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On the recall of the Republic of Korea’s ambassador from Ukraine

Park Ki-chang, South Korea’s ambassador to Ukraine, has returned to Seoul after being recalled in protest at Kyiv’s disclosure of information regarding the handover of North Korean prisoners of war to the South Korean side. Shortly before this, Song Yeon-gil, known for his reputation as a Russophile, was appointed as an adviser to the president. […]
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Zelensky’s Korean Blunder: Seoul Is Running Out of Patience

Volodymyr Zelensky probably did not expect two North Korean prisoners of war to create a diplomatic crisis with South Korea. That is nevertheless what happened. During his September address to the United Nations General Assembly, Zelensky disclosed that two North Korean soldiers captured while fighting alongside Russian forces had been transferred to South Korea. Seoul […]
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First Look At Hypersonic Boost-Glide Vehicle Just Tested By South Korea

The South Korean government has released images from its first successful test of a domestically developed hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. This includes shots of the vehicle impacting the water at the end of its flight. A weapon of this kind would give South Korea a significant new way to hold targets in North Korea at risk amid an ever-deepening arms race on the Peninsula.

South Korea’s Presidential Office, more commonly referred to as the Cheong Wa Dae or the Blue House, announced the test in a Korean-language press release yesterday. The Blue House initially released a video of President Lee Jae Myung and others observing the test from a conference room at the Anheung Proving Ground, which is located in South Chungcheong Province on the country’s western coast. South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD) manages testing at Anheung. A series of still images from the test itself was subsequently posted on the Blue House’s website.

A trio of pictures showing South Korea’s new hypersonic boost-glide vehicle impacting the water during the test yesterday. The Blue House
Another view of the impact at the end of yesterday’s South Korea hypersonic test as seen through what looks to be an electro-optical video camera on an aircraft. The Blue House

Included in the still image gallery are shots showing the launch of the missile, a formal name for which has not yet been disclosed, from a wheeled transport-erector-launcher on a platform sitting just off the coast. The low resolution of the pictures makes it hard to tell whether the missile and/or the TEL are of an existing South Korean design or are based on one. We will come back to this later on.

A picture showing the launch of the hypersonic weapon from the platform off the coast. The Blue House
Another picture from the test showing the missile after launch. The Blue House

As mentioned, there are also pictures of the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle hitting the water. At first glance, the vehicle looks to have a broadly conical design with stabilizing fins at the base. However, at least one of the fins looks to be truncated. Closer inspection of the available images shows further indicators that might point to it actually having a more wedge-shaped design with a distinct top and bottom, though it is still not definitely clear given the low resolution. Conical boost-glide vehicles are generally understood to be easier to design, relatively speaking, than wedge-shaped ones. Historically, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles of any kind have proven to be technically complex and challenging to turn into viable operational weapons, even by countries with extensive past experience with their development.

Another close-up look at the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle test yesterday, showing what looks to be a truncated fin on one side. The Blue House

“This test launch was conducted to verify, for the first time, the vehicle’s core technologies in a hypersonic flight environment: the performance of ultra-high-temperature heat-resistant materials, guidance and control capabilities, and the ability to perform irregular flight maneuvers at low altitudes,” the Blue House said in its release yesterday, per a machine translation of the Korean text. “The HGV [hypersonic boost-glide vehicle] successfully separated after ascending to the target altitude and executed its planned flight path within the hypersonic environment without any issues.”

With all this in mind, the fact that the vehicle just remained intact through to impact is noteworthy. At the time of writing, South Korean authorities do not appear to have disclosed more specific details about the test, including how far the boost-glide vehicle traveled before hitting the water or what peak speed it reached. Important questions also remain about how the vehicle is guided during the mid-course and terminal phases of flight, challenges that do not appear to have been addressed by this particular test.

In general, unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicles need to be brought first to an optimal altitude and speed. This is typically achieved using a sufficiently sized rocket booster, with existing ballistic missile designs often serving as a starting point.

Once released from the booster, a boost-glide vehicle flies along a relatively shallow flight path within the Earth’s atmosphere. The vehicle is able to maneuver along the way, sometimes erratically, while traveling at hypersonic speeds, generally defined as anything about Mach 5.

A graphic showing, in a very rudimentary way, the differences in trajectories between a traditional ballistic missile, a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, an aero or quasi-ballistic missile, and an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile. GAO

All of this sets hypersonic weapons of this kind apart from traditional ballistic missiles, even ones with advanced maneuverability capabilities, which all follow a broadly arcing trajectory to their targets. The combination of speed, flight trajectory, and maneuverability offered by hypersonic boost-glide vehicles creates distinct challenges for opponents. They are hard to spot and track, let alone attempt to intercept, and there is less time for defenders to react overall. This ability to penetrate enemy air defenses and cover ground rapidly makes these weapons particularly attractive for strikes on very high-value and time-sensitive targets.

“The HGV [hypersonic boost-glide vehicle] is a ‘key strategic asset capable of changing the game on the battlefield,’ as its unpredictable flight trajectory and overwhelming speed allow it to launch surprise strikes against key strategic targets during contingencies,” the Blue House’s release explicitly noted, again according to a machine translation.

With all this in mind, South Korea does have an entire family of domestically-produced ground-launched ballistic missiles that could be suitable starting places for launching an unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. President Lee was notably shown a TEL for the country’s newest Hyunmoo-5 ballistic missile at Anheung yesterday, though no explicit connection has been drawn between that weapon and the hypersonic test. The Hyunmoo-5 is itself still a relatively new development, having only entered service around the end of last year.

President Lee Jae Myung and others inspect a Hyunmoo-5 TEL on October 8, 2026. The Blue House

When it comes to new South Korean arms developments, the Hyunmoo-5, which entered service around the end of last year, has been and continues to be a major point of discussion by itself. It is officially categorized as a short-range design, despite how big it is (35 tons gross weight), which is said to be due largely to the equally substantial size of its warhead (17,000 pounds). Past reports have raised the possibility that it could be capable of flying out to intermediate ranges if the warhead weight were reduced. Short-range ballistic missiles are defined as ones with ranges between 190 and 620 miles (300 and 1,000 kilometers), while intermediate-range ballistic missiles can hit targets out to between 1,864 and 3,418 miles (3,000 to 5,500 kilometers). Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) fall in between these two categories.

A Hyunmoo-5 transporter-erector-launcher seen during a parade in 2024. Kim Jae-Hwan/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images

With its massive unitary warhead, the Hyunmoo-5 already gives South Korea an important new way to hold deeply buried and otherwise hardened targets in North Korea at risk. This fits in directly with the country’s broader Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) policy, as TWZ has previously written:

“While the Hyunmoo-5 has been widely reported as a future pillar of the KMPR, its specific ability to penetrate deeply buried bunkers, such as those used by the North Korean leadership, the same functions mean that it can also fulfill elements of the ‘kill chain.’ In this way, it could be used as part of a pre-emptive strike, to try and knock out North Korea’s launch capability by targeting its hardened command-and-control facilities and missile storage areas.”

By virtue of the very high speeds they reach in the terminal phase of flight, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles also offer bunker-busting benefits on top of the other aforementioned advantages they bring to the table.

In addition, the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle test reflects a broader arms race that has been expanding in scale and scope for years now. South Korea is also developing an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile, seen in the composite image below, as well as new air- and sea-launched ballistic missiles, the latter of which will be loaded on new surface warships and submarines.

via X

Though there are always questions about the actual maturity and viability of the designs, North Korea continues to churn out its own new missile developments. This includes two separate test launches of purported new hypersonic designs just in recent weeks. Tit-for-tat missile launches are not entirely uncommon on the peninsula, but there are limits to how quickly a test like the one South Korea conducted yesterday involving an emerging technology can reasonably be staged.

A picture of one of two new purported hypersonic missiles North Korea says it has tested in the past few weeks. North Korean State Media

Friction between the North and South has been at a particular high point, in general, following an incident on September 21, in which three South Korean troops were injured along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as well as the United Nations Command (UNC) on the Peninsula, have said a North Korean landmine placed in violation of the Armistice Agreement was to blame. South Korean authorities have demanded an apology and raised the prospect of some form of action in response, though President Lee has more recently sought to downplay the situation. The government in North Korea has denied the accusations and threatened an “immediate and powerful counteraction” should South Korea seek to retaliate.

An operational hypersonic boost-glide vehicle capability would also expand South Korea’s capacity to challenge opponents regionally beyond North Korea. Though the regime in Pyongyang represents the most proximate national security threat to the country, China and Russia have also been growing points of concern for South Korean authorities in recent years.

“We must secure our national security through our own strength,” President Lee said after yesterday’s hypersonic test, per the Blue House’s release. “The government must not rest on today’s success but must further advance the technology so that the hypersonic glide vehicle can establish itself as a robust strategic asset safeguarding our future security.”

South Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung, at center, and others applaud after yesterday’s test. The Blue House

South Korea’s very public test of its new hypersonic boost-glide vehicle underscores the country’s still-expanding efforts to broaden its options for striking even the best-defended targets in North Korea, as well as projecting power elsewhere regionally. At the same time, it remains to be seen when the South Koreans may field a real operational capability in this regard.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post First Look At Hypersonic Boost-Glide Vehicle Just Tested By South Korea appeared first on TWZ.

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From Seoul to Manila: How the Evolving GSOMIA Architecture Could Make the Western Pacific Less Secure

What makes the recent military-strategic developments orchestrated primarily by Japan, South Korea, Philippines and United States more dangerous than ever? And how can their impact on the Western Pacific be evaluated? The Western Pacific is quickly becoming as busy with security arrangements as it is with warships, missiles, and military exercises. Japan’s recent efforts to […]
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Sanctioned 22-Year-Old Tanker Makes Rare Late-Season Arctic Voyage

A 22-year-old product tanker sanctioned by the European Union is making an unusual late-season voyage along Russia's Northern Sea Route, highlighting the growing use of older, lower-specification vessels to move petroleum products through the Arctic.
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Scandal Erupts Between Kiev and Seoul: The Price of a “Free” Choice

Behind the cacophony of the diplomatic rift between South Korea and Ukraine hides a fundamental question: what is the price Seoul has had to pay for access to North Korean prisoners of war and how will this affect regional security? Essence of the Conflict In January 2025, in Kursk Oblast, Ukrainian forces captured two North […]
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How geopolitical tensions tainted the 2026 Asian Games

The 2026 Asian Games in Japan drew to a close on October 4 following two weeks of competition between 45 countries and territories across 43 sports. Despite the official slogan “Imagine One Asia,” fragmented regional politics came to the fore as the event unfolded. Just days before the games officially began, tensions between Japan and […]

The post How geopolitical tensions tainted the 2026 Asian Games appeared first on Asia Times.

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Logistics test: sustaining Northeast Asia trilateral deterrence

Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. While operational planners in the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan have made historic strides institutionalizing trilateral security cooperation, the credibility of deterrence ultimately hinges on a more punishing variable: wartime sustainment. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo have expanded joint exercises, real-time missile […]

The post Logistics test: sustaining Northeast Asia trilateral deterrence appeared first on Asia Times.

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When Will Vietnamese Victims of South Korean Violence Get Justice?

The crimes of South Korean military personnel in Vietnam are well known to researchers, but they still remain unpunished. An attempt to achieve justice during the rule of the “democratic” President Moon Jae-in effectively led nowhere, but a new initiative under Lee Jae Myung may change the situation. Let’s Recall the Facts The author has […]
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To keep the peace, South Korea’s Lee must prepare for war

When a South Korean soldier stepped on a land mine in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on September 21, it might have been taken as a grim reminder of a war that never formally ended. Instead, the explosion has revealed something more unsettling: the Korean Peninsula’s old security order is shifting, even as Seoul tries to […]

The post To keep the peace, South Korea’s Lee must prepare for war appeared first on Asia Times.

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A Historic Event: Russia and the DPRK Open the First Automobile Bridge Across the Tumen River

On September 7, 2026, a landmark event in the history of bilateral relations between Russia and the DPRK took place: the first automobile bridge across the border Tumen River was opened, linking the Russian settlement of Khasan with the North Korean city of Rason. Opening Ceremony The implementation of this project the necessity of which […]
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The Russia-North Korea Strategic Axis: Building a New Eurasian Security Partnership

The Russia-North Korea strategic partnership is reshaping Northeast Asian security through growing political, military and economic cooperation, while also highlighting Russia’s expanding strategic role and the emergence of a more multipolar Eurasian security environment. 7th September 2026 marked the opening of the first dedicated road bridge between Russia and North Korea across the Tumen River. […]
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North Korea Tests New Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Missile

North Korea has released imagery of what appears to be a flight test of an updated version of its Hwasong-11Ma hypersonic missile, nearly a year after the weapon first appeared publicly at a military technology exhibition in Pyongyang.

Launch of a Hwasong-11Ma-1 missile from the test facility in Anbyon County, south of Wonsan. North Korean State Media

The September 20 test involved a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) booster fitted with a hypersonic glide vehicle, according to photographs released by North Korean state media. A display screen visible in the imagery identifies the weapon as the Hwasongpho-11Ma-1, or Hwasong-11E-1 in the equivalent English-language designation.

The test was conducted from the east coast near Anbyon County, south of Wonsan, an area North Korea has repeatedly used for missile testing. The launch site allows missiles to be fired eastward over the Sea of Japan, providing a relatively controlled area for testing short- and medium-range systems.

Another two views of the launch of the Hwasong-11Ma-1 missile. North Korean State Media

South Korean and Japanese authorities say they detected two launches on September 20, with the first occurring at approximately 3:00 p.m. local time and the second several hours later.

North Korean photographs show the missile being launched from a coastal location, with Kim Jong Un and senior missile officials observing the test. Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, also appears in the imagery.

Kim Jong Un and Kim Ju Ae monitor the progress of the Hwasong-11Ma-1 test. North Korean State Media

North Korea displayed a mock-up of what it called the Hwasong-11Ma at its Defense Development-2025 exhibition in October 2025. The design uses the basic architecture of the Hwasong-11 family, known in the West as the KN-23 family, but substitutes a distinctive glide wedge-shaped vehicle for the conventional warhead arrangement.

The Hwasong-11Ma, among other weapons, on display at the weapons exhibition in Pyongyang in October 202. North Korean State Media

North Korea claimed another hypersonic missile test that same month, but did not release launch imagery clearly connecting that test to the Hwasong-11Ma. The missile was subsequently shown again during a military parade in Pyongyang.

Hwasong-11Ma missiles on five-axle TELs at last October’s military parade in Pyongyang. North Korean State Media

The latest “-1” designation suggests an iterative evolution of the Hwasong-11Ma, although Pyongyang has not explained what modifications it represents.

Based on the imagery, the new configuration also includes a modified launcher, with the missile carried on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). When the Hwasong-11Ma was first shown, it was mounted on a five-axle TEL. The latest vehicle also appears to incorporate modified retractable covers around the missile.

It remains unclear whether the new TEL represents a standardized operational vehicle or a test configuration.

Preliminary illustration of the new launch vehicle for North Korea's hypersonic missiles. pic.twitter.com/dZ31LA1cbn

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

As with previous North Korean weapons announcements, the country’s state media claims need to be treated very cautiously. Pyongyang has a long record of publicizing weapons systems and test results that cannot be independently verified, while some of its purported hypersonic tests have left outside analysts unable to determine whether the advertised maneuvering performance was actually demonstrated.

Perhaps the most revealing test-related imagery comes from a display screen photographed at the launch site.

Kim Jong Un and his daughter can be seen watching the screen, which shows the apparent flight trajectory of the Hwasong-11Ma-1. The displayed path initially follows a ballistic trajectory before descending and then performing a pull-up maneuver, regaining altitude before continuing toward the target area.

That type of trajectory is consistent with the basic concept behind a hypersonic glide vehicle. The booster provides the initial velocity and altitude, after which the unpowered glide body follows a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, while maneuvering rather than following a simple ballistic path.

The graphic is useful for understanding what Pyongyang says the weapon is designed to do, but it does not independently demonstrate that the missile actually followed the depicted trajectory.

The flight data visible on the display provides some unusually specific figures.

Enhancing the original image released by North Korea allows for an excellent view of the HS-11Ma hypersonic glide missile trajectory, providing altitude and speed data. Note: Slight inaccuracies in the numbers may occur due to the use of AI tools. pic.twitter.com/M4LkfF5VYu

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

According to the North Korean imagery, the missile traveled 908.2 kilometers (564.3 miles), reached an altitude of 35.8 kilometers (22.2 miles), and remained in flight for approximately 445 seconds, or 7.4 minutes.

The display gives a velocity of 2,146 meters per second, equivalent to roughly 4,800 mph. That is hypersonic velocity in the aerodynamic sense, but speed alone is not what makes a hypersonic glide weapon particularly challenging to defend against. More consequential parameters include sustained controlled flight, maneuverability, guidance, and accuracy.

Other portions of the display appear to show additional points along the flight, including different times, altitudes, and speeds. None of these figures have been independently verified.

The TEL raises one of its two Hwasong-11Ma-1 missiles into the launch position. North Korean State Media

The claimed range is particularly noteworthy because it does not match the publicly reported tracking data from South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea launched two SRBMs from the Wonsan area on September 20. The missiles were assessed to have traveled approximately 450 and 600 kilometers, respectively.

Japan similarly reported two launches, assessing the first at approximately 440 kilometers and the second at approximately 590 kilometers, with maximum altitudes of roughly 60 and 70 kilometers.

Those figures are substantially different from the 908.2-kilometer distance shown on North Korea’s display.

The Hwasong-11Ma-1 climbs after launch. North Korean State Media

The discrepancy does not necessarily establish that either side’s data are incorrect. The North Korean figure could represent a different measurement of the flight path, or could correspond to a portion of the test that was not reflected in the public South Korean and Japanese assessments. It is also possible, if not highly probable, that Pyongyang selectively presented or altered the data.

South Korean analysts have already raised questions about the unusually long distance displayed by North Korea. Yonhap reported that experts suggested Pyongyang may have altered the figure to portray the test as more successful.

Regardless of the range actually achieved in this test, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 is significant because it represents an attempt to combine a relatively compact SRBM with a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.

The underlying Hwasong-11 family is a well-established North Korean missile design. In its KN-23 configuration, members of the family have also been used by Russia against Ukraine. By placing a glide vehicle on this type of booster, Pyongyang could potentially give a regional strike weapon a flight profile substantially different from that of a conventional ballistic missile. The Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 also uses a solid-fuel booster, allowing for faster launches than earlier liquid-fuel designs.

The original North Korean Hwasong-11 short-range ballistic missile. North Korean State Media

In principle, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 could give North Korea an additional hypersonic strike option against more heavily defended targets in South Korea. Having road-mobile TELs would also provide greater operational flexibility despite their relatively limited range, while making it more difficult for adversaries to locate and track the launchers.

A genuine boost-glide weapon creates significant challenges for defending forces since the sheer speed of the weapon bypasses most air defenses. Its trajectory can also become less predictable after the boost phase. Maneuvering at lower altitudes could also reduce the time available to detect, track, and engage the weapon.

A close-up look at the Hwasong-11Ma’s boost-glide-vehicle. North Korean State Media

However, the available imagery does not establish the extent of the vehicle’s maneuverability, its ability to maintain controlled flight, its accuracy, or the reliability of the complete missile system.

North Korea has made similar claims about its hypersonic weapons in the past.

Pyongyang says it has flight-tested multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicle designs since at least 2021, but there continue to be questions about what degree of actual capability the country has achieved in this regard. Viable wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles have historically been extremely difficult to design and then bring to an operational state.

The challenge is not simply reaching hypersonic speed. A weapon has to sustain controlled flight and maneuverability under extreme thermal loads, while also overcoming demanding materials-science, guidance, and navigation requirements. The terminal phase is harder still. Accurately finding and striking a moving target, particularly a ship, requires a highly capable seeker and guidance system. Integrating a nuclear warhead introduces another layer of engineering and weapons-design challenges.

Those demands have made hypersonic weapons a major technological challenge for the United States and other major powers. China is currently widely regarded as the leading country in deploying and developing operational hypersonic systems, although important questions remain about the capabilities and maturity of individual weapons.

Pyongyang said it first flight-tested a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle in 2021 aboard the liquid-fuel Hwasong-8, before pairing a similar-looking vehicle with the solid-fueled Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2024.

VIDEO: Korean Central Television (KCTV) broadcasted footage of North Korea successfully testing the new "Hwasong-16B" hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Tuesday. pic.twitter.com/VNdhLAeyyK

— NK NEWS (@nknewsorg) April 3, 2024

In its coverage of the latest test, North Korean state media initially avoided identifying the weapon, describing the event as a successful trial of a “new-type weapon” that it said was significant for the rapid development of weapons technology.

Kim said the development would give adversaries an “incurable headache” and deliver what he described as a “cruel and unavoidable blow.”

Tal Inbar, the head of the Space and UAV Research Center at Israel’s Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies identifies the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 as a “very significant weapon, bringing hypersonics to the operational/tactical arena and [posing] a challenge to … air and missile defense systems.”

Whatever the exact achievements of the test, the imagery points to continued development of a weapon North Korea first publicly displayed nearly a year ago. The appearance of a new, six-axle TEL, a potentially modified missile, combined with the apparent flight test, suggests that the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 program has progressed since its initial public unveiling.

What remains uncertain is how much of that progress represents a genuine improvement in operational capability.

The latest test therefore provides another indication of the resources and attention Pyongyang is devoting to hypersonic weapons, but the available evidence is still insufficient to determine how closely the Hwasong-11Ma-1’s actual performance matches the capabilities depicted by North Korean state media.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post North Korea Tests New Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Missile appeared first on TWZ.

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What Is Really Behind the Cancellation of the Freedom Shield Exercise?

The reduction in the scale of US-South Korean military exercises is not a gesture of goodwill toward the DPRK, but rather an instrument of Donald Trump’s political pressure on Seoul aimed at forcing it to support US foreign policy in the Middle East and to block South Korea’s ambitions to gain operational control over its […]
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South Korea shouldn’t abet Trump in Hormuz

The Lee Administration leaked the possibility of deploying Korean forces to the Strait of Hormuz on September 3. The backlash was immediate from Korean civil society that opposes any type of support for Trump’s war of aggression. Furthermore, recent polls reveal that even 55% of Lee’s supporters oppose the dispatching of forces. And while the Lee administration has publicly backtracked, stating that nothing has been decided, it is, nonetheless, quietly undergoing the process of deployment: more than simply an assessment of the security conditions on the Strait of Hormuz, the Lee administration sent a team to check key military bases and ports that could be used at the United Arab Emirates.

Despite growing public opposition, the Lee administration is expected to introduce at the end of September a motion into the National Assembly, where it is likely to pass given his party’s considerable majority. Unlike his predecessor, the impeached Yoon Suk-yeol, President Lee is not a pro-US ideologue; he is a pragmatist. Why then is Lee going out on a limb with this deployment when the rest of the world is staying out of it?

Well, South Korea’s history has always been entangled and shaped by US foreign policy. The darker side to South Korea’s pop-culture is a country dominated and shaped through US policy and interventions. Today, it hosts the largest overseas US military base and controls the Korean military (through wartime operational control). In effect, it’s never been a sovereign state. Its economic, political, and military interests have always been beholden to the United States. 

Today, Lee is horsetrading with Trump: military support in exchange for more favorable terms in the US’s AI global supply chain of semiconductors and data centers along with a return of wartime operational control. While Lee’s pragmatism is navigating the real structural constraints on South Korea, it is ultimately short-sighted and harmful to Koreans and the world.

The war in Iran is inflicting considerable pain to the world’s economies, including South Korea that imports 61% of its crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, even from a completely pragmatic perspective, sending Korean forces to the Hormuz does nothing to resolve this problem. In fact, getting entangled with US aggression against Iran would strain the 64-year diplomatic relations with Iran while putting a target on South Korean assets in the region. Furthermore, if the world’s greatest naval and air power cannot secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, how could South Korea’s contribution make a difference? In fact, the deployment of Korean troops prolongs this war of aggression by giving Trump cover and leverage to demand that other countries, such as Japan, also deploy forces.

This isn’t the first time that South Korea would deploy forces due to US requests. In 2004, after pressure from the George W. Bush Administration, the Roh Moo-hyun administration deployed non-combat support troops to Iraq. In response, a militant Islamic group kidnapped a Korean translator and, when the Roh administration refused to cancel further and withdraw current deployment, beheaded the translator.

Most importantly, this war of aggression is not only illegal under international standards, but deployment also violates article five of the Korean constitution that mandates the government to “maintain international peace” and “renounce all aggressive war.” Thus, whether intervening in the frontlines, or in the rear, whether combatant or non-combatant, any deployment would be complicit in Trump’s war of aggression.

Ultimately, as Hamid Shahrabi, an Iranian activist and co-founder of the Global Resistance for Peace & Justice states, securing free passage through the Strait of Hormuz can be achieved but not through military pressure and destruction but by adhering to the “Islamabad MOU, which outlined measures to ensure free passage through the Strait.”

Being dominated by the US brings out the pragmatic among South Koreans. Yet, the world demands that we fight and that we hold the line against Trump. Deploying forces will prolong Trump’s illegal war of aggression. Fortunately, if Koreans can be pragmatic, they can also be fierce fighters against US imperialism when provoked. Instead of fanning the flames of war, we should fight to extinguish Trump’s forever wars.

Dae-Han Song is a part of the International Strategy Centerand the No Cold War collective and is an associate at the Korea Policy Institute.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

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South Korea’s Hormuz Dilemma: A Test of Strategic Decision-Making

South Korea faces a difficult choice over whether and how to support maritime security efforts in the Strait of Hormuz. With pressure from the United States, risks from Iran, and the continuing threat from North Korea, Seoul must balance alliance commitments with its own security priorities. The Hormuz crisis has placed South Korea in a […]
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In Tribute to the Koreans Killed After the Great Kantō Earthquake

On September 1, 2026, Tokyo’s Yokoamichō Park hosted a memorial ceremony to commemorate the Koreans who succumbed to the “Kantō Massacre” that followed the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923. The organizers of the ceremony called on the Japanese authorities to establish a full picture of what happened and to prevent a recurrence of such events. […]
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