“Thirty percent, we won’t consent” chants echoed across Schuman roundabout in the Brussels European quarter this week, as culture, media and journalist workers demanded that national leaders halt plans to reduce cash for culture in a protest on Thursday (29 October).
Representatives from European rights forums, culture groups and a journalism federation gathered in a bid to keep enough money flowing to their organisations.
“There’s a very grim future if we continue with these cuts,” said Rhys Nugent of Culture Action Europe, one of the protest’s organisers. “These sectors are already on their knees.”
The demonstration came after EU leaders discussed giving less money than previously proposed to AgoraEU, an umbrella for culture, media, democracy and rights initiatives, within the EU’s 2028-2034 budget.
30% less for culture
Reacting to the EU Commission’s proposal to give AgoraEU €8.6bn under the long-term budget, the EU parliament’s budget committee asked to ramp this up to €10.7bn.
But national capitals have not agreed to either proposal.
Instead, the Irish presidency of Council presented a plan earlier this month (October 10) to allocate €5.3bn for AgoraEU – representing a 30 percent cut to the commission’s proposal. It was responding to pressures for frugality from some member states.
National capitals are yet to finalise a budget agreement.
“They picked culture because they think it’s an easy target, but it will affect journalists, artists and NGOs who are the backbone of our democratic society” said Nela Reihl, a German Green MEP and chair of parliament’s culture and education committee.
“If this goes through, people will wake up one day and ask: why are my rights not protected? Why has that film festival disappeared? Where has my local publisher gone?” she said.
“These cuts will save only a tiny percent of the EU budget but cause massive damage to these sectors,” added the German lawmaker.
Protest organiser Nugent said Creative Europe “funds everything from small theatrical productions to large cooperation around Europe.”
He pointed to Flow, an Oscar-winning film, Europa Cinemas, and Culture Moves Europe as examples of the types of bodies that could be affected by a lack of EU funding.
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Ministers want to speed up and simplify the payment of farming subsidies by taking control of the EU’s multi-billion euro farming payment schemes, under a deal reached late on Monday night (26 October).
The agreement at a meeting of EU agriculture ministers in Brussels finalises the negotiating position of EU governments on the future of the bloc’s Common Agricultural Policy in its next seven-year budget.
The ‘negotiating box’ prepared by the Irish EU council presidency earlier this month for the 2028-34 multi-annual financial framework spared agricultural subsidies provided by the common agricultural policy from cuts worth a total of €141bn but proposed three-percent cuts, worth €24.6bn, to funding for National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPP), which are intended to streamline the distribution of EU cash to governments for a variety of different policies including agriculture and fisheries.
The idea behind the NRPPs is to set up one single fund to provide support for farmers.
Each EU country would be expected to develop a single comprehensive plan outlining the reforms and investments it intends to implement from 2028 to 2034 and how it plans to use EU funds.
EU governments agreed on Monday that this planning process should be designed to give them far greater autonomy. They say that the recommendations the commission makes to member states regarding the design of support programs should not be binding.
The new system is set to prioritise ‘active farmers’, which sets a threshold of a minimum level of agricultural activity for farmers, as well as young farmers and small farmers.
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The proposal sets the 2027 European Union budget commitments at €199.9 billion and payments at €212 billion. The Commission underlined that the ‘next year’s budget will continue to provide crucial funding for established EU political priorities, including major support for Ukraine’.
Background – 2027 budget procedure
The European Parliament is one of the two arms of the European Union’s budgetary authority, the Council being the other. The two institutions, assisted by the European Commission, decide on the budget in the annual EU budget procedure, within the limits of the long-term EU budget – the multiannual financial framework (MFF). It is the European Commission’s task to propose a draft budget each year. The Commission takes into account the views of the two arms of the EU budgetary authority, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) agreed on its guidelines for the 2027 EU budget on 17 February 2026. The European Parliament adopted its guidelines for the preparation of the 2027 budget, Section III on 28 April 2026. Parliament underlined that ‘the final year of the current MFF must focus on delivery for people, the economy and the planet and on providing investments for competitiveness’.
Next steps
On 9 July 2026, the Commission plans to formally adopt the 2027 draft budget and publish it in all official languages. More information on performance will be presented in the Annual Management and Performance Report scheduled for 16 June 2026.
On 16 July 2026, Parliament, Council and Commission will meet for a first budgetary trilogue.
By mid-July 2026, the Committee of the permanent representatives of the governments of the Member States to the European Union (Coreper) will approve Council’s draft position on the 2027 draft budget. The Council is expected to adopt its position on the 2027 draft budget in September 2026.
In October 2026, Parliament is due to adopt its position on the 2027 draft budget.
Possible meetings of the Conciliation Committee are likely to take place between 27 October and 16 November 2026.
The European Parliament voted on Thursday, 22nd October, to support a €47.4 billion budget for the Erasmus+ programme between 2028 and 2034, demanding substantially more funding than proposed by the European Commission.
The parliamentary position was approved by 454 votes to 34, with 93 abstentions, following negotiations over the future of the EU’s principal education, training and student mobility programme.
MEPs are seeking approximately €6.56 billion more than the Commission’s proposed €40.83 billion allocation, arguing that existing financial support does not adequately reflect rising living costs and the expense of studying abroad.
The decision establishes Parliament’s negotiating position but does not represent final approval of the funding. The programme remains subject to negotiations with national governments and agreement on the EU’s next seven-year budget.
Rising living costs affect student mobility
Erasmus+ allows students, apprentices, teachers and other participants to study, train or gain professional experience in another participating country.
Although widely associated with university exchanges, the programme also supports vocational education, schools, adult learning, youth organisations and sporting activities.
Participation often involves substantial personal expenditure, particularly for accommodation, transport and everyday living expenses.
These costs vary considerably between European destinations, creating financial difficulties for students whose Erasmus grants cover only part of their expenses.
The European Parliament is consequently calling for support mechanisms that account for differences in housing and living costs between host countries, regions and cities.
The proposal is intended to make participation more accessible to people who cannot rely on additional financial assistance from their families.
The European Parliament’s research service has identified unequal access, financial limitations and administrative complexity among the challenges facing the programme.
The proposed legislation would also establish a target under which at least 20 per cent of participants in mobility activities would be people facing fewer educational or economic opportunities.
Parliament seeks larger education allocation
The parliamentary proposal provides for approximately €47.39 billion in current prices over seven years.
The Commission originally proposed approximately €40.83 billion, combining funding for Erasmus+ with activities currently administered through the European Solidarity Corps.
According to the report prepared by Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education, the revised programme would include more explicit financial allocations for different activities.
Education and training would account for approximately 74.6 per cent of the proposed financial envelope, while youth and volunteering would receive around 15 per cent. Sport would receive approximately 4.1 per cent.
The proposed allocation structure is intended to provide greater certainty for organisations planning longer-term educational projects and cross-border partnerships.
Polish MEP Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, of the European People’s Party, is Parliament’s rapporteur on the legislation. His report calls for greater transparency over expenditure and more predictable funding arrangements.
The programme would continue supporting European university alliances, international educational cooperation and initiatives intended to improve professional skills.
Volunteering and vocational training
One proposed change concerns the integration of the European Solidarity Corps into the wider Erasmus+ framework.
The Solidarity Corps currently offers young people opportunities to participate in volunteering and community activities, including projects addressing social and humanitarian needs.
The Commission has proposed bringing these activities within the new programme in an attempt to simplify administration.
However, parliamentarians want safeguards to ensure that volunteering remains identifiable and accessible within the broader funding structure.
The parliamentary position also seeks to extend mobility opportunities across vocational training, adult education and sport.
These activities would allow a wider range of participants to benefit from international placements, including people outside conventional university education.
Additional attention is being given to the financial circumstances of participants and the administrative requirements faced by smaller educational organisations.
Dispute over the EU’s next budget
The Erasmus+ negotiations are taking place against the background of a wider dispute over the European Union’s 2028–2034 financial framework.
Member states are debating the overall size of the budget and the competing demands of agricultural policy, regional development, defence, research and education.
As EU Today recently examined, the negotiations have exposed disagreements over whether the EU should expand its financial commitments or constrain expenditure during a period of pressure on national finances.
Parliament’s Erasmus+ proposal will therefore depend not only on agreement over educational priorities but also on the final distribution of resources across the wider EU budget.
Some governments may support broader participation while resisting the full increase requested by MEPs.
What happens next?
Negotiations must establish the programme’s final budget, eligibility rules and the arrangements governing grants after 2027.
The Council has already developed a negotiating position on aspects of the programme, although financial questions remain connected to the broader budget settlement.
Erasmus+ will mark its 40th anniversary in 2027, shortly before the new framework is scheduled to begin.
More than 17 million people have participated in the programme and its related activities since its establishment.
The outcome of the current negotiations will determine whether the next generation of participants receives more financial support and whether the programme can expand without increasing the proportion of costs borne by students and their families.
Romania has formed a new government after six months of political deadlock, with parliament approving a minority administration led by independent diplomat Luca Niculescu on Tuesday, 20 October. The vote brings an end to repeated failed attempts to establish an executive, although the new prime minister faces considerable uncertainty over his government’s parliamentary support.
Niculescu secured 280 votes in favour and 58 against, comfortably exceeding the 233 required for confirmation. His ministers were sworn in before President Nicuşor Dan at the Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest later that evening, formally ending the prolonged government formation process.
The new administration comprises 18 ministers, including two delegated ministers. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) controls the majority of portfolios, while independent specialists hold several important positions, including finance and foreign affairs.
A government built on temporary parliamentary support
The appointment represents a political success for President Dan, who nominated Niculescu on 5 October following three unsuccessful attempts to assemble a functioning government.
The new cabinet is heavily dependent on agreements between parties that have frequently disagreed over economic policy and public spending. Although the parliamentary vote demonstrated sufficient support for its installation, the arrangement does not provide the government with a permanent majority.
The National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) supported the investiture while remaining outside the administration.
The arrangement gives Niculescu an opportunity to govern, but each major legislative proposal will require continued cooperation between parties with competing priorities.
The Social Democrats, who hold 11 of the ministerial positions, will exercise substantial influence over domestic policy, particularly decisions involving public-sector spending, welfare and taxation.
Budget deficit presents immediate challenge
Romania’s public finances represent the government’s most urgent problem.
The previous administration, led by Ilie Bolojan, collapsed in May following unpopular austerity measures. Political opposition to fiscal consolidation has complicated efforts to stabilise the budget and meet Romania’s commitments under the European Union’s fiscal framework.
Niculescu has indicated that addressing the deficit will be an immediate priority. Finance Minister Alexandru Nazare, appointed as an independent, faces the task of establishing a credible budget programme without provoking another parliamentary crisis.
The choices are politically difficult. Spending reductions risk resistance from public-sector employees and households already affected by higher living costs, while substantial tax increases could place further pressure on businesses and consumption.
Failure to establish a credible fiscal programme would prolong uncertainty over Romania’s borrowing requirements and its ability to comply with European budgetary obligations.
Brussels has a direct interest in the outcome. Romania remains subject to EU fiscal oversight, and the European Commission will assess whether the new administration’s financial plans are consistent with the country’s obligations.
The government’s credibility will depend on whether its parliamentary supporters are prepared to approve the measures that fiscal consolidation requires.
European funds and political credibility
The change of government also comes at a sensitive moment in Romania’s relationship with European institutions.
Romania has faced scrutiny over reforms linked to the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, particularly legislation concerning public integrity and institutional accountability.
Although the EU recovery programme reached its principal implementation deadline in August, outstanding assessments and financial decisions continue to carry consequences for national budgets.
A functioning government is therefore important not only for domestic legislation but also for negotiations with Brussels over fiscal commitments, investment and the wider EU budget.
Romania must also address longer-term weaknesses in public administration, infrastructure financing and the implementation of European legislation.
Political stability remains uncertain
Niculescu takes office against the background of Romania’s unusually turbulent political history since the annulment of the 2024 presidential election amid allegations of Russian interference.
The subsequent institutional disputes damaged confidence in the political system and contributed to the fragmentation of parliamentary support.
Opposition parties, including the nationalist Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), are positioned to challenge the government’s legitimacy and economic measures as the administration begins work.
Romania’s strategic importance extends beyond its domestic political difficulties. As an EU and NATO member bordering Ukraine and Moldova, it plays a substantial role in Black Sea security, military logistics and regional infrastructure.
Prolonged instability in Bucharest has therefore affected a country whose decisions carry consequences for European security and cross-border economic cooperation.
For the new prime minister, the immediate objective is to translate Tuesday’s parliamentary majority into support for legislation. His first serious test will come when the cabinet presents the fiscal measures that its supporters have so far struggled to agree upon.
The parliamentary vote has ended Romania’s government formation crisis. It has not resolved the disagreements that produced it.
MEPs have put themselves on a collision course with EU governments by rejecting plans for a 17-percent cut in foreign spending – instead demanding additional spending worth €25bn.
Earlier this month, the Irish government, which holds the six-month rotating EU council presidency, proposed that €38bn of cuts be made from the ‘Global Europe’ heading, which covers foreign aid, as part of an overall package of €141bn of cuts to the seven-year EU budget, known as the multi-annual financial framework (MFF).
But in a vote on Monday evening (19 October), the European Parliament’s development committee instead backed a dedicated minimum budget of €25bn for humanitarian aid, as well as dedicated budget lines for a Gaza reconstruction fund and for candidate countries. Put together, that would mean a €25bn increase on the EU Commission’s original budget of €200bn for the Global Europe heading.
The position agreed by MEPs, by a 61-to-34 vote margin, will eventually form the basis of negotiations between MEPs and ministers when EU governments agree their position on the budget.
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European Union governments have agreed a negotiating position on new agricultural market rules intended to take effect under the bloc’s 2028–2034 budget, advancing reforms to support arrangements for farmers while leaving the most contentious financial questions unresolved.
The Council approved its partial negotiating mandate on Monday, 19 October, covering changes to the Common Market Organisation regulation, which governs agricultural markets across the European Union.
The proposals include new arrangements for wine producers, protein crops and oilseeds, revised marketing standards, changes to the EU school food programme and provisions intended to improve preparedness for agricultural market disruptions.
However, the agreement does not settle future funding allocations or the broader structure of agricultural subsidies, which remain under negotiation as EU governments attempt to reconcile farming expenditure with competing demands for defence, industrial investment and regional development.
Agricultural markets under review
The Council’s negotiating position retains much of the European Commission’s original proposal while introducing amendments intended to accommodate national differences in agricultural production.
Under the proposed arrangements, sector-specific interventions would become mandatory in several areas, including beekeeping, fruit and vegetables and, under certain circumstances, wine production.
The Council has also proposed flexibility for countries where particular sectors are absent or relatively undeveloped.
For the wine industry, governments would be able to seek exemptions from certain obligations where national circumstances justify different arrangements.
This would allow the framework to retain common European rules while avoiding requirements that would be inappropriate for member states with little or no domestic wine production.
Sectoral interventions form part of the mechanisms through which the EU supports agricultural markets and producer organisations. They can cover measures intended to improve competitiveness, manage production and strengthen farmers’ commercial position.
New provisions for protein crops
The Council has endorsed the establishment of a separate sector for protein crops and oilseeds, replacing existing provisions covering dried fodder.
The objective is to encourage domestic production and reduce dependence on imported agricultural inputs, particularly crops used in animal feed and food production.
European livestock producers rely on protein-rich feed ingredients, including soyabeans, that are often sourced internationally.
Greater domestic production could reduce exposure to fluctuations in global commodity prices, transport costs and disruptions to international supply chains.
Under the Council’s proposal, member states would be encouraged to recognise producer organisations specialising in protein crops and oilseeds.
Such organisations can help farmers coordinate production, marketing and investment, although the effectiveness of the proposed measures will depend on how they are implemented nationally.
The proposals follow broader EU efforts to improve supply security in sectors extending from agricultural inputs to critical industrial materials.
School food and product labelling
The negotiating mandate also preserves the EU school scheme, which provides support for the distribution of fruit, vegetables and milk to schoolchildren.
Under the proposed framework, the programme would move from a school-year financing cycle to a calendar-year system, with transitional provisions intended to prevent disruption during implementation.
The Council has maintained the Commission’s objective of encouraging healthier eating habits by limiting products containing high levels of free sugars and fats.
The proposal also opens the possibility of additional marketing standards for several agricultural products, including protein crops, beef, pork, sheepmeat, goatmeat and rice.
These standards could provide consumers with more detailed information about product origins, subject to the final legislation.
Such measures would also have implications for producers and food businesses, which would need to comply with any new requirements concerning classification, marketing and labelling.
The Council additionally supports the harmonisation of rules covering industrial hemp, while retaining safeguards concerning seed certification and the permitted level of tetrahydrocannabinol.
Farming subsidies remain contested
The agricultural market agreement forms part of negotiations over the next Common Agricultural Policy, which will operate within the EU’s new seven-year financial framework.
Under the Commission’s proposed budget structure, several funding streams, including agricultural and cohesion programmes, would be brought together within national and regional partnership plans.
The restructuring has encountered opposition from governments and agricultural interests concerned that farming could lose protected access to EU funding.
As EU Today previously reported, 17 member states have called for agricultural and regional development expenditure to be protected against further reductions.
The Council’s latest position addresses how agricultural markets should operate rather than determining the size of the financial support available to them.
A separate debate concerns the conditions for receiving direct farm payments, including the definition of an active farmer and the degree of discretion granted to national governments.
Those questions remain central to the continuing CAP negotiations, which are due to return to the Agriculture and Fisheries Council on 26–27 October.
Negotiations move to Parliament
The Council’s partial mandate now provides a basis for negotiations with the European Parliament on the agricultural market provisions.
The legislation will still require agreement between the institutions, while its financing will depend on the eventual settlement of the 2028–2034 budget.
Governments must also complete negotiations on the wider CAP framework, including direct income support and the distribution of responsibility between Brussels and national administrations.
The market agreement reached on 19 October therefore establishes important elements of the proposed agricultural rules, but leaves unresolved the level of financial support available to European farmers after 2027.
The European Parliament has demanded €225 billion for the European Union’s foreign policy and development programmes between 2028 and 2034, challenging proposals by member states to reduce spending under the bloc’s next long-term budget.
The Parliament’s Foreign Affairs and Development committees approved their negotiating position on the Global Europe Instrument on Monday, 19 October, by 63 votes to 27, with five abstentions. The proposed allocation represents an increase of €25 billion over the European Commission’s original €200 billion proposal.
The decision comes as negotiations over the wider 2028–2034 EU budget have become increasingly contentious, with Germany and several other net contributors opposing higher expenditure while Brussels faces mounting demands for defence, industrial investment, enlargement and support for Ukraine.
Parliament rejects proposed reductions
Under the position adopted by the parliamentary committees, at least €25 billion would be reserved for humanitarian assistance. MEPs also want dedicated funding for reconstruction in Gaza and financial support for countries seeking EU membership.
The committees are proposing that 20 per cent of official development assistance should be directed towards human development, alongside stronger provisions covering democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Global Europe is intended to consolidate several existing financing instruments into a single framework governing much of the Union’s external expenditure. The programme would finance activities ranging from development cooperation and humanitarian assistance to economic partnerships and support for countries preparing to join the EU.
The Commission introduced the original €200 billion proposal in July 2025. However, subsequent negotiations among member states have raised the prospect of substantial reductions.
Germany, the Netherlands and several Nordic countries have argued that the next budget must reflect the financial constraints facing national governments. Their objections have complicated efforts to accommodate additional spending on European security and economic competitiveness.
The European Parliament has taken a different position, maintaining that reducing external expenditure would restrict the Union’s ability to operate internationally when European security and economic interests increasingly depend on developments beyond its borders.
Ukraine and enlargement funding
The parliamentary proposal would preserve support for Ukraine while seeking to prevent assistance connected with Russia’s invasion from reducing resources available to other partner countries.
Ukraine’s reconstruction, institutional reforms and integration with European markets will require substantial financing over the coming years. However, the precise allocation will depend on negotiations over the wider budget and the financing arrangements eventually approved.
For candidate countries, MEPs want clearer incentives linking EU assistance to progress on political and economic reforms. The proposed framework would also provide Brussels with greater powers to suspend funding where democratic standards, human rights or judicial independence deteriorate.
A separate provision would permit the Commission to suspend payments where partner countries seriously fail to meet obligations concerning the readmission of their nationals.
That measure reflects the growing connection between the EU’s development policy and its migration objectives. Brussels has increasingly sought cooperation on returns and border management as part of agreements with countries receiving European assistance.
The committees have also called for stronger parliamentary supervision of Global Europe, including more detailed reporting by the Commission and regular discussions with the commissioners responsible for implementation.
Difficult negotiations ahead
The financial disagreement extends well beyond external policy. The overall seven-year budget remains contested, particularly over agricultural subsidies, regional development funds, defence investment and repayment of borrowing undertaken during the coronavirus pandemic.
As EU Today previously reported, a group of 17 member states has opposed reductions in agricultural and cohesion spending, adding further pressure to negotiations.
The Parliament’s proposed €225 billion allocation has not been agreed by governments and does not constitute an approved spending commitment.
The committees also approved a mandate for negotiations with the Council, although their position still requires endorsement by the full Parliament, provisionally expected in November.
Meanwhile, member states must settle their own negotiating position, including the financial ceilings governing the programme.
The eventual settlement will determine how much Brussels can spend on development cooperation, humanitarian operations and international partnerships after 2027, and how those commitments can be reconciled with the EU’s expanding domestic financial obligations.
EU leaders have failed to settle their differences over the 2028–2034 budget, with Germany demanding further reductions to the proposed spending framework and the European Council taking charge of negotiations ahead of a difficult December deadline.
European Union leaders have ended their Brussels summit without agreement on the bloc’s next seven-year budget, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz rejected the scale of spending envisaged under the latest compromise proposal and demanded deeper cuts.
The discussions on 15–16 October exposed the continuing division between governments determined to contain national contributions and those seeking to protect agricultural subsidies, regional development and new European investment programmes. The dispute now threatens the political timetable for approving the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, the budget that will determine the Union’s spending priorities over the next seven years.
In their formal summit conclusions, leaders invited European Council President António Costa to take negotiations forward towards a timely agreement. No new spending settlement was endorsed, despite the Irish presidency having presented revised figures immediately before the summit.
Germany rejects the compromise
The European Commission originally proposed a framework approaching €2 trillion in current prices, arguing that Europe needed greater financial capacity to meet its growing responsibilities in defence, competitiveness, technological development, migration and external security.
Ireland, which holds the rotating Council presidency, submitted a revised negotiating document on 10 October intended to narrow the differences between governments. The latest proposal includes substantial reductions compared with the Commission’s initial ambitions while seeking to preserve financing for established EU programmes.
Those concessions have not satisfied Berlin. Merz argues that the Union must recognise the difficult fiscal position facing national governments and that the proposed increases in common spending remain excessive.
Germany, the largest contributor to the EU budget in absolute terms, has been working with other budget-conscious governments to seek reductions from the original Commission proposal.
The Irish compromise has done little to bridge the divide. The revised framework seeks to combine greater financial restraint with protection for agricultural and cohesion policies, while retaining significant investment in security, research and competitiveness.
Yet every attempt to rebalance the proposed spending exposes another political conflict.
Agriculture, cohesion and defence compete for funding
The Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funding remain among the largest and most politically sensitive components of the EU budget. Agricultural payments support farmers across the Union, while cohesion programmes finance infrastructure, regional investment and economic development, particularly in less prosperous territories.
Governments benefiting heavily from those programmes are reluctant to accept reductions, particularly when national finances are already under pressure.
France, Italy and other countries defending traditional EU expenditure have therefore resisted attempts to transfer the burden of budget restraint disproportionately onto agriculture and regional support.
At the same time, the Commission has argued that the EU cannot simply preserve the spending structure of previous decades while promising a stronger role in European defence, industrial development and economic security.
The contradiction is increasingly apparent. European governments demand greater independence from external suppliers, stronger military capabilities and sustained financial support for Ukraine, yet remain unwilling to agree on the larger common budget that might help deliver those objectives.
Cuts to research, innovation, cross-border infrastructure or defence-industrial programmes would not necessarily produce immediate political costs. Their consequences would emerge later, through investments postponed, capabilities not developed and projects left dependent on national budgets.
Conversely, reducing agricultural payments or regional investment would produce more immediate resistance from farmers, local authorities and national governments.
The Council’s budget negotiations had been intended to deliver a political agreement before the end of 2026. That would leave 2027 for the European Parliament and member states to complete the legislation required for the new financial framework to operate from January 2028.
Failure to reach that timetable would not immediately stop EU expenditure. It would, however, compress the period available for completing the detailed legal arrangements underpinning individual programmes and could complicate the uninterrupted delivery of funding at the beginning of the next budget cycle.
The political environment is hardly favourable. Several governments face difficult domestic debates over public spending, taxation and the demands of European integration. In France, the approach of the 2027 presidential election adds another complication to negotiations requiring sensitive national concessions.
Agreement on the seven-year framework requires unanimity among member states, followed by the consent of the European Parliament. The latter has already argued that the EU needs sufficient financial resources to match the responsibilities its governments have assigned to it.
Costa now faces the task of converting competing national positions into a financial settlement that all 27 governments can accept. That will require decisions not only about the overall ceiling but also about the balance between national allocations and programmes managed at European level.
The Brussels summit has demonstrated that the principal disagreements remain unresolved. The next negotiating round will determine whether governments are prepared to compromise on spending priorities or whether their ambitions for a more capable European Union will once again run ahead of their willingness to finance it.
Nearly 93 million EU residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, with the latest regional figures revealing sharp differences both between and within member states. The findings raise questions about how effectively European investment is addressing longstanding economic inequality.
More than one in five people living in the European Union remained at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, according to Eurostat figures that reveal substantial differences in living conditions across the bloc’s regions.
Approximately 92.7 million people, representing 20.9 per cent of the EU population, fell into the category during the year. Although the total declined slightly from 93.3 million in 2024, regional data show that economic vulnerability remains heavily concentrated in particular areas.
In 26 of the 243 EU regions for which figures were available, at least 31 per cent of residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. At the opposite end of the distribution, 24 regions recorded rates below 13 per cent.
The regional figures published by Eurostat show that the highest rate was recorded in French Guiana, at 54.8 per cent, while Slovakia’s capital region, Bratislavský kraj, recorded the lowest at 2.9 per cent.
National averages conceal substantial differences
The contrast is not confined to richer and poorer member states. In several countries, internal regional disparities are more pronounced than comparisons of national economic performance might suggest.
Within Slovakia, the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Východné Slovensko was 9.1 times the rate recorded in the Bratislava region.
In Italy, the equivalent rate in Calabria was 8.1 times that of Valle d’Aosta, illustrating the persistent economic divide between parts of the country’s north and south.
These differences are recorded in Eurostat’s regional living-conditions statistics, which provide a more detailed picture than EU-wide or national averages.
The comparison requires care. Eurostat’s measure of poverty or social exclusion combines three indicators: relative income poverty, severe material and social deprivation, and very low household work intensity.
Consequently, the figures do not mean that every person included lacks sufficient income to meet basic needs. They identify people experiencing at least one of the defined forms of economic disadvantage.
Differences in income, employment, household composition and living costs can also influence the results, making direct comparisons between metropolitan areas, rural districts and overseas territories more complicated than a single percentage might imply.
Nevertheless, the scale of regional variation illustrates why national economic growth does not automatically produce equivalent improvements in living standards throughout a country.
Poverty reduction remains an EU commitment
The European Union has set a target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030, including at least five million children.
The limited annual reduction recorded in 2025 indicates that progress remains modest relative to the scale of that objective.
The problem has become increasingly important for European policymakers as housing costs, energy prices and employment insecurity affect household finances in different ways across member states.
In May, the Commission presented an anti-poverty and housing policy package, bringing together measures concerning social inclusion, housing exclusion and child poverty.
The regional figures indicate that such initiatives will need to account for considerable differences in local economic conditions.
Policies designed for prosperous urban economies may have limited relevance in regions characterised by low employment, weak infrastructure or dependence on a small number of industries. Conversely, economic activity and relatively high average incomes do not necessarily prevent serious poverty problems within major cities.
Cohesion funding becomes a central question
The findings have direct relevance to negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028 to 2034.
The European Commission’s proposal envisages roughly €450 billion for economic, social and territorial cohesion under national and regional partnership plans, including at least €218 billion for less developed regions.
The proposed structure would combine several funding programmes within broader national plans, with the Commission arguing that the changes could improve coordination and make spending more responsive to local requirements.
However, regional authorities have expressed concern that greater national control over financial allocations could weaken their influence over investment decisions.
As EU Today reported earlier this week, representatives of European regions have warned that the proposed budget arrangements could concentrate decision-making in national capitals.
The latest poverty statistics provide a concrete context for that disagreement. Investment priorities may differ considerably between a region experiencing industrial decline, an agricultural area with limited employment opportunities and a metropolitan district facing severe housing affordability problems.
A central question for EU institutions is therefore how funding allocations will reflect measurable regional needs rather than being driven primarily by national political negotiations.
The Commission maintains that its proposed partnership arrangements will protect allocations for less developed regions and continue supporting social inclusion.
Negotiations over the financial framework will determine how those commitments are translated into enforceable rules, while Eurostat’s figures provide a statistical basis against which future claims of progress can be assessed.
With 92.7 million people still at risk, the debate is not simply about the overall size of the EU budget. It is also about whether spending reaches the communities where economic disadvantage remains most concentrated.
EU leaders met Thursday (15 October) for their first face-to-face talks on the 2028–2034 budget, killing the latest negotiation proposal put forward by Ireland.
Dublin, which holds the symbolic EU Council presidency, proposed cuts of up to €141bn from the long-term budget, about eight percent less than the commission proposal. But it failed to make anybody happy, for different reasons.
And now, EU Council president António Costa has been tasked to deliver a new compromise before EU leaders meet again on 26 November in Brussels, with the goal of striking a deal during the summit in December.
An EU official said Costa deemed the deal in December as “essential,” urging EU capitals “to assume their responsibility”.
For Denmark, for example, it is important to have more funds for defence, borders, illegal migration, and competitiveness. “It will probably be as difficult as it was last time or even more difficult,” said Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen ahead of the meeting.
“We need unanimity in the Council. We are far from that unanimity,” also said German chancellor Friedrich Merz before meeting counterparts.
The EU is divided into two camps. The so-called Frugals (Germany, Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden) want “several hundred billion” more to be cut, mostly from agriculture and cohesion funds, while 17 EU member states (self-named as Friends of Cohesion) criticise the savings.
But time is of the essence to reach a deal this year, especially for French president Emmanuel Macron. France will hold presidential elections in the spring, and if Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally party, wins, reaching an EU deal would become far more difficult.
Le Pen has pledged that, if she comes to power, she will halve France’s contribution to the EU budget.
And Macron reportedly said in the room with EU leaders that from January onwards, there will be no political room for reaching an agreement.
‘Easier to give up what you don’t yet have’
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The Irish text, known in Brussels as the negobox, keeps all three of the commission’s borrowing programmes that sit outside the budget’s normal limits: Catalyst Europe, a €150bn lending facility; a crisis mechanism of up to €395bn for major unforeseen shocks; and support for Ukraine of up to €100bn.
Add loans for defence and lending to other non-EU countries and, by our estimates, joint borrowing could still equal around 44 per cent of the new budget, about €800bn at current prices, up from 41 per cent under the Commission’s proposal. The budget shrinks, but the borrowing hardly changes.
Ireland’s proposed budget is too small for Europe’s mounting common challenges, and its borrowing approach is too ad hoc and risky.
Excluding the distorting effects of NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the Covid recovery fund, the Commission’s budget proposal is already far smaller than the headline figures suggest, and Ireland’s proposal would make it smaller still.
That matters because, as the Draghi report argued, Europe’s shared challenges such as Ukraine, rearmament and competitiveness require European public goods because no single member state captures their full benefits.
A budget worth just over one percent of the EU’s gross national income (GNI) is a poor match for that responsibility.
By comparison, total government expenditure across EU countries comes to close to half of their combined GNI. Keeping most fiscal capacity at national level, while expecting such a modest EU budget to finance increasingly vital continental priorities, is a bad use of public resources.
A stronger common budget needs more of its own revenue, at least what the Commission proposes in its Own Resources Decision, which Parliament broadly supports and which would raise nearly €60bn extra a year.
The Irish plan’s acceptance of five new resources is encouraging. But it has to survive the negotiations, and the details of the final reform will decide whether it means anything.
The Council’s approach to common borrowing remains haphazard, lacking a permanent framework and relying on crisis-driven compromises. Governments may not like it, but a more European approach is coming, and the €800bn is likely to grow.
And a successor to SAFE, the EU’s defence loan scheme, is widely expected, since €150bn has proved far from enough for Europe’s rearmament.
France has just shown what it costs to borrow alone. Its yields recently hit a 24-year high, and the state now pays more to borrow than some major French companies. Sharing the effort through the common budget, including prudent joint borrowing, would help spread that risk.
Yet Europe has no clear, sustainable plan for borrowing. To date, EU governments have reluctantly signed up to each new borrowing instrument and called it an exception.
European borrowing capacity has been assembled one crisis at a time, starting with the euro area crisis and accelerating since the pandemic.
NGEU was accepted by fiscally cautious states as a one-off decision to deal with the Covid-19 emergency. Then the war in Ukraine and the need to fund rearmament produced new exceptions.
This year, EU governments used enhanced cooperation, a procedure that lets a subset of member states go ahead without the rest, to approve the €90bn Ukraine Support Loan, the EU’s largest foreign loan ever.
For defence, they reached for Article 122, the treaties’ emergency clause, to set up SAFE. Parliament, which felt sidelined, decided to sue the Council before the European Court of Justice.
There is a catch though.
These exceptional programmes are guaranteed by the so-called budget headroom, the margin between the EU’s revenue ceiling and the spending limits in the seven-year budget, rather than by money set aside in advance.
In barely five years, headroom-backed exposure has climbed to €681bn (see Figure 1), 82 percent of all EU debt.
The European Court of Auditors has warned that if a Ukraine loan guaranteed this way goes bad, future EU budgets, and the national contributions that fund them, would have to cover the loss.
Frugals vs Friends of Cohesion
EU capitals remain divided over the new budget and over joint borrowing. Net contributors, sometimes referred to as the Frugal Six, want deep cuts in the commission’s proposal, argue that new common borrowing is not the solution and have misgivings about the creation of new own resources.
By contrast, a group of sixteen southern and eastern countries, that call themselves the “Friends of Cohesion”, are much more open to joint borrowing and back an approach closer to the Commission and Parliament on the budget and own resources.
Ireland’s plan largely reflects the influence of the frugal countries, yet one diplomat has already dismissed it as “not even close to a landing zone.”
Europe needs an ambitious budget, backed by at least the Commission’s proposed new own resources, so it relies less on national contributions based on GNI. Joint borrowing should become a permanent, predictable part of it, with safeguards.
First, it should fund loans, not grants, as the Commission suggests. Second, riskier exposures, especially to non-EU countries, should be at least partly backed by money set aside in advance, as the Court of Auditors recommends.
Where it makes sense, the headroom guarantee could be topped up with national guarantees in proportion to each country’s size, as under SURE, and like-minded partners outside the EU could sometimes take part.
Stronger capital at institutions such as the EIB, or at any future defence-financing vehicle, would also let Europe borrow more together without putting its creditworthiness at risk.
Governments should also consider deferring repayment of the NGEU bonds, as the Draghi report suggested, especially if the own-resources reform falls short. It would protect priority spending when it is needed most.
Sustained joint borrowing brings a bonus: more common safe assets in euros, which strengthens the euro’s international role. The demand is already there.
Wobbles in US bond markets, which partly reflect doubts about America’s fiscal health, its reliability as a partner and the dollar’s safe-haven status, give the euro an opening.
But it can only take it if EU governments put their own fiscal houses in order.
Ongoing tensions in the French bond market provide a clear warning. Putting France’s finances on a sustainable path would do more than reassure markets about the euro. It would restore French debt as a safe euro asset.
EU leaders meet on Thursday and Friday in Brussels. Whatever they discuss (and later decide) on the budget, Europe should keep borrowing together, and in large amounts.
The task now is to give that borrowing a coherent plan: a permanent framework, money set aside in advance and safeguards that cautious capitals can accept.
European regional and local leaders have warned that the EU’s next long-term budget risks transferring control over investment programmes to national governments, potentially increasing economic disparities and reducing the ability of poorer regions to shape their own development.
The warning was delivered in Brussels on 12 October by Kata Tüttő, President of the European Committee of the Regions, during the opening of the European Week of Regions and Cities.
Her intervention comes as EU leaders prepare to negotiate the 2028–2034 budget, with disagreements over agricultural funding, regional development, defence, industrial competitiveness and the distribution of financial responsibilities among member states.
The Committee of the Regions warned that greater centralisation could concentrate economic opportunities in already prosperous areas while limiting other territories’ capacity to attract investment and develop essential infrastructure.
The concern goes beyond money allocated to regional development. It addresses who controls spending decisions and whether local authorities retain a meaningful role in determining how European funds are used.
Regional governments resist centralisation
EU cohesion policy has traditionally sought to reduce disparities between richer and poorer regions through investment in transport, infrastructure, education, business development and public services. While national governments administer considerable funds, regional and local authorities are frequently involved in identifying priorities and delivering projects.
The Committee argues that restructuring which concentrates decision-making at national level could weaken this arrangement. National governments may favour country-wide industrial or infrastructure programmes, while regional authorities identify specific problems arising from local conditions.
A national infrastructure strategy could prioritise major transport routes and industrial centres. Regional administrations might instead emphasise connecting smaller communities, maintaining local services or developing specialised economic activities.
The dispute concerns whether the next EU budget will maintain flexibility for regional priorities. In Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy, regional institutions possess important responsibilities across economic development, education and infrastructure. Changes to EU spending governance could alter established relations between European, national and regional institutions.
The budget negotiations intensify the dispute
Ireland’s rotating Council presidency has proposed reducing the Commission’s original seven-year budget plans by approximately €141 billion while largely protecting agriculture and cohesion compared with other expenditure categories.
The proposed financial framework would nevertheless remain substantially larger than the current budget. The distribution of resources remains contentious, and an overall cut does not necessarily translate into the same reduction for every region.
Effects will depend on allocation formulas, national spending plans and programme governance. Meanwhile, European institutions face demands for stronger investment in defence production, digital infrastructure, competitiveness and support for Ukraine while maintaining agricultural and regional commitments.
Economic disparities remain a European problem
The Committee presented its seventh annual assessment of Europe’s regions and cities during the European Week of Regions and Cities, held in Brussels from 12 to 14 October.
The assessment examines competitiveness, resilience, public services, democratic governance and financial conditions. Regional disparities remain a significant feature of the EU economy despite decades of common investment programmes.
Large metropolitan areas often benefit from concentrations of universities, research institutions, advanced industries and capital. Less densely populated territories may struggle with demographic decline, shortages of skilled workers and the cost of maintaining infrastructure.
These differences can reinforce themselves over time. Businesses invest where suitable workers, transport networks and customers are already concentrated. Younger workers moving towards metropolitan economies may further reduce the economic prospects of communities they leave behind.
Defence spending creates new pressures
The increase in European defence expenditure introduces another dimension. Regions containing defence manufacturers, engineering firms, research institutions and military installations could benefit substantially from new spending, while others may receive little direct economic advantage.
If industrial investment concentrates in already advanced manufacturing centres, geographical disparities could widen. Conversely, procurement programmes and infrastructure investment could bring opportunities to weaker regional economies with suitable facilities and labour.
A question of political authority
The Committee of the Regions has limited formal authority over the EU’s long-term budget. National governments will negotiate the framework, and the European Parliament must consent to the final agreement.
Regional leaders are seeking to influence those negotiations before political compromises are established. Their central argument is that aggregate European economic growth alone does not capture the distribution of investment, employment and public services across the Union.
The approaching European Council negotiations will indicate whether governments intend to preserve regional influence over EU spending or concentrate greater authority over investment decisions at national level.
European Union governments are entering a critical round of budget negotiations after the Irish presidency of the Council proposed cutting €141 billion from the European Commission’s long-term spending plans, exposing deep disagreements over how the bloc intends to finance its expanding responsibilities.
The revised proposal, circulated ahead of the European Council meeting scheduled for 15–16 October, would reduce the planned 2028–2034 financial framework by approximately eight per cent to around €1.6 trillion, calculated in constant prices.
Despite the reduction, the proposed budget remains approximately 30 per cent larger than the current seven-year framework. Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and other governments concerned about national contributions have nevertheless argued that further restraint is necessary.
The compromise, detailed in negotiations over the EU’s next financial framework, reduces proposed spending across several areas while largely protecting the Union’s established agricultural and regional development programmes. The distribution of those cuts is becoming as contentious as the overall size of the budget.
Europe’s new priorities face the deepest reductions
Under the Irish proposal, agricultural and regional development allocations would decline by approximately three per cent compared with the Commission’s initial plans. By contrast, funding intended for competitiveness and security would be reduced by around 13 per cent, while external action and development cooperation face cuts of approximately 17 per cent.
The difference raises questions about whether the next EU budget can support the strategic ambitions repeatedly endorsed by European leaders.
The Commission has presented industrial competitiveness, technological development, defence readiness and economic resilience as central priorities for the remainder of the decade. Yet these sectors would absorb proportionately larger reductions under the revised framework than agricultural and cohesion programmes.
The consequences could extend to investments in advanced technologies, European industrial supply chains, research programmes and cross-border defence cooperation. They could also constrain the Union’s capacity to fund external partnerships and development initiatives.
The debate is particularly sensitive because the EU’s responsibilities have changed considerably since the previous budget was negotiated. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased defence requirements, while competition with China and the United States has intensified demands for industrial investment.
Germany and the net contributors demand restraint
The central disagreement concerns how much additional expenditure European governments are willing to finance through the common budget. Germany and other major net contributors face domestic fiscal constraints, rising borrowing costs and demands to increase national defence spending.
For these governments, accepting a substantially larger EU budget would add to financial commitments already being made through national budgets.
The Irish compromise therefore faces opposition from two directions. Some governments consider the reductions insufficient, while others fear that the remaining cuts will weaken programmes essential to their national economies.
Traditional recipients of agricultural and regional funding have an interest in protecting established expenditure. Governments seeking stronger European investment in defence, innovation and industrial competitiveness have different priorities.
The European Parliament is another obstacle. Its consent will be required before the final financial framework can enter into force, giving MEPs considerable leverage in negotiations with national governments.
New EU revenues remain controversial
The proposal also envisages approximately €55 billion in additional annual financing through new or revised EU revenue sources, including customs revenues, emissions-related income and corporate contributions.
The Commission’s framework for the next long-term budget reflects a broader debate over the extent to which the Union should develop independent financing mechanisms rather than rely predominantly on national contributions.
Such mechanisms would potentially give Brussels a more predictable revenue base. However, they also raise questions about fiscal sovereignty, the distribution of costs among member states and the political accountability of European taxation.
National governments remain reluctant to surrender substantial authority over revenue collection, particularly when proposed resources could impose costs on domestic industries or consumers.
Ukraine, enlargement and Europe’s strategic ambitions
The negotiations will influence the Union’s ability to respond to future enlargement. Ukraine and several Western Balkan countries are pursuing accession, but the financial implications of bringing additional members into the Union remain substantial.
Existing arrangements for agricultural subsidies and regional development assistance would require reconsideration if large new beneficiaries entered the budgetary system.
At the same time, the EU faces pressure to support Ukraine financially and strengthen defence production without depending indefinitely on extraordinary borrowing or ad hoc national contributions. These responsibilities cannot be addressed simply by preserving the structure of earlier budgets.
European Council President António Costa will seek to narrow the divisions among the 27 leaders, but agreement on the financial framework requires unanimity. Any government can withhold its consent if it considers the final distribution of costs unacceptable.
The forthcoming summit is therefore likely to establish the parameters of further negotiations rather than eliminate the underlying disagreements. The immediate political question is whether member states can reconcile their commitment to greater European strategic capacity with their reluctance to finance it collectively.
Getting co-decision powers on the budget, finally enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty after more than a decade of inter-institutional battles, was one of the European Parliament’s big wins.
The challenge facing MEPs in the coming months is whether they are really going to use those powers on the 2028-34 budget.
The early signs are that they are spoiling for a fight. The Irish government’s compromise proposal tabled on Saturday (10 October) – an 8 percent cut worth €141bn to the European Commission’s spending plan – isn’t exactly butchery.
But it does display a startling lack of ambition, in particular on the raft of ‘own resources’ proposed by MEPs to make the budget process less vulnerable to member states wanting to reduce or at least freeze their annual contributions
This time round, MEPs have proposed a digital services levy, an online gambling levy, and a levy on crypto-asset capital gains.
Put together the parliament reckons that these new taxes could bring an additional €30bn to the EU’s budget, on top of the €57.4bn that the EU commission believes can be raised from other levies, such as the emissions trading scheme and the carbon border levy.
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European Union leaders will meet in Brussels on 15–16 October under pressure to address surging energy costs, Russian hybrid attacks, continued support for Ukraine and the bloc’s next long-term budget. The summit comes as economic pressures expose growing differences between national governments.
European Union leaders are preparing for a two-day summit in Brussels dominated by the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and mounting pressure on governments to reconcile defence commitments with deteriorating public finances.
The European Council meeting on 15–16 October will bring together the leaders of the 27 member states to consider immediate measures addressing high energy prices alongside longer-term decisions on competitiveness, enlargement, migration and the EU’s budget for 2028–2034.
European Council President António Costa has placed economic competitiveness and energy costs at the centre of the discussions, reflecting concerns that the disruption of global oil and gas markets is threatening the bloc’s industrial recovery.
The meeting also takes place against the background of renewed disputes over national spending limits, with Italy and Greece seeking greater freedom to finance energy relief and France facing increasing pressure over the credibility of its budget.
Energy crisis puts fiscal rules under pressure
The Middle East conflict has created a renewed energy shock for European economies, raising transport and industrial costs while pushing inflation higher.
The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has also affected global oil supplies, exposing Europe’s continuing dependence on internationally traded fossil fuels despite efforts to diversify imports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
European leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary support measures for households and businesses, as well as longer-term policies intended to reduce energy dependence.
The political disagreement concerns how those measures should be financed.
The European Commission has resisted requests from Italy and Greece for further exemptions from the EU’s fiscal framework. Both governments argue that extraordinary energy costs require additional budgetary flexibility.
Brussels maintains that existing provisions already permit exceptional expenditure within defined limits.
The disagreement is particularly difficult for indebted governments that must simultaneously finance military expansion, maintain public services and protect their economies from energy inflation.
France’s position has added urgency to the debate. Its borrowing costs have increased sharply as investors question whether the government can adopt a credible budget ahead of the 2027 presidential election.
A summit agreement on emergency energy assistance would therefore have to accommodate substantially different national fiscal circumstances.
Ukraine and the changing transatlantic relationship
Support for Ukraine remains a central item on the summit agenda as Russia continues attacks against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure and industrial facilities.
EU leaders are expected to review military and financial assistance, the implementation of sanctions against Moscow and the resilience of Ukraine’s economy.
The discussions take place amid renewed uncertainty surrounding American weapons deliveries.
Washington’s reported threats to suspend supplies under the NATO-backed PURL procurement arrangement have raised further questions about Europe’s dependence on the United States for advanced military equipment.
European governments have increased defence expenditure and committed additional support to Ukraine, but replacing American capabilities remains difficult, particularly in air defence, precision-guided weapons and certain intelligence systems.
The summit is unlikely to resolve those industrial limitations, but the broader question of Europe’s ability to sustain Ukrainian defence over several years will influence discussions.
Member states must also consider how increased defence expenditure will be financed alongside other demands on national budgets.
Russian hybrid operations move higher on the agenda
The issue has gained prominence as European governments investigate sabotage, cyber operations, information interference and threats against infrastructure and defence-related industries.
Recent warnings concerning possible Russian assassination operations targeting European defence executives and employees of companies supplying Ukraine illustrate the changing nature of the security threat.
Such activities place additional demands on national intelligence services, police forces and European institutions responsible for cross-border cooperation.
The EU has strengthened its sanctions instruments against hybrid activities, but enforcement remains dependent on coordination between national authorities.
Any further measures would need to address intelligence sharing, protection of critical infrastructure and the relationship between internal security and the Union’s wider Russia policy.
Brussels has outlined possible institutional safeguards intended to prevent future members from undermining democratic standards or blocking common decisions.
Montenegro and Albania are advancing through their accession negotiations, while Ukraine and Moldova remain central to the EU’s geopolitical enlargement strategy.
The financial implications will become increasingly important as governments negotiate the next multiannual financial framework covering 2028–2034.
Existing members are already divided over how much the EU should spend, which programmes should receive priority and whether additional common resources should be raised.
Agricultural expenditure, cohesion funding, defence investment and support for Ukraine will compete for resources within the same budget negotiations.
The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated through targeted reforms, but securing agreement among member states will require decisions on future expenditure and the distribution of financial benefits.
Competitiveness and the single market
Leaders will also examine progress on the One Europe, One Market agenda, which aims to reduce barriers to economic activity within the EU and improve conditions for European businesses.
The initiative is intended to address structural weaknesses affecting investment, industrial development and the ability of European companies to compete internationally.
High energy prices have made those concerns more immediate, particularly for industries competing against producers in economies where electricity and fuel are cheaper.
The European Council will be asked to provide direction on measures planned for 2026 and 2027, but implementation will depend on subsequent legislation and decisions by member states.
The October meeting brings several unresolved European policy questions into the same negotiation: how to protect economic competitiveness, maintain fiscal credibility, finance defence, sustain Ukraine and prepare for enlargement.
The immediate test will be whether leaders can agree on a credible response to energy prices without reopening broader disputes over national budgets.
More difficult decisions concerning defence financing, institutional reform and the EU’s long-term expenditure commitments will extend well beyond the two-day summit.
The Irish government has set the path for a showdown between MEPs and governments over the next seven year EU budget after proposing an 8 percent cut worth €141bn to the European Commission’s spending plan.
Savings from the commission proposal have been found across all headings in the so-called ‘negotiating box’ for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). But farmers’ subsidies under the common agricultural policy and the bloc’s cohesion policy, which provides funding to the EU’s poorest regions, have been exempted from any cuts.
That is a nod to a sustained lobbying effort by a group of seventeen EU countries, known as ‘Friends of Cohesion’.
As expected, meanwhile, cuts totalling €38bn have been made from the ‘Global Europe’ heading, which covers foreign aid, while €75bn has been taken from the competitiveness fund and €10bn from the EU’s administrative costs.
In a statement on Saturday (10 October), Ireland’s minister for Europe, Thomas Byrne, said that the €1.62 trillion spending plan was “intended to bridge the many differences between Member States. It brings us closer to resolving the critical questions our Union faces on how to balance both new priorities and core policies, whilst also reflecting the fiscal realities that all Member States face.”
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When certain governments discuss the EU’s next seven-year budget, their first reflex seems to be: what can we cut? That is the wrong question. The real question is not how much the EU budget costs, but how much an insufficient budget will cost us all.
Economic benefits of EU membership are estimated to be two to six times the financial contribution of individual member states. For every euro we contribute to the EU budget, we can receive up to six euros in return.
That is the power of investing together: European investment delivers more than fragmented national spending. And it does so with a budget of just one percent of EU GNI, while national budgets can reach 50 percent.
The EU budget is not simply money transferred from national capitals to Brussels: it is an investment that creates value benefiting citizens through stronger economies, better infrastructure, food security, cutting-edge research, educational opportunities, regional development, and security.
Ultimately, all member states benefit from the added value created by the EU, making the concept of ‘net contributors’ obsolete.
Easing the pressure on national contributions is a legitimate objective, and it has a clear solution: an EU revenue reform.
The European Parliament supports the basket approach of the European Commission on new own resources and its proposals. It also proposed three additional options capable of generating substantial revenue by 1 January 2028: a digital service levy on major platforms (€25.2bn per year), a levy on online gambling (€3.9bn per year) and a crypto-assets-based own resource (€3bn per year).
Our position is clear: large global companies that benefit most from Europe’s single market should contribute fairly to the EU budget that makes those benefits possible.
The European Union’s common budget has not grown in real terms for 40 years. On the contrary, its purchasing power has been steadily eroded due to high inflation. The current EU budget has lost around 10 percent of its purchasing power compared to when it was adopted in 2020.
A more ambitious EU budget does not automatically mean that member states will have to contribute substantially more from their national budgets. When amounts are compared in constant prices and as a share of the size of the European economy – like with like – a more realistic picture emerges.
In terms of spending capacity, and without counting repayment of the Covid-19 recovery fund (NextGenerationEU), the commission’s proposal for the 2028-2034 budget would be below the relative size of the current 2021-2027 MFF at the time of its adoption.
Even with parliament’s proposed increase for key EU programmes, member states’ contributions would still not substantially increase.
Let us not forget: Europeans benefit considerably more than their countries’ headline contributions suggest. The single market is the clearest example. By removing barriers between 27 economies, it creates opportunities and delivers growth that no country could generate alone.
By reducing the budget, the EU and its member states will have less capacity to deliver the economic and social benefits that citizens expect. We’ll have less cohesion, less competitiveness, a weaker agricultural sector, less global influence, reduced social investment and a much less secure Europe. And this also comes at a cost. A big one.
Instead of “what can we cut” we should be asking ourselves, “how can we finance a budget that delivers more for all”.
If we genuinely want to use limited public resources efficiently, we must invest together. Economies of scale work for successful businesses, and they work for Europe.
Siegfried Mureşan (EPP, Romania) and Carla Tavares (S&D, Portugal) are the parliament’s co-rapporteurs on the EU budget, also known as the multiannual financial framework (MFF)
Europe’s Green party has called on the European Commission to exercise the powers it previously used during the Ukraine war to tax the exceptional profits made by big oil and gas companies during the ongoing conflict in Iran.
“There are models in Europe that we can use to tax these super profits,” German MEP Rasmus Andresen told a European Parliament debate in Strasbourg on Wednesday (7 October), in his call to crack down on Iran-crisis profiteering.
The Strasbourg debate came after Austria, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain wrote to Ireland’s finance minister in August calling for an EU-wide framework to tax windfall profits.
Ireland holds the rotating EU presidency and can set agendas in the EU Council until the end of the year.
Several of those in the group of six EU states already put in place energy windfall taxes since this summer, ranging from 60 percent levies on excess fuel profits in Poland to 33 percent in Portugal.
Many other EU countries oppose introducing another tax at European level, which would require unanimity among all 27 member states to put in place.
But for his part, the Greens’ Andresen told MEPs in the hemicycle on Wednesday: “I don’t understand how despite the fact that there is this initiative from these six member states, that the commission is not taking action.”
Estimates from NGO Transport and Environment found that excess profits of €7.5bn were seen by eight oil companies alone in the first half of 2026 in Europe.
The figures were twice what they had made in the previous quarter.
The EU had reacted to soaring energy prices after Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with a special “solidarity” tax on oil and gas firms, said groups on the Parliament’s left.
A commission assessment found that the measure raised €28bn in 2022-2023.
A senior official representing the Irish presidency, Thomas Byrne, said on Wednesday that windfall taxes “could be considered to respond to the concern related to the rising cost of living“.
But energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen poured cold water on appeals for EU-level action, saying “corporate taxation falls mainly in the realm of national competence” in legal terms.
If they were not taxed, “how can they be exonerated from all responsibility in the rise of prices at the gas station?,” said the French vice-president of the Greens group.
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European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has joined MEPs in urging the bloc’s governments not to gut the EU’s next seven-year budget, as talks on spending reach a critical phase.
The commission has proposed a budget worth just under €2 trillion, equivalent to 1.26 percent of the EU’s gross national income, a small increase on the previous seven year spending plan. But the so-called ‘frugal’ group of countries, led by Germany, have demanded hefty cuts, complaining that they are contributing too much.
“Having no new financial framework is by far the most financially advantageous solution for Germany,” chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Monday.
But 17 EU countries from Southern and Eastern Europe signed a joint letter last week, demanding that farmers’ subsidies via the Common Agricultural Policy are maintained, as well as spending across the EU’s poorest regions, known as cohesion policy
During a press conference on Tuesday, Siegfried Muresan, the Romanian centre-right MEP who is co-leading parliament’s negotiating team on the seven-year budget with Portuguese socialist and democrat Claudia Tavares, said that there was “still time” for the Irish presidency to avoid proposing “unjustified cuts” that “would make Europe weaker and severely undermine the institutional cooperation between parliament and council.”
Though Muresan conceded that governments did not want to increase their national contributions, “there is a way out”, he said.
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