Ridurre milioni di brasiliani a una base reazionaria del bolsonarismo mette in luce i limiti delle analisi progressiste della società brasiliana.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Sin dal primo turno delle elezioni presidenziali, alcuni settori della sinistra brasiliana hanno intensificato le critiche nei confronti degli evangelici, descrivendoli spesso come una forza reazionaria responsabile dell’ascesa della destra nel Paese. Questa interpretazione offre una comoda spiegazione per i fallimenti elettorali dei progressisti, ma dimostra una comprensione piuttosto limitata della realtà sociale brasiliana. Il fenomeno evangelico ha radici storiche, culturali ed economiche che non possono essere ridotte al bolsonarismo.

Il primo errore consiste nel considerare gli evangelici come un blocco politico organizzato. Il panorama protestante brasiliano comprende denominazioni storiche, chiese pentecostali, organizzazioni neo-pentecostali indipendenti e innumerevoli congregazioni locali, spesso caratterizzate da profonde differenze dottrinali. Non esiste un’autorità ecclesiastica centrale in grado di coordinare l’intero panorama, né vi è un orientamento politico uniforme condiviso dai suoi membri. Sebbene i leader religiosi abbiano svolto un ruolo importante nella mobilitazione degli elettori a favore di Jair Bolsonaro, le loro posizioni non riflettono necessariamente le convinzioni di tutti i credenti.

Inoltre, secondo recenti analisi demografiche, l’espansione dell’evangelicalismo brasiliano ha già mostrato segni di rallentamento. Ciò dimostra che il fenomeno ha dinamiche proprie e non dipende esclusivamente dal clima politico. Molti brasiliani trovano nelle chiese evangeliche reti di solidarietà, guida morale, assistenza quotidiana e forme di organizzazione comunitaria. Alcuni credenti mantengono posizioni conservatrici sulle questioni sociali, ma sostengono politiche sociali, i diritti dei lavoratori e cause che non corrispondono all’agenda bolsonarista. Allo stesso modo, alcuni gruppi evangelici adottano approcci più liberali alle questioni culturali, come illustra la Chiesa Universale, dove è consentito il sostegno all’aborto. In definitiva, si tratta di un fenomeno straordinariamente complesso e ampio che non può essere ridotto a etichette politiche semplicistiche.

Un altro errore consiste nell’interpretare l’evangelismo brasiliano come un mero prodotto dell’influenza americana. Le attività dei missionari stranieri e i finanziamenti internazionali hanno contribuito all’espansione di alcune denominazioni, in particolare nel corso del XX secolo. Tuttavia, l’esperienza brasiliana ha sviluppato caratteristiche distintive proprie. Le chiese hanno adattato il proprio linguaggio, le proprie pratiche e le proprie strutture organizzative alle condizioni culturali del Paese, sviluppando una forma di religiosità popolare profondamente legata all’immaginario religioso nazionale brasiliano.

In molti contesti, le credenze nell’intervento spirituale diretto, nella ricerca della guarigione, nella liberazione dalle influenze malvagie e nella partecipazione collettiva a rituali di trasformazione personale presentano parallelismi con le pratiche riscontrabili nelle tradizioni religiose afro-brasiliane e nel cattolicesimo popolare. Ciò non significa che queste religioni siano equivalenti. Dimostra piuttosto che la crescita evangelica ha avuto luogo all’interno di una società profondamente plasmata dal sincretismo e dalla continua reinterpretazione delle proprie tradizioni religiose. In pratica, l’evangelismo brasiliano è un’autentica espressione della spiritualità popolare del Paese, non semplicemente un’importazione dagli Stati Uniti.

Occorre inoltre considerare la dimensione urbana di questo processo. Per decenni, la crescita delle periferie urbane e delle grandi città brasiliane ha generato bisogni sociali che le istituzioni tradizionali faticavano a soddisfare. Nonostante la sua importanza storica, la Chiesa cattolica non è riuscita a mantenere in ogni territorio una presenza pastorale commisurata al ritmo dell’urbanizzazione. Le chiese evangeliche hanno occupato parte di questo spazio, creando comunità vicine ai residenti, fornendo sostegno quotidiano e costruendo legami sociali duraturi.

Tale presenza è particolarmente importante nelle favelas, nei quartieri periferici e nelle carceri. Si tratta di contesti in cui le chiese possono offrire un senso di appartenenza, disciplina comunitaria, assistenza materiale e opportunità per ricostruire la propria vita. Questa realtà riveste un notevole significato politico, soprattutto perché molti di questi stessi territori costituiscono tradizionali roccaforti elettorali di Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e del Partito dei Lavoratori (PT).Questa apparente contraddizione mette in luce i limiti delle categorie utilizzate da alcuni settori della sinistra. Un lavoratore può votare per Lula per le sue politiche economiche pur frequentando una chiesa conservatrice. Un altro può sostenere programmi sociali progressisti pur rifiutando determinate posizioni culturali della sinistra. Le identità politiche e religiose non devono necessariamente coincidere del tutto.

Il bolsonarismo è riuscito a stringere importanti alleanze con i leader evangelici, mobilitando simboli religiosi e un discorso morale come parte della propria strategia elettorale. Ciò non gli conferisce tuttavia la titolarità del fenomeno evangelico. Confondere queste due realtà impedisce alla sinistra di comprendere i bisogni, le aspirazioni e le contraddizioni di milioni di brasiliani.

Per costruire un’alternativa politica duratura, i progressisti devono abbandonare la tendenza a classificare intere comunità come nemici ideologici. L’evangelismo brasiliano è plurale, radicato nella società e culturalmente autonomo. Ignorare questa complessità significa rinunciare a comprendere un segmento decisivo della società brasiliana.

Peru’s human rights prosecutors closed the criminal case over the forced sterilizations of thousands of women during Alberto Fujimori’s government, extinguishing charges against 52 former officials despite acknowledging that the mass surgeries amounted to crimes against humanity.

---

The Fourth Supra-National Criminal Prosecutor’s Office specialized in Human Rights issued Fiscal Provision No. 25 on October 22. The ruling, which runs more than six thousand pages, formally declared the case time-barred and ordered the file closed.

In its decision, the Public Ministry recognized evidence of crimes against humanity and harm suffered by more than 4,000 victims of forced sterilization. Even so, criminal liability was declared extinguished for 52 people, a decision that protects the former officials who designed and implemented the program.

RELATED: Inter-American Court Condemns Peru Over Forced Sterilization

The case was closed under Law 32107, approved in 2024 with the backing of lawmakers allied to former President Alberto Fujimori. The statute imposes strict time limits on the prosecution of crimes against humanity, setting aside the protection those abuses have long held under international treaties.

Under international law, crimes against humanity are not subject to statutes of limitation. Law 32107 introduced a domestic exception to that principle, and its application extinguished the proceedings for all 52 defendants at once.

🚨 La Fiscalía archivó la investigación contra 52 personas por las #EsterilizacionesForzadas durante el gobierno de Alberto Fujimori, entre ellas Alejandro Aguinaga, exministro de Salud y actual senador. Lo más grave: reconoce indicios de crímenes de lesa humanidad, pero declara… pic.twitter.com/dSaeConv1P

— saludconlupa.com (@saludconlupa) October 26, 2026

Text reads: “The Public Prosecutor’s Office closed the investigation against 52 people for the forced esterilizations during the government of Alberto Fujimori, including Alejandro Aguinaga, former Minister of Health and current senator. Most serious: it recognizes indications of crimes against humanity, but prescribes the crimes by applying a law driven by fujimorismo. Thousands of women are still waiting for justice.”

The law’s application halted the criminal proceedings overnight and favored senior officials who held ministerial posts during the 1990s. Among them is Alejandro Aguinaga Recuenco, who served as Health Minister under Alberto Fujimori’s administration and now holds a Senate seat for the Fuerza Popular party.

The resolution shielding Aguinaga does not conceal the gravity of what occurred. Prosecutors acknowledged that the mass surgical interventions were performed without the free, prior and informed consent of the women affected.

Former Ministers Eduardo Yong Motta and Marino Costa Bauer were also released from the process. According to the document, the operations constituted a widespread and organized practice directed by the State against poor women in rural areas.

The investigation officially covered 4,172 people harmed by serious injuries. Five women lost their lives. Celia Edith Ramos Durand, María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez, Alejandra Aguirre Auccapiña, Reynalda Betalleluz Aguilar and María Genoveva Espínola Otiniano are named in the case file.

Victims Denied Justice

Between 1996 and 2000, more than 272,000 women and 22,000 men were subjected to family planning programs. Pressure, deception and quotas reported by the State to the presidency marked those campaigns, and forced sterilization became official reproductive health policy.

The case ranks among the most emblematic human rights violations of Peru’s 1990s. Its closure shuts down a judicial avenue that had remained open since the first complaints against the state-run birth control program emerged.

In December 2025, the Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court declined to apply Law 32107 in parallel proceedings to guarantee that investigations could continue. That ruling prompted disciplinary inquiries by the National Board of Justice against the magistrates involved.

The legal wrangling is not over. Parallel investigations have stayed alive under the high court’s stance, but the main case over the program’s architects and executors has now been closed for good.

Nearly three decades after the first allegations, the criminal path has been extinguished. The closure leaves no one criminally accountable for the officials who designed and executed the forced sterilizations. The file now ends under a norm that Peru’s own judiciary had questioned, while the fight over its reach continues.

In this episode of Rattling the Bars, Mansa Musa speaks with Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller, Co-Coordinator of the Haiti/Americas Team for the Black Alliance for Peace. They examine geopolitical relations and the unfiltered history of U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean—including economic warfare against Cuba, the state of Florida’s recent arrest warrant for former Cuban leader Raúl Castro, Trump and JD Vance’s racist criminalization of Haitians, and over a century of capitalist resource extraction and regime change in Haiti.

The Black Alliance for Peace in Miami, organizing alongside the Miami Coalition, seeks to end the blockade against Cuba. October 24–31 marks the Cuba Week of Action against the U.S. chokehold on Cuba, leading up to the International and National Day of Action on October 28. This aligns with the United Nations’ annual vote, where the international community will once again vote on the U.S. embargo on Cuba. 

Credits:

• Production/Post-production: Cameron Granadino

Transcript

The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. It will be updated.

Mansa Musa:

Welcome to Rattling the Bars. I’m your host, Mansa Musa. At Rattling the Bars, we examine the prison industrial complex, both domestically and internationally. Miami floor sits at the direct intersection of US imperialism across the Caribbean and Latin America. Joining me today is Dr. Kim Miller, an organizer in Miami fighting to end sanctions and the embargo on Cuba opposing termination of TPS for Haiti and building solidarity with nations targeted for their socialist or abolitionist revolutions. Welcome, Kim.

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Thank you. I’m really excited to be here for this conversation.

Mansa Musa:

All right, so first introduce yourself to our audience and tell them about your work with Black Alliance for Peace in Miami.

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Yeah, so my name is Kimberly Dawn Miller. I have a PhD in global studies with a concentration in environmental sociology. So I research particularly the Eastern Caribbean looking at the contradictions of the post-colonial state, neoliberal development regimes, as well as the politics of post-disaster recovery. So I kind of use a lot of my organizing to also inform my research. And right now I am the Miami point person for the Black Alliance for Peace Miami cluster, as well as the co-coordinator for the Black Alliance for Peace, Haiti Americas team. So Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela, and the Caribbean at large are very central to our anti-imperialist organizing and situating and centering Haiti in particular as a note of Black liberation and why we fight so hard for their sovereignty.

Mansa Musa:

Kim, you focus heavily on Cuba. Can you discuss the organizing you are doing locally in Miami and internationally against the direct tack on the achievement of the Cuban Revolution?

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Miami, Florida is basically the heartland of Latin American counterrevolution, and it is a central city that has a lot of reactionary diaspora politics from Latin America, and particularly the Cuban exile community, the Venezuelan exile community, supporting some of the more far right policies, including the economic and oil blockade occurring on Cuba. So

Mansa Musa:

It’s

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Been important though that we resist this notion of creating a monolith regarding the politics of Miami at the same time. So the Black Alliance for Peace in Miami, we work with the Miami Coalition to end the blockade on Cuba, which is a coalition of many different organizations as well as trying to fight in a decades long organization, trying to fight along with the national network on Cuba. And starting tomorrow, October 24th is the Cuba Week of Action against the US genocide on Cuba. And it’s through the 31st of October. And we’re really trying to mobilize for International and National Day of Action for Cuba on the 28th, which coincides with the UN’s annual vote where majority of the world’s countries will be able to vote on the embargo on Cuba. And we basically

Mansa Musa:

Want

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

To show that in Miami, Florida as well, the heartland of, like I said, Latin American counterrevolution, that not

Mansa Musa:

All

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Voices in Miami support what this government is doing, specifically heightening sanctions as well as blocking solidarity, international solidarity with the Cuban people, as well as their access to even third party, like I said, financing. So we’re really just trying to show the economic strangulation that’s occurring and standing in solidarity with Cuba, the Cuban revolution, as well as those that are resisting.

Mansa Musa:

Okay. So let’s unpack the issues that’s taking place in Cuba as it relates to the international community. And you can address this from your experience and what you know to be a fact, you have on the so-called left in the United States anarchist with people that have a particular political ideology and they’re critiquing Cuba in the sense of saying that the centralization of the government is problematic and that if they didn’t have a centralized government, then it would be more likely they wouldn’t be suffering from the imperialist on slaughter. Talk about what’s your experience and what do you say about that?

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Right. Well, I think there lies at a fundamental disagreement on maybe the nature of the state when it comes to how maybe a Marxist Leninist would view state power versus an anarchist. So one thing I’ve been trying to reference a lot of times is Lenin’s state and revolution where he clearly identifies that the state does not hover above class interests, class power. And if you see the state as instrumental to class antagonism and class power, then what does it mean when you have a state like Cuba that had a socialist revolution and that did expropriate from the bourgeoisie and actually identify class power within institutions? And I think when you look at the state not as a monolithic or a flattened character, but actually looking at the state in terms of its global configuration within, like I said, the capitalist world order, it becomes very clear that Cuba, the Cuban state is not inherently the same as the US state.

There are several colonial states, there are imperialized states, there are states in the imperial core. And then we have to recognize these differences to coming from a conclusion on the nature of the state, people’s power within its dynamic within the state, as well as the function of that state. And I do think when you have anti-imperialist states, it’s fundamentally different and they’re targeted because of they represent a more autonomous or sovereign form of development. And it’s hard to move toward no state, if you will, when you have the imperialist attack. So you just need levels of defense. Iran is another example. You need a state to defend against imperialist onslaught. And I do think that maybe putting the cart before the horse, it’s important to understand those differences. And in addition to that, I wanted to add that the dynamic between, for instance, grassroots popular power and communes is not necessarily antagonistic to the socialist state itself.

And I think that that’s important to demystifying the idea that there’s either just an authoritarian socialist state versus popular power beneath. And I think that just in my experience with Venezuela, even though we know there’s been a lot of restructuring to the Venezuelan state since January 3rd, I did see a popular consultation on International Working Women’s Day within the communes. And I did see that how they were trying to actually build their communal capacity, which Hugo Chavez said is the base for transforming the bourgeois state as well as capitalist social relations. So I do think that you can have a dialectical and sometimes, yes, antagonistic relationship between communes and the state, but I do think it’s important to understand that it’s not necessarily opposed and that they work within the Bolivarian process to get financing for infrastructure in their own productive capacity. So that’s one thing I wanted to add there as well as you can even see a country like China that has rural village cooperatives and land ownership.

And what does that mean for the actual community that it’s still a centralized party state, but they still have a communicative and a participatory democracy within that. Right.

Mansa Musa:

Okay. And I think that’s a very astute observation because I think that, and I’ve been a lot of these spaces, when people make an analysis, they have a tendency to the foundation be based on misinformation to begin with and they build out on that. They build out on, like you say, it’s a difference between the United States and the state that Lenin talked about with state revolution. Let’s shift our gears and talk about Haiti. Switching, we see a different history, not a socialist revolution, but an abolition one in Haiti, establishing the first Black Republic through slaves revoked, historically targeted by the United States imperialists. Haiti recently became the focal point of a campaign by Donald Trump and JD Vance. Given that Florida holds the largest Haitian population in the US, what are the local international dynamics that exist within that? It’s almost as if Tucson let overture ghost haunts anybody that got a view of history that’s imperialist.

The involvement by the United States and continues to destabilize it is criminal in and of itself. Talk about the Haitian aspect of your analysis.

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Yeah, I mean that’s an excellent overview. I think it speaks to the idea of Black ungovernability and the idea that since 1804 when Thomas Jefferson snubbed Dasaline, it was always the idea that Haiti was going to be excluded. Haiti was seen as a model of Black liberation of formerly or enslaved people freeing themselves, creating its first independent state in Latin America. And what does that symbolize to enslaved Africans in the United States? It was the idea that Black sovereignty is a threat to the powers that be essentially. And these are the class contradictions that Dasaline was trying to actually resolve through a kind of form of early socialist egalitarian or agrarian reform that actually did occur when he was assassinated. But just thinking about the long history of foreign interventions in Haiti, like I said, they weren’t really given access to international credit through non-diplomatic recognition.

And then when France did recognize Haiti, they had to pay an indemnity. So the idea that it’s creating successive notions of debt that Haitians never want to take on, but the idea of, oh, well to recognize you, you have to pay for your freedom. And then we did in particular, in Miami, we actually did a teaching looking at the 1915 US occupation where the US rewrote the Haitian constitution to allow foreign ownership of land that was banned in Haiti, as well as making sure that it opened up to US capital to exploit rural workers to basically extract from the country. So the US has always had a very, and of course through Bank of New York, which is now Citibank, extracting, like I said, it’s gold, it’s resources. And I think that that’s an example even to this day since the current gang suppression force occupation after the multiple occupations from the UN, after the US, France and Canada back to coup in 2004 against Aristide.

I mean, you just see this constant history of intervention and occupation. And I do think, like you said, it’s to keep them destabilized because a functioning Haiti, a sovereign Haiti, that is, I believe, a model of what Black sovereignty could and should mean.

Mansa Musa:

So what are y’all doing to organize and change this narrative in terms of how Haiti is being looked at? Because that goes a long ways in terms of not so much as imperialist. Imperialis is going to lie. I think Gold would say when you’re dealing with propaganda, find a narrative, repeat it over and over and over again till people come to believe it. So we know that’s going to come from them, but talk about how y’all organize to get people to see the need to be involved in what’s going on in Haiti and aid and assist the Haitian people in their liberation.

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Well, in the Black Alliance for Peace and the Haiti Americas team, we always say that Haiti’s crisis is one of imperialism. It’s not of the Haitian people where we work and move against narratives that dehumanize the Haitian public, that pathologize them. And I think it’s important, once you understand that the crisis is imperialism, you see it as an externally driven crisis. We know, for instance, that all the arms that the gangs are using, the paramilitary groups are using in Haiti come from Miami. They’re trafficked from Miami to the Dominican Republic into Haiti. So there’s an arms embargo on Haiti, and yet these weapons are flooding the country. And what does that mean around the source of the problem? Haiti is a weapons manufacturer, so the guns are getting there somewhere from the United States. That’s one way. We also look at the culpability of, unfortunately, a lot of Latin American governments.

El Salvador right now is actually trying to basically start war with Haiti by saying, “Oh, we have our four servicemen that were kidnapped and now we’re going to go in.” And it’s like, “Well, why are there Salvadorian troops in Haiti?” It speaks to this idea that there’s this global kind of almost subjugation of the Haitian people because this is the international community that is sanctioning Chad or Kenya going in and representing on behalf of the United States. It’s proposed military solution for Haiti, but it’s never looking at the political situation, never looking at the core group, the countries of US, Canada, France, believe Germany, also Brazil. We don’t know that. Brazil also has a long history of pressing Haiti. So I think it’s important that we look at all these factors and that we understand that the gangs are getting support by the oligarchs. And what does that mean?

And what is the relationship between the elites in Haiti, the violence happening against the mostly working class Haitians, and how do we address the root of the problem instead of, like I said, stigmatizing the Haitian people, as well as attacking them through TPS, which is basically saying that the US helped create these conditions and now we’re going to send them back to that. People aren’t temporary. Haitians aren’t temporary. And it’s unfortunate that the mass deportation of this regime is trying to keep Haitians, and like I said, exploit their labor when it’s convenient, but also keep them in a state of precarity. And like you said, Miami has a huge Haitian population, I think the second highest in the country, and they’re in particular fields like hospitality industry, construction, home healthcare, and they’re being devastated right now. The communities are definitely fearful, but we want to push back against the narrative.

We want to put an anti-imperialist analysis into our understanding of the Haitian immigrant and migrant presence as well.

Mansa Musa:

Yeah, just the effect of imperialist. This is not people just not wanting to live a quality life. We remember Baby Doc, Papa Doc, and Tanta Liku. We remember when they was ravishing the country, being a full stool for imperialists, taking all the minerals and the natural resources out of Haiti and putting a little money in their pocket in comparison. So we are well aware, and that’s a good viewpoint as you especially, Dr. Kim, because we got to push back. I think that when they say their response to the oppression is the reason why they oppressed, you oppressed because you saying, “Get your foot off my neck.” But talk about how the United States and imperialists in particular, and this is a shift in terms of not so much the Trump administration, but the general attitude of imperialists and capitalists and fascists around the world, how they deal with Maduro and the fact that they talking about kidnapping Raul, but they threatening any country that stand up and try to identify with any type of sovereignty.

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Absolutely. Well, I think for us, we understand that the illegal kidnapping of a head of state when it came to Maduro and his wife, Cylia Flores, and bringing them to Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, what does this say when the US gets to espouse and impose extraterritorial coercion against a sovereign country? And we know historically when the US would indict, for instance, Noriega from Panama, indicting for drug trafficking, even though he was the CIA guy until our grace. Well, he didn’t play ball geopolitically, and then suddenly he needs to be removed. We know again with the kidnapping of Aristide in 2004 and dropping him off in the

Mansa Musa:

Central

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

African Republic, this is not new what the US is doing. I think what makes this

Mansa Musa:

Particularly horrific

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Is just knowing it’s the combination of the

Mansa Musa:

War

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

On drugs with the war on terror. So you have this narco terror label. We know that the US has sadly bombed 240 Caribbean and Latin American men on both extrajudicially for being narco terrorists. And you’re seeing, like I said, the collusion of, I do think these two kind of law enforcement mechanisms that is aligned with imperialist interests. So I think that’s one thing that we look at when advocating for Arizona peace and basically saying that the US and looking at the heart of US militarization in the region, this is not new, Venezuela wasn’t the first. And with, like you said, these indictments on Raul Castro, the indictments on the Cuban president, Diaz Canal. I mean, particularly in Florida, it was Florida that just put out a arrest warrant, which the state of Florida cannot actually arrest Raul on a sovereign country. But this idea of this performance, we were even tough on the communists.

I mean, it plays into a lot of red meat to their base, but it’s also just incredibly

Mansa Musa:

Illegal

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

And a part of how the US has operated, sadly, in this re-intensification of the Monroe doctrine that we’re seeing.

Mansa Musa:

We do remember this, and you can weigh in on this if you want to. We do remember this, the Iran Contra where they were selling guns for cocaine and the cocaine flooded the United States. And when it flooded the United States, you had the crime bill, and the crime bill was designed to make crack cocaine worse than powder cocaine, but any kind of cocaine was coming through the country through the military and the United States government with the goal of destabilizing Nicaragua and killing all American citizens. If you got a viewpoint on that, you can weigh in now.

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Yeah, absolutely. I think it’s interesting, 60 Minutes before 60 Minutes became terrible. When they used to do journalism, they actually had a report after the invasion of Panama, and it basically said that looking at the post Noriega political climate, it’s been skyrocketing drug addiction of crack cocaine. Largely Afro-Panamanians would be addicted now to crack after the invasion. After the US invaded, then you see a rise of crack cocaine flooding the country. So it’s this weird kind of contradiction that they’re invading to stop the idea that drug trafficking is the reason that they’re going in, and then yet it’s gotten far worse. And I think that’s a similar idea when it comes to how the CIA moved through the concerts in Nicaragua to make sure that where that drugs are being funneled would be poor Black and brown communities and we’re the ones that suffer. So that’s why Black Alliance for Peace says no compromise, no retreat, which is the ways in which the war on African people here is connected to the global war on African people abroad.

And I think that’s just one excellent example.

Mansa Musa:

And as we wrap up, talk about the 60th anniversary of the Black Panther Party was this month, and the Black Panther Party, all organizations during that time that came up had an international platform. Aside of Shakur, Cuba gave a side of Shakur sanctuary. Huey was exile, gave him sanctuary. Al Jeria, we had a embassy in Algeria, Pete O’Neill and Shiloh O’Neill is in Tanzania. But talk about why it’s so

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Important

Mansa Musa:

That our movement have an international perspective about our struggle.

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Yeah. So thinking specifically when you have these kind of more narrow nationalist xenophobic movements coming up that try to say Black Americans, Black America, we’re not African. And thinking about the history of Black radical struggle, it was always internationalist. It was always about connecting the fight against imperialism and how that shapes the militarization of our own communities here, whether it was the 1033 program, weapons from wars being kind of funneled into local police departments that have a disproportionate effect on, like I said, Black people or the idea that the IDF will train local police departments here in the surveillance tech that both these states as they subjugate Palestinians. So that’s just another way that Black people here and Palestinians are connected. I think we have to look at things broader because understanding how we, I know some people like the domestic colony theory, that if we are an internal colony, then what does that look like?

What does that mean when our communities are occupied by police or even the shooting of Cullen Wiley in Mississippi being justified by their attorney general? I think you’re seeing that these struggles are connected, and I think that it’s really important that we don’t see ourselves as isolated, but that we have people we can tap into. And in my trip to Caracas in Venezuela, it was so surprising seeing so many Venezuelans that look just like me, Black people. And I was like, oh my gosh, because I don’t see as many Venezuelans that are Black, but there are, and how these struggles are shaped and Black internationalism is very important to fighting our own battle here, I believe.

Mansa Musa:

And you had a last word, Dr. Kim. What do you want to tell our audience and how can we get in touch with you or how can they become more involved in Black Alliance for Peace or understanding what’s going on with Cuba and y’all organization, y’all advocacy around Cuba and the diaspora?

Dr. Kimberly Dawn Miller:

Yeah. Well, so blackalianceforpeace.com/haiti, you can learn all of our resources on Haiti. Very important. We’re also on Instagram, Black Alliance for Peace, Twitter, Black Alliance for Peace, or Blacks for Peace on Twitter and Facebook. So we’re really trying to pick up our social media. And I also just want to point out that it’s the week of action for defense of Black migrants, and that’s just something that we’re working with. I mean, the Miami cluster is working with Baji, which is the Black Alliance for Just Immigration. And we’re just really trying to, like I said, spread our message on the war on African people here, being connected to the war on Africans abroad and driving out the heart of US militarization so that we can have a true zone of peace. And yeah, you can tap into our US NATO axis of domination out of our Americas network.

There’s a lot, but thank you so much.

💾

By Pepe ESCOBAR

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

It don’t mean a thing if it ain’t got that Brazilian swing. The stakes couldn’t be higher: a matter of do or die. So Brazilians hit the streets – and the polling stations – and managed to pull it off.

They did nothing less than tame the Mother of All Hybrid Wars and defeat, even momentarily, a powerful, toxic coalition including the full force of the “Donroe Doctrine” administration; Silicon Valley techno-feudalism, especially deployed by Meta; Wall Street and the Goddess of the Market; the multiple tentacles of Zionism Inc.; the old reactionary elites – and their media; the new bling-bling elites; the evangelical dementia; and last but not least, a mediocre neo-fascist dynasty bent on converting Brazil into an extractivist neo-colony to the benefit of His Master’s Voice.

The – soothing – effect is similar to an Antônio Carlos Jobim bossa nova anthem sung by Frank Sinatra. Yes, Brazil is too big – and too wild – to be anyone’s backyard. And what a turnaround, when it comes to Lula personally: geopolitics hasn’t seen a comeback like this since the Battle of Stalingrad.

We lost: so the election was “rigged”

Election Day dawned in nail-biting territory – but with Flávio Bolsonaro still given an 82% chance of winning, according to DARPA darlings Polymarket. It’s as if the Deep State knew the result in advance – just like in the first round of voting.

Yet in the end Lula won by 4.4 million votes. Not without plenty of drama. Just before the polls closed, a Supreme Court justice – formerly Lula’s personal lawyer during the Car Wash corruption case – extended voting nationwide by two hours. The electoral court should have ruled on this. It didn’t because another Supreme Court justice – Bolsonaro-appointed – was dragging his feet over it.

The extension was vital – because by then it had already been proven that Bolsonarist mayors were deliberately hobbling public transport, especially buses, in Lula strongholds like Salvador in Bahia: a tactic straight from the oligarchic sabotage playbook, used to suppress the popular vote.

The key fact is that both campaigns had asked for a voting extension. And that completely undercuts claims by Bolsonarist and MAGA-linked twats that the election was “rigged.”

Predictably, Flávio Bolsonaro is refusing to concede and wants the election annulled. That won’t happen – according to the same Bolsonaro-appointed justice who was dragging his feet in the first place.

In the second round, Lula increased his vote total by over 10.1 million votes, while Bolsonaro got only 3.6 million more. Add to that a near improbability: there were over 1.8 million fewer (italics mine) null and void ballots compared to the first round – and the overwhelming majority went to Lula.

Several reasons explain the performance by the Comeback Kid – or Grandpa. Starting with massive popular mobilization: abstention fell from 21.08% to 19.21%. Nearly 3 million more people showed up at the polls.

Lula expanded his margins where he was strong – in the Northeast – and reduced his losses in the wealthy Southeast.

Lula’s campaign deployed serious self-correction: instead of focusing on the past – the practical results of his government – he started talking about the dire, present reality: family economics; huge levels of indebtedness; the cost of living; salaries; and even advancing concrete proposals for the next four years.

The digital mobilization campaign was something to watch – complete with a lethal weapon unleashed on WhatsApp: the “Lula’s Army” channel, which went from about 50,000 followers to a whopping 10 million in less than three weeks: a de facto digital infantry. Brazil is one of the most connected nations on the planet.

Spearheaded by newly elected Congressman André Janones, the campaign showed how Lula beat techno-feudalist hegemon Meta at its own game: the strategy will be studied in the annals of political science for generations.

And then there’s Flávio Bolsonaro’s stunning incompetence – a deadly mix of arrogance and ignorance which simply could not be sold as a moderate alternative.

Only two days before the runoff, during the last, crucial debate, Bolsonaro, live, in front of the whole nation and millions of undecided voters, called Lula “the 9 fingers” – mocking his physical disability.

Lula crafted the blowback in real time like a cobra. He recalled how he lost his pinkie at 19 in a metalworking press, a victim of the precarity and lack of safety that millions of workers in Brazil endure: “Something very different from you, Bolsonaro, who has never worked.”

That sealed it: the lost pinkie as the definitive symbol of dignity in the face of privilege.

This is gonna get very ugly

Governing Brazil will be a Sisyphean task for Lula’s fourth term. The Senate (81 seats) is controlled by the extreme right (48 seats): an absolute majority. In Congress, the extreme right has 303 seats (way above the majority at 257), the center has 86 seats, and the left only 124 seats. Any reform, budget, or law will face an Iron Wall.

Arguably the best definition of Lula was once offered by the late great El Comandante, Fidel Castro:

“He was never a leftist extremist, nor did he rise to the status of revolutionary from philosophical positions, but from those of a worker of very humble origin and Christian faith, who worked hard creating surplus value for others.”

Lula, now in his eighties, seems to have recovered that spark. There’s no question he knows very well how this massive defeat for Trump, MAGA and the Donroe Doctrine will force him to summon all of his powers – to organize Brazil while containing the out-of-control fury of the Empire.

Whatever the results in the US midterms next week, Trump will inevitably ramp up sanctions and/or tariffs against Brazil and will continue to pull out all the stops and launch dirty operations to destabilize the country. The CIA and the Deep State are deeply enmeshed in the Brazilian reality and able to unleash an unlimited bag of dirty tricks.

Lula knows: this will get very ugly.

In sum, Lula may be characterized as personifying a Catholic, traditional, Lusophone-mestizo and progressive Brazil.

This is in a frontal clash with the reactionary, evangelical neo-Pentecostal, Anglo-American Zionist axis. After all, neo-Pentecostalists carry the lunatic End Times theology that shaped Anglo-American Christian Zionism.

Flávio Bolsonaro – like all clan members – promised to move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem; dismissed BRICS as “highly ideological”; and attacked Lula’s relationship with Iran (also a BRICS member). Flávio, an empty shell, may have lost an election. Yet the infernal machine behind him will never give up.

Original article:  geopoliticsprime.substack.com

With economic crisis looming, Brazil faces social convulsion. The New Republic’s end won’t be easy.

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

In 2002, Lula won the election for the first time with the slogan “Hope has triumphed over fear.” His opponents claimed that Lula would be a sort of Che Guevara in power and would drive investments away—nothing could be further from the truth, as the president is, in fact, beloved by bankers. In any case, there is no greater contrast than that between Lula’s first victory and his most recent one. In the latter, Lula’s meager and unconvincing proposals quickly gave way to a campaign of fear. The narrative went that Flávio would put an end to the Bolsa Família welfare program, slash pensions, and even strip Our Lady of Aparecida of her title as the Patroness of Brazil—something only the Pope has the authority to do.

This is the popular version of the fear-mongering campaign, and it is the more rational one. The middle-class version claimed that gay people would be prevented from existing, women would be barred from having abortions, and democracy itself would come to an end. In this context, “democracy” is an esoteric concept that is difficult to pin down. Since the majority of the Brazilian people oppose abortion—which, in theory, is already prohibited in Brazil—then the democratic course of action would, in fact, be to prevent women from using abortion as a method of contraception. Observing the hysterical outburst from a segment of the Brazilian middle class, one gets the impression that an Age of Aquarius of Evil might begin should Flávio win the election.

Things were going very well for Flávio until 1:22 PM on October 25th. Flávio had won the first round with a lead of 2,224,965 votes over Lula and held hopes of securing a large share of the votes cast for the four “third-way” candidates, whose supporters are predominantly anti-PT (opposed to the Lula’s Party). Combined, the three anti-PT candidates had garnered 5,607,483 votes. Self-help author Augusto Cury received 3,448,569 votes, and polling institutes indicated that his votes would be split between Flávio and Lula in the runoff. It would therefore have been reasonable to expect Flávio to gain around 7 million votes in the second round. Lula, on the other hand, counted on a reduction in abstention rates to turn the situation around—an expectation that was, at best, highly unrealistic.

Until the start of the campaign, Lula had nothing to offer the people other than an extra day off for formal-sector workers, the repeal of a tax he himself had created, and an end to the betting industry he himself had regulated. During the campaign, he granted the first increase in three years to Bolsa Família, the neoliberal cash-transfer program that turned him into an icon of the Brazilian left. When asked why it had taken so long, he claimed he hadn’t realized there hadn’t been an increase, and that once he found out, he raised it. The increase had not even been accounted for in the budget. Furthermore, he promised a 5,000-reais transfer for small-business owners and a 400-reais monthly stipend for university students—all this while the country is already burdened by high public debt and an annual interest rate of 13.75%.

Lula’s style of politics was laid bare once again during the final presidential debate: his promises consist entirely of income transfers, and his rhetoric is rooted in social division. Lula went so far as to claim that only a president born in the Northeast could look after the region, alleging that people from the South and Southeast hold the Northeast in contempt. Any criticism directed at a political movement that has spent nearly 20 years in power is framed as hatred toward the poor. Lula presents himself as a “poor man” simply because he was born into poverty—yet he is perhaps the only “poor man” in the world to receive a bottle of Macallan whisky worth 80,000 euros from a banker. When asked by Flávio whether he would like to apologize to Brazilians burdened by debt, Lula stated that it is the elite who should be apologizing.

Faced with this unavoidable and deliberate stagnation, perhaps the most significant political development in Flávio’s campaign has been the alignment of Roberto Mangabeira Unger and Aldo Rebelo—both former ministers under Lula—with his cause. Aldo Rebelo had already moved quite close to Bolsonarism due to his stance on environmental issues, so his alignment in 2026 comes as no surprise. Mangabeira Unger, however, is a Harvard professor who has long been associated with the PDT—a left-wing party that, while recently becoming a satellite of Lula, was, until not long ago, rooted in developmentalism. With these prominent left-wing figures—all champions of developmentalism—now aligning themselves with Bolsonarism, only Ciro Gomes is lacking; however, it was his aide, Gustavo Castañon, who organized the meeting between Flávio, Aldo, and Mangabeira—the latter having even flown in from the United States for this purpose.

At 1:22 PM on the 25th, however, the optimism within Flávio’s campaign began to falter when Lula’s PT requested that the Electoral Court extend voting hours in several Bahian cities until 7:00 PM. In Brazil, elections run from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM (Brasília time), followed by a rapid tabulation of votes from the voting machines. The basis for the request was an alleged conspiracy by mayors supporting Flávio to pull buses off the streets and prevent voters from reaching the polls. In reality, the delay in Salvador occurred because PT-affiliated union members had engaged in a “sticker campaign”—placing PT campaign stickers on buses while they were still in the depot. Operating the buses in that condition would have constituted an electoral offense. Since bus operations fall under the jurisdiction of the municipal government, the city held the vehicles to remove the stickers; by 10:30 AM, however, transit services had returned to normal. (Furthermore, polling stations are located within a short distance of a voter’s registered address—a location that can be updated at the voter’s request.)

Salvador is a stronghold for the PT, yielding a high number of votes for the party. Consequently, Flávio’s campaign also sought to use rainfall in right-leaning municipalities as a pretext to extend voting hours in those areas. Subsequently, the PT petitioned the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to extend the election nationwide. Through the STF’s opaque, non-auditable selection process, the case was assigned to Justice Zanin—formerly Lula’s personal attorney—who granted the extension at 5:05 PM. By that time, many voting machines had already been closed and powered down, and under the rules, they could not be reopened. Finally, the vote count took place—in an order different from the norm (for instance, votes from the Northeast usually come in last; in a typical Brazilian election, the right starts strong but sees its lead melt away as the count progresses). To everyone’s astonishment, Lula’s performance improved in every region of the country. Flávio gained only 3,721,538 additional votes—a modest figure, considering one might have expected around 7 million from the “third way”—while Lula managed to secure an incredible 10,376,694 new votes.

Flávio has announced that he will seek the annulment of the runoff election, though he is unlikely to succeed. The central problem in Brazil today is the credibility of the Judiciary itself, which treats any questioning of the electoral process as an assault on democracy.

Precisely because a large segment of the Brazilian population views the Supreme Federal Court (STF) as the nation’s greatest problem, Flávio focused on electing senators capable of voting for the impeachment of justices. He succeeded: next year, the Senate will include 45 Bolsonarist senators—more than half the chamber. Given the public’s deep dissatisfaction with the Court, it is not implausible that they could reach the 54-vote threshold (two-thirds of the Senate) required to remove at least one justice.

Lula already governs with the backing of the Supreme Court, allowing him to bypass the legislative branches and censor the public. As the looming economic crisis compounds the political one (consider, for example, that starting next year, companies will be required to pay taxes the moment they receive payments from their clients), Brazil is likely to experience social convulsion and face a wave of repression. The end of the New Republic will not be easy. As things stand, one child has already paid with her health: in a Rio de Janeiro slum controlled by drug traffickers, those “victims of society” celebrated Lula’s victory with fireworks and gunfire—one round of which struck a young girl.

Many anti-Zionists demand that Brazil vote for Lula for the sake of the children in Palestine. It would seem that only Palestinian children matter; Brazilian children, apparently, do not.

Senator Flávio Bolsonaro was ordered on Monday to hand over his passports within 24 hours and not to leave Brazil, a measure signed by Supreme Federal Court (STF) justice Alexandre de Moraes.

---

Brazil’s Federal Police on Monday notified Senator Flávio Bolsonaro that he must surrender his passports and comply with a ban on leaving the country, measures ordered by Supreme Federal Court (STF) justice Alexandre de Moraes a day after Bolsonaro lost the presidential run-off to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

RELATED: Flávio Bolsonaro’s Party Recognizes Lula’s Victory in Brazil

Federal Police agents located the senator on Monday morning near his father’s home in Brasília, where former President Jair Bolsonaro is under house arrest. Police told Bolsonaro on Monday morning that he had 24 hours to hand over his documents. The order also bars him from contacting lawyer Willer Tomaz, who is under investigation for alleged money laundering.

The ruling was signed on Sunday night, after the results of that day’s runoff were announced. Flávio Bolsonaro, the far-right candidate, had lost the second round to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Flávio Bolsonaro diz que foi intimado pela PF a entregar seus passaportes por decisão de Alexandre de Moraes pic.twitter.com/Ngvh19Pnmk

— Sam Pancher (@SamPancher) October 26, 2026

Text reads: “Flávio Bolsonaro says that he was subpoenaed by the federal police to surrender his passports by decision of Alexandre de Moraes.”

Flávio Bolsonaro alleged that the justice’s decision responds to remarks made last Friday by his brother, former congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro, who said in an interview that the senator should leave Brazil and challenge the vote count in the event of a defeat, according to the senator.

The Liberal Party’s senator denied any intention to flee, called the ruling an attempt at political intimidation and said he will hand over the documents while his lawyers file an appeal. “I never said that,” he wrote on his official channels, referring to leaving the country. “Is that a reason to take away my passport? Is this justice?,” he added.

Legal experts typically note that travel bans and passport seizures are precautionary measures and not findings of guilt.

Two Open Investigations

The order is tied to two cases pending at the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court. The first, led by Moraes and originating in proceedings in Rio Grande do Sul, examines alleged money laundering with Tomaz through betting companies and payment platforms. Last week the court ordered the freezing of up to 6 billion reais in assets linked to Tomaz, the suspension of his business activities and the lifting of his bank, tax and foreign-exchange secrecy.

Federal Police found that the senator appeared with a “master” user profile on an account of the firm Alcazar Holdings, and detected transactions of almost 130 million reais between March and May 2025 in accounts linked to the lawyer, the source says. Tomaz’s defense rejected the accusations and challenged the proportionality of the asset freezes.

The second case, assigned to justice André Mendonça, looks into alleged irregularities in raising private funds for the film “Dark Horse,” which focuses on Jair Bolsonaro’s political career. Investigators are analyzing audio and digital messages that link Flávio Bolsonaro to dealings with Daniel Vorcaro, the former owner of Master Bank, and police have asked for a 90-day extension to finish financial examinations and process international cooperation requests. Bolsonaro has acknowledged seeking funds for the film in earlier reports in this conversation and denies offering favors.

After Lula’s victory, Bolsonaro will be without public office from February 1, 2027, the first time in more than 20 years that he will be outside state service as he did not run for Senate reelection.

The Supreme Federal Court will keep jurisdiction over the cases against him, under a doctrine the court set in March 2025, approved by seven votes to four and complemented in May 2026, under which alleged crimes committed in office stay with the Supreme Court even after officials leave their posts.

From 2027, the senator will be without parliamentary immunity or public office, a condition that increases his exposure in the ongoing proceedings. The defense’s appeal and the pending expert reports mark the immediate path of the case.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez said Brazil delivered a lesson against extremism and fanaticism. The Workers’ Party founder secured 51.74% of the vote, compared with 48.26% for Flávio Bolsonaro.

---

Venezuela’s Acting President Delcy Rodríguez congratulated President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Brazilian people following Sunday’s electoral victory.

The Workers’ Party candidate prevailed in the runoff election with 51.79% of the vote, defeating far-right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro, who received 48.21%.

RELATED: Latin American Leaders Celebrate Lula’s Fourth Term in Brazil

Rodríguez made the remarks in Caracas during the launch of the Comprehensive Women’s Medical Specialty Service at Dr. Carlos Arvelo Military Hospital. During the event, she argued that the election provided an important lesson for Latin America.

“I once again congratulate President Lula da Silva and the people of Brazil because Brazil has shown that neither extremism nor fanaticism of any kind can prevail,” she said.

The Venezuelan Acting President also emphasized what she described as the message Brazilian society had sent to the region. “It is a healthy society that has delivered a message to the world, and especially to the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean,” she stated.

Ver esta publicación en Instagram

Una publicación compartida de teleSUR English (@telesurenglish)

Official figures confirmed the scale of Lula’s victory. The Brazilian President received 64,256,232 votes (51.79%), ten million more than he obtained in the first round on October 4, when he finished behind his opponent. Bolsonaro garnered 59,826,041 votes (48.21%).

The comeback was unprecedented. The Workers’ Party founder overturned his first-round deficit and secured another term at the head of Brazil’s government in a runoff election that drew intense attention across Latin America for weeks.

Following the announcement of the final results, political leaders and public figures from around the world welcomed Lula’s victory. The election was widely viewed as a contest over the future of democracy and national sovereignty in South America’s largest nation, and the outcome was celebrated by supporters as a rejection of extremist political currents.

Democracy Advances

Diosdado Cabello, secretary-general of Venezuela’s United Socialist Party (PSUV, in Spanish), also praised voter participation in Brazil. During his weekly press conference, the political leader said Brazilian citizens had demonstrated clarity and determination by using the democratic process to stop fascist political alternatives.

According to PSUV leaders, the vote reaffirmed the importance of democratic participation as a decisive tool in political processes across the region and showed that authoritarian alternatives lack support in Brazil.

His comments reflected a broader narrative promoted by the Venezuelan government, which framed Lula’s victory as a milestone for progressive political forces in the region. Officials suggested that the election could strengthen ties among left-leaning governments in Latin America and contribute to renewed efforts aimed at regional integration.

Ver esta publicación en Instagram

Una publicación compartida de teleSUR English (@telesurenglish)

Cabello also reviewed domestic political developments in Venezuela. He described the results of the National Popular Consultation held on October 18 as highly positive and congratulated community organizations and grassroots movements for their participation in local development projects.

On economic and agricultural matters, the Venezuela’s United Socialist Party leader highlighted the launch of a seasonal food production plan coordinated with regional governments and the Ministry of Popular Power for Communes.

Regarding the political dialogue process, Cabello said the third phase of talks is advancing in line with commitments adopted by the participating parties. The discussions include a proposed judicial reform promoted by the government and efforts to recover state assets blocked abroad.

Caracas’ recognition of Lula’s victory joined similar messages issued by leaders from multiple continents. Lula’s victory was achieved with more than 64 million votes, representing a substantial increase compared with his first-round performance. The result reinforced his position as one of the most influential political figures in Latin America and signaled continued support for his political agenda among a majority of Brazilian voters.

For Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, Lula’s re-election sends a clear message to the people of Latin America and the Caribbean, who, she argued, can draw an important lesson against fanaticism and political extremism from Brazil’s electoral outcome.

Brazil’s Liberal Party (PL), the political force that fielded far-right Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, formally recognized the reelection of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Monday.

---

Brazil’s political landscape entered a new phase on Monday as the Liberal Party (PL) formally recognized the results of the presidential election held last Sunday in the South American country.

The party which led Flávio Bolsonaro as a candidate in the balotaje that he lost against Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, took off from its leader and recognized the opposition victory that secured the re-election of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

RELATED: Flávio Bolsonaro Rejects Lula’s Victory, Seeks Annulment

The concession arrived in a letter published on the party’s social media accounts, signed by the party’s president Valdemar Costa Neto, who accepted the result proclaimed by the Superior Electoral Court while asking that “the questions raised” be “duly clarified.“

“Flávio Bolsonaro won the first round of the presidential elections,” the note read, but this Sunday “the result was different, in a scenario marked by strongly electoralist measures, with economic and social impact.”

The party maintained that an expansion of public spending and social benefits carried out by Lula’s government before the vote altered the fairness of the contest. It announced that it will demand explanations within the institutional framework, keeping its objections alive even as it accepted the official tally.

Ver esta publicación en Instagram

Una publicación compartida de Valdemar Costa Neto (@valdemarcostaoficial)

The Liberal Party closed its statement by underscoring what it called a “historic” legislative advance. The conservative bloc secured 121 seats in the lower house, 29 senators and six governors, a result it framed as the base of its political strength going forward.

The decision carries particular weight because the Liberal Party has long been one of the principal political forces aligned with Brazil’s conservative and far right-wing electorate. The party served as a key platform for the Bolsonaro political movement and has frequently acted as one of the most influential opposition voices during Lula’s administration.

Lula secured the victory in Sunday’s runoff with 51,79% of the vote against 48,21% for the far-right candidate, a gap of more than four million ballots. The win amounted to an unprecedented comeback, since the October 4 first round had ended with the eldest son of former President Jair Bolsonaro ahead by two percentage points.

Bolsonaro Refuses Defeat

Flávio Bolsonaro nonetheless declined to concede, instead he affirmed that he will “organize the opposition” to turn the lower house and the Senate into his “fortress against the barbarity” he anticipates “with four more years of Lula.”

He also pledged to press the courts to annul Lula’s candidacy over what he described as “all the abuses” committed during the campaign. Among them he cited the “industrial complex of fake news” assembled by the pro-government side and “abuses of political and economic power without precedent.”The party’s recognition therefore stands in tension with the posture of its own candidate. The institution accepted the official count while its standard-bearer promised to fight it, leaving Brazil’s opposition divided between concession and contestation as Lula prepares to begin another term in office. For the government, the letter clears the way for the new mandate to unfold without a wholesale challenge to its legitimacy.

Flávio Bolsonaro diz que foi intimado pela PF a entregar passaporte e que está proibido de deixar o país

Senador, derrotado no domingo para Lula, voltou a afirmar que pedirá a cassação da chapa vitoriosa

📲 Leia mais na #Folha: https://t.co/MqLgzj5Pmw pic.twitter.com/vgN7UYj64T

— Folha de S.Paulo (@folha) October 26, 2026

Bolsonaro’s Loss of Immunity

Flávio Bolsonaro will be left without public office for the first time in more than two decades, following Lula’s reelection. His Senate term ends January 31, 2027, and he did not stand for another mandate after serving three consecutive terms as a state deputy in the Rio de Janeiro Legislative Assembly between 2003 and January 2019.

Bolsonaro then entered the Senate after the 2018 contest that carried his father to the presidency. By prioritizing his presidential bid, the legislator skipped the renewal of the upper house.

Actually, the senator is under investigation by the Supreme Federal Court for alleged money laundering, tax evasion and corruption. His defeat is expected to push the inquiry toward possible crimes connected to a 134 million reais deal with Daniel Vorcaro, of Master Bank, to finance the film “Dark Horse,” a tribute to his father, former President Jair Bolsonaro, who is sentenced to 27 years in prison after a coup attempt in 2022.

If Flávio won the presidency, the case might have been shelved. The Federal Constitution establishes that the head of the executive power “cannot be held responsible for acts unrelated to the exercise of his functions.”

Without parliamentary immunity, prosecutors gain room to pursue those lines of inquiry. The Senator’s relationship with lawyer Willer Tomaz de Souza also draws scrutiny, as the Federal Police investigate whether Tomaz used betting operations to launder money. The end of Flávio’s mandate therefore carries consequences far beyond the ballot box. His departure from the Senate strips him of the shield that once kept judicial proceedings at bay and leaves the investigations against him exposed to movement.

For the Liberal Party, the cycle closes with a mixed record. The conservative bloc celebrated a “historic” legislative advance in the same election that ended its presidential hopes, securing a strong bench in Congress while its standard-bearer prepared to leave the chamber he had occupied for nearly a decade.

Flávio Bolsonaro now faces a future outside elected office for the first time since 2003. The man who built his career in his father’s shadow in Rio de Janeiro will hand over his Senate seat to party colleagues, while the courts take up the allegations that shadowed his rise through Brazilian politics.