“Associate membership” is out and “ever closer association” back in.
The offer of the first phrase was made to Canada a month ago by EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen.
The phraseology, made during von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech, surprised many EU diplomats who claimed that they had not been consulted.
It was also never clear precisely what this would mean.
The idea of Canada having representatives or observer status in the EU institutions always sounded fanciful. Besides, there is no mention of ‘associate membership’ in the EU treaties, and this uncertainty appears to have persuaded Germany to demand that it be dropped ahead of Thursday and Friday’s (29-30 October) EU-Canada summit.
The draft communique circulated ahead of the summit talks of “work to define by the 2027 EU-Canada summit the concept of an ever closer association of Canada to the EU, short of full membership itself.”
Von der Leyen appeared not to have read the memo.
Officials would “start discussing how to make Canada the first associate member of the EU,” she said on arrival in Montreal, adding that “our ambition is to build the closest partnership we have ever had with a non-European country”.
Yet this is a dispute over language rather than substance. The EU and Mark Carney’s Canada see each other as their closest ally. Both have been repeatedly threatened with hefty trade tariffs by Donald Trump’s White House and the consequences of Trump’s foreign policy adventures in the Middle East and the Arctic. Carney’s remarks at the World Economic Forum in January that ‘middle’ powers should club together to avoid being squeezed between China and the US were aimed at the EU.
Commission officials may blench at the comparison, but the EU is a collection of middle ranking and small states. And it is yet to act like a world power on the political stage.
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Activists and MEPs want notoriously corrupt foreign officials to face EU visa-bans and asset-freezes, in a proposal backed by Estonia.
People guilty of “serious corruption” including “bribery, misappropriation of public funds, and the laundering of their proceeds” should be added to an existing EU list of global human rights abusers, said 71 MEPs in a letter to EU leaders dated 21 October.
The human rights blacklist includes Russian judges who tormented dissidents, Taliban virtue-enforcers, African warlords, and extremist Israeli settlers among the 151 individuals and 34 entities it names.
But the fact the EU does not have “corruption” as a criterion for inclusion, unlike similar legislation in Western allies Australia, Canada, the US, and UK, left a loophole, the MEPs warned.
“This allows corrupt foreign officials already sanctioned by other Western partners to continue to benefit from EU institutions and its financial systems,” they said.
The anti-corruption bolt-on would have a moral and a strategic value, said Polish rightwing MEP and former interior minister Michał Kamiński, who co-signed the letter.
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Artificial intelligence is one of the economic sectors where the EU and China could be allies rather than foes; both are racing to close the gap with the United States. But until now, the EU has viewed China as a competitor and threat on AI and digital technology.
The two economies “have huge cooperation potential in new energy, AI, services trade, the digital economy and green low-carbon fields”, China’s ministry of commerce said in a statement following the second round of China-EU trade talks in Beijing earlier this month.
Those two days of talks between EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Chinese commerce secretary Wang Wentao were widely viewed as a successful first step forward by EU leaders at last week’s summit in Brussels.
In particular, China has agreed to reduce exports of electric vehicles and guarantees continued access to rare earths without new export controls. It also commits EU and Chinese officials to at least six more months of negotiations on a raft of trade disputes.
A visit to a robotics factory was part of the itinerary for a delegation from the European Parliament’s international trade committee who will make a three day visit to China from 27 October.
Committee chairman Bernd Lange told reporters that Unitree Robotics, a Chinese robotics company that uses its own humanoid robots—powered by embodied AI —to help manufacture and assemble more robots would be “at the heart of Chinese industry in the future.”
China is the world leader in the robotics market, with Lange’s Germany its main European rival.
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The European Commission will not help journalists facing jail in Egypt even though its multi-billion-euro EU-Egypt deal signed in 2024 is conditional on human rights.
On Thursday (29 October), it read out a prepared statement, noting the importance of independent media outlets and that its agreement with Egypt includes a commitment to universal values of democracy, rule of law and human rights.
The statement was read after Cairo cracked down on Lina Attalah, chief editor of the independent media outlet Mada Masr.
The journalist was convicted on Wednesday by a court in Cairo for operating a website without a licence even though she had made multiple attempts over the years to obtain such a licence.
Her latest application for a licence has been pending without response since 2023 and her site has been blocked in Egypt since 2017.
She was fined some €48,000 and ordered to shut down the outlet, highlighting a pattern of abuse against journalists and civil society throughout Egypt, a country deemed an essential partner for the EU in its efforts to curb migration.
As of early October, Egypt has imprisoned 25 journalists.
In response, the commission at a press briefing re-read its short statement on the importance of independent media in Egypt.
Asked if this also means it would press Egypt to drop its case against Lina Attalah, a commission spokesperson said he would not “go further than what we have already put out there”.
Pressed if the crackdown against her is a demonstration of the values cited in its €7.4bn agreement with Egypt, he deferred to another spokesperson before walking off the stage. No other comment was made on the matter.
The response has drawn criticism from rights defenders.
“We don’t need the EU to tell us that Egypt jails journalists. We need to know what it’s going to do about it,” said Claudio Francavilla of Human Rights Watch.
He said the EU has been funnelling billions to Egypt, conditioned on “concrete and credible steps” on human rights.
The exact wording of the agreement, which is published here, says that assistance to Egypt requires it “to make concrete and credible steps” towards respecting effective democracy, the rule of law, and guarantees respect for human rights.
“Egyptian authorities don’t seem to have read the memo. Lame statements like this one are hardly a reminder,” Francavilla said of the commission’s reaction.
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EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.
Find the full transcript below:
The EU-Canada summit opens today in Montreal and runs until tomorrow (30 October). One idea is overshadowing the meeting: making Canada an “associate member” of the EU. However, the 27 member states are far from agreed on it.
So, what can we actually expect from this summit?
Canada is, let’s say, one of the EU’s favourite partners. And it went as far as this: Ursula von der Leyen proposing to make Canada an associate member of the EU.
This came as a surprise, because the idea had not been discussed with the 27 member states. And now that we are getting into the details, it has become a real issue.
So much so that the EU is scrambling at the last minute to agree on the wording to use during the summit with Ottawa.
As an illustration, as recently as yesterday, the EU still didn’t know what to do with the term “associate member” in the joint EU-Canada declaration. Council officials had suggested mentioning the status, while making clear it was the Commission’s idea. But even in that form, Germany, France, Italy and Greece objected.
Why? First, because no decision was ever taken through the proper channels. And above all, because the status simply doesn’t exist.
The word “member” is already a problem, because it implies some form of participation in the EU. And the treaties limit that to a certain geographical area, which, as you can imagine, doesn’t stretch across the Atlantic.
So what does the Commission actually have in mind? According to an EU official, associate member status would mean consulting each other even more on a number of policies: climate, energy, AI, security and so on.
Canada could also join some EU programmes more automatically. Although in reality, it already takes part in several of them, such as Horizon, the research programme, or SAFE, the defence loan instrument. The same official says there would also be more regular meetings to coordinate positions.
But all of this remains very vague. For many observers, von der Leyen’s proposal was above all a way to show the friendship between the EU and Canada, at a time when the United States is behaving in a threatening way.
Now, what does Canada think of this? When von der Leyen made her proposal in her speech, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney welcomed it, as diplomacy and politeness require.
Since then, according to Canadian media, he has avoided using the expression “associate member”. And in any case, Canada has no intention of joining the EU. It simply isn’t something it is interested in.
So whether there are ways to deepen cooperation is, once again, still to be seen.
The summit, will surely not bring answers or decisions on such a relationship. More time will be needed to discuss a new status, or leave it completely.
In the meantime, the two blocs will sign what they call an “alliance for the future”. It is less binding and more consensual.
That’s what bilateral summits like this are for: reminding everyone of existing alliances, or clarifying them in some cases. Both sides adopt a joint declaration, a document in which they try to announce shared projects and take common positions on major international issues.
But as for associate membership, that will have to wait.
Any talk of EU sanctions on Israel is in limbo until a new government emerges, as experts warn that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu could attack Iran in a “matter of days” to improve his chances of retaining power.
Netanyahu is to stay on in a caretaker role for several weeks or months of coalition talks after inconclusive elections on Tuesday (27 October), which saw his rightwing bloc win the most seats (53 seats out of 120), but fall short of a majority.
The elections took place amid ongoing Israeli aggression in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon.
And this was expected to continue or get worse in the post-election power struggle, as Netanyahu courted the eight defector-MPs he needed to stay in power, by playing on security fears.
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“Everybody’s focusing on the legal basis of Ursula von der Leyen’s associate membership [with Canada] announcement, but frankly I don’t care,” says MEP Javier Moreno Sánchez.
The Spanish Socialists & Democrats lawmaker chairs the European Parliament’s Canada delegation. He hopes leaders can make the EU and Canada “as close as possible” at the Montréal summit beginning on Thursday (29 October). Hosting the talks is Canadian prime minister Mark Carney, who has repeatedly spoken of ‘middle powers’ such as Canada and the EU deepening cooperation.
In September, EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s announcement of an ‘associate membership’ possibility for Canada caught many by surprise. And there has been no consensus among member states on whether such wording should be used in written agreements with the North American ally.
EUobserver sat down with the MEP Moreno Sánchez in his Brussels office ahead of the major EU-Canada talks.
EU member states struggled to agree on inclusion of the term ‘associate member’ before the Montréal summit. Was it a mistake for EU commission president Ursula von der Leyen to announce this special category if she could not deliver it?
MEP Javier Moreno Sánchez: No, to have made this announcement is positive. I prefer for Canada to be an associate member, but I don’t care about the legal basis; it can be de facto associate membership. It’s true that the concept is not in the treaties, but the euro was not and neither was Schengen. When we have the political will, we don’t need the treaties.
I would like Canada’s relationship to be as strong and as close as possible with the European Union. It means that they will be like Switzerland or Iceland. We won’t have Canadian members in the European Parliament, or commissioners from Canada, but they will be in all the programmes. Now they will participate in Erasmus+, they are participating in SAFE [Security Action for Europe]. And There is big cooperation on artificial intelligence. But we want a horizontal and holistic approach to collaboration, not sector by sector.
Now, everybody’s focusing on the legal basis of Ursula von der Leyen’s associate membership announcement, but frankly I don’t care. As I said in the plenary last week, Canada and the EU share traditions, culture, language, values and principles. So in my view, they are already associated.
What is ‘associate membership’?
This post by my prime minister Pedro Sánchez is what associate membership means.
It was very funny because it was 2pm after the State of the Union speech, and I had an interview with people in Ottawa where it was 8am in the morning. I said associate membership is a very positive thing we have to do. And the journalist interviewing me said they’re just seeing this post from PM Sánchez.
What do you think Mark Carney and Ursula von der Leyen should prioritise in the Montréal summit ?
The digital trade agreement. I hope they will agree on that to protect all the consumers and our enterprise. And on critical raw materials, we need an agreement because Canada has everything. In order to not to depend on China, we have to strengthen that relationship. And personally, I’d like to see the EU extend conventions and programs like Erasmus+ to Canada in small steps, little by little.
Should there be free movement between Canada and the EU?
We have to go in this direction. I don’t know exactly at which speed. So little by little, there will be free movement. But if you ask the Council, maybe certain countries will say, “No free movement.”
And how important is it that Canada pays into the European community, particularly when it comes to Ukraine?
I went to Canada only a few months into Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine to meet with people, NGOs, the enterprise and development communities. In every meeting, I was told that Canada wanted to rebuild Ukraine together with Europe once the war was finished. I was a little bit astonished.
One of the reasons is that there are 1.5 million Ukrainian people in Canada. And, Canada is putting money into Erasmus+ by participating in it. And it is willing to put money in all the programs and to work with us.
To what extent is US president Donald Trump responsible for pushing together Canada and the EU?
Thanks to Trump, we have Mark Carney as Canadian prime minister. It was a very good gift from him because Pierre Poilievre was the favourite two months before the elections. And when Trump announced all these shitty things, very proud Canadians decided to vote for Carney. And it was symbolic in Canada. Everybody said, “elbows up.” They are very proud people.
Many Europeans now see the US as a less reliable ally. Do you agree?
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Vladimir Putin has been silent on a request by Kenyan president William Ruto for Moscow to assist in the repatriation of Kenyan men recruited to fight for the Russian army in its war against Ukraine.
Ruto’s request was made ahead of a two day Russia-Africa summit which began in Moscow on Wednesday (28 October).
Nigerian and South African officials have also voiced concern about their own people being recruited.
In an open letter on Wednesday, Amnesty International urged African leaders to urge the Kremlin to “immediately end the coercive and deceptive recruitment of African nationals into Russia’s military forces to fight against Ukraine.”
“For African leaders to remain silent on this issue would be a profound disservice to the people of their countries,” states the letter.
“At a moment when many African governments are speaking up about the enduring legacy of colonialism, and the importance of sovereignty and African agency in international affairs, they must reject any practice that treats nationals of African countries as a commodity for other countries’ political and military objectives.”
The Kremlin has been publicly silent on the issue of African fighters being used in its army.
It briefed that 22 African heads of state would attend the two-day summit in Moscow, with 26 other African states sending foreign ministers and other diplomatic officials.
“The era when the fate of entire continents was determined by a narrow bloc of states is irrevocably gone,” said Putin in his opening speech at the summit.
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Finland’s president has caused a minor EU diplomatic fiasco by phoning Russian president Vladimir Putin out of the blue.
Finland’s Alexander Stubb sat down together with Norwegian prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre in Helsinki on Tuesday (27 October) and “initiated” the call to Putin, in what was already a submissive gesture in protocol terms.
Their discussion lasted 90 minutes and was “frank and substantive”, Stubb’s readout said, while Støre said he had “stressed the importance of de-escalation”.
But Putin told them he would make zero concessions, for instance on Ukrainian territories he claims are now Russian.
Putin “assessed the current situation in the Ukraine conflict zone, reiterating its root causes and emphasising that a just and lasting peace would be possible only if the interests of the Russian Federation are considered in full and without any conditions attached”, the Kremlin readout said.
Putin also belittled them by saying “the EU and Nato’s confrontational policies … result in prolonging the hostilities”.
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The EU plans ‘massive’ investment in Australia’s critical minerals sector as it seeks to make Canberra a major partner in reducing the bloc’s current reliance on China.
“Since we wish to diversify away from China, then one of the most likely partners has to be Australia,” said the EU’s ambassador to Australia, Lawrence Meredith, who added that the bloc’s security and defence partnership, agreed with Canberra earlier this year, also relies on co-operation on critical minerals.
Speaking at the International Mining and Resources Conference in Sydney on Tuesday (27 October) Meredith said that the bloc would be “massively investing in critical minerals.”
EU and Australian trade officials are currently working on a bilateral trade agreement, with a view to concluding negotiations in early 2027, and a Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals access is set to be part of it.
Australian officials appear eager to partner with the EU.
On Tuesday, Australia’s resources minister Madeline King said that it would revamp its own critical minerals strategy to put greater emphasis on refining and processing in an attempt to curb China’s dominance.
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Donald Trump’s 9 October diesel deal with Vladimir Putin left Europeans – including Ukraine – out in the cold, as US dollars will now become key aid in the financing of Russia’s war.
In the meantime, hybrid attacks using drones and sabotage are escalating across Europe. Intelligence agencies warn Russia will be escalating them in the next months, and even consider a “limited military attack”, as Danish intelligence warned late September.
EUobserver spoke to Robert Pszczel, former Nato information bureau chief in Moscow, about European defence and information strategy.
Pszczel is a long-time Polish diplomat in Warsaw and Brussels, now working with a Polish think tank, Centre for Eastern Studies (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, OSW).
He closely follows Russia’s hybrid war and European defence strategy.
We see the US deprioritising Europe in their defence and diplomacy. What should our response be?
Let’s not mix our views of this administration’s policy with our strategic relations with the US. Why would we want to help with the process of decoupling? Do we want to give people in the US administration who marginalise the value of alliances arguments for disengagement? Because for me, that’s what ramblings about a European Defence Union do. The paradox is that this idea really appeals to die-hard MAGA isolationists because it gives them an excuse for undermining the Nato alliance.
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In a historic turn of electoral tides, Brazil’s incumbent president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated far-right opponent Flávio Bolsonaro on Sunday (25 October,) alleviating fears that a Bolsonaro-dynasty comeback would topple the world’s fourth-largest democracy.
Following a disastrous first-round election for Lula on 4 October, in which he narrowly lost a majority in Brazil’s national congress, the Workers’ party leader overturned predictions to become the first president to win the second round of voting after losing the first one.
First-round voting gave 47 percent for former president Jair Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio, and his rightwing Liberal Party, whose voters mainly represent wealthy and emerging middle classes in the south of Brazil, as well as evangelical Christians, one of the largest religious groups in the country.
Lula’s northeastern, working class, multi-racial support base only made up 45 percent of all primary votes, but climted to 51.8 percent in Sunday’s second-round of the presidential election.
Despite setting a record in being the first Brazilian president to win four non-consecutive terms, Lula’s triumph still leaves room for possible conflict.
Bolsonaro, whose campaign capitalised on continuing the work of his divisive father, who is currently serving a 27-year prison sentence for plotting a coup after losing the 2022 election, refused to concede defeat – leaving an open window for history to repeat itself.
“We’ll request the annulment of these elections,” Bolsonaro told the press after votes had been counted, accusing Brazil’s Supreme Court of having “changed the rules of the game in the middle of the game,” by ordering polls to stay open for two more hours on Sunday.
What Brazil’s nationalist candidate declared as “unacceptable” was an idea initially intended to facilitate all Brazilians’ attendance at the polls, since multiple areas were reported to have been affected by public transport problems.
Bolsonaro’s issue with the courts is another link in the chain of power-hungry promises he had made during his campaign to “re-democratise this country”.
Without guidance on what that could mean beyond his publicised desire to extend the duration of presidential terms, many voters fearfully associated his remarks with a potential coup, or with Jair Bolsonaro’s infamous liking for authoritarian rulers – including Brazil’s own 1964-1985 dictatorship.
‘Lula’s army’
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Israel’s election on Tuesday (27 October) could bring a new government without changing the country’s course. Having worked as a parliamentary adviser in the Knesset and later as executive director of Peace Now, I know how that can happen.
Many of the parties seeking to replace Benjamin Netanyahu are avoiding clear positions on the Israeli-Palestinian question, but some of their candidates may end up overseeing annexation they never campaigned for.
Israel’s previous coalition, led by Naftali Bennett in 2021, offers a warning.
Called the “government of change” because it ended Netanyahu’s 12-year run in office, it brought together a variety of parties, from Bennett’s rightwing party to Labor and Meretz, leftwing parties.
Its answer to profound ideological disagreements, particularly over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was to preserve the status quo. The coalition lasted roughly 18 months, and although it changed the tone of government, it left much of the policy towards the West Bank intact.
For example, Merav Michaeli, then Labor leader and transport minister, opposed settlement expansion.
Yet her ministry continued to implement previously approved infrastructure commitments, including substantial budgets for roads facilitating that expansion.
Through my work at Peace Now, I saw how the coalition’s status-quo agreement constrained her ability to challenge projects inherited from the previous government. A minister could thus find herself implementing a vision she opposed.
Today, the stakes are higher.
Another slice of the West Bank
Consider E1, between Jerusalem and the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim, where construction would threaten Palestinian territorial contiguity and the viability of a future Palestinian state.
The government has advanced tenders for all 3,401 planned housing units, with crucial stages of the tender process set to be completed before a new government takes office.
E1 exemplifies wider efforts to establish difficult-to-reverse facts: new settlement outposts, including in areas under Palestinian civil administration, expanding settlements and administrative changes that entrench Israeli control.
A successor government would have to intervene actively to reverse them.
These developments are backed by an explicit political vision. The current government’s guidelines and coalition agreements assert exclusive Jewish rights throughout the land of Israel and commit to advancing Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank.
Under Bezalel Smotrich, serving as a minister within the defence ministry, a new settlement administration and civilian positions have been established, shifting significant aspects of West Bank governance from military administration to civilian political control.
These structures will not disappear when their architects leave office. The far-right has equipped the state with both a vision and the machinery to advance it.
Inertia is not neutral when the machinery is already moving in one direction.
Parties seeking to replace Netanyahu need not necessarily agree on a final-status agreement with the Palestinians, but they must find enough common ground to commit to halting annexation and reversing the structures that enable it.
Those understandings belong in coalition negotiations, when parties still have leverage, rather than in battles left for individual ministers once they are in office.
Nor is this a distant constitutional question. Palestinians in the West Bank already face systematic violations of their basic rights and freedoms, from restrictions on movement and access to land to violence and forced displacement. Each new settlement and outpost deepens this injustice and makes the prospect of a political settlement more remote.
Facts on ground
The entrenchment of permanent Israeli control is creating a reality that is increasingly difficult to reverse, making political intervention more urgent with every passing year.
The current government’s response to growing international pressure illustrates the danger.
After the UK announced measures targeting settlements, foreign minister Gideon Sa’ar ordered the closure of its consulate in East Jerusalem. Britain considered expelling Israeli diplomats in response, and a compromise left a much smaller British mission operating.
The episode illustrates Netanyahu’s vision of a ‘Super Sparta’: an Israel preparing itself for international isolation rather than addressing the policies contributing to it.
A future government seeking to change that trajectory should start with two tasks.
‘Messianic minority’
First, it must take seriously the reasons behind international sanctions and address the policies driving them, including settlement expansion and settler violence. A messianic minority must not be allowed to drag Israel into international isolation and economic decline.
Second, the government should help European partners distinguish between Israel and the settlements, including through transparent supply chains and clear proof of origin, so that restrictions aimed at settlements do not spill over into the broader Israeli economy.
Both tasks require urgent and concrete policy changes, beyond a more moderate diplomatic tone.
European governments should not expect a new coalition, or even international sanctions themselves, to bring about these changes automatically. They need to make their expectations explicit, press prospective coalition partners to incorporate concrete commitments into their agreements, and judge the resulting government by its actions.
Without that pressure, politicians who never endorsed annexation may become useful idiots for a project they do not support, helping to consolidate a single undemocratic state in which millions of Palestinians are permanently denied equal rights and freedoms.
Preventing that outcome requires urgent political action, while a different future is still possible. Neither Israelis seeking change nor their European partners can afford to assume it will happen on its own.
The Ukraine battlefield is the hottest part of Russia’s war on the West, but not the only one. The Kremlin is betting that sabotage, intimidation and other sub-threshold attacks will make Ukraine’s allies so distracted, scared and tired that they cut their support to Kyiv. Meanwhile Russia’s political warfare is reaping rewards in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
The Berlin-based, Oxbridge-educated Russia expert unpicks Kremlin influence operations in a dozen-plus countries. Her reporting is meticulous, the descriptions vivid, and the conclusion bleak: Russia is using the West’s own weakness to beat us.
One paradox is globalisation: the West’s main project since the collapse of communism, but which now undermines its sanctions efforts.
‘Eurasian roundabout’
China, North Korea, Iran and other countries in what Notte calls the “Eurasian roundabout” help Russia export and import what it needs to keep its war machine running.
Hard-headed shipping magnates in Dubai will not stop dealing with the “shadow fleet”, any more than Indian energy tycoons will shun cheap oil. It’s just business, they tell her.
But not only that.
Many in the mis-named “Global South” instinctively despise Ukraine as an American proxy. The irony is head-spinning: Ukraine is treated as a pariah for its ties to a supposed patron that has now all but abandoned it.
As well as exploiting anti-Americanism (whatever that means these days) Russia also draws on deep historical sympathies that are all but incomprehensible seen from the former captive nations of Europe.
Many influential Africans, for example, have bitter first-hand or inherited memories of US treatment of their continent in the Cold War, including support for apartheid-era South Africa.
They also have a rose-tinted view of the Soviet Union, which supported their liberation struggle. Some studied there. That Ukraine is the victim of a revanchist imperialist Russia makes no sense to them; interviewed by Notte, they struggle to see it as a real country.
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The US and Israeli-led war with Iran, launched in late February, and other military campaigns in the region have disrupted flights, leaving around 5,500 deportations that would normally receive support from the EU’s border agency Frontex unexecuted.
The disruption comes despite the Warsaw-based agency’s recent announcement that returns rose in the first half of 2026, with Syrians and Iraqis among the 10 nationalities most frequently deported.
Internally, however, Frontex appears concerned.
In July, it highlighted return problems because of the Middle East crisis, a broad swathe of conflicts that has seen various airspace closures over Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Israel, Qatar, Syria, and the UAE.
It said roughly 4,000 returns had not been carried out because of direct cancellations or broader operational standstills, with member states halting the organisation or scheduling of Frontex-supported returns due to the Middle East conflicts.
By 30 September, that figure had climbed to 5,500.
Frontex document WK 9599/2026 INIT, made partially public on 2 July. Cites disruptions due to Middle East conflicts and returns to Syria and Afghanistan (Source: Frontex)
Although now open (as of publication), airspace restrictions, route availability and operational measures may be introduced, amended or lifted rapidly, sometimes with little notice.
European deportation setbacks typically involve everything from fragmented national systems, to people absconding, and to foreign states refusing to accept their own nationals. But war and conflict are now adding another layer of complications.
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The peaceful departure of Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić could open a positive new chapter in Western Balkans history, even as France drifts in the opposite direction.
Vučić acknowledged defeat shortly after 9.30PM on Sunday (25 October), when exit polls put his SNS party on 105 seats in parliament out of 250, behind the reformist Student List movement, led by cardiologist Ilija Srdanović, on 135 to 140, even though the final results were far from clear.
“Serbia is free! People, BRAVO!,” the Student List posted on X.
It had been a tense night in Belgrade, with a heavy police presence in front of government buildings, scuffles at polling stations, and with student and other citizens’ patrol groups monitoring voting, as well as over 300 formal international observers.
MEPs and US senators had also warned Vučić (who had once worked at the top levels of the brutal dictatorship of Slobodan Milošević) on X not to resort to violence to try to steal the vote.
But it seems that the landslide was so huge and the turnout so massive (over 69 percent) that there was nothing to be done.
Serbian nationalism, Western Balkan corruption, and Russian interference will not disappear from the region overnight, but with the nationalist-populist Vučić gone there is more chance of normalisation of Kosovo relations and less risk of a Bosnia break up.
And there is every chance that a positive reform momentum, rewarded by the EU, could spread from Serbia into neighbouring states and help bring more Western Balkan countries into Europe, after Montenegro is due to join in 2027.
It is the fourth defeat in national elections for pro-Russian and/or far-right parties in Europe this year, after Hungary, but also Sweden and Latvia.
And that is a good trend for progressives, in the run-up to the election super-cycle of late 2026/2027, which will see similar battles unfold in Spain, France, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Slovakia, Poland, and Italy in the next 12 months.
“If we have peace, whatever the outcome, it will be beneficial and blessed. If we have unrest, anger, and hatred, whatever the outcome, it will be disastrous for everyone,” said Serb Orthodox Church patriarch Porfirije earlier on Sunday.
Meanwhile, the spectacle of a peaceful, democratic transition of power in Serbia will not be welcomed by Moscow’s authoritarian rulers.
But if it is an example to Russian people, then it is also a powerful, alternative model for any students, leftwing activists, or ethnic minorities in France, Italy, or further afield in Europe, who spent a second weekend rioting in multiple towns in protest at social inequality.
If the far-right was to take power in France in April, spurred on by racial tension and civil unrest, it would quickly wipe out any gains made on Sunday in Serbia, in terms of EU stability, Western Balkans’ enlargement prospects, and Russian influence in Europe.
But if young people in the EU want fairer societies, then the students of Serbia, who began today’s tectonic shift in small protests two years ago in the provincial town of Novi Sad, have shown them that the path to victory lies in non-violent resistance and patience.
Israel’s 27 October election might disappoint everyone. To start, there may be no next-day resolution. Polls show the Netanyahu-allied and opposition blocs nearly tied, both short of a majority.
If that holds, expect weeks of furtive factional negotiations that diminish the reputations of all involved. If those fail, back to the ballot box.
If a new government forms quickly, it will likely be led by Benjamin Netanyahu or the opposition’s Gadi Eisenkot. Most observers outside Israel are hoping for Gadi. In truth, either result will confront Brussels and Washington with tough choices that both have put off too long.
Last week’s grudging and partial White House endorsement notwithstanding, Netanyahu is near-friendless on the international scene.
If he grinds out another win, many European leaders and US presidential contenders will find themselves managing bilateral relationships of mutual contempt.
Unwilling to face hard facts at home, Bibi seemed to think he could gamble them away with Gulf money and American missile interceptors. He marketed himself as the founding entrepreneur of a new-model Middle East powered by Saudi normalisation and Iranian regime change.
Instead, Houthi drones and Saudi budget deficits are vaporising the mirage of glass cities and data centres in the desert.
Trump’s war now
Iran is Trump’s war now, not Israel’s: He will fight or end it as he pleases. What’s left on the IDF’s regional briefing map are small places with complicated pasts and unclear futures, lands that Israel wishes the rest of the world would forget but is itself unwilling to leave.
The old Middle East is back. In truth, it never left.
It has been the beggar at the door of every air-conditioned Gulf investment conference. But the poor relations — Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen — have refused to go quietly.
Israel’s old politics are back, too.
The median Israeli is 29-years old. Netanyahu, whose hair and makeup bills are the subject of a considerable body of investigative journalism, just turned 77. His leading rival Eisenkot, who lost a son and two nephews in Gaza, launched his career as a platoon commander in Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
Israel, like America, is due generational change.
Instead, Israelis (or at least undecided centre-right voters) got a choice of character: the embarrassing, but reassuringly indestructible Bibi, or the earnest but untested Eisenkot.
It’s not just the faces that are familiar. The candidates are still fighting Israel’s culture wars. The debates that dominated the election — ultra-orthodox military enlistment, judicial reform, and the role of religion in the state — are serious. But they’re also stalemated.
Despite deafening recriminations about who is to blame for exposing Israel to Hamas’s 7 October attacks, the debate about security in Gaza and Israel’s north is equally stuck.
Indiscriminate destruction and deliberate destabilisation
Netanyahu promised “total victory”; that turned out to mean indiscriminate destruction and deliberate destabilisation. His opponents claim Netanyahu has squandered the IDF’s achievements. They promise to do what Netanyahu could not, by using the same crude tools to achieve the same poorly defined objectives — but this time, with greater skill.
The question of what that means for ordinary Palestinian civilians, and what future they can expect for their children, has barely been discussed.
Many Israeli voters, desensitised to the situation of Palestinians who are routinely dehumanised by Israel’s domestic press, don’t ask. Most Israeli candidates carefully avoid answering.
Both blocs pledge they’ll refuse to partner with the Arab-Israeli parties that could hold the key to a Knesset majority — even as prominent Arab candidates downplay their support for Palestinian statehood and campaign on more palatable topics like under-policing in Arab communities.
It’s comforting to imagine an Israeli government formed by anyone left of Netanyahu will steer instinctively towards international expectations. But a more centrist Israeli government, like any elected government anywhere, will operate within the political space created by the policy priorities and the empathetic capacity of its voters.
There isn’t much room for Palestinians.
If an opposition-bloc government forms, it will surely ask for time, assuring foreign capitals that the appearance of pressure makes meaningful change harder back home.
European leaders and US Democrats poised to win at least one house of Congress in November may be tempted to pause efforts to compel Israel towards rapid implementation of the international road map in Gaza, an end to ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, and full IDF withdrawal from Lebanon and Syria.
That would be a mistake.
There will be no place in Israeli politics for a realistic discussion of Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria until the foreign partners necessary to Israel’s security and economy insist, soberly and relentlessly, on creating one.
That will require tough new sanctions, not just wordplay. The things that have to be admitted are too hard, and the promises that must be broken are too many, for any Israeli leader to act alone.
Amanda Pilz served for 22 years as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. She is a former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Israeli-Palestinian affairs.
The UN food agency helping Palestinians and others in need across the world has come under scrutiny for its contract with Palantir – the controversial US tech and AI company used by various international border police and militaries to sort data and better identify targets.
The UN’s food agency, the World Food Programme (WFP), prolonged its contract with Palantir in July, prompting civil organisations to urge the end of these agreements in a letter published on Friday (23 October).
Some 3,000 European citizens have written to the WFP’s leadership, calling for the agency to end its Palantir partnership.
The WFP holds one of the biggest biometric databases in the world, with millions of its records containing information about vulnerable populations.
WFP is effectively supporting a company that undermines its own operations in Palestine by helping kill civilians for another client, which is “a very strong contradiction,” Giulio Carini, head of campaigns at an NGO WeMove Europe told EUobserver.
“On one hand, you’re feeding people of Gaza, but then, but on the other, you’re using software from a company whose technology is allegedly also being used to kill them” he added.
As many as 1.1 million people are reached by the WFP in Gaza each month, out of the 1.4 million facing acute food insecurity. The organisation is complaining that it had to scale down its food assistance in Gaza and the West Bank due to a lack of funding.
The WFP has argued that its use of Palantir’s software to compile its datasets and make better decisions has saved them $50m [€45m] that would otherwise be spent on inefficient management of its resources.
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Two leading Jewish groups want the EU’s next antisemitism tsar to also brief diplomats on foreign policy – despite the controversy it caused for the last one, Katharina von Schnurbein.
“EU external decisions have direct consequences for Jews living in Europe. Diplomats should hear from the person who sees those consequences every day,” said Pinchas Goldschmidt, who heads the Conference of European Rabbis (CER) in Munich, Germany.
The European Jewish Congress (EJC) in Brussels also told EUobserver: “The [EU antisemitism] coordinator should ensure that this objective is systematically reflected in all relevant EU policies, including external action and foreign policy.”
They spoke as von Schnurbein prepared to leave her EU post after 10 years to become a German “federal government commissioner for Jewish life in Germany and the fight against antisemitism” on 28 October.
The 53-year-old German baroness was highly active at events in EU capitals, had three staff, and travelled on missions to Israel, Serbia, Switzerland, and the US.
She also worked next door to European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen in her Brussels HQ and had close ties with the Israeli government.
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“The ‘job’ … has been mostly accomplished,” said a senior official in Belgium’s spy service, Hugues Brulin, in a WhatsApp message to the Belgian then EU commissioner, Didier Reynders.
“Bravo for the work you did,” said Reynders.
It was back in 2022, and, at least on the surface, they were chatting about a staff reshuffle inside Belgium’s intelligence service, La Sûreté de l’Etat/Veiligheid van de Staat (VSSE) — which was already a peculiar thing for Brulin to be doing on WhatsApp with an EU official.
But their messages, seen by EUobserver and published in full below, were now also evidence in a Belgian police investigation into Reynders on money-laundering charges, which painted them in the light of a potentially criminal conspiracy.
Brulin’s real “job” had been to stop the VSSE from probing Reynders and his potential Russia links, according to five former and current Belgian intelligence officers who spoke to EUobserver.
And Brulin also WhatsApp-ed Reynders on how to “counterattack” a Russia whistleblower.
The 68-year-old liberal politician from Liège, in French-speaking southern Belgium, had had a glittering career before his sudden fall from grace in December 2024, when Belgian police raided his properties, and before he was subsequently charged in 2025 with having laundered some €1m via the ING Bank, using lottery tickets and cash deposits.
Reynders had been EU justice commissioner from 2019 until 30 November 2024 (just four days prior to the police raid) and Belgium’s foreign and defence minister from 2011 to 2019.
And Belgium had vetted and cleared him to read “top secret” national, EU, and Nato documents.
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