RT | October 29, 2026

The Financial Times has refused to correct an anonymously sourced article about a recent phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the leaders of Norway and Finland, despite objections from both Nordic governments, according to media reports.

Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store and Finnish President Alexander Stubb spoke with Putin earlier this week, drawing criticism from some of Europe’s more Russia-hawkish politicians.

The British newspaper claimed that Putin spent much of the conversation “lecturing” the Nordic leaders on “medieval Slavic history” and its relevance to the Ukraine conflict, rather than discussing ways to end the hostilities. Citing three anonymous sources described only as “familiar with the conversation,” the FT portrayed the Russian president as “fixated” on history.

Store’s government told Norwegian daily Verdens Gang (VG) that the characterization was inaccurate and that Finland had contacted the FT on behalf of both countries to challenge its account, the newspaper reported on Thursday. Finnish media also covered the joint objection, with the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat citing its own sources to dispute the British paper’s description of the call.

Putin’s foreign policy adviser Yury Ushakov said later in the day that the FT article is “some invented information, or rather disinformation” and that the Nordic leaders were correct to call out the publication.

The FT, however, rejected the request, telling VG that it stood by its reporting.

Its article, published on Tuesday, was written by three journalists.

One of them, American national Christopher Miller, previously worked for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, a US government-funded international broadcaster originally established with covert CIA funding to conduct anti-communist propaganda operations during the Cold War. Miller went to Ukraine in 2010 as a volunteer with the US Peace Corps.

His co-authors, Max Seddon and Henry Foy, head the FT’s bureaus in Moscow and Brussels, respectively.

Last week, the newspaper published a lengthy article by Seddon titled “The Putin whisperers,” recounting a dramatic but difficult-to-verify story of American and German nationals attempting to avert a “nuclear Armageddon” through backchannel diplomacy with Moscow.

Foy, meanwhile, broke a story in 2025 alleging that a plane carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had experienced suspected Russian GPS jamming. The FT journalist was himself aboard the aircraft when it landed in Bulgaria, as he subsequently revealed on the newspaper’s podcast. His original report, citing anonymous officials, suggested Russia may have deliberately targeted the top EU executive with electronic interference.

Key elements of the story were challenged almost immediately by flight-tracking service Flightradar24. Bulgarian authorities subsequently debunked the core claims relayed by FT.

Despite the discrepancies, the FT insisted it stood by its reporting. Foy did not respond to requests for comment from fellow journalists who questioned the account.

Why Norway and Finland Were Right to Call Putin

By Glenn Diesen | October 29, 2026

The leaders of Norway and Finland are criticised for breaking with the European consensus on boycotting diplomacy by calling President Putin. Their decision to undermine this solidarity is seen as dividing and weakening Europe. I argue the opposite. It was a brave and necessary move, as the European consensus is based on a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes it increasingly irrelevant, and risks taking it to war with Russia – the world’s largest nuclear power. I will make a further argument: we should develop a healthy scepticism towards the notion that speaking with one voice is always a strength.

How to Speak with One Voice: The Rhetorical Trap

Ask yourself: how can 27+ countries with different political, economic, and security interests agree on a common foreign policy and speak with one voice? A common voice can be achieved by defining collective interests or by setting a rhetorical trap. A rhetorical trap is set when politicians use shared values and earlier commitments to pressure others into supporting policies they would otherwise oppose. Disagreement is portrayed as a betrayal of these values, making it politically costly to dissent, even when the policy goes against national interests.

The easiest way to force a consensus is to frame every issue as a struggle between good and evil. Once political disagreements become moral questions, those who challenge the consensus can be shamed rather than answered. If every issue is reduced to a choice between freedom and imperialism, it becomes much easier to speak with one voice. The obsession with speaking with one voice makes Europeans vulnerable to Manichean thinking and warmongering policies.

Europeans unite around absurd slogans such as “Putin is Hitler” and “Russia wants to restore the Soviet Union”. These slogans do not help us understand Russia or develop sensible policies to mitigate the security competition. Their purpose is to establish moral clarity and enforce political conformity. Challenging these slogans with well-documented arguments is considered immoral and a threat to European unity. This rhetorical trap is extremely dangerous because, in a struggle between good and evil, we reach the conclusion that diplomacy is appeasement and weapons are the path to peace.

The End of Debate

Consider the debate about European security after the Cold War. We once recognised the principle of indivisible security, which means that one state should not strengthen its security at the expense of others. Discussions about security entailed balancing deterrence with reassurance. These principles have largely disappeared from European political discourse. It is now only about deterrence. It is heresy to contest the notion that NATO is a “force for good”, and all concerns about NATO expansionism are framed as opposition to democracy and freedom. How can we resolve a security competition if we are not even allowed to discuss its causes?

Instead, European leaders increasingly measure the success of their policies by their moral intentions rather than their consequences. Sanctions are presented as a demonstration of resolve, the willingness to fight a war as an expression of solidarity, and refusing diplomacy as standing firm against aggression. But what happens when these policies fail to produce the intended results? The answer is usually more sanctions, more war, and less diplomacy. The policies themselves cannot be questioned without appearing to undermine the moral foundations of European unity.

Weaponising Solidarity

The demand for solidarity is also weaponised to override reason. WikiLeaks exposed how Norwegian officials had initially expressed serious concerns that US strategic missile defence would disrupt the nuclear balance with Russia and destabilise the world. The US ambassador reported to Washington that the Norwegians could be persuaded to change their position, not through arguments, but by emphasising the need for NATO solidarity. If the Norwegians were presented with a choice between “repeating Russian narratives” and defending NATO solidarity, they would fall in line.

Later, the American ambassador sent another cable to Washington confirming that their work with NGOs, think tanks, journalists, and politicians had delivered the message, and that the Norwegians were abandoning their security concerns. This was not the result of arguments, but of pressure to show solidarity in a world where everything is framed in black-and-white terms. Since then, the nuclear arms control architecture has largely collapsed, and the world faces a dangerous future – but the political class takes comfort in the fact that it was all done in solidarity.

This is a dangerous way to organise European security. If solidarity means that countries must abandon their own security assessments to support a common position, then solidarity itself becomes a source of insecurity. The purpose of cooperation should be to reconcile different interests and develop better policies, not to pressure governments into repeating the same empty arguments.

Speaking with One Voice or Correcting Course?

A strong Europe should be able to tolerate disagreements among its members. Indeed, such disagreements are necessary if Europe is to correct mistaken policies. When dissent is treated as disloyalty, political mistakes become almost impossible to reverse. Leaders become prisoners of their own rhetoric.

Norway and Finland should therefore not be criticised for challenging the European consensus on diplomatic isolation. They should be encouraged. Europe needs countries willing to question policies that have become resistant to criticism, especially when those policies concern war and peace.

The current European consensus is sustained by a rhetorical trap that isolates Europe, makes the continent increasingly irrelevant, and risks dragging us into war. I therefore argue for a little less solidarity and a little more common sense.

By Uriel Araujo | October 29, 2026

President Volodymyr Zelensky recently signed Bill No.16119, a law expanding educational rights for national minorities and indigenous peoples. Ukraine is thereby selectively adjusting, rather than reversing, its post-2014 Ukrainization policies.

The measure was presented as progress on minority rights and a step that could help open further EU accession clusters. Romanian President Nicusor Dan welcomed the legislation, noting that mother-tongue education for ethnic Romanians is “no abstract matter” for families living in Ukraine.

The law expands the use of eligible minority languages in schools, recognizes special institutional status for minority-language schools, and strengthens continuity of education.

Crucially, the additional protections apply only to official languages of the European Union and to indigenous languages such as Crimean Tatar. Hungarian, Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian and Slovak qualify. Russian does not. The Ukrainian Ministry of Education clarified that the additional rights “do not apply to the Russian language.”

Russian remains widely spoken, with 28% or even more Ukrainians still using both Russian and Ukrainian at home despite years of Ukrainization and wartime restrictions.

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe flagged the problem years ago: in its 2017 opinion, it found the less favorable treatment of non-EU languages, particularly Russian, difficult to justify and raised discrimination concerns. Its 2023 opinion report on national minorities legislation reiterated that promoting Ukrainian as the state language does not justify withholding equivalent protections from Russian speakers.

Ukraine’s Constitutional Court took a different view in 2021, holding that preferential treatment for EU languages was permissible – the European advisory body’s criticism and Kyiv’s domestic position have never fully aligned.

The expanded guarantees for ethnic Hungarians and Romanians may reflect Budapest’s and Bucharest’s ability to block or delay Ukraine’s EU accession process.

It is no accident Roma inclusion follows a separate track: a national strategy running to 2030 addresses education, housing and discrimination. These measures concern the social integration of marginalized Gypsies communities, rather than reversing Ukrainization.

Similarly, Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, who cannot exercise comparable leverage inside the EU process, remain outside the new framework.

By comparison, although the ongoing war complicates it, Russia formally recognizes ethnic Ukrainians, while its Constitution and laws guarantee the preservation and study of minority languages.

In any case, Kyiv explicitly differentiates between Russian and EU minority languages, while Moscow formally has an inclusive framework.

Ukraine’s Russian minority-rights controversy predates the 2022 invasion: differential treatment has been a structural feature of post-Maidan policy, rather than just a temporary wartime measure.

After 2014, language, media and minority legislation steadily elevated Ukrainian while narrowing the public space for Russian. US political scientist Nicolai N. Petro, writing in Foreign Policy in late 2023, described policies that further relegated Russian speakers to a permanent second-class status – and warned that such approaches risk alienating a significant share of the population even once fighting ends.

Ukrainian officials have at times declared there is simply “no Russian minority”, a claim that sits uneasily with census data and everyday bilingual reality, to say the least.

Meanwhile, nationalist historical narratives persist: a Lviv’s museum dedicated to Nazi collaborator Roman Shukhevych was being rebuilt just weeks before the education law was signed. Shukhevych incited anti-Polish pogroms in 1930.

The continued public commemoration of such figures is hard to reconcile with any claim of comprehensive ideological retreat from post-Maidan nation-building. Moreover, the reforms will be viewed by Ukrainian ultranationalists as a setback forced by European partners – and are likely to generate domestic pushback.

They may also, on the other hand, encourage further demands from minority communities, including over the glorification of controversial wartime figures – an issue that still strains relations with Poland. Not surprisingly, Ukrainian tensions with neighbors have been a recurring feature of the regional landscape – Hungary being a case in point.

As part of its EU accession plans, Kyiv is reviewing chauvinistic policies regarding some minorities – while leaving the largest linguistic community outside the latest concessions.

The “macro” dimension of the conflict involves great-power rivalry, proxy dynamics and the long trajectory of NATO expansion. The micro or rather “meso”-level dimension remains the unresolved issue of post-Soviet borders and the ethnopolitics of a post-Soviet republic still consolidating its nation-building project.

In the words of Kristin Henrard (Professor of International Law at the Brussels School of Governance): “Ukraine will need to acknowledge that the Russian minority, as one of the several minorities with kinstates in its territory, is special because of that strong numerical size, and traditional presence.” This would be “in line with Ukraine’s international obligations”, she writes.

So much for the idea that minority-rights problems were ever merely “Russian propaganda.” They were real enough for Hungarians and Romanians that Kyiv had to legislate; they remain real for Russian speakers. The civil-rights issue remains.

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.