❌

Reading view

U.S. Intel Confirms This Is China’s Secret Spaceplane (Updated)

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has confirmed that an image that has been circulating online for years does indeed show an experimental Chinese reusable spaceplane in orbit. A newly released higher-resolution copy of the image underscores that the design is nearly a dead ringer for the X-37B miniature space shuttles now operated by the U.S. Space Force.

DIA included the higher-resolution image of the Chinese spaceplane in a new unclassified report on global security challenges outside of the Earth’s atmosphere, which was released yesterday. A satellite belonging to Maxar Technologies (now Vantor) captured the image, but when exactly remains unclear. It does have a 2024 copyright date.

The image shows a miniature space shuttle-like design with small wings and twin vertical tails. It also has upward-opening doors above a central payload bay. There is also an extension at the tail end with solar panels seen deployed on either side. There are what look to be side-by-side ventral bays, which are likely for the main gear in a tricycle landing gear configuration. Overall, the core design is extremely similar to that of the U.S. X-37B, which also features tricycle landing gear and can also be fitted with an extended payload module at the tail. One major difference is that the wings on the Chinese design have a much longer chord compared to the X-37B.

A side-by-side comparison of the on-orbit shot of the experimental Chinese reusable spaceplane (at left) and a U.S. X-37B fitted with an extended payload module being prepared for launch (at right). Vantor/U.S. Space Force
Another look at an X-37B, seen here sitting on its tricycle landing gear after returning from a mission in space. USAF The X-37B used on the OTV-6 mission on the flight line at the Kennedy Space Center after its return to Earth on November 12, 2022. USAF

“A key capability for reusable space activities are spaceplanes like this PRC [People’s Republic of China] Spaceplane captured by Maxar. Spaceplanes can launch into orbit to place objects in space or even test them and return to earth [sic],” reads the caption to the picture in DIA’s report.

As noted, the basic fact of the existence of this image is not new. U.S. Space Force Col. John Patrick, then head of U.S. Space Forces-Korea (SPACEFOR-KOR), included a much lower-resolution version in a presentation at the Open Space Forum in South Korea in 2024. It was also not immediately clear at that time whether or not the picture simply showed an X-37B. TWZ had reached out at the time to the U.S. Space Force and Maxar for more information, and both had declined to comment. Two X-37Bs were built, and they have been sent on eight orbital missions, in total, since 2010. The Orbital Test Vehicle 8 (OTV-8) mission was launched on August 22, 2025.

X-37B in orbit photographed by ground-based telescopes? pic.twitter.com/YPj8I4cQmZ

— 笑脸男人 (@lfx160219) November 8, 2024

China is understood to have conducted four separate orbital spaceplane missions using the same experimental vehicle since 2020. Three of those missions had concluded before Col. Patrick gave his presentation. The most recent launch occurred on February 7 of this year, and the vehicle has not yet returned, at least as far as we are aware.

On the third mission, which lasted from December 14, 2023, to September 6, 2024, the Chinese spaceplane was observed releasing multiple smaller objects into orbit. What those payloads may have been remains unknown, but they could have been released from the main payload bay, which is seen open in the on-orbit image. The bay could have opened without any subsequent release of objects on either of the two prior missions, as well.

As an aside, the spaceplane appears to have released at least one more object earlier this year in the course of its latest mission.

A secretive airbase in the northwest end of China, sporting one of the longest runways in the world at 16,400 feet, looks to be where the spaceplane has landed after missions. The facility, which has been expanded massively in recent years, is now loosely akin to America’s top-secret proving ground at Area 51, and has been the site of other advanced aviation test efforts.

DIA’s report also says that “China has two primary spaceplane models: the Shenlong and Tengyun,” but does not specify which one is seen in the image. The name Shenlong has been commonly used to refer to the spaceplane China has been experimenting with to date. Images said to show a prototype or test article of this design slung underneath an H-6 bomber for testing purposes had emerged in 2007.

Images that emerged in 2007 of a reusable spaceplane prototype, or a related test article, referred to as Shenlong, underneath an H-6 bomber. Chinese internet

The state-run China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) unveiled the Tengyun design in 2016 as part of a so-called two-stage-to-orbit system that uses a mothership aircraft flying within the atmosphere as part of the launch method rather than a traditional space launch rocket. As of 2020, CASIC was aiming for a live test of Tengyun in 2025, but it is not immediately clear whether or not that occurred.

Images showing wind tunnel testing of a Chinese two-stage-to-orbit concept. Chinese internet

There have been other spaceplane developments in China in recent years. This includes designs from the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) subsidiary Chengdu. The design from Chengdu is called Haolong and has been in development officially as an option for resupplying the country’s Tiangong space station.

👀 They seem not only got a model but also a full-scale prototype.
HaoLong-1 cargo spaceplane https://t.co/VI1Yoh3sRj pic.twitter.com/Dthfd1gi1v

— CNSPACE (@CNSpaceflight) November 11, 2024

In general, “spaceplanes are … reusable and feature enhanced maneuverability, making them more suitable for certain missions than traditional satellites,” DIA’s report notes.

TWZ has highlighted in the past how reusable space shuttle-like vehicles offer ideal platforms for rapidly deploying small satellites and any other payloads into orbit. In this way, they can be critical assets for space-based experimentation, as well as operational activities. This could include intelligence gathering, and even on-orbit attacks, areas of clear interest to the Chinese government.

As we often mention in the context of the X-37B, spaceplanes also have distinct advantages when it comes to rendezvousing with and maneuvering very close to other objects in space. They can execute course changes and other maneuvers in ways that traditional satellites cannot. All of this only underscores their potential as weapon systems, as well as for gathering intelligence. The fact that a Maxar (now Vantor) satellite took an on-orbit picture – a service the company is known to offer – of a Chinese spaceplane further highlights the kind of cat-and-mouse games that are increasingly emerging in space. The general risks posed by these kinds of activities were recently thrust into the public eye by the unprecedentedly close shadowing of a commercial radar imaging satellite tied to Ukraine by another satellite belonging to Russia.

China has been making massive investments, in general, in new space-based intelligence and other capabilities in recent years. Chinese space developments have now also extended into reusable space launch rocket boosters. Space launch company LandSpace became the first in China to achieve a successful recovery of a reusable space launch rocket booster on land in August. That followed CASC’s successful recovery of a reusable space launch rocket booster at sea using a specially configured ship the month before.

In general, “access to space traditionally requires expendable spacecraft: single-use launch vehicles, satellites, and one-time use capsules designed to maximize performance. Reliance on expendable vehicles has made access to space expensive and exclusive,” DIA’s report explains. “Reusable technologies, while even more difficult and expensive to develop and build, stand to greatly reduce the cost of spaceflight by recovering, refurbishing, and reusing rocket stages, fairings, and capsules.”

Chinese spaceplanes, one of which we have not definitively gotten a view of in orbit, look set to become an increasingly important part of this growing ecosystem.

Update: 6:32 PM ET –

Vantor has now provided an additional copy of the image of the Chinese spaceplane, elements of which look to be redacted, and some additional details. The company has confirmed it was taken on May 28, 2024, by the WorldView-3 satellite at a range of just under 56 miles (90 kilometers).

“There is a separate satellite docked to the aft section of the vehicle whose structure and solar arrays are visible,” Vantor also told us. “The spacecraft’s payload bay doors are visibly open.”

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post U.S. Intel Confirms This Is China’s Secret Spaceplane (Updated) appeared first on TWZ.

  •  

USAF Orders ARRW Hypersonic Missile Into Production, The Same Weapon It Nearly Cancelled

The U.S. Air Force has handed Lockheed Martin a $694 million contract for the production of AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) hypersonic missiles. In 2023, the service had moved to cancel ARRW, which had been in line to be the U.S. military’s first operational hypersonic weapon. At the time, we had reservations about the service’s intent and speculated the missile could make a major comeback or continue development in a classified setting. The program has since made an incredible turnaround, and there are already plans for another variant that will be able to use an all-new seeker to hit moving targets, including enemy warships.

The ARRW contract was awarded on September 29, but only announced today. It is not immediately clear how many missiles are to be built under this deal or when the Air Force expects to start taking delivery of them. The Air Force has previously disclosed plans to integrate the missiles onto its B-52 and B-1 bombers. Other aircraft with sufficiently large payload capacities and physical space to carry outsized stores could potentially carry AGM-183As, or variants thereof, in the future.

A B-1 bomber seen carrying an ARRW missile, or a relevant test article, on an external pylon during a flight test. USAF capture

“The contract was executed under the Department of War’s Enterprise-Wide Agile Acquisition Contract to modernize America’s Arsenal of Freedom,” according to an Air Force press release. “This milestone marks the formal transition of the boost-glide hypersonic missile program from prototyping and flight testing into production, solidifying the Air Force’s commitment to fielding standoff, high-speed strike options.”

As noted here, the AGM-183A is a so-called boost-glide vehicle-type hypersonic weapon, which uses a rocket booster to bring it first to an optimal speed and altitude. The nose cone on ARRW then breaks away, and a wedge-shaped unpowered boost-glide vehicle concealed within is released.

A rendering depicting an ARRW hypersonic missile’s nose cone breaking away to reveal the unpowered boost-glide vehicle inside. Lockheed Martin

The vehicle then glides to its target along a relatively shallow flight path within the Earth’s atmosphere at hypersonic speed, defined as anything above Mach 5. It is capable of maneuvering along the way, sometimes erratically. The mix of speed, flight trajectory, and maneuverability creates significant challenges for opponents in terms of spotting and tracking the glide vehicle, let alone attempting to intercept it. As a result, hypersonic weapons of this type offer particular benefits for piercing enemy air defenses to very rapidly strike time-sensitive and otherwise high-value targets.

The ARRW production contract “is a turning point in our advanced weapons roadmap,” Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink said in a statement accompanying today’s release. “By moving ARRW from test to production, we’re providing our combatant commanders with a credible, high-speed strike weapon capable of penetrating the most advanced anti-access and area-denial systems.”

“Fielding ARRW enhances our ability to hold targets at risk anywhere around the world,” Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach said in his own statement. “This hypersonic weapon provides the Joint Force a flexible and rapid response option for highly contested environments.”

A graphic offering a very general comparison of the typical flight trajectories of hypersonic boost-glide vehicle weapons and air-breathing hypersonic cruise missiles, as well as aeroballistic (or quasi-ballistic) missiles and traditional ballistic missiles. GAO

As mentioned, the Air Force had moved to cancel ARRW in 2023, following a number of failed flight tests. The explicit intent at the time was to shift resources to the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) effort. HACM is an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile that functions in a completely different way from ARRW. HACM is still in development, and the program has now moved into flight testing, as TWZ was first to report earlier this month.

There had already been steady signs in recent years that ARRW’s fortunes were changing and that it had not actually been axed, despite the Air Force’s stated plans to do so. The Air Force’s 2026 Fiscal Year budget request last year confirmed that the service had fully rebooted the program and was seeking new funding to procure actual missiles.

The service’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request, released earlier this year, revealed further plans “to begin [ARRW] INC 2 [Increment 2] technology efforts such as but not limited to integrating pre-planned product improvements, design, trade studies, hardware upgrades, facilitization, affordability initiatives, and testing.”

A live AGM-183A ARRW missile seen under the wing of a B-52 bomber at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam ahead of a test in 2024. USAF

A request for $296 million would support “the design, test, and evaluation of Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) Increment 2 with terminal seeker and data link capability and other cost reduction production initiatives into ARRW,” those same documents added.

In general, the U.S. Air Force has historically framed hypersonic weapons, including ARRW and HACM, as being especially critical for success in future conflicts, especially high-end fights, such as one in the Pacific against China. This was underscored by the launch of an AGM-183A with a live warhead from a B-52 flying from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam in 2024. The future anti-ship variant could be even more relevant in a Pacific context.

As TWZ has written previously:

“…the Guam test sent clear signals to China. The Air Force has made no secret of how important it views the development and fielding of hypersonic weapons as part of larger preparations for a potential future high-end fight against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Pacific. This is further underscored by the fact that the mention of the ‘terminal seeker and data link capability’ for Increment 2 of ARRW is actually contained in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) section of the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget request.”

A low-quality image of an ARRW after launch during a previous live-fire flight test. USAF

“In the context of a major conflict in the Pacific, there would also be a very high demand for prompt, long-range anti-ship capability. The ability to conduct those strikes even in the face of dense anti-air defenses would be even more attractive for engaging very high-value vessels, such as China’s growing fleets of aircraft carriers or big deck amphibious assault ships. The PLA Navy’s (PLAN) combat fleets, overall, continue to grow in scale and scope at a prodigious rate, as well. This, in turn, has put additional emphasis on the development and fielding of new and improved anti-ship capabilities that can be air-launched, as well as employed from the maritime and ground domains, across the U.S. military in recent years. Increment 2 ARRWs could also offer another means to strike mobile, high-value targets on land, such as ballistic missile transporter-erector-launchers.”

China’s aircraft carriers Shandong, at left, and Liaoning, at right, sail together, along with various escorts, as elements of their air wings fly overhead, in 2024. Chinese state media

“For its part, the PLA has been actively developing and fielding various types of hypersonic weapons, including boost-glide vehicle designs. Its ever-growing arsenal of traditional ballistic missiles now includes several air-launched types, including ones with nuclear and conventional warheads. The latter are widely believed to be capable of being employed against enemy ships, as well as targets on land.”

If nothing else, after moving to cancel the ARRW three years ago, the Air Force has now fully reversed course and has placed its first order for production examples of this hypersonic missile.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post USAF Orders ARRW Hypersonic Missile Into Production, The Same Weapon It Nearly Cancelled appeared first on TWZ.

  •  

EU Lawmakers Move to Relax 2035 Car Emissions Rules as Industry Presses for Greater Flexibility

The European Parliament has taken another step towards revising the European Union’s 2035 vehicle-emissions framework, after lawmakers from three major political groups agreed amendments offering manufacturers greater flexibility in meeting carbon dioxide reduction targets.

The compromise, approved on 22 October by Parliament’s Transport and Industry committees, proposes an 87.5 per cent reduction in average emissions from new passenger cars by 2035, compared with the 2021 baseline. This is less stringent than the European Commission’s proposed 90 per cent reduction and represents a further departure from the existing 100 per cent reduction in tailpipe emissions for new cars and vans.

The changes have not become law. They remain subject to parliamentary procedures and negotiations with EU governments. Nevertheless, the committee agreement shows how concerns over manufacturing competitiveness, production costs and technological choices are reshaping European climate legislation.

A fundamental revision of the 2035 framework

The original 2035 target, adopted in 2023 as part of the EU’s Fit for 55 legislation, required manufacturers to achieve a 100 per cent reduction in average tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions from new cars and vans. It effectively directed the market towards battery-electric and other zero-emission vehicles.

Manufacturers have argued that the transition is taking place under difficult commercial conditions. Competition from Chinese producers, costs of developing new platforms and batteries, and uncertainty over charging infrastructure contributed to demands for regulatory flexibility.

In December 2025, the European Commission responded with an automotive package proposing a 90 per cent reduction requirement by 2035. It would permit manufacturers to compensate for some remaining emissions using mechanisms involving low-carbon steel produced in the EU and qualifying renewable fuels.

The latest parliamentary compromise would lower the target further, to 87.5 per cent, while allowing low-carbon steel credits to count towards compliance. For light commercial vehicles, lawmakers also proposed reducing the 2035 target to 80 per cent and the 2030 target to 35 per cent.

Why low-carbon steel matters

A notable feature of the compromise is the connection between car-emissions rules and European steelmaking. Steel production is a major industrial source of carbon dioxide, and companies face investment requirements to replace conventional production processes with lower-emission alternatives.

Regulatory credits for carmakers using qualifying European low-carbon steel could create demand for cleaner industrial materials and encourage domestic investment. But emissions avoided during production are not equivalent to reductions in exhaust emissions. The accounting mechanism therefore creates a distinction between cutting tailpipe output and compensating for some remaining emissions through materials and manufacturing.

The compromise also connects vehicle rules with a broader industrial-policy debate about European-made products. As EU Today previously reported, vehicle decarbonisation has increasingly become part of the discussion about European industrial competitiveness.

Electric vehicle sales continue to increase

The debate comes despite growth in electric vehicle registrations. According to figures from the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association, battery-electric cars represented 22.7 per cent of new EU passenger car registrations in the first nine months of 2026, against 16.1 per cent during the same period of 2025.

Approximately 1.93 million battery-electric cars were registered between January and September, with considerable growth in Germany and France. Hybrid-electric vehicles nevertheless remained the largest single powertrain category at 36.3 per cent, while petrol and diesel together represented 28.2 per cent, down from 36.9 per cent a year earlier.

The figures show that electrification is progressing, but combustion engines still account for a substantial share of sales. Manufacturers must make investment decisions across several technologies while anticipating changing legislation.

Disagreements over industrial strategy

The parliamentary compromise follows discussions between France and Germany about the relationship between car-emissions rules and measures favouring European production. Paris has emphasised domestic industrial capacity; Berlin has pressed for greater technological flexibility.

Supporters of looser standards argue that manufacturers need time to adjust investment and respond to consumer demand. Critics warn that weakening the target could delay investments in electric vehicles, batteries and charging networks by making future demand less certain.

The eventual legislation will determine not only which vehicles may be sold after 2035, but also how the EU balances emissions reduction, international competition and the position of its manufacturing industry.

  •  
❌