❌

Normal view

Bombs for Tel Aviv, Promises for Riyadh

By: aletho
15 October 2026 at 19:49
By Muhammad Hamid ad-Din – New Eastern Outlook – October 15, 2026

The Gaza Ceasefire Is Falling Apart. And So Is the American Plan to Expand the Abraham Accords.

The Gaza Ceasefire That Is Killing Palestinians

The ceasefire in Gaza, which took effect on October 10, 2025, was supposed to stop a two-year war. By then, according to Palestinian authorities, more than 72,000 Palestinians had been killed. A year after the document was signed, the picture was no more peaceful. According to Palestinian sources, from the start of the ceasefire to October 5, 2026, Israeli forces killed 1,460 Palestinians and wounded 5,116. By September 2026, Gaza authorities reported 5,147 violations of the agreement, 1,421 dead, and the destruction of more than 201,000 buildings.

The second phase of negotiations—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the enclave and the disarmament of Palestinian factions—stalled almost immediately. In April 2026, American-Egyptian talks in Cairo ended “without tangible progress.” Hamas links disarmament to the end of the occupation. Israel demands disarmament as a precondition for any further step. Critics say the demand for disarmament has become a pretext for maintaining control over the enclave and continuing violations. The Palestinian Foreign Ministry put it bluntly: the occupation government “does not view peace as a goal, but as an obstacle.”

Diktat Instead of Diplomacy

Against this backdrop, the Trump administration is forcing the expansion of the Abraham Accords. In May 2026, the U.S. president publicly demanded that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey join the accords. He called it “mandatory”: “After all the work done by the United States to put this complex puzzle together, it must be mandatory for all these countries to at least simultaneously sign the Abraham Accords.” Pakistan publicly refused. The others remained silent.

Washington’s main interest is Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said at the White House in November 2025: “We want to be part of the Abraham Accords. But we also want to be sure that we secure a clear path to a two-state solution.” Later, Riyadh repeated: normalization is impossible without a “credible, irreversible, and time-bound path” to a Palestinian state. The Israeli government rejects this prospect. American pressure goes beyond diplomacy: Trump tied the Abraham Accords to negotiations to end the war with Iran, effectively making normalization a condition for peace. According to Axios, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan were “caught by surprise.”

Mutual Influence: Gaza as Leverage and as an Obstacle

Gaza and the reshaping of alliances are directly connected. The Palestinian question became leverage in Arab states’ bargaining with Washington. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel without movement toward a Palestinian state is politically toxic. Riyadh is using the fragile ceasefire to postpone an unpopular step. Qatar, a key mediator, took an equally tough position. Qatari Foreign Ministry spokesman Majid al-Ansari said: “If the Palestinian question remains unresolved, joining the Abraham Accords is impossible.” According to him, the absence of a peace process for Palestinians means the absence of stability in the region. Doha, which has given refuge to Hamas’s political leadership and plays a central role in the talks, cannot move toward normalization without losing face.

There is also a reverse dependency. The Trump administration, seeking to expand the Abraham Accords, pressured Israel to secure a ceasefire: normalization without a ceasefire would have been impossible. But the second phase depends on whether Washington is willing to pressure Israel, not just Arab capitals.

Bombs Instead of Peace

The result of U.S. and Israeli policy looks increasingly contradictory. Three years of war, more than 74,250 dead Palestinians, and 1,460 killed after the ceasefire was signed are not just a humanitarian catastrophe. They are a verdict on America’s strategy in the Middle East. Trump tried to push through the expansion of the Abraham Accords by linking unrelated issues: normalization with Israel, a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, and ending the war with Iran. In July 2026, he stated directly that a U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear agreement “will depend entirely on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.” Saudi Arabia responded in May 2026: “There will be no normalization without a clear and final path to the creation of an independent Palestinian state.” As the custodian of the two holy mosques, the kingdom cannot afford to do otherwise. Qatar refused. Pakistan publicly rejected it. Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey remained silent.

Criticism of Washington goes far beyond diplomatic missteps. The U.S. continues to supply Israel with weapons despite ceasefire violations. In September 2026, the Trump administration proposed a $2.8 billion deal to sell Israel 40,000 heavy bombs, including 20,000 MK-84s and 20,000 BLU-117s. Senator Chris Van Hollen vowed to block the transfer: “Trump is sending $2.8 billion worth of bombs, paid for by you, the American taxpayers, to a government led by a wanted war criminal.” Congressman Gregory Meeks, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also vetoed it: “The Trump administration has not provided sufficient assurances that these weapons will be used in accordance with American and international law. Therefore, I will not approve this sale.” Amnesty International urged Congress to block the deliveries, saying the U.S. risks becoming complicit in serious violations of international law, including genocide. New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani accused Washington of “complicity with every arms shipment” to Tel Aviv.

What Next: The Results of U.S. and Israeli Policy Against the Arab Region

Washington’s paradox is that it wants to expand the Abraham Accords but continues to support the Israeli occupation, which makes normalization politically impossible for Arab states. The U.S. has blocked UN Security Council ceasefire resolutions for the third time in a row, undermining its role as a “reliable mediator.” Public opinion in the Arab world is sharply opposed to normalization. Polls show that 89% of Moroccans oppose recognizing Israel. Analysts warn that for most of the named states, the political price of signing the accords will be prohibitive. The war in Gaza has strengthened this sentiment, not weakened it.

The main question is whether the ceasefire will hold. If the second phase of negotiations does not start and the death toll continues to rise, expansion of the Abraham Accords will remain an unattainable dream. Saudi Arabia will wait. Qatar will mediate. The UAE will increase oil production. Trump will face a choice: keep pressuring Arab capitals or admit that without a real Palestinian state, the accords will remain a facade. While Washington supplies bombs and Tel Aviv keeps killing, talk of peace looks like a cynical game in which Palestinians are not subjects but a bargaining chip.


Muhammad Hamid ad-Din is a well-known Palestinian journalist.

Follow new articles on our Telegram channel.

Over 62,000 Detained In Britain For Social Media Posts Since 2021

15 October 2026 at 10:36

Click to see the full-size image

Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

Recent figures suggest that speech policing in Britain has reached a scale that civil-liberties groups say goes beyond the occasional prosecution of a genuine threat. From January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2025, police recorded at least 62,199 arrests under three communications offenses, according to Britain’s Free Speech Problem, a report Big Brother Watch published in September 2026. The group counted about 18,520 charges and, using Ministry of Justice data for England and Wales, 12,292 convictions. By those figures, roughly one in five arrests results in a conviction.

The laws in question are section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988, which covers indecent or grossly offensive messages sent to cause distress; section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, which criminalizes “grossly offensive” messages sent over a public electronic network; and section 179 of the Online Safety Act 2023, which creates the false-communications offense.

Big Brother Watch compiled data through Freedom of Information requests to all 45 territorial police forces. Several forces returned no data or only partial data. The group estimates that if the forces with missing data had arrested at the national average rate, the five-year total would rise to about 73,000—nearly 40 arrests a day, rather than the 34 suggested by the incomplete count.

Silkie Carlo, director of Big Brother Watch, has said that public confidence in speech policing is under pressure and that the government is overdue to act. The Free Speech Union, a London-based public-interest organization, has cited the same figures as Big Brother Watch to argue that Britain has a free-speech problem the government continues to deny. Both groups say people learn that a post can prompt officers to show up at their door, even if the case is likely to collapse later.

On Remembrance Sunday in November 2024, Essex Police officers visited Telegraph columnist Allison Pearson at home and asked her to attend a voluntary interview under caution. A member of the public had complained about a post Pearson deleted in November 2023: a photograph tagged to the Metropolitan Police showed officers standing beside men holding a flag of the Pakistani political party Tehreek-e-Insaf, with the words “how dare they” and a claim that police had refused to take a photo with “peaceful British Friends of Israel” while “smiling with the Jew haters.”

Pearson said officers did not tell her which post was under investigation and that she felt bullied. Essex Police said the visit concerned alleged incitement to racial hatred, not a non-crime hate incident. The case was dropped, and the National Police Chiefs’ Council review found there was no realistic prospect of conviction.

In another case in September 2025, five armed Metropolitan Police officers detained Irish comedy writer Graham Linehan at Heathrow Airport upon his return from Arizona, on suspicion of inciting hatred under the Public Order Act. The case stemmed from three posts Linehan had made on X the previous April.

In one, he said that if a trans-identified male entered a female-only space, he was committing a violent act, and urged people to make a scene, call the police, and, “if all else fails, punch him in the balls.” Another post described an image of a protest as “a photo you can smell.” In a third, he wrote, “I hate them,” referring to “misogynists and homophobes.”

Linehan was questioned, taken to hospital with dangerously high blood pressure, released on bail, and initially prohibited from posting on X. Backed by the Free Speech Union, he sued for wrongful arrest. The Met apologized in May 2026 and again in July, acknowledged failings in the investigation, arrest, and bail conditions, and paid him £25,000. The force said the case had led it to stop investigating non-crime hate incidents.

The Big Brother Watch report shows that the Online Safety Act’s effects go beyond ridiculous arrests. Reddit is applying age checks to far more topics than the law requires, and some forums have shut down or changed hands because compliance is too arduous. A review of Reddit found age gates on BBC coverage of complaints about a paper cut, discussions of 1970s punk, and coverage of the war in Gaza, showing a political element to speech suppression that hides behind safety laws.

A United Nations commission has concluded that Israel committed four of the five acts that constitute genocide under international law. Some platforms still treat the term “genocide” as off-limits, arguing that the claim that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza is a contested legal and political position. But the claim is not, by itself, hate speech or antisemitism. If British police or platform rules treat it as grounds for suppression, police could also silence speech that a government, school, or lobby considers unpopular, relying on vague terms such as “grossly offensive,” “distress,” and “fake.”

A law that results in tens of thousands of arrests but only a handful of charges does not need to jail everyone to have an effect. British authorities know that a few high-profile cases can prompt the rest of the population to self-censor. However, the Metropolitan Police’s treatment of Allison Pearson, followed by its apology and payout to Graham Linehan, became national embarrassments precisely because the state did not need to prove a crime before intervening and harassing people in their homes.


MORE ON THE TOPIC:

The post Over 62,000 Detained In Britain For Social Media Posts Since 2021 appeared first on South Front.

Russia And The Taliban Are Drawing Closer. What's In It For Both Sides?

15 October 2026 at 10:27
Russia is deepening diplomatic and military cooperation with Afghanistan's Taliban rulers, driven by security concerns in Central Asia. But worsening Taliban-Pakistan tensions and questions over the scope of Moscow's assistance are complicating the rapprochement.

Political crisis in Pakistan deepens with dismissal of PTI-led provincial government

13 October 2026 at 22:08

Large-scale protests broke out in different parts of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province on Monday, October 12, after the federal government dismissed its elected government and imposed the centralized Governor’s rule.

The federal government also declared an emergency in 12 out of 40 of KP’s districts, citing a law-and-order situation. The imposition of the emergency under article 232 of Pakistan’s constitution means the suspension of citizen’s fundamental rights.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) which was ruling the KP government, called the dismissal of its government a “direct assault on the democratic mandate of the people.” PTI is currently leading a large march to Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, demanding the release of its jailed leader and former prime minister, Imran Khan,

Several of its leaders and activists protested the federal government’s decision in different parts of the province on Monday and Tuesday, despite the repression unleashed by security forces.

The federal government has deployed the armed forces in large numbers across the province, closed down all the educational institutions and blocked all access routes to the capital Peshawar with shipping containers in order to prevent large protests.

Chief Minister Sohail Afridi was also arrested on Monday, along with several of the elected members of the provincial legislative council, with PTI claiming his whereabouts were unknown.

Afridi, who was leading the march to Islamabad since October 4, had, on Saturday, dared the federal government to dismiss his government, claiming the imposition of federal rule by dismissing “the only truly elected government” in the country would be a brutal repression of popular will.

The PTI has called for large-scale protests against the move in the coming days. It has also filed a petition demanding the revocation of the Governor’s rule and production of its elected members, arrested since Sunday.

“Unpardonable crime“

Reacting to the dismissal of the PTI government, Ammar Ali Jan, leader of the leftwing Haqooq-e-Khalq Party (HKP) called it “one of the darkest chapters” in the country’s history.

“All those responsible, including the PMLN [Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz, the ruling party], PPP [Pakistan Peoples Party, part of the ruling coalition] & the establishment [the Army] have committed an unpardonable crime against our people,” Ali Jan said, asking people to “revolt against this tyranny.”

Several other groups and parties opposed the federal government’s move, calling it an attack on people’s basic rights.

HKP called it a brazen disregard for the will of the people which will further increase the gap between the people and the government “in the midst of unprecedented security, economic and regional challenges” faced by Pakistan.

The left-wing Mazdoor Kisan Party (MKP) and Awami Workers’ Party-Marxist also opposed the move, calling it an example of authoritarianism. The MKP dismissed the justification about the PTI government’s failure to maintain law and order and curb terrorism as just excuses to undermine the popular mandate.

The federal government, led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of the PMLN, has long accused the KP government of failing to secure law and order in the province, citing rising cases of “terrorist attacks.”

It claimed the PTI-led government has “deliberately disengaged with the fight against terrorism” as justification for its dismissal on Sunday.

Pakistan’s Information Minister Attaullah Tarar also claimed on Monday that the move has been welcomed by the people of KP as the PTI government was sympathetic and even supportive to “terrorist” groups.

The dismissal of the PTI government in KP is largely seen as a result of the persistent political tensions between the PTI and the ruling coalition.

The PTI is the largest opposition party in the country’s National Assembly. Khan, despite being in prison for the last three years, still has a large popular following.

Khan and the PTI have maintained that the ruling coalition, in collaboration with the country’s armed forces, conspired and rigged the 2024 elections to deprive them of power after Khan spoke against the latter’s interference in the democratic governance.

The PTI was denied its symbol during the national elections, forcing it to run its candidates as independents, while Khan was disqualified to contest in the elections and denied permissions to campaign. He was put in prison and charged with scores of cases related to corruption, misuse of power, and violence.

Archaeologists Excavate a Nearly 100-Meter Building Opposite Pakistan’s Greek-Style Temple at Taxila — Its Purpose Is Unknown

The building, named Jandial D, turned up during excavations by the Italian Archaeological Mission of Ca’ Foscari University of Venice in Pakistan, part of the Khyber PATH project. Work began in mid-August 2026 and has exposed an imposing structure: almost 100 meters (about 330 feet) long, close to the length of a football field, and […]

Descubren en la antigua Taxila en Pakistán un enorme edificio de 100 metros frente al templo griego de Jandial

El monumento, bautizado Jandial D, ha aparecido en las excavaciones que la Misión Arqueológica Italiana de la Universidad Ca’ Foscari de Venecia realiza en Pakistán, dentro del proyecto Khyber PATH. Los trabajos empezaron a mediados de agosto de 2026 y han dejado a la vista una estructura imponente, con muros que se conservan al menos […]

PTI opposition jailed as Trump embraces Pakistan’s Asim Munir

13 October 2026 at 15:44

As US President Donald Trump deepens his ties with Pakistan’s powerful military chief Asim Munir, the nation’s government has detained the elected leadership of the last province controlled by jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s opposition party – a move critics have condemned as a coup. Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari, declared a state of […]

The post PTI opposition jailed as Trump embraces Pakistan’s Asim Munir appeared first on Asia Times.

From Buffer to Bridge: The Wakhan Corridor and the Return of Russia and China to Eurasia

13 October 2026 at 14:59
As the United States reassesses its global commitments, the opening of Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor creates a new trade artery between China, Central Asia and South Asia — giving Russia and China new openings to reshape the Eurasian order. The Changing Global Balance of Power On 4th October 2026, Afghanistan opened the Wakhan Corridor, which means […]

Pakistan’s Emergency Rule Raises Uncomfortable Questions for Brussels

12 October 2026 at 07:48

The imposition of emergency rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, an opposition-controlled province, raises disturbing questions about the relationship between Pakistan’s civilian government and its powerful military establishment. Is this a legitimate response to terrorism, or another calculated assault on democracy?

There is an old saying in Pakistan that most countries have an army, but in Pakistan the army has a country. It is a cynical observation, certainly, but one that has survived successive governments, constitutional crises and military interventions with remarkable durability.

The latest developments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the northwestern province governed by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, suggest that the observation may be as relevant today as ever.

President Asif Ali Zardari’s decision to impose emergency rule in the province, ostensibly in response to deteriorating security conditions, has prompted an obvious and deeply uncomfortable question: is Pakistan witnessing another military coup, albeit one conducted without tanks surrounding parliament or generals appearing on television to announce the suspension of democracy?

The answer depends largely upon how one defines a coup.

A constitutional manoeuvre with political consequences

Under Pakistan’s constitutional framework, federal authorities possess emergency powers that can, under specified circumstances, override provincial administrations.

Such powers are not inherently illegitimate. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has experienced serious violence involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the federal government has a responsibility to protect citizens against terrorist attacks.

Nevertheless, the timing of the intervention demands scrutiny.

The province represents one of the most significant remaining political strongholds of Imran Khan, whose imprisonment and continuing confrontation with Pakistan’s political establishment have generated considerable unrest.

Suspending an elected provincial administration in these circumstances inevitably raises suspicions that national security has become a convenient instrument for achieving political objectives.

The crucial distinction is between responding to a genuine emergency and exploiting that emergency to neutralise an inconvenient opposition.

Pakistan’s authorities must demonstrate not merely that a security threat exists, but that the removal of elected provincial leadership is necessary and proportionate.

The army that never really left politics

Pakistan’s military has exercised an extraordinary degree of influence over the country’s political development since independence in 1947.

General Ayub Khan seized power in 1958. General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government in 1977. General Pervez Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

These were unmistakable military coups, involving direct intervention against civilian authority.

Yet Pakistan’s experience also demonstrates that generals need not formally assume the presidency to dominate political affairs. The military establishment has long maintained substantial influence over national security, relations with India, Afghanistan policy and, at various moments, the composition and survival of civilian governments.

Under Field Marshal Asim Munir, the relationship between the armed forces and civilian political authority has again attracted intense scrutiny. The central question is therefore not simply whether Pakistan’s generals have seized power. It is whether elected politicians retain sufficient independence to exercise it.

Imran Khan and the price of political defiance

Imran Khan’s political trajectory illustrates the extraordinary volatility of Pakistan’s relationship between civilian leadership and military power.

Once widely regarded as enjoying the establishment’s favour, Khan subsequently became one of its most prominent critics. His removal through a parliamentary no-confidence vote in April 2022 marked the beginning of an increasingly bitter confrontation.

His subsequent imprisonment, the prosecution of PTI figures and restrictions affecting the party’s political activities have fuelled allegations that Pakistan’s democratic institutions are being manipulated to exclude a popular opposition movement.

The authorities reject accusations of politically motivated persecution, while Khan’s supporters insist that his treatment demonstrates the extent to which democratic competition has been compromised.

Against this background, emergency intervention in a PTI-governed province cannot reasonably be viewed in isolation. It forms part of a wider struggle over who ultimately controls Pakistan’s political future.

A coup without the traditional trappings?

The latest emergency is particularly significant because Pakistan’s civilian government and military leadership appear aligned in their criticism of PTI.

According to Reuters reporting on 11 October, the province will be administered by a governor for an initial six months, with troops deployed to support security operations.

Hundreds of activists and three of Khan’s sisters have reportedly been detained ahead of opposition demonstrations.

PTI spokesperson Zulfikar Bukhari has characterised the emergency as a disguised coup. Even Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose party has been involved in mediation efforts, condemned the intervention as an attack on democracy.

Yet evidence that the military directly ordered the takeover remains absent from the public record. Accusations of military involvement should be investigated rather than treated as established fact.

Nevertheless, a coup need not always involve soldiers removing a prime minister. Democratic institutions can also be progressively hollowed out through ostensibly lawful decisions that concentrate authority and deprive opposition parties of meaningful power.

A dangerous precedent for Pakistan

For Pakistan’s international partners, including the European Union, the implications extend beyond an internal constitutional dispute.

Pakistan benefits from preferential access to European markets under the EU’s GSP+ trading arrangement, which is linked to commitments concerning human rights, democratic governance and international conventions. Brussels should therefore be watching developments closely.

If emergency powers become a mechanism for suppressing political opposition rather than protecting public security, the European Commission will face legitimate questions about Pakistan’s adherence to its international obligations.

The immediate crisis may not constitute a conventional military coup. But the more troubling possibility is that Pakistan’s political system is evolving towards a form of government in which elections continue, civilian politicians remain in office, and the military’s influence is sufficiently powerful to determine the boundaries of democracy.

For Imran Khan‘s supporters, that distinction may offer little consolation.

Pakistan’s generals have seized power openly before. The question now is whether they need to do so again.

Geneva side event sharpens focus on Pakistan’s GSP+ status and rights record

No Permanent Allies: Pakistan and the Politics of National Interest

11 October 2026 at 13:59
In a world of shifting alliances, Pakistan must balance strategic partnerships with national interests — and the key question is whether the Makkah Pact will become a tool of strategic autonomy or another form of dependence. In recent years, the world has seen an unprecedented shift in global alliances. According to the realist school of […]

As Russian Arms Exports Slide, Central Asia Shops Elsewhere

11 October 2026 at 08:21
Central Asian nations are increasingly turning to India, China, Turkey, and Europe for military equipment to reduce their dependence on Russia. Analysts note that this diversification offers greater political flexibility but could create long-term logistical and operational challenges.

Deep Debt, Failing Health: Afghans Desperate To Escape Poverty Sell Kidneys To Survive

9 October 2026 at 11:02
As millions of Afghans struggle just to afford food, some have turned to selling one of their last remaining resources: a healthy kidney. The costs can be devastating: One woman said her health has deteriorated since she sold a kidney for a modest sum that failed to clear her family's debts.

Afghan road to China tests Pakistan’s power and leverage

9 October 2026 at 10:27

China is increasingly trying to diversify its connections to the region as Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan create new security and strategic problems for Beijing. The opening of a road through the Wakhan Corridor is an important step in that effort. Afghanistan has formally inaugurated a 121-kilometer road through the corridor, running from Broghil to the […]

The post Afghan road to China tests Pakistan’s power and leverage appeared first on Asia Times.

Pakistan’s Saudi Deployment: A Strategic Gamble with Grave Consequences

9 October 2026 at 09:30
Pakistan’s deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia under the Makkah Pact could deepen domestic political instability, strain its relations with Iran, and undermine its strategic autonomy by drawing Islamabad further into a regional conflict with wider US and Israeli strategic implications. For decades, Israel has been committing genocide and war crimes in Palestine. In the […]

Yemen’s Red Sea Gambit: A New Regional Power Struggle

8 October 2026 at 12:29
Operation Dawn has opened a new chapter in Yemen’s long-running war, bringing the strategically vital Bab al-Mandeb Strait back to the centre of the conflict, as Iran, the United States, Pakistan and Türkiye are increasingly drawn into a wider struggle. On 4th October, Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi said in a televised address, “Today, I announce […]

India’s Central Asia missile sales spark a new Great Game

8 October 2026 at 10:04

A flurry of landmark arms deals is reshaping Central Asia’s strategic landscape, as regional states leverage alternative defense suppliers to assert their sovereignty amid Russia’s waning dominance and an intensifying Sino-Indian rivalry. Indian Defense Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh confirmed the export of India’s domestically developed Akash surface-to-air missile system to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, multiple media […]

The post India’s Central Asia missile sales spark a new Great Game appeared first on Asia Times.

Bit by bit, the Taliban is losing control of Afghanistan

8 October 2026 at 06:46

Five years after seizing Kabul, the Taliban’s strongest argument for international acceptance rests on control. The Taliban governs every provincial capital and faces no conventional army capable of marching on Kabul. It repeatedly cites improved security as proof that Afghanistan’s post-2021 order is settled. But armed resistance is becoming more geographically dispersed, more organizationally diverse […]

The post Bit by bit, the Taliban is losing control of Afghanistan appeared first on Asia Times.

❌