By Kamran Yeganegi | The Cradle | October 3, 2026
Saudi oil tankers are loading again at Yanbu, less than three weeks after drone strikes shut down the East–West Pipeline that supplies the Red Sea port. On 24 September, crude was reported to be flowing west again, although no ship had yet loaded a cargo.
By 29 September, trade sources and shipping data showed that loadings had resumed. The interruption and recovery have offered a costly demonstration of what an oil route around the Strait of Hormuz can, and cannot, do.
Yanbu, Ceyhan and Baniyas sit at three very different points on that spectrum.
Yanbu has a 1,200-kilometer pipeline in operation and an established export terminal. Ceyhan is already loading Iraqi crude, though current Iraqi flows are measured in hundreds of thousands–not millions–of barrels a day. Baniyas could eventually give Iraq a major Mediterranean outlet, but for now it remains a project that depends on new infrastructure and financing, political agreements, and protection across two fragile states.
The comparison begins with the oil that reaches ships during a crisis. Pipeline capacity matters only as much as the pumps, terminals, and security along the route allow.
Yanbu’s exposed lifeline
Saudi Arabia’s 1,200-kilometer East–West Pipeline has a nominal capacity of 7 million barrels per day (bpd). Before the September strikes, reported flows through the system were already below that capacity. Three pumping stations were damaged, and the shutdown halted crude loadings at Yanbu. Riyadh blamed Iraqi resistance factions; the Islamic Resistance in Iraq denied responsibility for the strike. Baghdad condemned the strike and opened an investigation.
Restarting the line on 22 September did not immediately restore exports. Crude had to reach Yanbu and replenish stocks before tankers could load. Two vessels scheduled for 23 September left without cargo, according to shipping data cited by Reuters. Loadings resumed days later, after a strike on pumping stations hundreds of kilometers inland had kept the port idle.
Yanbu was moving between 2 million and 2.65 million bpd when tankers returned. Traders expected flows to rise to 3 million to 4 million bpd, but a return to the pre-attack level of roughly 5.5 million bpd could take another month.
The voyage has become more expensive, too. Quoted war-risk premiums for Saudi-linked tankers calling at Yanbu have risen to around 3 percent of vessel value, up from below 1 percent in early July. For a $100 million tanker carrying two million barrels, a 3 percent premium adds roughly $1.50 to the cost of each barrel, before fuel or freight. Yanbu may bypass Hormuz, but insurers are charging heavily for the detour.
Yanbu still leaves Asia-bound cargoes exposed to the southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. Attacks and warnings by Yemen’s Ansarallah-aligned army have made passage through those waters more costly and uncertain. Heidmar Maritime Holdings chief executive Pankaj Khanna has highlighted another problem for shipowners: the Red Sea lacks the US naval protection sometimes available around Hormuz.
Saudi Arabia has escaped one strait only to send its oil toward another. Cargoes bound for Europe can head north through the Red Sea, but Asian customers require the southern passage. That split limits how freely Riyadh can reroute shipments when risks around Bab al-Mandab rise.
Ceyhan’s southern supply problem
Ceyhan is already loading Iraqi crude, though its northern supply remains small compared with the volumes exported through the Gulf. Flows stood at roughly 200,000 bpd in mid-September, down from about 250,000 bpd before the war. Baghdad’s challenge is getting oil from its vast southern fields into that northern export system.
Iraq has begun moving southern oil north by road. A September trial sent 209 tanker trucks carrying about 38,000 barrels to Kirkuk over two days. Basra Oil Company later said around 250,000 bpd was being transported north for onward export through Ceyhan.
Truck convoys are useful during a crisis, but they cannot replace a high-capacity pipeline. The first trial averaged about 182 barrels per truck. Moving 250,000 barrels at that rate would require roughly 1,370 loaded truck trips, with vehicles returning south for the next run. Road conditions and loading points impose additional constraints. Expanding Ceyhan therefore depends less on the Turkish terminal than on a reliable south-to-north connection within Iraq.
Energy analyst Richard Bronze of Energy Aspects has warned against treating bypass infrastructure as a substitute for Hormuz altogether. “The idea that the strait will stop mattering or become worthless is pure rhetoric,” he told Arab News. For Iraq, the road to Ceyhan provides an outlet. It cannot yet carry southern crude at a scale that would loosen Baghdad’s reliance on the Gulf.
Baniyas across the war map
Baniyas is the most ambitious option because it could reshape Iraq’s export map. Iraq has approved preliminary studies comparing routes including Basra–Haditha–Kirkuk–Ceyhan and Basra–Haditha–Baniyas, with a consortium that includes Chevron, TI Capital, and Qatar’s UCC. Chatham House estimates the wider Iraq–Syria network at around $15 billion, with a proposed initial capacity of roughly 2 million bpd and construction potentially taking about four years.
Syrian officials have given a somewhat shorter timeframe. Syrian Petroleum Company chief Youssef Qablawi said in August that the Haditha–Baniyas project could take around 30 months to three years after final agreements and engineering work. Even the shorter timetable places Baniyas beyond the present shipping crisis, assuming agreements and funding are secured.
The route’s security problem is also more complex than a line drawn on a map. A pipeline from Haditha toward Syria would traverse western Iraq, including areas where ISIS cells remain a concern, before entering eastern Syria, where state authority remains uneven and armed groups continue to operate.
Chatham House noted in September that armed actors, including ISIS, have attacked oil wells and tanker trucks in eastern Syria, while Iraq’s fragmented security system leaves multiple actors capable of obstructing or extracting rents from infrastructure.
Israel’s strikes and military presence in Syria would loom over any pipeline to Baniyas. There is no evidence that Israel plans to attack the project, but a route through Syrian territory would depend on security guarantees Damascus cannot yet provide.
Baniyas itself is more functional than the word “reconstruction” sometimes suggests. Iraqi-origin fuel oil has already been trucked through Syria and handled at the terminal, demonstrating that a commercial logistics chain can operate.
The existing trade gives the project a foothold, but handling trucked fuel oil is far removed from loading 1–2 million bpd of pipeline crude. Storage, pumping systems, berths and terminal reliability would have to be scaled accordingly.
The old Kirkuk–Baniyas line was badly damaged, and the planned network may take a different route. Existing truck traffic therefore offers little indication of the cost or the construction work required to handle sustained crude flows.
Sanctions are another constraint, though less severe than under Bashar al-Assad. The EU lifted its broad economic sanctions on Syria in 2025 while retaining security-based and targeted measures, and the US rescinded Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in August 2026. That lowers, but does not eliminate, banking, insurance, due-diligence and counterparty risk for a multi-billion-dollar project.
Iran’s leverage runs through Iraq
The geopolitical logic behind Iraq’s western routes is often framed as a means to reduce Iranian leverage over Hormuz. Iran’s influence in Iraq also extends through energy trade, political networks, and armed factions embedded in Iraq’s fragmented security order.
At the same time, Tehran does not treat Iraq exactly as it treats other Gulf states. Mostafa Khoshcheshm, a political commentator on Iranian television, told Al Jazeera in August that Iran viewed Iraq as a “friendly state” and had allowed some Iraqi oil tankers to pass Hormuz.
He said Baghdad had “always stood up to the United States.” His view is one Iranian reading of Baghdad’s position. An Iraqi move toward Gulf- and US-backed western export corridors would also alter the economic leverage surrounding it.
An expansion through Baniyas or Ceyhan would give Baghdad more room to negotiate export terms without severing its ties to Iran. Gulf investment would bring new transit partners and sources of capital, though it would not automatically shift Iraq’s political alignment.
The security question cuts both ways. Iran-aligned resistance factions could be a source of vulnerability if they viewed a corridor as threatening their strategic interests. ISIS remnants and local power brokers could also obstruct it, while transit-state disputes might halt flows without an attack. Yanbu’s damaged pumps are a warning about the vulnerability of a land corridor.
Iraq’s other proposed exits face obstacles of their own. Reviving the dormant Iraq Pipeline through Saudi Arabia (IPSA) would require Riyadh’s agreement and extensive repairs. The Basra–Aqaba route would have to be built across western Iraq and Jordan.
Egypt’s SUMED pipeline is already operating, but Baghdad has no direct way to feed Iraqi crude into it. For now, the southern Gulf terminals remain Iraq’s only outlet capable of handling exports at scale.
What reaches the tanker?
As of early October, Yanbu can move the largest potential volume because the pipeline and port already exist, but its 7 million bpd nameplate figure overstates the immediately exportable capacity, while Red Sea shipping costs and the Bab al-Mandab remain concerns.
Ceyhan can now load Iraqi crude, but expansion depends on resolving Iraq’s internal north–south logistics. Baniyas offers the largest geopolitical transformation, but it remains years, billions of dollars, and security agreements away from moving crude at scale.
Hormuz remains central to the region’s oil trade even as states invest in alternatives. Yanbu, Ceyhan and Baniyas each shift some exposure from the strait to pumping stations, desert corridors, insurers or transit governments. Their value will be measured by the barrels reaching ships when the Gulf route is under threat, not by the capacity listed in a project plan.
By Robert Inlakesh | MintPress News | October 2, 2026
Scrambling to halt the ongoing offensive of Yemen’s Armed Forces, Israel and Saudi Arabia have strengthened ties through a joint covert campaign aimed at salvaging what remains of their supremacy in the Red Sea region. Tel Aviv and Riyadh’s losses of key military strongholds in Yemen’s Western coast, has ushered in a new era of soft-normalisation.
Saudi Arabia has carried out hundreds of airstrikes in Yemen, resulting in thousands of casualties since its renewed bombing campaign began this July. It now heavily relies on Israeli targeting intelligence backing in order to conduct dozens of strikes across Yemeni territory on a daily basis, including attacks on civilian market places and residential buildings.
Meanwhile, Israeli officials heaped praise on Riyadh this Wednesday for facilitating the first ever commercial flight between Israel and Saudi, following the Kingdom’s intervention to aid Israeli passengers on-board a Flydubai plane that was forced to undergo an emergency landing.
In contrast, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) initiated the renewal of the Saudi-Yemen war, by bombing the runway of Sana’a International Airport in order to prevent an Iranian civilian jetliner from landing inside the country. This measure was taken to enforce a long-standing aerial blockade on Yemen, while Israeli aircraft freely use Saudi airspace.
Riyadh’s pivot to the Israeli orbit entails a covertly coordinated campaign centered around Yemen, bearing regional consequences – from joint intelligence operations, target bank sharing, direct meetings between officials and a calibrated propaganda campaign.
In early September, Israel’s national broadcaster Kan News reported that Tel Aviv had begun supplying intelligence to aid Saudi Arabia in building up a target bank to strike inside of Yemen. Neither side has any formal diplomatic ties and yet Israel is already aiding Saudi Arabia in the military sphere — a development that would usually be a major regional scandal, yet the primarily Gulf State funded Arabic-language media has all but ignored it.
Come mid-September, only days after the Yemeni Armed Forces had liberated the West Coast of their country from Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) militias, Axios News revealed that US Central Command had organised a private Arab-Israeli military retreat in Germany. At the private retreat, both Israeli and Saudi military officials were able to directly discuss issues concerning Iran and Yemen’s Ansarallah-led government.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently visited Cairo, formally meeting Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi to discuss issues of trade and foreign affairs. On the sidelines of this trip, CENCTOM officials repeatedly presented a proposal to form a regional command structure and coordination mechanism, that would include Israel, in order to properly confront the Ansarallah-led forces in Yemen.
Even more damning is that when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Abu Dhabi on September 27, he didn’t only attend a meeting with Emirati-ruler Mohamed bin Zayed – according to Israeli Channel 14 News, Netanyahu also secretly met with a Saudi delegate.
While analysts argued over whether the recently signed ‘Mecca Pact’ – between Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara – was signalling the beginning of ‘Sunni Muslim NATO’, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has instead drifted towards a covert strategic alliance with Israel instead. Collusion between the two leaderships – which between them rule over all three of the Islamic Holy Sites – has reached historic heights.
Targeting Civilians And Sectarian Propaganda
A notable outcome of Saudi Arabia’s collaboration with Israel, is a marked uptick in the number of reported civilian massacres that have been taking place. The corporate media’s reporting on such attacks have drawn enormous parallels to the way similar strikes were covered in the Gaza Strip.
Take for example a recent strike carried out by Saudi fighter jets in the Taiz governorate, which killed at least seven civilians in a marketplace and destroyed a food storage site. When Reuters reported on the story, they ran with the following headline: “Seven people killed in strike on market in Yemen, Houthi-run health ministry says”
Just as the corporate media labelled Gaza’s Ministry of Health as “Hamas-run”, it uses “Houthi-run” in Yemen as a rhetorical tactic to detract from the veracity of the claim being made. In Gaza, Hamas is indeed the political Party that heads the local government of the territory, technically making this linguistic trick somewhat accurate, despite it being clear cut propaganda. However, in the case of Yemen it isn’t even vaguely accurate, as the political Party that controls the government is called Ansarallah, “the Houthis” are a family from northern Yemen.
Saudi Airstrikes also targeted other civilian locations such as residential buildings in the Mokha Port area, recently taken over by the Ansarallah-led government’s forces, killing at least 6. While US Central Command has been cited as arguing that Tel Aviv’s targeting data provided to Riyadh is essential, there has been no evidence that the intelligence provided has led to any material change on the battlefield.
It is not currently possible to verify whether the civilian infrastructure struck by Saudi Arabia’s airforce were targets located by Israeli intelligence gathering efforts or not, it is clear that Israel’s own strikes on Yemen have killed overwhelmingly civilians.
Both Israel and Saudi Arabia do indeed have shared interests in Yemen. Both seek the overthrow of the nation’s Sana’a based government. The recent capture of the Bab al-Mandab coastline by the Yemeni Armed Forces threatens both Tel Aviv and Riyadh, as they are the only two nations which Sana’a has reason to impose a blockade on.
The Yemeni imposed blockade on Israel, beginning in late 2023, completely bankrupted the southern Israeli Port of Eilat. This measure was taken in support of Gaza and the blockade ended with the implementation of the October 8, 2025 ceasefire. In the case of Saudi Arabia, a blockade has been imposed upon them in the Red Sea as a retaliatory measure against the long-standing Saudi blockade of Yemen.
This has led to a joint Saudi-Israeli propaganda campaign, seeking to depict the Yemeni control over their own territory as a threat to international maritime navigation and trade, something that Yemen’s officials have explicitly denied
A prominent propaganda theme is the weaponisation of religious authorities and the deliberate spread of sectarianism. Take prominent Saudi Islamic Scholar Dr. Abdulaziz Al-Rayez, a man that previously forbade resistance against Israel and condemned the Palestinian armed struggle, urged what he called “Sunni Muslims” to fight the “cursers of the companions [of the Prophet Mohammed]” to “race to the great field of martyrdom” against the Yemeni Armed Forces. Al-Rayez promotes factually inaccurate sectarianism, deeming the Sana’a based government as an evil Shia opposition to a righteous Saudi-backed Sunni force.
Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Saleh bin Fawzan Al-Fawzan also made a rare public statement on the war against Yemen, framing the issue as a religious obligation for Muslims to fight against the Yemeni Armed Forces. Additionally a top Saudi-linked Pakistani cleric, infamous for praising Osama bin Laden as “a Muslim warrior”, deemed Ansarallah to be “terrorists” and claimed that they are not even Muslims.
Across Gulf State owned Arabic-language media there has been a virulently anti-Ansarallah coverage of the war, with various pundits attempting to claim that the Zaydi Muslim sect in Yemen are conspiring with Iran to usher in a Shia Muslim tyranny across West Asia; aimed oppressing the Sunni majority.
While Saudi Arabia conspires alongside Israel to strike targets across Yemen and its officials meet with their Israeli counterparts, a concerted propaganda effort attempts to convince the region’s public that Riyadh is the victim; weaponising sectarianism as a means of distracting from its continued pivot towards the Israeli sphere of influence.
Robert Inlakesh is a political analyst, journalist and documentary filmmaker currently based in London, UK. He has reported from and lived in the occupied Palestinian territories and hosts the show ‘Palestine Files’. Director of ‘Steal of the Century: Trump’s Palestine-Israel Catastrophe’. Follow him on Twitter @falasteen47
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 3, 2026
RT | October 2, 2026
Yemen’s Houthis have denied targeting a power station in the city of Medina. A Saudi-led coalition earlier accused the militant group of targeting the facility supplying power to the Prophet’s Mosque – one of the holiest sites in the Muslim world.
A senior Houthi official branded the accusation a “lie” aimed at tarnishing the group’s image and reinforcing similar claims made by the coalition in the past.
On Thursday, the Saudi coalition’s spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, accused the Yemeni militants of striking the Taibah electricity distribution station in Medina earlier this week in what he called a “cowardly terrorist act” and a part of an alleged broader campaign by the Houthis to “target the Two Holy Mosques.”
In mid-September, Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of launching a drone towards the holy city of Mecca. The unmanned aerial vehicle was intercepted and destroyed, it added. The Yemeni movement’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, dismissed that claim as a “heinous lie” in a televised address at the time, claiming Riyadh was “weaponizing lies” to advance its own agenda.
The developments have sparked concerns in Türkiye and Pakistan, which signed a joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in August. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called any “threat to the sanctity” of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina a “red line that must never be crossed.”
Ankara denounced this week’s alleged Medina attack. “Any attack targeting the sanctity, peace, and security of the Two Holy Mosques is an unacceptable affront directed at the shared sensitivities of the entire Islamic world,” the Turkish government spokesman, Burhanettin Duran, said on X on Friday. He vowed that Türkiye “will continue to stand by Saudi Arabia.”
The developments come amid the continued escalation between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Riyadh has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government against the Houthis since intervening in the country’s civil war in 2015.
Large-scale fighting largely subsided after a UN-brokered truce in 2022, but the conflict erupted again this summer after an airport in the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital of Sanaa was bombed to prevent a returning Houthi delegation that had flown to Iran from landing.
Greece will extend the presence of its air defense battery of Patriot missiles in Saudi Arabia for at least another month, top defense and foreign policy officials agreed on Thursday. In a session chaired by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the Government Council on National Security and Foreign Affairs (KYSEA) took into consideration the increased tension […]
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The U.S. State Department today approved the possible sale of 48 F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The proposed deal, worth an estimated total cost of $24.3 billion, was announced as the Kingdom is in the midst of a fierce fight against the Houthi rebels of Yemen. It marks a major policy shift, with Washington previously being unwilling to export the advanced stealth fighters to Arab states and will likely serve as a reminder at a very challenging time for the Saudis of the unique security capabilities that only the U.S. can provide them.
In addition to the jets, which will be conventional takeoff and landing variants, Saudi Arabia has requested 49 Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines, support and other items.
Despite concerns from Israel that providing Saudi Arabia with the advanced fighters will tip the balance of power in the region, the proposed sale of this equipment and support “will not alter the military balance in the region,” the State Department noted.
The United States has a requirement to maintain Israel’s so-called qualitative military edge, which essentially guarantees that Israel will be prioritized for advanced U.S. weapons ahead of Arab states in the region. Among these advanced weapons, the stealthy F-35 is highly prominent.
You can read our past feature about the wide-ranging impacts of an F-35 sale to Saudi Arabia here.
“This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major non-NATO ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Gulf region,” the State Department wrote. “The proposed sale will improve Saudi Arabia’s capability to deter current and future threats by strengthening its homeland defense, and improving interoperability with U.S. forces, and other regional and NATO forces. The proposed sale will also augment Saudi Arabia’s operational aircraft and enhance its air-to-air, and air-to-ground self-defense capability. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.”
In November, “President Trump approved a major defense sale package, including future F-35 deliveries, which strengthens the U.S. defense industrial base and ensures Saudi Arabia continues to buy American,” according to the White House.
Trump has pushed for closer ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia and wants the Kingdom to join the Abraham Accords initiative. This is a set of agreements that establish normalized diplomatic relations between Israel and different Arab states. Doing so would be a major breakthrough, following the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and others.
A Saudi F-35 deal was also discussed under the Biden administration, as part of a broader deal that sought to normalize the Kingdom’s relations with Israel.
This is a developing story.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
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“What stands in the way becomes the way,” Marcus Aurelius writes in Meditations. Nearly two millennia later, the idea captures Pakistan’s strategic dilemma with remarkable precision. Islamabad must convince Saudi Arabia that its defence commitment carries real weight without being drawn into another Middle Eastern war or rupturing its relationship with Tehran. That obstacle may itself have become Pakistan’s most useful instrument: strategic ambiguity, writes Dimitra Staikou.
On 10 September 2026, following Houthi attacks against Saudi targets, Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Sajjad Haider Khan said there was no discussion of an immediate military response under the new defence agreement. Yet only a day earlier, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif had warned that continued aggression against Saudi Arabia could make the pact operational.
The contradiction may be more calculated than accidental. On 13 September, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif expressed Pakistan’s complete solidarity with Mohammed bin Salman. Two days later, fresh missile and drone attacks against Saudi targets brought the question of collective defence closer to reality. Pakistan is trying to reassure Riyadh that it will not stand alone while avoiding any clear definition of when political solidarity becomes military involvement. At the same time, Islamabad is keeping channels with Tehran open and leaving Saudi Arabia’s adversaries uncertain about where Pakistan’s real red line lies. But September’s events suggest that the space for such ambiguity is narrowing. The central question is no longer whether Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are security partners, but how far Islamabad is actually prepared to go when deterrence is tested.
That question has become more urgent because the relationship has changed institutionally. On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, declaring that an armed attack against any one of the three would be regarded as an attack against all. On 31 August, their foreign and defence ministers and military chiefs met in Istanbul to begin institutionalising the arrangement, agreeing to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and deepen joint defence-industry cooperation, technology development and production. This is therefore more than another declaration of political solidarity. The Makkah Alliance is beginning to acquire the machinery designed to make collective deterrence credible.
The military relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia itself stretches back decades. Pakistani officers have trained Saudi forces, Pakistani troops have periodically been deployed in the Kingdom, and Riyadh has reciprocated with economic and political support. Yet the most important episode for understanding the limits of this relationship came in 2015. When Saudi Arabia assembled its coalition for the intervention in Yemen, Riyadh sought Pakistani military support. On 10 April, Pakistan’s parliament unanimously backed neutrality, effectively rejecting direct participation while pledging to defend Saudi Arabia if its territorial integrity were threatened. The distinction was crucial: Islamabad was prepared to defend the Kingdom, but not automatically to participate in its wars. In 2026, that very red line is being tested.
The Riyadh-Islamabad rapprochement does not mean that Saudi Arabia is abandoning the United States. It does, however, demonstrate that the Kingdom no longer wants its security to depend exclusively on Washington. The limited US response following the attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in 2019, followed by Washington’s 2021 decision to end support for offensive operations in Yemen, had already exposed the limits of American protection. That uncertainty resurfaced this September. Mohammed bin Salman sought military assistance from Donald Trump against the Houthis, but the US president declined to authorise direct American strikes, with Washington instead offering intelligence-sharing and targeting support. On 12 September, Trump said Iran was probably responsible for the attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline and described Mohammed bin Salman as a “good friend”. The United States remains an indispensable Saudi partner, but not always a willing combatant. Pakistan gains importance in precisely this space: not as a replacement for America, but as an additional regional pillar of Saudi security.
If the American position explains why Riyadh is seeking more strategic options, China points towards the direction in which the wider security system may be moving. Beijing is one of Islamabad’s most important strategic and military partners, while simultaneously developing an increasingly close relationship with Saudi Arabia. In April 2026, Xi Jinping told Mohammed bin Salman that China wanted to deepen “mutual strategic trust” with the Kingdom. On 2 September, Xi argued that regional states should work towards “a new security architecture for the Middle East” and hold their future in their own hands. His remarks were not about the Makkah Agreement and should not be interpreted as Chinese endorsement of it. They do, however, reflect a broader shift: a Riyadh seeking greater strategic autonomy, an Islamabad deeply connected to Beijing, and a China seeking a greater role in shaping the regional order. The issue is not a secret trilateral alliance, but the potential convergence of Saudi capital, Pakistani military power and Chinese technological and strategic support.
There is also an unavoidable nuclear dimension. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Saudi Arabia is not a nuclear weapons state. Nothing publicly released about the Makkah Agreement establishes a Pakistani nuclear guarantee to Riyadh, and there is no evidence that Islamabad intends to deploy nuclear weapons on Saudi territory. Yet that absence of clarity is itself strategically significant. Pakistan’s nuclear capability sits behind a collective-defence commitment whose public language does not specify where conventional deterrence ends and strategic deterrence begins. For Iran, Israel, Washington and European capitals, the question is therefore not whether Saudi Arabia has suddenly acquired a Pakistani nuclear umbrella — it has not — but whether potential adversaries may now have to calculate against that possibility in an extreme crisis. Deterrence often depends as much on uncertainty as on declared doctrine.
For Europe, this shift is anything but distant. On 9 September, France expressed full solidarity with Riyadh following the Houthi attacks. In Berlin, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul assured his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan of Germany’s solidarity, while on 11 September the German Foreign Office warned that growing Houthi pressure around Bab al-Mandab could restrict oil and LNG supplies, with consequences for global markets. In Brussels, Kaja Kallas had already put “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea on the European agenda, asking publicly what more Europe could do. These concerns are tangible: energy security, maritime trade routes and regional stability are becoming intertwined in the same crisis. The attacks of 15 September have made the danger even clearer, with renewed strikes against Saudi targets adding to pressure on energy markets and further threatening the routes connecting the Gulf, the Red Sea and Europe.
There is another reason Europe cannot treat the Makkah Alliance as a distant development: Türkiye. Ankara is simultaneously a party to the new collective-defence architecture and a member of NATO. That does not mean the Makkah Agreement automatically engages NATO obligations, nor that the two systems are inherently incompatible. But it does create questions that European allies should address before, rather than during, a major crisis. What happens if Türkiye is asked to participate in collective action under the Makkah Agreement? How would Ankara manage parallel commitments if escalation involved Iran or another regional actor? And how much strategic consultation should occur within NATO before such a scenario materialises?
Brussels cannot afford to wait for the agreement to be activated for the first time before deciding how to respond. Europe needs deeper dialogue with Riyadh and Islamabad on non-proliferation and missile technologies, stronger protection for navigation in the Red Sea and a clear discussion within NATO about Ankara’s new defence commitments. It does not need to treat the emerging security architecture as hostile. But it does need to understand what happens when that architecture moves from declarations to action.
The real test of the Makkah Alliance will come when Riyadh asks Islamabad to demonstrate what it means for an attack on one to be treated as an attack on all. At that moment, the strategic ambiguity that today gives Pakistan room to manoeuvre may become the problem itself. And the question — whether Pakistan is genuinely prepared to fight for Saudi Arabia — will no longer concern Riyadh and Islamabad alone. The answer could reshape the security balance from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea all the way to Europe.
Top Left image: Yemen army – Source, Top Right image Yemen military illustration – Source, Bottom Left image Saudi Mohammed bin Salman with Jeffrey Epstein – source: The Epstein Files, Bottom Right image Saudi Mohammed bin Salman with Donald Trump in the White House – Source.
by Brian Shilhavy
Health Impact News
The Iran War drastically changed at the end of last week, as Yemen’s Ansarullah-led Armed Forces (Houthis) took control of the country’s western coastline, capturing key positions overlooking the Bab al-Mandab Strait, including the coastal city of Mokha and strategic islands in and around the waterway, and they are now effectively controlling traffic in the Red Sea.
As far as I can tell, this was a complete surprise to everyone, especially to Saudi Arabia and the United States.
It forced the U.S. corporate media to report this, and it dominated the news stream until the fake “AI is going to destroy humanity if we don’t do something about it” narrative took control of the news stream this past weekend.
Saudi Arabia, who has been at war with Yemen since 2014 with the help of the U.S. and using U.S. military weapons, was forced to shut down their East-West oil pipeline, which was allowing Saudi Arabia to bypass the Strait of Hormuz to be able to get oil out of their country.
This pipeline in Saudi Arabia reportedly transports about 4% to 5% of the global oil supply.
Saudi Arabia is now in panic mode, and has reportedly pleaded with the U.S. to help them and start bombing the Yemen forces who have taken control of the Red Sea.
However, it appears that Saudi Arabia never got the memo about one of Trump’s objectives in the Iran War, which was to let Iran destroy the Gulf Nations’ ability to control oil prices through OPEC, while at the same time seizing Venezuela oil amid plans to make America the center of oil sales around the world.
Trump’s response to Saudi Arabia: sorry, you’re on your own.
Scoop: MBS urged Trump to strike Houthis amid Red Sea threat
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) called President Trump twice Thursday, urging him to launch strikes against the Houthis as the Iran-backed group closed in on a vital Red Sea chokepoint, two U.S. officials told Axios.
Trump declined, and U.S. officials stressed the administration has no plans to intervene directly against the Houthis for now.
Of course, even if the U.S. did want to stop Yemen’s military and protect Saudi Arabia’s interests, it is doubtful that they would even be able to do so, given the depletion of their weapons and military assets as Iran continues to control the Strait of Hormuz.
This very well could be the demise of Saudi Arabia.
And if the Yemen takeover of the Red Sea turns the tide overall in the war against Iran, what will the Evangelical Christians do who are so positive that this war was sanctioned by God, and was to hasten the return of Jesus Christ?
Could this also be the start of the decline of Christian Zionism as well when they realize that the U.S. cannot defeat Iran and force the return of Jesus Christ after all?
Yemen children in refugee camps. Image source.
While estimates of how many people have died in the Yemen conflict with Saudi Arabia, including children, most of whom have died from starvation due to the U.S.-Saudi blockade on their ports, varies, the number is significant, and probably rivals the number of people killed among the Israeli Palestinians, as well as the number of dead Lebanese people killed by the U.S. and Israel.
This was published in 2018, and the situation is obviously far worse today.
YEMEN: 85,000 CHILDREN MAY HAVE DIED FROM STARVATION SINCE START OF WAR
Using data compiled by the UN, Save the Children evaluated mortality rates for untreated cases of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) in children under five years. Using a conservative estimate, the humanitarian aid agency discovered that approximately 84,701 children with SAM may have died between April 2015 and October 2018.[i]
After almost four years since the brutal conflict in Yemen escalated the UN says that up to 14 million people are at risk of famine. That number has increased dramatically since the Saudi and Emirati-led coalition imposed a month-long blockade of Yemen just over a year ago.[ii]
Since then, commercial imports of food through Hodeidah port have reduced by more than 55,000 metric tonnes a month. That’s enough to meet the needs of 4.4 million people, including 2.2 million children[iii]. Any further decline in imports could likely lead directly to famine.
Barak Obama with Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia in 2016. Source.
Like so many other stories of unrest in the Middle East, the one in Yemen follows an all-too-familiar path that I am sure ultimately leads back to the U.S. and the “intelligence” agencies like the CIA and Mossad who control world politics ensuring that candidates friendly to the Zionist Epstein agenda rise to power.
The rationale, as it has been used so many times, was to overthrow “dictatorships” and alleged “ruthless” rulers who had ruled for long period of times and replace them with “pro-democracy” leaders, and always ending in disaster for the local populations.
It was this same rationale that took down leaders such as Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and even more recently Bashar al-Assad in Syria, all of whom were replaced by pro-Western leaders aligned with the U.S. (and by proxy, Israel).
What most Americans do not realize, is that while these “ruthless dictators” were portrayed as evil by the U.S., they were very popular in their own countries, and most of them were even elected in landslides, while the U.S. declared those elections “rigged.”
Imagine the U.S. with their highly ethical election system (sarcasm) dictating to foreign governments whether their elections were “fair” or not.
During the “Arab Spring” in 2012, Ali Abdullah Saleh, the first elected president of the Republic of Yemen, suffered the same fate, and was forced from office and replaced with the pro-U.S. candidate Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.
When the Houthis struck back at the U.S. puppet regime, the U.S. had no problems with uniting with local groups in the area opposed to the Houthis, but had officially been branded as “terrorist” groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda.
It is very similar to what recently happened in Syria, where a former member of al-Qaeda, the group who allegedly bombed the World Trade Center towers in New York under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, was chosen by the U.S. to lead Syria today, Ahmed al-Sharaa.
But these factions in Yemen were not strong enough to fight back against the Houthis, so starting with President Obama, the U.S. got involved to prop up their puppet government in Yemen.
One for all, and all for one: The U.S. Uniparty political system. Image source New York Times.
The country of Yemen has the unique distinction of being the first country where U.S. citizens were executed by drone strikes by their own government, with no judge, jury, or trial.
President Barak Obama was the first U.S. President known to authorize a drone strike on a U.S. citizen, Abdulrahman Anwar al-Awlaki, a 16-year-old boy who was in Yemen and whose father was linked to al-Qaeda.
This was headline news back in the day.
Nawar al-Awlaki, eight-year-old American girl executed by a drone strike in Yemen ordered by President Trump. Image source.
When Trump succeeded Obama and took office in 2017, he proceeded to do the same thing, by ordering a drone strike in Yemen that killed Nawar al-Awlaki, an eight-year-old American girl and the daughter of Anwar al-Awlaki. The 16-year-old U.S. citizen killed by Obama was her brother. (Source.)
Since I lived in Saudi Arabia for several years and was a professor at one of their top universities back in the 1990s, I will offer my own opinion on the current leader of Saudi Arabia, which you will be hard-pressed to find from any other western journalist, the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS).
MBS was quite young when he came into power, and he reportedly earned a law degree from King Saud University in Riyadh, allegedly finishing second in his class.
I have heard Muslim commentators mention that due to his being educated in Saudi Arabia, rather than going to a Western university, that MBS was better suited and trained to rule Saudi Arabia and not as prone to Western influence.
I strongly disagree.
Back in the day when I was teaching English at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, located in Dhahran, right next to the Aramco oil compound, it was well-known among the faculty back then that if any member of the Al-Saud family came to study at the University and had to complete their first year learning English, that they had basically flunked the English test needed to attend one of the top universities in the U.S. or the UK.
They were not among the “cream of the crop” among Saudi high school students. We had one or two come through during my tenure there, and they were mostly viewed as seeing themselves as “privileged” due to being part of the Al-Saud family, and not very good students at all, preferring instead to go out partying in the desert with their expensive Range Rovers.
So when I read that MBS graduated “second” in his class, I wondered why he did not graduate first, being a member of the Royal family. My best guess is that someone in the Al-Saud family higher up the ladder must have beat him out at the time.
But the true intellectuals and leaders among Saudis probably all graduated from Ivy League schools in the U.S., or from the top universities in the UK.
And of course, MBS is clearly a puppet who has served, first Obama, and now most recently has served as Trump’s lap dog, in my opinion.
So he is hardly against Western culture, even though he was educated in Saudi Arabia.
His rise in power within the Al-Saud dynasty coincided with Donald Trump’s first term (coincidence?).
Mohammed was appointed crown prince on 21 June 2017, following the King’s decision to depose Muhammad bin Nayef and make his own son the heir to the throne.
On the day bin Salman became crown prince, US president Donald Trump called to congratulate him.
Trump and Mohammed pledged “close cooperation” on security and economic issues and discussed the need to cut off support for terrorism, the diplomatic dispute with Qatar, and the push for peace between Israel and the Palestinians.
Mohammed told The Washington Post in April 2017 that without America’s cultural influence on Saudi Arabia, “we would have ended up like North Korea.”
In May 2017, Mohammed launched a purge against competing Saudi business and political elites in an anti-corruption campaign.
On 4 November 2017, the Saudi press announced the arrest of the Saudi prince and billionaire Al-Waleed bin Talal, a frequent English-language news commentator and a major shareholder in Citi, News Corp and Twitter, as well as over 40 princes and government ministers on corruption and money laundering charges.
Others arrested or fired in the purge included Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah, head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard; Minister of Economy and Planning Adel Fakeih; and the commander of the Royal Saudi Navy, Admiral Abdullah bin Sultan bin Mohammed Al-Sultan.
Those arrested in the Ritz Carlton were the subject of what became called “the night of beating”. Most were beaten, and some were tied to walls in stress positions as part of torture by Saudi agents.
The detainees were threatened with blackmail.
Detainees were denied sleep, had their heads covered, and were beaten.[50] Seventeen had to be hospitalised.[50] After many days, the remaining detainees were moved to Al-Ha’ir Prison, while some released are banned from travelling abroad.
The purge helped centralise political powers in the hands of bin Salman and undermine the pre-existing structure of consensus-based governance among Saudi elites.
The arrests resulted in the final sidelining of the faction of King Abdullah, and bin Salman’s consolidation of control of all three branches of the security forces. It also cemented bin Salman’s supremacy over business elites in Saudi Arabia and resulted in a mass seizure of assets by the bin Salman regime.
Trump expressed support for the move, tweeting
“Some of those they are harshly treating have been ‘milking’ their country for years!“
Trump seemingly worked hard in an effort to turn MBS into a full-fledged Zionist and support Israel, but MBS stated that if he did not support the Palestinian right to have their own homeland, his own people would stone him to death.
In 2018, (MBS) voiced his support for a Jewish homeland of Israel, the first time that a senior Saudi royal has expressed such sentiments publicly.
In 2020, Mohammed met with Netanyahu and Israeli head of the Mossad Yosi Cohen in Neom. The United States had been pushing for Israel’s normalisation for some years, calling (in this context) the Abraham Accords the “deal of the century”, but Riyadh rejected reports of progress.
In 2023, there were ongoing U.S. lead negotiations to establish diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Mohammed also said that his country was moving steadily closer to normalising relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords.
Amid the Gaza war, according to reporting by The Atlantic, Mohammed told U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in January 2024 that he was open to Saudi normalisation with Israel, adding,
“Do I care personally about the Palestinian issue? I don’t, but my people do.”
Surveys in the early stages of the Gaza war showed that over 90 percent of Saudis citizens believed that the Arab states should break off their relations with Israel.
In August 2024, Mohammad discussed his fears of facing assassination due to his support for establishing and normalising Saudi-Israel ties, and the threats he received. He believed for any deal, it was important to include a true path to the State of Palestine.
As I reported back in June of 2024, Saudi Arabia made the historical move to not renew an 80-year-old agreement with the United States that established the U.S. Dollar as the world currency to purchase Saudi oil, in return for U.S. military protection.
They saw the handwriting on the wall, apparently, and wanted to be able to sell oil to China in their own currency, the Yuan. See:
This, more than anything, could be the primary reason why the U.S. will not participate in helping them fight back against the Houthis anymore.
And one of the biggest reasons why I believe that MBS may not survive much longer, is because Saudi Arabia has taken most of their $billions made from oil profits during the past few years and invested it in AI technology, in what will probably be the largest financial bubble to burst in the history of the modern era.
We could very well be watching the last stages of the Epstein financial empire crumbling right before our eyes.
This article was written by Human Superior Intelligence (HSI)
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The post The Demise of Saudi Arabia, and Perhaps Christian Zionism? Yemen Shocks the World by Taking Control of the Red Sea first appeared on Health Impact News.
Debris from a Chinese-made ballistic missile found in Yemen could have inadvertently revealed a previously undisclosed addition to Saudi Arabia’s secretive ballistic missile arsenal. Imagery circulating online appears to show the wreckage of a Chinese DF-15A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), potentially marking the first known Saudi combat use of a weapon in this class, although both the identification and ownership remain unconfirmed.
The booster stage of a Chinese-made DF-15A (Dong Feng-15A) ballistic missile operated by Saudi Arabia fell in Raghwan District, Marib Governorate, northern Yemen. pic.twitter.com/dfSXMOiCzQ
— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) September 14, 2026
It is also unclear what happened to the missile itself. The debris suggests a stage separation or the missile broke apart or crashed before reaching its target. The Houthis are not known to possess any weapons that could have intercepted it.
The development comes amid a sharp escalation in the long-running Saudi-Houthi conflict. After years of relative de-escalation following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks as Houthi forces have dramatically overrun Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around strategically important Marib and Taiz. The Houthis have also escalated missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while threatening the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The group has declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, adding a direct threat to one of Riyadh’s critical energy-export routes.
You can catch up with our latest coverage of the fighting here.
As for the DF-15, also known by its NATO designation CSS-6, this is a road-mobile, solid-fueled SRBM developed by China during the 1980s. The system formed part of Beijing’s effort to develop a new generation of conventionally armed mobile ballistic missiles, including systems primarily intended for export.
العثور على بقايا صاروخ صيني من طراز DF-15A في اليمن. pic.twitter.com/af9mGNNxiA
— إيران بالعربية (@iraninarabic_ir) September 14, 2026
As you can read about here, the DF-15 family has evolved through several variants, although open-source information concerning their capabilities remains inconsistent.
The DF-15A reportedly entered Chinese service in the mid-1990s. Estimates of these missiles’ maximum range vary substantially, from roughly 600 kilometers (373 miles) for the original DF-15 to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles) for later versions.
China is the only confirmed operator of the DF-15 family. There have been longstanding reports of Chinese transfers of the DF-15 or the related M-9 export version to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, but in each case, the export record is heavily disputed, with some reports likely conflating the DF-15 with the broadly similar DF-11.
While Saudi Arabia has never publicly acknowledged operating the DF-15 family, it has a well-established history of acquiring Chinese ballistic missiles.
In 2013, Prince Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed, Deputy Minister of Defense, visited the Strategic Missile Forces of Saudi Arabia, and was given this model. YEARS of speculation on the smaller missiles (The large is DF-3). Now we know – they are DF-15 and DF-15A. pic.twitter.com/oOn8qiCgye
— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 14, 2026
Saudi Arabia imported Chinese ballistic missiles to expand its long-range strike options. Its desire for a land-based strategic deterrent was initially driven by concerns over Iran, regional missile proliferation, and nuclear hedging. More recently, however, it shifted toward fielding more accurate, mobile systems with greater conventional military utility.
Riyadh secretly obtained DF-3A missiles from China beginning in the late 1980s, establishing a strategic ballistic-missile capability that remained largely outside public view.
The kingdom has also subsequently been linked to the DF-21 family. Satellite imagery and other open-source intelligence have provided evidence of Chinese-designed ballistic-missile infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.
While the Houthis have their own ballistic-missile arsenal, this is principally associated with Iranian technology, captured Yemeni systems, and locally produced or modified weapons.
Saudi employment of an SRBM in the current fighting would represent a notable expansion of the kingdom’s response options. If Saudi Arabia did indeed do this, its main advantage would be speed and responsiveness. A solid-fueled ballistic missile could reach targets deep inside Yemen within minutes while keeping Saudi aircraft and crews out of the immediate engagement area, providing Riyadh with a rapid strike option against fixed Houthi targets. That could be particularly valuable as the conflict expands and Saudi forces face pressure to respond quickly to Houthi attacks on military and energy infrastructure.
Previous losses at the hands of Houthi ground-based air defenses could also dissuade Riyadh from relying on crewed aircraft to strike targets on the ground deep inside Yemen. Houthi air defenses, while pathed together in many ways, are capable enough to give even U.S. airpower a serious run for their money.
At the same time, a conventional SRBM like the DF-15A can deliver a large warhead at very high speed, imparting significant kinetic energy, making it particularly useful against fixed, high-value, or hardened targets.
Use of an SRBM would also be in line with the current pattern of escalation, with the Houthis conducting missile and drone attacks against Saudi military and energy targets while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are engaged in renewed ground fighting. Riyadh’s demonstration of an SRBM capability in this campaign would also signal that it is is willing to draw more heavily on its strategic missile inventory as the conflict intensifies, potentially further raising the stakes of the confrontation.
Such a move would carry a message beyond Yemen. Using a previously unacknowledged ballistic missile capability in combat would signal to Iran that Riyadh is now willing to employ this arsenal, after decades of keeping it very much in the shadows.
If the evidence ultimately points to a Saudi DF-15A launch, the discovery would offer a rare look at the operational use of an extremely secretive part of the kingdom’s arsenal, and add a significant new dimension to the rapidly escalating Saudi-Houthi war.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Saudi Arabia Appears To Have Used Its Secretive Stash Of Ballistic Missiles For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.
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