An African man, who was described as “perfectly integrated,” is on trial in Bonn on charges connected to the strangling murder of his wife, whom he then dismembered. The woman’s remains were later found in several locations across Germany, according to court proceedings.
Asmerom G., 42, an Eritrean national, faces the charges in Bonn Regional Court in North Rhine-Westphalia. The case stems from events in mid-November 2025 involving his wife, Weghata A., 32. The couple had married in Ethiopia in 2019, and she arrived in Germany in 2024 through family reunification.
The defendant allegedly met his wife, 32-year-old Weghata A., inside his car, where they began arguing on their way back from a church visit. According to Bonner Generalanzeiger newspaper, Asmerom G. later told police that his wife told him their 3-month-old girl was not his biological child. He reportedly could not remember what happened next.
According to prosecutors, Asmerom G. then strangled his wife in the back seat of the car in a parking lot in Bonn, directly in front of the baby who was sitting in a child seat.
After the crime, the defendant is said to have driven with the body and the baby in the car to the Monastery of Saint Anthony, 160 kilometers away, where he abandoned the little girl in the stroller when it was only 2 degrees Celsius (35 degrees Fahrenheit).
Fortunately for the girl, monks found the child just 40 minutes after she was dropped off.
Asmerom G. then went to work dismembering Weghata’s body, including packing her hands and head in plastic bags.
He left the torso behind, which was found at the end of November 2025. Asmerom G. left the body parts on the side of the autobahn, on the A45. The head of the woman was discovered by garbage collectors in April 2026.
Asmerom G. was arrested in Ethiopia and extradited to Germany. He has a prior conviction for aggravated assault. On the first day of the trial, he declined to comment on the allegations. Defense attorney Martin Kretschmer has said the case rests largely on DNA evidence and mobile-phone data.
Kretschmer told Bild newspaper, “Until his arrest, he was considered perfectly integrated.”
German media was even singing his praises in 2016. The man from Eritrea had landed a job as an electrical assistant at a firm in Rheinbach, in North Rhine-Westphalia, and gave interviews about leaving his homeland three years earlier to escape political persecution.
He wanted German citizenship, he said. His boss at the time was quick to describe Asmerom G. as talented, reliable, and “capable of anything,” according to Bild newspaper.
However, then trouble began. Within a year, Asmerom G. was in trouble with the law. A brawl led to a conviction for grievous bodily harm at Siegburg District Court, earning him a six-month suspended sentence.
He moved on from Rheinbach and took up work behind the wheel of a freight truck. Somewhere along the way, he made a trip back to his home country — for reasons that remain unclear — and returned to Germany with a woman named Weghata A., who was 31 at the time, his wife under Eritrean law. On July 26, 2025, she delivered their daughter.
The child is now in the care of authorities. Lawyer Gesine Ickert, representing the daughter and the deceased’s father, has stated that the child is well looked after under the circumstances.
The trial continues.
The post Germany: ‘Perfectly-integrated’ African migrant on trial for strangling his wife next to their baby appeared first on Remix News.
Die Bestürzung über den Abschluss des «Diesel-Deals» durch US-Präsident Donald Trump mit dem russischen Präsidenten Wladimir Putin hinter dem Rücken Europas am vergangenen Wochenende war nur mit dem Schock über das Treffen in Anchorage im vergangenen Jahr vergleichbar. Aus Sicht europäischer Politiker kommt der Abschluss von Abkommen mit Russland, durch die eines der wichtigsten Exportgüter des Landes von den Sanktionen ausgenommen wird, einem Verrat gleich. Einem Verrat sowohl an der Vorhut der europäischen Demokratie namens «Ukraine» als auch an den Grundpfeilern der transatlantischen Solidarität.
Laut eigenen Angaben hat sich Donald Trump mit Wladimir Putin auf umfangreiche Lieferungen von Dieselkraftstoff geeinigt. Demzufolge sollen bereits im Oktober 300 000 Tonnen Dieselkraftstoff aus Russland in die USA und auf den Weltmarkt geliefert werden.
Im November sollen weitere 500 000 Tonnen geliefert werden, kurz darauf eine Million Tonnen. Insgesamt beläuft sich die Menge damit auf 1,8 Millionen Tonnen. Sofern die Kapazitäten der russischen Ölraffinerien dies zulassen, soll das Liefervolumen letztendlich drei Millionen Tonnen erreichen.
Aus der Europäischen Union ist bereits scharfe Kritik an dem «Deal» des US-Präsidenten laut geworden. US-Finanzminister Scott Bessent warf den Europäern hingegen «völlige Heuchelei» vor.
Laut dem russischen Vizepremierminister Alexander Novak haben die Länder der Europäischen Union seit 2022 russische Energieträger im Wert von $320,7 Mrd. gekauft. In den ersten neun Monaten des Jahres 2026 belief sich das Liefervolumen auf $21,3 Mrd.
Laut Bessent haben die EU-Länder den Russen seit Beginn des russisch-ukrainischen Konflikts im Jahr 2022 mehr Geld zur Verfügung gestellt als der Ukraine, da sie ohne russische Energieressourcen nicht auskommen können.
Damit hat Bessent einen wunden Punkt angesprochen. Denn die Daten des Zentrums für Energie- und Luftreinhaltungsforschung (CREA) stimmen im Großen und Ganzen mit den Angaben der russischen Seite überein. Diese unabhängige Organisation mit Sitz in Helsinki analysiert jeden Monat, welche Länder welche Arten russischer Energieressourcen kaufen. Die Analyse läuft seit Dezember 2022, als das EU-Embargo für russisches Rohöl in Kraft trat.
Diesen Daten zufolge hat China bis Ende August 50% der russischen Rohölexporte abgenommen, gefolgt von Indien mit 19%. Auf die Türkei und die EU entfallen jeweils 5%. Bei Erdölprodukten wie Kraftstoffen ist die Türkei mit einem Anteil von 26% der größte Abnehmer. Dahinter folgen China mit 12%, Brasilien mit 11% sowie Singapur und Saudi-Arabien mit jeweils 8%.
Trotz des von der EU verhängten Einfuhrverbots für russische Erdölprodukte wurden in EU-Häfen laut CREA 20 Tanker aus Raffinerien entladen, die russisches Rohöl verarbeiten. Das sind zwei mehr als im Juli. Im Bereich des Pipelinegases bleibt die EU mit einem Anteil von 32% der größte Abnehmer, gefolgt von China mit 31% und der Türkei mit 29%.
Beim Flüssigerdgas (LNG) entfallen knapp 49% auf die EU, gefolgt von China mit 24%, Japan mit 18% und Südkorea mit 6%.
Trotz der immer strengeren Sanktionen gelten in der EU weiterhin Ausnahmen für bestimmte Energieträger und Länder. Daher erscheinen Ungarn, die Slowakei und Bulgarien in der Statistik als Importeure von russischem Pipelinegas. Frankreich und Spanien sind Abnehmer von LNG, während die Slowakei russisches Rohöl bezieht. Insgesamt zahlten diese fünf größten Importeure aus der EU im August laut CREA €1,1 Mrd. an Russland.
Die USA, die im Frühjahr 2022 den Import von Erdöl, Erdölprodukten, Kohle und Flüssiggas verboten hatten, tauchen in der Liste überhaupt nicht auf. Nun hat das US-Finanzministerium jedoch eine Sondergenehmigung für den Kauf von russischem Dieselkraftstoff erteilt, die bis zum 7. April 2027 gültig sein wird.
Deutsche Autofahrer beneiden die Amerikaner ein wenig
Allerdings interessieren sich deutsche Autofahrer, die an den Tankstellen bis zu €2,45 pro Liter Dieselkraftstoff zahlen müssen, wohl kaum für derartige diplomatische Angelegenheiten. Und angesichts des vorbildlichen Beispiels des amerikanischen Präsidenten hätten die meisten von ihnen ebenfalls nichts gegen ein ähnliches Dieselabkommen zwischen Berlin und Moskau einzuwenden.
Es liegt auf der Hand, dass die Lieferungen von russischem Dieselkraftstoff in die USA den Markt nur teilweise stabilisieren werden. Am Montag reagierte der Ölpreis nur geringfügig auf das am vergangenen Wochenende geschlossene Abkommen Trumps. Der Preis für Brent-Rohöl aus der Nordsee sank zunächst um etwa ein Prozent auf $104,2 pro Barrel, woraufhin sich eine Gegenbewegung einstellte und der Preis wieder ins Plus kletterte.
Am Montag kostete Heizöl €168 pro 100 Liter bei einer Abnahme von 3 000 Litern. Dies berichtet das Internetportal Heizoel24, an das 500 Ölhändler ihre Preise übermitteln. Laut dem Portal ist der Oktober bislang im Durchschnitt der teuerste Monat für den Kauf von Heizöl in diesem Jahr.
Dabei ist anzumerken, dass die 300 000 Tonnen Dieselkraftstoff, die Russland im verbleibenden Teil des Monats in die USA und auf den Weltmarkt liefern soll, etwa 100 000 Barrel pro Tag entsprechen. Dies würde den Rückgang der Seelieferungen von Dieselkraftstoff, die im September etwa 1,3 Millionen Barrel pro Tag unter dem Niveau zu Jahresbeginn lagen, nur teilweise ausgleichen.
Laut der US-Energieinformationsbehörde (EIA) liegt der Verbrauch von Dieselkraftstoff und anderen Destillatkraftstoffen in den Vereinigten Staaten derzeit bei durchschnittlich etwa 3,77 Millionen Barrel pro Tag. Dies entspricht etwa 500 000 Tonnen. Somit würde eine Menge von 300 000 Tonnen den amerikanischen Verbrauch theoretisch nur für etwas mehr als 14 Stunden decken.
Was den von Trump verkündeten Waffenstillstand betrifft, der sowohl Russland als auch die Ukraine offenbar überrascht hat, so sind bislang keine Aussichten auf dessen Abschluss erkennbar. Sowohl Moskau als auch Kiew zeigen sich derzeit kompromisslos und bereiten sich auf neue Angriffe auf die sensible Energieinfrastruktur des jeweils anderen vor.
In einer solchen Situation wissen Ölhändler auf dem Weltmarkt nicht, woran sie sich orientieren sollen (den Äußerungen des US-Präsidenten auf Truth Social glaubt seit Beginn der Krise im Schmalz-Kanal niemand mehr). Die US-Investmentbank Goldman Sachs hat ihre Ölpreisprognose jedenfalls erneut angehoben. Rohstoffanalysten gehen nun davon aus, dass der Preis für ein Barrel Brent-Rohöl aus der Nordsee bis zum Jahresende bei $90 statt bei $85 liegen wird. Zuletzt hatten sie ihre Prognose im September angehoben. Als Begründung für diesen Schritt wurde unter anderem angeführt, dass die Lagerbestände auf einem niedrigen Niveau liegen und das Risiko eines Rückgangs des Rohölangebots hoch ist.
By Finian Cunningham | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 14, 2026
It’s hard to know whether to break the TV set or throw up when listening to the European governments rushing to condemn the air strike by Yemeni forces on Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid international airport.
The blast from a ballistic missile that slammed into the airport at the weekend, October 12, killed at least 13 civilians and injured scores of other travellers. Horrific video footage shows the moment the missile explosion ripped through a terminal lounge.
European leaders immediately in a coordinated fashion trotted out condemnations of Yemeni “terrorism” and vowed solidarity and support for Saudi Arabia. U.S. President Donald Trump called it “a terrible thing.” (As if bombing schoolchildren is not quite a terrible thing.)
Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, and Spain all issued strident denunciations of the Yemeni attack.
The strike on the Saudi capital came after the Ansar Allah-led Yemen Armed Forces had given ample warning to the Saudis that their airports would be targeted and for civilians to avoid the areas. The airports were kept open for business as usual. The Yemenis have said that the attack on Riyadh and other Saudi airports are retaliation for weeks of multiple air strikes by the Saudis on Yemeni civilian centers.
Hundreds of Yemeni civilians have been killed since Saudi Arabia broke a four-year truce with an air strike on the international airport in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, on July 13. Saudi warplanes, U.S.-supplied F-15s and European Typhoon jets, have been continously bombing homes across Yemen. This week, two days after the Riyadh strike, at least nine people including five children were killed in air raids on houses in Taiz city and in northern al Jawf province. Al Masirah TV footage showed a distraught father holding up a child’s shredded body amid rubble. There was no condemnation of that atrocity from any European leader.
As Mick Wallace and Clare Daly, former Irish Members of the European Parliament, point out in their podcast this week, the official European reaction is utter hypocrisy and a cynical distortion of the conflict on the Arabian Peninsula.
Britain and France in particular, along with the United States, have backed the Saudi aggression against Yemen beginning in 2015. Over seven years, that aggression killed up to 400,000 Yemenis through air strikes and a blockade on humanitarian needs.
The European Union remained largely silent for seven years. No protests were made to Washington, Paris or London. Ambassadors were not summoned, sanctions were not imposed.
The return to hostilities that began with Saudi air strikes on Sanaa in July have been enabled by U.S. and Britain supplying warplanes, military advisors and intelligence.
None of the European governments have bothered to condemn this recent U.S. and UK-backed slaughter.
So, it is nauseating when one hears British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband saying he is “appalled” by the strike on Riyadh airport. And other European leaders vowing “full solidarity with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”
Germany’s Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul condemned Yemen’s “terrorist act.”
His French counterpart said France stood with Saudi Arabia “in defending its territory and infrastructue.” (No mention of what the Saudis have been doing for years to Yemen’s territory.)
Referring to the strike on Riyadh without any context, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni said: “Attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure are unacceptable and must cease.” (Yes, indeed, so why not tell that to the Saudis who are doing it deliberately on a massive scale with support from Washington and London?)
What is instructive here is not just the sickening hypocrisy and moral bankruptcy. It is the manifestation of a systematic corruption and criminal responsibility. This is not just one more example of a flawed European political class whose judgement is suspect. What is increasingly apparent is the totality of the corruption.
The same European supporters of Saudi monarchs waging a genocidal war on Yemen are also contemporaneously supporting the Israeli Zionist regime in its extermination of Palestinians. They are complicit in enabling the U.S. aggression against Iran, Cuba and Venezuela. They are sponsors of the NeoNazi regime in Kiev to keep fighting a proxy war against Russia despite more than one million Ukrainian military casualties and the risk of nuclear conflagration.
The death cult of Western capitalism is on full display in multiple theaters, exposing the organic evil at work. There is sense that all of Western imperialist history is now on display in one final orgy of barbarity.
In previous times, the death cult operated discreetly in seemingly disparate conflict scenarios. Wars on different continents seemed somehow unconnected. The Western media would in the past reliably cover up the crimes by distorting the motives and objectives with false narratives and (laughable) claims of noble purpose. The West was “defending democracy,” “fighting communism,” “protecting human rights,” or “waging war on terrorism,” or some other pretext that in isolation and with loads of media propaganda managed to fool a lot of people as somehow plausible.
What’s happening now, it seems, is a concatenation of wars that ultimately exposes the essential system that drives the violence, and its insatiable lust for human suffering.
It is impossible to work for such a vile system, the death cult of capitalism, without also being oblivious to its evil ways. To remain oblivious necessitates denial or lies. That deception might be tenable for occasional and seemingly disparate scenarios. But not when the system is exposed in its infernal entirety.
American and European wars in the past might have succeeded in being sold to the Western public as one-off wars and misadventures. We think of the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Latin American, Africa, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently Libya.
In more recent years, as consciousness evolved, the public began discerning and decrying “endless wars”.
But now the world is witnessing a totalizing of the war machine that goes by the name of “Western democracy”.
What’s happening in Ukraine, Gaza, Iran and Yemen is not coincidence. It is the death cult on display and unable to hide itself. It manifests too in attacking and locking up Western citizens who condemn genocide or who simply call for peace.
Capitalism, fascism, wars, the Epstein class, endemic poverty and suffering – it’s a death cult in a theater near you.
The politicians, governments, media and pundits who promote it or serve it are seen for what they are.
RT | October 14, 2026
Did Ukraine’s strikes on Russian data centers destroy the Kremlin’s pro-MAGA bot army? Or are Vladimir Zelensky and his European patrons insulting their citizens with remedial-grade propaganda? RT takes a trip down the rabbit hole.
Ukrainian forces hit three Yandex (Russia’s equivalent to Google) data centers with long-range drones between October 8 and 11. Yandex confirmed that operations were “completely halted” at the facility struck on October 8, and temporarily halted at the center struck on October 11. This much is true, but the story that followed veers into NAFO fiction.
How did the ‘Russian bots’ story begin?
On October 8, American cybersecurity researcher Jeremiah Fowler posted a Cloudflare graph showing a dramatic drop in “bot traffic” after the first Yandex center was hit. As Yandex is primarily a search company, its bots crawl the internet indexing content for users. All search engines function in this way, but Fowler – either through malice or ignorance – conflated this search bot activity with social media bot activity, claiming that the drop in traffic could “disrupt the midterm elections in the US.”
The story spread, hitting the mainstream media on October 11 when Tom’s Hardware published an article claiming that “Russian disinformation bot traffic” had been “nearly eliminated” after the strikes. The word “disinformation” was later pulled from the headline, but the tale had already taken on a life of its own.
That same day, an AI-created graph began circulating, claiming that “Russian bots” were making 56% fewer posts in support of Germany’s right-wing AfD party in the aftermath of the strikes. The graph, which was unsourced and had one axis unlabeled, measured the “decline in activity of Russian bots” up to October 15, four days in the future at the time it appeared online.
Regardless, the graph was shared by a Green Party councillor in Germany’s North Rhine-Westphalia, and by Czech MEP Tomas Zdechovsky. “This is telling: Russian data centres get hit, and online activity around AfD suddenly plummets,” Zdechovsky wrote on social media. “So much talk about German patriotism… then the connection from Russia goes down.”
Who spread the lie?
By October 12, the story had been reported by Germany’s Der Standard and Focus. That morning, Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky spread it further, claiming at the Warsaw Security Forum that his strikes on Yandex data centers had made it “a little easier to breathe on many social media platforms.”
“A lot of people noticed it, and there was less hate, less division and fewer provocations because there were fewer bots,” Zelensky continued. “And it’s pretty clear where those bots were coming from. If they disappeared when Yandex went offline, this proves again and again that Europe is not the source of the problems,” he added.
Speaking on the sidelines of the forum, Polish minister Tomasz Siemoniak claimed that the country’s domestic intelligence agency was “observing a significant, radical decline in Russian bot activity online,” while Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevicius said that “we should ask Mr. Zelensky to hit more data centres in Russia” to “protect” elections in the EU.
Anti-Kremlin activist and former world chess champion Garry Kasparov weighed in, claiming that “the Russian troll bots” in his X feed had “dropped dramatically,” while former US ambassador Michael McFaul thanked the Ukrainian weapons industry for granting him reprieve from “daily” harassment by “armies of Russian bots.”
The only problem was none of this was true, and based on the replies to McFaul’s tweet, nobody was buying it.
How was the bots story debunked?
The story didn’t take long to fall apart. Common Consultancy, a Scandinavian NGO that has previously accused Russia of orchestrating social media influence campaigns, concluded that there was “no visible effect” on pro-MAGA or pro-AfD social media posts after the Yandex strikes. Leonid Volkov, an anti-Kremlin activist associated with deceased opposition figure Alexey Navalny, slammed Zdechovsky for spreading “nonsense and falsehood.”
CeMAS, a liberal German think tank, stated that it was “not seeing a drop in the number of posts that could be explained by an attack on data centers.” The Hasso Plattner Institute and Polisphere, two tech nonprofits, concurred, and German newspapers began quietly editing their articles on Monday night.
Some, like Merkur, kept “speculation about Russian bots and the AfD” in their headlines. Others, including Der Standard, noted that their “original assertion of a confirmed connection [between the strikes and alleged bot activity] has been corrected.” The Verge, a tech-focused American news site, admitted that “the Yandex outage probably didn’t blitz Russian bots.”
Is this hybrid war?
By the time the story was debunked and corrected, the damage was done. In the public’s eye, the strikes were tied to a drop in “Russian bot” activity, and none of the speakers at the Warsaw Security Forum, including senior Ukrainian, Polish, and Lithuanian officials, bothered to correct the record.
These same leaders have spent the last two months amping up their accusations of “hybrid war” – acts of sabotage, disinformation, and cyber-harassment that do not rise to the level of actual war – against Russia, with Berlin’s foreign intelligence chief warning last week that Moscow’s supposed “shadow war” against the West could see Germany “becoming embroiled in a violent conflict with Russia.”
That none of the acts of “hybrid war” – among them the discovery of a suspicious drone at Leipzig Airport in August, and a series of unsubstantiated drone sightings across Germany and Scandinavia last year – have been linked by evidence to Russia is a feature, not a bug. “Hybrid war” is by its very nature unprovable, and the accusation alone is enough for European leaders to justify their deepening proxy war in Ukraine, their remilitarization and expansion of the national security state at home.
Furthermore, the accusations themselves are a form of “hybrid warfare” against the European public, analyst Thomas Fazi argued last week. “Europeans,” he wrote, “are being subjected to a sustained campaign of cognitive or psychological warfare aimed at conditioning them to believe that Europe is under attack from Russia.”
Who stands to gain?
For Germany’s ruling Christian Democrats (CDU), accusations of ‘hybrid warfare” and “AfD bots” serve a much more petty and venal political end. Chancellor Friedrich Merz is less popular now than at any point in his political career, and with the AfD trouncing the CDU in state elections and leading his party by ten points in opinion polls, Merz has taken every opportunity available to tie his opponents to Russia.
“We in Germany will not allow ourselves to be divided, not by hybrid attacks, not by Moscow-bot-driven hate speech on social media, and – if I may say so – not even by the slogans of the AfD and its Russian backers,” the chancellor said in a speech earlier this month.
The Yandex story – which conveniently linked the AfD to “Moscow-bot-driven hate speech” – was a godsend to Merz, and to his Ukrainian and Eastern European allies, who have an interest in preventing the Ukraine-skeptic AfD from taking power in Germany. Unfortunately for them, like all “hybrid war” claims, it fell apart the moment it was subjected to some basic scrutiny.
European Union finance ministers have reached an agreement to expand centralised supervision of financial markets, but Germany has secured provisions allowing important parts of Deutsche Börse to remain under national oversight, substantially narrowing the European Commission’s original reform proposals.
The compromise, agreed at a meeting in Luxembourg on 9 October, would transfer responsibility for supervising selected trading venues, clearing houses and securities settlement institutions to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
However, the agreement introduces exemptions and thresholds that reduce the number of institutions automatically subject to direct European supervision.
The result is a significant political compromise between governments seeking deeper financial integration and those reluctant to surrender oversight of nationally important market operators.
The most contentious element of the negotiations concerned Deutsche Börse, the German financial-market group that operates the Frankfurt stock exchange and provides trading, clearing and other financial infrastructure services.
Germany opposed arrangements that would place all major market operators under direct ESMA supervision, arguing that institutions with predominantly domestic activities should continue to be regulated nationally.
The agreed compromise refines the criteria for determining which trading venues qualify for centralised oversight.
These conditions allow certain Deutsche Börse operations to remain outside the new supervisory regime.
The exemption had already become a point of contention during negotiations among European governments.
As EU Today reported in June, Berlin had sought to protect Deutsche Börse from mandatory European supervision despite Germany’s broader support for integrating EU capital markets.
The October agreement formalises a narrower approach within the Council’s negotiating position, although the legislation remains subject to approval by the European Parliament.
The European Commission has repeatedly argued that fragmented national supervision weakens the EU’s ability to compete with financial markets in the United States.
Although the Union operates a single market, many financial institutions continue to face differing regulatory interpretations, procedures and supervisory relationships across member states.
These differences can increase operating costs and discourage financial businesses from expanding across borders.
The Market Integration and Supervision Package is intended to simplify those arrangements and strengthen common oversight of financial infrastructure with significant cross-border activity.
Under the Council’s position, ESMA would assume direct supervision of selected trading platforms and institutions involved in clearing and securities settlement.
Such institutions perform essential functions in financial markets, including managing transactions, transferring securities and controlling risks between counterparties.
Differences in supervisory arrangements can complicate the operation of financial services that increasingly function across national borders.
The Commission argues that greater consistency would allow European capital to move more efficiently between member states and provide businesses with improved access to investment.
The Commission’s original approach envisaged broader centralisation of supervisory responsibilities.
The Council agreement of 9 October introduces more restrictive criteria governing the institutions that would fall under ESMA’s direct authority.
In addition to the treatment of trading venues, ministers agreed that direct supervision of crypto-asset service providers should initially concentrate on businesses with the most significant cross-border operations.
The Council also supported changes to ESMA’s governance arrangements, including the creation of a full-time executive board.
The proposed board would strengthen the authority’s ability to make supervisory decisions independently of individual national regulators, while preserving mechanisms for cooperation with those authorities.
The compromise also introduces arrangements allowing national supervisors collectively to challenge certain decisions.
These provisions reflect concerns about concentrating regulatory powers within an institution that must oversee financial businesses operating under different national legal systems.
The supervision reforms form part of the EU’s broader Savings and Investments Union initiative.
European policymakers want to increase the availability of private capital for companies investing in technology, defence, infrastructure and industrial development.
The Union has substantial household savings, but much of that money remains in bank deposits or is invested outside the European economy.
Companies seeking capital for expansion may consequently face higher financing costs or more limited investment opportunities than comparable businesses operating in larger and more integrated markets.
The Commission’s Savings and Investments Union programme seeks to improve access to finance and make cross-border investment more attractive.
Financial-market supervision represents only one element of that programme.
Differences in taxation, insolvency law, national investment products and corporate governance requirements also influence where investors allocate their money.
Nevertheless, regulators regard consistent supervision as an important condition for reducing fragmentation.
The agreement reached by finance ministers does not conclude the legislative process.
The European Parliament must adopt its position before negotiations can determine the final provisions.
Parliamentary discussions could revisit the exemptions secured by Germany and the criteria determining which institutions fall under direct ESMA supervision.
The debate will expose differences over whether European financial integration should proceed through incremental reforms or a more substantial transfer of regulatory authority.
Governments supporting national exemptions argue that supervision should reflect the actual geographic scope of a company’s activities.
Supporters of broader European oversight contend that major trading businesses can influence financial markets beyond their home jurisdictions even when individual operations appear predominantly domestic.
The Deutsche Börse exemption has become a prominent example of the conflict between those positions.
Europe’s largest economies broadly support the objective of deeper capital markets, but remain divided over the institutional powers needed to achieve it.
The final legislation will determine whether the expanded responsibilities granted to ESMA are sufficient to reduce fragmentation or leave important parts of Europe’s financial infrastructure operating under substantially different national supervisory systems.
By Freddie Ponton | 21st Century Wire | October 12, 2026
For four years, Europe presented its energy break with Russia as a strategic and moral necessity, with Brussels expanding sanctions, promising to cut Moscow’s revenues and preparing a complete ban on Russian liquefied natural gas. Yet European companies bought more LNG from Russia’s Yamal project in the first nine months of 2026 than in the same period of 2025.
EU ports received a record 12.18 million tonnes of Yamal LNG between January and September 2026, an increase of 9.5% over the same period in 2025. The gas arrived in 167 cargoes, roughly one every 1.6 days. The EU received 85% of Yamal’s recorded deliveries by volume even as the project’s worldwide shipments fell by 1.3%.
Urgewald, a German environmental and human rights organisation, placed the estimated benchmark value of those deliveries at €7.88 billion, using cargo volumes and monthly European TTF gas prices rather than disclosed contract payments. European leaders spoke of economic separation while EU ports remained the destination for a multibillion-euro Russian LNG trade.
Sanctions that preserved trade
The EU’s ban on Russian LNG under existing short-term contracts took effect on 25 April 2026. Eligible long-term agreements signed before 17 June 2025 could continue supplying Europe through the end of 2026, with the prohibition taking effect on 1 January 2027. Brussels could announce the coming break while established contracts kept Russian cargoes moving.
Five months after the ban on imports under eligible short-term LNG contracts took effect, EU ports received 792,440 tonnes of Yamal LNG in September, slightly more than a year earlier.
Yamal sold most of its output under long-term contracts signed before the war. TotalEnergies agreed to buy 4 million tonnes a year directly from the project, CNPC contracted 3 million, Germany’s SEFE inherited a 2.9 million tonne agreement, and Spain’s Naturgy held another for 2.5 million tonnes. Novatek sold part of its own allocation through separate agreements with TotalEnergies, Shell and Gunvor, now known as Centalion Group Ltd, These contracts kept major European energy companies commercially tied to Yamal after the political rupture with Moscow, securing supplies that could be sold or traded through their international portfolios, with destination flexibility varying by agreement.
TotalEnergies chief executive Patrick Pouyanné confirmed that its Yamal agreements were linked to Brent crude. During periods of extreme volatility, those long-term contracts secured supplies that could cost less than replacement gas on the European spot market. When spot prices outpaced oil-linked purchase prices, the gap created an opportunity to earn more from selling the contracted cargoes.
Buyers could exploit that opportunity through global portfolios spanning ships, terminals, storage facilities and supplies from several producing countries. They could exchange cargoes, redirect available gas and meet customer obligations from alternative sources, freeing supplies for sale in markets offering stronger returns.
Russian officials acknowledged that portfolio buyers could swap Yamal supplies against gas from other sources and direct available cargoes towards the most lucrative markets. A Yamal cargo could fulfil one obligation while freeing another supply for sale elsewhere, allowing traders to earn from price differences across markets.
The contracts that bound companies to Russian suppliers also secured access to gas that could cost less than replacement cargoes bought at crisis prices. Keeping those agreements meant preserving both the supply and the trading opportunities it created.
The profits behind the policy
TotalEnergies owns 20% of Yamal LNG and holds 19.4% of Novatek, the project’s controlling shareholder. It also buys and markets Yamal cargoes, giving it commercial interests as both a shareholder and a cargo trader.
In July 2026, chief executive Patrick Pouyanné told analysts that lifting and selling Yamal cargoes generated an average of about $400 million annually. TotalEnergies had direct access to the cash booked through its UK trading entity. The income fluctuated with Brent crude prices because the contracts were linked to oil.
TotalEnergies also retained rights to dividends through its ownership positions, although sanctions limited its ability to transfer those funds from Russia to Europe. Pouyanné confirmed that some cash flows had been distributed without disclosing how much had been repatriated, while the company’s Novatek dividends, which he had valued at around $600 million annually in 2024, had previously remained stuck abroad.
The commercial incentive extended beyond the immediate Yamal income, as continued deliveries preserved access to contracted gas while removing Russian LNG before replacement supplies became available could drive prices higher across the wider market. Pouyanné warned at a French Senate hearing that replacing those supplies would force Europe to pay more, and told analysts in April 2024 that sanctions on Yamal would benefit TotalEnergies’ global portfolio by pushing LNG prices higher.
TotalEnergies had commercial interests under either outcome, as continued Yamal trade generated sales income while a sudden prohibition could tighten supply and raise the value of gas sold elsewhere in its portfolio. Continued access and greater scarcity offered different routes to income, leaving the company with a potential financial benefit even if Russian deliveries stopped.
A French Senate inquiry called in 2024 for France to lead efforts to sanction Russian LNG and end its own imports as soon as possible, yet two years later TotalEnergies was still earning about $400 million annually from Yamal sales.
Germany’s retained Russian contract
Germany’s state-owned energy group SEFE inherited a contract for about 2.9 million tonnes of Yamal LNG annually through the former Gazprom Marketing & Trading business, after Berlin nationalised its parent company, Gazprom Germania, in 2022. The group became Securing Energy for Europe, retaining the Russian supply agreement under German state ownership.
SEFE’s trading operation later attributed substantial profits across its LNG portfolio to contractual flexibility, freight optimisation and arbitrage, while its 2024 financial report recorded £411.2 million in EBITDA and £199.4 million in profit after tax. Those figures covered SEFE Marketing & Trading and its subsidiaries, without isolating the contribution from Yamal.
That flexibility extended to its Indian supply obligations, for which Reuters reported that the business had arranged cargoes from other sources to reduce freight costs. SEFE’s chief executive also explained that it could retain Yamal supplies in Europe and serve India from elsewhere in its portfolio when doing so was cheaper, although that account described an available trading option rather than documenting individual cargo swaps.
Under German state ownership, SEFE retained a long-term agreement for about 2.9 million tonnes of Yamal LNG annually, even as Europe sought to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. Berlin’s nationalisation changed the ownership of Gazprom’s former German business, but the Russian supply agreement remained in place, preserving its commercial ties to Yamal inside a state-owned international trader.
Shell’s phased withdrawal
On 8 March 2022, Shell announced a phased withdrawal from Russian hydrocarbons, including oil, gas and LNG, but later acknowledged that long-term contractual commitments remained despite the end of its spot purchases of Russian LNG.
Among those commitments was a 2015 agreement with Novatek for approximately 900,000 tonnes of Yamal LNG annually, with a term exceeding 20 years. In February 2023, a Shell spokesperson confirmed that the company was still receiving Russian LNG cargoes under that contract, almost a year after announcing its withdrawal.
Shell’s Yamal agreement sat within a global LNG portfolio, with its cargoes passing through a contractual transhipment point at Montoir-de-Bretagne in France. Across the wider business, Shell used its international operations to capture differences in regional demand and prices, and chief executive Wael Sawan attributed strong late-2023 trading results to arbitrage between eastern and western markets. Those results demonstrate the commercial value of portfolio flexibility, without identifying how much came from Yamal.
Naturgy and former Gunvor also retained access to Yamal supplies through long-term agreements, with Naturgy contracted for 2.5 million tonnes annually and Centalion Group Ltd, for about 500,000 tonnes through Novatek. Reporting on Yamal’s portfolio buyers describes how companies could exchange those supplies with gas sourced elsewhere and direct cargoes towards more lucrative markets.
The contracts therefore carried commercial opportunities alongside their obligations, preserving access to gas that could be sold or exchanged within wider portfolios. Remaining in the trade could generate value even where companies presented their continuing purchases as a contractual constraint, although that potential should not be confused with a verified profit from each agreement.
Russian gas beyond Nord Stream
On 7 February 2022, then US President Joe Biden stood beside German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and said that a Russian invasion would bring Nord Stream 2 to an end. Asked how Washington could achieve that when Germany controlled the project, he maintained that the United States could ensure the outcome without explaining the mechanism.
Germany halted Nord Stream 2’s certification on 22 February 2022, preventing a pipeline that had never entered commercial service from beginning operations. Nord Stream 1 had already stopped delivering gas when explosions ruptured three of the system’s four pipeline strings on 26 September 2022, leaving only one Nord Stream 2 string intact. With the Nord Stream route out of operation, Russian LNG continued reaching European terminals through the contracts held by companies such as TotalEnergies, SEFE and Shell.
Yamal had begun exporting LNG in December 2017, almost five years before the Nord Stream explosions, and its seaborne supply network survived the loss of the pipelines. European companies continued buying Russian gas under long-term contracts, receiving by-sea supplies that remained commercially valuable even as the direct pipeline connection between Russia and Germany stood idle.
America captured the market
The decline of Russian pipeline supplies opened a larger European market for American LNG, and Washington worked with Brussels to expand the trade. In their 25 March 2022 agreement, the United States pledged to work towards at least 15 billion cubic metres of additional LNG for the EU that year, including supplies from international partners, while maintaining a regulatory environment that would support additional export capacity. The European Commission committed to working with member states to secure demand for approximately 50 billion cubic metres of additional American LNG annually until at least 2030, giving the effort to reduce Russian dependence a long-term market for US supplies.
American deliveries to the EU rose from 22 billion cubic metres in 2021 to 56 billion in 2022, exceeding the initial expansion target. By the second quarter of 2026, the United States supplied 63.2% of EU LNG imports, with Russia second at 17.3%. Europe’s retreat from Russian pipeline gas had been accompanied by a US-European policy effort to expand American supply, while Russian LNG retained a substantial place in the same market.
Dependence became leverage
Europe’s reliance on American supplies extended beyond LNG, giving Washington leverage over another essential fuel when the Trump administration asked the EU to release 120 million barrels of emergency diesel over six months. Washington presented reserve releases as an alternative to restricting American diesel exports, a threat with considerable force because the United States supplied around half of the EU’s diesel imports in August 2026.
Washington was pressing Europe to release finished diesel that could reach consumers without further refining, while its own emergency contribution consisted of crude offered to companies under loan arrangements requiring repayment in oil with additional barrels. The US Department of Energy’s September solicitation explicitly built replenishment into those contracts, leaving Europe under pressure to draw on immediately usable fuel while American releases carried a contractual obligation to restore its crude reserves.
The pressure was followed by a G7 agreement on 2 October 2026 to coordinate the release of 100 million barrels over four months, with a substantial diesel release brought forward into the first 20 days. G7 leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from energy export restrictions against one another, placing continued access to supplies alongside the agreement to draw down emergency stocks.
Washington had helped build a larger European market for American energy as part of the effort to reduce dependence on Russia, then used the prospect of restricting diesel exports to press European governments to release their reserves. Europe’s reliance on an allied supplier had left it exposed to pressure over access to fuel, with emergency stocks becoming part of the negotiation over keeping those supplies flowing.
A credibility crisis
European leaders need to explain how their effort to cut Russia’s energy revenues can be reconciled with rising Yamal deliveries to EU ports and European traders earning income from the cargoes. TotalEnergies’ disclosure of about $400 million in annual income makes continued trade harder to present solely as an unwanted contractual obligation, when the same agreement also sustained a valuable business. Compliance with the sanctions timetable does not resolve the political contradiction; it shows how much commerce that timetable allowed to continue.
Brussels also committed to building long-term demand for American LNG, while Washington later demonstrated its willingness to use fuel exports as leverage over European governments.
Whose interests are being served when Europe distances itself from Russian pipeline supplies, remains a paying customer for Russian LNG and becomes more exposed to American pressure?
European leaders owe their citizens an explanation of why Russia remained an acceptable supplier for profitable LNG contracts while economic separation was presented as a strategic necessity. They must also explain whose interests were served by replacing that dependence with greater exposure to Washington.
Cologne police are investigating an unprecedented incident in which a humanoid robot was allegedly used to sexually harass a 16-year-old girl on a busy city street, with the act filmed and livestreamed. Videos of the assault appear to show two men with a migration background controlling the robot, which they named “Ahmed,” an Arabic name. They also claim the robot is from the multicultural neighborhood of Neukölln in Berlin.
The case, which has drawn international attention as potentially the first documented instance of a robot being used directly in a sexual assault, has to do with red-and-gold Unitree robot that approached different teenage women. In the videos, which Remix News has compiled into one longer clip, the robot grabs their behinds, makes masturbatory motions, and humps the women.
The post has been censored on X.
At least one victim, a 16-year-old girl, has filed a criminal complaint.
According to a police statement, the roughly 1.2-meter-tall robot touched the girl on the buttocks and made thrusting motions against her between 11:45 p.m. and midnight on the night of October 10–11, 2026, near the corner of Palmstrasse and Hohenzollernring.
The girl was with two friends, ages 17 and 18. Officers responding to the scene located a 16-year-old from Wegberg and a 19-year-old companion nearby. The robot was found in the trunk of a Volkswagen where the younger suspect had stowed it; police seized the machine and the pair’s mobile phones. Investigators are examining whether the movements were deliberately controlled via remote control or an app and are treating the matter as a suspected case of sexual harassment.
— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) June 29, 2026
The 16-year-old and his companion are accused of filming the encounter, streaming it live on social media, and providing commentary.
Many of the victims appear to be German women. Some of them laugh or appear to be amused, but others appear uncomfortable or scream.
Media reports speculate the model is the Unitree R1-series model, priced around €5,000, which can walk, respond to voice commands, and be remotely operated or programmed with custom movement sequences. Experts have noted that the specific thrusting motions are not standard factory behaviors.
As Remix News has reported, many public areas have become insecure, featuring robberies, rapes, assaults, and other threats. However, for women, the threat level has gone up substantially, including from random street harassment due to mass immigration.
— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) June 6, 2026
— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) November 25, 2025
The post Germany: 2 males with a migration background use robot ‘Ahmed’ to sexually assault young women in Cologne, possible first ever case of a robot used for sexual assault appeared first on Remix News.
Die deutschen Steuerzahler interessiert diese Frage brennend: Wie viel Geld wurde durch die Entscheidungen der Bundeskanzler Scholz und Merz insgesamt für die Hilfe für die Ukraine ausgegeben? Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Bereiche Bildung, Gesundheitswesen und Sozialversicherung in Deutschland jährlich von massiven Krisen erschüttert werden und finanzielle Unterstützung durch die Bundesregierung ihnen keineswegs schaden würde, ist diese Frage keineswegs müßig. Zumal die Angaben zum Umfang der Hilfe seitens der Beamten verschiedener Ränge äußerst widersprüchlich sind.
Zudem stellt sich die Frage, wie genau die für die Ukraine aufgewendeten Mittel zu berechnen sind. Rein militärische Lieferungen? Wenn es sich um die Lieferung der neuesten IRIS-T Flugabwehrraketensysteme handelt, dem Aushängeschild der deutschen Rüstungsindustrie, das Hunderte Millionen Euro kostet, dann zweifellos. Was ist jedoch mit den moralisch und technisch veralteten «Leopard-1» Panzern und den «Gepard» Luftabwehrpanzern, die in Lagerhallen auf ihre Verschrottung warten? Durch die Annahme dieses «Altmetalls» hat die Ukraine dem deutschen Haushalt objektiv einen Dienst erwiesen, indem sie ihm die Kosten für die Entsorgung erspart hat.
Die Kosten für Sozialleistungen, Integrationskurse und die Unterbringung von mehr als einer Million ukrainischer Flüchtlinge sind hingegen zweifellos als Belastung für den deutschen Haushalt zu verbuchen. Ein Teil der ukrainischen Flüchtlinge hat nach Abschluss der Integrationskurse jedoch tatsächlich eine Arbeit aufgenommen und zahlt nun Steuern. Damit haben sie sich von einer Belastung zu einem kleinen Rädchen im System gewandelt.
Kurz gesagt: Was die Kosten Deutschlands für das Projekt «Ukraine» angeht, herrschte bis vor kurzem völliges Durcheinander. Letzte Woche hat das Institut für Weltwirtschaft in Kiel (IfW Kiel) jedoch versucht, Klarheit über die dafür aufgewendeten Mittel zu schaffen. Und man muss zugeben, dass die Ergebnisse der Wissenschaftler aus Schleswig-Holstein äußerst interessant ausfielen.
Von den €101 Mrd. , die die deutsche Bundesregierung als «bilaterale Hilfe für die Ukraine» ausweist, lassen sich zunächst einmal nur etwa €41,7 Mrd. der Kategorie der tatsächlichen bilateralen Hilfe zuordnen. Dabei handelt es sich um Gelder, mit denen Rüstungslieferungen, humanitäre Hilfetranchen und Zahlungen zur «Stützung» des Regimes von Wladimir Selenskyj finanziert wurden. Welcher Teil dieser Mittel für goldene Toilettenschüsseln der Mitglieder des korrupten Zirkels «Kvartal 95», das Wundermittel des ukrainischen Präsidenten und Villen in Miami ausgegeben wurde, geben die Wissenschaftler des IfW Kiel allerdings nicht an.
Bekannt ist hingegen, dass fast €36 Mrd. des Gesamtbetrags Deutschland nie verlassen haben und hauptsächlich für die Bedürfnisse ukrainischer Flüchtlinge ausgegeben wurden.
Diese Zahl umfasst Sozialleistungen (€27,45 Mrd.) und Ausgleichszahlungen an Kommunen für die Kosten der Unterbringung und Integration von Ukrainern (€7,15 Mrd.). Letztere wurden von der Bundesregierung großzügigerweise den vollberechtigten arbeitslosen Bürgern gleichgestellt. Weitere €1,3 Mrd. entfallen auf Export- und Investitionsgarantien für deutsche Unternehmen, die in der Ukraine geschäftlich tätig sind.
Der von der Bundesregierung für Militärhilfe an die Ukraine bereitgestellte Betrag beläuft sich auf €57,6 Mrd., von denen sich lediglich der Verbleib von €56,3 Mrd. nachvollziehen lässt. Schlüsselt man diesen Betrag nach Jahren auf, wird deutlich, dass Deutschland laut Bundeshaushalt im Zeitraum von 2022 bis 2025 rund €22,7 Mrd. für Militärhilfe bereitgestellt hat. Für das Jahr 2026 wurden weitere €11,6 Mrd. bereitgestellt.
Weitere €22 Mrd. sind Verpflichtungen zur militärischen Hilfe für Kiew. Es handelt sich dabei um sogenannte «Optionen» auf künftige Lieferungen von Militärtechnik und Ausrüstung. Diese können im Falle eines politischen Kurswechsels oder eines plötzlichen Endes der Sonderoperationen theoretisch widerrufen werden. Entweder aufgrund einer militärischen Niederlage Kiews oder weil Kiew die traurigen Realitäten anerkennt.
Tatsächlich sind nur €7,4 Mrd. als Bargeld in die Ukraine geflossen: €6,3 Mrd. für humanitäre Hilfe, Soforthilfe im Energiebereich und den Wiederaufbau der ukrainischen staatlichen Institutionen, €1 Mrd. als Zuschuss zugunsten des ukrainischen Staates, bereitgestellt vom Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF), und €0,1 Mrd. zur Entlastung der Schuldenlast durch einen Zahlungsaufschub.
Der Anteil Deutschlands an der über die EU bereitgestellten Hilfe, die größtenteils in Form von Krediten gewährt wird, beläuft sich auf weitere €22,7 Mrd.
Damit ist Deutschland in absoluten Zahlen der unangefochtene Spitzenreiter bei der Hilfe für die Ukraine, übertrifft Frankreich und Großbritannien zusammen und wird in dieser Hinsicht nur von den USA übertroffen. Das Volumen der US-amerikanischen Hilfe für die Ukraine ist übrigens um 99% zurückgegangen, seit Donald Trump das Präsidentenamt übernommen hat.
Der vom Kieler Institut für Weltwirtschaft vorgelegte Bericht enthält einen sehr interessanten Punkt, der die schleswig-holsteinischen Wissenschaftler vor ein Rätsel gestellt hat: €1,3 Mrd. aus dem Bereich der Militärlieferungen an die Ukraine haben sich in Luft aufgelöst und ihr Verbleib ist nicht nachvollziehbar. Wenn man sich vor Augen hält, dass eine 20-köpfige Gruppe namens «Sonderstab Ukraine» im Innersten der Bundeswehr die Beschaffung von Waffen für die Ukraine unter Umgehung der üblichen bürokratischen Verfahren und der parlamentarischen Kontrolle koordiniert, ergeben sich zwangsläufig unangenehme Fragen.
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