On October 25, Brazil’s three-time and current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, surprised the entire world by overcoming an electoral setback in the first round (in which he was defeated by the far-right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro) and securing victory and the presidential seat in Brasília.

Lula, the legendary union leader during the dictatorship, secured 51.79%, equivalent to 64,256,232 votes, while Bolsonaro (son of the detained former president Jair Bolsonaro) received 48.21%, or 59,826,041 votes.

What is truly surprising about Bolsonaro’s defeat (given that most pollsters had predicted a very likely victory for him) is the enormous number of votes Lula managed to gain during the three weeks between the first and second rounds of voting. In that first round, Bolsonaro took first place with 48.21% (more than 56 million votes), and Lula came in second with 45.15% (just under 54 million votes).

Many believed that the nearly 9 million votes obtained by all the other candidates combined in the first round would be distributed in a way more favorable to Bolsonaro, since most of those votes were cast for right-wing and center-right candidates. This seemed even more evident after many of the leaders of those parties endorsed Bolsonaro.

Added to this question was the high probability that, in a society highly polarized between the two candidates, many voters who either cast blank or invalid ballots or abstained from voting in the first round would support one of the two candidates.

Indeed, both of these circumstances played out. According to available data, more than 14 million Brazilians who had voted for other candidates, cast invalid ballots, or abstained from voting participated in the runoff, supporting either Lula or Bolsonaro.

And this is precisely the key factor in understanding Lula’s victory. Assuming that very few voters would have switched their support from Lula to Bolsonaro or vice versa, it is important to note that of those 14 million votes that were redistributed, Lula managed to secure 10.37 million more votes than he received in the first round, while Bolsonaro managed to gain just under 4 million votes. This was enough for Lula not only to close the gap against his opponent but also to surpass him by a comfortable margin.

What happened in Brazil?

Faced with this surprising turn of events, hundreds of analysts in Latin America and around the world have rushed to present countless charts, hypotheses, and analyses in an effort to fully understand the reasons behind this victory. And the reasons have to do not only with the clearly impressive comeback by Lula’s Workers’ Party and its allies, but also with the fact that he appears to have put a halt to a seemingly unstoppable string of victories by the far right in Latin America.

Given this, the question seems clear: How did Lula manage to convince such a staggering number of people to vote for him in the runoff who had not done so in the first round? In response, technical reasons have been put forward (such as campaign strategy, the use of social media, and mass mobilization), as well as political ones (fear of a far-right government, social-class alliances, the formation of a broad-based coalition, etc.).

Among the technical reasons, Lula’s tremendous effort to turn the runoff campaign into a genuine, nearly constant mass mobilization (in both large cities and small towns) has been highlighted. The former union leader once again demonstrated his great charisma and ability to rally people before thousands of PT activists and members of other allied parties who fought day and night without stopping to overturn the result.

Added to this is the PT’s digital strategy; the party had repeatedly accused major social media platforms of boycotting the presidential campaign by hindering or reducing the visibility of Lula’s ads – but not those of Bolsonaro. In response, André Janones proposed a change in strategy.

Lula’s WhatsApp channel grew from 3.7 million subscribers to more than 10 million in the span of 12 days. Through this channel, users were instructed to post certain messages, search for information online, comment on specific posts, and so on. In other words, to circumvent an algorithmic system that, they claimed, was deliberately sabotaging Lula’s campaign.

The result was astonishing: despite the alleged media blockade on social media, the platforms were flooded with messages, images, and videos (many generated by AI) featuring Lula and attacking Bolsonaro’s candidacy, which undoubtedly had a major impact on the political communication strategy of the PT’s campaign, led by re-elected Governor Rafael Fonteles. For example, online interactions about Lula increased from 41% to 65% during the runoff election.

But Lula also took the risk of bringing about tangible changes in people’s lives, and he sent what may have been his final message during the runoff election, when his party and allies succeeded in passing legislation to end the six-day workweek. The move was celebrated by the country’s workers and clearly gave Lula’s campaign a pro-worker tone. That is why he gained so many millions of votes in the second round of the election in the working-class suburbs of major cities.

Read more: Brazil’s Congress ends 6×1 work schedule

And yet, there remains a certain suspicion that if this set of measures had been applied in any other similar situation, something would have been missing to set it in motion and give deeper meaning to the purely political campaign – with its communication, marketing, and other tactical decisions. And that something is Lula.

At times it seems that only someone with his political stature, his charisma, and the historic place he has already carved out in the history books could have won an election in Latin America against the far right, which enjoys the support of the most influential imperial powers of our time and an international oligarchy.

The “warrior of the Brazilian people

Lula achieved this, as already mentioned, thanks to a series of changes in his campaign strategy and concrete improvements in people’s lives. But it must be said without fear of contradiction: he did so by blending two dimensions that might seem contradictory, yet which a figure like him could bring together.

The first is that, as some of his campaign strategists recount, he began to speak extensively about Brazil’s future despite having already served as president three times. In this way, he moved away from nostalgia for the past and began to speak of hope for the future.

And second, Lula insisted throughout the campaign that this future was threatened by the Bolsonaros, whom he constantly linked to a submissive attitude toward US interests. In this way, Lula also employed a discourse of fear and danger, personifying it in Bolsonaro, who, as is well known, had reportedly left Brazil for the United States.

But Lula did not do so in a pitiful or apocalyptic way; rather, he presented himself as the only one capable of halting that advance. And more than just capable, as the only one who, without a doubt, would do so. In other words, Lula established himself, at the age of 80, as a “warrior of the Brazilian people,” just as his supporters chanted in the streets.

Then, in the debates (which undoubtedly had a huge impact on the runoff election) it seems Lula had had enough of the far right always appearing to be on the offensive, while the left and progressives always seemed to be waiting for the next blow. Lula put on his boxing gloves and began playing the game the far right had set for him … and won by knockout.

And for that very reason, Lula, his followers, and many of those who supported him (not necessarily because they believe in his agenda, but because they feared a new far-right government, as the numbers show) must realize that, with a hostile legislature and an opposition united around a single family, Lula’s fourth term will likely be the most difficult of his life.

Lula will have to seek ways to overcome the clear obstacles that the right and the far right will place in his path in order to achieve what he called “the best government in Brazil’s history.” For now, he has managed to prevent another Bolsonaro from reaching the presidency, but that does not mean the remainder of his term will be a “Brazilian pax.” 

In this regard, there is a Japanese proverb that Lula should keep in mind: “When you’ve won a battle, tighten your helmet.”

Brazilian progressive leader and incumbent president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made history last night, defeating far-right Flávio Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party in the second round after coming in second in the first round.

The results were awaited with bated breath after a judge ordered polls to be open for two more hours following complaints from voters who claimed they had been unable to reach polling places due to transportation problems. First the Workers’ Party (PT), and then the Liberal Party (PL), requested the extension, which paused the vote count until 7:00 pm in Brasília, the capital.

With 51.79% of the valid votes, the former union leader, metalworker, and head of the Workers’ Party staged a historic comeback against Bolsonaro, who lost the initial momentum he had in the first round and barely reached 48.21%. This is the first time a candidate who finished second in Brazil’s first round has staged a comeback and won the election in the runoff.

Bolsonaro entered the runoff with a relative – though significant – lead following his victory in the first round of voting on October 4, where he received 47.03% (approximately 56,104,503 votes), while Lula, to the surprise of many, came in second with 45.16% (53,879,538 votes).

In other words, there was a gap of nearly 3 million votes between the two candidates that seemed very difficult for Lula to overcome, especially considering that the remaining votes were split among candidates who were mostly from the right and center-right – a fact that led many to believe that Bolsonaro, the son of former president and currently imprisoned Jair Bolsonaro, would win the runoff.

But Lula, a true legend of Brazilian politics (a labor leader during the dictatorship who won the presidency three times), achieved the unthinkable. Between the first and second rounds of voting, he managed to gain more than 10 million votes compared to the first round – an astronomical figure, considering that Bolsonaro barely managed to gain some 3.7 million votes.

Lula’s victory

After it was clear that Lula’s victory was irreversible, the Brazilian streets were filled with people wearing the traditional red of the Workers’ Party. However, the victory was celebrated by a sort of broad coalition that had formed to overturn the result – one that spanned the political spectrum from classical left-wing parties and movements, to progressive liberals, and even some center-right groups that saw Bolsonaro as a threat to democracy.

In his speech marking his fourth presidential victory, Lula said: “I want to thank the Brazilian people – those who have stood by me for so long – and express my gratitude for the generosity of Brazil’s young people … We are going to change the way this country is governed … we are going to involve the people more. Digital communication will play a very significant role in this administration. I will deliver the best presidential term this country has ever seen.”

“Following our victory, we will have to discuss a new way of governing this country. The people’s participation in this campaign – the students, women, and workers who took to the streets – will compel us to find a new way of governing. This country will never be the same again,” said the reelected president.

Lula also stated that the debates against Bolsonaro and the PL campaign were riddled with lies and “denialism”: “I never thought a person could lie so much in this country, with such brazenness, as if there were not a single shred of humanity within him.”

Finally, he also addressed the problems his campaign faced regarding the dissemination of its messages on social media. The PT repeatedly denounced that the major social media platforms hindered or outright prevented the spread of its political messages, while Bolsonaro’s messages faced no such issues.

Is Meta meddling in Brazil's elections? With Sunday's runoff neck and neck, new reporting raises serious questions.

The pattern is hard to ignore: Lula's campaign was blocked from boosting Instagram posts for nearly 24 hours, his ad account was previously restricted, and… pic.twitter.com/DVjDWJa7Xw

— BreakThrough News (@BTnewsroom) October 23, 2026

Hence, he suggested placing limits on the power of the major corporations behind social media platforms – a stance he has taken on other occasions and which has caused friction with tech giants: “We cannot fail to recognize that a crime in the digital world must be treated the same as a crime in real life. We cannot have monstrous companies of this size – which make billions without paying taxes to our country – trying to alter election results,” Lula said in his victory speech.

Bolsonaro’s reaction

For his part, far-right politician Flávio Bolsonaro said he “rejects” the election results and announced that he will seek to have the election annulled: “We are going to consult with our legal team; we are going to request that these elections be annulled. I will not accept that the rules of the game have been changed in the middle of the game – once again – by Lula’s friends on the Federal Supreme Court.”

Bolsonaro, who delivered his speech to his supporters, was referring to the extension of voting hours. According to his team, the extension was ordered after the polling stations had closed, which, they claimed, violates Brazilian electoral rules – even though the PL itself had also requested the extension.

This is not the first time that Bolsonaro’s supporters have rejected Lula’s victory. In 2022, it was Jair Bolsonaro who refused to acknowledge his defeat. Months later, during Lula’s inauguration, hundreds of Bolsonaro supporters violently stormed several government buildings, after which investigations were launched into an alleged attempted coup d’état. One of those found guilty in the case was Jair Bolsonaro himself, who is currently serving a sentence for that crime.

However, it will be difficult for Bolsonaro’s allegations to gain traction in Brazil’s immediate future. With the exception of Argentina’s far-right politician Milei, South American countries – through their heads of state and foreign ministries – have publicly congratulated Lula on his victory, which amounts to a de facto recognition of his win.

However, the Bolsonaros still have the Trump administration as a last resort, as it has publicly supported the PL candidate, just as it did with his father in the past. This is the first time since Trump began his second term that a candidate he supported in a Latin American country has failed to win, which still raises questions about what Washington’s stance will be regarding Lula’s historic victory – a victory in which, against all odds, he managed to defeat Washington’s candidate and thus halted a wave of far-right victories in Latin America.

The week before October 25 in Brazil was frenetic. It appeared that every one of the over 200 million Brazilians had a political opinion about the presidential election. The country was fundamentally polarized. Polls showed that the vote was going to be tight, with most polls favoring the challenger Flávio Bolsonaro, son of the former president Jair Bolsonaro, and the standard bearer of the far right of a special type. But the incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula and president of Brazil from 2003 to 2011 and then since 2023, would not allow the polls to stop him. He traveled the length and breadth of the country, holding massive and energetic rallies to mobilize people to vote. In the first round, 21% of the voters did not turn out in a process that is otherwise compulsory (and a large section who did vote left the presidential section either unmarked or spoiled). Only 2.2 million ballots separated Bolsonaro (who won 47% in the first round) from Lula of the 158.7 million registered voters. To win between October 4 (first round) and October 25 (second round), Lula had to either attract people who had voted for Bolsonaro or those who had not voted or spoiled their ballots. No other candidate had turned around such a deficit in Brazil’s modern history. But Lula did it.

Streets

In the three weeks between the first and second rounds, Lula and his team motivated millions of people onto the streets in the large cities of Brazil, but also in several smaller, but significant towns. These enormous mobilizations created a sense that Lula would overcome the mathematical disadvantage presented by the voting numbers after the first round. All psephological analyses showed that Bolsonaro would cruise through in the second round, which would have indicated the impossibility for Lula. But the left did not rest on this handicap but went on the offensive.

In the first round, Bolsonaro finished 2.22 million votes ahead, but in the runoff, Lula finished with 4.43 million votes ahead. The margin moved by 6.66 million votes. These votes came from the large cities: the 319 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, home to 57% of Brazil’s population, delivered 3.89 of the 6.66 million of the turnaround. Lula’s vote grew more in municipalities that are more evangelical, richer, whiter, more schooled, and more urban. This meant that he ate substantially into Bolsonaro’s base, which was something that surprised even the Lula team. The key to the turnaround was the mass mobilizations driven by the social movements, with the Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) in the lead.

Advances

Across his three terms, Lula has presided over an extraordinary advance in the social conditions of the Brazilian people. Bolsa Família, increases in the minimum wage, the expansion of public universities, and support for family farming brought food, income, and opportunity into households that the ruling class had long treated as disposable. These achievements changed millions of lives and established that poverty could be confronted through public action. Yet the political formula that made these advances possible has reached its limits. Lula sought to improve the lives of the poor while accommodating the power of finance, agribusiness, and the dominant sections of Brazilian capital. During his first two terms, favorable international conditions created room for this accommodation. But redistribution without a corresponding transformation of economic power left the foundations of inequality intact, allowing the beneficiaries of the old order to retain the means to obstruct change and reverse its gains.

In his third term, fiscal restrictions, expensive credit, and dependence on conservative parliamentary forces have narrowed the space for reform. Social programs remain indispensable, but they cannot by themselves overcome insecure employment, household indebtedness, inadequate public services, or the concentration of land and wealth. The exhaustion lies in a governing strategy whose compromises increasingly obstruct the fulfilment of its promises. Lula’s personal authority cannot indefinitely bridge the distance between popular expectations and the concessions demanded by the powerful. A renewed project will require the organized strength of workers, peasants, and residents of the urban peripheries, the very people who form Lula’s base, with an agenda of agrarian reform, public investment, industrial development, and democratic control over finance. The movements that filled the streets must acquire greater power to shape the government’s direction. Defeating the far right opens that possibility, but securing the social gains of the Lula years will require confronting the structures that continually threaten them.

Defeat of Trump

US President Donald Trump, his vice president JD Vance, and members of the Brazilian diaspora in Miami put an immense amount of effort into defeating Lula. Brazil, which makes up half the landmass of South America, and is the largest economy in Latin America, stands out against the wave of far-right governments that now dominate the Americas. Interference in the Brazilian elections is now an acknowledged fact, with Meta cutting off Lula’s accounts at a crucial stage of the contest and other reports of funding and social media intervention.

Trump had hoped that Bolsonaro would win in Brazil so that he can then strengthen his Shield of the Americas process that began in Miami in March 2026. This process was presented by Trump as an institutional form to coordinate security but also for the suffocation of the popular movements and the left. Lula’s victory has blocked Trump’s path to exercise the Monroe Doctrine. It has also meant that Trump will not be able to so easily access the critical minerals in Brazil or to dominate the new oil find in the basin of the Amazon delta.

Despite the obstacles faced by Lula, his victory has been able to show that the far right is not invincible.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books (New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

The approval of Constitutional Amendment Proposal (PEC) 221 of 2019 by the Federal Senate establishes the most profound alteration in the organization of the Brazilian work schedule since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution. The text eliminates the model of six days of work followed by one day of rest and sets a maximum work week of 40 hours with two paid weekly rest days, without salary reduction.

Because it is a constitutional amendment, the text does not depend on the sanction or veto of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT). Promulgation is the responsibility of the presiding officers of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in a joint session of the National Congress. Once promulgated and published in the Official Gazette of the Union (DOU), the amendment enters into force in a phased manner, with specific adaptation periods for companies, professional categories, and the public sector.

Transition timeline

The transition from the 44-hour work week to the definitive model of 40 hours per week and five working days followed by two days off (5×2 schedule) will occur in two main stages:

First stage (60 days after publication): Two months after the amendment is published, workers become entitled to two paid days off per week, preferably on Sundays. At the same time, the weekly working hours limit is reduced from 44 to 42 hours.

Second stage (14 months after publication): after 12 months from the implementation of the first stage, totaling 14 months from the official publication, the maximum weekly workload is definitively reduced to 40 hours, with a limit of eight hours per day.

During the 12-month period in which the 42-hour weekly limit will be in effect, employers must distribute the two extra hours across the weekdays. If distributed evenly across the five working days, the daily work schedule becomes 8 hours and 24 minutes.

Collective labor agreements and conventions may authorize daily work schedules exceeding eight hours during this transitional period to accommodate the 42-hour schedule, provided that the two weekly days off are strictly maintained.

Once the 14-month transition period is complete, any activity exceeding eight hours per day or 40 hours per week will require the payment of overtime or compensation through a time bank, mechanisms that remain permitted under labor law.

Special schedules and shifts

The new constitutional guidelines do not impose a single work schedule format for the entire market and safeguard the operation of continuous activities and essential services. Uninterrupted services, such as hospitals and health units, public safety, public transportation, urban cleaning, and surveillance, may adopt specific models for organizing and compensating working hours through collective bargaining agreements or conventions.

In these areas, the traditional 12-hour work shift followed by 36 hours of rest (12×36 shift) is not automatically eliminated by the PEC, but will need to be adapted at the negotiating table between employers’ and workers’ unions.

The reorganization of shifts must take into account the reduction of the weekly workload and the minimum rest and meal periods stipulated in the Constitution. The text also refers to future specific laws for the complementary regulation of conditions for categories with their own operational characteristics.

In the case of workers subjected to prolonged confinement, such as on offshore oil platforms, amendments proposing prior exceptions in the constitutional text were rejected by rapporteur Omar Aziz. The parliamentarian pointed out that the work regime for offshore oil workers should be subject to subsequent legal regulation.

Compensation and average monthly days off

The proposed amendment allows companies and unions to establish, exceptionally and through collective agreement or convention, work schedule compensation regimes with shifts different from the 5×2 format, including enabling the eventual continuation of the 6×1 shift schedule.

For this flexibility to be valid before the Labor Court, the proposal requires compliance with two mandatory criteria: the worked days off must be fully compensated within the same calendar month; and the worker is entitled to at least one day of rest within a maximum period of one week of service, and must reach, at the end of the month, an average of two paid days off per week.

The three express exceptions

The text approved by Congress establishes differentiated rules and specific conditions for three groups of workers and economic sectors:

Outsourced public administration workers: To safeguard the continuity of essential public services and preserve the economic and financial balance of administrative contracts, outsourced companies providing services to the State will have up to 12 months after the enactment to adjust their work schedules, instead of the general 60-day period. Contracts amended after 60 days from the publication must already comply with the new schedule. If the public authority and the service providers do not formalize an addendum within one year, the reduction in working hours for outsourced workers will automatically take effect, without a reduction in salary.

Professionals with a university degree and salaries starting at R$ 21,100: the so-called “highly qualified workers,” who are employees with a university degree and a monthly salary equal to or greater than 2.5 times the ceiling of Social Security benefits (currently R$ 21,188.87), are exempt from general daily working hour limits and timekeeping. These professionals can negotiate their schedules directly with the company, but retain the constitutional right to two days of paid weekly rest. This exception does not apply to public employees.

Brazilian labor law already provides for situations where there is no traditional control of working hours, such as in the case of employees who hold positions of trust or who work outside the company in activities where it is not possible to control their hours.

Individual micro-entrepreneurs and small businesses: the proposed constitutional amendment (PEC) stipulates that a subsequent complementary law will create transitional measures for mitigation and fiscal or credit support for individual micro-entrepreneurs, micro-enterprises, and small businesses. The granting of these benefits will be expressly conditional upon maintaining jobs and employment levels in these establishments.

Current contracts and old agreements

The application of the new work schedule to existing employment contracts is direct and immediate, requiring no formal re-hiring or termination of employment. The Constitution guarantees the principle of non-reduction of wages, prohibiting any nominal cut or proportional reduction in employee salaries or in the minimum wages of professional categories.

For workers who already work 40 hours a week or less, the amendment does not create a further reduction in weekly working hours. However, these employees will now have a guaranteed right to two paid days of weekly rest.

In the labor union sphere, clauses in previously agreed collective bargaining agreements and conventions that address working hours or weekly rest periods and are incompatible with the new constitutional parameters will lose all legal validity 60 days after the amendment is published.

Impact on the labor market

The shift to a new work schedule affects tens of millions of workers in operational, customer service, and ongoing production roles across the country.

A technical survey prepared by the Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (Dieese), based on the Continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), indicates that the measure will directly benefit 26.8 million workers.

The contingent consists of 22 million employees with formal contracts in the formal sector (equivalent to 54% of the country’s formal workers) and approximately 4.8 million informal workers who register weekly work schedules exceeding 40 hours.

Data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MTE) indicates that 14.8 million formal workers were directly subject to the 6×1 work schedule in 2025, while another 29.7 million were already working on the 5×2 schedule.

The scope of the change is also reflected in the profile of contracted work schedules in Brazil. Studies by the National Confederation of Commerce of Goods, Services and Tourism (CNC), structured from the Annual Social Information Report (Rais), reveal that 35.7 million workers under the CLT (Consolidation of Labor Laws), about 62% of the formal Brazilian workforce, currently work schedules ranging between 40 and 44 hours per week.

Read in English here

Las elecciones generales de Brasil del 4 de octubre representaron una severa advertencia para la izquierda. Flávio Bolsonaro, el candidato presidencial del Partido Liberal (PL), superó al presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, con aproximadamente un 47% frente a un 45%. Ninguno de los dos obtuvo la mayoría, lo que los llevará a una segunda vuelta el 25 de octubre. Más preocupante que este estrecho margen presidencial fue el avance del bolsonarismo en el Congreso. Las elecciones han fortalecido un movimiento político cuyas ambiciones van más allá de derrotar a Lula para llegar a remodelar las instituciones que obstaculizan su ejercicio del poder.

El encarcelamiento (arresto domiciliario) y la exclusión electoral de Jair Bolsonaro no han disuelto su movimiento. Su hijo Flávio lleva su estandarte presidencial, mientras que otros miembros de la familia han obtenido escaños en el Congreso. Michelle Bolsonaro, esposa de Jair, y Carlos Bolsonaro, su hijo, ingresan al Senado; Jair Renan, otro de sus hijos, y Renato, hermano de Jair, ingresan a la Cámara de Diputados. Nepobolsonarismo es un nombre apropiado para la expansión de esta familia a través del Estado. Sin embargo, la familia es solo la expresión más visible de un proyecto más amplio, arraigado en poderosos intereses económicos y en una política reaccionaria profundamente organizada.

Una contienda presidencial con implicaciones continentales

Lula sigue siendo el principal obstáculo para el regreso de este proyecto a la presidencia. Su derrota afectaría a los trabajadores y campesinos de todo Brasil, pero también a las posibilidades de cooperación regional y de una política exterior latinoamericana independiente. El tamaño de Brasil, su capacidad industrial, sus minerales en bruto (como los minerales críticos), sus recursos agrícolas y su alcance diplomático otorgan a su orientación política una importancia continental. Un gobierno que subordine estos activos a las prioridades de Washington debilitaría el espacio disponible para los países vecinos que buscan sus propios caminos de desarrollo.

La distribución geográfica de la primera vuelta pone de manifiesto tanto la fortaleza de Lula como sus dificultades. Mantuvo una posición dominante en el Noreste, mientras que Flávio lideró en las otras cuatro regiones. El enorme electorado de São Paulo proporcionó una ventaja particularmente importante a la derecha. Estas divisiones no pueden explicarse mediante una oposición entre una población ilustrada y otra ignorante. Requieren un análisis de las diferentes condiciones laborales, la organización de la vida política y la capacidad de los movimientos rivales para interpretar las frustraciones de la gente.

Lula llega a la segunda vuelta con un historial social sustancial. El desempleo cayó al 5,3% en el trimestre que finalizó en agosto, la tasa más baja para ese período en la serie estadística que comienza en 2012. Estas mejoras son de enorme importancia para las familias para quienes un salario regular supone un alivio frente a la incertidumbre cotidiana. Sin embargo, un indicador nacional mejorado no zanja la discusión política. El empleo puede coexistir con desplazamientos agotadores, viviendas costosas, servicios públicos inadecuados y la inseguridad que genera la deuda. La brecha entre la mejora estadística y la experiencia vivida sigue siendo un terreno en el que opera la derecha.

El bolsonarismo, o la extrema derecha brasileña de un tipo especial, traduce estas frustraciones en resentimiento contra la izquierda, todas las instituciones públicas y los sectores vulnerables de la sociedad. Su promesa de orden ofrece un lenguaje inmediato para el miedo, al tiempo que oculta los mecanismos económicos que generan inseguridad.

La izquierda no puede responder a esto simplemente promocionando los logros del gobierno. Debe vincular esos logros a un programa creíble para cambiar la vida cotidiana y explicar qué intereses impiden nuevos avances. Un trabajador que lucha contra las deudas necesita algo más que la seguridad de que la economía va bien. Este ha sido el problema de Lula, cuyo programa para el futuro no parece prometer más de lo que se ha logrado hasta ahora.

El Senado: una lucha por el poder institucional

Las elecciones al Senado son particularmente trascendentales porque se disputaron 54 de sus 81 escaños. Los senadores tienen mandatos de ocho años, por lo que los resultados marcarán la política nacional mucho más allá de la próxima administración presidencial. El PL obtuvo 19 escaños y contará con 28 en el nuevo Senado, lo que lo convierte en el partido más grande. El PT tendrá nueve. Los bolsonaristas han establecido, por lo tanto, una posición formidable, aunque el propio PL sigue sin alcanzar la mayoría y deberá negociar con otros partidos.

Michelle Bolsonaro y Bia Kicis obtuvieron los dos escaños del Distrito Federal, mientras que Carlos Bolsonaro y Carol de Toni ganaron los dos escaños de Santa Catarina. Estas victorias demuestran la capacidad del movimiento para organizar campañas coordinadas y concentrar el apoyo en torno a sus candidatos. Hubo éxitos importantes para la izquierda: Rui Costa y Jaques Wagner ganaron en Bahía, Humberto Costa conservó su representación en Pernambuco y Marília Campos ganó en Minas Gerais. Estos resultados preservan puntos de resistencia dentro de una cámara cada vez más hostil. La importancia del Senado va más allá de la legislación ordinaria. Los bolsonaristas han convertido su enfrentamiento con la Corte Suprema Federal en un objetivo político central, lo que incluye demandas para destituir a sus magistrados. Su representación reforzada aumenta su capacidad para llevar adelante ese enfrentamiento e influir en la elección del presidente del Senado. Las predicciones de una mayoría automática a favor del juicio político deben tomarse con cautela: la afiliación partidaria, las declaraciones de campaña y los votos en un procedimiento específico son cosas distintas. No obstante, el peligro de utilizar el poder legislativo para intimidar al poder judicial ha aumentado claramente.

Esto forma parte de una lucha por las condiciones bajo las cuales la extrema derecha puede gobernar. Los procesos judiciales contra Jair Bolsonaro no han eliminado a las fuerzas sociales que lo respaldan. Esas fuerzas buscan ahora una mayor influencia sobre las instituciones capaces de frenarlas. Para la izquierda, la defensa del espacio democrático debe, por lo tanto, ir de la mano de la lucha por ampliar los derechos sociales. Las organizaciones de trabajadores no pueden permitirse perder las libertades a través de las cuales se organizan, educan y se enfrentan al capital.

Diputados federales: la derecha avanza, la izquierda encuentra oportunidades

Este año se renovaron los 513 escaños de la Cámara de Diputados. El PL obtuvo 121, consolidando su posición como el partido más grande tanto en esta cámara como en el Senado. La federación del Partido de los Trabajadores, el Partido Comunista de Brasil y el Partido Verde ganó 88 escaños, de los cuales el propio PT obtuvo 70. El crecimiento de la federación es significativo, pero deja a los aliados de Lula lejos de alcanzar la mayoría. Los partidos de la derecha cuentan con 303 escaños, mientras que la izquierda parlamentaria en sentido amplio tiene 124.

El resultado fortalece a una extrema derecha de carácter particular dentro de una legislatura ya dominada por intereses conservadores. También debilita a algunos intermediarios tradicionales del poder parlamentario, como el centrão, la coalición de partidos que intercambia apoyo legislativo por influencia en los nombramientos y los recursos públicos, aunque sigue siendo indispensable para la formación de mayorías. Las negociaciones que se lleven a cabo dentro del centrão ahora se desarrollarán junto a un PL más grande y más asertivo. Si Lula gana en la segunda vuelta, se enfrentará a una resistencia sustancial en el Congreso; pero si gana Flávio, ese mismo Congreso podría facilitar un programa reaccionario.

Sin embargo, la elección también llevó a la Cámara a importantes representantes de una izquierda combativa. Jones Manoel, el historiador comunista elegido por el PSOL en Pernambuco, obtuvo 249.077 votos y quedó en primer lugar en Recife. Elias Jabbour, el geógrafo comunista, fue elegido por el PCdoB en Río de Janeiro. Sus victorias sugieren que existe un público receptivo a la educación política y a los argumentos socialistas, incluso en medio del avance de la derecha. Ofrecen recursos para reconstruir la confianza entre las personas que se han impacientado ante las ambiciones cada vez más limitadas de la política parlamentaria.

Jones Manoel ya se ha ofrecido a colaborar en la campaña de la segunda vuelta de Lula, incluida su comunicación digital, al tiempo que propone prestar mayor atención a demandas como el transporte público gratuito. Este es un ejemplo útil de claridad política: la crítica a las limitaciones del gobierno puede coexistir con una movilización activa contra una extrema derecha de un tipo especial. Dicha unidad no requiere que los trabajadores renuncien a sus demandas. Se fortalece cuando esas demandas aportan energía y dirección a la campaña.

La tarea antes del 25 de octubre

La segunda vuelta no se puede ganar únicamente mediante negociaciones entre los líderes de los partidos. Requiere una actividad organizada en los lugares de trabajo, los barrios, las universidades y las comunidades rurales, con un programa que la gente pueda reconocer en sus propias vidas. El transporte, los salarios, la vivienda, la deuda, la salud pública y el tiempo dedicado al trabajo deben convertirse en la esencia de una campaña democrática. La defensa de la soberanía se vuelve tangible cuando se vincula con la capacidad de utilizar la riqueza de Brasil para satisfacer las necesidades de su pueblo.

La marea furiosa ha avanzado, pero no ha arrastrado a los millones de personas que aún buscan otro Brasil. Los nuevos diputados comunistas, las organizaciones de masas que han sobrevivido (especialmente los trabajadores sin tierra del MST) y la enorme base electoral de Lula constituyen los cimientos de la resistencia. La tarea inmediata es derrotar a Flávio Bolsonaro. La tarea a más largo plazo es construir un poder popular lo suficientemente fuerte como para impedir que la oligarquía decida, elección tras elección, qué tan poco cambio se le permitirá a la mayoría.

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The election campaign in Brazil is at its peak. Candidates are stepping up their speeches, campaign ads are airing more frequently, and attacks on opponents are the order of the day. Brazilian political life has found its focal point, and that is the contest – as it is being portrayed – between two titans.

On one side is the country’s current president, the legendary labor union leader and head of the Workers’ Party, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva – a representative of progressivism and Brazil’s center-left – who has stated that he has chosen to run for reelection to prevent the far right from conquering one of the last countries to have resisted the new wave of far-right politics in South America.

Leading the charge is Flávio Bolsonaro, a senator from São Paulo who has stepped into the long shadow of his father, the neoliberal and ultra-conservative former president Jair Bolsonaro (a close friend of Trump’s) who is currently in custody, according to Brazilian authorities, for his role in an attempted coup d’état aimed at preventing the swearing-in of the current president, Lula.

The latest polls

For now, polls predict a potential runoff election (October 25) to determine the president, as neither candidate is expected to reach the 50% needed to win in a single round.

According to the polling firm Quaest, Lula continues to hold a slight 5% lead over Bolsonaro. Thus, the center-left candidate would reach 39% and Bolsonaro 34%. Meanwhile, the polling firm BTG Pactual/Nexus reports that Lula has 42% and Bolsonaro 37%.

The remaining candidates would not receive more than 4%, while undecided voters account for 5%. About 10% of those surveyed said they would cast a blank or invalid vote.

In a potential runoff, the race is much closer. Quaest reports that Lula and Bolsonaro would be tied in a future runoff, each with 42%. Nexus, on the other hand, gives Lula a lead in the runoff with 46%, compared to Bolsonaro’s 44%.

Two models, one possible path

From a media and strategic perspective, portraying the South American giant’s current situation as a crossroads can sometimes be a bit misleading. Both candidates advocate capitalism as the only viable economic system, and both are open to international cooperation with necessary trading partners.

However, the major differences – and the significant possibilities that accompany them – undoubtedly point to two distinct paths the country could take. Bolsonaro advocates for a radical reduction of the state and the full opening of the country to international capital, which has once again turned its attention with great interest to South America’s immense natural resources. Minerals, gold, oil, and Brazil’s enormous hydroelectric potential are fundamental to the new material distribution of the imperialist economy.

And while Lula is by no means an isolationist (in fact, he promotes investment) he is not a politician willing to hand over those resources at any cost without a significant state presence and without promoting the economic interests of Brazilian capital. Furthermore, Lula has based his campaign, among other things, on the country’s sovereignist rhetoric.

This issue is probably the most important in geopolitical terms. Lula is not part of Trump’s political-military coalition known as the Shield of the Americas, the true operational arm of Washington’s hemispheric strategy – namely, securing Latin America as its zone of control and influence.

Flávio Bolsonaro, on the other hand, asserts that during his potential presidency, the United States will be not only his main political partner but also his security partner (a relationship that has historically held over the past few decades).

And Trump, of course, has not been a bystander in this dispute – even from a personal standpoint. When he learned of Jair Bolsonaro’s conviction for an alleged coup attempt, he stated that he would impose sanctions on the Brazilian economy for having imprisoned the man he called “his friend.”

In response, Lula has played a game that carries high economic costs but maintains a firm diplomatic stance. Whenever tariffs have been raised, Lula has ordered a similar response, which has put him in direct conflict with the Trump administration.

This issue is likely of much greater significance than it appears, given that Brazil alone accounts for nearly 50% of the region’s total GDP. Therefore, what is at stake in Brazil’s upcoming elections is more than just a presidential election; it is also the continuation of a right-wing wave in the region or a halt to it – one that, given Brazil’s economic and territorial importance, could mean more than just a statistical anomaly.

Militants and supporters of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva participated, this Sunday, September 27, in demonstrations as part of the national mobilization “Let’s go, Lula,” held a week before the first round of elections. In Rio de Janeiro, “CarnaLula 2026” spanned the length of Copacabana beach.

With a microphone, PT Senate candidate Benedita da Silva spoke about the importance of Carnival as an expression of popular culture and called on those present to also vote for a progressive bloc in the Rio de Janeiro Legislative Assembly and the Federal Chamber of Deputies. She reinforced the discourse that, in this election, not only democracy is at stake, but also national sovereignty. “We will not be anyone’s backyard,” she repeated Lula’s phrase.

Read more: Brazil’s presidential campaign heats up

In São Paulo, the event began with Carnival parades, circus performances, and bike rides on Paulista Avenue, where candidates gave speeches in defense of democracy. “Denialism will not prevail,” said Senate candidate Simone Tebet. Federal deputy Erika Hilton echoed Tebet, speaking about the importance of electing candidates who will steer Brazil away from fascism and who are in favor of the working class, as well as defending the end of the 6×1 work schedule. Also present at the event, actor Humberto Carrão told Brasil de Fato that he urged voters to decide the presidential election in the first round.

The capital of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, was one of the cities with the largest number of activities in support of Lula’s re-election. Among them was a flag-waving demonstration in the city center, where hundreds of activists unfurled a banner that read “Lula of Brazil.” In a review of the event, Pedro Martins, a member of the Alvorada collective, one of the organizers of the action, spoke of the need to occupy the streets. “It was a spectacular event, with all the social movements gathered. This week was an important week, showing that we need to go to the streets, and only in this way can we turn the vote around and achieve victory,” he told Brasil de Fato.

In Florianópolis and Curitiba, supporters held a bike ride carrying flags in defense of Lula’s candidacy. In Brasília, the gathering was on the Eixão, a fast road that connects the Plano Piloto from north to south.

Lula’s campaign reported that the day’s events were organized in a decentralized manner, with more than 500 activities planned across the 27 state capitals and hundreds of municipalities. The program included walks, motorcades, leaflet distribution, and cultural performances.

First published by Brasil de Fato in Portuguese.