The Israeli military intensified its deadly attacks on Palestinians in different parts of the Gaza Strip in the last 24 hours that preceded the announcement of the Knesset election results, which are expected by the morning of Friday, October 30.

Read more: Israel’s elections: all roads lead to genocide

At least six Palestinians were killed and dozens of others wounded in Israeli strikes that targeted different areas of the war-torn enclave.

The fatalities include four government employees, who were killed in an Israeli strike on the Ministry of Economy in the Al-Mawasi area, west of the southern city of Rafah. Thirty others were wounded in the same offensive. 

The Gaza-based government media office condemned the assault in a statement published on Telegram, describing it as “a new crime and a horrific massacre that targeted a group of civilian public-sector employees.”

It added that “targeting government teams and civilian public employees is part of the organized crime that the Israeli occupation has practiced, and a malicious exposed attempt to push towards chaos and disorder by undermining the work of government crews and institutions, which seek to maintain the stability and safety of society.”

Meanwhile, two people were killed and several others were wounded when an Israeli drone struck a civilian vehicle near the entrance to the Al-Maghazi refugee camp, in the central Deir al-Balah Governorate.

The latest deaths take the toll of people killed by Israel in Gaza since the US-brokered ceasefire deal was reached in October 2025 to more than 1,574 people, with 5,867 others wounded, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry.

The ministry also reported that at least 74,570 people have been killed since Israel started its genocidal aggression on the besieged strip in October 2023.

Jaffa, Israel — Outside of Ahva Elementary School in Ajami, a historic Palestinian neighborhood just south of central Tel Aviv, the mood was defiant on October 27, the day of Israel’s national elections. “We fear that if we do not get this government out of power, we will lose everything,” one Palestinian voter told me after casting her ballot.

It came as no surprise that she, like most of the Palestinian citizens of Israel I interviewed on Election Day, asked not to be named. Since October 7, 2023, more than 400 Palestinian citizens of Israel have been investigated by police for “incitement,” often over social media posts, according to the legal rights group Adalah.

During the 1948 war, which Palestinians call the Nakba, most of Jaffa’s nearly 100,000 Palestinian residents fled or were expelled. The fewer than 4,000 who remained were concentrated in Ajami, fenced in with barbed wire, where they lived under Israeli military rule until 1949.

Just weeks ago, it was not clear that the parties most Palestinian citizens of Israel vote for would even appear on the ballot. In September, Israel’s Central Elections Committee, a body of party representatives, voted to disqualify both Arab parties — which are led by and draw most of their votes from Palestinian citizens of Israel — from running in the election. The Joint List is an alliance of three parties running together to clear the 3.25 percent threshold needed to enter the Knesset.

Hadash, a left-wing party with roots in Israel’s Communist Party, is the only one of the three with both Jewish and Palestinian members. Ta’al’s platform has historically focused on the rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel. Balad, a Palestinian nationalist party, calls for Israel to become a state of all its citizens, with equal rights for everyone.

The other party, running independently, is Ra’am, a conservative Islamist party led by Mansour Abbas, which in 2021 became the first Arab party to join an Israeli governing coalition.

The two Arab parties were eventually reinstated and allowed to run in the Israeli election, but only after an appeal to Israel’s Supreme Court.

As Israelis vote to elect the country’s 26th parliament (Knesset), Palestinian voters in the Ajami neighborhood said Gaza was at the top of their minds. Just down the road is a public memorial displaying photos of some of the more than 20,000 children who have, according to a UN commission, been killed by the Israeli military in Gaza since October 7, 2023.

The memorial, at Hajj Kahil Square, has been torn down more than once. In May, according to Bokra, a Palestinian news site, two men, one of them carrying a rifle, ripped the photos from the walls. The next day, Jaffa residents put them back up and renamed the traffic circle the “Gaza Children’s Roundabout.” Police, who ultimately answer to Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s far right minister of national security, have also tried to stop protesters from displaying the images.

Whether or not to participate in Israel’s national elections has long been a fraught topic among Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Whether or not to participate in Israel’s national elections has long been a fraught topic among Palestinian citizens of Israel. Some fear that voting in the election would lend legitimacy to a state that expelled most of their families in 1948 and maintains a military occupation over Palestinians in the West Bank, and that human rights groups say has committed genocide in Gaza; but others view it as their only way to gather power in the Knesset, especially more than three years after October 7.

An unprecedented wave of homicides in the community has also pushed many to the polls. At least 184 Palestinian citizens of Israel have been killed this year, putting 2026 on pace to surpass last year’s record of 252, according to the Abraham Initiatives. Police filed indictments in just 12 percent of homicides in Palestinian communities by June 2026, compared with a historic rate of indictments in 65 percent of cases involving homicides committed against Jewish Israelis.

On Israel’s Election Day, a recorded voice message went out to more than 1 million Palestinian voters from Sousan Sultan, whose sister Susan was killed in April 2025, and whose husband, Ziad, was murdered last August. “My sister was murdered, and she cannot vote in the election,” Sultan said in the recording, asking voters to cast their ballots in her sister’s name.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his main challengers have all ruled out forming a coalition with the Arab parties, even as polls suggest the opposition may struggle to reach a majority without them. Throughout the campaign, Likud (Israel’s largest right-wing party) and its allies have made those parties a frequent target of their campaign ads, using Palestinian electoral power as a way to drum up turnout among anti-Palestinian blocs.

Some ads depict images of Palestinian political leaders, including Ahmad Tibi, who was an adviser to Yasser Arafat, alongside center-right politician Gadi Eisenkot, whose Yashar party leads the opposition, proclaiming the choice is “the right” or “Palestine.”

In the Negev, the desert region in Israel’s south that is home to most of the country’s roughly 300,000 Bedouin citizens, many of whom identify as Palestinians, voter turnout has historically been low. But in this election, that appears to have completely shifted. In the Bedouin village of al-Atawneh, turnout had reached 64 percent by noon on the day of the election, the highest in the country, according to Central Elections Committee data. In the last election, it was 41 percent for the entire day.

“We are seeing record-breaking voter turnout in the Naqab [the Arabic name for the Negev] today for the Knesset elections, reaching unprecedented levels,” Huda Abu Obaid, advocacy coordinator with the Negev Coexistence Forum, told Truthout on Election Day. “However, right-wing groups are intentionally delaying the voting process, forcing voters to wait in excessively long lines.”

Many of the Negev’s Bedouin citizens live in villages the state does not recognize, which lack connection to the national water and electricity grids and where homes face demolition for being built without permits. Israeli authorities demolished a record 5,187 buildings in Bedouin communities in the Negev in 2024 alone, up from 3,283 the year before, according to the Negev Coexistence Forum.

Far right parties sent their own observers to polling stations in Palestinian communities, and rights groups reported long delays in the Galilee, in the north, and the Negev, both home to large Palestinian populations. The Central Elections Committee said it had found no evidence of systematic tampering and that polling stations would stay open past 10:00 pm for anyone still in line.

On Election Day in 2015, Netanyahu warned in a video that Palestinian voters were heading to the polls “in droves,” a message widely credited with driving a late surge in support for Likud. This year, he did it again, warning his base of high Palestinian turnout and claiming, without evidence, that his opponents were trying to steal the election.

With about 84 percent of all votes counted by Wednesday afternoon, no party bloc was close to reaching the 61-seat threshold required to form a majority in the Knesset. Netanyahu’s bloc was the largest, at 54 seats, but it was still down from 68 he held in the outgoing Knesset. Meanwhile, the opposition bloc (composed of all non-Arab parties running to unseat Netanyahu) won 49 seats. The Arab parties won a combined total of 17 seats, the most they have ever won in history. Turnout among Palestinian citizens reached an estimated 80 percent, breaking a record set in 1999, and surpassing the turnout rate among Jewish Israeli voters for the first time ever.

Jafar Farah, director of the Mossawa Center, a Haifa-based advocacy group for Arab citizens of Israel, cautioned against reading too much into the numbers. Farah was elected to the No. 2 spot on Hadash’s slate in May but withdrew in September. He said the rise in Palestinian turnout does not necessarily mean Palestinian citizens have renewed faith in the Israeli state or its institutions, or believe the ballot can end the military occupation of the West Bank (a theme in some of the Joint List’s campaign ads), or change conditions in Gaza. Instead, Farah said, many voters see casting a ballot as a form of “damage control.”

At least 184 Palestinian citizens of Israel have been killed this year.

“The increase in turnout projected in the 2026 polls, if it materializes, cannot automatically be interpreted as a return of trust in the Israeli establishment or in the Arab parties,” Farah said. “It may also reflect a growing sense of the need for political protection in conditions marked by uncertainty.”

A May poll by Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center found that while more than 77 percent of Palestinian citizens of Israel want an Arab party in the next government, only 40 percent believe Jewish Israelis genuinely support a political partnership with them.

Netanyahu’s challengers offer little on the issues many Palestinian voters care about. Eisenkot’s party says it supports Jewish settlement wherever it is carried out legally and opposes a Palestinian state. Eisenkot himself has said anyone still thinking about a two-state solution after October 7 is “simply delusional.” Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who leads the B’Yachad list, has ruled out ceding any land to what he calls Israel’s enemies, an apparent reference to a Palestinian state.

As of today, the math appears simple: Without the Joint List or Ra’am joining the coalition, the opposition appears to have no way to form a majority in the Knesset. Yet Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Liberman, two right-wing opposition leaders, are still ruling out any government that relies on Arab parties, and Eisenkot has not dropped conditions for coalition partners that most Palestinian lawmakers are unlikely to accept.

Palestinian citizens of Israel turned out in record numbers to get the Netanyahu government out of power, but it remains to be seen whether the other opposition parties will join in their efforts.

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By Peiman Salehi | The Cradle | October 28, 2026

The presence of Saudi, Turkish, and Pakistani officials in Tehran on 26 October reflected a growing recognition that Iran cannot be excluded from any serious regional security arrangement. Despite the US–Israeli war against Iran, Tehran remains central to the region’s military and political balance.

For Riyadh and its partners, the meeting also exposed the limits of the Mecca defense pact, particularly as Saudi Arabia faces renewed confrontation with the Ansarallah-aligned Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF).

Much of the speculation surrounding the four-country meeting centered on what Iran might be expected to surrender, particularly its relationship with Sanaa. Such expectations rested on the assumption that Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan had established a regional security order into which Iran was now seeking admission, with Tehran potentially offering concessions over Yemen in return.

Yet the political and military circumstances that brought the participants to Tehran suggest a different calculation. Iran has withstood sustained American and Israeli attacks, while Saudi Arabia and its partners have struggled to contain the YAF’s military operations. Any agreement that disregards these realities risks reproducing the confrontations it seeks to resolve.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry had identified Israel’s expansionist policies, Lebanon, and the US war against Iran among the subjects for discussion. Yemen was absent from the announced agenda and the subsequent press statement.

Ali Bagheri, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said the gathering also served to congratulate Mohsen Rezaei, the council’s newly appointed secretary, and discuss regional security, including opposition to foreign interference, particularly by Washington. According to information obtained by The Cradle, Yemen was not discussed during the meeting.

On the morning of 27 October, a day after the talks, Rezaei met Yemen’s ambassador, Ibrahim Mohammad al-Dailami, in Tehran. Rezaei praised Yemen’s defense of Gaza and its confrontation with Israel, while the ambassador thanked him and the Iranian government for their positions.

The encounter came amid speculation that Tehran’s diplomatic engagement with Riyadh might come at the expense of its relationship with Sanaa. By publicly reaffirming those ties immediately after the summit, Iran signaled its intention to pursue regional diplomacy while maintaining its existing alliances.

Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of Iran’s conservative daily Kayhan, wrote in a 27 October editorial that “Yemen’s revolutionaries are allies of Islamic Iran.” He warned that the visiting delegations might seek to create the impression that Tehran was distancing itself from Sanaa, offering Washington and its allies “breathing room, however brief” by encouraging expectations of an imminent settlement.

The Mecca pact’s limits

Iran has good reason to approach the Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani framework, commonly known as the Mecca pact, with caution. The agreement brings together three states with substantial military capabilities and extensive relations with Washington, raising questions about whether their security cooperation could eventually be directed against the Axis of Resistance.

For Riyadh, Yemen remains a central concern. Years of confrontation with the YAF have demonstrated Sanaa’s ability to impose high military and economic costs beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia’s renewed campaign has again brought its energy infrastructure and military installations within range of Yemeni retaliation, exposing the limits of the kingdom’s reliance on foreign military protection.

In Tehran, closer military coordination among the pact’s members could be seen as an attempt to contain the Axis of Resistance at a time when American security guarantees are becoming increasingly uncertain.

Iran’s participation in talks with the pact’s members carries no commitment to join their alliance. Tehran has made no such announcement, while Rezaei’s explanation of the summit emphasized the establishment of security through regional cooperation, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and an end to outside interference.

These objectives leave considerable differences between the participants. Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan maintain security relationships with Washington, while Iran regards the American military presence as a principal source of regional instability. Their respective positions on armed resistance movements, Israeli aggression, and the obligations of any collective defense arrangement also remain unresolved.

The meeting produced a brief press statement confirming the participants’ intention to continue their dialogue, without setting out binding commitments. Rezaei indicated that further meetings would follow, suggesting that the four governments were exploring the foundations of a wider regional accommodation.

The initiative itself emerged from Pakistani army chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran the previous week, according to information obtained by The Cradle. Iranian officials also confirmed Pakistan’s proposal, describing the gathering as an opportunity to advance regional security arrangements based on shared interests and mutual trust.

Riyadh’s security dilemma

The Saudi–Turkish–Pakistani alliance combines considerable military resources, diplomatic influence, and strategic relationships. Its effectiveness, however, depends on the willingness of its members to confront threats that may carry very different consequences for each country.

The limited assistance Pakistan and Turkiye have provided during the renewed confrontation between Yemen and Saudi Arabia illustrates these constraints. Although both countries have pledged support for Riyadh, their involvement has fallen short of the decisive intervention that might alter the military balance with the YAF.

Kayhan was more scathing in its assessment, accusing Turkiye and Pakistan of having “milked Saudi Arabia and done nothing.”

Saudi Arabia’s own account of the visit was more restrained. In a statement following the meeting, Riyadh said the talks formed part of efforts to de-escalate tensions, encourage diplomatic solutions, and support mediation by Qatar and Pakistan. It also reaffirmed the Mecca pact’s role in promoting regional security and stability.

Islamabad and Ankara have also sought to limit their military involvement. Turkish officials have ruled out offensive operations against Yemen, while Pakistan has denied reports that its aircraft carried out strikes on Yemeni forces. These restrictions expose the distance between the pact’s collective defense commitments and its members’ willingness to enter a wider war.

The continuing Yemeni operations against Saudi targets have consequently strengthened the argument for direct engagement with Tehran. Riyadh must weigh the costs of further confrontation against the possibility of reaching an understanding with Iran, whose regional relationships and military capabilities remain central to the wider balance of power.

Despite the damage inflicted during the war, Tehran has retained the ability to influence the course and costs of regional confrontation. Its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and its capacity to retaliate against military infrastructure have complicated Washington’s efforts to impose a settlement on its own terms.

These developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position, although translating military endurance into a durable security arrangement will require more than the recognition of its regional weight. Tehran must also demonstrate that cooperation with its neighbors can reduce the likelihood of renewed war without undermining the relationships that have helped it withstand external pressure.

For Saudi Arabia, the lesson is equally significant. Its security cannot be guaranteed indefinitely through military partnerships that exclude one of the region’s principal powers, particularly when those partnerships have struggled to prevent attacks on Saudi territory.

Yemen cannot be traded

The suggestion that Tehran might trade its relationship with Ansarallah for concessions from Riyadh overlooks the movement’s independent political interests and roots in Yemen. Ansarallah’s resistance to Saudi intervention grew out of a prolonged struggle over the country’s political future, during which its ties with Iran deepened.

The two sides share important strategic interests, but Yemen’s military and political decisions cannot be reduced to directives from Tehran. The YAF’s intervention in support of Gaza, its confrontation with Israel, and its continuing war with Saudi Arabia reflect calculations shaped by Yemen’s own circumstances.

Iran’s regional relationships have also evolved through years of confrontation with Washington and Tel Aviv. The Islamic Republic’s resistance to American and Israeli pressure has become inseparable from its wider regional security calculations, particularly as the war has intensified the threats facing its allies.

Sanaa has paid a substantial price for its military and political positions, enduring years of bombardment, blockade, and attempts to dismantle its authority. Ansarallah’s survival has given it considerable influence over Yemen’s future, making any settlement negotiated without its participation unlikely to produce lasting results.

The assumption that Tehran could simply secure Yemeni compliance also underestimates the political consequences of such an arrangement. The Sanaa government would have little reason to accept an agreement that disregards its security interests or leaves Saudi military pressure intact.

Rezaei’s meeting with the Yemeni ambassador therefore served an important political purpose. As Tehran opened discussions with the Mecca pact’s members, it reaffirmed a relationship whose continuity remains important to the wider Resistance Axis.

Israel’s declining leverage

The summit’s joint statement made no reference to Israel, but Rezaei’s subsequent account of the talks placed Israeli military operations among the issues discussed. He said the participants had emphasized ending Israeli attacks and securing Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories in Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine.

Before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Saudi–Israeli normalization was a serious diplomatic prospect. Washington sought to advance Israel’s integration into a regional security and economic framework that would strengthen its position while isolating Iran and its allies.

The wars that followed have disrupted those calculations. Israel’s military campaigns across West Asia, alongside the American war against Iran, have exposed the risks associated with a regional order built around Israeli military superiority and US security guarantees.

Rezaei’s public emphasis on Israeli aggression reflects the changing circumstances in which the talks took place. Riyadh has not formally adopted his characterization in the joint statement and maintains its longstanding relationship with Washington, but Saudi security concerns have increasingly brought it into direct contact with Tehran despite years of hostility.

The contrast with 2017 is especially revealing. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) then threatened to take the confrontation inside Iran, reflecting Riyadh’s confidence in its ability to challenge Tehran through regional pressure and military alliances.

Nearly a decade later, Saudi officials are in Tehran discussing regional security with the same government Riyadh once threatened to attack. Years of confrontation have failed to break Iran’s regional influence, while Washington’s ability to shield its allies from another war is increasingly in doubt.

Yemen’s ability to remain a consequential military actor despite years of Saudi-led operations has also shaped this reassessment. Its continued resistance has demonstrated the limits of attempts to impose regional arrangements through military force.

Tehran’s next move

The summit’s lasting significance will depend on whether the participating governments can translate their discussions into practical security arrangements. Iran has an opportunity to advance its longstanding position that West Asia’s security must be determined by the countries of the region, without dependence on foreign military intervention.

Such an arrangement would require Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan to recognize Iran’s security concerns and its existing alliances. Tehran would also have to address its neighbors’ security concerns without compromising those relationships.

The presence of all four countries in Tehran suggests that these questions are now receiving serious attention. Rezaei’s subsequent meeting with Yemen’s ambassador also indicated the basis on which Iran intends to participate: regional cooperation alongside continued support for its established allies.

Any regional agreement must also account for Yemen and the other members of the Axis of Resistance. Their military and political weight cannot be ignored, nor can their futures be decided through negotiations between Tehran and its neighbors.

Iran has emerged from the war with its regional alliances intact and greater room to negotiate. The question now is whether Riyadh and its partners are prepared to reach an understanding with Tehran that recognizes those alliances rather than seeking to dismantle them.

MEMO | October 28, 2026

A group of former US government officials who resigned because of Washington’s policy in the Gaza Strip has urged candidates seeking the 2028 presidential nomination to pledge not to appoint officials they said enabled Israel’s genocide in the enclave, Anadolu reports.

“Senior Biden Administration officials who were architects of the Gaza policy are now actively white-washing their own roles in enabling genocide,” Gaza Resignees said in a statement signed by 12 former officials.

“They violated U.S. and international law by providing U.S. weapons while Israel indiscriminately and disproportionately attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure, and as Israel arbitrarily blocked humanitarian assistance to Gaza,” it said.

The signatories include former State Department officials Josh Paul, Annelle Sheline and Stacy Gilbert, former diplomats Hala Rharrit and Mike Casey, former White House official Anna Del Castillo and former USAID senior adviser Alexander Smith. Also among them are former Army officer and Defense Intelligence Agency official Harrison Mann, former Air Force Maj. Riley Livermore, former Navy Lt. Cmdr. Hani Z. Nofal and former political appointees Tariq Habash of the Education Department and Lily Greenberg Call of the Interior Department.

“Not even two years since the end of their disastrous time in office, many of these same officials appear to be pursuing a path back into the halls of power,” they said.

“The most basic level of accountability, the most minimal level of consequences, is to ensure that those who have wreaked so much harm from within the highest levels of our Government cannot return to it,” according to the statement.

The group said that “Gaza has become a litmus test for the credibility of American politicians and the viability, in particular, of Democratic candidates.”

The pledge asks candidates to acknowledge US “complicity” in Israel’s genocide in Gaza. It also asks them to exclude any past or present political appointee who was “an architect, leader, defender, or key enabler” of the policy.

In a video released with the statement, the former officials took turns reading the call over images of former Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who now sits on the board of directors of the Center for American Progress, a Washington think tank.

“We have watched as elite institutions have welcomed these officials,” said Mann, as the video showed former White House Middle East coordinator Brett McGurk, who is now with venture capital firm Lux Capital and a CNN commentator. It also showed former National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and former USAID Administrator Samantha Power, who both joined Harvard Kennedy School after leaving office.

“We have watched as these officials have tried to launder their bloody reputations,” Paul said, with Rharrit adding, “and prepare to re-enter the halls of power.”

“And we say, enough,” the former officials said in the video. “Enough with the culture of impunity in Washington. Enough with policies that break our laws and defy our values.”

“They have blood on their hands,” they added.

Top Biden administration officials at that time acknowledged civilian suffering in Gaza but defended Israel’s right to defend itself following the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack.

US-made weapons were photographed several times in Israeli strikes in Gaza, although US authorities have declined to confirm this.

Since October 2023, Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza has killed more than 74,000 Palestinians, mostly women and children, and wounded over 175,000, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry. It has also caused widespread destruction affecting around 90% of the territory’s civilian infrastructure.

More than 1,500 Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip since an October 2025 ceasefire went into effect.