If the State considers itself to be at war, why does it not state so where the Constitution requires it to do so?
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The Ravenna case
It all begins in Ravenna, a historic city and major Italian port on the Adriatic coast. The port of Ravenna is a civilian port: bulk cargo, fertilizers, containers, cruise ships. Yet in a brief filed this summer with the Council of State, the State Attorney General’s Office attributed “military significance” to it within the country’s maritime defense system. The reason lies in a single sentence: making certain data public would pose an unacceptable risk because “a ‘piecemeal’ and ‘hybrid’ world war is underway, involving, among others, Italy as well.”
The data did not consist of routes, schedules, or ship names. They were aggregate figures: the amount of military equipment that left the port in 2025, broken down by four-month period and categorized as exports or transit. Journalist Linda Maggiori had requested this information in January under the general right of access to public information—Italy’s equivalent of the FOIA—which does not require justification. On October 13, Il Fatto Quotidiano turned the statement into a national issue. On October 16, the Sixth Section of the Council of State rejected the Customs Agency’s appeal.
In February, the Customs Agency, which reports to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), denied the request entirely, citing national security, public order, and commercial confidentiality. Maggiori, represented by attorney Andrea Maestri, filed an appeal with the Emilia-Romagna Regional Administrative Court (TAR), which on July 1 partially upheld the appeal: the quantities must be made public because the numerical data is “neutral,” while the destinations may remain confidential. Customs, represented by the State Attorney’s Office, filed an appeal. The Council of State upheld the Regional Administrative Court’s ruling: the administration failed to demonstrate either the necessity or the concrete nature of the harm. It also noted “apparently contradictory” conduct, as the Livorno Customs Office had previously provided similar data without objection.
In February 2025, approximately 13 metric tons of forged parts bound for an Israeli defense company were seized in Ravenna without export authorization; the proceedings are ongoing, and the presumption of innocence applies. It appears that on October 14 of this year, another 4 metric tons were at the port.
What does “war” mean, who decides, and the arms law
The word has three meanings, and memory confuses them. The first is constitutional. Article 11 establishes that Italy “rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means of resolving international disputes.” Article 78 entrusts the Chambers with the authority to declare a state of war and to grant the necessary powers to the government; Article 87 assigns the declaration of war to the President of the Republic. In the history of the Republic, a state of war has never been declared: neither in 1991, nor for Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Libya.
The second meaning is international: under international humanitarian law, armed conflict exists de facto, but supplying weapons to a belligerent party—according to prevailing legal opinion and that of the International Committee of the Red Cross—does not make one a party to the conflict. The third issue is political-strategic. “Hybrid warfare” (cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation below the threshold of armed conflict) and “proxy war” are analytical tools, not legal categories. In a judicial ruling, therefore, a political term was used to justify an exception to a legal right. The Council of State rejected the postponement.
Parliament declares a state of war, authorizes missions (Law 145/2016), and receives the annual report on exports. The government authorizes exports through the UAMA of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Prime Minister is the sole custodian of state secrets (Law 124/2007), under the oversight of COPASIR. The President of the Republic chairs the Supreme Defense Council. The Ministry of Defense signs the classified aid packages for Ukraine. The State Attorney’s Office, which reports to the Prime Minister’s Office, defends government agencies in court: its briefs are legal documents, not foreign policy statements. No minister has yet clarified whether they agree with the statements made therein.
Moreover, the information has never been classified as a state secret. Customs authorities have invoked the relevant provisions of Article 5-bis of the Transparency Decree (Legislative Decree 33/2013), which allow for a refusal only if necessary to avoid “concrete harm” to national security, defense, or international relations.
Law No. 185 of 1990 prohibits the export and transit of arms to countries engaged in armed conflict in violation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, to countries whose policies conflict with Article 11, to countries under embargo, or to those responsible for serious human rights violations. However, it excludes government-to-government transfers and transits for NATO forces. The annual report to Parliament (Art. 5) lists authorizations by country and company, not by port: no public document specifies how much passes through a single port. This is the gap that the Ravenna petition sought to fill. According to the Peace and Disarmament Network, the government’s reform bill, approved by the Senate in 2024 (A.C. 1730), would reduce the data included in the report; based on the sources consulted, it has not yet been definitively approved.
Those who defend confidentiality argue that harmless data—aggregated and cross-referenced with maritime tracking data—could reveal supply routes: this is the argument used by the Trieste Customs Office to deny an identical petition. Also important are obligations to allies and corporate confidentiality. Those advocating for transparency point out that Law 185 stems from the idea that arms require more public oversight, not less, because they pertain to Article 11 and, in the case of free transfers, involve public funds. An annual total does not enable hostile actions, and data published in Livorno does not become dangerous simply because it is in Ravenna.
Secrecy has a legitimate place. The Constitutional Court has linked it to national security since Ruling 86/1977 and reaffirmed this in the Abu Omar case (106/2009). Secrecy becomes problematic when it loses its criteria: concrete evidence of harm, proportionality, a time limit, consistency among agencies, and oversight by a judge or Parliament. The argument of a “piecemeal world war” failed on all counts. It did not identify any harm, rejected the Regional Administrative Court’s (TAR) compromise solution, treated data from a past year as if it were an ongoing operation, and contradicted the Livorno ruling. If merely invoking a widespread conflict suffices, then that justification applies to any data and indefinitely: hybrid wars, as described in official documents themselves, have no declared beginning nor anticipated end.
That language has a specific origin: the Ministry of Defense’s non-paper from November 2025, according to which Italy is already embroiled in a hybrid conflict. Committees and unions believe that part of Ravenna’s cargo is destined for Haifa and Ashdod: the withheld data would make it possible to verify this.
The political paradox
The government states in Parliament that Italy is not at war; one of its agencies writes the same in court to conceal a figure. The case was successfully closed, but only thanks to a journalist willing to pursue the matter through two levels of appeal. Yet, even with the case closed, the gravity of what was stated remains.
If the state deems the international situation serious enough to restrict the right to information, that assessment cannot be confined to a customs office or a legal brief. The logic of Article 78 applies even on a small scale: whoever invokes the exception must answer for it before Parliament. All that is needed is the uniform publication of quantities for each port—as requested by the Ravenna Region and Municipality—their inclusion in the report on Law 185, and a review of the classifications by COPASIR, with predefined deadlines.
An emergency becomes permanent when no one declares it and no one revokes it. One question remains for Parliament: if the State considers itself to be at war, why does it not state so where the Constitution requires it to do so? And if it does not consider itself to be at war, by what authority does one of its bodies write as much?
Last week, not only did Oregon's restrictive gun laws fail to stop a shooter intent on killing innocent people, but a passing good Samaritan had to violate those laws to end the murder spree. Fortunately, authorities don't appear intent on prosecuting Kaylub Giamanco, father to two girls who attend the school, for ignoring the ban on guns on school grounds to save lives. But the law is clearly more of a threat to people with good intent than it is to those bent on doing harm. Such laws should and must be defied, but lawmakers need to remove these legal minefields before they do more damage.
"I want to start by thanking and praising the quick thinking and courage of the Silver Rail Elementary School staff and parents—and the first responders who rushed to the scene," Oregon Gov. Tina Kotek commented in a press release after the attack by a 16-year-old shooter at Silver Rail Elementary School in Bend, Oregon. "And to the community member who heroically intervened to stop further loss of life, your actions carry a heavy emotional burden—and my thoughts are with you."
That community member was Kaylub Giamanco, who had two daughters at the school. He was reportedly driving past when he saw the shooter approaching Silver Rail with a shotgun in hand. Giamanco parked his vehicle, grabbed his firearm, and followed the shooter, who had blasted his way through the facility's locked doors.
The shooter murdered four people, but Giamanco was able to kill him before he did any more damage. In the incident, the murderer obviously violated the law. But so did Giamanco.
"Oregon gun laws are rated as the 12th strictest in the nation according to data collected by gun violence prevention group Everytown for Gun Safety, but they didn't stop the shooting of four elementary school children and two teachers at a Bend elementary school on Thursday," wrote Lillian Mongeau Hughes of The Oregonian. (Reports say three children and a teacher were murdered, with two others injured.)
The gun-control group Everytown for Gun Safety boasts that "Oregon has passed a broad range of gun safety laws in recent years, including a requirement that guns be securely stored whenever they are not in their owner's immediate control, a prohibition on guns at the state capitol, and a law that gives universities the authority to prohibit guns on their grounds."
The similarly restriction-oriented Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence gives Oregon an A- for its laws, ranking the state 11th out of 50. The group notes that the state "allowed local governments to limit firearms in government buildings."
Of specific interest in this case, the state adopted a law in 2021 that, among other things, says "the governing board of a community college or a district school board" may adopt policies banning guns on school grounds, even for those "licensed to carry a concealed handgun."
Importantly, the Bend–La Pine Schools, which include Silver Rail, mandate that "no person on grounds of the schools controlled by the Board of Directors for Bend–La Pine Schools (including in school buildings) shall bring to, possess, conceal or use a weapon or firearm at any property under the jurisdiction of Bend-La Pine Schools, any activities under the jurisdiction of the district, or any interscholastic activities administered by a voluntary organization (i.e., Oregon School Activities Association). This prohibition includes those who may otherwise be permitted by law to carry such weapons or firearms."
The prohibition applies to the Silver Rail murderer, though it was unlikely to be a concern to a person already intent on slaughter. It also applies to Giamanco, who stopped the attack and who must now—probably successfully, given the case's high profile—rely on the authorities to not enforce their own laws.
Giamanco is by no means alone in taking the initiative to stop an attack. I've written in the past about Jordan Salinas and others in the Twin Falls incident, as well as Elisjsha Dicken at the Greenwood Park Mall in Indiana. The actions of bystanders are crucial given the evidence that would-be mass murderers must be countered with defensive force within the first 30 seconds to avoid a double-digit body count.
There were 634 active attacks in the United States between 2000 and 2025, according to the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center at Texas State University. ALERRT defines an "active attack" as an incident in which "an individual or individuals is actively killing or attempting to kill multiple unrelated people in a public space." Of those, 374 were resolved before police arrived, with 29 concluded by civilians shooting the perpetrator and another 60 attackers otherwise subdued by civilians.
That's certainly not a full count of actions by armed citizens to defend themselves and others. The 2026 National Firearms Survey finds that "guns are used defensively by firearms owners in approximately 2.2 million incidents per year. In most defensive incidents no shot was fired (76.3%), about half (50.8%) involved more than one assailant, and in 70.6% of incidents respondents report that the defensive use was successful, such that no crime remained to be reported to the police."
Undoubtedly, many of those incidents aren't reported to the police because people who have just averted a threat to themselves or others don't want to get entangled with a legal system that is all too often hostile to self defense. If all has ended well, why risk arrest for violating a law that would have prevented you from defending yourself or that you may not even have known about?
As The Oregonian points out, Oregon's "strong laws" didn't stop the shooting. Those laws ban murder, of course. They also specify that "guns be locked, stored in gun safes or in specialized gun rooms as a way to keep children from accessing firearms," according to the report. "Police have not said if those laws were violated." They also ban guns on the grounds of schools with restrictive policies.
The thing about criminals, though, is that they don't obey laws. That's especially true of those who plan murder sprees they don't intend to survive. The consequences the perpetrators anticipate involve death, and if that's not a deterrent, the potential prosecution of their moldering corpses holds little weight.
Unfortunately, legal peril can be a deterrent to good people who intend no harm. The threat of authoritarian laws and malicious prosecutors who enjoy state protection could convince some people to leave the means of self defense at home. Fortunately, Kaylub Giamanco wasn't one of them.
Giamanco's example at Silver Rail Elementary School is one to be emulated. If we're to protect ourselves, our children, and our neighbors, we have a right and a duty to defy laws that seek to disarm us and put us at the mercy of human predators. But we shouldn't have to suffer the threat of such laws to exercise our natural self-defense rights. Given the inability of weapons restrictions to deter crime and the harm they pose for good people, government officials need to eliminate these embarrassing restrictions and get out of our way.
The post Hero Oregon Dad Showed the Importance of Defying Restrictive Gun Laws appeared first on Reason Magazine.
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