President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has placed an important qualification on Donald Trump’s proposed energy ceasefire: Ukraine will stop attacking Russian energy facilities only if Moscow stops targeting Ukraine’s electricity generation and distribution infrastructure. Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on Monday, 12 October, Zelenskyy confirmed Kyiv’s willingness to accept a reciprocal arrangement while pointing out that Russian attacks had continued after the American president announced that a ceasefire was already in effect.
The sequence of events has exposed a fundamental weakness in Washington’s initiative. On 11 October, Trump announced an immediate energy ceasefire, declaring that Russia and Ukraine had both agreed to suspend attacks on energy infrastructure. Yet Kyiv had not received the agreement’s terms, Moscow had offered no public confirmation, and Russian drones continued striking Ukrainian power facilities, including a combined heat and power plant in Kharkiv.
Zelenskyy’s response was deliberately restrained. Rather than reject Trump’s initiative, he welcomed the possibility of an agreement while insisting that Russia demonstrate its acceptance through its actions. His remarks also exposed the difference between announcing a diplomatic understanding and establishing an enforceable military arrangement.
The apparent symmetry of an agreement prohibiting attacks on energy facilities disguises substantial differences between the two countries.
Russia retains an extensive oil-refining industry, producing fuels for domestic consumption, military operations and export. Ukrainian drone attacks on refineries have consequently become an instrument of economic warfare, disrupting production, increasing operating costs and forcing Moscow to divert resources towards protecting strategically important industrial installations.
Ukraine occupies a different position. Its major oil-refining capacity was devastated early in the full-scale invasion, including the Kremenchuk refinery. Russia’s present campaign is concentrated heavily on electricity generation, substations, heating systems and other installations essential to maintaining civilian life and economic activity.
An agreement narrowly focused on oil refineries would therefore protect an important Russian asset while offering Ukraine comparatively little protection. A comprehensive energy ceasefire could be reciprocal, but only if it explicitly covered the infrastructure each side actually possesses and attacks.
Zelenskyy’s insistence on equivalent obligations is consequently more than a negotiating formula. It seeks to prevent Washington from treating attacks on Russian fuel production and the destruction of Ukraine’s electricity and heating networks as interchangeable military activities without examining their respective consequences.
The distinction becomes particularly consequential with winter approaching. A Ukrainian suspension of attacks on Russian refineries could allow Moscow to restore production and rebuild damaged facilities. Unless Russia simultaneously halted attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, Kyiv would surrender an important means of pressure while remaining exposed to further disruption of electricity and heating supplies.
The concern in Kyiv is no longer confined to the proposed ceasefire’s wording. European officials have disclosed that Washington is threatening to restrict military assistance and intelligence sharing unless Ukraine suspends its strikes against Russian refineries.
According to accounts of the American pressure campaign, the threatened measures include suspending the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), the NATO-coordinated mechanism through which European countries finance purchases of American weapons for Ukraine. Reuters was unable to independently verify the reported threats, and the White House had not responded publicly.
If implemented, such restrictions would establish a direct connection between Ukraine’s willingness to accommodate Washington’s energy priorities and its access to essential military support.
This creates an imbalance in the negotiations. Moscow could continue military operations while Kyiv faced the possibility of losing American assistance for refusing an agreement whose Russian obligations remain undefined.
The ceasefire proposal also needs to be examined alongside Trump’s separate agreement with Putin, announced on 9 October, to increase Russian diesel supplies.
Trump stated that Russia would initially release more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel, followed by another 500,000 tonnes in November and one million tonnes thereafter. Further supplies were envisaged, depending on Russia’s refining capacity.
The US Treasury subsequently issued General Licence 135, authorising transactions involving Russian-origin diesel that would otherwise face sanctions restrictions.
The initial volumes are unlikely to transform international diesel markets. Nevertheless, the agreement gives Washington a commercial interest in maintaining Russian refinery output at precisely the moment Ukrainian attacks are disrupting it.
Trump has an evident domestic incentive to seek lower fuel prices before the American congressional elections on 3 November. Putin, meanwhile, has an interest in preserving Russia’s refining capacity and reopening sanctioned markets.
These interests need not prove the existence of a coordinated political strategy against Kyiv. They do, however, create conditions in which American economic priorities and Russian military objectives could converge.
The possibility becomes more significant when considered alongside Trump’s public criticism of Zelenskyy and his suggestion that Ukraine requires different leadership.
The most consequential scenario is one in which Washington demands immediate Ukrainian compliance while leaving Russia’s obligations subject to subsequent negotiation.
If Kyiv suspends refinery attacks without obtaining verifiable Russian commitments, Moscow gains relief from a costly Ukrainian campaign. If Kyiv refuses, Washington could present that refusal as an obstacle to peace and use it to justify restrictions on military assistance.
This is a possible negotiating outcome, not an established secret agreement between Trump and Putin. There is no publicly verified evidence that the two presidents arranged the ceasefire specifically to force Ukraine into such a position.
Nevertheless, the combination of the diesel agreement, American pressure over refinery strikes and the premature announcement of a ceasefire creates a credible risk that Ukraine could be required to make concessions before Russia demonstrates any corresponding restraint.
The implications extend beyond Ukraine. European governments financing American weapons through PURL would find their own assistance programmes vulnerable to Washington’s decisions over an energy arrangement negotiated separately with Moscow.
For Brussels, the immediate question is therefore whether European military support can remain dependable if American commercial interests increasingly influence the conditions attached to supplying Ukraine.
Ukraine’s attacks on Russian refineries cannot by themselves compel Moscow to end the war. They can, however, impose material economic costs and complicate Russia’s ability to maintain fuel production, exports and military logistics.
Abandoning those attacks without an enforceable agreement would remove pressure from Moscow without ensuring that Ukrainian civilians receive any corresponding protection.
Zelenskyy’s position preserves an alternative: simultaneous, reciprocal restrictions covering electricity generation, heating installations, oil refineries and other specified energy infrastructure, supported by clear verification procedures and consequences for violations.
Whether Washington is prepared to enforce such an arrangement against Russia remains unanswered.
The central danger for Kyiv is not an energy ceasefire itself. It is an arrangement in which Ukraine’s obligations are immediate and enforceable through the threat of lost American support, while Russia’s obligations remain uncertain.
Until that imbalance is resolved, Trump’s initiative risks delivering Moscow protection for its oil industry without securing protection for Ukraine’s energy system.
President Donald Trump’s announcement of an immediate ceasefire covering Russian and Ukrainian energy infrastructure was overtaken by events on Sunday evening when Russian forces struck a major thermal power station in Kharkiv. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed Ukraine’s willingness to suspend attacks on Russian energy facilities, but said Moscow was continuing its bombardment even as Washington presented the arrangement as an accomplished diplomatic breakthrough.
The contradiction emerged within hours of Trump declaring that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to stop targeting each other’s energy infrastructure. Zelenskyy, responding in his evening address on 11 October, welcomed the proposal but reported that Russian attack drones remained active over Ukrainian territory and that Kharkiv’s CHP-5 thermal power station had just been struck.
The Ukrainian president made clear that Kyiv had not rejected the American initiative. Ukraine was prepared to refrain from attacking Russian energy installations and expected Moscow to accept the same restrictions. However, no corresponding commitment had been publicly confirmed by the Kremlin, and Washington had provided no explanation of how the supposed ceasefire would be implemented.
The timing was particularly significant because Ukraine had apparently not been informed that a binding agreement had been concluded. According to accounts of the announcement, Zelenskyy was unaware of Trump’s declaration before it became public, although he subsequently indicated his readiness to support the initiative.
His response therefore amounted to an acceptance of the proposed terms rather than confirmation that a negotiated ceasefire was already in force.
The reported strike on Kharkiv came at the end of a particularly destructive week for Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Zelenskyy said Russian forces had carried out more than 200 attacks against electricity generation and transmission facilities over seven days, alongside 17 strikes targeting gas and oil installations.
He also reported that more than 150 Ukrainians had been killed and over 700 wounded during the week. These figures, supplied by the Ukrainian authorities, have not been independently verified.
The continuing bombardment places additional pressure on Ukraine’s power network as winter approaches. Thermal power stations and substations remain particularly vulnerable, while damage to generating capacity can disrupt electricity, heating and water supplies across entire urban districts.
Trump’s ceasefire announcement follows an increasingly bitter dispute over Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries, which have damaged Moscow’s fuel production and distribution infrastructure.
The American president has blamed Ukrainian strikes for worsening international diesel shortages and rising fuel prices. His administration has also threatened restrictions on military assistance and intelligence sharing if Kyiv refuses to suspend its campaign against Russian refineries.
Meanwhile, Washington has reached an arrangement with Moscow permitting substantial Russian diesel exports under a temporary easing of sanctions. Zelenskyy has criticised the decision, arguing that additional energy revenues could strengthen Russia’s capacity to continue its invasion.
For Ukraine, refinery attacks have become an important means of disrupting Russian military logistics and imposing economic costs on Moscow. Agreeing to suspend them without guarantees that Russian strikes will also cease would remove one of Kyiv’s principal instruments of pressure.
The diplomatic sequence has consequently raised questions about whether Trump’s initiative offers equivalent obligations to both countries, or primarily serves Washington’s immediate objective of stabilising fuel supplies.
By Sunday evening, Moscow had issued no public confirmation that Putin had accepted the arrangement. Washington had provided no details of its duration, the installations covered or any mechanism for verifying compliance.
An agreement confined to energy infrastructure would also leave both armies free to continue other military operations, including attacks on cities, industrial installations and military positions.
Zelenskyy said Ukrainian forces had received the necessary orders, while Kyiv awaited clarification of Washington’s discussions with Moscow. He maintained that Ukraine supported credible measures to end the fighting but expected Russia to demonstrate a corresponding commitment.
The immediate question is whether Trump obtained an undertaking from Putin that Moscow is prepared to honour. Until Russia confirms the terms and its attacks cease, the announced energy truce remains a presidential declaration rather than an established cessation of hostilities.
With a month still to go before America’s mid-term congressional and gubernatorial elections, the prospect of a “blue wave” of Democratic success in the House of Representatives, the Senate and in many governorships is looking increasingly likely. But whether that forecast holds true or not, one important aspect has already become clear. It is that […]
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The U.S. government set off conventional explosives inside a tunnel deep in the Nevada desert this week in a test designed to replicate a so-called “decoupled” nuclear detonation. Data collected is now being used to help improve methods for detecting this kind of nuclear testing. Just earlier this year, American authorities accused China of using decoupling to conceal new nuclear tests despite the country’s stated moratorium on such activities.
The test, which involved the use of chemical high-explosives and radiotracers, was conducted yesterday inside P Tunnel in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSA), according to a press release from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSS, which is situated within the boundaries of the U.S. Air Force’s Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), is used for a wide variety of testing purposes today. An agency under the Department of Energy, NNSA’s main jobs are to oversee the development and production of nuclear weapons, as well as manage America’s nuclear deterrent stockpile.
“This experiment is especially focused on further enhancing the U.S. capabilities to detect a ‘decoupled’ explosion,” per NNSA’s release. “Data collected from the experiment will be used to validate scientific models and refine algorithms that are critical to U.S. nuclear explosion detection efforts.”
“Just as a stealth aircraft looks smaller on radar, decoupling can greatly muffle the signals detected by nuclear detection sensors, making a large explosion appear smaller,” the release explains. “In a conventional, or ‘coupled,’ underground nuclear test, a device is placed deep in a hole in close contact with the rock, allowing much of the explosion’s shockwave to reach sensors. In a decoupled test, by contrast, the device is detonated inside a large underground chamber, substantially reducing the explosion’s seismic signature.”
“In this experiment, researchers gathered measurements using a broad suite of advanced sensors, including accelerometers, seismometers, infrasound sensors, electromagnetic sensors, chemical and radiotracer samplers, and meteorological sensors,” it adds. ”Together, these measurements will improve scientists’ understanding of the signatures produced by underground explosions and strengthen the United States’ ability to detect and characterize nuclear explosive events.”
The U.S. already maintains a U.S. Atomic Energy Detection Systems (USAEDS) network, which is overseen by the U.S. Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC). USAEDS is made up of more than 3,600 sensors positioned around the world. USAEDS is also tied in with the International Monitoring System (IMS), which is managed by the organization responsible for overseeing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). AFTAC also supports the mission to monitor for potential nuclear testing globally using a fleet of specially configured WC-135R Constant Phoenix aircraft. In addition, those planes are used to help keep watch for unusual spikes in atmospheric radiation that could point to nuclear or radiological accidents or other incidents leading to the spread of potentially dangerous radioactive material.
With regard to the USAEDS network specifically, “once a disturbance is detected underground, underwater, in the atmosphere or in space, the event is analyzed for nuclear identification, and the findings are reported to command authorities,” according to AFTAC’s website.
As mentioned, the U.S. government has accused its Chinese counterparts of using decoupling to conceal new nuclear testing, and NNSA’s press release draws explicit attention to these allegations. At the annual Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, in February, Thomas DiNanno, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said that China had conducted at least one such test at Lop Nur on June 22, 2020. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) subsequently said the IMS had not detected an event matching that description at that location on that date. For its part, the Chinese government has denied the accusation.
The social media posts below include satellite imagery showing activity at Lop Nur that could point to new nuclear testing activities in recent years.
参考
— KAROTASU (@type36512) May 24, 2026
Satellite Imagery Analysis of China’s Alleged 2020 Nuclear Test at Lop Nurhttps://t.co/aafvU5Szh7
CSIS 20260213
ROLES SAT ANALYSIS No.7 中国に核実験実施の動き ー Lop Nur核実験場の画像分析 ーhttps://t.co/n66yYk0hLg
ROLES 20250522
While China is a signatory to the CTBT, the country has never ratified it. The Chinese government last acknowledged a critical-level nuclear test in 1996, after which a self-imposed moratorium was put in place, at least publicly. As an aside, the United States has also signed, but never ratified, the CTBT, and has a similar self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992. It is worth noting that the treaty does not ban so-called sub-critical testing, which involves fissile material, but does not result in a full-fledged nuclear reaction.
Last week, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration has been holding new talks with the Chinese government regarding various aspects of the country’s massively and rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, including the testing allegations. That story immediately preceded a state visit by China’s President Xi Jinping to Washington, D.C., to meet with Trump.
“The discussions between American and Chinese officials have centered on measures to reduce nuclear risks and haven’t been aimed at negotiating a formal arms-control pact, an effort Beijing has sharply rebuffed in the past,” according to that report. “The Trump administration has begun to highlight the possibility of implementing new verification measures.”
“Independent experts say seismic instruments might be placed on or near test sites,” The Journal‘s story also noted. “Another possibility, which was floated during the Biden administration, is to install radiation-detection equipment at test sites.”
NNSA’s announcement about the test at the Nevada National Security Site is certainly an example of the development underway already of new means of verification that could be deployed at sites around the world.
The United States has separately accused Russia of conducting lower-yield nuclear testing in secret in the past. Russia is a signatory to the CTBT and had previously ratified it. In 2023, President Vladimir Putin revoked that ratification in line with the provisions of a law passed by the country’s parliament, or Duma.
President Trump has also floated the idea of the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing in response to Russian and Chinese activities, though other U.S. officials have downplayed the possibility of doing so. The United States is otherwise in the midst of a huge nuclear modernization effort that impacts the air, sea, and land-based legs of the deterrent triad. American authorities are also now pursuing these efforts in an environment fully unbounded by relevant arms control agreements following the sunset of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) earlier this year.
The Russian government has said it is ready to conduct new nuclear tests if the United States pursues this course of action. The last official nuclear test in Russia came in 1990 right before the fall of the Soviet Union.
“It takes nuclear expertise to detect nuclear activities and experiments like these [to] ensure America remains unmatched in detection,” NNSA Administrator Brandon Williams said in a statement yesterday in light of the test in Nevada. “The Trump Administration has made it clear that the United States will lead from a position of strength. You cannot evade American innovation. With this experiment, we are sending a clear message: under this administration, America will never be outmatched.”
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
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The European Parliament has backed calls for an EU-wide strategy to tackle worsening shortages of healthcare professionals, including an ambition to increase the health workforce by one million, as doctors, nurses, pharmacists and dentists urged the European Commission to turn the recommendations into concrete action.
The own-initiative report, led by MEPs Loucas Fourlas (EPP, Cyprus) and Ruggero Razza (ECR, Italy), warns that shortages of doctors, nurses, carers and other professionals are becoming structural, driven by ageing populations, rising demand for care and persistent burnout...
The European Commission wants to cut the EU’s public procurement rulebook from around 900 pages to 200, in a sweeping reform that aims to simplify tendering while giving governments greater scope to favour European economic and security interests, writes Catherine Feore.
Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné held up the existing body of rules alongside its much slimmer replacement, to illustrate his point.
“These here are the European rules which currently govern public procurement in Europe: 900 pages,” he said. “And this is what we are proposing today… down to 200 pages.”
The proposed Public Procurement Act would replace three EU procurement directives with a single regulation, with a view to simplifying procurement provisions spread across 26 sectoral laws and cutting the number of procedures from five to three.
The Commission estimates the changes could save businesses and public authorities €650 million a year in administrative costs.
The reform matters because of Europe’s massive purchasing power involved. EU public procurement exceeds €2.5 trillion annually, around 15% of EU GDP, covering everything from trains and hospitals to energy infrastructure, schools and IT systems.
From lowest price to strategic purchasing
The proposal is not just about cutting red tape. Brussels wants governments to use their purchasing power more strategically.
The Best Price-Quality Ratio would become the standard method for awarding contracts, with quality normally accounting for at least 30% of the assessment and 50% for labour-intensive contracts. Authorities could consider environmental and social performance, innovation, security and resilience alongside price.
The commitment to a so-called European preference has been tempered by the EU’s international commitments, but access can be restricted when a country doesn’t reciprocate market access. Restrictions could also be imposed where reliance on foreign suppliers creates security-of-supply dependencies or threatens EU economic security.
“European public money should, wherever possible, create jobs, investment and opportunities in Europe rather than filling the order books of our competitors,” Séjourné said.
Five procurement procedures would become three: open, dynamic and innovation procedures. Each would allow negotiation between buyers and bidders.
The Commission also plans an integrated EU digital procurement marketplace connecting national e-procurement platforms. A company registered through one connected system should be able to bid elsewhere in Europe without repeatedly submitting the same documentation. This is intended to reduce bureaucracy and tackle one of the current system's weaknesses: too little competition, particularly from SMEs and companies bidding across borders.
National, regional and local priorities may appreciate this flexibility in theory, but constrained budgets often mean that price will remain the bottom line for many. This legislation offers greater freedom in determining needs, but it remains to be seen what its impact will be.
PHOTO CREDIT: European Commission Executive Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné says the rules reduced from 900 pages to 200 pages © European Union
European leaders losing sleep over Trump’s economic and territorial threats should spare a thought for their Canadian counterparts. On August 22nd, Canadian prime minister Mark Carney announced that his country was “at war” with the United States after trade negotiations collapsed at the eleventh hour. Trump’s subsequent renaming of Lake Ontario to Lake America echoed the crisis with Greenland in January, when the US called into question Denmark’s sovereignty over the territory and refused to rule out taking it by military force.
Both the EU and Canada, in other words, face a similar conundrum: how to de-risk their relationship with an increasingly predatory United States, which exposes them to security threats from Russia and poses a new threat of its own. It is against this backdrop that Carney will attend commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the European Union Speech in Strasbourg on September 16th. An EU-Canada summit will follow in October. The timing could scarcely be better for Europe and Canada to make common cause. But if European leaders want to shift the relationship into a new gear, they will have to revise their usual approach to how the EU treats third countries, particularly in defence and security, where both sides’ dependence on the US runs deepest.
Some Canadians, traumatised by Trump’s bullying, have fantasised about joining the EU. Alas, Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union—its accession clause—restricts membership of the bloc to European states. But the EU need not choose between full membership and arm’s-length third-country status. A strict in-or-out model of security and defence co-operation risks excluding partners like Ukraine, Britain, Norway and Canada from key initiatives and the bloc’s defence technological and industrial base—leaving Europe less safe as a result.
The EU already treats one non-member as something more than an ordinary third country or even one on the path to membership: Ukraine has received notable carve-outs for the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mechanism, which offers €150bn in low-interest defence loans—not to mention exemptions in other areas like trade, energy, and telecommunications. In other words, the question is not whether bending the rules is permissible under certain circumstances, but what those circumstances are. Extending the same treatment to Canada (as inoffensive an ally as they come) would be popular at home and would offer a template for how other relationships, including with Britain, could be structured.
There is already a clear trend towards a closer relationship between Brussels and Ottawa, especially on the defence industrial side. In 2021, Canada joined the military mobility project of the EU’s framework for deeper defence co-operation, PESCO. Last year, both sides signed a security and defence partnership and this year they agreed to Canada’s participation in SAFE.
On the bilateral front, Berlin and Ottawa are finalising a strategic partnership agreement which will include elements on defence cooperation, on top of agreements already signed with France, Denmark, and other Nordics. On the procurement side, German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems won a contest to build 12 submarines for the Royal Canadian Navy—the biggest defence deal in Canadian history. Canada is also considering buying Swedish Gripen fighter jets instead of American F-35s and is building ice-breakers in Helsinki. Finally, Canada is actively involved in deterring Russia with boots on the ground in Latvia, where it leads a multinational brigade as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP).
But these efforts are mostly non-binding and aspirational—except for SAFE (which is time-limited) and eFP (which sits outside of EU structures entirely). The EU-Canada summit at the end of October gives Brussels and Ottawa a concrete opportunity to turn these efforts into specific investments, capabilities and operational co-operation.
Canada is an underrated military power. The 2% of its GDP that it currently spends on defence is already more than the 14 smallest EU defence budgets combined
The EU stands to gain more from a closer relationship than one might think. Canada is an underrated military power. The 2% of its GDP that it currently spends on defence is already more than the 14 smallest EU defence budgets combined. Compared to the EU’s biggest defence spenders, it ranks behind only Germany, France, Italy and Poland. And its budget is set to increase significantly as Canada moves to spend 4% by 2030 and C$500bn (€310bn) over the next decade.
Much of that money will be invested in equipment and suppliers outside of Canada. As Carney made clear in a recent speech: “The days of our military sending 70 cents of every dollar to the United States are over.” EU defence projects should open up to countries outside the EU and the European Economic Area. Canada’s armed forces bring significant know-how in Arctic warfare, an area of increasing interest to Europe amid growing threats from both Russia and the US. And its six decades within the joint US-Canadian air-defence command, NORAD, give it rare experience of continental-scale air defence and early warning, just as Europeans scramble to expand their own independent missile-defence network.
The EU can use these resources and capabilities to deter Russia and wean itself off its dependence on America, starting with deeper Canadian co-operation with the EU’s defence projects and agencies. A first step would be encouraging Canada to join further PESCO projects. Canada’s expertise could be of great help in ACCESS, which aims to develop Arctic-capable, GPS-denied electronic warfare and sensor systems, and TWISTER’s space-based early warning strand. Canada could join both without too much red tape (for EU standards) because neither project is supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA). A second step would be an administrative arrangement between Canada and EDA, which would allow Canada to join EDA-supported PESCO projects it is currently ineligible for, as well as joint training, monitoring and research. Since the US already has such an arrangement, extending it to Canada should prove uncontroversial.
But the most ambitious step the EU could take would be to treat Canada as a full-fledged member of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base instead of as a third country. Member states and the commission should write Canada into EDIP’s successor, the ring-fenced defence-spending stream—or “window”—of the upcoming European Competitiveness Fund (ECF), which is currently being negotiated as part of the EU’s next budget.
As it stands, current EDIP rules will likely roll over into the ECF unchanged. Under those rules, a system built in Europe carrying 35% American components would qualify for funding, but a wholly Canadian one would not. When EDIP was being negotiated, members states deliberately created a carve-out for Ukraine. Member states should extend the same preferential terms to Canada under the ECF, but also go further, letting Canada run programmes as well as bid for them.
These would be major concessions and they must not be given away for free. The expectation should be that Canada pay for access, open its own procurement to European firms in return, and align its export controls with the EU’s. As a proof-of-concept, both sides could design at least one major system with no US export-controlled parts in it (a counter-drone system would work very well).
In addition to these efforts, Berlin and Paris should also throw their weight behind Canada’s proposal for a Defence Security and Resilience Bank. They might even propose merging it with Britain’s proposed Multilateral Defence Mechanism to create a coalition spanning Britain, Canada and EU member states.
As the EU’s borders come under pressure from multiple directions, there is a strong case for expanding Canada’s stake in European territorial integrity. That begins by establishing reciprocity. Europeans shouldn’t scoff at Canadian concerns—just as Denmark flew blood bags to Greenland in anticipation of a US invasion in January, so too have the Canadian Armed Forces modelled a possible US military invasion.
European countries should make it clear to Washington that its statements calling into question its ally’s sovereignty are intolerable. They should also prevail upon Canada to unequivocally pick sides should the US raise the Greenland issue again. In the event of a future military mission to Greenland, similar to the Danish-led Operation Arctic Endurance, or even a mission under the EU’s common security and defence policy, Copenhagen should invite Ottawa to join with boots on the ground, just as it has done in Latvia. Likewise, the EU could bind its anti-coercion instrument to equivalent Canadian countermeasures, ready for joint activation during a crisis.
Boosting Ottawa’s participation in Arctic issues would tie it more closely to the defence of the region more broadly and would give it a bigger role in defending European borders. After all, no serious conversation about the region is conceivable without Canada, whose Arctic territory is vastly larger than that of most other Arctic states. Canada is already part of the region’s multilateral infrastructure, but there is still scope to deepen its co-operation with the EU instruments specifically. One way to bridge the gap would be to take up the European Parliament’s proposal to create a dedicated EU-Canada Arctic cooperation framework with structured dialogues between EU and Canadian institutions.
An additional step which would contribute decisively to European security would be to invite Canada to the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the UK-led coalition of northern European states. Canadian forces have already taken part in JEF exercises in Latvia last year and Carney has participated in virtual meetings of the group. Formally joining JEF, which sits outside NATO and EU structures, would involve little red tape and could happen almost immediately. As the US considers far-reaching troop reductions in Europe, any step that improves interoperability among non-US NATO allies is a win for the entire continent.
The steps outlined above are likely to draw America’s ire and invite retaliation. The US has repeatedly cast scorn on Carney’s middle powers strategy—an effort to rally mid-sized states against pressure from larger ones—which it increasingly views as a serious challenge to its primacy. Under-secretary of war for policy Elbridge Colby recently suspended the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, a longstanding US-Canadian strategic consultative body, and linked the pause to Canada’s weak defence spending and its middle powers strategy. Both the EU and Canada should expect increasing pushback if they embark on this joint course. But any American paroxysm will prove the point—that both Europe and Canada are better off together than alone or in thrall to Washington. If that means blurring the boundaries between EU member states and third countries, so be it.
The European Commission calls it the Affordable Housing Act and says it can “truly bring a change in people’s lives”. But how much will it actually do to make housing more affordable, asks Catherine Feore?
The tension at the heart of the proposal is that Brussels is making ambitious claims about tackling the housing crisis while simultaneously making clear that it is not imposing new housing policies on governments or cities.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen says the measure fulfils a promise to tackle housing affordability, describing it as “one step in this direction” and declaring: “Today, we are delivering for all Europeans.” Housing Commissioner Dan Jørgensen went further, saying the Act gives governments and cities tools to “make more affordable homes available”.
Yet the proposed legislation itself is considerably more cautious.
The Commission acknowledges that insufficient housing supply is the structural cause of the affordability crisis. Short-term rentals, second homes and other non-primary uses are not the root problem, although they can exacerbate shortages and push up prices in already constrained markets.
Housing stress test
The Act principally delivers a common legal framework for authorities that choose to intervene.
Central to this is a new EU test for housing stress. An area would normally qualify where an average home costs at least eight years of disposable per-capita income, that ratio has increased over the previous decade, and pressures are unlikely to ease over the next three years. At a ratio of ten or more, the historical deterioration test is dropped. Population dynamics, housing supply and demand must also be assessed.
Authorities could then restrict short-term rentals outside a host’s primary residence or tackle second homes, prolonged vacancy and certain other non-primary uses. But there is no obligation. They must also demonstrate that the activity has significantly harmed housing affordability or availability for at least three years, and any restriction must be targeted, necessary and proportionate. This seems to set a high bar of evidence for most local authorities.
Currently, local authorities must notify the Commission of short-term rental restrictions under the Services Directive. That notification requirement will no longer be required. Cities can use the new framework without seeking prior Commission approval, although measures must be published and remain open to legal challenge. Officials argue this will remove a burdensome procedure and make intervention easier.
But the Commission is equally explicit about what it is not doing. The Act does not regulate rents, harmonise housing policy, give Brussels new housing competences, dictate taxation, inheritance or planning, or require, recommend or encourage authorities to impose restrictions. Housing policy choices “remain national, regional and local”.
Executive Vice-President Teresa Ribera says that when markets fail to provide affordable homes, “public authorities have a responsibility to act”. But the Act does not compel that action; it provides a stronger legal framework if authorities choose to act independently.
Its impact could be real in tourist hotspots where non-primary housing use is demonstrably worsening shortages. But it cannot itself build a home or lower a rent. The question is whether a clearer legal toolbox matches the expectations created by the Commission’s promise to tackle Europe’s housing crisis. When asked to quantify how much of a difference the new provisions could make, the Commission couldn’t give precise figures, saying that it would depend on the measures adopted.
PHOTO CREDIT: Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for a Clean, Just and Competitive Transition, and Dan Jørgensen, European Commissioner for Energy and Housing, give a press conference on the affordable housing Photographer: Jennifer Jacquemart © European Union
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