Il «Grande Progetto» volto a «mantenere [la civiltà occidentale] al vertice del mondo» (come ha affermato il Segretario di Stato statunitense Marco Rubio) richiede che gli strumenti per garantire l’obbedienza siano di due tipi: La creazione di un fervore rivoluzionario distruttivo dal basso (oggi definito «cambio di regime»); e, in secondo luogo, l’uso di ciò che Theodore Herzl, in una famosa frase, definì «il terribile potere del denaro di esercitare una pressione irresistibile sulla politica internazionale», al fine di cooptare gli strati dominanti in una rete di potere che promuovesse il «progetto» del Grande Disegno.Questo è ciò che stiamo osservando nella guerra di Trump contro l’Iran.
L’attacco israelo-americano del giugno 2025 era principalmente un attacco di decapitazione volto a neutralizzare sia la leadership politica che quella militare dell’Iran, mentre elementi armati addestrati dal Mossad, il MEK e i separatisti baluchi tra gli altri sarebbero stati infiltrati in Iran per fomentare la rivoluzione dalla base. A quel tempo, il figlio dell’ex Scià – in modo poco plausibile – veniva presentato ai media occidentali come il futuro leader dell’Iran.
Non ha funzionato. E ora Netanyahu sta sostenendo che Israele disponga di «nuove prove» del fatto che l’Iran si stia orientando verso la produzione di un componente bellico nell’ambito del proprio programma nucleare. Sta dicendo a Trump che ora deve portare a termine l’opera di distruzione dell’Iran. E per motivare ulteriormente Trump, il principale quotidiano israeliano Ma’ariv riporta che Israele ha trasmesso direttamente alla Casa Bianca i sondaggi del Likud, secondo cui Netanyahu potrebbe vincere le elezioni israeliane del 27 ottobre. Secondo l’articolo, queste informazioni del Likud (che contraddicono la maggior parte degli altri sondaggi israeliani) hanno spinto Trump a esprimere il proprio pieno sostegno elettorale a Netanyahu.
Allo stesso tempo, i miliardari filosionisti stanno esercitando il «terribile potere del denaro» su Trump: «Non accetteremo nulla di meno della sconfitta dell’Iran. Se continuerà a cercare un accordo, le ritireremo il nostro sostegno finanziario».
Alti funzionari della sicurezza israeliani, sia in carica che in pensione, confutano tuttavia la necessità di un attacco imminente all’Iran e l’affermazione di Netanyahu relativa a nuove prove che l’Iran si stia muovendo verso l’arma nucleare –il Capo di Stato Maggiore delle Forze di Difesa Israeliane (IDF) Zamir ha dichiarato al Canale 13 israeliano: «Non vediamo la necessità di attaccare l’Iran prima delle elezioni»; Il principale stratega militare israeliano Udi Evental ha messo in guardia: «Una guerra per ostacolare le elezioni e la democrazia, non per ostacolare il programma nucleare dell’Iran. Netanyahu, che si sospetta sia immerso fino al collo in considerazioni politiche e personali estranee alla questione, non è idoneo a prendere una decisione del genere. Non glielo si deve permettere».
Che esistano o meno prove del genere non ha davvero importanza. Probabilmente non esistono. L’affermazione costituisce semplicemente il pretesto con cui si sta esortando gli Stati Uniti ad agire per ‘portare a termine l’opera’ contro l’Iran. Come sempre, Netanyahu ha dichiarato negli ultimi giorni: «L’Iran sta ancora una volta cercando di sviluppare le sue armi di morte… C’è un solo modo per eliminare questa minaccia una volta per tutte: rovesciare il regime in Iran, e questa è la mia direttiva all’IDF, al Mossad e alle agenzie di sicurezza».Un alto funzionario iraniano ha dichiarato a Drop Site che l’attuale valutazione dei servizi segreti interni di Teheran indica un’elevata probabilità che possano iniziare bombardamenti su larga scala – anche prima delle elezioni israeliane di martedì.
Il punto è che all’Iran non interessa chi vincerà le elezioni di medio termine, né chi conquisterà la presidenza degli Stati Uniti nel 2028. Per la leadership iraniana è tutto uguale. Comprendono bene il concetto del «Grande Disegno» (come potrebbero non farlo?).In Iran è ben chiaro che il Paese è impegnato in una lunga guerra contro l’intero blocco atlantista: Israele, i suoi servizi di intelligence, i suoi arsenali, i suoi satelliti, la sua industria militare e la sua macchina mediatica. Non importa se alla Casa Bianca ci sia un repubblicano o un democratico. Gli alti funzionari iraniani ritengono che entrambi i partiti siano stati comprati dal terribile potere sionista del denaro.
Comprendere il «Progetto» significa comprendere che la classe dei finanziatori sionisti non si accontenterà mai di un «accordo o compromesso». Essi sostengono con certezza che l’Iran alla fine verrebbe meno a qualsiasi acconsentimento ipotizzato alle richieste statunitensi. Gli israeliani e i loro alleati della classe dei finanziatori semplicemente non credono (e lo ripetono incessantemente) che l’Iran accetterebbe mai di sottomettersi a Israele, né di accettare il dominio politico e culturale degli Stati Uniti. Potrebbero avere ragione. Perché? Semplicemente perché l’Iran possiede una civiltà profonda, che affonda le sue radici in un complesso di credenze e pratiche specificamente persiano-iraniane risalenti al secondo millennio a.C.: il mazdeismo, una cosmologia del dramma divino, rappresentata dalla lotta continua tra Luce e Oscurità.
Il rinomato studioso, il professor Henri Corbin, ha sostenuto che «l’Iran era situato in una posizione centrale… non essendo solo una nazione o un impero, ma un universo spirituale». Egli concepiva quindi l’Iran come una forza mediatrice, sia geograficamente che metafisicamente.
Per millenni, gli iraniani hanno percepito il mondo come dotato di una chiara dimensione metafisica – e di una storia. È quindi improbabile che possano essere attratti da un atteggiamento materialistico e nichilista di stampo occidentale. Gli Stati civilizzatori, siano essi l’Iran o la Russia, che abbracciano valori contrari non soccomberebbero mai al «Grande Disegno». Di conseguenza, devono essere distrutti.
Cosa significa questa storia metafisica? Significa che l’Iran si sta preparando alla guerra, non a un «accordo». Mohsen Rezaei, segretario del Consiglio Supremo di Sicurezza Nazionale iraniano e rappresentante personale della Guida Suprema, l’Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, ha affermato che, «Se la domanda è se l’Iran abbia ancora la capacità di proseguire le operazioni con missili e droni [in caso di attacco], la risposta è “sì” … Gli Stati Uniti dispongono di risorse preziose nella regione. In caso di guerra, anche cavi, centri dati e strutture di intelligenza artificiale potrebbero rientrare nel raggio d’azione. Se il conflitto dovesse riprendere, avremo un piano più ampio». «Tutti devono comprendere che un’azione contro l’Iran comporta un costo».
Alti funzionari iraniani ritengono che la guerra sia imminente. L’Iran dispone di piani di ampia portata (in caso di attacco) che coinvolgono anche l’Arabia Saudita e la sua leadership, ha lasciato intendere un alto funzionario iraniano. Karl Miller (dal campo) afferma che, a questo proposito, un quarto della produzione petrolifera saudita è già stato distrutto e che i danni causati dagli attacchi di rappresaglia di AnsarAllah interessano l’intera catena produttiva saudita – «dalla testa di pozzo alla stazione di servizio» – e che l’Arabia Saudita sta colmando il deficit attingendo alle proprie riserve.
Il rapporto di Miller, citato da Larry Johnson, avverte che,«se i canali di esportazione dell’Arabia Saudita dovessero chiudersi, il suo petrolio non avrebbe altra destinazione se non le proprie raffinerie, le proprie centrali elettriche e i propri serbatoi di stoccaggio. Una volta che lo stoccaggio fosse pieno, si raggiungerebbe all’incirca il limite massimo di produzione che l’Arabia Saudita potrebbe mantenere. Se Ras Tanura e Yanbu venissero chiusi contemporaneamente, il Regno sarebbe costretto a chiudere la maggior parte dei propri giacimenti petroliferi. Questo è esattamente lo scenario che la campagna di Ansar Allah contro l’oleodotto, il Mar Rosso e i terminali del Golfo è volta a provocare». «Qualsiasi nuova campagna americana o israeliana contro l’Iran si abbatterà su un sistema energetico saudita che non dispone più di margini per assorbirla», osserva Larry Johnson.
Qualsiasi nuovo attacco all’Iran, per estensione, significherà la fine del Golfo così come lo conosciamo, la fine del petrodollaro e la fine del Golfo come principale fornitore di liquidità per Wall Street e il mondo della tecnologia.
Ciononostante, secondo quanto riferito, Trump avrebbe affermato che gli Stati Uniti non stanno attualmente negoziando con l’Iran e che qualcosa accadrà «molto presto».
Forse. (Ma con Trump tutto si riduce a speculazioni). Se però sta bluffando, non funzionerà, e la sua umiliazione sarà ancora più profonda.
Un uomo che conosce Trump meglio di molti altri (avendo scritto quattro libri su di lui), Michael Wolff, sostiene che se i Democratici vinceranno nelle elezioni di medio termine del 3 novembre –
«Cercheranno di far capire al mondo che è “un nuovo giorno”. Trump, dal canto suo, cercherà di far capire al mondo che è ancora lui a controllare la scena. Ci sarà una serie di eventi di questo tipo (come una presunta invasione di Cuba, ad esempio) di portata superiore a qualsiasi cosa possiamo immaginare. Non si mostrerà umile. Il concetto di umiltà non esiste nell’animo di Donald Trump. Pertanto, farà esattamente il contrario».
The United States has privately warned Middle Eastern allies to prepare for renewed military operations against Iran following the 3 November congressional elections, according to diplomatic sources. Although President Donald Trump has not authorised further strikes, the warnings have heightened concerns about regional escalation, energy infrastructure and the consequences for European economies already facing rising fuel costs.
American officials have advised several governments in the Middle East to prepare for possible new military strikes against Iran after next week’s US midterm elections, raising the prospect of another escalation in a conflict that has already disrupted international energy markets.
According to an Associated Press investigation published on 29 October, two diplomats familiar with the warnings said US officials had urged regional allies to consider the possibility of Iranian retaliation against energy facilities and other critical infrastructure.
The diplomats emphasised that President Donald Trump had not made a final decision to resume military operations.
Nevertheless, Washington’s warnings suggest that preparations are being discussed for a potential campaign extending over several days.
Regional governments are concerned that retaliatory action by Iran or organisations aligned with Tehran could prolong the fighting beyond the duration initially envisaged by the United States.
The White House and American officials declined to comment on the reported communications.
Military Preparations and Political Timing
The warnings come as Trump approaches the final days of campaigning ahead of the 3 November elections.
The president has repeatedly suggested that further military action against Iran could follow the vote, although he has also claimed that the conflict may be approaching its conclusion.
During a campaign appearance in Texas, Trump said the war could end within weeks, while reiterating his insistence that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons.
The timing of possible military action remains uncertain.
The Pentagon has increased its regional military presence, including the deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and additional amphibious forces.
Approximately 9,000 military personnel were associated with the deployment announced in September.
However, the movement of forces does not establish that an attack has been authorised or that particular targets have been selected.
American military preparations can also serve as deterrence, signalling and contingency planning.
The distinction is important because the political consequences of renewed strikes would depend on their scale, objectives and Iranian response.
Tehran Maintains That Diplomacy Remains Possible
Iran has indicated that it remains willing to pursue negotiations.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on 28 October that Tehran was continuing to consider diplomatic proposals and wanted elements of its earlier ceasefire initiative to form the basis for renewed discussions.
That proposal had previously been rejected by Washington.
The continuing disagreement concerns both the conditions for ending military operations and wider questions about Iran’s nuclear programme.
The United Arab Emirates has urged the parties to seek political solutions and avoid returning to large-scale fighting.
Regional governments face a particularly difficult position because they may be exposed to retaliation even when they are not directly involved in American military operations.
Energy facilities, airports, ports and other infrastructure could become targets during an escalation.
Such attacks would also affect civilian populations and commercial activity beyond the immediate combatants.
The Conflict Has Already Spread
The war involving Iran, the United States and Israel began in late February and has subsequently affected other parts of the Middle East.
Iran-aligned Houthi forces have carried out attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure and airports, prompting retaliatory operations by a Saudi-led coalition against targets in Yemen.
These developments have complicated attempts to contain the conflict geographically.
The United States has not conducted a strike against Iran since early September, according to the reporting available on 29 October.
However, the absence of recent American attacks has not removed the risk of renewed operations.
Regional governments are therefore considering a range of possible developments, including limited strikes, a longer military campaign or retaliatory attacks preceding any American operation.
None of these scenarios should be treated as inevitable.
Europe Faces Another Energy Risk
For the European Union, a renewed confrontation would have implications extending well beyond diplomatic relations with Washington.
The Middle East remains a major source of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.
The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important to international energy shipping, connecting producers in the Persian Gulf with markets in Europe and Asia.
An increase in attacks on shipping, production facilities or export terminals could place further pressure on global energy prices.
The consequences would not necessarily be confined to countries purchasing oil or gas directly from the region.
European consumers compete in internationally connected markets, meaning supply disruptions can influence prices even where import arrangements have been diversified.
The EU has substantially reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas since 2022, but growing reliance on liquefied natural gas creates exposure to fluctuations in international supply and demand.
A further Middle Eastern escalation could therefore complicate Europe’s efforts to rebuild gas reserves and contain industrial energy costs before winter.
Higher fuel prices would also affect transport, food production and household expenditure.
The Strategic Dilemma for European Governments
European governments must balance several interests.
They support efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, maintain relations with the United States and preserve stability in the Middle East.
At the same time, they have a direct economic interest in avoiding prolonged disruption to maritime trade and energy production.
A new American military campaign could revive debates concerning the legality, necessity and proportionality of military action, particularly if diplomatic alternatives remain available.
European governments may also face decisions about the protection of their nationals, regional diplomatic missions and commercial shipping.
The immediate significance of Washington’s warnings lies in the possibility of renewed hostilities, not in confirmation that such hostilities have been ordered.
With the American elections approaching, governments across the Middle East and Europe are preparing for developments that remain contingent on decisions in Washington and Tehran.
Whether the warnings lead to military action or renewed diplomacy will determine the next phase of a conflict whose economic effects are already being felt far beyond the region.
Photo: Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Kaylianna Genier / US Navy / Wikimedia Commons (Public Domain).
The Houthis (Ansar Allah) stepped up missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and its allies over the past week, while maintaining their dominance on the battlefield in Yemen.
On October 22, the Houthis announced four operations carried out over the preceding 48 hours, targeting Saudi Arabia’s Defense Ministry headquarters in Riyadh, King Fahd International Airport in Dammam, an Aramco facility in Yanbu and Abha International Airport. Saudi aviation authorities said an attack on King Fahd Airport killed two people and wounded eight.
Two days later, the Houthis announced seven more operations involving ballistic missiles and drones against Saudi targets. The reported targets included King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Aramco facilities in Yanbu, the Rabigh oil refinery, oil pumping stations, the East-West Pipeline, King Fahd Airport, Najran Airport and an air base in Khamis Mushait.
The Houthis also stepped up attacks on government-held positions in southern Yemen. On October 24, Yemeni authorities accused the group of launching ballistic missiles at Aden International Airport, the al-Tawahi port area and two Coast Guard facilities.
On October 26, the Houthis announced two additional missile operations targeting military positions and weapons depots in the Salah al-Din area of Aden and the al-Wahat area of neighboring Lahij province. The group said the strikes caused dozens of casualties and destroyed military vehicles and weapons depots. The claims were not independently verified.
The following day, the Houthis said that they had repelled an advance by Saudi-backed forces toward Bab al-Mandab. They said the advancing troops were targeted with ballistic missiles and heavy weapons, resulting in casualties and the destruction of several military vehicles.
Also on October 27, the Houthis said they had struck Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura oil refinery with a ballistic missile, sparking a fire at the complex. The group also reported attacks on two Saudi military transport aircraft at Najran Airport and an air base in Khamis Mushait.
Meanwhile, Houthi forces continued to tighten their siege of Taiz, capturing additional territory and roads around the city. These advances further restricted Saudi-backed forces’ access to water sources.
On October 28, the Houthis called for the immediate evacuation of Aden International Airport, alleging that a Saudi military cargo plane carrying weapons was at the facility.
The increasing frequency of Houthi strikes, alongside their continued territorial gains, underscores their position as the dominant force on Yemen’s battlefield. Against this backdrop, recent reports suggest that Saudi Arabia is seeking a diplomatic path to halt the escalation through Iranian mediation. One report indicated that Riyadh was prepared to offer the Houthis up to $1 billion in exchange for a ceasefire and an end to attacks on Saudi territory.
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SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence
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The Iran-backed Houthis reported deadly strikes on residential areas of western Yemen, blamed on their Saudi foe, while explosions later rocked Riyadh, weeks into intensified violence.
Israel's chief opposition candidate Gadi Eisenkot has warned that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was working to delegitimise election results with his allegations of malfeasance by Arab parties.
Iran claims to have brought down what looks to be a U.S.-made MQM-170C Outlaw G2 drone largely intact. A video shows it has a notable feature on top of its nose. In U.S. military use today, Outlaw-series drones are best known as an aerial target for use in training and testing.
The footage in question, and the accompanying claims, should be treated with caution given that the regime in Tehran and the country’s media outlets do routinely make exaggerated and unverified claims. That being said, so far, the footage looks to be credible. Furthermore, the U.S. military has pushed back on Iran’s version of events, but has not explicitly denied having lost one of these drones in the region recently.
For its part, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) says it captured the MQM-170-series drone following what it described as an “offensive electronic warfare operation” somewhere to the “west of the Strait of Hormuz.” The IRGC also claims that the uncrewed aircraft was conducting reconnaissance on Iranian air defenses positioned along the country’s Persian Gulf coast. At the time of writing, no firm evidence has been provided to support either of these assertions. The IRGC has released the aforementioned video, seen below, which it says shows the drone being tracked via an infrared camera, as well as after its recovery.
#Iran / #USA: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (#IRGC) Navy captured a US Drone after intercepting it with EW Systems.
The Drone captured by the IRGC Navy appears to be Griffon Aerospace Outlaw G2 “MQM-170C” UAV. pic.twitter.com/Xw6JYOu1s6
“In the past weeks and months, the IRGC has repeatedly lied out of desperation, and today is no different,” U.S. Navy Capt. Tim Hawkins, spokesperson for U.S. Central Command, told TWZ when asked about the specific Iranian claims.
“We’re not going to waste our time. U.S. forces remain vigilant and laser-focused on our assigned missions,” Hawkins said in response to a follow-up question about whether CENTCOM could confirm or deny the loss of an MQM-170-series drone for any reason.
As an aside, Iran recovered an Anduril Dive-LD uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) largely intact last month in what the IRGC claimed had been a “complex intelligence and operational action.” U.S. authorities ultimately confirmed the loss of the advanced UUV, but said it was the result of a malfunction.
As mentioned, the drone seen in the IRGC video does look to be an MQM-170C, or at least a closely-related variant thereof. It has an interesting feature on top of its nose: a single forward-looking aperture. This is something that is commonly associated with staring-type optics, which drones often use to aid with navigation. There is a possibility that it could be a seeker, if the drone were to be configured as a one-way-attack munition, but this seems unlikely.
Additional views of the nose end of the drone Iran says it captured, with the ‘staring’ aperture plainly visible. Iranian media captures via XA stock picture of an MQM-170C drone in U.S. military service in its typical configuration as an aerial target. USNAnother picture of U.S. MQM-170C target drones offering additional views of their noses. USAF
MQM-170C’s manufacturer, Griffon Aerospace, which refers to this design internally as the Outlaw Gen 2 (G2), does say on its website that it can be configured as “an inexpensive payload development platform offering great endurance, payload size, weight, and power.” The company’s website also says that the target configuration of the G2 has a gross weight of 150 pounds, but that this can grow to 225 pounds when used as a more general-purpose drone.
The drone, which is nearly 11 feet long and has a wingspan of 16 feet, otherwise has a stated maximum endurance of eight hours, top speed of 126 knots, and the ability to reach altitudes of more than 16,000 feet. The design is propelled by a 2-cylinder, 2-stroke combustion engine driving a single pusher propeller. The G2 gets into the air via a catapult-type launcher and can be recovered, either after a glide-in landing on suitable terrain or via parachute.
An MQM-170C target drone seen being launched via catapult. USN
Griffon Aerospace also offers an ‘expanded’ G2E version with fixed tricycle landing gear as an “open and customizable platform for ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] missions, subsystem testing, and R&D [research and development].” This version has a lower maximum takeoff weight and total endurance compared to the baseline G2, according to the company’s website. The IRGC video does not show any evidence of landing gear, but it could have broken away when the drone came down.
The landing-gear-equipped Outlaw G2E. Griffon Aerospace
The larger Outlaw family, which traces back to the early 2000s, also includes the Gen 1 MQM-170A, which has a completely different design from the subsequent G2 drone. Griffon also developed a derivative of the Gen 1 design with a twin-boom tail, called the Outlaw Boomer, which the U.S. military designated the MQM-170B. There is also a twin-engine, twin-boom derivative of the Outlaw G2 that the U.S. military has at least tested in the past.
A twin-engine, twin-boom derivative of the Outlaw G2, seen here in U.S. Army markings. Griffon Aerospace
This brings us to the additional matter of a contract the U.S. Army awarded to Griffon Aerospace, valued at nearly $68 million, for the procurement of a Gen 3 version of the Outlaw on June 3. When the Pentagon first announced this deal, it was explicitly said to be “in support of Operation Epic Fury” against Iran. That portion of the announcement was quietly deleted sometime thereafter.
“A company official declined to provide details about the Gen 3 design,” Breaking Defense reported in a story published on June 5.
On August 25, Griffon received an additional contract from the Army, valued at just under $133 million, “to procure Griffon Outlaw systems, support equipment and field service representatives for system use and employment.” That announcement made no mention of operations against Iran.
At the time of writing, Griffon Aerospace’s website does not appear to make any mention of the Gen 3 Outlaw. TWZ has reached out for more information about this drone.
Given the known breadth of Outlaw designs to date, it is possible that the Gen 3 drone is substantially, if not entirely, different from any of the existing types. At the same time, the June contract announcement does establish a link between the Outlaw family and U.S. military use outside of training and testing, and specifically as part of real-world operations aimed at Iran.
There remains the potential that Iran simply captured an Outlaw target drone that U.S. forces lost control of during training or testing in the region. The drone seen in the IRGC video lacks the high-visibility orange markings typically seen on aerial targets, though these could easily have been painted over. Iranian authorities could have still fabricated the recovery, in part or in whole, though there is no firm evidence of that at present, either.
An MQM-170C target drone belonging to the U.S. Marine Corps, seen here in use during an exercise in Saudi Arabia in 2023. USMC
Another non-U.S. operator region could also be employing versions of the Outlaw, including in non-target drone roles, such as for surveillance and reconnaissance, or as decoys.
All of this does now come amid growing signs that the United States, as well as Israel, are preparing to launch a new major campaign against Iran. As TWZ reported recently, stimulating Iranian air defenses to glean key intelligence about their current capabilities and positions would be critical in the lead-up to any such operation.
“Stimulating Iran’s air defenses is critical,” our own Tyler Rogoway wrote on X earlier this month following unconfirmed reports of unusual Israeli air activity. “By Iran operating as if a full scale attack could be coming, their air defenses can be detected, categorized and geolocated. This is absolutely critical prior to a major air operation. Surveilling them during times of lower alert does not provide the same fidelity of actionable intelligence. Knowing where those threats are and how they are operating can mean the difference of life and death and/or will help standoff munitions make their way to their targets as those defenses can be suppressed, destroyed, or avoided entirely via careful mission planning.”
I don’t know what this is, or if it’s legit BUT remember we are in a new age of misdirection, decoy and guile. Specifically using low end drone technology. There are more ways to stimulate an enemy air defense system, distract a populous, assess the flow of public info from a… https://t.co/wW7YVlbayB
“Such reports come amid an increasingly sophisticated use of low-end drones, decoys, and other forms of deception. These kinds of systems can be employed not only to stimulate adversary air defenses, but also to distract populations and probe how information moves out of a denied area. In such an environment, unusual aerial sightings should be viewed with caution — but not necessarily dismissed as irrelevant. We have been talking about how new forms of misdirection and guile will leverage relatively low-end technologies in future conflicts for many years now. While it isn’t clear if this light show in the sky over Iran was such an activity, it is certainly a reminder to keep that possibility in mind.”
It would certainly be plausible for suitably configured Outlaw drones to be in use now as another means of simulating Iranian air defenses. There is precedent even for ostensible target drones to be used operationally to deploy countermeasures and just as decoys in support of major strikes. U.S. BQM-34 Firebee target drones were notably used to spread radar-confusing chaff over the Iraqi capital Baghdad as part of the opening phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.
Altogether, though still not definitively confirmed, Iran’s claimed recovery of an MQM-170C drone is an interesting development as the prospect that major hostilities in the region could resume soon continues to grow.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy has claimed to have captured a US MQM-170 drone in the Strait of Hormuz. IRGC-N claimed in a statement that its electronic warfare unit took control of the drone’s guidance and control systems and brought it down.
“Fighters of the IRGC Navy’s electronic warfare unit carried out an offensive electronic warfare operation. They detected and identified an MQM-170 reconnaissance and decoy drone belonging to the ‘terrorist U.S. army’ west of the Strait of Hormuz, took control of its guidance and control systems, and brought it down intact.
The drone’s mission was to locate the Islamic Republic of Iran’s air defense systems along the Persian Gulf coastline and the Strait of Hormuz. IRGC Navy specialists recovered data from the aircraft and determined that it had taken off from the coast of one of the countries on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf.”
CENTCOM spokesman Tim Hawkins rejected the claim outright: “In the past weeks and months, the IRGC has repeatedly lied out of desperation, and today is no different.”
The MQM-170 is a low-cost, recoverable aerial target drone used by the U.S. Army and Navy for air-defense training.
It is not a high-end reconnaissance UAV comparable to systems such as the MQ-9 or RQ-170. Some variants can carry sensors, but its main role is to simulate threats. An intact capture of a target/decoy drone would still offer limited technical intelligence value compared with more advanced platforms.
Screengrab
Earlier, Iran claimed to have seized American drones.
“Through a coordinated, complex operation involving intelligence oversight and electronic warfare, IRGC naval forces’ personnel successfully captured an advanced unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) belonging to the terrorist US military,” the IRGC naval forces said in a statement on the 8th September, according to state TV.
The IRGC said that the drone was “operating in the Strait of Hormuz for espionage purposes”, identifying the model as a Remus 600 autonomous underwater vehicle that was “now in the hands of the force’s specialists for data recovery”.
Earlier, as EurAsian Times reported, the IRGC, on September 8, said that they had recovered a US drone submarine at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.
“One of the US military’s most advanced unmanned underwater vehicles was seized by Iranian armed forces at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz during a complex intelligence and field operation and brought into Iran, IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) said in a post on X.
Iran’s state media later officially identified the captured vessel as an Anduril Dive-LD UUV.
US Navy Captain Tim Hawkins, the spokesperson for US CENTCOM, said, “An underwater drone operated by US forces malfunctioned more than a day ago. It was surveying regional waters in support of ongoing operations. The defective drone was an older model that neither collected sensitive data nor carried any classified sonar or radar equipment. US operations in area waters continue.”
Tankers on Fire
Meanwhile, at least four tankers have caught fire after hitting mines while attempting to pass the Strait of Hormuz, which the Trump administration said was free of mines and under American control.
For instance, on 25 August, Trump posted on Truth Social: “I have just been informed by the United States Navy that all mines have been removed and/or detonated from within the International Waters of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran has been notified that any ship or boat placing new mines will be immediately and systematically destroyed. Through Space Force, we are watching every square inch of the Strait, as we are, also, with Pickaxe Mountain and the already destroyed three other Nuclear sites. There is a Zero Tolerance policy on mine placement in full force and effect.
IRGC said in a statement: “Over the past 24 hours, three violating oil tankers exploded and caught fire after striking mines while attempting to pass through the unauthorized southern route of the Strait of Hormuz.
The vessels had switched off all their radar and navigation systems and disregarded warnings from the IRGC Navy as they attempted to leave through the unauthorized southern route. The tankers were left stranded/abandoned along the southern coast of the Strait.
The IRGC Navy states that the unauthorized route through the Strait of Hormuz is mined, and that vessel owners and crews are responsible for transiting these routes and should not pay attention to CENTCOM’s delusions/illusions on social media.
The facts on the ground will speak for themselves / will determine the outcome. Any provocative action, supported by the terrorist and invading US military’s act of mischief, that disregards the regulations governing the Strait will be met with a resolute/firm response.”
In recent weeks, Iran has reported multiple vessels striking sea mines, prompting CENTCOM to reaffirm that all mines in “primary transit routes” have been cleared.
On Thursday, Hossein Mohebi, the IRGC spokesman, challenged the claim, saying, “Prove your Hormuz mine-clearing claim with independent evidence, not statements!” in a post on X.
Arsenio Dominguez, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization, said: “The traffic separation scheme, the information that we have is that they still have mines. And of course, whilst the conflict is ongoing, it’s very difficult for us to use third parties to verify that it is clear of these hazards. So in the meantime, we cannot guarantee that a vessel that intends to transit that route will not be hit by a mine.”
Jakob Larsen, Chief Safety & Security Officer, BIMCO (Baltic and International Maritime Council, the world’s largest international shipping association), also highlighted the risk of mines and said: “We still consider it very risky for ships to commence transits at this point. The threat of mines in the area remains a concern immediately as well as further down the line, and mine-free routes need to be established.”
Benjamin Netanyahu alleged on Thursday, without providing evidence, that Arab parties’ record gains in an election this week were driven in part by voter fraud, a charge rejected by Arab leaders who accused the premier of incitement.
The allegation represents an escalation of anti-Arab rhetoric by Netanyahu and his far-right partners after high Arab turnout in a national ballot on Tuesday effectively blocked a smooth path to power for either him or his main Jewish rivals.
Israeli election officials said on Thursday that there was a probe into fraud allegations, though the election’s integrity was not “systematically compromised.”
Analysts and critics say that by stepping up attacks on Arab parties, Netanyahu may be trying to ensure his main rival, Gadi Eisenkot, feels unable to even consider forming a minority government with Arab help that could oust him from power.
Netanyahu’s goal is “delegitimizing any Arab-Jewish cooperation”, said Eytan Gilboa, professor of politics at Reichman University.
Election officials were expected to finish tallying votes later on Thursday, in a tightly fought election that has produced no clear winner and is likely to be followed by weeks of protracted negotiations over a new government.
With nearly 93% of votes counted, Netanyahu’s nationalist-religious bloc held a modest lead in seats over a bloc of right-wing and centre-left parties led by Eisenkot, with both men’s coalitions short of the 61 seats needed for a majority in parliament.
Parties representing Israel’s 21% Arab minority were projected to win an unprecedented 19 seats, leaving Eisenkot’s bloc, with 48 seats against Netanyahu’s camp of 53, with no realistic path to power without broad Arab backing, an option Eisenkot has so far ruled out.
However, Eisenkot’s camp could also try to form a minority government with Arab support from the outside, without including them in a governing coalition.
NETANYAHU ACCUSES ARAB PARTIES OF FRAUD; ARAB PARTIES CALL IT INCITEMENT
Ahmad Tibi, one of the leaders of the Arab Joint List party, said Netanyahu was on an orchestrated, toxic campaign meant to undermine the election results.
“This entire campaign is directed against Eisenkot, to prevent him, intimidate and scare him off forming a government that relies on external support from the Joint List or Ra’am,” Tibi told Reuters.
During and after Tuesday’s election, Netanyahu and his allies warned against rising Arab turnout and his right-wing Likud party issued statements accusing the Arab parties of “stealing the vote.”
It demanded police and the Shin Bet domestic intelligence service investigate incidents of suspected election bribery and intimidation at ballot stations in Arab towns. It said it possessed evidence of such activity but has not presented it to the public.
The police say they have arrested at least seven people since Tuesday in Israel’s south, where many Arabs live, on suspicion of voter fraud. Israel’s public broadcaster Kan said they were suspected of attempting to bribe voters to cast ballots for the Arab-dominated party Ra’am, which has Islamist roots.
On Thursday, the head of Israel’s Central Election Committee, Supreme Court jurist Noam Sohlberg, said he had asked the Shin Bet to investigate suspicions that unidentified foreign players had tried to intervene in the election.
Likud seized on Sohlberg’s request, alleging an attack on Israel’s democracy, “an Islamisation of Israel and the toppling of the right-wing in order to bring about IDF withdrawal and defeat on all fronts, foremost Iran.”
Likud said Qatar was behind the alleged election intervention, which Qatar later denied.
Ra’am head Mansour Abbas said on Thursday his party was not involved in the reported suspicious conduct and urged a full investigation. He said that Netanyahu was on an incitement campaign against Israel’s Arab citizens.
“We have one message in response to the campaign of incitement and delegitimization he is waging against Arab citizens: Nothing will come of it, because there is nothing there,” Abbas said in a statement.
In a letter sent to a parliamentarian and published by the Central Election Committee, the committee said that there was “no base for claims that there was systematic harm to the election’s integrity.”
ISRAELI PRESIDENT: ‘WE MUST NOT TARNISH AN ENTIRE COMMUNITY’
After vote tallying is completed, President Isaac Herzog will consult with party chairs and choose a candidate who he thinks has the best chance to form a government.
The coalition that last toppled Netanyahu, in 2021, relied on Abbas’ Ra’am party. But Eisenkot’s underperformance means the opposition would now need backing from the Arab-dominated Joint List, which includes an explicitly anti-Zionist party. Most Jewish leaders have shunned formal alliances with Arab parties since Israel’s founding.
Eisenkot called for an investigation that would protect election integrity but said Netanyahu was exploiting the suspicions to “spread chaos.”
He said in a statement that Netanyahu’s aim was to “challenge the official election results, in which the Israeli public voted against the government.”
Herzog said the allegations must be investigated.
“But even at a moment like this, we must not tarnish an entire community that sought to exercise its right to vote and take an active part in democracy,” Herzog said in a statement.
The Pentagon has fired its top military strategist as Washington draws up contingency plans for a possible escalation of hostilities with Iran.
Army Lt. Gen. Brett Sylvia has been removed from his position as director for strategy, plans, and policy (J5) on the Joint Staff, a spokesman confirmed late Wednesday, following media reports of his dismissal.
His predecessor, Lt. Gen. Joseph McGee, was forced into retirement a year ago amid reported friction with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine. Sylvia previously served as vice director of the J5.
The Pentagon did not explain Sylvia’s departure. His responsibilities included developing military strategies and plans to advise the chairman and the US president. He joins nearly two dozen senior military and civilian officials removed during Hegseth’s tenure.
The secretary has portrayed the dismissals as part of an effort to reduce the military’s bloated ranks of generals and make the armed forces more efficient and lethal. Critics, however, have characterized the shake-up as an ideological “purge.”
President Donald Trump has repeatedly raised the possibility of renewing large-scale hostilities with Iran, including resuming the intensive bombing campaign conducted during the first 40 days of the conflict, which the US and Israel launched in late February. A potential escalation could be timed around the November midterm elections.
Military experts have widely expressed concern that another bombing campaign would fail to “finish the job,” as Trump has put it, while further increasing the conflict’s economic toll worldwide. Tehran has repeatedly warned that it is prepared to retaliate against US allies in the Gulf region if it faces renewed attacks.
Conversely, speculation has emerged that Trump could dismiss Hegseth after the midterms, when the opposition Democratic Party is expected to make gains in both chambers of Congress. Critics of the Iran war, including Republican Rep. Thomas Massie, have argued that firing the secretary could help Trump avoid a potential impeachment battle if Democrats take control of the House.
Trump’s public rhetoric remains supportive of Hegseth and his policies.
Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on Thursday that three oil tankers exploded and caught fire after striking naval mines while attempting to cross an unauthorized southern route through the Strait of Hormuz.
The vessels disregarded warnings from Iranian naval forces and switched off their radar and navigation systems before entering the mined passage, according to the statement.
“Over the past 24 hours, three violating oil tankers exploded and caught fire after striking mines while attempting to pass through the unauthorised southern route of the Strait of Hormuz,” the IRGC said.
The navy reported that the tankers were left along the southern shores of the strait following the explosions. Their identities and flags were not immediately available, and no information was provided about casualties.
IRGC warns crews against relying on CENTCOM assurances
The IRGC Navy reiterated that the southern route remains mined, warning shipowners and crews against attempting passage in disregard of its instructions or relying on statements issued by US Central Command (CENTCOM).
“The IRGC Navy states that the unauthorised route through the Strait of Hormuz is mined, and that vessel owners and crews are responsible for transiting these routes and should not pay attention to CENTCOM’s delusions on social media,” the statement said.
It further warned that any provocative action backed by the US military that disregards Iran’s rules governing passage through the strait would be met firmly.
Iranian forces have repeatedly accused CENTCOM of encouraging commercial vessels to use the southern corridor near the Omani coast despite Iranian warnings.
In a statement issued on Wednesday, CENTCOM rejected earlier Iranian reports of commercial vessels striking mines and maintained that US forces had cleared all internationally recognized primary transit routes. It also said thousands of commercial vessels had used those lanes safely. The statement preceded Thursday’s IRGC announcement.
UKMTO receives report of vessel burning near Oman
Separately, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said on Thursday that a shipmaster had reported seeing another vessel on fire nine nautical miles north of Khasab, Oman.
The agency did not identify the vessel or establish the cause of the blaze. Its connection to the three tankers reported by the IRGC remained unclear.
The developments come amid restrictions on shipping through the strait since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28. Tehran maintains that vessels must coordinate their passage with Iranian authorities, while Washington has imposed a blockade on Iranian ports.
IRGC announces capture of US reconnaissance drone
In a separate statement, the IRGC Navy announced that its electronic warfare unit had captured a US drone in the western Strait of Hormuz and brought it down intact.
The navy identified the aircraft as an MQM-170 reconnaissance and decoy drone, saying it had been tasked with detecting Iranian air-defense systems along the Gulf coastline and the strait.
“The IRGC Navy announced that its electronic warfare unit had successfully captured a US MQM-170 drone during an offensive operation in the western Strait of Hormuz,” the statement said.
The War on Iran, and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, forced energy buyers to source crude oil and refined products from the United States. But US exports of crude to Asia have since collapsed, and are plumbing multiyear lows. Oil transport costs have skyrocketed, making American oil shipments to Asia non-competitive. Industry insiders strongly suspect that the increased oil flows through the Persian Gulf are a result of oil suppliers quietly paying Iran for safe passage through the Hormuz. Middle East suppliers are also selling oil on a “delivered basis” to buyers in China and India, thereby assuming all the transport costs and insurance risks.
Ship captains and crews transiting the Strait of Hormuz make so much danger pay that they’re ‘almost being viewed as mercenaries’ https://fortune.com/2026/10/10/ship-c…
Driven by escalating Houthi threats and allied military restraint, Saudi Arabia and Israel might be inching towards a pragmatic “marriage of convenience” to safeguard their mutual survival. However, deep-seated public hostility and the unresolved Palestine issue will likely keep this strategic convergence tightly under wraps as an implicit, tactical arrangement rather than formal normalisation. The […]
The presence of Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani officials in Tehran on 26 October reflected a growing recognition that Iran cannot be excluded from any serious regional security arrangement. Despite the US–Israeli war against Iran, Tehran remains central to the region’s military and political balance.
For Riyadh and its partners, the meeting also exposed the limits of the Mecca defense pact, particularly as Saudi Arabia faces renewed confrontation with the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).
Much of the speculation surrounding the four-country meeting centered on what Iran might be expected to surrender, particularly its relationship with Sanaa. Such expectations rested on the assumption that Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan had established a regional security order into which Iran was now seeking admission, with Tehran potentially offering concessions over Yemen in return.
Yet the political and military circumstances that brought the participants to Tehran suggest a different calculation. Iran has withstood sustained American and Israeli attacks, while Saudi Arabia and its partners have struggled to contain the YAF’s military operations. Any agreement that disregards these realities risks reproducing the confrontations it seeks to resolve.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry had identified Israel’s expansionist policies, Lebanon, and the US war against Iran among the subjects for discussion. Yemen was absent from the announced agenda and the subsequent press statement.
Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the gathering also served to congratulate Mohsen Rezaei, the council’s newly appointed secretary, and discuss regional security, including opposition to foreign interference, particularly by Washington. According to information obtained by The Cradle, Yemen was not discussed during the meeting.
On the morning of 27 October, a day after the talks, Rezaei met Yemen’s ambassador, Ibrahim Mohammad al-Dailami, in Tehran. Rezaei praised Yemen’s defense of Gaza and its confrontation with Israel, while the ambassador thanked him and the Iranian government for their positions.
The encounter came amid speculation that Tehran’s diplomatic engagement with Riyadh might come at the expense of its relationship with Sanaa. By publicly reaffirming those ties immediately after the summit, Iran signaled its intention to pursue regional diplomacy while maintaining its existing alliances.
Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s conservative daily Kayhan, wrote in a 27 October editorial that “Yemen’s revolutionaries are allies of Islamic Iran.” He warned that the visiting delegations might seek to create the impression that Tehran was distancing itself from Sanaa, offering Washington and its allies “breathing room, however brief” by encouraging expectations of an imminent settlement.
The Mecca pact’s limits
Iran has good reason to approach the Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani framework, commonly known as the Mecca pact, with caution. The agreement brings together three states with substantial military capabilities and extensive relations with Washington, raising questions about whether their security cooperation could eventually be directed against the Axis of Resistance.
For Riyadh, Yemen remains a central concern. Years of confrontation with the YAF have demonstrated Sanaa’s ability to impose high military and economic costs beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia’s renewed campaign has again brought its energy infrastructure and military installations within range of Yemeni retaliation, exposing the limits of the kingdom’s reliance on foreign military protection.
In Tehran, closer military coordination among the pact’s members could be seen as an attempt to contain the Axis of Resistance at a time when American security guarantees are becoming increasingly uncertain.
Iran’s participation in talks with the pact’s members carries no commitment to join their alliance. Tehran has made no such announcement, while Rezaei’s explanation of the summit emphasized the establishment of security through regional cooperation, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and an end to outside interference.
These objectives leave considerable differences between the participants. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan maintain security relationships with Washington, while Iran regards the American military presence as a principal source of regional instability. Their respective positions on armed resistance movements, Israeli aggression, and the obligations of any collective defense arrangement also remain unresolved.
The meeting produced a brief press statement confirming the participants’ intention to continue their dialogue, without setting out binding commitments. Rezaei indicated that further meetings would follow, suggesting that the four governments were exploring the foundations of a wider regional accommodation.
The initiative itself emerged from Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran the previous week, according to information obtained by The Cradle. Iranian officials also confirmed Pakistan’s proposal, describing the gathering as an opportunity to advance regional security arrangements based on shared interests and mutual trust.
Riyadh’s security dilemma
The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani alliance combines considerable military resources, diplomatic influence, and strategic relationships. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of its members to confront threats that may carry very different consequences for each country.
The limited assistance Pakistan and Turkiye have provided during the renewed confrontation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia illustrates these constraints. Although both countries have pledged support for Riyadh, their involvement has fallen short of the decisive intervention that might alter the military balance with the YAF.
Saudi Arabia’s own account of the visit was more restrained. In a statement following the meeting, Riyadh said the talks formed part of efforts to de-escalate tensions, encourage diplomatic solutions, and support mediation by Qatar and Pakistan. It also reaffirmed the Mecca pact’s role in promoting regional security and stability.
Islamabad and Ankara have also sought to limit their military involvement. Turkish officials have ruled out offensive operations against Yemen, while Pakistan has denied reports that its aircraft carried out strikes on Yemeni forces. These restrictions expose the distance between the pact’s collective defense commitments and its members’ willingness to enter a wider war.
The continuing Yemeni operations against Saudi targets have consequently strengthened the argument for direct engagement with Tehran. Riyadh must weigh the costs of further confrontation against the possibility of reaching an understanding with Iran, whose regional relationships and military capabilities remain central to the wider balance of power.
Despite the damage inflicted during the war, Tehran has retained the ability to influence the course and costs of regional confrontation. Its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and its capacity to retaliate against military infrastructure have complicated Washington’s efforts to impose a settlement on its own terms.
These developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, although translating military endurance into a durable security arrangement will require more than the recognition of its regional weight. Tehran must also demonstrate that cooperation with its neighbors can reduce the likelihood of renewed war without undermining the relationships that have helped it withstand external pressure.
For Saudi Arabia, the lesson is equally significant. Its security cannot be guaranteed indefinitely through military partnerships that exclude one of the region’s principal powers, particularly when those partnerships have struggled to prevent attacks on Saudi territory.
Yemen cannot be traded
The suggestion that Tehran might trade its relationship with Ansarallah for concessions from Riyadh overlooks the movement’s independent political interests and roots in Yemen. Ansarallah’s resistance to Saudi intervention grew out of a prolonged struggle over the country’s political future, during which its ties with Iran deepened.
The two sides share important strategic interests, but Yemen’s military and political decisions cannot be reduced to directives from Tehran. The YAF’s intervention in support of Gaza, its confrontation with Israel, and its continuing war with Saudi Arabia reflect calculations shaped by Yemen’s own circumstances.
Iran’s regional relationships have also evolved through years of confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv. The Islamic Republic’s resistance to American and Israeli pressure has become inseparable from its wider regional security calculations, particularly as the war has intensified the threats facing its allies.
Sanaa has paid a substantial price for its military and political positions, enduring years of bombardment, blockade, and attempts to dismantle its authority. Ansarallah’s survival has given it considerable influence over Yemen’s future, making any settlement negotiated without its participation unlikely to produce lasting results.
The assumption that Tehran could simply secure Yemeni compliance also underestimates the political consequences of such an arrangement. The Sanaa government would have little reason to accept an agreement that disregards its security interests or leaves Saudi military pressure intact.
Rezaei’s meeting with the Yemeni ambassador therefore served an important political purpose. As Tehran opened discussions with the Mecca pact’s members, it reaffirmed a relationship whose continuity remains important to the wider Resistance Axis.
Israel’s declining leverage
The summit’s joint statement made no reference to Israel, but Rezaei’s subsequent account of the talks placed Israeli military operations among the issues discussed. He said the participants had emphasized ending Israeli attacks and securing Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.
Before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Saudi–Israeli normalization was a serious diplomatic prospect. Washington sought to advance Israel’s integration into a regional security and economic framework that would strengthen its position while isolating Iran and its allies.
The wars that followed have disrupted those calculations. Israel’s military campaigns across West Asia, alongside the American war against Iran, have exposed the risks associated with a regional order built around Israeli military superiority and US security guarantees.
Rezaei’s public emphasis on Israeli aggression reflects the changing circumstances in which the talks took place. Riyadh has not formally adopted his characterization in the joint statement and maintains its longstanding relationship with Washington, but Saudi security concerns have increasingly brought it into direct contact with Tehran despite years of hostility.
The contrast with 2017 is especially revealing. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) then threatened to take the confrontation inside Iran, reflecting Riyadh’s confidence in its ability to challenge Tehran through regional pressure and military alliances.
Nearly a decade later, Saudi officials are in Tehran discussing regional security with the same government Riyadh once threatened to attack. Years of confrontation have failed to break Iran’s regional influence, while Washington’s ability to shield its allies from another war is increasingly in doubt.
Yemen’s ability to remain a consequential military actor despite years of Saudi-led operations has also shaped this reassessment. Its continued resistance has demonstrated the limits of attempts to impose regional arrangements through military force.
Tehran’s next move
The summit’s lasting significance will depend on whether the participating governments can translate their discussions into practical security arrangements. Iran has an opportunity to advance its longstanding position that West Asia’s security must be determined by the countries of the region, without dependence on foreign military intervention.
Such an arrangement would require Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan to recognize Iran’s security concerns and its existing alliances. Tehran would also have to address its neighbors’ security concerns without compromising those relationships.
The presence of all four countries in Tehran suggests that these questions are now receiving serious attention. Rezaei’s subsequent meeting with Yemen’s ambassador also indicated the basis on which Iran intends to participate: regional cooperation alongside continued support for its established allies.
Any regional agreement must also account for Yemen and the other members of the Axis of Resistance. Their military and political weight cannot be ignored, nor can their futures be decided through negotiations between Tehran and its neighbors.
Iran has emerged from the war with its regional alliances intact and greater room to negotiate. The question now is whether Riyadh and its partners are prepared to reach an understanding with Tehran that recognizes those alliances rather than seeking to dismantle them.
The Saudi Minister of Defense, Prince Khalid, brother of MbS; the Turkey head of intel, Ibrahim Kalin; and the military head of Pakistan, Field Marshal Asim Munir, all three full members of the Mecca Defense Alliance, enter a lavish room in the proverbial Persian palace to greet – or kiss the ring – of the potentate, sorry, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Moshen Rezaee, number two of the Iranian power structure right below Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.
This was not the Mecca Defense Alliance ostensibly on parade – representing neo-Ottomans, Arabs and South Asians. This was the Tehran Summit – as defined by the Persians.
Iran had only agreed to hold this ground-breaking summit – actually suggested by Asim Munir during his visit to Tehran last week – outside of the framework of the Mecca deal, and explicitly within the framework of discussing “endogenous regional security.”
So yes, they did discuss Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Gulf security and the Strait of Hormuz, in the spirit of reducing the proverbial “regional tensions” and ending the U.S. war against Iran and the Axis of Resistance.
The Tehran Summit may eventually signify the – reluctant or otherwise – acceptance of Iran’s security demands and the final status of the Strait of Hormuz, being elaborated via the Iran-Oman agreement.
It all depends, of course, on what the House of Saud will finally decide. And this decision is directly linked to how Riyadh will solve its deadly clash against Yemen.
Tehran was explicit: we are prepared to mediate and assist in resolving the Yemen dossier; however, it’s up to Riyadh to address – and accept – Ansarallah’s conditions. Otherwise, the – pre-existing – war will keep going on.
Deconstructing the “seven conditions”
It was Dr. Ali Bagheri Kani, the immensely competent Deputy Secretary of the SNSC, who offered the best inside view of what was being discussed at the table.
1.The four nations identified Israel as the main source of regional instability, with Iran as its immediate target and other countries potentially next (italics mine). The other source is the United States. Imagine Prince Khalid agreeing to all of the above.
An agreement on lasting security in West Asia must be built from within, without dependence on foreign powers.
Tehran positioned itself as the central link (italics mine) connecting Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. Feel free to be gobsmacked.
All four nations agreed to continue talking. Iran will coordinate the next meeting. No date or location yet.
Now add to this already stunning framework a Mohsen Rezaee Unplugged special: he was definitely in a much more cheerful mood than usual.
Take this highlight:
“I feel the presence of a new atmosphere in the region. It has formed thanks to the resistance of the Iranian people and the capability of the armed forces. I have sensed an extremely positive atmosphere in the discussions with these gentlemen.”
Even as he praised “the success of this rhetorical discussion and statements”, Rezaee was cautious: “We preferred not to issue any statement at the present time, but we will issue a single joint statement in which we agree on these points and reach an understanding, and the implementation of these matters will be practical and real, and we will move forward with them.”
Meanwhile, a Sisyphean task remains: how to force the Empire of Piracy to understand diplomacy in West Asia.
Bagheri-Kani: “The United States must fulfill Iran’s seven conditions.” He then added, “Rezaee mentioned today that the seven-day plan could be shortened to five days or even four.”
Let’s deconstruct these numbers.
The seven conditions remain the same: they are the abridged version of that serially dead cat, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which Trump himself tore up and insists it means nothing.
Recap: lifting sanctions; ceasing military threats; recognizing Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy; ending support for Israel; acknowledging Iran’s sovereign rights over the Strait of Hormuz; halting interference in Iran’s internal affairs; and providing credible guarantees against future aggression.
Even camels in the middle of the Nejd know the Exceptionals will never fulfill any of these commitments.
What changes now is the timeline. According to the original plan, in the unlikely event the U.S. would fulfill the conditions, on the sixth day the Strait of Hormuz would be opened; and on the seventh day, like in an act of divine will, negotiations would begin.
Rezaee’s new proposal can only be interpreted as a joyful tease: everything can be done in five days or even four days, why not?
Rezaee is essentially saying that all the seven conditions remain; but if Trump is really interested in negotiations (he’s not: he wants a capitulation), Iran doesn’t need to wait for seven days. Four will do.
Whatever happens next – and after the U.S. mid-terms might well be a Trumpian military attack – it’s Tehran that still runs the clock. Plus the seven conditions – which are the prerequisites for any negotiation. Plus the timeframe. Plus the fact that if there’s no movement, the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed.
What Bagheri-Kani and Rezaee – the top two security guys – are emphasizing is that Iran has presented an invoice to the Empire of Piracy. By the way, every single item on the invoice has already been signed off on by POTUS himself, however he tries to extricate himself.
It’s “endogenous” security or bust
At first sight the Mecca Defense Alliance was supposed to be seen as a powerful Sunni-led collective security/defense alignment.
Yet the last thing the strategically deprived Empire of Piracy would expect is that the trio would start exploring avenues of cooperation with the nation they were being forced to treat as an existential threat.
Never underestimate the Persians. Displaying their usual finesse, what they have just done is to strategically turn containment of Iran on its head.
In the near future Iran might even contemplate joining the Mecca Defense Alliance – which quite a few serious Muslim scholars actually describe as a blasphemy on Mecca.
Before that, the petro-sheikhs – those Persian Gulf counterparts of the Baltic chihuahuas – may have met their doom, in case they are helpless to defuse the relentless Anglo-Salafi incitement of sectarian wars.
Iranians are as much worshippers of sacred Mecca and Medina as Yemenis – as both were directly praised by the Prophet (Iranians were singled out as unparalleled in the discernment of knowledge and the pursuit of wisdom).
And that ultimately explains why this meeting was defined as the Tehran Summit – with nothing to do with the notion of a “Mecca” pact.
As for Yemenis, Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, a key member of Ansarallah’s Supreme Political Council, laid down the law: he blasted Saudi Arabia’s claims of seeking regional de-escalation through Prince Khalid’s visit to Tehran, emphasizing that Riyadh’s diplomatic rhetoric contradicts the continued war, blockade, and occupation of Yemen.
After the Tehran Summit, Leader Mojtaba Khamenei met Mohsen Rezaee in person. Number One talking to Number Two.
Khamenei explicitly called for ending the current state of “neither war nor peace” by ensuring that the seven conditions are met, and by “maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz.”
Rezaee actually briefed Khamenei on the idea of “endogenous” security across West Asia. Talk about a direct counterpart to the Russian drive for “indivisibility of security” in late 2021, which was then met by a non-response response by the U.S. and NATO.
Yet now, the ball is entirely on West Asia’s court. The U.S. is not even on the table. It’s up to Turkey, Saudi, Pakistan and Iran to make it happen.
Arab parties in Israel have rejected accusations of foreign funding and accused Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of trying to scare the opposition against dealing with Israeli Arab politicians.
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