Last Saturday, the Irish presidency of the EU proposed cutting nearly €160bn from the EU’s next seven-year budget against the European Commission’s proposal, a bid to bring the wealthiest, frugal member states on board. The deepest cuts fall on competitiveness (€75bn), external action (almost €38bn) and the EU’s administration costs (€10bn).

What the plan leaves alone is the borrowing.

The Irish text, known in Brussels as the negobox, keeps all three of the commission’s borrowing programmes that sit outside the budget’s normal limits: Catalyst Europe, a €150bn lending facility; a crisis mechanism of up to €395bn for major unforeseen shocks; and support for Ukraine of up to €100bn.

Add loans for defence and lending to other non-EU countries and, by our estimates, joint borrowing could still equal around 44 per cent of the new budget, about €800bn at current prices, up from 41 per cent under the Commission’s proposal. The budget shrinks, but the borrowing hardly changes. 

Ireland’s proposed budget is too small for Europe’s mounting common challenges, and its borrowing approach is too ad hoc and risky. 

Excluding the distorting effects of NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the Covid recovery fund, the Commission’s budget proposal is already far smaller than the headline figures suggest, and Ireland’s proposal would make it smaller still.

That matters because, as the Draghi report argued, Europe’s shared challenges such as Ukraine, rearmament and competitiveness require European public goods because no single member state captures their full benefits.

A budget worth just over one percent of the EU’s gross national income (GNI) is a poor match for that responsibility.

By comparison, total government expenditure across EU countries comes to close to half of their combined GNI. Keeping most fiscal capacity at national level, while expecting such a modest EU budget to finance increasingly vital continental priorities, is a bad use of public resources. 

A stronger common budget needs more of its own revenue, at least what the Commission proposes in its Own Resources Decision, which Parliament broadly supports and which would raise nearly €60bn extra a year.

The Irish plan’s acceptance of five new resources is encouraging. But it has to survive the negotiations, and the details of the final reform will decide whether it means anything.

The Council’s approach to common borrowing remains haphazard, lacking a permanent framework and relying on crisis-driven compromises. Governments may not like it, but a more European approach is coming, and the €800bn is likely to grow.

Support for Kyiv, to be provided outside budget ceilings via the Ukraine Reserve and policy loans, is capped at €100bn for the whole period. This is already looking tight given the accelerating rate of disbursements to Ukraine seen in recent years.

And a successor to SAFE, the EU’s defence loan scheme, is widely expected, since €150bn has proved far from enough for Europe’s rearmament.

France has just shown what it costs to borrow alone. Its yields recently hit a 24-year high, and the state now pays more to borrow than some major French companies. Sharing the effort through the common budget, including prudent joint borrowing, would help spread that risk.

Yet Europe has no clear, sustainable plan for borrowing. To date, EU governments have reluctantly signed up to each new borrowing instrument and called it an exception.

European borrowing capacity has been assembled one crisis at a time, starting with the euro area crisis and accelerating since the pandemic.

NGEU was accepted by fiscally cautious states as a one-off decision to deal with the Covid-19 emergency. Then the war in Ukraine and the need to fund rearmament produced new exceptions.

This year, EU governments used enhanced cooperation, a procedure that lets a subset of member states go ahead without the rest, to approve the €90bn Ukraine Support Loan, the EU’s largest foreign loan ever.

For defence, they reached for Article 122, the treaties’ emergency clause, to set up SAFE. Parliament, which felt sidelined, decided to sue the Council before the European Court of Justice.

There is a catch though.

These exceptional programmes are guaranteed by the so-called budget headroom, the margin between the EU’s revenue ceiling and the spending limits in the seven-year budget, rather than by money set aside in advance.

In barely five years, headroom-backed exposure has climbed to €681bn (see Figure 1), 82 percent of all EU debt.

The European Court of Auditors has warned that if a Ukraine loan guaranteed this way goes bad, future EU budgets, and the national contributions that fund them, would have to cover the loss.

Frugals vs Friends of Cohesion

EU capitals remain divided over the new budget and over joint borrowing. Net contributors, sometimes referred to as the Frugal Six, want deep cuts in the commission’s proposal, argue that new common borrowing is not the solution and have misgivings about the creation of new own resources.

By contrast, a group of sixteen southern and eastern countries, that call themselves the “Friends of Cohesion”, are much more open to joint borrowing and back an approach closer to the Commission and Parliament on the budget and own resources.

Ireland’s plan largely reflects the influence of the frugal countries, yet one diplomat has already dismissed it as “not even close to a landing zone.”

Europe needs an ambitious budget, backed by at least the Commission’s proposed new own resources, so it relies less on national contributions based on GNI. Joint borrowing should become a permanent, predictable part of it, with safeguards.

First, it should fund loans, not grants, as the Commission suggests. Second, riskier exposures, especially to non-EU countries, should be at least partly backed by money set aside in advance, as the Court of Auditors recommends.

Where it makes sense, the headroom guarantee could be topped up with national guarantees in proportion to each country’s size, as under SURE, and like-minded partners outside the EU could sometimes take part.

Stronger capital at institutions such as the EIB, or at any future defence-financing vehicle, would also let Europe borrow more together without putting its creditworthiness at risk.

Governments should also consider deferring repayment of the NGEU bonds, as the Draghi report suggested, especially if the own-resources reform falls short. It would protect priority spending when it is needed most.

Sustained joint borrowing brings a bonus: more common safe assets in euros, which strengthens the euro’s international role. The demand is already there.

Last month Piotr Serafin, the EU’s budget commissioner, flew to Seoul and Tokyo to meet investors. Asian buyers’ share of EU bond syndications has risen from 5 per cent to 9 per cent in the second half of 2025.

Wobbles in US bond markets, which partly reflect doubts about America’s fiscal health, its reliability as a partner and the dollar’s safe-haven status, give the euro an opening.

But it can only take it if EU governments put their own fiscal houses in order.

Ongoing tensions in the French bond market provide a clear warning. Putting France’s finances on a sustainable path would do more than reassure markets about the euro. It would restore French debt as a safe euro asset.

EU leaders meet on Thursday and Friday in Brussels. Whatever they discuss (and later decide) on the budget, Europe should keep borrowing together, and in large amounts.

The task now is to give that borrowing a coherent plan: a permanent framework, money set aside in advance and safeguards that cautious capitals can accept.

European regional and local leaders have warned that the EU’s next long-term budget risks transferring control over investment programmes to national governments, potentially increasing economic disparities and reducing the ability of poorer regions to shape their own development.

The warning was delivered in Brussels on 12 October by Kata Tüttő, President of the European Committee of the Regions, during the opening of the European Week of Regions and Cities.

Her intervention comes as EU leaders prepare to negotiate the 2028–2034 budget, with disagreements over agricultural funding, regional development, defence, industrial competitiveness and the distribution of financial responsibilities among member states.

The Committee of the Regions warned that greater centralisation could concentrate economic opportunities in already prosperous areas while limiting other territories’ capacity to attract investment and develop essential infrastructure.

The concern goes beyond money allocated to regional development. It addresses who controls spending decisions and whether local authorities retain a meaningful role in determining how European funds are used.

Regional governments resist centralisation

EU cohesion policy has traditionally sought to reduce disparities between richer and poorer regions through investment in transport, infrastructure, education, business development and public services. While national governments administer considerable funds, regional and local authorities are frequently involved in identifying priorities and delivering projects.

The Committee argues that restructuring which concentrates decision-making at national level could weaken this arrangement. National governments may favour country-wide industrial or infrastructure programmes, while regional authorities identify specific problems arising from local conditions.

A national infrastructure strategy could prioritise major transport routes and industrial centres. Regional administrations might instead emphasise connecting smaller communities, maintaining local services or developing specialised economic activities.

The dispute concerns whether the next EU budget will maintain flexibility for regional priorities. In Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy, regional institutions possess important responsibilities across economic development, education and infrastructure. Changes to EU spending governance could alter established relations between European, national and regional institutions.

The budget negotiations intensify the dispute

Ireland’s rotating Council presidency has proposed reducing the Commission’s original seven-year budget plans by approximately €141 billion while largely protecting agriculture and cohesion compared with other expenditure categories.

The proposed financial framework would nevertheless remain substantially larger than the current budget. The distribution of resources remains contentious, and an overall cut does not necessarily translate into the same reduction for every region.

Effects will depend on allocation formulas, national spending plans and programme governance. Meanwhile, European institutions face demands for stronger investment in defence production, digital infrastructure, competitiveness and support for Ukraine while maintaining agricultural and regional commitments.

Economic disparities remain a European problem

The Committee presented its seventh annual assessment of Europe’s regions and cities during the European Week of Regions and Cities, held in Brussels from 12 to 14 October.

The assessment examines competitiveness, resilience, public services, democratic governance and financial conditions. Regional disparities remain a significant feature of the EU economy despite decades of common investment programmes.

Large metropolitan areas often benefit from concentrations of universities, research institutions, advanced industries and capital. Less densely populated territories may struggle with demographic decline, shortages of skilled workers and the cost of maintaining infrastructure.

These differences can reinforce themselves over time. Businesses invest where suitable workers, transport networks and customers are already concentrated. Younger workers moving towards metropolitan economies may further reduce the economic prospects of communities they leave behind.

Defence spending creates new pressures

The increase in European defence expenditure introduces another dimension. Regions containing defence manufacturers, engineering firms, research institutions and military installations could benefit substantially from new spending, while others may receive little direct economic advantage.

If industrial investment concentrates in already advanced manufacturing centres, geographical disparities could widen. Conversely, procurement programmes and infrastructure investment could bring opportunities to weaker regional economies with suitable facilities and labour.

A question of political authority

The Committee of the Regions has limited formal authority over the EU’s long-term budget. National governments will negotiate the framework, and the European Parliament must consent to the final agreement.

Regional leaders are seeking to influence those negotiations before political compromises are established. Their central argument is that aggregate European economic growth alone does not capture the distribution of investment, employment and public services across the Union.

The approaching European Council negotiations will indicate whether governments intend to preserve regional influence over EU spending or concentrate greater authority over investment decisions at national level.

European Union governments are entering a critical round of budget negotiations after the Irish presidency of the Council proposed cutting €141 billion from the European Commission’s long-term spending plans, exposing deep disagreements over how the bloc intends to finance its expanding responsibilities.

The revised proposal, circulated ahead of the European Council meeting scheduled for 15–16 October, would reduce the planned 2028–2034 financial framework by approximately eight per cent to around €1.6 trillion, calculated in constant prices.

Despite the reduction, the proposed budget remains approximately 30 per cent larger than the current seven-year framework. Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and other governments concerned about national contributions have nevertheless argued that further restraint is necessary.

The compromise, detailed in negotiations over the EU’s next financial framework, reduces proposed spending across several areas while largely protecting the Union’s established agricultural and regional development programmes. The distribution of those cuts is becoming as contentious as the overall size of the budget.

Europe’s new priorities face the deepest reductions

Under the Irish proposal, agricultural and regional development allocations would decline by approximately three per cent compared with the Commission’s initial plans. By contrast, funding intended for competitiveness and security would be reduced by around 13 per cent, while external action and development cooperation face cuts of approximately 17 per cent.

The difference raises questions about whether the next EU budget can support the strategic ambitions repeatedly endorsed by European leaders.

The Commission has presented industrial competitiveness, technological development, defence readiness and economic resilience as central priorities for the remainder of the decade. Yet these sectors would absorb proportionately larger reductions under the revised framework than agricultural and cohesion programmes.

The consequences could extend to investments in advanced technologies, European industrial supply chains, research programmes and cross-border defence cooperation. They could also constrain the Union’s capacity to fund external partnerships and development initiatives.

The debate is particularly sensitive because the EU’s responsibilities have changed considerably since the previous budget was negotiated. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased defence requirements, while competition with China and the United States has intensified demands for industrial investment.

Germany and the net contributors demand restraint

The central disagreement concerns how much additional expenditure European governments are willing to finance through the common budget. Germany and other major net contributors face domestic fiscal constraints, rising borrowing costs and demands to increase national defence spending.

For these governments, accepting a substantially larger EU budget would add to financial commitments already being made through national budgets.

The Irish compromise therefore faces opposition from two directions. Some governments consider the reductions insufficient, while others fear that the remaining cuts will weaken programmes essential to their national economies.

Traditional recipients of agricultural and regional funding have an interest in protecting established expenditure. Governments seeking stronger European investment in defence, innovation and industrial competitiveness have different priorities.

The European Parliament is another obstacle. Its consent will be required before the final financial framework can enter into force, giving MEPs considerable leverage in negotiations with national governments.

New EU revenues remain controversial

The proposal also envisages approximately €55 billion in additional annual financing through new or revised EU revenue sources, including customs revenues, emissions-related income and corporate contributions.

The Commission’s framework for the next long-term budget reflects a broader debate over the extent to which the Union should develop independent financing mechanisms rather than rely predominantly on national contributions.

Such mechanisms would potentially give Brussels a more predictable revenue base. However, they also raise questions about fiscal sovereignty, the distribution of costs among member states and the political accountability of European taxation.

National governments remain reluctant to surrender substantial authority over revenue collection, particularly when proposed resources could impose costs on domestic industries or consumers.

Ukraine, enlargement and Europe’s strategic ambitions

The negotiations will influence the Union’s ability to respond to future enlargement. Ukraine and several Western Balkan countries are pursuing accession, but the financial implications of bringing additional members into the Union remain substantial.

Existing arrangements for agricultural subsidies and regional development assistance would require reconsideration if large new beneficiaries entered the budgetary system.

At the same time, the EU faces pressure to support Ukraine financially and strengthen defence production without depending indefinitely on extraordinary borrowing or ad hoc national contributions. These responsibilities cannot be addressed simply by preserving the structure of earlier budgets.

European Council President António Costa will seek to narrow the divisions among the 27 leaders, but agreement on the financial framework requires unanimity. Any government can withhold its consent if it considers the final distribution of costs unacceptable.

The forthcoming summit is therefore likely to establish the parameters of further negotiations rather than eliminate the underlying disagreements. The immediate political question is whether member states can reconcile their commitment to greater European strategic capacity with their reluctance to finance it collectively.

Getting co-decision powers on the budget, finally enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty after more than a decade of inter-institutional battles, was one of the European Parliament’s big wins. 

The challenge facing MEPs in the coming months is whether they are really going to use those powers on the 2028-34 budget. 

The early signs are that they are spoiling for a fight. The Irish government’s compromise proposal tabled on Saturday (10 October) – an 8 percent cut worth €141bn to the European Commission’s spending plan – isn’t exactly butchery. 

But it does display a startling lack of ambition, in particular on the raft of ‘own resources’ proposed by MEPs to make the budget process less vulnerable to member states wanting to reduce or at least freeze their annual contributions  

This time round, MEPs have proposed a digital services levy, an online gambling levy, and a levy on crypto-asset capital gains.

Put together the parliament reckons that these new taxes could bring an additional €30bn to the EU’s budget, on top of the €57.4bn that the EU commission believes can be raised from other levies, such as the emissions trading scheme and the carbon border levy. 

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The Irish government has set the path for a showdown between MEPs and governments over the next seven year EU budget after proposing an 8 percent cut worth €141bn to the European Commission’s spending plan. 

Savings from the commission proposal have been found across all headings in the so-called ‘negotiating box’ for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). But farmers’ subsidies under the common agricultural policy and the bloc’s cohesion policy, which provides funding to the EU’s poorest regions, have been exempted from any cuts. 

That is a nod to a sustained lobbying effort by a group of seventeen EU countries, known as ‘Friends of Cohesion’. 

As expected, meanwhile, cuts totalling €38bn have been made from the ‘Global Europe’ heading, which covers foreign aid, while €75bn has been taken from the competitiveness fund and €10bn from the EU’s administrative costs. 

In a statement on Saturday (10 October), Ireland’s minister for Europe, Thomas Byrne, said that the €1.62 trillion spending plan was “intended to bridge the many differences between Member States. It brings us closer to resolving the critical questions our Union faces on how to balance both new priorities and core policies, whilst also reflecting the fiscal realities that all Member States face.” 

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When certain governments discuss the EU’s next seven-year budget, their first reflex seems to be: what can we cut? That is the wrong question. The real question is not how much the EU budget costs, but how much an insufficient budget will cost us all.  

Economic benefits of EU membership are estimated to be two to six times the financial contribution of individual member states. For every euro we contribute to the EU budget, we can receive up to six euros in return.

That is the power of investing together: European investment delivers more than fragmented national spending. And it does so with a budget of just one percent of EU GNI, while national budgets can reach 50 percent.

The EU budget is not simply money transferred from national capitals to Brussels: it is an investment that creates value benefiting citizens through stronger economies, better infrastructure, food security, cutting-edge research, educational opportunities, regional development, and security.

Ultimately, all member states benefit from the added value created by the EU, making the concept of ‘net contributors’ obsolete.

Easing the pressure on national contributions is a legitimate objective, and it has a clear solution: an EU revenue reform. 

The European Parliament supports the basket approach of the European Commission on new own resources and its proposals. It also proposed three additional options capable of generating substantial revenue by 1 January 2028: a digital service levy on major platforms (€25.2bn per year), a levy on online gambling (€3.9bn per year) and a crypto-assets-based own resource (€3bn per year).

Our position is clear: large global companies that benefit most from Europe’s single market should contribute fairly to the EU budget that makes those benefits possible.

Cutting the EU budget may look like saving money. But if it means weaker competitiveness, less social investment and a less secure Europe, we save nothing and taxpayers foot the bill.

The European Union’s common budget has not grown in real terms for 40 years. On the contrary, its purchasing power has been steadily eroded due to high inflation. The current EU budget has lost around 10 percent of its purchasing power compared to when it was adopted in 2020. 

A more ambitious EU budget does not automatically mean that member states will have to contribute substantially more from their national budgets. When amounts are compared in constant prices and as a share of the size of the European economy – like with like – a more realistic picture emerges. 

In terms of spending capacity, and without counting repayment of the Covid-19 recovery fund (NextGenerationEU), the commission’s proposal for the 2028-2034 budget would be below the relative size of the current 2021-2027 MFF at the time of its adoption.

Even with parliament’s proposed increase for key EU programmes, member states’ contributions would still not substantially increase. 

Let us not forget: Europeans benefit considerably more than their countries’ headline contributions suggest. The single market is the clearest example. By removing barriers between 27 economies, it creates opportunities and delivers growth that no country could generate alone. 

By reducing the budget, the EU and its member states will have less capacity to deliver the economic and social benefits that citizens expect. We’ll have less cohesion, less competitiveness, a weaker agricultural sector, less global influence, reduced social investment and a much less secure Europe. And this also comes at a cost. A big one.

Instead of “what can we cut” we should be asking ourselves, “how can we finance a budget that delivers more for all”.  

If we genuinely want to use limited public resources efficiently, we must invest together. Economies of scale work for successful businesses, and they work for Europe.

Siegfried Mureşan (EPP, Romania) and Carla Tavares (S&D, Portugal) are the parliament’s co-rapporteurs on the EU budget, also known as the multiannual financial framework (MFF)

Europe’s Green party has called on the European Commission to exercise the powers it previously used during the Ukraine war to tax the exceptional profits made by big oil and gas companies during the ongoing conflict in Iran. 

“There are models in Europe that we can use to tax these super profits,” German MEP Rasmus Andresen told a European Parliament debate in Strasbourg on Wednesday (7 October), in his call to crack down on Iran-crisis profiteering.

The Strasbourg debate came after Austria, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain wrote to Ireland’s finance minister in August calling for an EU-wide framework to tax windfall profits.

Ireland holds the rotating EU presidency and can set agendas in the EU Council until the end of the year.

Several of those in the group of six EU states already put in place energy windfall taxes since this summer, ranging from 60 percent levies on excess fuel profits in Poland to 33 percent in Portugal.

Many other EU countries oppose introducing another tax at European level, which would require unanimity among all 27 member states to put in place.

But for his part, the Greens’ Andresen told MEPs in the hemicycle on Wednesday: “I don’t understand how despite the fact that there is this initiative from these six member states, that the commission is not taking action.”

Estimates from NGO Transport and Environment found that excess profits of €7.5bn were seen by eight oil companies alone in the first half of 2026 in Europe.

The figures were twice what they had made in the previous quarter. 

The EU had reacted to soaring energy prices after Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with a special “solidarity” tax on oil and gas firms, said groups on the Parliament’s left.

A commission assessment found that the measure raised €28bn in 2022-2023.

A senior official representing the Irish presidency, Thomas Byrne, said on Wednesday that windfall taxes “could be considered to respond to the concern related to the rising cost of living“.

But energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen poured cold water on appeals for EU-level action, saying “corporate taxation falls mainly in the realm of national competence” in legal terms.

Andresen’s fellow Green MEP, Marie Toussaint, said taxing Iran profits could be used “to pay for the energy transformation” in Europe, in the context of difficult talks on the EU’s next multi-annual European budget.

If they were not taxed, “how can they be exonerated from all responsibility in the rise of prices at the gas station?,” said the French vice-president of the Greens group.

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European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has joined MEPs in urging the bloc’s governments not to gut the EU’s next seven-year budget, as talks on spending reach a critical phase. 

“I would like to caution against large cuts. It would risk cutting deep into critical priorities that we all together have agreed on,” von der Leyen told MEPs during a speech in Strasbourg on Tuesday (6 October), ahead of an EU summit on 15 October.

The commission has proposed a budget worth just under €2 trillion, equivalent to 1.26 percent of the EU’s gross national income, a small increase on the previous seven year spending plan. But the so-called ‘frugal’ group of countries, led by Germany, have demanded hefty cuts, complaining that they are contributing too much. 

“Having no new financial framework is by far the most financially advantageous solution for Germany,” chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Monday. 

But 17 EU countries from Southern and Eastern Europe signed a joint letter last week, demanding that farmers’ subsidies via the Common Agricultural Policy are maintained, as well as spending across the EU’s poorest regions, known as cohesion policy 

During a press conference on Tuesday, Siegfried Muresan, the Romanian centre-right MEP who is co-leading parliament’s negotiating team on the seven-year budget with Portuguese socialist and democrat Claudia Tavares, said that there was “still time” for the Irish presidency to avoid proposing “unjustified cuts” that “would make Europe weaker and severely undermine the institutional cooperation between parliament and council.” 

Though Muresan conceded that governments did not want to increase their national contributions, “there is a way out”, he said. 

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