Yemen was already “renowned as the ‘graveyard of the Turks'” during Ahmed Feyzi Pasha’s campaigns.

She also quoted an Ottoman official: “Yemen has become now the graveyard of Muslims and money.”

Turkish journalist and author Mustafa Balbay titled his book ‘Türkler Mezarlığı Yemen,’ which means “Cemetery of the Turks”.

In fact, describing Yemen as a “graveyard of Turkish soldiers” is a recurring theme in Ottoman (Turkish) historical memory.

Yemen Türküsü is a famous Turkish folk song that serves as a tragic lament for Ottoman soldiers who marched off to fight in Yemen during World War I and never returned.

Another Turkish folk song remembers the difficulties faced by Ottoman soldiers in Yemen and pays homage to Turks who went to Yemen but never returned.

“There are no clouds in the sky, what is this smoke?
There is no death in the neighborhood, what is this commotion?
These lands of Yemen are so treacherous
Oh, Yemen, its rose is a meadow
Why do those who leave not return?”

Ayşe Hür, in her article “The largest Ottoman cemetery: Yemen,” recounts that the Ottoman rule in Yemen was fiercely opposed by Zaydis, the ancestors of Houthi rebels.

According to the Zaydis, the Ottomans were ‘turbaned infidels’.

In his work titled “My Lament,” Ahmet İzzet (Furgaç) Pasha, who was sent to Yemen in early 20th century to supress a Zaydi revolt against the Ottomans described the period of Ottoman struggle in Yemen (1635-1840) in following words: “After a century of conflict in Jabal, with internal revolts and constant wars against the Zaydi imams, which continued until the year 1045 AH (1635), the entire Yemen region fell under the rule of the Zaydi imams due to the siege and pressure exerted on Haydar Pasha, who was forgotten and left in Jabal by the central government.”

Ottoman sources do not specify how many people died in the wars with the Zaydis during these 100 years, merely stating that “thousands of people died.”

“Going to Yemen and not returning” has been the fate of Ottoman soldiers since the 16th century, Ayşe Hür wrote in her article.

In the article titled “The Situation in Yemen” in the 15th issue of the Ottoman Newspaper dated 1316 (1900), it was stated: “As a result of Ahmet Fevzi Pasha’s wrong policies, approximately 4,000 soldiers died every year.”

Ayşe Hür also quoted an Ottoman official in her article who said that 1,30,000 Ottoman soldiers were buried in the Hijaz and Yemen between 1871 and 1894.

Marshal Galip, who served as a captain in Yemen in the 19th century, wrote: “Since I worked under the General Staff, all the general staff records passed through my hands. In these records, I noticed a wide and terrible gap between the new soldiers joining the army and those who were replaced or disabled… Yemen was a permanent war zone at that time.

“I compared the number of those who joined their factions or were mobilized en masse and sent away due to rebellions with the number of those who survived and returned to their homeland. The conclusion I reached was this: In the 22 years that had passed, a total of 130,000 Anatolian youths had been buried in the deserts of Hejaz and Yemen.”

In 2011, then-Turkish President Abdullah Gül renovated and inaugurated a Turkish Memorial Cemetery (Yemen-Türk Şehitliği) in Sanaa to commemorate the Ottoman soldiers who died in Yemeni campaigns.

Just one year later, in 2012, Houthi rebels demolished part of the memorial.

For centuries, the memorial has symbolized the Ottoman presence in Yemen. The deliberate attack on this memorial serves as a reminder of how the Houthis recall Ottoman campaigns in Yemen.

It was also a clear message to Ankara that they would not accept any Turkish involvement in Yemen.

Writing in Politics Today, Ahd Yaseen Al-Tamimi said: “History textbooks, which were adopted after 1962, presented a positive view of the Ottoman Empire and its rule over Yemen. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Zaydi supporters from maintaining their strict and extremist position on the Ottoman Empire.”

Of course, Turkey is a strong military power, and its influence extends in Yemen as well.

It has achieved remarkable military success in Syria, Libya, and in combating Kurdish insurgents in Iraq. Its military support to Azerbaijan was perhaps the deciding factor in its war against Armenia.

However, Yemen is a different ballgame altogether.

And if history is anything to go by, then Yemen, often described as a “graveyard of the Ottomans,” could once again become a quagmire for Turkey.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Why Yemen Could be a Graveyard for Turkish & Mecca Pact Soldiers: History Has The Answers: OPED appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq is a watershed moment in the geopolitics of the Middle East. There comes a moment in global politics where imperialism loses and the world clings to the hope of a better future, a future based on prosperity, inclusivity, and promotion of human dignity. This moment has found its […]

The Middle East has seen many explosions of violence in recent years. But while the US-Iran war has grabbed the headlines this year, the rapidly escalating conflict between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognized government and Saudi Arabia risks becoming just as consequential for the region. The complexity of Yemen’s internal conflict cannot be underestimated. […]

The post How Yemen’s renewed civil war could set the whole region ablaze appeared first on Asia Times.

US defense giant Lockheed Martin said the Royal Moroccan Air Force’s (RMAF) first F-16 Block 72 had completed its maiden flight, a test milestone as the fighter jet moves toward delivery.

The company said the Block 72 is the newest variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon, with updated avionics, sensors and mission systems, and changes intended to improve safety and reliability. Morocco was the launch customer for the configuration when Washington approved the purchase in March 2019.

“This first flight reflects meaningful progress on Morocco’s F-16 Block 72 program and is a critical step in strengthening Morocco’s future airpower,” Mike Shoemaker, vice president and general manager of Lockheed Martin’s Integrated Fighter Group, said. “The F-16 remains a vital component of today’s and future air defense, and we’re proud of the role it will continue to play in supporting Morocco’s sovereignty and contributing to regional stability for decades to come.”

The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of two related sales on March 25, 2019.

One covered 25 new Block 72 aircraft, plus weapons, equipment and services, at an estimated $3.8 billion. The other, valued at more than $985 million, covered upgrades for Morocco’s 23 existing F-16C/D Block 52+ jets to the F-16V standard, which is broadly similar to the new Block 70/72 aircraft, along with related equipment and support.

If both go ahead, the Royal Moroccan Air Force’s F-16 fleet would roughly double and be built around a common, modernized standard.

“The purchase will improve interoperability with the United States and other regional allies and enhance Morocco’s ability to undertake coalition operations, as it has done in the past in flying sorties against ISIS in Syria and Iraq,” the agency said of the new-aircraft sale. “Morocco already operates an F-16 fleet and will have no difficulty absorbing this aircraft and services into its armed forces.”

The Block 70 and Block 72 differ mainly in the engine. The Block 70 uses General Electric’s F110-GE-129; the Block 72 uses Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-229. Morocco’s existing Block 52+ jets already use F100 engines, so the new aircraft fit the support setup already in place.

Morocco’s F-35 Bid

Morocco was looking to acquire U.S. F-35 fighter jets since 2020–22, after normalizing ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords and as Algeria reportedly moved to acquire Russia’s Su-57.

Israeli intelligence firm Jafaj said King Mohammed VI raised tensions with Algeria in a private meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz during his 2021 visit.

Algeria and Morocco have not had diplomatic ties since August 2021.

The firm, citing an unnamed European source, said Rabat wanted Israeli help tracking Algerian troops and militia deployments and was also seeking Israeli surveillance and strike drones.

Jafaj said Defense Minister Abdellatif Loudiyi told Gantz that Morocco needed more combat aircraft for a possible war with its neighbor, that the F-35 was the preferred choice, and that Israel’s help lobbying the Biden administration would be welcome.

An F-35 was displayed at the 2024 Marrakech Air Show.

In August 2026, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank, said there had been “little concrete progress” and described the F-35 purchase as hypothetical.

Meanwhile, Lockheed is again exhibiting at the Marrakech Airshow, which runs from Oct. 7 to 10.

Its stand includes an F-35 cockpit demonstrator, with demonstrations for invited guests, and scale models of the F-35A, F-16 and C-130J Super Hercules.

• By ET Online Desk
• Contact the author at admin (at) eurasiantimes.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

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“Keep our city out of your reckless war talk,” said San Diego’s mayor, Todd Gloria, Monday night after President Donald Trump’s rambling speech at a rally in Nebraska included a particularly violent mention of the California city. Gloria was among several Democratic political leaders who were incensed after Trump – moments after predicted the Republican […]

The post Did he really invite Iran to take out California cities? appeared first on Asia Times.

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Iran’s economic adaptation over decades, marked by domestic production, regional trade and Asian partnerships, is on course to thwart Washington’s economic terrorism.

Press TV – October 6, 2026

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s prediction that Iran’s economy would soon collapse underscores the depth of delusion within the current American leadership.

“Iran is absolutely not sanctionable,” Deputy Economy Minister Mortaza Zamanian said this week as Tehran worked to keep trade flowing despite Washington’s latest sanctions campaign.

Zamanian cited Iran’s extensive borders, established commercial routes and longstanding trading relationships, saying that they make it impossible for external pressure simply to switch off the country’s economy.

His remarks came as Washington intensified its economic terrorism against Iranian oil, shipping, aviation, finance, technology and foreign companies supporting those sectors.

The new American campaign has been accompanied by extraordinary predictions from senior American officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s claim that Iran could have “nothing left to trade” within two weeks.

Speaking on September 27, Bessent claimed that Iran would probably make its final oil deliveries to China within two weeks, after which, he asserted, “they will have nothing.”

That prediction deserves comparison with history, because American administrations have imposed increasingly severe sanctions on Iran since 1979 while repeatedly expecting economic pressure eventually to produce collapse.

Yet the economy did not disappear, and Iran instead developed domestic industries, expanded regional commerce, strengthened trade with Asian powers and accumulated extensive experience operating outside Western financial channels.

The proposition that an economy which has absorbed American sanctions for almost half a century will suddenly disintegrate within two weeks therefore indicates the depth of delusion among the current US leadership.

Iran enters this confrontation possessing a large domestic market, extensive productive capacity, enormous energy resources and deeply established commercial relationships across Eurasia.

These are not temporary sanctions evasions assembled during the present crisis, but economic capabilities developed over decades through investment, industrial learning, regional integration and repeated adaptation to external restrictions.

The most important fact about Iran’s economic structure is its size, because a country with more than ninety million people possesses a domestic market capable of supporting extensive production independently of Western consumers.

The World Bank describes Iran as relatively diversified for an oil-exporting economy, with a substantial domestic market, a large workforce and significant activity across manufacturing, agriculture and services.

That domestic market sustains production across food, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, steel, petrochemicals, machinery, transportation, consumer goods and numerous intermediate industrial sectors serving Iranian households and companies.

Iran is therefore not an economy that must export continuously merely to keep its factories operating, because a substantial portion of its production already serves domestic consumption, investment and infrastructure.

That distinction becomes particularly important when external restrictions are designed around the assumption that cutting foreign trade will automatically paralyze domestic economic activity.

A country whose productive system is centered on domestic demand possesses an economic engine that continues operating even when international transactions become more complicated.

Iran has also spent decades building industrial capabilities specifically suited to its own resource base, population, infrastructure requirements and energy-intensive economy.

Steel production, petrochemicals, cement, refining, power generation, construction, food processing and pharmaceuticals represent substantial industrial ecosystems involving domestic engineering, manufacturing, logistics and skilled employment.

These capabilities have repeatedly expanded during periods when access to Western investment and technology was severely restricted, demonstrating that Iranian industrial development does not depend upon continuous Western participation.

Iran’s long exposure to sanctions has produced another asset that cannot be imposed or removed through a Treasury designation, namely a large body of accumulated technical and commercial experience.

When foreign manufacturers withdraw, Iranian companies have learned to redesign equipment, substitute components, develop domestic suppliers and work with companies from countries willing to maintain commercial relationships.

Academic research has documented this process in Iranian industries, including evidence that sanctions simultaneously restricted access to foreign technology while encouraging the development of domestic technological capabilities.

The resulting industrial knowledge extends beyond individual companies, because engineers, technicians, procurement specialists and managers have accumulated practical experience with restricted supply chains over successive decades.

A manufacturer that has operated under sanctions for years does not design its procurement system around the assumption that every international supplier will remain available indefinitely.

It develops alternatives as part of ordinary business planning, creating a commercial culture in which substitution, regional sourcing and domestic production are integrated into industrial decision-making.

This is one of the strongest reasons the prediction of sudden economic emptiness looks disconnected from Iran’s actual economic structure.

There is no single foreign supplier whose disappearance can remove Iran’s entire industrial capacity, because Iranian production is distributed across thousands of domestic enterprises and numerous regional supply relationships.

The system has been shaped by scarcity for so long that adaptation has become embedded within the operating methods of Iranian companies themselves.

Iran’s geographical position provides another form of economic strength that cannot be erased by financial sanctions, because the country physically connects several of the world’s most important commercial regions.

Iran borders Turkey, Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, while its southern coastline provides direct access to the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.

Those borders connect Iranian commerce with the Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, Turkey and Iraq, creating commercial possibilities extending in several directions simultaneously.

This geography gives Iran direct access to neighboring markets while also placing the country along important transportation corridors linking Russia, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.

The significance of Zamanian’s argument is therefore practical rather than rhetorical, because no financial authority can relocate Iran away from its geographic position.

Goods can move through different borders, suppliers can be found in different countries and exporters can redirect shipments towards different markets when commercial conditions change.

Iran has consequently developed a regional trading system that does not depend upon one border, one port, one customer or one foreign economic relationship.

Its trade with Iraq, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Caucasus, Central Asia and China represents an extensive commercial geography developed through years of interaction.

The World Bank has documented precisely this shift, noting that Iranian trade has increasingly pivoted towards neighboring countries and China as sanctions have restricted conventional international economic relationships.

That transformation is now an established feature of Iran’s economy rather than an emergency measure invented after the latest American escalation.

China gives Iran’s economic system another dimension because it combines enormous industrial capacity with sustained demand for Iranian energy and other commodities.

In other words, Iran possesses access to a major global market even while facing comprehensive American restrictions on its oil industry.

China also supplies Iranian companies with machinery, manufactured products, electronics, industrial equipment and intermediate goods required across the domestic production system.

The relationship therefore operates in both directions, with Iran supplying commodities and China supplying industrial goods, creating a commercial relationship considerably broader than the simple sale of sanctioned oil.

Iran consequently does not need unrestricted access to every Western market when it possesses substantial trade relationships with China and numerous neighboring economies.

Iran’s energy resources provide perhaps the clearest demonstration of the country’s underlying economic strength.

It ranks second globally in proven natural-gas reserves and fourth in proven crude-oil reserves, giving the country extraordinary resource depth beneath its existing industrial economy.

These resources provide not merely potential export earnings but also abundant domestic energy and petrochemical feedstocks supporting Iran’s manufacturing, electricity generation, transportation and industrial production.

Iran has consequently developed an extensive downstream economy that converts hydrocarbons into refined products, petrochemicals and industrial inputs rather than relying exclusively upon crude-oil exports.

The World Bank has specifically noted that sanctions encouraged additional processing of crude oil and hydrocarbons into petrochemicals, illustrating how restrictions have contributed to changes within Iran’s economic structure.

The country’s resource base also gives it a durable position in Asian energy markets, where large industrial economies require reliable supplies of oil and petrochemical products.

That is why American attempts to eliminate Iranian oil revenue confront persistent commercial demand rather than an absence of buyers interested in Iranian resources.

The financial system represents another area where Iran has developed substantial independent capacity after decades of exclusion from conventional Western banking.

Iran’s economic ties span a broad network of foreign entities, reflecting its commercial reach across banking, shipping, logistics, commodities, and manufacturing.

Against this background, Bessent’s latest prediction appears less to be an independent economic forecast than an expectation based on what the American campaign is intended to achieve.

His claim that Iran will have nothing left to trade within two weeks assumes that removing one major source of oil revenue effectively removes the economic foundations supporting the entire Iranian system.

Iran’s actual economic structure is considerably broader, because oil exports represent one component of national economic activity alongside manufacturing, agriculture, services, domestic consumption and regional commerce.

The World Bank estimates that Iran’s economy contracted during the Iranian year ending March 2026, while simultaneously describing an economy that has adapted to sanctions through changing trade patterns and alternative payment mechanisms.

Those facts should not be confused with economic collapse, because contraction in a particular period is fundamentally different from the disappearance of productive capacity, markets and commercial institutions.

The historical record is even more significant, because American sanctions have been imposed repeatedly since 1979 and have been intensified dramatically during successive administrations.

The sanctions regime has targeted Iranian banking, oil exports, investment, technology, shipping and foreign companies, with especially severe measures introduced during the 2010s and after Washington abandoned the nuclear agreement.

Iran nevertheless retained its industrial base, rebuilt oil exports after earlier restrictions, expanded non-oil exports and redirected a growing share of trade towards neighboring countries and China.

The American expectation that economic pressure would eventually produce decisive Iranian economic capitulation has therefore been tested repeatedly against an economy that continued adapting.

Predicting that a strategy that failed to trigger economic collapse over half a century will suddenly achieve it within fourteen days merits no serious consideration, because it reveals the naivety of its proponents.

Washington now possesses powerful financial tools, but financial power does not eliminate Iran’s factories, oilfields, farms, engineers, consumers, borders, ports, regional markets or established commercial relationships.

Iran enters the current phase with an economic architecture extending from domestic manufacturing plants to Chinese refineries, from Persian Gulf shipping networks to northern Eurasian trade corridors.

Its domestic market provides magnitude and size, its industrial base provides production, its energy reserves provide commodities and its geography provides access to several major commercial regions.

In other words, Iran already possesses the domestic capabilities and international relationships required to keep its economy operating beyond the reach of any single American economic sabotage.

introduction by Gospa News Editorial Staff

9/11 & 10/7 AWFUL FALSE-FLAG Intel Plots

VERSIONE IN ITALIANO

Originally posted on October, 7, 2026 – updated on October, 8, 2026

As the tragic anniversary of October 7, 2023, approaches —the day Hamas terrorists massacred Israelis near the Gaza Strip border, triggering the genocide in Palestine perpetrated by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Zionist regime —we are publishing an exclusive intelligence analysis.

This video marks the launch of a new Gospa News series titled “TOP SECRET Interview” by Fabio G.C. Carisio—founder and director of Gospa News—which will also be republished on the long-standing American site VT UnCensored Foreign Policy (where Carisio hosts a column).

This features an interview with Antonio Evangelista, a top Italian police official and counter-terrorism expert who spent seven years as Interpol official in Jordan, and who is now an author of geopolitical essayes and novels concerning international intrigue.

He confirms that the recent attack in the Holy Land—like the September 11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York—was a horrific “false flag” operations…

A “false flag” operation is one carefully premeditated over a long period by a foreign intelligence entity to implicate an enemy nation and discredit it in the eyes of global public opinion. It is planned down to the finest detail, carrying the risk of causing actual casualties.

In fact, if unforeseen “collateral damage”—such as unexpected deaths beyond the planned injuries or killings—occurs during the operation, the orchestrators are even more pleased, as the resulting bloodshed lends greater credibility to the terrorist attack.

Historically, the CIA (US counter-intelligence) and Mossad (Israeli counter-intelligence) have been recognized masters of such plots, occasionally utilizing partners such as the secret services of other nations or terrorist groups.

QUESTIONS ON WESTERN INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM by the Director of GOSPA NEWS

In the video, the former Interpol official answers the following questions by Gospa News director Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio:

1. Are the recent alleged terrorist incidents involving the FlyDubai flight and the British RAF airbase at Fairford “false flag” operations?
2. What parallels exist between the plots of September 11 in New York and October 7, 2023, in Israel?
3. What has been the historical strategy of Western intelligence agencies regarding terrorist actions by Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hamas?
4. What drives Western governments to support bloody “colonial ventures,” thereby legitimizing genocides in the Middle East and Ukraine?
5. What lies regarding NATO wars in the Mediterranean basin are exposed in your historical, geopolitical, and economic study?
6. Do US, Europe and Italy face a real risk of a world war?

No summary today. If you want to hear the answers, watch the video to the end.

Below the video, you will find links to the major investigations mentioned in the footage.

VIDEO INTERVIEW to ANTONIO EVANGELISTA – Former Interpol official in Jordan

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The American withdrawal from Iraq is not an end but a strategic pivot, a calculated transition from direct occupation to remote containment. By pressuring Iraq to disarm its resistance groups, Washington aims to neutralize Iran’s forward defense line and clear the battlefield for a potential full-scale confrontation with Tehran. This gambit risks either delivering Iraq […]

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