Moscú, 30 oct (Prensa Latina) El primer ministro Abiy Ahmed regresa hoy a Etiopía tras concluir su participación en la Tercera Cumbre Rusia-África, visita que puso de relieve el potencial de la asociación estratégica entre Addis Abeba y Moscú para generar resultados tangibles.
The post Primer ministro de Etiopía concluyó visita en Rusia first appeared on Noticias Prensa Latina.
The 3rd Russia-Africa Summit concluded on October 29 at the Kremlin, where the plenary session approved the final declaration, a specific agreement on artificial intelligence, and the action plan that will govern the 2027-2029 period, presenting the A7 platform as a sovereign alternative to Western banking.
These documents set out the agreed roadmap for expanding cooperation between Moscow and African states while advancing what both sides describe as a fairer international system. A world order free from hegemonies ultimately summarizes the goal declared by the parties.
RELATED: Moscow Hails Africa as Multipolar Pillar Ahead of Russia-Africa Summit
The final declaration consolidates what the Kremlin describes as steady progress toward a just international system, while the separate statement on artificial intelligence opens a new technological front in the partnership.
Alongside the summit, the Economic and Humanitarian Forum also took place, serving as a platform to deepen bilateral exchange. According to participants, the forum sought a joint response to financial pressures and coercive measures imposed by Western countries.
Addressing the plenary session, Vladimir Putin stated that bilateral relations rest on a shared history of friendship, which he described as the foundation for a global architecture with multiple centers of power and no double standards. In this sense, the Russian President reaffirmed his country’s commitment to international law, the Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the sovereignty of African nations, which he argued is essential for strengthening their economies and social sectors.
The model currently promoted by Moscow combines technology transfer with sovereign investment. Through this approach, the parties reaffirm their rejection of resource exploitation and their commitment to stronger cooperation across the Global South.
Putin insisted that the Russian business model breaks sharply with the extractivism practiced throughout history by the imperial powers of the collective West. “Their approach is the exact opposite. Far from extracting profits in the manner of the colonial practices once employed by former imperial powers, they reinvest their earnings in the development of their national economies,” the Russian leader said.
This combination of technology transfer and sovereign investment, he argued, underpins the rejection of resource plunder and moves forward the integration of the Global South on more equal terms.
🇷🇺🌍 Putin Pushes for $50B+ Russia–Africa Trade and Alternatives to Western Finance
— Think BRICS (@RealBRICSnews) October 29, 2026
At the Russia–Africa summit in Moscow, Putin called for doubling bilateral trade, expanding payments in national currencies and sharing Russian technology in energy, AI, agriculture and… pic.twitter.com/JJ8ZaU53v3
Russian President Putin underscored the operational efficiency of the A7 platform, explaining that conversions between currencies, digital ones included, are processed instantly, slashing the costs, delays and financial intermediation that have long made Global South trade more expensive.
“Digital currencies are developing all over the world, both in the United States and here in Russia, but why can’t the African continent connect to this high-tech system?” he asked the international delegates. His answer was unequivocal. “This system is sovereign as well. It is not tied to anyone or anything, and nobody is going to block it,” he stressed.
⚡️Russia showcases payment systems operating beyond Western control
— Russian Embassy in South Africa 🇷🇺 (@EmbassyofRussia) October 29, 2026
Finance Minister #Siluanov highlighted Russian company A7, which is preparing to offer cross-border payment services in #Africa, with transactions processed "in one click" for a fee of just 0.3% pic.twitter.com/xFlbWGK15b
Created in the wake of the Western financial measures introduced in 2022, the A7 platform now processes around 2,000 transactions per day on average. It is being presented to African countries as a mechanism for selling raw materials, purchasing industrial inputs, financing infrastructure projects, and importing food using their own currencies, without relying on Western banking systems or their associated conditions and transaction costs.
The action plan running through 2029 supplies the framework for converting the summit’s pledges into concrete mechanisms over the next three years, consolidating what both parties describe as movement toward a just international system.
Sudan’s “civil war” is a proxy war for gold, now waged from above with foreign-armed drones. Journalist and researcher Mosaab Baba says Sudan’s “gold curse” has both the army and the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) increasingly striking civilian targets in a neocolonial war entering its fourth year, which has already killed thousands of civilians and left millions facing famine.
With most of Sudan’s gold now funneled to Abu Dhabi, Baba tells Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra the country has become a “backyard” for the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to extract precious minerals, farmland and access to the Red Sea. A year after the fall of El Fasher, he also explains why the world’s largest humanitarian crisis keeps slipping out of the headlines. Baba also unpacks how the legacy of the December Revolution still offers hope for a sovereign, people-led Sudan, and lays out the stakes driving the Sudanese campaign against Emirati diplomat Lana Nusseibeh’s potential bid to become the next UN secretary-general.
“The only glimmer of hope is that Sudanese people themselves are starting to realize how insane this war is [and] how much they need to remove these neocolonial leaders from the country.”
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Rough transcript follows:
[Speaker 1:] The UAE is the main culprit in pushing for the RSF to take over Sudan, driven by the gold trade and regional domination. They’re closely allied with the Ethiopian government, and unfortunately, Abiy Ahmed is aligned with them, though not fully carrying out their wishes. They have a strong influence on Chad and are the biggest investors in Egypt. This is why we explain this as a neo-colonial war. These powers might support both sides but have no issues with each other.
[Speaker 2:] Moving on to Sudan, another drone strike occurred this week, blamed on the Sudanese army, killing dozens in a crowded market in Nala. The RSF’s de facto capital in Darfur was affected, and RSF drones knocked out power across central and eastern Sudan, including Khartoum. Sudanese journalist and researcher Mossab Baba joins us to discuss this proxy war, now in its fourth year, and the foreign-supplied weapons that have killed thousands of civilians.
[Speaker 3:] Thank you for having me. I appreciate it.
[Speaker 2:] We appreciate your time and analysis. Let’s start with the latest in Nala. Local tolls range from 21 to over a hundred killed. The army claims it’s softening RSF positions ahead of a ground assault. This follows hundreds killed in drone strikes last week. Is this recent strike the opening of a push into Darfur?
[Speaker 3:] There have been changes in how both sides conduct this war, with drone strikes becoming more prominent. It shifted from relying on mortars and ground forces to drone strikes over the last year and a half. The pattern is unusual; whenever there’s stagnation between the forces, drones start firing. The SAF targets markets, as seen in Nala and a disputed area between Sudan and South Sudan.
After these attacks, the RSF retaliates by hitting civilian infrastructure in SAF areas, leaving millions without power. The strikes in Nala were fatal, and similar incidents have occurred before, like in West Darfur. This shift to drone warfare is partly due to the increasing international drone market, with both sides having partners willing to supply weapons. The SAF, as the official army, faces fewer issues bringing in weapons, but the RSF relies on a network traced by a UN report, mainly through Libya and Chad.
[Speaker 2:] The Sudanese citizen is being pummeled by this war, and neither side takes responsibility. The SAF doesn’t acknowledge strikes hitting civilians, and the RSF remains silent on their attacks. This leads to speculation about rogue elements within these camps. The SAF camp is fragmented, with different factions and militias, while the RSF has rogue elements crossing borders.
[Speaker 3:] The use of drones is a dangerous escalation in this war, now over three years old, causing one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes. International players are involved on both sides. This isn’t merely a Sudanese conflict. Powers like the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are involved. How did Sudan become a battleground for these powers?
[Speaker 3:] The SAF and RSF were part of the same government under an imperial order. Decisions about Sudan go through Cairo, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh. This control carries over from the Bashir regime, which handed Sudan to Gulf countries. Both SAF and RSF were recruited for the war in Yemen in 2015 and remain there. The war’s goal was to kill the people’s movement calling for sovereignty and wealth redistribution. The West views these demands as socialism, though in Sudan, it’s seen as government responsibility.
Forcing Sudan to sign the Abraham Accords is another factor. Netanyahu often includes Sudan in his maps of the new Middle East. This is a late-stage neo-colonial order, with military forces lacking loyalty to the Sudanese people, allowing countries like Turkey, the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to exploit Sudan for resources like gold and farmland.
[Speaker 2:] Speaking of resources, what’s up for grabs in Sudan? Gold, farmland, Red Sea access—what are foreign powers targeting?
[Speaker 3:] Gold is the most fatal, with the RSF utilizing it economically. Most gold ends up in the UAE, which has destabilized regions for gold mines. This gold rush causes instability, similar to the oil curse. Livestock is a close second, while agriculture struggles due to sustainability issues and food crises. Gold is a quick fix for militias and warlords running the economy and war.
[Speaker 2:] It’s been one year since the ethnic cleansing in Al-Fashir, and several massacres have occurred since. Why hasn’t Sudan registered more on people’s radars? What international efforts are being made to end the conflict, and who’s stopping them?
[Speaker 3:] Internally, there are efforts for national dialogue and a negotiated end to the war. Political parties and traditional leadership engage in people-to-people dialogue. Activists, especially in the diaspora, campaign against the UAE, which lobbies the UN and influences US policy. The UAE’s deep pockets are the main reason this conflict lacks attention. They’re pushing for the RSF to take over Sudan for gold trade and regional domination.
[Speaker 2:] Eight years ago, the Sudanese revolution began, a hopeful moment for organizing across sectors. Now, the military establishment has co-opted and crushed it. Your thoughts on this?
[Speaker 3:] The December revolution was a historic moment, uniting Sudan against the Bashir government. It was coerced by leadership and countries pressuring the military. Protests in Khartoum last December remembered the revolution. Many volunteers and activists emerged from it, maintaining social fabric and aid efforts. The revolution’s core discourse remains valid, and though affected by war, it will manifest differently as people realize the war’s insanity.
[Speaker 2:] Before we wrap up, regarding the UAE, one name floated for the next UN Secretary-General is Lana Nusseibeh, an Emirati diplomat. After the UN accused the RSF of genocide, she dismissed the allegations. If she becomes Secretary-General, it could undermine confidence in international bodies. Any thoughts?
[Speaker 3:] People see through it. Human rights organizations are making noise about this. Sudanese have a campaign against her appointment. If she’s allowed to become Secretary-General, it will erode trust in international bodies. The UN’s role in documenting atrocities is crucial, and her appointment would damage confidence in any Western body, even those with good intentions.
[Speaker 2:] Thank you, Mossab, for your time and analysis. We look forward to speaking with you again soon.
[Speaker 3:] Thank you, Ronnie and Zoe. Appreciate it.
US vice-president writes to top Iranian security official in sign Washington has not abandoned diplomacy
Hopes of averting a major new conflagration between Iran and the US soon after Tuesday’s midterm elections could rest on Iran’s response to a personal letter from the US vice-president, JD Vance, offering to restart diplomacy.
The letter, written after predominantly Qatari mediation, was sent to the secretary of Iran’s supreme national security council, Mohsen Rezaei on Sunday. It requires Tehran to agree to make commitments on its nuclear programme at the start of a process that would lead to the opening of the strait of Hormuz within seven days in return for US sanctions relief.
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© Photograph: Evan Vucci/Pool Reuters/AP
© Photograph: Evan Vucci/Pool Reuters/AP
© Photograph: Evan Vucci/Pool Reuters/AP
Borr said approximately 280 cubic metres of marine diesel fuel was onboard the Prospector 5 when it went down.
© Reuters
Borr said approximately 280 cubic metres of marine diesel fuel was onboard the Prospector 5 when it went down.
© Reuters
Borr said approximately 280 cubic metres of marine diesel fuel was onboard the Prospector 5 when it went down.
© Reuters
Between these two roles lies a striking paradox in Saudi policy across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. By day, Riyadh calls on warring parties to cease fire; by night, it chooses its allies and backs them politically and militarily, leveraging its financial and security clout to reshape the balance of power in ways that serve its own interests.
From Port Sudan to Mogadishu, by way of Yemen and Eritrea, the question is no longer limited to whether Saudi Arabia can mediate between adversaries. It now extends to the kingdom’s position within the conflicts themselves, and then to its control over the balance of power around the Red Sea and its securing of ports and strategic corridors. Thus the image of the neutral mediator recedes in the face of the reality of a state seeking to build an axis of influence spanning both shores of the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia sponsored the Jeddah talks between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces in 2023, presenting itself as a party working to end the war and protect civilians. But its subsequent political stance showed a growing bias toward the army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
In January 2026, Reuters revealed negotiations over a $1.5 billion Pakistani arms deal for the Sudanese army, covering aircraft, drones and air defense systems, with a Saudi role in mediating it.
In April, the agency reported that Pakistan had suspended the deal after a Saudi objection and Riyadh’s withdrawal of its funding, according to security and diplomatic sources. On the same day, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received al-Burhan in Jeddah. Here the glaring paradox emerges: how can a mediator maintain an image of neutrality while being tied to a track of military support for one party to the conflict?
If Sudan reveals the overlap between mediation and partisanship, Yemen offers the clearest picture of Saudi military intervention. Since March 2015, Riyadh has led a military coalition, carried out air operations, and supported government forces and local armed groups, in addition to providing economic aid to the internationally recognized government.
Its presence has not been limited to confronting the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has become an influential party in the conflicts within the anti-Houthi camp, particularly as its dispute with the Southern Transitional Council has escalated. In early January 2026, Saudi aircraft struck Transitional Council positions in Hadramawt, while Riyadh-backed forces advanced to retake control of southern areas.
This came at a time when Saudi Arabia was calling on Yemeni parties to engage in dialogue, which reveals the duality of the tools in use: military pressure to alter the balance of control, followed by a political track to arrange the outcomes.
Riyadh’s relationship with the Yemeni Islah Party reveals a further paradox. The Carnegie Center documented Saudi Arabia’s reliance on forces linked to the party in confronting the Houthis, and its provision of military and financial support to them, despite Riyadh’s declared position toward the Muslim Brotherhood, to whose political current Islah belongs.
So in Yemen the picture is clear: Saudi Arabia does not appear to be an observer of the course of the war, but one of the forces that helped shape it, determine its allies, and influence its maps of control.
On the African shore of the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia has built close security ties with Eritrea that date back to the years of the war in Yemen, when Eritrean territory and ports were used within the coalition’s military arrangements. Political and security coordination between Riyadh and Asmara continued through 2025 and 2026, coinciding with rising tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia over access to the Red Sea. Regional analyses report that Saudi Arabia and Egypt lean toward supporting the Eritrean position against Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions, while Addis Ababa views the rapprochement between Riyadh, Cairo and Asmara with concern.
The irony is that Saudi Arabia had sponsored the 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, before its own regional security relationships became part of the balancing calculations between the two sides. This reveals Riyadh’s shift from sponsoring reconciliation to building strategic partnerships with one of the two parties to the tension.
In Somalia, the Saudi presence took a more explicit course during 2026. After Riyadh announced its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity and its rejection of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Saudi Arabia and Mogadishu signed a military cooperation memorandum in February, alongside continued Saudi development and humanitarian assistance.
The agreement comes in a region witnessing escalating competition over ports and military influence, especially near Bab al-Mandab, where the interests of Gulf states, regional powers and international powers intersect. Regional studies read the Saudi-Somali rapprochement as part of Riyadh’s efforts to strengthen its security presence on the African shore of the Red Sea.
However, the military agreement in itself does not mean Saudi participation in Somalia’s internal war. Its political significance lies in adding Mogadishu to the network of Saudi security partnerships and strengthening Riyadh’s ability to influence the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
Any reading of Saudi policy is incomplete without pausing at the historical controversy over the financing of extremist groups through Saudi donors and institutions. Diplomatic cables from the U.S. published by WikiLeaks in 2010 revealed Washington’s concerns about financial flows from Saudi donors to extremist groups. The UN Security Council also placed branches of the Al-Haramain Foundation on sanctions lists linked to al-Qaeda, while Saudi Arabia and the United States took part in measures targeting specific institutions and financiers.
In Syria, we should read the lawsuits brought by the families of the victims of the September 11 attacks with the same eyes. Judicial developments have allowed accusations concerning individuals linked to Saudi Arabia to continue to be heard. The importance of this file is that it keeps past Saudi policies and the financing networks tied to individuals and institutions under continuing scrutiny, even as Riyadh seeks to present itself as a partner in counterterrorism and regional stability.
It is true that Saudi Arabia’s tools differ from one arena to another, but a political thread runs through them all: one meant to secure allies capable of protecting Riyadh’s interests in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
In Sudan, there is political backing for the army and a role attributed to Saudi Arabia in arranging its armament. In Yemen, the intervention takes a direct military form. In Eritrea, the relationship rests on security partnership and regional alignment. As for Somalia, it represents an expansion of the Saudi military cooperation network.
None of these facts mean that Saudi Arabia is fighting five direct wars, but they undermine its portrayal as a neutral party in all of these conflicts. Mediation can coexist with interests, but it loses its claim to neutrality when the mediator becomes part of the balance of power it is trying to manage.
Here the mask of the neutral mediator falls, not because Riyadh has stopped hosting negotiations, but because in a number of arenas it has become an influential party in determining who negotiates, who holds power, and who keeps the territory. From Port Sudan to Mogadishu, Saudi Arabia appears less concerned with standing outside the conflicts and more engaged in shaping their outcomes. A mediator who takes part in making the balance of war cannot ask others to treat him as a mere referee between the disputants.
Prime minister claims Arab Israeli parties used foreign backing to steal elections, in which his coalition lost its majority
Benjamin Netanyahu has been accused of using smear tactics to cling to power, after he claimed that Arab Israeli parties had used foreign backing to “steal” Tuesday’s election, in which the prime minister’s coalition lost its parliamentary majority.
Netanyahu and his allies called on the internal security service, Shin Bet, to investigate alleged vote buying and other irregularities in Palestinian communities in Israel, supposedly funded by foreign money.
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© Photograph: Jalaa Marey/AFP/Getty Images
© Photograph: Jalaa Marey/AFP/Getty Images
© Photograph: Jalaa Marey/AFP/Getty Images
"60 Minutes" was told weeks before the segment aired that a deported Malian husband and father, who was the subject of a sympathetic report on Sunday, claimed to have been gay in his asylum application, Fox News Digital confirmed.
Fox News previously obtained records showing Moussa Diawara alleged in his 2009 asylum application that he would face persecution if he were sent back to Mali due to his sexuality.
The "60 Minutes" segment depicted an anguished father deported to Africa with his wife and two children still living in the U.S. and noted that a U.S. judge said Diawara could be persecuted, pointing to fears over converting to Christianity. However, the show did not mention that Diawara’s application contradicted his family man narrative and the reason why he claimed he couldn’t return to his native country was because of his sexual orientation.
Fox News Digital has since obtained a copy of an email sent to CBS News by the Department of Homeland Security informing the network about Diawara's claim, which was first reported by The New York Post.
The email was sent Oct. 6, nearly three weeks before Sunday's segment aired.
A spokesperson for CBS News declined to comment.
FROM THE HUNTER BIDEN LAPTOP TO KAMALA HARRIS EDITS: THE LONG HISTORY OF '60 MINUTES' CONTROVERSIES
On his 2009 asylum application, Diawara said he feared for his life as a gay man if he was forced to return to Mali.
"My asylum application is based upon ground of well-founded past persecution and an undisputable fear of life-threatening [sic] to my person if I were to return to my country Mali. In fact, I had experienced extreme punishment and persecution based on the ground of my sexual orientation," Diawara wrote in his asylum application.
"Since I came to the USA I had the possibilities [sic] to express my feelings to men without any embarrassment no reserve. Indeed, my tribal group and community as a whole had reported my sexual orientation to my family back home because such behavior is unwelcome in my society," he continued. "My life is hence worth threatened if I have to go back to my country because I could be executed either by the Islamic group or the community."
CBS SHOOTS DOWN 'POLITICAL INTERFERENCE' CLAIMS IN AFTERMATH OF '60 MINUTES' FIRINGS
DHS General Counsel James Percival, who was interviewed in the "60 Minutes" segment, took to social media after it aired, saying the newsmagazine made Diawara the "poster child for what it claims are wrongful deportations."
"His claimed reason for fearing Mali was that he is ‘gay,’ just in case you’re wondering how bad the immigration fraud problem is," Percival wrote.
The segment put a spotlight on Diawara, who was living in the U.S. for 25 years without a criminal record, overstaying his tourist visa and getting nabbed by ICE and sent to Ghana, which ultimately sent him to his home country of Mali. According to the report, Diawara has since fled to an undisclosed African country.
During the segment, Percival noted there is "a lot of fraud" in the immigration system and many "fear claims" are untrue.
A "60 Minutes" insider previously defended the integrity of the report, pointing to how Diawara's claim that "part of the reason he didn't feel safe" was for religious reasons did make the broadcast. According to the report, he had converted to Christianity, and Mali is a Muslim-majority nation.
"The broadcast acknowledged DHS questioned the credibility of Moussa Diawara's fear of persecution, which they're claiming now on social media," the insider told Fox News Digital.
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Fox News' Brian Flood and Brooke Taylor contributed to this report.
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